UNDER C:

Rule 130, Documentary Evidence, Electronic Evidence, Case No. 1

HEIRS OF SABANPAN v. COMORPOSA
G.R. No. 152807 | August 12, 2003
FACTS:
This case arose from a complaint for unlawful detainer filed in the MTC by
petitioners against respondents involving possession of a parcel of petitioners land
by respondents. Respondents argue that they have acquired just and valid
ownership of the premises and that the Regional Director of the DENR has already
upheld their possession over the land in question when it ruled that they were the
rightful claimants and possessors. MTC ruled in favour of petitioners which was
reversed by the RTC. On appeal, CA affirmed RTC ruling that although not yet final,
the Order issued by the DENR Regional Director remained in full force and effect.
The certification that the DENR's community environment and natural resources
(CENR) officer issued was proof that when the cadastral survey was conducted, the
land was still alienable and was not yet allocated to any person. Respondents had
the better right to possess alienable and disposable land of the public domain,
because they have sufficiently proven their actual, physical, open, notorious,
exclusive, continuous and uninterrupted possession thereof since 1960. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE: Is the CENR Officer's Certification, which only bears the facsimile of the
alleged signature of a certain Jose F. Tagorda admissible as evidence?
HELD:
In the case of Garvida, the Court held that: "A facsimile or fax transmission is a
process involving the transmission and reproduction of printed and graphic matter
by scanning an original copy, one elemental area at a time, and representing the
shade or tone of each area by a specified amount of electric current."
Pleadings filed via fax machines are not considered originals and are at best exact
copies. As such, they are not admissible in evidence, as there is no way of
determining whether they are genuine or authentic.
The Certification, on the other hand, is being contested for bearing a facsimile of
the signature of CENR Officer Jose F. Tagorda. The facsimile referred to is not the
same as that which is alluded to in Garvida. The one mentioned here refers to a
facsimile signature, which is defined as a signature produced by mechanical means
but recognized as valid in banking, financial, and business transactions. Note that
the CENR officer has not disclaimed the Certification. In fact, the DENR regional
director has acknowledged and used it as reference in his Order. If the Certification
were a sham as petitioner claims, then the regional director would not have used it
as reference. He would have either verified it or directed the CENR officer to take
the appropriate action, as the latter was under the former's direct control and
supervision.

As for the new matter raised for the first time on appeal, the court ruled that neither
the rules of procedure nor jurisprudence would sanction the admission of evidence
that has not been formally offered during the trial. But this evidentiary rule is
applicable only to ordinary trials, not to cases covered by the rule on summary
procedure -- cases in which no full-blown trial is held.
The admissibility of evidence should not be confused with its probative value.
Admissibility refers to the question of whether certain pieces of evidence are to be
considered at all, while probative value refers to the question of whether the
admitted evidence proves an issue. Thus, a particular item of evidence may be
admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the
guidelines provided by the rules of evidence

