SOLID HOMES, INC. vs.

SPOUSES ANCHETA TAN and CORAZON DE JESUS TAN

G.R. Nos. 145156-57, July 29, 2005
FACTS:
On April 7, 1980, Solid Homes, Inc., sold a subdivision lot to the spouses Joe Uy and Myrna
Uy, which was registered under their name. They later sold it to the spouses Ancheta Tan and
Corazon de Jesus-Tan. With that, the former title covering the lot was cancelled and replaced by
another under the Tans name.
When the Tans visited the property, they found out the sad state of development thereat with
squatters occupying their lot and its surrounding areas.
Consequently, the Tans, through a letter, demanded on petitioner to provide the needed
utility systems and clear the area of squatters and other obstructions within a period of time to
enable them to start the construction of their house and to allow other lot owners in the area a full
access to and peaceful possession of their respective lots, conformably with P.D. No. 957 which
requires an owner or developer of a subdivision project to develop the same within one year from
the issuance of its license.
Since there was no reply, the Tans filed with the Field Office of the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB), NCR a complaint for specific performance and damages.
After due proceedings, the Housing and Land Use Arbiter rendered judgment in favor of the
Tans. Dissatisfied, petitioner appealed to the HLURB Board of Commissioners, which affirmed
that of the Arbiter. The petitioner then elevated the case to the Office of the President. It affirmed
with modification the appealed decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners, that in case
Solid Homes, Inc. fails to replace subject lot with a lot of similar size and with available
facilities, it shall pay spouses Tan the total amount received from them as purchase price.
On June 25, 1999, respondents filed a motion for partial reconsideration praying for the
deletion of that portion giving petitioner the option of merely paying them the purchase
price with interest. Respondents argued that it would be more in accord with equity and fair play
if they will be paid the fair market value of the lot in question and not merely its purchase price,
should there be no available lot with facilities in the area. Such motion was denied.
Both parties then went to the Court of Appeals via their respective petitions for review,
which was consolidated.
The Court of Appeals set aside the decision of the O.P. and affirmed the earlier decision of
the HLURB Board of Commissioners, but subject to the modification that petitioner shall pay
respondents the current market value of the lot, not merely its purchase price, should there be no
more available lots with facilities in Loyola Grand Villas Subdivision.
ISSUES:
1) Whether the respondents rights to bring the instant case against petitioner already
prescribed.

2) Whether the petitioner should pay them merely the purchase price with legal interest or
the current market value.
HELD:
1) No, the action has not prescribed.
As provided in Article 1144 of the Civil Code, the prescriptive period for bringing action
for specific performance prescribes in 10 years with the concurrence of the following: (1) Upon a
written contract; (2) Upon an obligation created by law; and (3) Upon a judgment.
In this case, respondents made their written demand upon petitioner to perform what is
incumbent upon it only on December 18, 1995, it was only from that date when the 10-year
prescriptive period under Article 1144 commenced to run. And since respondents complaint for
specific performance was filed with the Field Office of the HLURB only on April 1, 1996, or less
than four months after the date of their demand, petitioners reliance on prescription of action is
simply without any leg to stand on.
2) The injured party should be paid the market value of the lot.
There would be unjust enrichment if Solid Homes, Inc. & Purita Soliven are made to pay
only the purchase price plus interest. It is definite that the value of the subject property already
escalated after almost two decades from the time the petitioner paid for it.
Equity and justice dictate that the injured party should be paid the market value of the lot,
otherwise, respondents Solid Homes, Inc. & Purita Soliven would enrich themselves at the
expense of herein lot owners when they sell the same lot at the present market value. Surely,
such a situation should not be countenanced for to do so would be contrary to reason and
therefore, unconscionable. Over time, courts have recognized with almost pedantic adherence
that what is inconvenient or contrary to reason is not allowed in law.