Professional Documents
Culture Documents
civiliansinthewakeoftheBostonMarathonbombing.Whilepreventingfutureattacks
shouldbealeadingpriorityforgovernmentatalllevels,officialsmusttakecarenotto
focusonlyonthethreatofterroristattacks.Doingsocoulddiminishtheresources,
preparation,andskillsneededformanagementofotherdisasters,andthereforeresultin
greaterrisktothepopulation.
Psychology of terrorism
Themajorcharacteristicofcontemporaryterrorismisitsunexpectedness.Thetimeand
mannerofattacksareunpredictableandcatchtargetedcommunitiesnormallyinnocent
civiliansbysurprise.Inthepast,targetsofwereoftenpoliticalandsymbolicfigures,
notthegeneralpublic,andtheperpetratorsproudlynotifiedwhotheywereandwhythey
hadacted.Thepurposesandtargetsofcontemporaryterrorism,ontheotherhand,are
oftenveryunclear.Terroristsattackinnocentciviliansindiscriminatelywithoutprior
notification,makingattacksmoredifficulttoprevent.
Eventhoughthephysicaldamagefromterrorattacksisnormallysmallerthanthatfrom
largenaturaldisasters,thepsychologicaldamageofsuchterrorattacksissignificant.
EarlyresearchperformedbyPaulSlovicandothersin1980sdelvedintothisconceptof
psychologicaldamage.Usingpsychometricmethodologies,theydefinedseveral
importantcharacteristicsofmanydifferentformsofrisk.Atthattime,inthewakeofthe
ThreeMileIsland(TMI)nuclearpowerplantaccidentin1979,theirmainresearchtarget
wasnuclearpowerplants.Slovicunderlinedtheimportanceofpsychologicaleffectsof
riskstatingthatdespitethefactthatnotasinglepersondied(intheTMIaccident),
nootheraccidentinourhistoryhasproducedsuchcostlysocietal
impacts.[1]Reminiscentoftodaysterrorattacks,theyconcludedthatthenuclearriskis
unknown,dread,uncontrollable,involuntary,andlikelytoaffectfuturegenerations,soit
hasaverycriticalimpactonthemindsofthegeneralpublic.Contemporaryterrorism
sharesmanyofthesecharacteristics:itisusuallyunknown,frightening,uncontrollable,
involuntary,andalsoindiscriminatelyfataltoevenchildren(futuregenerations).Itsurely
hassignificantpsychologicaleffectsonpeoplesminds.
Terrorism and media
Forthenewsmedia,terrorismisaverystrongproductwhicheasilyattractsalotof
viewers.Mostmediaaggressivelyselltheproduct,terrorism,andhelpsowfearaspeople
enthusiasticallyconsumetheproduct.Inaseminalworkonthesocialamplificationof
risk,RogerKaspersonandcolleagues[2]describedhowthepublicperceptionofrisk
interactswithsocialandculturalsystems(suchasthemedia)andcanbeamplifiedduring
theinformationdeliveryprocess,sometimesresultingininstitutionalizedfear.This
amplificationprocesscaneventuallygeneratecertainpublicbehaviors,somenegative
andsomepositive,andmayresultindisruptionsinsociety.Obviously,somerisksare
morelikelytobeamplifiedthanothers.Terrorism,becauseofitsspecialcharacteristics,
iseasilyamplified.Also,todayssocialnetworkcommunicationtechnologies,suchas
FacebookandTwitter,canaccelerateandstrengthentheamplificationprocess.
Thus,themediafocusandpublicconcernscreatepoliticalpressure,andnational
emergencymanagementpolicymakersprioritizecounterterrorism,orcivildefense,
overotherformsofriskmanagement,suchascivilprotectionagainstallhazards
includingnaturaldisasters.
Civil defense again?
