The Journal of Genetic Psychology, 2005, 166(4), 451463

Copyright 2006 Heldref Publications

Cognitive Processes in the

ReflectiveImpulsive Cognitive Style
PAULETTE ROZENCWAJG
Laboratoire Cognition et Dveloppement
Universit Paris, France
DENIS CORROYER
Laboratoire de Psychologie Environnementale
Universit Paris, France

ABSTRACT. In this study, the authors improved the understanding of the cognitive
processes underlying the reflectiveimpulsive cognitive style (RI), which was initially
measured by J. Kagan, B. L. Rosman, D. Day, J. Albert, and W. Phillips (1964) on the
Matching Familiar Figures Test (MFFT). The authors determined the relationships
between the RI style and the cognitive factors, which would be likely to explain different
MFFT solving modesfield dependence or independence as a cognitive style, the g factor, the spatial factor, and a metacognitive control index, which the authors developed for
this study. The hypotheses were largely based on various studies (J. P. Ancillotti, 1984,
1985; J. Kagan, B. L. Rosman, D. Day, J. Albert, & W. Phillips, 1964; T. Zelniker & W.
E. Jeffrey, 1976; T. Zelniker, A. Renan, I. Sorer, & Y. Shavit, 1977). The results are presented separately for each of four groups: (a) reflective individuals, who implement an
analytic process and are cognitively mature; (b) impulsive individuals, who use a holistic
process and are cognitively immature; (c) fast-accurate individuals, who are capable of
implementing both analytic and holistic processes and exhibit cognitive maturity; and (d)
slow-inaccurate individuals, who exhibit good metacognitive control but have trouble
implementing both types of processing.
Key words: cognitive processes, cognitive style, reflectiveimpulsive

RESEARCHERS HAVE STUDIED THE COGNITIVE PROCESSES that

underlie the reflectiveimpulsive cognitive style (RI style), which was initially
measured by Kagan, Rosman, Day, Albert, and Phillips (1964). The RI style is
defined as a property of the cognitive system that combines individuals decisionmaking time and their performance in problem-solving situations, which involve
a high degree of uncertainty. People differ by the way they gather, organize, and
Address correspondence to Paulette Rozencwajg, Laboratoire Cognition et Dveloppement, Universit Paris, 68 avenue de la Faisanderie, 91800 Brunoy, France;
paulette.rozencwajg@univ-paris5.fr (e-mail).
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process the information they apply to solving problems. In other words, different
individuals preferentially use qualitatively different adaptive processes.
Kagan et al. (1964) were the first researchers to propose the RI, which they
measured using the Matching Familiar Figures Test (MFFT). This visual comparison task requires participants to select the one figure that matches a standard
from several alternative figures. Two variables are measuredlatency (time taken
to respond) and accuracy (number of errors). Kagan et al. classified people into
two groups on the basis of their scores on these two variables relative to the medianreflective individuals (long latency, high accuracy) and impulsive individuals (short latency, low accuracy).
With respect to the cognitive processes, Ancillotti (1984) found that reflective individuals used an analytic processing mode, whereas impulsive individuals used a holistic processing mode (Rollins & Genser, 1977; Zelniker & Jeffrey,
1976; Zelniker, Renan, Sorer, & Shavit, 1977). Ancillotti (1984, 1985) proposed
that impulsive individuals lacked cognitive maturity, usually assessed by their
operating level. Lawry, Welsh, and Jeffrey (1983) found a similar result in that
reflective individuals performed better than did impulsive individuals on Ravens
Progressive Matrices (1998). Borkowski, Peck, Reid, and Kurtz (1983) showed
that reflective individuals exhibited superior metamemory compared with impulsive individuals.
Zelniker et al. (1977) found no difference in the general intelligence level of
these two groups: Impulsive individuals tended to use a different processing mode
(holistic) than did reflective individuals. The MFFT task requires individuals to
use analytic processing, which does not fit with the preferences of impulsive individuals. Inversely, reflective individuals, who generally use an analytic processing mode, are not as adept at adopting holistic processing on tasks that require it.
To demonstrate this, Zelniker and Jeffrey (1976) modified the MFFT task so that
it would include both global items and analytic items. Unlike Kagan et al.s (1964)
MFFT items, those global items did not differ by a detail, rather they differed by
the contour of the figure, which formed a gestalt. The results showed that analytic items were advantageous for reflective individuals, whereas global items
were beneficial to impulsive individuals. On global items, the impulsive individuals outperformed the reflective ones in that they took less time but did not make
more mistakes.
The RI style is sometimes compared with another type of cognitive style
Witkin, Ottman, and Raskins (1985) field dependence or independence (FDI).1
Riding and Sadler-Smith (1992), for example, treated the two as if they were the
same by considering both to be based on analytic processing. From the standpoint
of cognitive processes, FDI favors individuals who use an analytic strategy to
ones who use a global strategy (Huteau, 1987), particularly in Kohs blocks
(Rozencwajg & Corroyer, 2002; Rozencwajg & Huteau, 1996).
If field-dependent individuals and impulsive individuals both use a holistic,
global processing mode, and fieldindependent individuals and reflective indi-

