FILED

15-0993
5/19/2016 3:56:25 PM
tex-10728244
SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS
BLAKE A. HAWTHORNE, CLERK

NO. 15-0993

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS

THE HONORABLE MARK HENRY,

COUNTY JUDGE OF GALVESTON COUNTY,
Petitioner,
V.
THE HONORABLE LONNIE COX,
JUDGE OF THE 56TH DISTRICT COURT OF GALVESTON COUNTY,
Respondent

On Petition for Review from the

First Court of Appeals at Houston, Texas
No. 01-15-00583-CV

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE COLLIN COUNTY, TEXAS

IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REVIEW

J. Greg Hudson
SBN 10156980
HUDSON & OLEARY LLP
1010 Mopac Circle, Suite 201
Austin, Texas 78746
(512) 441-9941 Phone
(512) 441-1501 Facsimile
ghudson@holaw.net
Counsel for Amicus Curiae
Collin County, Texas

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS .......................................................................................... ii

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES.................................................................................... iii
IDENTITY AND INTERESTS OF AMICUS CURIAE ..........................................1
ARGUMENT .............................................................................................................3
THE TRIAL COURTS INJUNCTION INTERFERED WITH THE
COMMISSIONERS COURTS STATUTORY DUTIES TO PROVIDE FOR
EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION ...................................................................................... 3
THE DISTRICT COURT ACTED BEYOND ITS SUPERVISORY
AUTHORITY AS VESTED BY ARTICLE V, SECTION 8 OF THE TEXAS
CONSTITUTION .................................................................................................................. 4
THE DISTRICT COURTS INJUNCTION CREATES DANGEROUS
PRECEDENT INSOFAR AS IT SHIFTS LEGISLATIVE POWER TO THE
JUDICIARY ............................................................................................................................ 8
PRAYER .................................................................................................................................. 9
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ......................................................................................... 10
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE .............................................................................. 11

ii

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Commissioners Court of Lubbock County v. Martin,
471 S.W.2d 100 (Tex. Civ. App.Amarillo 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.) ....................5
Dist. Judges of 188th Judicial Dist. v. County Judge and Commissioners Court for
Gregg County, Tex.,
657 S.W.2d 908 (Tex. App.Texarkana 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.) .........................5
District Judges of Collin County v. Commissioners Court of Collin County, 677
S.W.2d 743 (Tex. App.Dallas 1984, writ refd n.r.e).........................................7
Ector County v. Stringer,
843 S.W.2d 477 (Tex. 1992) ......................................................................... 5, 6, 7
Lewis v. City of Fort Worth,
126 Tex. 458, 89 S.W.2d 975 (Tex. 1936) .............................................................6
Vondy v. Commissioners Court,
620 S.W.2d 104 (Tex.1981) ..................................................................................7
Statutes
TEX. CONST. art. V, 8 ..............................................................................................5
TEX. GOVT CODE 75.401(d). ...................................................................................3
TEX. LOC. GOVT CODE 152.011 .............................................................................3
iii

IDENTITY AND INTERESTS OF AMICUS CURIAE

Collin County, Texas (Collin County) is the seventh-most populous county
in the State of Texas.

The issue before this Court, which pertains to the

supervisory authority of the District Court over the Commissioners Court

involving matters pertaining to county employee compensation, is of great interest
and significance to Collin County. Collin County has eleven District Courts,
staffed by a significant number of County employees. The County budget exceeds
three hundred sixty million dollars. The setting of the County budget (including
compensation of county employees) is a transparent political process, involving
public meetings and hearings in which the Countys taxpayers are afforded the
right to voice their opinions and concerns.
Collin County believes the Court of Appeals decision is erroneous insofar as
it allows a District Court to impermissibly overreach into the legislative budgeting
functions of the Commissioners Court in instances when the District Court simply
disagrees with the financial decision of the Commissioners Court involving the
compensation of a county employee.

Although District Courts have limited

powers to exercise supervisory authority over actions of a Commissioners Court, in

this instance the undisputed facts reflect no illegal, unreasonable or arbitrary
conduct to support the exercise of such authority.

Unwarranted interference by the judiciary into fiscal decisions made by the

Commissioners Court threatens the separation of powers between the judicial and
legislative branches of county government. Such interference erodes the powers
and statutory duties of the Commissioners Court regarding the control and
expenditure of County funds, and if such interference is allowed to stand, could
plausibly result in a dramatic shift power to the judicial branch.
Moreover, such actions remove the taxpayers from having any input or voice
in the political process. Rather, the decisions of the District Court, as evidenced in
this instance, were made at the District Courts sole discretion and without any
rights afforded to the public to participate.
Further, the Court of Appeals decision conflicts with legal precedent,
including opinions of this Court.

