Facts:

On 12/10/73, Filomena de Sevilla died intestate leaving 8 children: William, Peter, Leopoldo, Felipe, Rosa, Maria, Luzvilla
and Jimmy. William, Jimmy and Maria are deceased survived by their spouses and children. Filomena left 4 parcels of
land. Parcel 1 was a paraphernal property by the deceased co-owned with her sisters Honorata and Felisa while parcel
2,3 and 4 were conjugal properties together with her late husband. When Honorata died, she left her 1/3 share to Felisa
and the heirs of Filomena in shares each.
Felisa died on 7/6/88. Previously, on 11/25/85, she executed a last will and testament devising her 1/2 share in parcel 1 to
the spouses Leopoldo Sevilla and Belen Leyson. On 8/8/86, Felisa executed another document denominated as
"Donation Inter Vivos" ceding to Leopoldo Sevilla her 1/2 undivided share in Lot No. 653, which was accepted by
Leopoldo in the same document.
On 9/3/86, Felisa and Peter, in his own behalf and in behalf of the heirs of Filomena, executed a Deed of Extra-judicial
Partition, identifying and adjudicating the 1/3 share of Honorata to the heirs of Filomena and to Felisa.
Thereafter, respondents Leopoldo, Peter and Luzvilla Sevilla obtained the cancellation of TCT over parcel 1, and the
issuance of the corresponding titles to Felisa and the heirs of Filomena. However, the requested titles for Lot Nos. 653-A
and 653-B, were left unsigned by the Register of Deeds of Dipolog City, pending submission by Peter Sevilla of a Special
Power of Attorney authorizing him to represent the other heirs of Filomena.
On 6/21/90, Petitioners filed the instant case against respondents, for annulment of the Deed of Donation and the Deed of
Extrajudicial Partition, Accounting, Damages, with prayer for Receivership and for Partition of the properties of the late
Filomena. They alleged that the Deed of Donation is tainted with fraud because Felisa, who was then 81 years of age,
was seriously ill and of unsound mind at the time of the execution thereof; and that the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition is
void because it was executed without their knowledge and consent.
In their answer, respondents denied that there was fraud or undue pressure in the execution of the questioned
documents. Respondents further prayed that Parcels II, III, and IV be partitioned among the heirs of Filomena Almirol de
Sevilla in accordance with the law on intestate succession.
RTC decided in upholding the validity of the deed of donation and the unenforcability of the deed of extra-judicial partition.
Both parties appealed to the CA. Petitioners stated that the deed of donation should be void and that parcel 1 should be
divided among them equally while defendants stated that the court erred in ruling the deed of extra judicial partition
unenforceable. CA agreed with the RTC.
Issue:
W/N the deed of donation was valid? YES
Ruling:
There is nothing the facts that would show that the donation of Felisa was without consent. In fact, she was already the
rightful owner of of the property since it was validly given to her by Honorata. She has the freedom to do as she pleases
with the property that she owns. Donation in the act of liberality and its invalidity should be proven by clear and convincing
evidence. There is nothing that would show that there was fraud on the part of Leopoldo as claimed by the petitioners.
They also were not able to prove that Felisa was incapable of donation because of her old age. The assumption therefore
must be for its validity. Hence, the donation is in fact valid.

G.R. No. L-45262 July 23, 1990

RUPERTO REYES and REYNALDO C. SAN JUAN, in his capacity as Special Administrator, petitioners,
vs.
HON. LORENZO R. MOSQUEDA, Judge of CFI, Pampanga (Branch VII), and URSULA D. PASCUAL, respondents.
G.R. No. L-45394 July 23, 1990

PEDRO DALUSONG, petitioner,

vs
HON. LORENZO R. MOSQUEDA, JUDGE, BRANCH VII, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF PAMPANGA, and
URSULA D. PASCUAL, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 73241-42 July 23, 1990
OFELIA D. PARUNGAO and ROSARIO DUNCIL, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, (Third Civil Cases Division), BENJAMIN P. REYES and OSCAR
REYES, respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

