Laperal vs. Republic GR No.

18008, October 30, 1962

FACTS: The petitioner, a bona fide resident of Baguio City, was married with Mr. Enrique R. Santamaria
on March 1939. However, a decree of legal separation was later on issued to the spouses. Aside from
that, she ceased to live with Enrique. During their marriage, she naturally uses Elisea L. Santamaria. She
filed this petition to be permitted to resume in using her maiden name Elisea Laperal. This was opposed
by the City Attorney of Baguio on the ground that it violates Art. 372 of the Civil Code. She was claiming
that continuing to use her married name would give rise to confusion in her finances and the eventual
liquidation of the conjugal assets.
ISSUE: Whether Rule 103 which refers to change of name in general will prevail over the specific
provision of Art. 372 of the Civil Code with regard to married woman legally separated from his husband.
HELD: In legal separation, the married status is unaffected by the separation, there being no severance of
the vinculum. The finding that petitioners continued use of her husband surname may cause undue
confusion in her finances was without basis. It must be considered that the issuance of the decree of legal
separation in 1958, necessitate that the conjugal partnership between her and Enrique had automatically
been dissolved and liquidated. Hence, there could be no more occasion for an eventual liquidation of the
conjugal assets. Furthermore, applying Rule 103 is not a sufficient ground to justify a change of the name
of Elisea for to hold otherwise would be to provide for an easy circumvention of the mandatory provision
of Art. 372. Petition was dismissed.
Van Dorn vs. Romillo 139 SCRA 139
FACTS: Alice Reyes Van Dorn, a Filipino Citizen and private respondent, Richard Upton, a US citizen,
was married in Hong Kong in 1979. They established their residence in the Philippines and had 2
children. They were divorced in Nevada, USA in 1982 and petitioner remarried, this time with Theodore
Van Dorn. A suit against petitioner was filed on June 8, 1983, stating that petitioners business in Ermita
Manila, the Galleon Shop, is a conjugal property with Upton and prayed therein that Alice be ordered to
render an accounting of the business and he be declared as the administrator of the said property.
ISSUE: Whether or not the foreign divorce between the petitioner and private respondent in Nevada is
binding in the Philippines where petitioner is a Filipino citizen.
HELD: Private respondent is no longer the husband of the petitioner. He would have no standing to sue
petitioner to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is estopped by his own representation before the
court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. Furthermore, aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national
law. Petitioner is not bound to her marital obligations to respondent by virtue of her nationality laws. She
should not be discriminated against her own country if the end of justice is to be served.

Van Dorn vs. Romillo 139 SCRA 139

FACTS: Alice Reyes Van Dorn, a Filipino Citizen and private respondent, Richard Upton, a US citizen,
was married in Hong Kong in 1979. They established their residence in the Philippines and had 2
children. They were divorced in Nevada, USA in 1982 and petitioner remarried, this time with Theodore
Van Dorn. A suit against petitioner was filed on June 8, 1983, stating that petitioners business in Ermita
Manila, the Galleon Shop, is a conjugal property with Upton and prayed therein that Alice be ordered to
render an accounting of the business and he be declared as the administrator of the said property.
ISSUE: Whether or not the foreign divorce between the petitioner and private respondent in Nevada is
binding in the Philippines where petitioner is a Filipino citizen.
HELD: Private respondent is no longer the husband of the petitioner. He would have no standing to sue
petitioner to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is estopped by his own representation before the
court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. Furthermore, aliens may obtain divorces

abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national
law. Petitioner is not bound to her marital obligations to respondent by virtue of her nationality laws. She
should not be discriminated against her own country if the end of justice is to be served.

Garcia-Recio vs. Recio

TITLE: Grace J. Garcia-Recio v Rederick A. Recio
CITATION: GR NO. 138322, Oct. 2, 2002 | 366 SCRA 437
FACTS:
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian Citizen, in Malabon, Rizal on
March 1, 1987. They lived as husband and wife in Australia. However, an Australian family court issued
purportedly a decree of divorce, dissolving the marriage of Rederick and Editha on May 18, 1989.
On January 12, 1994, Rederick married Grace J. Garcia where it was solemnized at Our lady of Perpetual
Help Church, Cabanatuan City. Since October 22, 1995, the couple lived separately without prior judicial
dissolution of their marriage. As a matter of fact, while they were still in Australia, their conjugal assets
were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.
Grace filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy on March 3, 1998,
claiming that she learned only in November 1997, Redericks marriage with Editha Samson.
ISSUE: Whether the decree of divorce submitted by Rederick Recio is admissible as evidence to prove
his legal capacity to marry petitioner and absolved him of bigamy.
HELD:
The nullity of Redericks marriage with Editha as shown by the divorce decree issued was valid and
recognized in the Philippines since the respondent is a naturalized Australian. However, there is
absolutely no evidence that proves respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner though the former
presented a divorce decree. The said decree, being a foreign document was inadmissible to court as
evidence primarily because it was not authenticated by the consul/ embassy of the country where it will be
used.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record
of a foreign country by either:
(1) an official publication or
(2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in
the Philippines, such copy must be:
(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the
Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and
(b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
Thus, the Supreme Court remands the case to the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City to receive or
trial evidence that will conclusively prove respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner and thus free him
on the ground of bigamy.