Culturallyandhistorically,civildefenseisquitedifferentfromcivilprotection.Civil
defense,bornoutofwartimeeffortstoorganizeairraidprecautions,sheltering
arrangementsandalarmsfornoncombatants,hasmilitaryoriginsandfocuseson
protectionagainstforeignmilitaryattacks.[3]Civilprotection,ontheotherhand,has
disasteroriginsandfocusesonmanyformsofnaturalandmanmadedisastersandother
publicsafetyissues.IntheColdWarera,civildefenseagainstnuclearattackwasthe
mainobjectiveofnationalemergencymanagementintheUnitedStates.Atthattime,
nuclearattackwasaninstitutionalizedfearmadebymediaandgovernmentauthorities.
ManyAmericanhomesandpublicbuildingspreparednuclearfalloutshelters,illustrating
thisfearveryclearly.
FollowingtheendofColdWarandrecognitionoftheincreasingtrendoflargeman
madeandnaturaldisasters,civilprotectiongraduallyreplacedthetermcivildefense
inmostcountries.Civilprotectionfocusesmoreongenericdisastersthanonthearmed
aggression,andadministrativelyitismoredecentralizedthancivildefense.IntheUnited
States,theFederalEmergencyManagementAgency(FEMA)wasestablishedin1979.It
wasmainlyacivildefenseorganizationduringtheColdWar,butinthelasttwodecades
hasworkedtoredirectsomeresourcestowardthemanagementofvariousdisasters(civil
protection).JamesWitt,directorofFEMAunderPresidentClinton,clarifiedthischange
ofdirection.AstheFEMAwebsiteexplains,theendoftheColdWaralsoallowedWitt
toredirectmoreofFEMAslimitedresourcesfromcivildefenseintodisasterrelief,
recoveryandmitigationprograms.[4]FEMAalsointroducedanallhazards
approach,recognizingthemanydifferentkindsofdisastersthatmayrequiremitigation,
preparedness,response,andrecovery.
TheSeptember11,2001terrorattackdramaticallychangedthedirectionofemergency
managementintheUnitedStates.Aftertheattack,theUnitedStateshastilyconstructed
theDepartmentofHomelandSecurityanddowngradedFEMA,whosemaindutywas
civilprotection.Thisattractedcriticismfromsomepublicadministrationexpertsthatthe
U.S.governmentconcentratedtoomuchonterrorism,perhapsbecauseofthesocial
amplificationoftheriskinthewakeoftheattack,despitethemanyothercriticalrisks
facingU.S.citizens.Basically,thecriticscharged,theUnitedStateschangedthe
directionofitsemergencymanagementfromcivilprotectionbacktoColdWarstylecivil
defense.
ThecostofthatshiftinprioritieswasonfulldisplaywhenHurricaneKatrinastruckNew
Orleansin2005,easilydestroyingtheweakleveesystemandsubmergingmuchofNew
Orleansunderwater.Federalandlocalgovernmentsmitigation,responseandrecovery
totheHurricaneKatrinaweremostlyinadequateresultinginthemostseveredisaster
damageinU.S.historyatthattime.Duetobudgetcuts,theArmyCorpsofEngineershad
beenunabletostrengthentheleveesystemprotectingNewOrleans.Aftertheflooding
andotherdamageoccurred,thegovernmentsdisastersituationawarenesswaspoor.
Communicationamongauthoritiesandbetweenauthoritiesandcivilianswasbroken.
Assistancefromthefederalgovernmentwasdelayedandinsufficient,andpeopledied
whileawaitingrescueorotherassistance.Criticsalsochargedthattoomanygovernment
officialswerenotfamiliarwiththeNationalResponsePlanwhichwasimplementedin
December2004after9/11terroristattack.Planningandtrainingforlargenatural
disasterswereinsufficientaftertheimplementationoftheplan.Inshort,toogreatafocus
oncounterterrorismunderminedcapacitiesfornaturaldisastermitigation,response,and
recoveryinthepost9/11UnitedStates.