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viduals both use an analytic processing mode, it would be difficult to differentiate the two cognitive styles. Huteau (1987) explained that difficulty by showing
that the two styles have three components or factors in common: (a) their attention allocation behavior, which consists in going back and forth many times
between the standard figure and the alternative figures, with visual field exploration being more systematic in analytic, reflective individuals; (b) they have a
general intelligence factor in common; and (c) they share motivational processes
related to metacognitive control.
In this study, our aim was to show that these two cognitive styles, FDI and
RI, do not supply the same information about an individuals preferred processing mode. We used two methods.
First, for the RI style, we distinguished not only reflective and impulsive individuals, but also fast-accurate individuals (short latency, high accuracy) and slowinaccurate individuals (long latency, low accuracy). Most researchers are interested only in two of the groupsthe impulsive and the reflectivebecause they
contain the largest number of individuals (about 70%; Reuchlin, 1991) and
because they support Kagan et al.s (1964) initial hypothesis that individuals who
answer too quickly (impulsivity) make more mistakes. These results show up not
only as a negative correlation between these two variables, but also by the result
that the correlation is high. However, there are always some individuals who take
little time and make few mistakes and others who take a lot of time and make
many mistakes.
Second, we measured the two cognitive styles in the same population, along
with three factors that were likely to be related to themthe g factor, a spatial
factor, and a metacognitive control index.
We expected impulsive individuals, who should have a lower FDI score, g
factor, and metacognitive control index, to obtain a higher score on the spatial
factor, which is based on global (analogical, holistic) information processing
(Denis, 1990; Lansman, Donaldson, Hunt, & Yantis, 1982; Snow & Lohman,
1984), whereas we expected reflective individuals to obtain a high FDI score, g
factor, and metacognitive control index, but a lower spatial score. It is difficult to
set forth any hypotheses for the slow-inaccurate and fast-accurate individuals
because these two groups rarely have been studied.
Method
Participants
We tested forty-two 12- and 13-year-old seventh graders from two middle
schools in the metropolitan Paris area. We acknowledge that the sample size was
small.
We studied seventh graders on the basis of the differentiationdedifferentiation
hypothesis (Li et al., 2004). In that hypothesis, the authors postulated that intel-