The instant petitions have been consolidated as they arose from the same facts and involve similar issues. Dr. Emilio
Pascual died intestate and without issue on November 18,1972. He was survived by his sister, Ursula Pascual and the
children of his late sisters as follows: (1) Maria Pascual Reyes- Ruperto Reyes and Jose Reyes; (2) Ines Pascual ReyesJose P. Reyes, Benito Reyes, and Manna Reyes Manalastas; (3) Josefa Pascual Reyes-Augusto Reyes and Benjamin
Reyes; and (4) Escolastica Pascual Dalusong (half- blood Pedro Dalusong.
On December 3, 1973, the heirs of Dr. Pascual filed Special Proceedings No. 73-30-M in the then Court of First Instance
of Pampanga for the administration of his estate. Atty. Marcela Macapagal, Clerk of Court of Branch VII was appointed
special administratrix. Macapagal was, however, replaced by Reynaldo San Juan.
On February 12, 1976, Ursula Pascual filed a motion to exclude some properties from the inventory of Pascual's estate
and to deliver the titles thereto to her. Ursula alleged that Dr. Pascual during his lifetime or on November 2, 1966 executed
a "Donation Mortis Causa" in her favor covering properties which are included in the estate of Dr. Pascual (subject of
Special Proceedings No. 73-30-M) and therefore should be excluded from the inventory.
On August 1, 1976; the trial court issued an order excluding from the inventory of the estate the properties donated to
Ursula, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing discussion, let the properties listed in paragraph 2 of the
motion of February 12, 1976 filed by Ursula D. Pascual thru counsel be, as it is hereby ordered, excluded
from the inventory of the estate of the deceased Dr. Emilio D. Pascual, without prejudice to its final
determination in a separate action. Special Administrator Reynaldo San Juan is hereby ordered to return
to Court the custody of the corresponding certificates of titles of these properties, until the issue of
ownership is finally determined in a separate action. (G.R. No. 45262, pp. 23-24)
The Order is now the subject of G.R. Nos. 45262 and 45394. On January 5, 1977, we issued a temporary restraining
order enjoining the trial court from enforcing the August 1, 1976 Order.

Among the properties included in the "donation mortis causa" in favor of Ursula was Lot 24, Block No. 15 of the
subdivision plan Psd-3231, located at 1109-1111 R. Papa St., Tondo, Manila as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 17854. The records show that on May 15, 1969, Emilio Pascual executed a deed of donation of real property inter
vivos over the abovementioned lot in Manila in favor of Ofelia D. Parungao, petitioner in G.R. Nos. 73241-42 a minor with
her mother, Rosario Duncil, accepting the gift and donation for and in her behalf. When Parungao reached the age of
majority or on December 20, 1976, she tried to have the donation registered. However, she found out that the certificate of
title was missing from where it was supposed to be kept, prompting her to file a petition for reconstitution of title with the
Court of First Instance of Manila. The petition was granted in October 1977. Parungao registered the deed of donation
with the Register of Deeds of Manila who cancelled Transfer Certificate of Title No. 17854 and issued in lieu thereof
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 129092 in the name of Ofelia Parungao. She then filed a motion for exclusion in Special
Proceedings No. 73-30-M.
In the meantime, on September 23, 1976, Ursula Pascual executed a deed of absolute sale over the Tondo property in
favor of Benjamin, Oscar, Jose and Emmanuel, all surnamed Reyes.
On May 2, 1978, Benjamin Reyes, private respondent in G.R. Nos. 73241-42 filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 129092, Register of Deeds of Manila and/or reconveyance of deed of title against Ofelia
Parungao and Rosario Duncil, with the then Court of First Instance of Manila. The case was docketed as Civil Case No.
115164.
In their answer with compulsory counterclaim Parungao and Duncil, denied Reyes' assertion of ownership over the Tondo
property. On November 6, 1978, Ofelia Parungao filed a complaint for recovery of possession over the Tondo property
against Benjamin Reyes and his nephew Oscar Reyes with the Court of First Instance of Manila. The case was docketed
as Civil Case No. 119359. In her complaint, Parungao also alleged that as early as 1973, the defendants occupied two (2)
doors of the apartment situated at the Tondo property by mere tolerance of the previous owner, Dr. Emilio Pascual, and
later by her until April 8, 1978 when she formally demanded that the defendants vacate the premises. Parungao prayed
that the defendants be evicted from the premises.
The two cases were consolidated. On June 3, 1982, the then Court of First Instance, Branch 8 rendered a joint decision,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered: In Civil Case No. 115164
1) Declaring TCT No. 129092 in the name of Ofelia Parungao null and void; and ordering the Register of
Deeds of Manila to cancel said title and to restore, in lieu thereof, TCT No. 17854 in the name of Emilio D.
Pascual;
2) Ordering Ofelia D. Parungao to pay plaintiff Benjamin P. Reyes the sum of Two Thousand (P2,000.00)
Pesos, as and for attorney's fees; and to pay the costs of suit including all fees which the Register of
Deeds may prescribe for the full implementation of this decision. For lack of merit, the counterclaim is
dismissed.
In Civil Case No. 119359
1) Dismissing the complaint for want of merit; and
2) On the counterclaim, ordering Ofelia Parungao to pay defendant defendants the sum of Two Thousand
(P2,000.00) Pesos as and for attorney's fees.'
Parungao appealed the decision to the then Intermediate Appellate Court. The decision was, however, affirmed, with costs
against the appellant.
The Intermediate Appellate Court decision is now the subject matter in G.R. Nos. 73241-42.