ThisnotonlythecaseintheUnitedStates,however.TheUnitedKingdomexperienceda
similartransitionafterthe7/7Londonbombingsin2005,inwhichsuicideattacksbyfour
homegrownterroristskilled55civilians.Inresponse,theU.K.governmentintroduced
severalmeasuressuchasthePreventionofTerrorismBill.Criticssaidthatsome
responsestotheattackswereantiliberal,militarizing,andcentralizing,andwereinthe
wrongdirectionfromtheviewpointofanallhazardsapproach.Theproblem,asone
observerwrote,wasthattoogreatafocusononetypeofthreatandoninstitutional
preparednesscandivertattentionawayfromotherproblematicareasanddistancethe
public.[5]
InSouthKorea,theprovocationsofNorthKoreacandivertthedirectionofnational
emergencymanagement.SouthKoreahadbeenunderathoroughcivildefenseoriented
culturesincetheendoftheKoreanWarin1953.Allcitizens,forexample,must
participateincompulsorycivildefensetrainingpreparingformilitaryattacksfromNorth
Korea,andthereisamilitaryservicerequirementformen.
ThemoodofreconciliationthatdevelopedontheKoreanPeninsuladuringthepostCold
WarKimDaejungandRohMoohyunadministrations(19982008)changedthe
directionofKoreanemergencymanagementpolicies,highlightedbythe2004
establishmentoftheSouthKoreanNationalEmergencyManagementAgency(NEMA)
bytheRohMoohyunadministration.LargedisasterssuchasTyphoonRusain2002and
theDaegusubwayaccidentin2004demandedacomprehensiveemergencymanagement
systemthatcanmanagethealltypesofhazards,notonlyamilitaryattackbyNorth
Korea.SouthKoreaisgraduallyreplacingitscivildefenseculturewithoneofcivil
protection.TheLeeMyungbakadministration(20082013)establishedtheMinistryof
PublicAdministrationandSecurity(MOPAS)in2008.MOPASenlargedthescopeof
disastermanagementtoincludefosteringasafetycultureandanticipatingfuturedisasters
inducedbyclimatechange.TheMinistryhasproposedcivilprotectionstrategiessuchas
promotingpublicsafetyawareness,strengtheningleadershipoflocalgovernments,and
promotingparticipationofprivatecompaniesindisasterpreparationandmitigation.Also,
MOPASpushedaheadseveralprojectsliketheSafeCityinitiativethattriestoenhance
thesafetyleveloflocalcommunitiesbyencouragingtheparticipationofvariouslocal
stakeholdersinpreparation,mitigation,andresponseplanninganactivities.Thismeans
thatthecivilprotectionidealsandanallhazardsapproachwerewidelyadoptedasa
governmentpolicydirectionatthattime.
However,thebombardmentofYeonpyeongIslandbyNorthKoreanforcesinNovember
2010,whichwasunexpectedandresultedinfourdeaths,changedthistrendbackagain.
AftertheYeonpyeongIslandbombardment,mostprojectsfordisasterandsafety
managementwerecanceledanddelayedbecausethehighestprioritywasplacedon
nationaldefenseagainstNorthKorea.Tosomeextent,thismirrorstheexperiencesofthe
UnitedStatesafter2001andtheUnitedKingdomafter2005.Althoughthedeathsby
YeonpyeongIslandbombardmentwererelativelyfewcompared209deathsinTyphoon
Rusaand192deathsintheDaegusubwayaccident,thepoliticalimpactontheKorean
governmentwashuge.
Keeping a balance in emergency management
Civilprotectionandanallhazardsapproacharevitaltomaintainingpreparationandthe
bestpossibleresponsetomajornaturalandmanmadedisaster.Buttheycanbeweakened
ifgovernmentsfocustooheavilyonnationalsecurity(includingcivildefenseagainst
terrorism).Andthatcanresultintheotherlargedisasters.Keepingbalanceinemergency
managementplanning,andimplementinganallhazardsapproacharecrucialtoeffect
publicadministrationinthisarea.