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lectual abilities are rather undifferentiated in childhood, undergo differentiation

during maturation leading to a multi-faceted ability structure that remains largely
invariant during adulthood, and becomes undifferentiated again (dedifferentiation)
during senescence (p. 1). The extent of differentiation (i.e., multiple ability
dimensions) inferable from the interrelationship of the psychometric tests was estimated by the number of dominant principal components (PC) for each age group.
As predicted, the estimated number of dimensions of the correlation matrix involving the 15 tests was smaller in childhood, late adulthood, and old age than in adolescence, young, and middle adulthood. The amount of variance accounted for by
the first PC was larger at both ends of the lifespan and fluid and crystallized intelligence were more highly correlated in childhood, late adulthood, and old age than
in adolescence, young, and middle adulthood (p. 5). Seventh graders correspond
to the age group in the differentiation phase. In this article, our objective was to
distinguish four groups of individuals (reflective, impulsive, fast-accurate, slowinaccurate) and not only the two groups of individuals (reflective, impulsive), which
have been studied often when factor g (fluid intelligence) explains a large part of
the total variance.
Materials
We administered the MFFT to each student individually. We tested the students collectively on the Group Embedded Figures Test (GEFT; Witkin et al.,
1985), a g-factor test developed at the Institut National dEtudes du Travail et de
lOrientation Professionnelle (UCSWPO [National Institute of Studies on Work
and Professionnal Orientation]; Demangeon, 1978), and a spatial abilities test
(Primary Mental Abilities subtest; Thurstone & Thurstone, 1964).
We calculated a metacognitive control index from the MFFT scores
(Rozencwajg, 2003). According to Flavell (1987), individuals exhibit metacognition if they are capable of adjusting their effort to the difficulty of a task. To measure this type of control, we analyzed the individuals behavior as they took the
MFFT test. This test contains items of different levels of difficulty, but they are not
presented in order of difficulty. To exercise metacognitive control, individuals do
not need to know that the item is more difficult, they only need to take more time
to answer. We designed the metacognitive control index to indicate whether the persons latency increased when an objectively more difficult item was presented. This
specific index is an estimate of the actual difficulty of the item (see Table 1). We
called this index the metacognitive index of reactivity to task difficulty (MRD). We
obtained the index for each person by calculating the correlation (BravaisPearson
coefficient) between two series of 12 measures, which corresponded to the 12 items
on the MFFT (the individuals latency [time taken to give first response] and the
median latency of individuals who succeeded on that item on the first try). To succeed on the first try, a person had to look at every one of eight figures before giving an answer. The median latency indicated the time taken to inspect all eight fig-

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TABLE 1. Latency of a Particular Participant and Median Latency of All

Participants Who Answered Correctly on the First Try, for the 12 Matching
Familiar Figures Test Items

Item
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

Participants
who succeeded
on first try, n

Median
latency, s

Participants
latency, s

26
12
14
21
28
33
26
20
24
24
23
32

49.5
77.5
84.0
59.0
99.5
36.0
81.0
86.5
49.5
64.0
69.0
47.5

113
87
109
59
104
38
34
143
87
57
71
85

Note. The number of participants differs across items.

ures. The advantage of calculating the median rather than the mean is that the median is an indicator of a central tendency that is less sensitive to extreme values. In
this way, very short or very long latencies, which are atypical, would not carry
excessive weight in determining an items true level of difficulty.
An MRD value of +1 reflects perfect time adjustment, whereas a value of 1
reflects poor adjustment. In the example in Table 1, we obtained a positive value
of .39.
Validity Data for the Metacognitive Control Index
Metacognitive progressing is related to general intelligence. Campione
(1987) showed, for example, that a group of children with mental retardation were
capable of learning a strategy and retaining it in memory, but were often incapable of generalizing it for use in new situations. Campione interpreted this lack
of transfer as being the result of poor development of the metacognitive processes that enable participants to become aware of, and thus monitor, their own functioning. However, the result also can be interpreted as a more general cognitive
deficit. With seventh graders, the correlation between the monitoring index with
a test of fluid intelligence was .64. Furthermore, the correlation between the monitoring index and fluid intelligence, with crystallized intelligence held constant,
changed little and dropped only from .64 to .54 (Rozencwajg, 2003).

