RULE 111

thousand pesos.

ANTONIO M. GARCIA vs.FERRO CHEMICALS, INC

G.R. No. 172505 October 1, 2014

The trial courts lack of jurisdiction cannot be cured by the parties

silence on the matter. The failure of the parties to raise the matter of
jurisdiction also cannot be construed as a waiver of the parties.
Jurisdiction is conferred by law and cannot be waived by the parties.

FACTS: An information based on the complaint of Ferro Chemicals, Inc.

was filed against Antonio Garcia before the Regional Trial Court. He was
charged with estafa under Article 318 (Other Deceits) of the Revised
Penal Code for allegedly misrepresenting to Ferro Chemicals, Inc. that
the shares subject of the contracts entered into were free from all liens
and encumbrances. The information reads:
FERRO CHEMICALS, INC. (FCI) represented by Ramon M. Garcia, that
his share of stock/proprietary share with Ayala Alabang Country Club,
Inc. and Manila Polo Club, Inc. collectively valued at about P10.00
Million Pesos, being part of other shares of stock subject matter of a
Deed of Absolute Sale and Purchase of Shares of Stock between the
accused and FCI, were free from all liens, encumbrances and claims by
third persons, when in truth and in fact, accused well knew that
aforesaid share of stock/proprietary share had already been garnished
in July 1985 and subsequently sold at public auction in September
1989, and which misrepresentation and assurance FCI relied upon and
paid the consideration in accordance with the stipulated
condition/manner of payment, all to the damage and prejudice of FCI in
the aforestated amount of P10.00 Million Pesos.
The petition for certiorari filed before this court sought to annul the
decision of the trial court acquitting Antonio Garcia.There are pertinent
and important issues that the parties failed to raise before the trial court,
Court of Appeals, and this court.
ISSUES:
(1)
(2)

Whether the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction over the case?
Whether the act of FerroChemicals, Inc. in filing the notice of
appeal before the Court of Appeals and the petition for certiorari
assailing the same trial court decision amounted to forum
shopping

HELD:
(1)

The Regional Trial Court did not have jurisdiction

Jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter is vested by law. In

criminal cases, the imposable penalty of the crime charged in the
information determines the court that has jurisdiction over the case.
The information charged Antonio Garcia with violation of Article 318 of
the Revised Penal Code, which is punishable by arresto mayor, or
imprisonment for a period of one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6)
months. Article 318 states:
ART. 318: Other deceits. The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine of
not less than the amount of the damage caused and not more than
twice such amount shall be imposed upon any person who shall
defraud or damage another by any other deceit not mentioned in the
preceding articles of this chapter.
Any person who, for profit or gain, shall interpret dreams, make
forecasts, tell fortunes, or take advantage of the credulity of the public
in any other similar manner, shall suffer the penalty of arresto
mayoror a fine not exceeding 200 pesos.
When the information was filed on September 3, 1990, the law in force
was Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 before it was amended by Republic Act
No. 7691. Under Section 32 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the
Metropolitan Trial Court had jurisdiction over the case:
SEC. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in criminal cases.
....
2. Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with
imprisonment of not exceeding four years and two months, or a fine
of not more than four thousand pesos, or both such fine and
imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other
penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or
predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amount
thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to
property through criminal negligence they shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not exceed twenty

(2)