TheUnitedStatesisatriskfromadiverserangeofnaturalandmanmadedisasters.
ClimatechangewillproducehistoricallystronghurricaneslikeKatrinaandSandymore
andmorefrequently.Thereisahighpossibilityoflargeearthquakesandoutbreaksof
newpandemicdiseases.AsindicatedbytherecentTexasfertilizerplantexplosion,man
madedisasterscanalsohavebigimpacts.Tociteanotherareawherecivilprotection
shouldnotbeneglected,thenumberofroadfatalitiesperonemillioninhabitantswas111
permillioninhabitantsor,wellover30,000individualsintheUnitedStatesin2009.
ThisrateisalmostthreetimesJapansrateof45fatalitiesperonemillioninhabitants,
andhigherthantheEuropeanUnionaverageof70fatalitiesperonemillioninhabitants.
Howdowekeepbalanceinemergencymanagement?Thoughofficialsindemocratic
countriessuchasSouthKoreaandtheUnitedStatesmustrespondtopublicopinion,
approachestoemergencymanagementshouldbedecidedneitherbypublicopinion,
whichcanbeeasilyagitatedbyshockingincidents,norbythenewsmediawhichtendto
followsensationalevents.AlthoughthenumberofcasualtiesintheBostonterrorattack
wasmuchsmallerthanTexasexplosion,thepsychologicalimpactandnews
attractivenessofBostonweremuchhigher.Indeed,thenewsoftheTexasfertilizerplant
explosionwasalmostsweptawayinanoceanofnewsaboutBoston.Instead,prioritiesin
emergencymanagementshouldbedecidedbasedonthescientificevidence,accurate
statistics,andrationalpolicyplanning.
Counterterrorismisnecessaryandobviouslyveryimportant.Governmentsmusttake
policymeasurestopreventterrorism,buttheyshouldresistcontributingto
institutionalizedfear.Theymustalsorememberthathumanbeingsaresurroundedbya
plethoraofrisks,manyofwhichcausemorephysicaldamagethanterrorism.
Governmentsshouldpreparepolicymeasuresformitigation,preparedness,response,and
recoveryforallhazardswecanencounter,andshouldkeepabalancebasedonsciences
andaccuratestatisticaldata.
Forthispurpose,anumberpolicymeasuresareappropriate.First,weneedaclearcost
benefitanalysesofthecurrentpoliciesinemergencymanagement.Accordingtoresearch
conductedbyJohnMuellerandMarkGStewartandpublishedin2011,[6]theUnited
Stateshasspentover$1.1trilliononhomelandsecurityafter9/11;MuellerandStewart
evaluatetheeffectivenessofthismassivespendingasverylow.Ifthismoney,orsomeof
it,hadbeenappliedtootherpublicsafetyareas,suchasclimatechangemitigationor
industrialsafetymanagementwherethecosteffectivenessishigh,theUnitedStates
couldbeasaferplace.
Second,peopleshouldknowwhattherealrisksare.Thewellknownriskssuchastraffic
accidents,industrialaccidents,andfloodskillfarmorepeopleinAmericathanterrorism
does.Accordingtoseveralpsychologicalresearchstudies,familiaritycanreducethe
levelofthepublicsriskperception.So,thereisamuchsmallersenseofurgencyabout
manyoftherisksthatsurrounduseveryday.Scienceandstatisticsonrisks,and
governmentaleffortstoprovideinformationandeducationaboutrisks,canhelp
individualsandlocalcommunitieseffectivelyincreasetheiroverallsafetylevel.
Thus,themediafocusandpublicconcernscreatepoliticalpressure,andnational
emergencymanagementpolicymakersprioritizecounterterrorism,orcivildefense,
overotherformsofriskmanagement,suchascivilprotectionagainstallhazards
includingnaturaldisasters.