On January 29, 1986, we issued a minute resolution denying the above petition for lack of merit. The resolution became
final and executory on March 10, 1986 and on this same day the entry of judgment was effected. The entry of judgment
was however set aside in the resolution dated January 19, 1987 on the ground that the January 29, 1986 resolution was
not received by the petitioners' counsel of record. The petitioner was granted leave to file a motion for reconsideration of
the January 29, 1986 resolution.
The motion for reconsideration is now before us for resolution petition.
The issues raised in these petitions are two-fold: (1) In G.R. No. L-45394, petitioner Pedro Dalusong questions the
jurisdiction of the probate court to exclude the properties donated to Ursula Pascual in its Order dated August 1, 1976,
and (2) In G.R. No. L-45262 and G.R. Nos. 73241-42 Ruperto Reyes, Reynaldo C. San Juan, in his capacity as special
administrator of the estate of Emilio Pascual (petitioner in G.R. No.
L- 45262), Ofelia Parungao and Rosario Duncil (petitioners in G.R. Nos. 7324142) question the appellate court's finding
that the "Donation Mortis Causa" executed by Emilio Pascual in favor of his sister Ursula Pascual was actually a Donation
Inter Vivos.
We first discuss the issue on jurisdiction. The questioned August 1, 1976 order of the then Court of First Instance of
Pampanga in S.P. Proc. No. 73-30-M categorically stated that the exclusion from the inventory of the estate of the
deceased Dr. Emilio D. Pascual was "without prejudice to its final determination in a separate action." The provisional
character of the exclusion of the contested properties in the inventory as stressed in the order is within the jurisdiction of
the probate court. This was stressed in the case of Cuizon v. Ramolete (129 SCRA 495 [1984]) which we cited in the case
of Morales v. Court of First Instance of Cavite, Branch V (146 SCRA 373 [1986]):
It is well-settled rule that a probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate
cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are equally
claimed to belong to outside parties. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to
determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be
administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, well and good; but if there is, then the parties, the
administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the
conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so (Mallari v. Mallari, 92 Phil. 694; Baquial
v. Amihan, 92 Phil. 501).itc-asl
Similarly, in Valero Vda. de Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals, (91 SCRA 540) we held that for the purpose of
determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory, the probate
court may pass upon the title thereto but such determination is not conclusive and is subject to the final
decision in a separate action regarding ownership which may be instituted by the parties (3 Moran's
Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Edition, pages 448449 and 473; Lachenal v. Salas,
L-42257, June 14, 1976, 71 SCRA 262, 266).
On the second issue, it may be noted that the Court of Appeals did not pass upon the authenticity of the 1969 donation to
Parungao because of its finding that the 1966 donation to Pascual was inter vivos. The petitioners do not press the
authenticity of the 1969 donation as their challenge centers on whether or not the 1966 donation was inter vivos.
However, the trial court has a lengthy discussion reflecting adversely on the authenticity of the 1969 donation to
Parungao.
The petitioners assert that the 1966 donation was null and void since it was not executed with the formalities of a will.
Therefore, the petitioners in G.R. No. L-45262 insist that the donated properties should revert to the estate of Emilio
Pascual while the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 73241-42 insist that the donation of real property inter vivos in favor of Ofelia
Parungao be given effect.
The subject deed of donation titled "DONATION MORTIS CAUSA" duly notarized by a certain Cornelio M. Sigua states:

That Dr. Emilio D. Pascual, Filipino, single, of age and resident of Apalit, Pampanga, hereinafter called the
DONOR and Ursula D. Pascual, Filipino, single, also of age, resident of and with postal address at Apalit,
Pampanga, hereinafter called the DONEE, have agreed, as they do hereby agree, to the following, to wit:
That the said DONOR, Dr. Emilio D. Pascual, for and in consideration of the love and affection which he
has and bears unto the said DONEE, as also for the personal services rendered by the said DONEE to
the said DONOR, does hereby by these presents voluntarily GIVE, GRANT, and DONATE MORTIS
CAUSA unto the said DONEE URSULA D. PASCUAL, her heirs and assigns, all of my rights, title and
interest, in and to the following parcels of land with all the improvements thereon, situated in the
Municipality of Apalit, Pampanga, and more particularly described and Identified as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
(Enumerated herein are 41 parcels of land)
Also included in this DONATION MORTIS CAUSA are all personal properties of the DONOR in the form
of cash money or bank deposits and insurance in his favor, and his real properties situated in other towns
of Pampanga, such as San Simon, and in the province of Rizal, San Francisco del Monte and in the City
of Manila.
That the said donor has reserved for himself sufficient property to maintain him for life; and that the said
DONEE does hereby ACCEPT and RECEIVE this DONATION MORTIS CAUSA and further does express
his appreciation and gratefulness for the generosity of said DONOR; (Rollo of G.R. No. L-45262, pp. 1216)
xxx xxx xxx
Considering the provisions of the DONATION MORTIS CAUSA the appellate court ruled that the deed of donation was
actually a donation inter vivos although denominated as DONATION MORTIS CAUSA.
It is, now a settled rule that the title given to a deed of donation is not the determinative factor which makes the donation
"inter vivos" or "mortis causa" As early as the case of Laureta v. Manta, et al., (44 Phil. 668 [1928]) this Court ruled that
the dispositions in a deed of donation-whether "inter vivos" or "mortis causa" do not depend on the title or term used in the
deed of donation but on the provisions stated in such deed. This Court explained in Concepcion v. Concepcion (91 Phil.
823 [1952])
...But, it is a rule consistently followed by the courts that it is the body of the document of donation and the
statements contained therein, and not the title that should be considered in ascertaining the intention of
the donor. Here, the donation is entitled and called donacion onerosa mortis causa. From the body,
however, we find that the donation was of a nature remunerative rather than onerous. It was for past
services rendered, services which may not be considered as a debt to be paid by the donee but services
rendered to her freely and in goodwill. The donation instead of being onerous or for a valuable
consideration, as in payment of a legal obligation, was more of remuneratory or compensatory nature,
besides being partly motivated by affection.
We should not give too much importance or significance to or be guided by the use of the phrase 'mortis
causa in a donation and thereby to conclude that the donation is not one of inter vivos. In the case of De
Guzman et al. v. Ibea et al. (67 Phil. 633), this Court through Mr. Chief Justice Avancena said that if a
donation by its terms is inter vivos, this character is not altered by the fact that the donor styles it mortis
causa.
In the case of Laureta v. Mata, et al. (44 Phil. 668), the court held that the donation involved was inter
vivos. There, the donor Severa Magno y Laureta gave the properties involved as

... a reward for the services which he is rendering me, and as a token of my affection toward him and of
the fact that he stands high in my estimation, I hereby donate 'mortis causa to said youth all the properties
described as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
I also declare that it is the condition of this donation that the donee cannot take possession of the
properties donated before the death of the donor, and in the event of her death the said donee shall be
under obligation to cause a mass to be held annually as a suffrage in behalf of my sold, and also to defray
the expenses of my burial and funerals.'
It will be observed that the present case and that of Laureta above cited are similar in that in both cases
the donation was being made as a reward for services rendered and being rendered, and as a token of
affection for the donee; the phrase 'mortis causa was used; the donee to take possession of the property
donated only after the death of the donor; the donee was under obligation to defray the expenses incident
to the celebration of the anniversary of the donor's death, including church fees. The donation in both
cases were duly accepted. In said case of Laureta this Court held that the donation was in praesenti and
not a gift in futuro.
In the later case of Bonsato et al. v. Court of appeals, et al. (95 Phil. 481 [1954]) this Court, distinguished the
characteristics of a donation inter vivos and "mortis causa" in this wise:
Did the late Domingo Bonsato, make donations inter vivos or dispositions post mortem in favor of the
petitioners herein? If the latter, then the documents should reveal any or all of the following
characteristics:
(1) Convey no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or, what amounts to
the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (fun or naked) and control of the property
while alive (Vidal v. Posadas, 58 Phil., 108; Guzman v. Ibea 67 Phil., 633);
(2) That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but
revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the
properties conveyed (Bautista v. Sabiniano, G.R. No. L- 4326, November 18, 1952);
(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.
These principles were repeated in the case of Castro v. Court of Appeals (27 SCRA 1076 [1969]), to wit:
Whether a donation is inter vivos or mortis causa depends upon the nature of the disposition made. 'Did
the donor intend to transfer the ownership of the property donated upon the execution of the donation? If
this is so, as reflected from the provisions contained in the donation, then it is inter vivos; otherwise, it is
merely mortis causa, or made to take effect after death.' (Howard v. Padilla and Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. L-7064 and L-7098, April 22, 1955.
Applying the above principles to the instant petitions, there is no doubt that the so-called DONATION MORTIS CAUSA is
really a donation inter vivos. The donation was executed by Dr. Pascual in favor of his sister Ursula Pascual out of love
and affection as well as a recognition of the personal services rendered by the donee to the donor. The transfer of
ownership over the properties donated to the donee was immediate and independent of the death of the donor. The
provision as regards the reservation of properties for the donor's subsistence in relation to the other provisions of the deed
of donation confirms the intention of the donor to give naked ownership of the properties to the donee immediately after
the execution of the deed of donation.
With these findings we find no need to discuss the other arguments raised by the petitioners.