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Rozencwajg (2003) showed a correlation between the monitoring index and

problem strategies in physics (.43), which can be considered relatively strong
(Corroyer & Rouanet, 1994). That correlation is relatively high when compared
with similar studies. A tool for assessing reading metacognition was developed
by Otero, Campanario, and Hopkins (1992), who related the results to scores on
a test of overall academic achievement at various ages. The authors obtained correlations ranging from .15 to .41. Jacobs and Paris (1987) devised another tool
for evaluating reading metacognition. They obtained correlations with a reading
test ranging from .22 to .35.
Ineffective monitoring was mainly characteristic of students whose performance and conceptualization were weak. That group did not gear their resource
allocation to task difficulty (the group whose monitoring index was negative).
That result was consistent with the findings obtained by Fayol and Monteil
(1994), who noted that weak students sense that all efforts are useless because
they think they have no control over their performance (p. 97). Chartier and
Lautrey (1992) found that those students did not apply themselves cognitively
because they felt helpless.
Results
In addition to computing the traditional inferential statistics, which indicate
whether the true population effect differs from zero, we also checked the magnitude of the effect found for each of the analyses (Wilkinson et al., 1999). We followed two steps for comparing means. At the descriptive level, we looked at the
calibrated effect (CE; CE = square root [F k/n] in which k is the number of groups
and n is the number of participants). We considered the observed population effect
to be small, medium, or large if the CE was less than .30, between .30 and .60, or
more than .60, respectively (Cohen, 1988; Corroyer & Rouanet, 1994; Rouanet,
1996). This index is the ratio of the between-variance to the within-variance. The
higher the CE is, the greater the difference of means between the groups, compared
with the individual variations within each group. We tested the magnitude of the
effect in the parent population (the true effect, d) by calculating the Bayesian probability (g), knowing that a value of .90 (90%) is considered a sufficient guarantee
(Bernard, 1998; Rouanet). For all analyses, we used PAC and LeBayesien statistical software (see www.univ-rouen.fr/LMRS/persopage/lecoutre/eris.htm).
MFFT Results
We divided the participants into four groups using the median as the cutoff
point: (a) fast-accurate (short latency, high accuracy), (b) reflective (long latency,
high accuracy), (c) impulsive (short latency, low accuracy), and (d) slow-inaccurate
(long latency, low accuracy). The median of the latency scores was 61.87 s and the
median of the accuracy scores was 1.62 errors.

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Table 2 shows that the proportion of participants in each group is similar to

that which is typically found (Reuchlin, 1991) with a high correlation (but not 1)
between the latency and the number of mistakes (.75). Latency (CE = 2) and
accuracy (CE = 1.57) differed sharply in the four groups (Corroyer & Rouanet,
1994; Rouanet, 1996).
Results for the Other Cognitive Factors
As Table 3 shows, the variables clearly differentiated the participants, especially the new MRD index (metacognitive control of the solving process in the
MFFT task), which spanned a large range between a negative value of 0.42 and
a positive value of +0.86.
Relationships Between Variables
Table 4 presents the raw and z scores we obtained for the four groups, and
Figure 1 presents a graphic representation of the z scores for the different factors,
as a function of MFFT group.
TABLE 2. Mean Latency and Accuracy in the Four Groups
Group

Latency, s

Accuracy

Fast-accurate
Reflective
Impulsive
Slow-inaccurate

5
16
16
5

52.1
93.1
31.6
75.7

1.48
1.30
2.45
1.75

Note. F(3, 38) = 41.78 (p < .0001) for latency. F(3, 38) = 26.02 (p < .0001) for accuracy.

TABLE 3. Values Obtained for Each Variable

Variable
FDI
g factor
MRD
Spatial test

Min.

Max.

SD

1.00
3.00
0.42
0.00

18.00
15.00
+ 0.86
54.00

11.62
11.29
+0.42
23.67

4.95
3.39
0.33
14.79

Note. FDI = field dependence/independence; MRD = metacognitive index of reactivity to task

difficulty.