Civil defense again?
Culturallyandhistorically,civildefenseisquitedifferentfromcivilprotection.Civil
defense,bornoutofwartimeeffortstoorganizeairraidprecautions,sheltering
arrangementsandalarmsfornoncombatants,hasmilitaryoriginsandfocuseson
protectionagainstforeignmilitaryattacks.[3]Civilprotection,ontheotherhand,has
disasteroriginsandfocusesonmanyformsofnaturalandmanmadedisastersandother
publicsafetyissues.IntheColdWarera,civildefenseagainstnuclearattackwasthe
mainobjectiveofnationalemergencymanagementintheUnitedStates.Atthattime,
nuclearattackwasaninstitutionalizedfearmadebymediaandgovernmentauthorities.
ManyAmericanhomesandpublicbuildingspreparednuclearfalloutshelters,illustrating
thisfearveryclearly.
FollowingtheendofColdWarandrecognitionoftheincreasingtrendoflargeman
madeandnaturaldisasters,civilprotectiongraduallyreplacedthetermcivildefense
inmostcountries.Civilprotectionfocusesmoreongenericdisastersthanonthearmed
aggression,andadministrativelyitismoredecentralizedthancivildefense.IntheUnited
States,theFederalEmergencyManagementAgency(FEMA)wasestablishedin1979.It
wasmainlyacivildefenseorganizationduringtheColdWar,butinthelasttwodecades
hasworkedtoredirectsomeresourcestowardthemanagementofvariousdisasters(civil
protection).JamesWitt,directorofFEMAunderPresidentClinton,clarifiedthischange
ofdirection.AstheFEMAwebsiteexplains,theendoftheColdWaralsoallowedWitt
toredirectmoreofFEMAslimitedresourcesfromcivildefenseintodisasterrelief,
recoveryandmitigationprograms.[4]FEMAalsointroducedanallhazards
approach,recognizingthemanydifferentkindsofdisastersthatmayrequiremitigation,
preparedness,response,andrecovery.
TheSeptember11,2001terrorattackdramaticallychangedthedirectionofemergency
managementintheUnitedStates.Aftertheattack,theUnitedStateshastilyconstructed
theDepartmentofHomelandSecurityanddowngradedFEMA,whosemaindutywas
civilprotection.Thisattractedcriticismfromsomepublicadministrationexpertsthatthe
U.S.governmentconcentratedtoomuchonterrorism,perhapsbecauseofthesocial
amplificationoftheriskinthewakeoftheattack,despitethemanyothercriticalrisks
facingU.S.citizens.Basically,thecriticscharged,theUnitedStateschangedthe
directionofitsemergencymanagementfromcivilprotectionbacktoColdWarstylecivil
defense.
Balance collapsed in emergency management
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Countering Terrorism
ThecostofthatshiftinprioritieswasonfulldisplaywhenHurricaneKatrinastruckNew
Orleansin2005,easilydestroyingtheweakleveesystemandsubmergingmuchofNew
Orleansunderwater.Federalandlocalgovernmentsmitigation,responseandrecovery
totheHurricaneKatrinaweremostlyinadequateresultinginthemostseveredisaster
damageinU.S.historyatthattime.Duetobudgetcuts,theArmyCorpsofEngineershad
beenunabletostrengthentheleveesystemprotectingNewOrleans.Aftertheflooding
andotherdamageoccurred,thegovernmentsdisastersituationawarenesswaspoor.
Communicationamongauthoritiesandbetweenauthoritiesandcivilianswasbroken.
Assistancefromthefederalgovernmentwasdelayedandinsufficient,andpeopledied
whileawaitingrescueorotherassistance.Criticsalsochargedthattoomanygovernment
officialswerenotfamiliarwiththeNationalResponsePlanwhichwasimplementedin
December2004after9/11terroristattack.Planningandtrainingforlargenatural
disasterswereinsufficientaftertheimplementationoftheplan.Inshort,toogreatafocus
oncounterterrorismunderminedcapacitiesfornaturaldisastermitigation,response,and
recoveryinthepost9/11UnitedStates.