Ferro Chemicals, Inc. committed forum shopping

Forum shopping is defined as "the act of a litigant who repetitively

availed of several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or
successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the
same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the
same issues either pending in, or already resolved adversely by some
other court . . . to increase his chances of obtaining a favorable decision
if not in one court, then in another." Once clearly established that forum
shopping was committed willfully and deliberately by a party or his or
her counsel, the case may be summarily dismissed with prejudice, and
the act shall constitute direct contempt and a cause for administrative
sanctions.
The test and requisites that must concur to establish when a litigant
commits forum shopping are the following:
The test for determining the existence of forum shopping is whether the
elements of litis pendentiaare present, or whether a final judgment in
one case amounts to res judicatain another. Thus, there is forum
shopping when the following elements are present: (a) identity of
parties, or at least such parties asrepresent the same interests in both
actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief
being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two
preceding particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the other
action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res
judicatain the action under consideration; said requisites are also
constitutive of the requisites for auter action pendant or lis pendens.
MERLINDA CIPRIANO MONTAESvs.LOURDES TAJOLOSA
CIPRIANO
G.R. No. 181089 October 22, 2012
FACTS: On April 8, 1976, respondent married Socrates Flores
(Socrates) in Lezo, Aklan. On January 24, 1983, during the subsistence
of the said marriage, respondent married Silverio V. Cipriano (Silverio) in
San Pedro, Laguna while her first marriage have not been judicially
dissolved by proper judicial authorities. An Information for Bigamy was
filed against respondent.
On July 24, 2007 and before her arraignment, respondent, through
counsel, filed a Motion to Quash Information (and Dismissal of the
Criminal Complaint) alleging that her marriage with Socrates had
already been declared void ab initio in 2003, thus, there was no more
marriage to speak of prior to her marriage to Silverio on January 24,
1983; that the basic element of the crime of bigamy, i.e., two valid
marriages, is therefore wanting. She also claimed that since the second
marriage was held in 1983, the crime of bigamy had already prescribed.
The prosecution filed its Comment arguing that the crime of bigamy had
already been consummated when respondent filed her petition for
declaration of nullity; that the law punishes the act of contracting a
second marriage which appears to be valid, while the first marriage is
still subsisting and has not yet been annulled or declared void by the
court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the declaration of nullity of respondent's first
marriage justifies the dismissal of the Information for bigamy filed
against her?
HELD: NO. Here, at the time respondent contracted the second
marriage, the first marriage was still subsisting as it had not yet been
legally dissolved. The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the
first marriage would not change the fact that she contracted the second
marriage during the subsistence of the first marriage. Thus, respondent
was properly charged of the crime of bigamy, since the essential
elements of the offense charged were sufficiently alleged.
Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves
its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of competent
courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be
held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the
presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a
second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.

In the case at bar, respondents clear intent is to obtain a judicial

declaration nullity of his first marriage and thereafter to invoke that very
same judgment to prevent his prosecution for bigamy. He cannot have
his cake and eat it too. Otherwise, all that an adventurous bigamist has
to do is disregard Article 40 of the Family Code, contract a subsequent
marriage and escape a bigamy charge by simply claiming that the first
marriage is void and that the subsequent marriage is equally void for
lack of a prior judicial declaration of nullity of the first. A party may even
enter into a marriage license and thereafter contract a subsequent
marriage without obtaining a declaration of nullity of the first on the
assumption that the first marriage is void. Such scenario would render
nugatory the provision on bigamy.
RULE 112
FELILIBETH AGUINALDO AND BENJAMIN PEREZ v. REYNALDO P.
VENTUS AND JOJO B. JOSON
G.R. No. 176033, March 11, 2015
FACTS: An Information charging petitioners with the crime of estafa
under Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of the RPC was filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Manila. Claiming petitioners connived in
convincing private respondents to part with their Two Hundred Sixty
Thousand (P260,000.00) Pesos in consideration of a pledge of two
motor vehicles which the latter had misrepresented to be owned by
Aguinaldo, but turned out to be owned by one Levita De Castro,
manager/operator of LEDC Rent-A-Car.
Petitioners jointly filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of
Manila their Motion forReconsideration and Motion for the Withdrawal
of the Information Prematurely Filed With the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 8, City of Manila. Petitioners then filed an Urgent Motion for
Cancellation of Arraignment, pending resolution of their motion for
reconsideration filed with the OCP of Manila. The OCP, however, denied
the motion for reconsideration. As a consequence, petitioners filed with
the Department of Justice (DOJ) a petition for review.
Petitioners filed an Urgent Motion to Cancel Arraignment and Suspend
Further Proceedings, until their petition for review before the DOJ is
resolved with finality.
They contend that such precipitate filing of the Information and issuance
of a warrant of arrest put petitioners at the risk of incarceration without
the preliminary investigation having been completed because they were
not afforded their right to file a motion for reconsideration of the DOJ
resolution. In support of their contention, they raise the following
arguments: that the right to preliminary investigation is a substantive,
not merely a procedural right; that an Information filed without affording
the respondent his right to file a motion for reconsideration of an
adverse resolution, is fatally premature; and, that a denial of a complete
preliminary investigation deprives the accused of the full measure of his
right to due process and infringes on his constitutional right to liberty.
The public respondent then granted petitioners motion.
Levita De Castro, through the Law Firm of Lapea and Associates, filed
a Motion to Reinstate Case and to Issue Warrant of Arrest. De Castro
alleged that she was the private complainant in the estafa case that had
been ordered archived. The motion was then granted.
Petitioners filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, which was dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
ISSUES:
(1) WON reinstating the case and issuing an arrest warrant against
Aguinaldo was erroneously granted because the motion was filed
by De Castro who is not a party in criminal case?
(2) WON Section 11, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court limiting the suspension
for arraignment to only sixty (60) days is merely directory; thus, it
cannot deprive petitioners of their procedural right to due process,
as their petition for review has not yet been resolved by the DOJ?
(3) WON the preliminary investigation by the prosecutor has not yet been
completed?
HELD:
(1) YES. De Castro is not even a private complainant, but a mere witness
for being the owner of the vehicles allegedly used by petitioners in
defrauding and convincing private respondents to part with their
P260,000.00. Thus, the public respondent should have granted
petitioners' motion to expunge, and treated De Castro's motion as
a mere scrap of paper with no legal effect, as it was filed by one