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TABLE 4. Mean Raw Scores (z Scores in Parentheses) for FDI, the Spatial
Factor, the g Factor, and MRD, Obtained by the Four MFFT Groups
Group
Fast-accurate
Reflective
Impulsive
Slow-inaccurate

FDI

Spatial

g factor

MRD

16.00 (+.90)
13.75 (+.44)
8.94 (.55)
9.00 (.54)

30.40 (+.46)
20.63 (.21)
26.50 (+.19)
17.60 (.42)

13.20 (+.57)
13.31 (+.61)
8.94 (.70)
10.40 (.26)

0.53 (+.33)
0.56 (+.43)
0.22 (.64)
0.54 (+.35)

Note. FDI = field dependence/independence; MRD = metacognitive index of reactivity to task

difficulty; MFFT = Matching Familiar Figures Test.

1.4

Factors in z Scores

1.0

0.6

0.2
0.2

0.6
1.0

Fast-Accurate

Reflective

Impulsive Slow-Inaccurate

FIGURE 1. Profile (z scores) of the four groups defined by the Matching Familiar Figures Test.

RI and FDI
As we expected, reflective individuals had a higher FDI score than did impulsive ones. Moreover, Table 4 and Figure 1 show that the fast-accurate group was
like the reflective group, whereas the slow-inaccurate group was like the impulsive

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group. The comparison (CE, t test, g) differed from the reflective and fast-accurate
groups to the impulsive and slow-inaccurate groups, CE = .90, t(1, 38) = 3.83, p <
.001. The difference seemed to be more than about 4 points, g(d > 3.90) = 0.90.
RI and the g Factor
Similarly, the reflective group achieved a higher g-factor score than did the
impulsive group. Table 4 and Figure 1 show that the fast-accurate group was like
the reflective group, whereas the slow-inaccurate group was like the impulsive
group. The reflective and fast-accurate individuals differed from the impulsive
and slow-inaccurate individuals, CE = 1.03, t(1, 38) = 3.56, p < .001. The
Bayesian probability was sufficiently high to guarantee a difference of more than
about 3 points, g(d > 2.72) = 0.90.
RI and the Spatial Factor
For the spatial factor, we expected the reflective group to have a lower score
than the impulsive group. Indeed, impulsive individuals were like fast-accurate ones
in performing better than reflective and slow-inaccurate individuals. The impulsive
and fast-accurate groups differed from the reflective and slow-inaccurate ones;
however, the magnitude of the observed difference was moderate (CE = .37), and
the true difference was not different from 0, t(1, 38) = 1.75, ns, p = .09. The difference was larger in the comparison of the fast-accurate and reflective groups (CE
= .47), and it was smaller in the comparison of the impulsive and reflective groups
(CE = .28). These results can be interpreted in terms of effective processing (here,
use of the holistic process in the spatial test), which required a certain level of general intelligence. When all participants whose general intelligence test score was
more than 1 standard deviation below the mean were withdrawn from these two
groups (impulsive, reflective), the results were different (see Table 5). In particular,
the magnitude of the difference became greater (CE rose from .28 to .63), and the
true effect differed from 0, t(1, 23) = 2.23, S, p = .04.
RI and Metacognitive Control
We expected reflective individuals to perform better than impulsive individuals on the metacognitive control index. We found that the reflective group was
similar to the fast-accurate and slow-inaccurate groups, but they were all different from the impulsive group. Impulsive individuals were different from the other
three groups. The slow-inaccurate individuals obtained poor scores on all tests
except metacognitive control, CE = .80, t(1, 38) = 3.30, p = .0001. The Bayesian
probability was sufficiently high to guarantee a difference of more than .20 points,
g(d > 0.20) = 0.90. MRD is a correlation coefficient, and a difference of .20 can
be regarded as large.