ThisnotonlythecaseintheUnitedStates,however.TheUnitedKingdomexperienceda
similartransitionafterthe7/7Londonbombingsin2005,inwhichsuicideattacksbyfour
homegrownterroristskilled55civilians.Inresponse,theU.K.governmentintroduced
severalmeasuressuchasthePreventionofTerrorismBill.Criticssaidthatsome
responsestotheattackswereantiliberal,militarizing,andcentralizing,andwereinthe
wrongdirectionfromtheviewpointofanallhazardsapproach.Theproblem,asone
observerwrote,wasthattoogreatafocusononetypeofthreatandoninstitutional
preparednesscandivertattentionawayfromotherproblematicareasanddistancethe
public.[5]
InSouthKorea,theprovocationsofNorthKoreacandivertthedirectionofnational
emergencymanagement.SouthKoreahadbeenunderathoroughcivildefenseoriented
culturesincetheendoftheKoreanWarin1953.Allcitizens,forexample,must
participateincompulsorycivildefensetrainingpreparingformilitaryattacksfromNorth
Korea,andthereisamilitaryservicerequirementformen.
ThemoodofreconciliationthatdevelopedontheKoreanPeninsuladuringthepostCold
WarKimDaejungandRohMoohyunadministrations(19982008)changedthe
directionofKoreanemergencymanagementpolicies,highlightedbythe2004
establishmentoftheSouthKoreanNationalEmergencyManagementAgency(NEMA)
bytheRohMoohyunadministration.LargedisasterssuchasTyphoonRusain2002and
theDaegusubwayaccidentin2004demandedacomprehensiveemergencymanagement
systemthatcanmanagethealltypesofhazards,notonlyamilitaryattackbyNorth
Korea.SouthKoreaisgraduallyreplacingitscivildefenseculturewithoneofcivil
protection.TheLeeMyungbakadministration(20082013)establishedtheMinistryof
PublicAdministrationandSecurity(MOPAS)in2008.MOPASenlargedthescopeof
disastermanagementtoincludefosteringasafetycultureandanticipatingfuturedisasters
inducedbyclimatechange.TheMinistryhasproposedcivilprotectionstrategiessuchas
promotingpublicsafetyawareness,strengtheningleadershipoflocalgovernments,and
promotingparticipationofprivatecompaniesindisasterpreparationandmitigation.Also,
MOPASpushedaheadseveralprojectsliketheSafeCityinitiativethattriestoenhance
thesafetyleveloflocalcommunitiesbyencouragingtheparticipationofvariouslocal
stakeholdersinpreparation,mitigation,andresponseplanninganactivities.Thismeans
thatthecivilprotectionidealsandanallhazardsapproachwerewidelyadoptedasa
governmentpolicydirectionatthattime.
However,thebombardmentofYeonpyeongIslandbyNorthKoreanforcesinNovember
2010,whichwasunexpectedandresultedinfourdeaths,changedthistrendbackagain.
AftertheYeonpyeongIslandbombardment,mostprojectsfordisasterandsafety
managementwerecanceledanddelayedbecausethehighestprioritywasplacedon
nationaldefenseagainstNorthKorea.Tosomeextent,thismirrorstheexperiencesofthe
UnitedStatesafter2001andtheUnitedKingdomafter2005.Althoughthedeathsby
YeonpyeongIslandbombardmentwererelativelyfewcompared209deathsinTyphoon
Rusaand192deathsintheDaegusubwayaccident,thepoliticalimpactontheKorean
governmentwashuge.