County Collin County requests that this Court

grant the petition for review and reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.
In accordance with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 11(c), Collin County
represents that it has not been and will not be paid any fee for preparing this brief.

ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURTS INJUNCTION INTERFERED WITH THE
COMMISSIONERS COURTS STATUTORY DUTIES TO PROVIDE FOR
EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION
Included in the legislative responsibilities of the Commissioners Court is the
statutory duty to budget for payment of salaries and benefits to County employees
TEX. LOC. GOVT CODE 152.011.

In particular, the Commissioners Court has

specific statutory authority requiring it to set the compensation of a court

administrator. See TEX. GOVT CODE 75.401(d). At the time of the temporary
injunction was granted by the District Court in this matter, the statute provided
that:
A court administrator is entitled to reasonable compensation as set by
the commissioners court.
Subsequent to the issuance of the temporary injunction, the 84th Legislature in
2015 amended the statute to provide as follows:
A court administrator is entitled to reasonable compensation, as
determined by the judges served and in the salary range for the
position, as set by the commissioners court.
Tex. Govt Code 75.401(d)
The District Courts temporary injunction was based solely on the Courts
disagreement with the action of the Commissioners Court in reducing Ms.
Quirogas compensation (which resulted as a consequence of the reduction of her
3

job duties). The District Court, on a sua sponte basis without any evidentiary
hearing, substituted its judgment for that of the Commissioners Court. Allowing
this practice to stand would preclude the Commissioners Court from being able to
comply with its statutory duties to set compensation for County employees.

It

would engraft a judicial exception to the otherwise exclusive statutory power of

the Commissioners Court to set county employee compensation, such judicial
exception potentially triggered any time a District Court disagreed with the
Commissioners Courts action on such matters.
Clearly such interference is not contemplated within the current statutory
scheme. Rather, at the time Ms. Quirogas compensation was reduced, section
75.401(d) provided that her compensation as court administrator was to be set by
the Commissioners Court. Even after the statutes amendment in 2015, the salary
for Ms. Quiroga would have to fall within the range set by the Commissioners
Court in order to satisfy the statute. The District Courts temporary injunction, and
the Court of Appeals affirmance of such order, violate this statutory scheme for
setting compensation for court administrators and result in an overreach by the
Courts into the legislative functions of the Commissioners Court.
THE DISTRICT COURT ACTED BEYOND ITS SUPERVISORY
AUTHORITY AS VESTED BY ARTICLE V, SECTION 8 OF THE TEXAS
CONSTITUTION

Article V, section 8 of the Texas Constitution vests a district court

with general supervisory control over the County Commissioners Court, with
such exceptions and such regulations as may be prescribed by law. TEX. CONST.
art. V, 8.

This authority is necessary to ensure that the legislative branch of

county government provides the staffing and resources sufficient to allow for
county departments and the other branches of county government to perform their
essential functions.

Dist. Judges of 188th Judicial Dist. v. County Judge and

Commissioners Court for Gregg County, Tex., 657 S.W.2d 908 (Tex. App.
Texarkana 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Commissioners Court of Lubbock County v.
Martin, 471 S.W.2d 100, 110 (Tex. Civ. App.Amarillo 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
The Texas Supreme Court had occasion to interpret this grant of authority in
the context of county employee compensation in Ector County v. Stringer, 843
S.W.2d 477 (Tex. 1992). Ector County involved discretionary fiscal decisions
made by the Commissioners Court in the performance of their official duties.
Rather than giving the district court broad authority, as the First Court of Appeals
has done in the case below, the Texas Supreme Court narrowly circumscribed the
district courts powers in reviewing such decisions. It stated:
[A] court has no right to substitute its judgment and discretion for the
judgment and discretion of the governing body on which the law visits
the primary power and duty to act. Of course, if such governing body
5

acts illegally, unreasonably, or arbitrarily, a court of competent

jurisdiction may so adjudge, but there the power of the court ends.
Ector County v. Stringer 843 S.W.2d at 479 citing Lewis v. City of Fort Worth, 126
Tex. 458, 89 S.W.2d 975, 978 (Tex. 1936).
The principles outlined in Ector County are clear and unambiguous. Absent
a finding that the Commissioners Court acted illegally, unreasonably, or arbitrarily,
the district court had no authority to order a specific amount of compensation to be
paid to Ms. Quiroga.