who is not a party to that case.

In reinstating the case and issuing the arrest warrant against
Aguinaldo, the public respondent erroneously relied on the DOJ
Resolution dismissing the petition for review in a different case.
As correctly noted by petitioners, however, their petition for review
with the DOJ is still pending resolution.
(2) NO. The Court disagrees with petitioners' contention that the provision
of Section 11 (c), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court limiting the
suspension for arraignment to only sixty (60) days is merely
directory; thus, the estafa case against them cannot proceed until
the DOJ resolves their petition for review with finality.
CA correctly ruled, thus:
The delay in the resolution does not extend the period of 60 days
prescribed under the afore-quoted Section 11(c), Rule 116 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. Besides, the petitioners
may be faulted for the delay in the resolution of their petition.
According to their counsel, she received the letter dated April 15,
2004 from the DOJ requiring her to submit the pertinent pleadings
relative to petitioners' petition for review; admittedly, however, the
same was complied with only on October 15, 2004. We therefore
find that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the assailed orders.
(3) NO. While they are correct in stating that the right to preliminary
investigation is a substantive, not merely a procedural right,
petitioners are wrong in arguing that the Information filed, without
affording the respondent his right to file a motion for
reconsideration of an adverse DOJ resolution, is fatally
premature.
The Court believes that the period of almost one (1) year and seven
(7) months from the time petitioners filed their petition for review
with the DOJ when the trial court finally set their arraignment, was
more than ample time to give petitioners the opportunity to obtain
a resolution of their petition. In fact, the public respondent had
been very liberal with petitioners in applying Section 11 (c), Rule
116 of the Rules of Court which limits the suspension of
arraignment to a 60-day period from the filing of such petition.
Indeed, with more than eleven (11) years having elapsed from the
filing of the petition for review and petitioners have yet to be
arraigned, it is now high time for the continuation of the trial on the
merits in the criminal case below, as the 60-day period counted
from the filing of the petition for review with the DOJ had long
lapsed.
Both petitioners cannot claim denial of their right to a complete
preliminary investigation as part of their right to due process. After
all, [d]ue process simply demands an opportunity to be heard.
Due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded a fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of the
controversy. Where an opportunity to be heard either through oral
arguments or through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of
procedural due process.
JOSEPH SCOTT PEMBERTON v. HON. LEILA M. DE LIMA
G.R. No. 217508, April 18, 2016
FACTS: A complaint for murder was filed by the Philippine National
Police-Olongapo City Police Office and private respondent Marilou
Laude y Serdoncillo (Laude) against petitioner Joseph Scott Pemberton.
During the preliminary investigation, the City Prosecutor of Olongapo
City found probable cause against Pemberton for the crime of murder
and filed for an Information. Pemberton filed his Petition for Review
before the Department of Justice. Secretary De Lima denied
Pemberton's Petition for Review and stated that based on the evidence
on record, there was "no reason to alter, modify, or reverse the
resolution of the City Prosecutor of Olongapo City. Pemberton filed this
Petition for Certiorari with application for the ex-parte issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.
Pemberton argues that in sustaining a finding of probable cause,
Secretary De Lima committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess or absence of jurisdiction based on the following grounds: (a)
Secretary De Lima took into account additional evidence which the City
Prosecutor allegedly had no authority to receive and which Pemberton