Keeping a balance in emergency management
Civilprotectionandanallhazardsapproacharevitaltomaintainingpreparationandthe
bestpossibleresponsetomajornaturalandmanmadedisaster.Buttheycanbeweakened
ifgovernmentsfocustooheavilyonnationalsecurity(includingcivildefenseagainst
terrorism).Andthatcanresultintheotherlargedisasters.Keepingbalanceinemergency
managementplanning,andimplementinganallhazardsapproacharecrucialtoeffect
publicadministrationinthisarea.
TheUnitedStatesisatriskfromadiverserangeofnaturalandmanmadedisasters.
ClimatechangewillproducehistoricallystronghurricaneslikeKatrinaandSandymore
andmorefrequently.Thereisahighpossibilityoflargeearthquakesandoutbreaksof
newpandemicdiseases.AsindicatedbytherecentTexasfertilizerplantexplosion,man
madedisasterscanalsohavebigimpacts.Tociteanotherareawherecivilprotection
shouldnotbeneglected,thenumberofroadfatalitiesperonemillioninhabitantswas111
permillioninhabitantsor,wellover30,000individualsintheUnitedStatesin2009.
ThisrateisalmostthreetimesJapansrateof45fatalitiesperonemillioninhabitants,
andhigherthantheEuropeanUnionaverageof70fatalitiesperonemillioninhabitants.
Howdowekeepbalanceinemergencymanagement?Thoughofficialsindemocratic
countriessuchasSouthKoreaandtheUnitedStatesmustrespondtopublicopinion,
approachestoemergencymanagementshouldbedecidedneitherbypublicopinion,
whichcanbeeasilyagitatedbyshockingincidents,norbythenewsmediawhichtendto
followsensationalevents.AlthoughthenumberofcasualtiesintheBostonterrorattack
wasmuchsmallerthanTexasexplosion,thepsychologicalimpactandnews
attractivenessofBostonweremuchhigher.Indeed,thenewsoftheTexasfertilizerplant
explosionwasalmostsweptawayinanoceanofnewsaboutBoston.Instead,prioritiesin
emergencymanagementshouldbedecidedbasedonthescientificevidence,accurate
statistics,andrationalpolicyplanning.
Counterterrorismisnecessaryandobviouslyveryimportant.Governmentsmusttake
policymeasurestopreventterrorism,buttheyshouldresistcontributingto
institutionalizedfear.Theymustalsorememberthathumanbeingsaresurroundedbya
plethoraofrisks,manyofwhichcausemorephysicaldamagethanterrorism.
Governmentsshouldpreparepolicymeasuresformitigation,preparedness,response,and
recoveryforallhazardswecanencounter,andshouldkeepabalancebasedonsciences
andaccuratestatisticaldata.
Forthispurpose,anumberpolicymeasuresareappropriate.First,weneedaclearcost
benefitanalysesofthecurrentpoliciesinemergencymanagement.Accordingtoresearch
conductedbyJohnMuellerandMarkGStewartandpublishedin2011,[6]theUnited
Stateshasspentover$1.1trilliononhomelandsecurityafter9/11;MuellerandStewart
evaluatetheeffectivenessofthismassivespendingasverylow.Ifthismoney,orsomeof
it,hadbeenappliedtootherpublicsafetyareas,suchasclimatechangemitigationor
industrialsafetymanagementwherethecosteffectivenessishigh,theUnitedStates
couldbeasaferplace.
Second,peopleshouldknowwhattherealrisksare.Thewellknownriskssuchastraffic
accidents,industrialaccidents,andfloodskillfarmorepeopleinAmericathanterrorism
does.Accordingtoseveralpsychologicalresearchstudies,familiaritycanreducethe
levelofthepublicsriskperception.So,thereisamuchsmallersenseofurgencyabout
manyoftherisksthatsurrounduseveryday.Scienceandstatisticsonrisks,and
governmentaleffortstoprovideinformationandeducationaboutrisks,canhelp
individualsandlocalcommunitieseffectivelyincreasetheiroverallsafetylevel.