628 SCRA 266 Civil Law Persons and Family Relations Family Code Article 26; Effect of Foreign
Divorce
Remedial Law Evidence Presumptive Evidence Foreign Judgment; Divorce
Civil Procedure Rule 39 Rights of Alien Spouse Divorcee
In November 2000, Gerbert Corpuz became a naturalized Canadian citizen. In January 2005, he married
Daisylyn Sto. Tomas, a Filipina. In April 2005, Gerbert discovered that Daisylyn was having extramarital
affairs. In December 2005, Gerbert filed a petition for divorce in Canada. In January 2006, a Canadian
court issued a divorce decree in favor of Gerbert.
In 2008, Gerbert intended to marry another Filipina here in the Philippines. Gerbert went to the Pasig City
Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyns marriage
certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics Office (NSO)
informed Gerbert that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be
enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court,
pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.
Thus, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage as
dissolved with the RTC. The RTC later denied Gerberts petition. The RTC ruled that under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy of having a
foreign divorce decree be judicially recognized. Since Gerbert is not a Filipino spouse, he cannot avail of
such remedy.
ISSUE: Whether or not only a Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy provided for in the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.
HELD: Yes. Article 26 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except
those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling
the doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse
considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry. The RTC was correct in limiting the
applicability of the provision for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse
can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right
under this provision.
But is Gerbert left with no remedy?
No. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the aliens national law
have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in
favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of
foreign judgments:
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal
of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:
xxx
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is
presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title.
The divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce is
valid according to his or her national law.
So what should Gerbert do in order to have the the foreign divorce be recognized?
File a petition under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court (Cancellation Or Correction Of Entries In The Civil
Registry). And in that petition, he can raise an issue for the recognition of the foreign divorce decree.
At this juncture, the SC ruled that the registration of the divorce decree by the Pasig Civil Registry is
wrong. The Civil Register cannot do that without a court order. Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that
no entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected, without judicial order.
Likewise, in the event that a proper petition for judicial recognition of a foreign divorce decree is filed, say
for example if in this case, the person who filed the petition was Daisylyn, and the same was granted
such judicial recognition alone is not sufficient to cause the cancellation of the entry in the civil registry.
The SC ruled that a separate petition under Rule 108 must still be had.

YASIN V. SHARIA DISTRICT COURT (1995)

EN BANC
(G.R. No. 94986 February 23, 1995)
FACTS:
On May 5, 1990, Hatima C. Yasin filed in the Shari'a District Court in Zamboanga City a "Petition
to resume the use of maiden name. The respondent court ordered amendments to the petition as it was
not sufficient in form and substance in accordance Rule 103, Rules of Court, regarding the residence of
petitioner and the name sought to be adopted is not properly indicated in the title thereof which should
include all the names by which the petitioner has been known. Hatima filed a motion for reconsideration of
the aforesaid order alleging that the petition filed is not covered by Rule 103 of the Rules of Court but is
merely a petition to resume the use of her maiden name and surname after the dissolution of her
marriage by divorce under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, and after marriage of her
former husband to another woman. The respondent court denied the motion since compliance to rule 103
is necessary if the petition is to be granted, as it would result in the resumption of the use of petitioners
maiden name and surname.

ISSUE:
Whether or not in the case of annulment of marriage, or divorce under the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws of the Philippines, and the husband is married again to another woman and the former
desires to resume her maiden name or surname, is she required to file a petition for change of name and
comply with the formal requirements of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.

RULING:
NO. When a woman marries a man, she need not apply and/or seek judicial authority to use her
husband's name by prefixing the word "Mrs." before her husband's full name or by adding her husband's
surname to her maiden first name. The law grants her such right (Art. 370, Civil Code). Similarly, when
the marriage ties or vinculum no longer exists as in the case of death of the husband or divorce as
authorized by the Muslim Code, the widow or divorcee need not seek judicial confirmation of the change
in her civil status in order to revert to her maiden name as the use of her former husband's name is
optional and not obligatory for her. When petitioner married her husband, she did not change her name
but only her civil status. Neither was she required to secure judicial authority to use the surname of her

husband after the marriage, as no law requires it. The use of the husband's surname during the marriage,
after annulment of the marriage and after the death of the husband is permissive and not obligatory
except in case of legal separation.
The court finds the petition to resume the use of maiden name filed by petitioner before the
respondent court a superfluity and unnecessary proceeding since the law requires her to do so as her
former husband is already married to another woman after obtaining a decree of divorce from her in
accordance with Muslim laws.

700 SCRA 69 Civil Law Family Code Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage Who May File
Bigamy
Remedial Law Special Proceedings Rule 108 Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
In January 204, Minoru Fujiki, a Japanese citizen, married Maria Paz Marinay, a Filipino, here in the
Philippines. But in May 2008, Marinay, while her marriage with Fujiki was still subsisting, married another
Japanese citizen (Shinichi Maekara), here in the Philippines. Marinay and Maekara later went to Japan.
In 2010, Fujiki and Marinay reconciled and decided to resurrect their love affair. Fujiki helped Marinay
obtain a Japanese judgment declaring Marinays marriage with Maekara void on the ground of bigamy.
Said decree was granted in the same year. Fujiki and Marinay later went back home to the Philippines
together.
In 2011, Fujiki went to the RTC of Quezon City and filed a petition entitled Judicial Recognition of
Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage). He filed the petition under Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court (Cancellation Or Correction Of Entries In The Civil Registry). Basically, Fujiki wanted
the following to be done:
(1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized;
(2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initio under Articles
35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines; and