WHEREFORE, this Court hereby renders judgment as follows:

1) In G.R. Nos. 45262 and 45394 the petitions are DENIED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued on January 5, 1977
is hereby LIFTED; and
2) In G.R. Nos. 73241-42, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED. This DENIAL is FINAL.
SO ORDERED.

PAJARILLO VS IAC
Facts:
Perfecta baleen died in 1945 leaving a 28-hectare lot. Perfecta was survived by sister juana and brother felipe.
May 1946 juana and felipe executed an Extrajudicial Sale of the Estate of Perfecta, which states that Felipe and
Juana agreed to carry out the requests of perfecta that in consideration of her love and affection it be donated to
Salud who is the daughter of Juana.
June 1946 Salud executed the following public instrument which states: that I salud the only done do hereby
receive and accept this donation and further express my gratitude for the kindness and liberality of the donors,
felipe and juana.
1951, acceding to the request of her mother juana, salud transferred possession of the lot to her mother who was
them living with Claudio saluds brother and his family.
During the period they were occupying the land, Claudio paid realty taxes.
May 25, 1956 Juana executed a deed of absolute sale conveying the land to Claudio for 12,000. Claudio had the
land registered in his name and was issued.
1963, juana died.
1965 salud filed a complaint for reconveyance on the ground that deed of sale in favor of Claudio was fictitious
and its registration was null and void.
Claudio argues that the fact that acceptance was made in separate instrument was not noted in both instruments
as required by the civil code.
ISSUE: WON THE DONATION IS VALID
HELD:YES.
It is true that there is nothing in either of the two instruments showing that authentic notice of the acceptance
was made by salud to felipe. And while the first instrument contains the statement that the done does hereby
accept this donation and does hereby express her gratitude for the kindness and liberality of the donor the only
signatories thereof were Felipe and Juana.. That was in fact the reason for separate instrument f acceptance
signed by Salud a month later.
A strict interpretation of art 633 of the old civil code, can lead to no other conclusion that on the annulment of the
donation for being defective in for. This would be in keeping with the unmistakable language of art. 633.
A literal adherence to the requirement of the law might result not in justice to the parties but conversely a
distortion of their intentions it is also a policy of the court to avoid such an interpretation.
The purpose of the formal requirement is to insure that the acceptance of the donation is duly communicated to
the donor. Here it is not even, suggested that Juana was unaware of the acceptance for she in fact confirmed it
later and requested that the donated land be not registered during her lifetime by salud.
The donation cannot be declared ineffective just because there is no notation in the EJS of donees acceptance
that would be placing too much stress on mere form over the substance. It would also be disregard the clear

reality of the acceptance of the donation as manifested in these separate instrument and as later acknowledge
and as latter acknowledged by juana

GESTOPA vs. COURT OF APPEALS:

Perfection of Donations:
Spouses Diego and Catalina Danlag owned 6 parcels of land. In 1965, they executed 3 Deeds of Donations
Mortis Causa in favor of Mercedes Danlag-Pilapil. Later, they executed a Deed of Donation Inter Vivos in
favor of Mercedes over the same parcels of land plus 2 more with the condition that the Donors will
continue enjoying the fruits of the land during their lifetime and the donee cannot sell the land without the
Donors previous consent.
In 1973, Danlag spouses sold 2 parcels of land to the Gestopa Spouses; the lands sold were covered by the
DoD in favor of Mercedes. They then revoked the DoD, to recover the 6 parcels of land from Mercedes.
Mercedes filed a petition for Quieting of Title against the Danlags and the Gestopas.
RTC- Ruled in favor of the defendants. CA- reversed the decision of the RTC and declared Mercedes as the
absolute owner of the 6 parcels of land in the DoD inter vivos. It held, among other things: the reservation
by the donor of lifetime usufruct indicated that he transferred to Mercedes the ownership over the donated
properties; and that the right to sell belonged to the donee, and the donor's right referred to that of merely
giving consent.
ISSUE: Whether the donor intended the to transfer the ownership over the properties upon execution of
the deed.
RULING:
CAs decision is affirmed. The Deed of Donation stated that Diego donated the properties out of love and
affection for the donee. This is a mark of a donation inter vivos. The Deed contained a reservation of
lifetime usufruct, which indicates that the donor intended to transfer the naked ownership over the
properties. The donor stated that he reserved sufficient properties for his maintenance in accordance with
his standing in society, indicating that he intended to part with the six parcels of land. Lastly, the donee
accepted the donation Alejandro vs. Geraldez: an acceptance clause is a mark that the
donation is inter vivos. Acceptance is a requirement for donations inter vivos. Donations
mortis causa, being in the form of a will, are not required to be accepted by the donees during
the donors' lifetime.
CA was correct: the right to dispose of the properties belonged to the donee. The donor's right to give
consent was merely intended to protect his usufructuary interests.
Prior to the execution of donation inter vivos, the Danlag spouses already executed three donations mortis
causa. If they did not intend to donate inter vivos, they would not again donate the four lots already
donated mortis causa.
The revocation was not valid. A valid donation, once accepted, becomes irrevocable, except on
account of officiousness, failure by the donee to comply with the charges imposed in the donation, or
ingratitude. The donor-spouses did not invoke any of these reasons in the deed of revocation.