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TABLE 5. Mean Spatial Score in the Reflective and

Impulsive Groups After Removal of 1 Reflective
Participant and 6 Impulsive Participants
Group

Spatial test score

Reflective
Impulsive

15
10

20.73
33.20

From the standpoint of the processes implemented, one can therefore conclude that:
1. Reflective individuals tended to use an analytic process, which they were
capable of implementing (FDI+, g+) and which they controlled well (MRD+),
but holistic processing was not their preferential mode (S).
2. Fast-accurate individuals seemed to be capable of implementing both analytic (FDI+) and holistic (S+) processes, and they exhibited cognitive maturity
(g+, MRD+).
3. Impulsive individuals lacked cognitive maturity (g, MRD) and tended
to prefer holistic processing (S+) over analytic processing (FDI). The use of a
holistic process nevertheless seemed to require an adequate level of general intelligence.
4. Slow-inaccurate individuals adjusted their response latency to the difficulty of the task. In this respect, they were like the reflective and fast-accurate
groups and unlike the impulsive group (MRD+). They were still unable to achieve
adequate analytical (FDI) or holistic (S) processing.
Discussion
Consistent with the results of previous researchers (Borkowski et al., 1983;
Lawry et al., 1983) and with Ancillottis hypothesis (1984, 1985), reflective individuals seemed to exhibit cognitive maturity and a preference for analytic processing. These cognitive processes are unlike those of impulsive individuals, who
seemed to lack cognitive maturity and showed a preference for holistic processing. Thus, we only partly validated the hypothesis of Zelniker et al. (1977)
impulsive individuals preferred holistic processing and exhibited normal cognitive
maturity. Their privileged process was indeed holistic, but it was associated with
insufficient cognitive maturity. Moreover, when the general intelligence level of
the impulsive individuals was too low, we did not observe their superiority in holistic processing. In other words, holistic processing seemed to be possible only if
they had reached a certain level of general intelligence. On the basis of these
results, we hypothesized that general intelligence and information-processing

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preferences (i.e., cognitive styles) were only partially independent (Tucker & Warr,
1996; Zhang, 2002). One way to gain further insight into the solving modes of
impulsive individuals would be to record their eye movements to observe whether
they looked quickly (too quickly) at all eight figures in the MFFT or whether they
simply gave the first answer that seemed correct without making a thorough
inspection. This approach could be used with the MFFT of Kagan et al. (1964)
and also with Zelniker and Jeffreys (1976) global version of it.
In support of Huteaus (1987) hypothesis, reflective individuals and impulsive
individuals were different from each other when it came to metacognitive control
of problem solving, which was good for the former and bad for the latter. Fastaccurate individuals achieved a high performance level (short latency accompanied
by few mistakes) because they seemed capable of analytic and holistic processing.
Slow-inaccurate individuals were doubly jeopardized by their deficient processing
in both modes. They proved capable of adjusting the time spent on a problem to its
level of difficulty (high metacognitive control index) but to no avail. These participants apparently exerted proper metacognitive control over task execution but
lacked the ability to implement an analytic process on the MFFT.
The distinctiveness of the conclusions emerges only when all five of the
indexes are considered. In other words, a single factor cannot explain cognitive
functioning. These results support the model of integrative intelligence, which
was developed by Rozencwajg (2005).
Our findings can be conceptualized in terms of the vicariante process model,
which showed that different individuals may implement different cognitive strategies to solve a given task, depending on their preferential information-processing
mode (Reuchlin, 1978). It seems that some individuals (fast and accurate ones)
benefit from equal accessibility of analytic and global processes.
NOTE
1. We considered FDI to be the ability to master embedded contexts, not a way of
weighing visual, postural, and labyrinthine information in certain perceptual situations
(see Huteau, 1987). Because of this restriction, we assessed FDI using the GEFT.
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Received April 5, 2005