(3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court
judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to
the Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office (NSO).
The RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that what Fujiki wanted is to have the marriage between
Marinay and Maekara be declared null (hence a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage); that
under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages, a petition for such may only be filed by the husband or wife or in
this case either Maekara or Marinay only.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC is correct.
HELD: No. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is not applicable here. Whats applicable is Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court. As aptly commented by the Solicitor General:
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is the procedure to record [a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning
the civil status of persons in the civil registry as required by Article 407 of the Civil Code. In other words,
[t]he law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences upon
a persons legal capacity and status x x x. The Japanese Family Court judgment directly bears on the
civil status of a Filipino citizen and should therefore be proven as a fact in a Rule 108 proceeding.
Thus:
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic,
this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a
declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage does not apply if the reason behind the petition is
bigamy.
But how will Fujikis petition in the RTC prosper?
Fujiki needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy
of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24
and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.
Fujiki may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment through
(1) an official publication or

(2) a certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody of the judgment. If the office which has
custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the certification may be made by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and authenticated by the seal of office.

Estrada vs Escritor (August 4, 2003)

Estrada vs. Escritor
AM P-02-1651, August 4, 2003
FACTS:
Soledad Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. Alejandro Estrada, the
complainant, wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, presiding judge of Branch 253, RTC of Las Pinas City,
requesting for an investigation of rumors that Escritor has been living with Luciano Quilapio Jr., a man not
her husband, and had eventually begotten a son. Escritors husband, who had lived with another woman,
died a year before she entered into the judiciary. On the other hand, Quilapio is still legally married to
another woman. Estrada is not related to either Escritor or Quilapio and is not a resident of Las Pinas but
of Bacoor, Cavite. According to the complainant, respondent should not be allowed to remain employed
in the judiciary for it will appear as if the court allows such act.
Escritor is a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovahs Witnesses and the Watch Tower and
Bible Tract Society where her conjugal arrangement with Quilapio is in conformity with their religious
beliefs. After ten years of living together, she executed on July 28, 1991 a Declaration of Pledging
Faithfulness which was approved by the congregation. Such declaration is effective when legal
impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their union. Gregorio, Salazar, a member of the
Jehovahs Witnesses since 1985 and has been a presiding minister since 1991, testified and explained
the import of and procedures for executing the declaration which was completely executed by Escritor
and Quilapios in Atimonan, Quezon and was signed by three witnesses and recorded in Watch Tower
Central Office.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the administrative charge of gross and immoral
conduct and be penalized by the State for such conjugal arrangement.
HELD:
A distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should be kept in mind. The
jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality.
The Court states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for
accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality
could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state
interests.
The states interest is the preservation of the integrity of the judiciary by maintaining among its ranks a
high standard of morality and decency. There is nothing in the OCAs (Office of the Court Administrator)
memorandum to the Court that demonstrates how this interest is so compelling that it should override
respondents plea of religious freedom. Indeed, it is inappropriate for the complainant, a private person,

to present evidence on the compelling interest of the state. The burden of evidence should be discharged
by the proper agency of the government which is the Office of the Solicitor General.
In order to properly settle the case at bar, it is essential that the government be given an opportunity to
demonstrate the compelling state interest it seeks to uphold in opposing the respondents position that her
conjugal arrangement is not immoral and punishable as it is within the scope of free exercise protection.
The Court could not prohibit and punish her conduct where the Free Exercise Clause protects it, since
this would be an unconstitutional encroachment of her right to religious freedom. Furthermore, the court
cannot simply take a passing look at respondents claim of religious freedom but must also apply the
compelling state interest test.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the case is REMANDED to the Office of the Court Administrator. The Solicitor
General is ordered to intervene in the case where it will be given the opportunity (a) to examine the
sincerity and centrality of respondent's claimed religious belief and practice; (b) to present evidence on
the state's "compelling interest" to override respondent's religious belief and practice; and (c) to show that
the means the state adopts in pursuing its interest is the least restrictive to respondent's religious
freedom. The rehearing should be concluded thirty (30) days from the Office of the Court Administrator's
receipt of this Decision.

Estrada vs. Escritor , 492 SCRA 1 ; 22 JUN 2006

FACTS: Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. She has been living with
Quilapio, a man who is not her husband, for more than twenty five yearsand had a son with him as well.
Respondents husband died a year before she entered into the judiciary while Quilapio is still legally
married
to
another
woman.
Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC to investigate respondent. According to
complainant, respondent should not be allowed to remain employed therein for it will appear as if the
court
allows
such
act.
Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is permitted by her religionthe Jehovahs Witnesses
and the Watch Tower and the Bible Trace Society. They allegedly have a Declaration of Pledging
Faithfulness under the approval of their congregation. Such a declaration is effective when legal
impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their union.
ISSUE: Whether or Not the State could penalize respondent for such conjugal arrangement.
RULING: No. The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her right tofreedom of
religion. The free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the fundamental rights in our
Constitution. As Jefferson put it, it is the most inalienable and sacred of human rights. The States interest
in enforcing its prohibition cannot be merely abstract or symbolic in order to be sufficiently compelling to
outweigh a free exercise claim. In the case at bar, the State has not evinced any concrete interest in
enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges against respondent or her partner. Thus the States interest
only amounts to the symbolic preservation of an unenforced prohibition.
Furthermore, a distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should be kept in
mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality.
The Court further states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room
for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent
neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend

compelling state interests. Assuming arguendo that the OSG has proved a compelling state interest, it
has to further demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive means possible so that the free
exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the state. Thus the
conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for it constitutes an exemption to the law based on her right
to freedom of religion.