had no opportunity to address and rebut, thereby denying him due

process of law;(b) Secretary De Lima found probable cause to charge
Pemberton with the crime of murder when "the evidence on record does
not support the existence of probable cause to indict [him] . . . with
either homicide or murder[;]" and (c) Secretary De Lima found that "the
killing was attended with the qualifying circumstances of treachery,
abuse of superior strength[,] and cruelty despite prevailing jurisprudence
dictating that the elements of these qualifying circumstances . . . be
established by direct evidence.
Secretary De Lima, through the Office of the Solicitor General, points
out that this Petition is procedurally infirm. The Petition assails the
appreciation of evidence and law by Secretary De Lima, which are
"errors of judgment . . . [that] cannot be remedied by a writ of certiorari."
Further, by filing this Petition before this court and not the Court of
Appeals, Pemberton violated the principle of hierarchy of courts.
Moreover, the case is moot and academic, considering that the Regional
Trial Court has convicted Pemberton for the crime charged
ISSUES:
(1) WON respondent Secretary Leila M. De Lima committed grave
abuse of discretion in sustaining the finding of probable cause
against petitioner Joseph Scott Pemberton, thereby denying
petitioner due process of law?
(2) WON petitioner violated the principle of hierarchy of courts by
filing his Petition before this Court instead of the Court of
Appeals?
(3) WON this case has been rendered moot and academic?
HELD:
(1)

(2)

(3)

Respondent De Lima's finding of probable cause against

petitioner was not rendered with grave abuse of discretion.
Rather, her determination was based on a careful evaluation of
evidence presented. Moreover, petitioner was fully accorded due
process in the preliminary investigation proceedings. Petitioner
had multiple opportunities to controvert the evidence presented
during the preliminary investigation. He was directed to file a
counter-affidavit, which was an opportunity to refute the
allegations against him. Petitioner was also given the opportunity
to seek reconsideration of the initial finding of probable cause.
Respondents contend that petitioners' failure to file the proper suit
with a lower court of concurrent jurisdiction is sufficient ground for
the dismissal of their petition. They add that observation of the
hierarchy of courts is compulsory. While respondents claim that
while there are exceptions to the general rule on hierarchy of
courts, none of these are present in this case. On the other hand,
petitioners cite Fortich v. Corona on this court's discretionary
power to take cognizance of a petition filed directly to it if
warranted by "compelling reasons, or [by] the nature and
importance of the issues raised . . . ." Petitioners submit that there
are "exceptional and compelling reasons to justify a direct resort
[with] this Court."
YES. Petition for Certiorari is denied for lack of merit and for being
moot and academic

ANITA MANGILAv. JUDGE HERIBERTO M. PANGILINAN

G.R. No. 160739, July 17, 2013
FACTS: Seven criminal complaints charging petitioner Anita Mangila
and four others with syndicated estafa in violation of Article 315 of
the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Presidential Decree No. 1689,
and with violations of Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant
Workers and Overseas Filipino Act of 1995) were filed in the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities in Puerto Princesa City (MTCC). The complaints
arose from the recruiting and promising of employment by Mangila and
the others to the private complainants as overseas contract workers in
Toronto, Canada, and from the collection of visa processing fees,
membership fees and on-line application fees from the private
complainants without lawful authority from the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration.
Judge Heriberto M. Pangilinan, Presiding Judge of the MTCC,
conducted a preliminary investigation on the complaints. After examining
Miguel Aaron Palayon, one of the complainants, Judge Pangilinan
issued a warrant for the arrest of Mangila and her cohorts without
bail.On the next day, the entire records of the cases, including the
warrant of arrest, were transmitted to the City Prosecutor of Puerto