UNDER C:
Rule 130, Documentary Evidence, Electronic Evidence,
Case No. 2

TORRES vs. PAGCOR

G.R. No. 193531 | December 14, 2011
FACTS:
Petitioner was a Slot Machine Operations Supervisor (SMOS) of respondent Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation
(PAGCOR). On the basis of an alleged intelligence report of padding of the Credit Meter Readings (CMR) of the slot machines at
PAGCOR-Hyatt Manila, then Casino Filipino-Hyatt (CF Hyatt), which involved the slot machine and internal security personnel of
respondent PAGCOR, and in connivance with slot machine customers, respondent PAGCOR's Corporate Investigation Unit (CIU)
allegedly conducted an investigation to verify the veracity of such report. The CIU discovered the scheme of CMR padding which
was committed by adding zero after the first digit of the actual CMR of a slot machine or adding a digit before the first digit of the
actual CMR, e.g., a slot machine with an actual CMR of P5,000.00 will be issued a CMR receipt with the amount of
eitherP50,000.00 or P35,000.00. Based on the CIU's investigation of all the CMR receipts and slot machine jackpot slips issued by
CF Hyatt for the months of February and March 2007, the CIU identified the members of the syndicate who were responsible for
such CMR padding, which included herein petitioner.
On the same day, another Memorandum of Charges signed by Rogelio Y. Bangsil, Jr., Senior Branch Manager, CF Hyatt Manila,
was issued to petitioner informing him of the charge of dishonesty (padding of anomalous SM jackpot receipts). Petitioner was then
required to explain in writing why he should not be sanctioned or dismissed. Petitioner was placed under preventive suspension
effective immediately until further orders.
Petitioner wrote Manager Bangsil a letter explanation/refutation of the charges against him. He denied any involvement or
participation in any fraudulent manipulation of the CMR or padding of the slot machine receipts, and he asked for a formal
investigation of the accusations against him.
On August 4, 2007, petitioner received a letter dated August 2, 2007 from Atty. Lizette F. Mortel, Managing Head of PAGCOR's
Human Resource and Development Department, dismissing him from the service.
On September 14, 2007, petitioner filed with the CSC a Complaint against PAGCOR and its Chairman Efraim Genuino for illegal
dismissal, non-payment of backwages and other benefits. The complaint alleged among other things, that he tried to persuade
respondent PAGCOR to review and reverse its decision in a letter of reconsideration dated August 13, 2007 addressed to the
Chairman, the members of the Board of Directors and the Merit Systems Protection Board and that no resolution was issued on his
letter reconsideration.
Thereafter, the CSC dismissed the complaint on the ground that the same has already prescribed.
After the denial of his Motion for Reconsideration, Torres elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which likewise dismissed his
petition on the same ground. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the sending of his letter of reconsideration by means of a fax machine is a valid mode of filing a letter of
reconsideration?
HELD:
A motion for reconsideration may either be filed by mail or personal delivery. When a motion for reconsideration was sent by mail,
the same shall be deemed filed on the date shown by the postmark on the envelope which shall be attached to the records of the
case. On the other hand, in case of personal delivery, the motion is deemed filed on the date stamped thereon by the proper office.
And the movant has 15 days from receipt of the decision within which to file a motion for reconsideration or an appeal therefrom.
The mode used by petitioner in filing his reconsideration which was sent through a facsimile transmission is not sanctioned by the
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.
In Garvida v. Sales, Jr., we found inadmissible in evidence the filing of pleadings through fax machines and ruled that:
A facsimile or fax transmission is a process involving the transmission and reproduction of printed and graphic matter by scanning
an original copy, one elemental area at a time, and representing the shade or tone of each area by a specified amount of electric
current. The current is transmitted as a signal over regular telephone lines or via microwave relay and is used by the receiver to
reproduce an image of the elemental area in the proper position and the correct shade. The receiver is equipped with a stylus or
other device that produces a printed record on paper referred to as a facsimile.
xxx A facsimile is not a genuine and authentic pleading. It is, at best, an exact copy preserving all the marks of an original. Without
the original, there is no way of determining on its face whether the facsimile pleading is genuine and authentic and was originally
signed by the party and his counsel. It may, in fact, be a sham pleading.xxx
Moreover, a facsimile transmission is not considered as an electronic evidence under the Electronic Commerce Act. In MCC
Industrial Sales Corporation v. Ssangyong Corporation, We determined the question of whether the original facsimile transmissions
are "electronic data messages" or "electronic documents" within the context of the Electronic Commerce Act.
We, therefore, conclude that the terms "electronic data message" and "electronic document," as defined under the Electronic
Commerce Act of 2000, do not include a facsimile transmission. Accordingly, a facsimile transmission cannot be considered as
electronic evidence. It is not the functional equivalent of an original under the Best Evidence Rule and is not admissible as electronic
evidence.

UNDER C:
Rule 130, Documentary Evidence, Electronic Evidence, Case No. 3

ANG V. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 182835 | April 20, 2010 618 SCRA
FACTS:
This case concerns a claim of commission of the crime of violence against women when a former boyfriend sent to the girl
the picture of a naked woman, not her, but with her face on it. The herein petitioner, Rustan Ang and the private

respondent, Irish Sagud were lovers during their college days in Wesleyan University in Maria Aurora Province of
Aurora. Eventually, Irish heard that Rustan has a live-in-partner whom Rustan got pregnant. Because of this, Irish
decided to broke up with Rustan. The latter asked Irish to elope with him, since he does not love the other girl, to
which Irish refused. To pressure Irish to get back with him he send multimedia messages to Irish, bearing a picture of

After she got the

obscene picture, she received text messages from Rustan threatening
her that he will spread the picture he sent through the Internet.
a naked woman, who spread her legs with a face of Irish superimposed on it.