Narag vs. Narag, 291 SCRA 451

25JUL
FACTS:
Atty. Dominador Narag was alleged to have abandoned his family for his paramour who was once his
student in tertiary level. The administrative complaint of disbarment was filed by her wife, Mrs. Julieta
Narag. Respondent filed motion to dismiss because allegedly the complainant fabricated the story as well
as the love letters while under extreme emotional confusion arising from jealousy. The case took an
unexpected turn when another complaint was filed, the wife as again the complainant but now together
with their seven children as co-signatories. After several hearings, the facts became clear, that the
respondent indeed abandoned his family as against morals, based on testimonial evidences. In addition,
the assailed relationship bore two children.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of gross immorality and for having violated and the Code of Ethics for
Lawyers culpable for disbarment.
HELD:
YES. Respondent disbarred.
RATIO:
The complainant was able to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that the respondent breached
the high and exacting moral standards set for the members of the law profession.
Good moral character is not only a condition precedent to the practice of law, but
a continuing qualification for all members of the bar.
CANON 7 A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and
support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
Undoubtedly, the canons of law practice were violated.
Goitia vs Campos-Rueda
Goitia vs. Campos-Rueda
35 Phil 252
FACTS:
Luisa Goitia y de la Camara, petitioner, and Jose Campos y Rueda, respondent, were married on January
7, 1915 and had a residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino Manila. They stayed together for a month before
petitioner returned to her parents home. Goitia filed a complaint against respondent for support outside
the conjugal home. It was alleged that respondent demanded her to perform unchaste and lascivious
acts on his genital organs. Petitioner refused to perform such acts and demanded her husband other
than the legal and valid cohabitation. Since Goitia kept on refusing, respondent maltreated her by word
and deed, inflicting injuries upon her lops, face and different body parts. The trial court ruled in favor of
respondent and stated that Goitia could not compel her husband to support her except in the conjugal
home unless it is by virtue of a judicial decree granting her separation or divorce from respondent. Goitia
filed motion for review.
ISSUE: Whether or not Goitia can compel her husband to support her outside the conjugal home.
HELD:
The obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife is created merely in the act of marriage. The
law provides that the husband, who is obliged to support the wife, may fulfill the obligation either by
paying her a fixed pension or by maintaining her in his own home at his option. However, this option
given by law is not absolute. The law will not permit the husband to evade or terminate his obligation to
support his wife if the wife is driven away from the conjugal home because of his wrongful acts. In the
case at bar, the wife was forced to leave the conjugal abode because of the lewd designs and physical
assault of the husband, she can therefore claim support from the husband for separate maintenance even
outside the conjugal home.

PEREZ VS. COURT OF APPEALS

255 SCRA 661

FACTS:
1. Private respondent Ray Perez is a doctor of medicine practicing in Cebu while petitioner Nerissa, his
wife is a registered nurse.
2. They were married on December 6, 1986.
3. After six miscarriages, two operations and a high-risk pregnancy, petitioner finally gave birth to Ray II in
NY on July 20, 1992.
4. Petitioner who began work in the US in October 1988, used part of her earnings to build a modes
house in Mandaue City, Cebu.
5. She also sought medical attention for her successive miscarriages in New York.
6. In February 1992, petitioner became a resident alien.

7. Private respondent stayed with her in the US twice and took care of her when she became pregnant.
8. Unlike his wife, however, he had only a tourist visa and was not employed.
9. In January 1993, the couple and their baby arrived in Cebu.
10. After a few weeks, only Nerissa returned to the US.
11. When Nerissa came home a few days before Ray IIs first birthday, the couple was no longer on good
terms.
12. Petitioner did not want to live near her in-laws and rely solely on her husbands meager income of P
5,000.00.
13. She longed to be with her only child but her husband was keeping him away from her.
14. On the other hand, Ray wanted to stay here , where he could raise his son even as he practiced his
profession.
15. Petitioner was forced to move to her parents home in Mandaue.
16. Nerissa filed a petition for Habeas Corpus asking respondent to surrender the custody of their son to
her.
17. The court a quo issued an Order awarding custody of the one year old child to his mother, citing
paragraph 2, of Art. 213 of the Family Code which provides that no child under seven years of age shall
be separated from the mother, unless the Court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.
18. On appeal, the CA reversed the trial courts order and awarded custody of the boy to his father.
Holding that granting custody to the boys father would be for the childs best interest and welfare.
ISSUE:
As between father and mother, who should have rightful custody of a child who bears in his person both
their genes?
HELD:
When the parents of the child are separated, Article 213 of the Family Code is the applicable law.
Since the Code does not qualify the word separation to mean legal separation decreed by a court,
couples who are separated in fact, such *** petitioner and private respondent, are covered within its
terms.
The Revised Rules of Court also contains a similar provision . Rule 99, Section 6 (Adoption and Custody
of Minors). The provisions of law *** mandate that a child under 7 years of age shall not be separated
from his mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. The use of the word shall
in Article 213 of the Family Code and Rule 99, Section 6 of the Revised Rules of Court connotes a
mandatory character.
The general rule that a child under 7 years of age shall not be separated from his mother finds its raison
d' etre in the basic need of a child for his mothers loving care. Only the most compelling reasons shall
justify the courts awarding the custody of such a child to someone other than his mother, such as her
unfitness to exercise sole parental authority. In the past the following grounds have been considered
ample justification to deprive a mother of custody and parental authority: neglect, abandonment,
unemployment and immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction , maltreatment of the child, insanity
and being sick with a communicable disease.
It has long been settled that in custody cases, the foremost consideration is always the welfare and best
interest of the child.