Princesa City for further proceedings and appropriate action. As a

consequence, Mangila was arrested.
Claiming that Judge Pangilinan did not have the authority to conduct the
preliminary investigation; that the preliminary investigation he conducted
was not yet completed when he issued the warrant of arrest; and that
the issuance of the warrant of arrest was without sufficient justification or
without a prior finding of probable cause, Mangila filed in the Court of
Appeals (CA) a petition for habeas corpus to obtain her release from
detention. Her petition averred that the remedy of habeas corpus was
available to her because she could no longer file a motion to quash or a
motion to recall the warrant of arrest considering that Judge Pangilinan
had already forwarded the entire records of the case to the City
Prosecutor who had no authority to lift or recall the warrant. The CA
denied the petition for habeas corpus for its lack of merit.
ISSUE: Did the CA err in ruling that habeas corpus was not the proper
remedy to obtain the release of Mangila from detention?
HELD:NO. A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a
special proceeding governed by Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, as
amended. The inquiry in a habeas corpus proceeding is addressed
to the question of whether the proceedings and the assailed order
are, for any reason, null and void. The writ is not ordinarily granted
where the law provides for other remedies in the regular course,
and
in
the
absence
of
exceptional
circumstances.
Moreover, habeas corpusshould not be granted in advance of trial.
The orderly course of trial must be pursued and the usual
remedies exhausted before resorting to the writ where exceptional
circumstances are extant. In another case, it was held that habeas
corpus cannot be issued as a writ of error or as a means of
reviewing errors of law and irregularities not involving the
questions of jurisdiction occurring during the course of the trial,
subject to the caveat that constitutional safeguards of human life
and liberty must be preserved, and not destroyed. It has also been
held that where restraint is under legal process, mere errors and
irregularities, which do not render the proceedings void, are not
grounds for relief by habeas corpus because in such cases, the
restraint is not illegal.
There is no question that when the criminal complaints were lodged
against Mangila and her cohorts, Judge Pangilinan, as the Presiding
Judge of the MTCC, was empowered to conduct preliminary
investigations involving all crimes cognizable by the proper court in
their respective territorial jurisdictions. His authority was expressly
provided in Section 2, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, to wit:
Section 2. Officers authorized to conduct preliminary investigations.
The
following
may
conduct
preliminary
investigations:
(a) Provincial or City Prosecutors and their assistants;
(b) Judges of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts;
(c)
National
and
Regional
State
Prosecutors;
and
(d)
Other
officers
as
may
be
authorized
by
law.
Their authority to conduct preliminary investigations shall include
all crimes cognizable by the proper court in their respective
territorial jurisdictions.
Under Section 6(b) of Rule 112of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the investigating judge could issue a warrant of arrest during
the preliminary investigation even without awaiting its conclusion should
he find after an examination in writing and under oath of the complainant
and the witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers that a
probable cause existed, and that there was a necessity of placing the
respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends
of justice.In the context of this rule, Judge Pangilinan issued the warrant
of arrest against Mangila and her cohorts. Consequently, the CA
properly denied Mangilas petition for habeas corpus because she had
been arrested and detained by virtue of the warrant issued for her arrest
by Judge Pangilinan, a judicial officer undeniably possessing the legal
authority
to
do
so.
It is relevant to point out at this juncture that the authority of the MTC
and MTCC judges to conduct preliminary investigations was removed
only effective on October 3, 2005 pursuant to A.M. No. 05-8-26-SC.