And the record is devoid of any evidence of illegal,

unreasonable or arbitrary conduct by the Commissioners Court in reducing

Quirogas compensation.
To the contrary, in setting Ms. Quirogas new salary as court administrator,
the Commissioners Court relied upon salary surveys and findings that Quirogas
new position required fewer duties than the position she previously occupied. Her
adjusted compensation, as set by the Commissioners Court was not unreasonable.
But, clearly it was not favored by the District Court which acted sua sponte to
enjoin any reduction in Ms. Quirogas compensation. But in doing so, the District
Court exceeded its inherent supervisory authority as allowed under Article V,
section 8 of the Texas Constitution.
There are several incidents in Texas jurisprudence where the judiciary
addressed salaries set by the Commissioners Court and determined that Court
6

intervention was necessary per its supervisory authority vested by Article V,

section 8. In such instances, where the evidence reflects that the Commissioners
Courts salary allowances are found to be arbitrary or unreasonable, the Court
orders the Commissioners Court to provide reasonable compensation to the
affected official or employee, thereby sending the issue back to the Commissioners
Court to be legislatively re-determined. Ector County v. Stringer, 843 S.W.2d 477,
479 (Tex. 1992). (Thus, while the district court may order the commissioners
court to carry out its constitutional duty to set a reasonable salary, the district court
cannot substitute its discretion for that of the commissioners by making that
determination itself.); Vondy v. Commissioners Court, 620 S.W.2d 104
(Tex.1981). However, in those instances, the Courts do not dictate the amount of
compensation, but simply order that reasonable compensation be paid.
That is not the case here. The District Courts temporary injunction did not
command the Commissioners Court to set a reasonable salary for Ms. Quiroga.
Rather it ordered that her prior salary be reinstated.

On its face, the order violated

TEX. GOVT. CODE 75.401(d), usurping the authority of the Commissioners Court
to set the salary amount to be paid to Ms. Quiroga. District Judges of Collin
County v. Commissioners Court of Collin County, 677 S.W.2d 743, 746 (Tex.
App.Dallas 1984, writ refd n.r.e) (district judges order that set a salary is

void when it contravenes a statute which vests exclusive authority in the

Commissioners Court to set the salary.)
THE DISTRICT COURTS INJUNCTION CREATES DANGEROUS
PRECEDENT INSOFAR AS IT SHIFTS LEGISLATIVE POWER TO THE
JUDICIARY
The Court of Appeals ruling creates a dangerous precedent for several
reasons. First, it affirms the power of a District Court to substitute its judgment for
that of the Commissioners Court in those situations where it merely disagrees with
a legislative decision of the Commissioners Court, thereby disregarding the proper
standard of review set forth in the decisions of the States appellate courts.

Such

action usurps the legislative grant of authority vested in the Commissioners Court,
in the instant case, by TEX. GOVT. CODE 75.401(d).
Second, the overreach by the District Court threatens the separation of
powers doctrine of government, allowing the decisions of the District Court to
interfere with, and in this instance override the valid exercise the legislative power
of the Commissioners Court.
Third, the District Courts action, in setting Ms. Quirogas compensation
was taken sua sponte, outside the political process for which the public has a right
to participate. Implicit in any legislative act is the right for such action to be taken
in the open, with rights afforded to the public to participate and provide input.
And lastly, practically and pragmatically, if a District Court is allowed to
8

assume the role of big brother to the decisions of the Commissioners Court,
second guessing the Commissioners decisions and acting to override those for
which the Court disagrees, the result would be the degradation and erosion of the
County Commissioners day-to-day control of the County budget and County
expenditures.
PRAYER
Collin County respectfully prays that the petition in this case be granted and
that the judgment of the Court of Appeals be reversed.

Respectfully submitted,
/s/ J. Greg Hudson
J. Greg Hudson
SBN 10156980
HUDSON & OLEARY LLP
1010 Mopac Circle, Suite 201
Austin, Texas 78746
(512) 441-9941 Phone
(512) 441-1501 Facsimile
ghudson@holaw.net
Counsel for Amicus Curiae
Collin County, Texas

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a copy of this Brief of Amicus Curiae Collin County, Texas
was served electronically on this the 19th day of May to the following counsel of
record:
N. Terry Adams, Jr.
tadams@bmpllp.com
Joseph M. Nixon
jnixon@bmpllp.com
Nicholas D. Stepp
nstepp@bmpllp.com
BEIRNE, MAYNARD & PARSONS, L.L.P.
1300 Post Oak Blvd., Suite 2500
Houston, Texas 77056
Telephone: (713) 623-0887
Fax: (713) 960-1527

Mark W. Stevens
markwandstev@sbcglobal.net
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 8118
Galveston, TX 77553
(409) 765-6306 telephone
(409) 765-6469 facsimile
Attorney for Respondent

James E. Trey Trainor, III

ttrainor@bmpllp.com
BEIRNE, MAYNARD & PARSONS, L.L.P.
401 W. 15th Street, Suite 845
Austin, Texas 78701
Telephone: (512) 623-6700
Fax: (512) 623-6701
Attorneys for Petitioner

10

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
The undersigned attorney certifies that this document complies with the
word-count limitations of Tex. R. App. P. 9.4 according to the word count feature
of MS Word. This document contains 2,272 words.

/s/ J. Greg Hudson

J. Greg Hudson

11