ART. 72 (FC).

When one of the spouses neglects his or her duties to the conjugal union or commits acts which tend to
bring danger, dishonor or injury to the other or to
the family, the aggrieved party may apply to the court for relief. (116a)
CASE:
DADIVAS DE VILLANUEVA VS. VILLANUEVA. 54 Phil. 92. GR No. L-29959. December 3,1929
PLAINTIFF:
Aurelia Dadivas de Villanueva (Wife)
DEFENDANT:
Rafael Villanueva (Husband)
NATURE OF THE CASE:
The case at bar is an
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of FirstInstance of Manila.
Plaintiff filed a case against the Defendant on May 27, 1927 for the purposeof obtaining separate
maintenance and custody of two younger minor children. As
well as a proper allowance for professional legal services rendered by the Plaintiffs
attorney.Upon hearing the cause the trial court absolved the defendant from thecomplaint and abrogated
a prior order of the court for maintenance pendent lite,with costs against the plaintiff. From this judgment,
the plaintiff appealed.
FACTS:
1.
July 16, 1905- Plaintiff and Defendant were married.
2.
Manila- place of marriage and residence of the couple.
3.
Children: Antonio- 18 yrs.Guillermo- 10 yrs., minorSergio- 9 yrs., minor
4.
Infidelity and cruelty- grounds on which separate maintenance is sought

5.
Proof of infidelity-ten years prior to the institution of the action, the defendant was guiltyof repeated acts of
infidelity with four different women.6.
Incorrigible nature of the defendant in relations with other women andbrutality towards the plaintiff caused
the plaintiff to establish a separateabode for herself and two minor children.7.
April 20, 1927-occurrence of final separation of wife (plaintiff) and husband (defendant).-the month before
the plaintiff filed an appeal to obtain separatemaintenance.8.
Proof to the charge of cruelty-does not establish a case for separate maintenance-unproved
and insufficient9.
Repeated acts of conjugal infidelity (by the husband/defendant)-proved-recurrent-gives wife (plaintiff) an
undeniable right to relief
ISSUE:
Whether the wife has an undeniable right to relief
HELD:

The decision/judgment of the lower court was reversed in favor of thewife/plaintiff and against the
husband/defendant. It was ordered that the plaintiff
have and recover of the defendant the sum of Php. 2,000 for attorneys fees, Php.
720 for expenses of procuring transcript and Php. 500 per month, beginning April 1,1928.The defendant
was ordered to pay the plaintiff by way of maintenance on orbefore the 10
th
day of each month, the sum of Php. 500.
RATIONALE:
In order to entitle a wife to maintain a separate home and to require separatemaintenance from her
husband, it is not necessary that the husband should bring aconcubine into the marital domicile.
Repeated illicit relations with women outside of the marital establishment are enough. The law is not so
unreasonable as to require awife to live in marital relations with a husband whose propensity towards
otherwomen makes common habitation with him unbearable.
CASE:
GARCIA VS. SANTIAGO AND SANTIAGO. 53 Phil. 952. GR No. L-28904. December 29,1928
PLAINTIFF:
Cipriana Garcia
DEFENDANT:
Isabelo Santiago and Alejo Santiago
NATURE OF THE CASE:
The case at bar is an
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of FirstInstance of Nueva Ecija.
This is an appeal by the plaintiff from a judgment of the Court of FirstInstance of Nueva Ecija dismissing
the complaint.
FACTS:
1.
April 8, 1910- alleged date of marriage between the plaintiff, CiprianaGarcia and the defendant, Isabelo
Santiago.2.
February 3, 1925- the date when the plaintiff was compelled to leave herconjugal dwelling due to
continued family dissensions.3.
Alejo Santiago (Defendant No. 2)-Son of Isabelo Santiago (Defendant No. 1)-allegedly seduced Prisca
Aurelio4.
Prisca Aurelio

daughter of Cipriana Garcia (the Plaintiff)gave birth to a child that was allegedly Alejo Santiagos
child5.
Isabelo Santiago