It was clear that under Section 5, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the resolution of the investigating judge was not
final but was still subject to the review by the public prosecutor who had
the power to order the release of the detainee if no probable cause
should be ultimately found against her. In the context of the rule,
Mangila had no need to seek the issuance of the writ of habeas
corpus to secure her release from detention. Her proper recourse was to
bring the supposed irregularities attending the conduct of the preliminary
investigation and the issuance of the warrant for her arrest to the
attention of the City Prosecutor, who had been meanwhile given the
most direct access to the entire records of the case, including the
warrant of arrest, following Judge Pangilinans transmittal of them to the
City Prosecutor for appropriate action. We agree with the CA, therefore,
that the writ of habeas corpus could not be used as a substitute for
another
available
remedy.
RULE 113
DANILO VILLANUEVA y ALCARAZvs.PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 199042 November 17, 2014
FACTS: Petitioner Danilo Villanueva was charged with violation of
Section 11, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 or The
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. Four witnesses testified
for the prosecution, which reveal that a Complaint was filed by Brian
Resco against Danilo Villanueva for allegedly shooting the former along
C-3 Road, Navotas City. After recording the incident in the police blotter,
PO3 Jonathan Coralde, SPO3 Enrique de Jesus, SPO2 Henry Martin
and SPO1 Anthony Asiones, together with Resco, proceeded to the
house of Villanueva. They informed Villanueva about the Complaint
lodged against him. They invited him to the police station. There, he was
subjected to a body search and, in the process, a plastic sachet of
shabu was recovered from the left pocket of his pants.
RTC convicted petitioner of the offense charged and the CA affirmed the
decision.
ISSUE: WON Petitioners arrest does not fall within the purview of valid
warrantless arrests?
HELD: YES. However, Accused-appellant is estopped from questioning
the legality of his arrest.
Accused-appellant was arrested without a warrant. Section 5, Rule 113
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, lays down the basic rules
on lawful warrantless arrests either by a peace officer or a private
person, as follows:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable
cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped
from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
The circumstances that transpired between accused-appellant and the
arresting officer show none of the above that would make the
warrantless arrest lawful. Nevertheless, records reveal that accusedappellant never objected to the irregularity of his arrest before his
arraignment. He pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. He actively
participated in the trial of the case. Thus, he is considered as one who
had properly and voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the
trial court and waived his right to question the validity of his arrest.
The warrantless search conducted is not among those allowed by law.
A waiver of an illegal arrest, however, is not a waiver of an illegal
search. Records have established that both the arrest and the search
were made without a warrant. While the accused has already waived his
right to contest the legality of his arrest, he is not deemed to have
equally waived his right to contest the legality of the search.

Jurisprudence is replete with pronouncements on when a warrantless

search can be conducted. These searches include: (1) search of a
moving vehicle; (2) seizure in plain view; (3) customs search; (4) waiver
or consented search; (5) stop-and-frisk situation; (6) search incidental to
a lawful arrest and (7) exigent and emergency circumstance. The search
made was not among the enumerated instances.
Having been obtained through an unlawful search, the seized item is
thus inadmissible in evidence against accused-appellant. Obviously, this
is an instance of seizure of the "fruit of the poisonous tree." Hence, the
confiscated item is inadmissible in evidence consonant with Article III,
Section 3(2) of the 1987 Constitution: "Any evidence obtained in
violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding." Without the seized item, therefore, the
conviction of accused appellant cannot be sustained.
RULE 114
A R N O L D AL VA v. H O N . C O U R T O F AP P E A L S
G . R . N o . 1 5 7 3 3 1 Ap r i l 1 2 , 2 0 0 6
F AC T S : An I n f o r m a t i o n w a s f i l e d c h a r g i n g p e t i t i o n e r w i t h
having committed the crime of estafa defined under
Article 315, Paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code.
Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the
crime charged. During date of promulgation, petitioner
and counsel both failed to appear in court despite due
notice. The RTC issued an Order directing the
promulgation of its decision in absentia and the
issuance of a bench warrant of arrest against petitioner
for his failure to appear before it despite due notice.
A document entitled Personal Bail Bond issued by Mega
Pacific Insurance Corporation, seemed to have been
filed before and approved by the RTC as evidenced by
the signature of Judge Muro on the face of said bail
bond. For such reason, petitioner appeared to have been
admitted to bail anew after his conviction.
Incongruous to the above inference, however judgment
was rendered against Eastern Insurance and Surety
Corporation,
the
bonding
company
that
issued
petitioners original bail bond, in the amount of
P17,000.00, for failure to produce the person of
petitioner within the 10 day period earlier provided and
to explain why the amount of its undertaking should not
be forfeited.
In the interregnum, Police Superintendent Ramon Flores
D e J e s u s , C h i e f o f W ar r a n t a n d S u b p o e n a S e c t i o n ,
manifested to the RTC the return of the unexecuted
W ar r a n t o f Ar r e s t .
O n a p p e a l b e f o r e t h e C o u r t o f Ap p e a l s t h e a p p e l l a t e
court required petitioner to show cause wh y his appeal
should not be dismissed it appearing that no new bail
bond for his provisional liberty on appeal had been
posted
C o u r t o f Ap p e a l s , n o n e t h e l e s s d i s m i s s e d t h e a p p e a l f o r
failure to post a new bond for his provisional liberty on
appeal and in view of the fact that his personal bail bond
posted in the lower court had already expired. A Motion
for Reconsideration was filed but denied by the same
court citing that the posting of a bail presupposes that
the accused and/ or accused-appellant is detained or in
t h e c u s t o d y o f t h e l a w. I n t h e c a s e a t b a r, t h e b e n c h
warrant of arrest still remains unserved. Nothing in the
records of the case, neither in the RTC nor the Court of
Appeals, demonstrates that petitioner was ever arrested,
as there has been no related Order of Release issued by
any court, or that he voluntarily surrendered or at the
v e r y l e a s t p l a c e d h i m s e l f u n d e r t h e c u s t o d y o f t h e l a w.
ISSUES:
( 1 ) W h e t h e r o r n o t C o u r t o f Ap p e a l s c o m m i t t e d r e v e r s i b l e
error in dismissing the appeal in view of petitioners
alleged failure to post a valid bail bond to secure
his provisional liberty on appeal?