G.R. No. 77425 June 19, 1991

THE ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA, THE ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF IMUS, and the SPOUSES
FLORENCIO IGNAO and SOLEDAD C. IGNAO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE ESTATE OF DECEASED SPOUSES EUSEBIO DE CASTRO and MARTINA RIETA,
represented by MARINA RIETA GRANADOS and THERESA RIETA TOLENTINO, respondents.
G.R. No. 77450 June 19, 1991
THE ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA, THE ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF IMUS, and the SPOUSES
FLORENCIO IGNAO and SOLEDAD C. IGNAO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE ESTATE OF DECEASED SPOUSES EUSEBIO DE CASTRO and MARTINA RIETA,
represented by MARINA RIETA GRANADOS and THERESA RIETA TOLENTINO, respondents.
Severino C. Dominguez for petitioner Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus, Cavite.
Dolorfino and Dominguez Law Offices for Sps. Ignao.
Joselito R. Enriquez for private respondents.

REGALADO, J.:p
These two petitions for review on certiorari 1 seek to overturn the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
05456 2 which reversed and set aside the order of the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite dismissing Civil Case No. 09584, as well as the order of said respondent court denying petitioner's motions for the reconsideration of its aforesaid
decision.
On November 29, 1984, private respondents as plaintiffs, filed a complaint for nullification of deed of donation, rescission
of contract and reconveyance of real property with damages against petitioners Florencio and Soledad C. Ignao and the
Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus, Cavite, together with the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, before the Regional Trial
Court, Branch XX, Imus, Cavite and which was docketed as Civil Case No. 095-84 therein. 3
In their complaint, private respondents alleged that on August 23, 1930, the spouses Eusebio de Castro and Martina
Rieta, now both deceased, executed a deed of donation in favor of therein defendant Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Manila covering a parcel of land (Lot No. 626, Cadastral Survey of Kawit), located at Kawit, Cavite, containing an area of
964 square meters, more or less. The deed of donation allegedly provides that the donee shall not dispose or sell the
property within a period of one hundred (100) years from the execution of the deed of donation, otherwise a violation of
such condition would render ipso facto null and void the deed of donation and the property would revert to the estate of
the donors.
It is further alleged that on or about June 30, 1980, and while still within the prohibitive period to dispose of the property,
petitioner Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus, in whose administration all properties within the province of Cavite owned by
the Archdiocese of Manila was allegedly transferred on April 26, 1962, executed a deed of absolute sale of the property
subject of the donation in favor of petitioners Florencio and Soledad C. Ignao in consideration of the sum of P114,000. 00.
As a consequence of the sale, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 115990 was issued by the Register of Deeds of Cavite on
November 15, 1980 in the name of said petitioner spouses.
What transpired thereafter is narrated by respondent court in its assailed decision. 4 On December 17, 1984, petitioners
Florencio Ignao and Soledad C. Ignao filed a motion to dismiss based on the grounds that (1) herein private respondents,
as plaintiffs therein, have no legal capacity to sue; and (2) the complaint states no cause of action.
On December 19, 1984, petitioner Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus also filed a motion to dismiss on three (3) grounds, the
first two (2) grounds of which were identical to that of the motion to dismiss filed by the Ignao spouses, and the third
ground being that the cause of action has prescribed.