-failed to see the vindication of

the honor of Prisca Aurelio, the plaintiffs
daughter by requiring his son to marry her.- refused to get involved with the matter, thus seemingly
countenancing
the illicit relations between his son and the plaintiffs daughter
-has allegedly conveyed/been conveying their conjugal properties to Alejoto
foster latters whims & caprices and thus, damaging & prejudicing her

rights. Some of these properties include lands acquired during the

plaintiffs and the defendants
marriage with money belonging to theconjugal partnership.-publicly maintained illicit relationship
with Geronima Yap6.
February 3, 1925-separation of the plaintiff and defendant.-the separation was necessary to
avoid personal violence7.
Isabelo Santiago-continually refused to
provide for the plaintiffs support
8.
Cipriana Garcia (the plaintiff)-could not live in their conjugal dwelling because of the illicit
relationshipbetween her daughter, Prisca Aurelio and Alejo Santiago, countenanced bythe other
defendant, Isabelo Santiago.-demanded that she is entitled to P500.00 pendente lite monthly pensionfrom
conjugal partnership-claimed that her husband, Isabelo Santiago (Defendant No. 1) has shownhimself
unfit to administer the property of conjugal partnership and thecourt should therefore order its
administration to be placed in her hands.
ISSUE/RATIONALE:
1. Whether their separation is unjustifiedNO. They were having a stormy life prior to the separation due to
thefrequent fights.Isabelo ordered her to leave the house & threatened to ill-treat her if she returned.
Priscas situation is embarrassing for her mother.
Highly possible that Alejo caused
Priscas pregnancy. Compelling them to
cohabit could lead to further quarrels.2. Whether transfers of property from Isabelo to Alejo are illegal
NO. Failed to prove that property was community property. Documentaryevidence even show that it was
acquired by Isabelo before their marriage.3.Whether Cipriana is entitled to P500.00 monthly maintenance
NO. Thats too much. P50.00
would be enough.4. Whether Isabelo is unfit to administer their conjugal propertyNO. No sufficient reason
found to deprive him of this right.5. Whether
Cipriana is entitled to an allowance of attorneys fees
NO.
HELD:
That the judgment appealed from is therefore modified. Separation is allowed.Isabelo is ordered to
provide
Cipriana with a P50.00 monthly allowance to be paidwithin the first 10 days of the
month. No costs allowed.
Atilano v. Chua Ching Beng, 103 Phil. 255 March 29, 1958
FACTS:Chua Ching Beng and Pilar Atilano were married on May 1951 in Zamboanga City. Aftertheir
marriage, they went to Manila and live with Chua's parents. In October 1951, the couple wentto
Zamboanga to visit Pilar s parents. Chua returned to Manila with the understanding that Pilarwould
follow him, but she did not.In 1953, Pilar filed a complaint for support against Chua alleging that they have
been livingseparately for two years due to constant fights and Chua's inability to provide a home
forthemselves apart from his parents.Chua stated that he was willing to support his wife but only if she
lives in Manila with him. He wasalso willing to establish a conjugal dwelling separate from his
parents.Meanwhile, Pilar filed a petition for alimony pendente lite. Based on a stipulation of facts
agreedupon by the parties, the court rendered judgment granting the Pilar s allowance after finding
thatthe latter's refusal to return was caused by her aversion to stay with the parents of Chua after shehad
experienced some previous in-law troubles.Chua filed a petition electing to fulfill his obligation as thus

fixed by the court by receiving andmaintaining Pilar at his residence in Pasay, which was, apart, from that
of his parents and that ifthe Pilar refuses, he will not be compelled to remit allowance to her in
Zamboanga.His petition was denied, thus this case.
ISSUE:WON Pilar is entitled to support when she refused to live with Chua

HELD:The court found that while the wife strongly wanted to be separated from the husband, thehusband
was open to fix the problem, acknowledging his obligation to support her and evenexpressing his
willingness to abide by her wishes to have a conjugal dwelling apart from hisparents, although this might
be financially taxing for him to sustain. The defendant acknowledgesthat the Art. 111, CC imposes on the
husband the responsibility of maintaining and supporting hiswide and family but he insists that under Art.
209, CC he is given the option to fulfill said dutyeither by paying the allowance as fixed by the Court or by
receiving and maintaining the personentitled thereto in his house. He has thus elected to perform his
obligation by the second meansallowed by the law. The law affords moral and legal obstacle as aground
to compel husband toprovide separate maintenance for the wife. However, misunderstanding with in-laws
is not a validmoral and legal obstacle. Art. 110 does not preclude the husband from fixing the
conjugalresidence at the patriarchal home, nor is it against any recognized norm of morality. Although the
husband and the wife are, obliged to live together, observe mutual respectand fidelity and render mutual
help and assistance (Art. 109), and that the wife is entitled to besupported, our laws contain no provision
compelling the wife to live with her husband where evenwithout legal justification she establishes her
residence apart from that provided for by theformer, yet and in such event We would see no plausible
reason why she should be allowed anysupport from the husband.Judgment was modified. Chua was
given the option of supporting his wife at their conjugaldwelling apart from the home of his parents, and
should Pilar refuse to abide by the terms, thenChua would be relieved from the obligation of giving any
support.

PELAYO VS LAURON, 12 PHIL 453

FACTS:
Petitioner Pelayo, a physician, rendered a medical assistance during the child delivery of the
daughter-in-law of the defendants. The just and equitable value of services rendered by him was P500.00
which the defendants refused to pay without alleging any good reason. With this, the plaintiff prayed that
the judgment be entered in his favor as against the defendants for the sum of P500.00 and costs.
The defendants denied all of the allegation of the plaintiff, contending that their daughter-in-law
had died in consequence of the child-birth, and that when she was alive, she lived with her husband

independently and in a separate house, that on the day she gave birth she was in the house of the
defendants and her stay there was accidental and due to fortuitous circumstances.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendants are obliged to pay the petitioner for the medical assistance
rendered to their daughter-in-law.
HELD:
According to Article 1089 of the Old Civil Code (now 1157), obligations are created by law, by
contracts, by quasi-contracts, by illicit acts and omissions or by those which any kind of fault or
negligence occurs. Obligations arising from law are not presumed. Those expressly determined in the
Code or in special law, etc., are the only demandable ones.
The rendering of medical assistance in case of illness is comprised among the mutual
obligations to which the spouses are bound by way of mutual support as provided by the law or the Code.
Consequently, the obligation to pay the plaintiff for the medical assistance rendered to the defendants
daughter-in-law must be couched on the husband.
In the case at bar, the obligation of the husband to furnish his wife in the indispensable services
of a physician at such critical moments is especially established by the law and the compliance therewith
is unavoidable.