(2) W hether or not petitioner failed to submit himself to the

jurisdiction of the court or to the custody of the law
despite the posting of the subject bail bond?
HELD:
(1) S e c t i o n 5 o f R u l e 114 o f t h e 1 9 9 4 R u l e s o f C o u r t ,
as amended, intrinsically addresses the foregoing
prefatory matter viz:
S E C . 5 . B a i l , w h e n d i s c r e t i o n a r y. U p o n
conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an
offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, the court, on
application, may admit the accused to bail.
The court, in its discretion, may allow the
accused to continue on provisional liberty
under the same bail bond during the period to
appeal subject to the consent of the bondsman.
If the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment
exceeding six (6) years, but not more than
twenty (20) years, the accused shall be denied
bail, or his bail previously granted shall be
cancelled, upon a showing by the prosecution,
with notice to the accused
A p p r o p r i a t e l y, R u l e 1 2 4 o f t h e R u l e s o f C o u r t
presents the procedural requirements regarding
a p p e a l s t a k e n t o t h e C o u r t o f Ap p e a l s . S e c t i o n 8 o f
s a i d R u l e f i n d s a p p l i c a t i o n t o t h e c a s e a t b a r, v i z :
SEC. 8. Dismissal of appeal for abandonment or
f a i l u r e t o p r o s e c u t e . T h e a p p e l l a t e c o u r t m a y,
upon motion of the appellee or its own motion
and notice to the appellant, dismiss the appeal
if the appellant fails to file his brief within the
time prescribed by this Rule, except in case the
appellant is represented by a counsel de oficio.
The court may also, upon motion of the appellee
or on its own motion, dismiss the appeal if the
appellant escapes from prison or confinement
or jumps bail or flees to a foreign country
during the pendency of the appeal .
T h u s , t h e C o u r t o f Ap p e a l s c o m m i t t e d n o r e v e r s i b l e
error in dismissing petitioners appeal. W ithin the
meaning of the principles governing the prevailing
criminal procedure, petitioner impliedly withdrew
his appeal by jumping bail and thereby made the
j u d g m e n t o f t h e R T C f i n a l a n d e x e c u t o r y.
(2) Custody of the law is accomplished either by arrest
or voluntary surrender (citation omitted); while (the
term) jurisdiction over the person of the accused is
acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance
(citation omitted). One can be under the custody of
the law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the
court over his person, such as when a person
arrested by virtue of a warrant files a motion before
arraignment to quash the warrant. On the other
hand, one can be subject to the jurisdiction of the
court over his person, and yet not be in the custody
o f t h e l a w, s u c h a s w h e n a n a c c u s e d e s c a p e s
custody after his trial has commenced
Moreover, jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost at
the instance of parties, as when an accused escapes
f r o m t h e c u s t o d y o f t h e l a w, b u t c o n t i n u e s u n t i l t h e
c a s e i s t e r m i n a t e d . E v i d e n t l y, p e t i t i o n e r i s c o r r e c t i n
that there is no doubt that the RTC alread y acquired
jurisdiction over the person of the accused petitioner
when he appeared at the arraignment and pleaded
not guilty to the crime charged notwithstanding the
fact that he jumped bail and is now considered a
fugitive.