On January 9, 1985, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila likewise filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that he is
not a real party in interest and, therefore, the complaint does not state a cause of action against him.
After private respondents had filed their oppositions to the said motions to dismiss and the petitioners had countered with
their respective replies, with rejoinders thereto by private respondents, the trial court issued an order dated January 31,
1985, dismissing the complaint on the ground that the cause of action has prescribed. 5
Private respondents thereafter appealed to the Court of Appeals raising the issues on (a) whether or not the action for
rescission of contracts (deed of donation and deed of sale) has prescribed; and (b) whether or not the dismissal of the
action for rescission of contracts (deed of donation and deed of sale) on the ground of prescription carries with it the
dismissal of the main action for reconveyance of real property. 6
On December 23, 1986, respondent Court of Appeals, holding that the action has not yet prescibed, rendered a decision
in favor of private respondents, with the following dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, the Order of January 31, 1985 dismissing appellants' complaint is SET ASIDE and Civil
Case No. 095-84 is hereby ordered REINSTATED and REMANDED to the lower court for further
proceedings. No Costs. 7
Petitioners Ignao and the Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus then filed their separate motions for reconsideration which were
denied by respondent Court of Appeals in its resolution dated February 6, 1987, 8 hence, the filing of these appeals by
certiorari.
It is the contention of petitioners that the cause of action of herein private respondents has already prescribed, invoking
Article 764 of the Civil Code which provides that "(t)he donation shall be revoked at the instance of the donor, when the
donee fails to comply with any of the conditions which the former imposed upon the latter," and that "(t)his action shall
prescribe after four years from the non-compliance with the condition, may be transmitted to the heirs of the donor, and
may be exercised against the donee's heirs.
We do not agree.
Although it is true that under Article 764 of the Civil Code an action for the revocation of a donation must be brought within
four (4) years from the non-compliance of the conditions of the donation, the same is not applicable in the case at bar. The
deed of donation involved herein expressly provides for automatic reversion of the property donated in case of violation of
the condition therein, hence a judicial declaration revoking the same is not necessary, As aptly stated by the Court of
Appeals:
By the very express provision in the deed of donation itself that the violation of the condition thereof would
render ipso facto null and void the deed of donation, WE are of the opinion that there would be no legal
necessity anymore to have the donation judicially declared null and void for the reason that the very deed
of donation itself declares it so. For where (sic) it otherwise and that the donors and the donee
contemplated a court action during the execution of the deed of donation to have the donation judicially
rescinded or declared null and void should the condition be violated, then the phrase reading "would
render ipso facto null and void" would not appear in the deed of donation. 9
In support of its aforesaid position, respondent court relied on the rule that a judicial action for rescission of a contract is
not necessary where the contract provides that it may be revoked and cancelled for violation of any of its terms and
conditions. 10 It called attention to the holding that there is nothing in the law that prohibits the parties from entering into an
agreement that a violation of the terms of the contract would cause its cancellation even without court intervention, and
that it is not always necessary for the injured party to resort to court for rescission of the contract. 11 It reiterated the
doctrine that a judicial action is proper only when there is absence of a special provision granting the power of
cancellation. 12
It is true that the aforesaid rules were applied to the contracts involved therein, but we see no reason why the same
should not apply to the donation in the present case. Article 732 of the Civil Code provides that donations inter vivos shall
be governed by the general provisions on contracts and obligations in all that is not determined in Title III, Book III on
donations. Now, said Title III does not have an explicit provision on the matter of a donation with a resolutory condition
and which is subject to an express provision that the same shall be considered ipso facto revoked upon the breach of said
resolutory condition imposed in the deed therefor, as is the case of the deed presently in question. The suppletory
application of the foregoing doctrinal rulings to the present controversy is consequently justified.