Tolentino v CA (1988)
Tolentino v CA (1988)
Private respondent Consuelo David married Arturo Tolentino in 1931. The marriage was dissolved and
terminated in 1943 pursuant to the law during the Japanese occupation by a decree of absolute divorce
on the grounds of desertion and abandonment by the wife for at least 3 continuous years.
Arturo Tolentino then married Pilar Adorable but she died soon after the marriage. After
that, Constancia married Arturo Tolentino on April 21, 1945 and they had 3 children. Constancia Tolentino
is the present legal wife of Arturo Tolentino.

Consuelo David continued using the surname Tolentino after the divorce and up to the time that the
complaint was filed. Her usage of the surname Tolentino was authorized by the family of Arturo Tolentino
(brothers and sisters).
In RTC, Consuelo David should discontinue her usage of the surname of Tolentino. The CA
decision reversed that of the RTCs.
ISSUES:
1. WON the petitioners cause of action has already prescribed
2. WON the petitioner can exclude by injunction Consuelo David from using the surname of her former
husband from whom she was divorced.
HELD:
1. Yes
In Art 1150 CC The time for prescription of all kinds of actions, when there in no special provision which
ordains otherwise, shall be counted from the day they may be brought.
Art 1149 CC Period of prescription is 5 years from the right of action accrues.
The action has long prescribed because she married Arturo Tolentino on April 21, 1945; Civil Code took
effect on August 30, 1950; She acquired knowledge that Consuelo David was still using the surname
Tolentino in 1951.
She should have filed the case after she obtained knowledge that Consuelo David was still using the
surname Tolentino. The case was filed on November 23, 1971 or 20 years after she obtained knowledge.
2. No
Philippine law is silent whether or not a divorced woman may continue to use the surname of her husband
because there are no provisions for divorce under Philippine law.
On the Commentary of Tolentino as regards Art 370 of the CC. The wife cannot claim an exclusive right to
use the husbands surname. She cannot be prevented from using it, but neither can she restrain others
from using it.
Art 371 is not applicable because it contemplates annulment while the present case refers to absolute
divorce where there is severance of valid marriage ties. Effect of divorce was more akin to death of the
spouse where the deceased woman is continued to be referred to as Mrs. of the husband even if he has
remarried.
If the appeal would be granted the respondent would encounter problems because she was able to prove
that she entered into contracts with third persons, acquired properties and entered into other legal
relations using the surname Tolentino. Petitioner failed to show the she would suffer any legal injury or
deprivation of right.
There was no usurpation of the petitioners name and surname. Usurpation implies injury to the interests
of the owner of the name. It consists with the possibility of confusion of identity. The elements of
usurpation were 1. Actual use of anothers name, 2. Use is unauthorized, 3. Use of anothers name is to
designate personality or identity of a person. None of these elements were present in the case because
public knowledge referred to Constancia as the legal wife of Arturo, and Consuelo did represent herself
after the divorce as Mrs. Arturo Tolentino.
Silva v Peralta was cited by the petitioner but the case is not applicable. In Silva, it was not mere use of
the surname that was enjoined but the defendants representation that she was the wife of Saturnino
Silva, there was usurpation of the status of the wife.