As to whether or not petitioner has placed himself

under the custod y of the CA, it is not the same for
being in the custody of the law signifies restraint on
the person, who is thereby depriv ed of his own will
a n d l i b e r t y, b i n d i n g h i m t o b e c o m e o b e d i e n t t o t h e
w i l l o f t h e l a w. C u s t o d y o f t h e l a w i s l i t e r a l l y c u s t o d y
over the body of the accused. It includes, but is not
l i m i t e d t o , d e t e n t i o n . I n t h e c a s e a t b a r, p e t i t i o n e r ,
being a fugitive, until and unless he submits himself
t o t h e c u s t o d y o f t h e l a w, i n t h e m a n n e r o f b e i n g
under the jurisdiction of the courts, he cannot be
granted any relief by the CA.
MANOLET O. LAVIDES vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 129670. February 1, 2000
FACTS: 12 informations for child abuse were filed against petitioner for
child abuse in violation of Art. III, 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 in Regional Trial
Court, Quezon City. No bail was recommended. Nonetheless, petitioner
filed separate applications for bail in the nine cases and the RTC
granted the right to post bail with the following conditions in an order
dated May 16, 1997:
a) The accused shall not be entitled to a waiver of appearance during
the trial of these cases. He shall and must always be present at the
hearings of these cases;
b) In the event that he shall not be able to do so, his bail bonds shall
be automatically cancelled and forfeited, warrants for his arrest shall
be immediately issued and the cases shall proceed to trial in
absentia;
c) The hold-departure Order of this Court dated April 10, 1997 stands;
and E
d) Approval of the bail bonds shall be made only after the arraignment
to enable this Court to immediately acquire jurisdiction over the
accused;
Petitioner filed a motions to quash the information against him, suspend
arraignment and to reduce bail bond; which were denied by RTC. Hence
an appeal with the CA.
The appellate court invalidated the first two conditions imposed in the
order for the grant of bail to petitioner but ruled that the issue concerning
the validity of the condition making arraignment a prerequisite for the
approval of petitioners bail bonds to be moot and academic. It noted
"that petitioner has posted the cash bonds; that when arraigned,
represented by lawyers, he pleaded not guilty to each offense; and that
he has already been released from detention." The Court of Appeals
thought that the aforesaid conditions in the order were contrary to Art.
III, 14(2) of the Constitution which provides that "[a]fter arraignment, trial
may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that
he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable."
ISSUE: Whether the court should impose the condition that the accused
shall ensure his presence during the trial of these cases before the bail
can be granted?
HELD: No. As the trial court itself acknowledged, in cases where it is
authorized, bail should be granted before arraignment, otherwise the
accused may be precluded from filing a motion to quash. For if the
information is quashed and the case is dismissed, there would then be
no need for the arraignment of the accused. In the second place, the
trial court could ensure the presence of petitioner at the arraignment
precisely by granting bail and ordering his presence at any stage of the
proceedings, such as arraignment. Under Rule 114, 2(b) of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure, one of the conditions of bail is that "the accused
shall appear before the proper court whenever so required by the court
or these Rules," while under Rule 116, 1(b) the presence of the accused
at the arraignment is required.
On the other hand, to condition the grant of bail to an accused on his
arraignment would be to place him in a position where he has to choose
between (1) filing a motion to quash and thus delay his release on bail
because until his motion to quash can be resolved, his arraignment
cannot be held, and (2) foregoing the filing of a motion to quash so that
he can be arraigned at once and thereafter be released on bail. These

scenarios certainly undermine the accuseds constitutional right not to be

put on trial except upon valid complaint or information sufficient to
charge him with a crime and his right to bail.
The order dated May 16, 1997 is declared valid, with the exception of
condition (d) in the second paragraph of the order of May 16, 1997
(making arraignment a prerequisite to the grant of bail to petitioner),
which is hereby declared void.