The validity of such a stipulation in the deed of donation providing for the automatic reversion of the donated property to
the donor upon non-compliance of the condition was upheld in the recent case of De Luna, et al. vs. Abrigo, et al. 13 It was
held therein that said stipulation is in the nature of an agreement granting a party the right to rescind a contract unilaterally
in case of breach, without need of going to court, and that, upon the happening of the resolutory condition or noncompliance with the conditions of the contract, the donation is automatically revoked without need of a judicial declaration
to that effect. While what was the subject of that case was an onerous donation which, under Article 733 of the Civil Code
is governed by the rules on contracts, since the donation in the case at bar is also subject to the same rules because of its
provision on automatic revocation upon the violation of a resolutory condition, from parity of reasons said pronouncements
in De Luna pertinently apply.
The rationale for the foregoing is that in contracts providing for automatic revocation, judicial intervention is necessary not
for purposes of obtaining a judicial declaration rescinding a contract already deemed rescinded by virtue of an agreement
providing for rescission even without judicial intervention, but in order to determine whether or not the rescission was
proper. 14
When a deed of donation, as in this case, expressly provides for automatic revocation and reversion of the property
donated, the rules on contract and the general rules on prescription should apply, and not Article 764 of the Civil Code.
Since Article 1306 of said Code authorizes the parties to a contract to establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and
conditions not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy, we are of the opinion that, at the very
least, that stipulation of the parties providing for automatic revocation of the deed of donation, without prior judicial action
for that purpose, is valid subject to the determination of the propriety of the rescission sought. Where such propriety is
sustained, the decision of the court will be merely declaratory of the revocation, but it is not in itself the revocatory act.
On the foregoing ratiocinations, the Court of Appeals committed no error in holding that the cause of action of herein
private respondents has not yet prescribed since an action to enforce a written contract prescribes in ten (10) years. 15 It is
our view that Article 764 was intended to provide a judicial remedy in case of non-fulfillment or contravention of conditions
specified in the deed of donation if and when the parties have not agreed on the automatic revocation of such donation
upon the occurrence of the contingency contemplated therein. That is not the situation in the case at bar.
Nonetheless, we find that although the action filed by private respondents may not be dismissed by reason of prescription,
the same should be dismissed on the ground that private respondents have no cause of action against petitioners.
The cause of action of private respondents is based on the alleged breach by petitioners of the resolutory condition in the
deed of donation that the property donated should not be sold within a period of one hundred (100) years from the date of
execution of the deed of donation. Said condition, in our opinion, constitutes an undue restriction on the rights arising from
ownership of petitioners and is, therefore, contrary to public policy.
Donation, as a mode of acquiring ownership, results in an effective transfer of title over the property from the donor to the
donee. Once a donation is accepted, the donee becomes the absolute owner of the property donated. Although the donor
may impose certain conditions in the deed of donation, the same must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order and public policy. The condition imposed in the deed of donation in the case before us constitutes a patently
unreasonable and undue restriction on the right of the donee to dispose of the property donated, which right is an
indispensable attribute of ownership. Such a prohibition against alienation, in order to be valid, must not be perpetual or
for an unreasonable period of time.
Certain provisions of the Civil Code illustrative of the aforesaid policy may be considered applicable by analogy. Under the
third paragraph of Article 494, a donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period which shall not exceed twenty (20)
years. Article 870, on its part, declares that the dispositions of the testator declaring all or part of the estate inalienable for
more than twenty (20) years are void.
It is significant that the provisions therein regarding a testator also necessarily involve, in the main, the devolution of
property by gratuitous title hence, as is generally the case of donations, being an act of liberality, the imposition of an
unreasonable period of prohibition to alienate the property should be deemed anathema to the basic and actual intent of
either the donor or testator. For that reason, the regulatory arm of the law is or must be interposed to prevent an
unreasonable departure from the normative policy expressed in the aforesaid Articles 494 and 870 of the Code.
In the case at bar, we hold that the prohibition in the deed of donation against the alienation of the property for an entire
century, being an unreasonable emasculation and denial of an integral attribute of ownership, should be declared as an
illegal or impossible condition within the contemplation of Article 727 of the Civil Code. Consequently, as specifically stated
in said statutory provision, such condition shall be considered as not imposed. No reliance may accordingly be placed on

said prohibitory paragraph in the deed of donation. The net result is that, absent said proscription, the deed of sale
supposedly constitutive of the cause of action for the nullification of the deed of donation is not in truth violative of the
latter hence, for lack of cause of action, the case for private respondents must fail.
It may be argued that the validity of such prohibitory provision in the deed of donation was not specifically put in issue in
the pleadings of the parties. That may be true, but such oversight or inaction does not prevent this Court from passing
upon and resolving the same.
It will readily be noted that the provision in the deed of donation against alienation of the land for one hundred (100) years
was the very basis for the action to nullify the deed of d donation. At the same time, it was likewise the controverted
fundament of the motion to dismiss the case a quo, which motion was sustained by the trial court and set aside by
respondent court, both on the issue of prescription. That ruling of respondent court interpreting said provision was
assigned as an error in the present petition. While the issue of the validity of the same provision was not squarely raised,
it is ineluctably related to petitioner's aforesaid assignment of error since both issues are grounded on and refer to the
very same provision.
This Court is clothed with ample authority to review matters, even if they are not assigned as errors on appeal, if it finds
that their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision of the case: 16 Thus, we have held that an unassigned
error closely related to an error properly assigned, 17 or upon which the determination of the question properly assigned is
dependent, will be considered by the appellate court notwithstanding the failure to assign it as error. 18
Additionally, we have laid down the rule that the remand of the case to the lower court for further reception of evidence is
not necessary where the Court is in a position to resolve the dispute based on the records before it. On many occasions,
the Court, in the public interest and for the expeditious administration of justice, has resolved actions on the merits instead
of remanding them to the trial court for further proceedings, such as where the ends of justice, would not be subserved by
the remand of the case. 19 The aforestated considerations obtain in and apply to the present case with respect to the
matter of the validity of the resolutory condition in question.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of respondent court is SET ASIDE and another judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING
Civil Case No. 095-84 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XX, Imus, Cavite.
SO ORDERED.