Remo vs. Secretary of Foreign Affairs G.R. 169202; 5 March 2010 Facts: Maria Virginia V. Remo (Remo)
is a Filipino citizen, married to Francisco R. Rallonza. Her Philippine passport, which was to expire on 27
October 2000, showed Rallonza as her surname, Maria Virginia as her given name, and Remo as
her middle name. While her marriage was still subsisting, she applied for the renewal of her passport with
the Department of Foreign Affairs office in Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A., with a request to revert to her maiden
name and surname in the replacement passport. When her request was denied, she made a similar
request to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. The Secretary of Foreign Affairs denied the request, holding
that while it is not obligatory for a married woman to use her husbands name, she could use her maiden
name in her passport application only if she had not used her married name in her previous application.
The Secretary explained that under the implementing rules of Republic Act No. 8239 or the Philippine
Passport Act of 1996, a woman applicant may revert to her maiden name only in cases of annulment of
marriage, divorce, and death of the husband. Remo brought the case to the Office of the President which
affirmed the Secretarys ruling. Remo filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals which denied
the petition. When her motion for reconsideration was denied, Remo filed a petition for review before the
Supreme Court. Remo argued that RA 8239 conflicted with and was an implied repeal of Article 370 of the
Civil Code which allows the wife to continue using her maiden name upon marriage, as settled in the case
of Yasin vs. Honorable Judge Sharia District Court [311 Phil. 696, 707 (1995)]. Issue: Whether or not
Remo, who originally used her husbands surname in her expired passport, can revert to the use of her
maiden name in the replacement passport, despite the subsistence of her marriage. Ruling: The petition
was denied. Remo cannot use her maiden name in the replacement passport while her marriage subsists.
No conflict between Civil Code and RA 8239 Indeed, under Article 370 of the Civil Code and as settled in
the case of Yasin vs. Honorable Judge Sharia District Court (supra), a married woman has an option, but
not an obligation, to use her husbands surname upon marriage. She is not prohibited from continuously
using her maiden name because when a woman marries, she does not change her name but only her
civil status. RA 8239 does not conflict with this principle. RA 8239, including its implementing rules and
regulations, does not prohibit a married woman from using her maiden name in her passport. In fact, in
recognition of this right, the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) allows a married woman who applies for
a passport for the first time to use her maiden name. Such an applicant is not required to adopt her
husbands surname. In the case of renewal of passport, a married woman may either adopt her
husbands surname or continuously use her maiden name. If she chooses to adopt her husbands
surname in her new passport, the DFA additionally requires the submission of an authenticated copy of
the marriage certificate. Otherwise, if she prefers to continue using her maiden name, she may still do so.
The DFA will not prohibit her from continuously using her maiden name. However, once a married woman
opted to adopt her husbands surname in her passport, she may not revert to the use of her maiden
name, except in the following cases enumerated in Section 5(d) of RA 8239: (1) death of husband, (2)
divorce, (3) annulment, or (4) nullity of marriage. Since Remos marriage to her husband subsists, she
may not resume her maiden name in the replacement passport. Otherwise stated, a married womans
reversion to the use of her maiden name must be based only on the severance of the marriage. Yasin
case not in point Yasin is not squarely in point with this case. Unlike in Yasin, which involved a Muslim
divorcee whose former husband is already married to another woman, Remos marriage remains
subsisting. Also, Yasin did not involve a request to resume ones maiden name in a replacement passport,
but a petition to resume ones maiden name in view of the dissolution of ones marriage. Special law

prevails over general law Even assuming RA 8239 conflicts with the Civil Code, the provisions of RA 8239
which is a special law specifically dealing with passport issuance must prevail over the provisions of Title
XIII of the Civil Code which is the general law on the use of surnames. A basic tenet in statutory
construction is that a special law prevails over a general law. Implied repeals are disfavored Remos
theory of implied repeal must fail. Well-entrenched is the rule that an implied repeal is disfavored. The
apparently conflicting provisions of a law or two laws should be harmonized as much as possible, so that
each shall be effective. For a law to operate to repeal another law, the two laws must actually be
inconsistent. The former must be so repugnant as to be irreconcilable with the latter act. This, Remo
failed to establish. State is mandated to protect integrity of passport Remo consciously chose to use her
husbands surname in her previous passport application. If her present request would be allowed, nothing
prevents her in the future from requesting to revert to the use of her husbands surname. Such unjustified
changes in one's name and identity in a passport, which is considered superior to all other official
documents, cannot be countenanced. Otherwise, undue confusion and inconsistency in the records of
passport holders will arise. The acquisition of a Philippine passport is a privilege. The law recognizes the
passport applicants constitutional right to travel. However, the State is also mandated to protect and
maintain the integrity and credibility of the passport and travel documents proceeding from it as a
Philippine passport remains at all times the property of the Government. The holder is merely a possessor
of the passport as long as it is valid. Ponente: J. Antonio T. Carpio Vote: 5-0

Arroyo v Vasquez (1921)

ARROYO v VASQUEZ (1921)
FACTS:
Plaintiff Mariano and defendant Dolores were married in 1910, and lived in Iloilo City. They lived together
with a few shortintervals of separation. On July 4, 1920, defendant Dolores went away from
their common home and decided to live separately from plaintiff. She claimed that she was compelled to
leave on the basis of cruel treatment on the part of her husband. She in turn prayed for a decree of
separation, a liquidation of their conjugal partnership, and an allowance for counsel fees and permanent
separate maintenance.
CFI ruled in favor of the defendant and she was granted alimony amounting to P400, also other fees
Plaintiff then asked for a restitution of conjugal rights, and a permanent mandatory injunction requiring the
defendant to return to the conjugal home and live with him as his wife.
ISSUES:
1. WON defendant had sufficient cause for leaving the conjugal home
2. WON plaintiff may be granted the restitution of conjugal rights or absolute order or permanent
mandatory injunction
HELD:
1. The wife had sufficient cause for leaving the conjugal home. Cruelty done by plaintiff to defendant
was greatlyexaggerated. The wife was inflicted with a disposition of jealousy towards her husband in an
aggravated degree. No sufficient cause was present.

Courts should move with caution in enforcing the duty to provide for the separate maintenance of the wife
since this recognizes the de facto separation of the two parties. Continued cohabitation of the pair must
be seen as impossible, and separation must be necessary, stemming from the fault of the husband. She
is under obligation to return to the domicile.
When people understand that they must live togetherthey learn to soften by
mutual accommodation that yoke which they know they cannot shake off; they become good husbands
and wivesnecessity is a powerful master in teaching the duties which it imposes (Evans v. Evans)
2. On granting the restitution of conjugal rights. It is not within the province of the courts to compel one of
the spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. In the case of property rights, such
an action may be maintained. Said order, at best, would have no other purpose than to compel the
spouses to live together. Other countries, such as England and Scotland have done this with much
criticism.
Plaintiff is entitled to a judicial declaration that the defendant absented herself without sufficient cause and
it is her duty to return. She is also not entitled to support.