Because of this scenario, Irish, asked help from the Vic-Mayor of the municipality, to which coordination with the local
police was made. Under

police supervision, Irish contacted Rustan through the

cellphone number he used in sending the picture and text message.
She asked him to meet her at a resort and he did. Upon parking his

motorcycle and walking towards Irish, the police intercepted and

arrested him. The police seized his cellphone and several SIM cards.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Rustans contention that the multimedia messages should not be made admissible for the basic
reason that such was not properly authenticated as provided by the Rules on Electronic Documents?
HELD:
Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text message constitutes an electronic document.
Thus, it should be authenticated by means of an electronic signature, as provided under Section 1, Rule 5 of the
Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC).
But, firstly, Rustan is raising this objection to the admissibility of the obscene picture, Exhibit A, for the first time before
this Court. The objection is too late since he should have objected to the admission of the picture on such ground at
the time it was offered in evidence. He should be deemed to have already waived such ground for objection.
Besides, the rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal action. The Rules on Electronic Evidence applies only
to civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and administrative proceedings.

UNDER C:
Rule 130, Documentary Evidence, Electronic Evidence, Case No. 4
RAMON A. SYHUNLIONG V. TERESITA D. RIVERA
G.R. No. 200148 | June 4, 2014
FACTS:

UNDER C:
Rule 130, Testimonial Evidence, Disqualifications

MARCOS V. HEIRS OF ANDRES NAVARRO

G.R. No. 198240 |

July 03, 2013

FACTS:
Spouses Navarro died in 1958 and 1993, respectively. They left behind
several parcels of land including a 108.3997-hectare lot located in
Cayabon, Milagros, Masbate. The spouses were survived by their
daughters Luisa Navarro Marcos, herein petitioner, and Lydia Navarro
Grageda, and the heirs of their only son Andres Navarro, Jr. The heirs
of Andres, Jr. are the respondents herein.
Petitioner and her sister Lydia discovered that respondents are
claiming exclusive ownership of the subject lot. Respondents based
their claim on the Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property where Andres,
Sr. donated the subject lot to Andres, Jr. Believing that the affidavit is a

forgery, the sisters, through Assistant Fiscal Andres Marcos, requested

a handwriting examination of the affidavit. The PNP handwriting
expert PO2 Mary Grace Alvarez found that Andres, Sr.s signature on
the affidavit and the submitted standard signatures of Andres, Sr. were
not written by one and the same person. Thus, the sisters sued the
respondents for annulment of the deed of donation before the RTC of
Masbate.
Respondents moved to disqualify PO2 Alvarez as a witness. The RTC
granted respondents motion and disqualified PO2 Alvarez as a
witness. The RTC ruled that PO2 Alvarezs supposed testimony would
be hearsay as she has no personal knowledge of the alleged
handwriting of Andres, Sr.
The sisters sought reconsideration of the order but the RTC denied
their motion. Aggrieved, the sisters filed a petition for certiorari before
the CA, which however, dismissed their petition. The CA likewise
denied their motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not PO2 Alvarez should be disqualified as a witness.
HELD:
No. In Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement and Separation
Benefits System v. Republic of the Philippines, we said that a witness
must only possess all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications provided in the Rules of Court. Section 20, Rule 130 of
the Rules on Evidence provides:
SEC. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications.Except as provided in the next
succeeding section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make
known their perception to others, may be witnesses.

Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the

case, or conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by
law, shall not be a ground for disqualification.
Specific rules of witness disqualification are provided under Sections 21
to 24, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence. Section 21 disqualifies a
witness by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. Section 22
disqualifies a witness by reason of marriage. Section 23 disqualifies a
witness by reason of death or insanity of the adverse party. Section 24
disqualifies a witness by reason of privileged communication.
As a handwriting expert of the PNP, PO2 Alvarez can surely perceive
and make known her perception to others. We have no doubt that she

is qualified as a witness. She cannot be disqualified as a witness since

she possesses none of the disqualifications specified under the Rules.
Respondents motion to disqualify her should have been denied by the
RTC for it was not based on any of these grounds for disqualification.
The RTC rather confused the qualification of the witness with the
credibility and weight of her testimony.
Moreover, Section 49, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence is clear that
the opinion of an expert witness may be received in evidence, to wit:

SEC. 49. Opinion of expert witness.The opinion of a

witness on a matter requiring special knowledge, skill,
experience or training which he is shown to possess, may
be received in evidence.
For instance, in Tamani v. Salvador, we were inclined to believe that
Tamanis signature was forged after considering the testimony of the
PNP document examiner that the case involved simulated or copied
forgery, such that the similarities will be superficial. We said that the
value of the opinion of a handwriting expert depends not upon his
mere statements of whether a writing is genuine or false, but upon the
assistance he may afford in pointing out distinguishing marks,
characteristics and discrepancies in and between genuine and false
specimens of writing which would ordinarily escape notice or detection
from an unpracticed observer.
Thus, we disagree with the RTC that PO2 Alvarezs testimony would be
hearsay. Under Section 49, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence, PO2
Alvarez is allowed to render an expert opinion, as the PNP document
examiner was allowed in Tamani. But the RTC already ruled at the
outset that PO2 Alvarezs testimony is hearsay even before her
testimony is offered and she is called to the witness stand. Under the
circumstances, the CA should have issued a corrective writ of certiorari
and annulled the RTC ruling.

UNDER C:
Rule 130, Testimonial Evidence, Disqualifications, Mental Incapacity or Immaturity

PEOPLE V. GOLIMLIM
G.R. No. 145225
|
April 2, 2004
FACTS:
Private complainant Evelyn G. Canchela (Evelyn), is a mental retardate.
When her mother, Amparo Hachero, left for Singapore on May 2, 1996
to work as a domestic helper, she entrusted Evelyn to the care and
custody of her (Amparos) sister Jovita Guban and her husband
Salvador Golimlim, herein appellant, at Barangay Bical, Bulan,
Sorsogon.
Sometime in August 1996, Jovita left the conjugal residence to meet a
certain Rosing,leaving Evelyn with appellant. Taking advantage of the
situation, appellant instructed private complainant to sleep, and soon
after she had laid down, he kissed her and took off her clothes.7 As he
poked at her an object which to Evelyn felt like a knife, he proceeded
to insert his penis into her vagina. His lust satisfied, appellant fell
asleep.
When Jovita arrived, Evelyn told her about what appellant did to her.
Jovita, however, did not believe her and in fact she scolded her.
Sometime in December of the same year, Lorna Hachero, Evelyns halfsister, received a letter from their mother Amparo instructing her to
fetch Evelyn from Sorsogon and allow her to stay in Novaliches,
Quezon City where she (Lorna) resided. Dutifully, Lorna immediately
repaired to appellants home in Bical, and brought Evelyn with her to
Manila.
A week after she brought Evelyn to stay with her, Lorna suspected that
her sister was pregnant as she noticed her growing belly. She
thereupon brought her to a doctor at the Pascual General Hospital at
Baeza, Novaliches, Quezon City for check-up and ultrasound
examination.
Lornas suspicions were confirmed as the examinations revealed that
Evelyn was indeed pregnant. She thus asked her sister how she
became pregnant, to which Evelyn replied that appellant had sexual
intercourse with her while holding a knife.

On February 27, 1997, Evelyn, assisted by Lorna, filed a criminal

complaint for rape against appellant before the Municipal Trial Court of
Bulan, Sorsogon,
Finding for the prosecution, the trial court, by the present appealed
Decision, convicted appellant as charged. Hence, the accused
appealed, he argues that the mind of the victim is not normal. He
further alleged that Evelyns testimony is not categorical and is replete
with contradictions, thus engendering grave doubts as to his criminal
culpability. He further
ISSUE:
Whether Evelyn, a mental retardate is disqualified as a witness.
HELD:
No. Sections 20 and 21 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court
provide:
SEC. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. Except as
provided in the next succeeding section, all persons who
can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their
perception to others, may be witnesses.
xxx
SEC. 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or
immaturity. The following persons cannot be witnesses:
(a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of their
production for examination, is such that they are incapable
of intelligently making known their perception to others;
(b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render
them incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which
they are examined and of relating them truthfully.
In People v. Trelles, where the trial court relied heavily on the therein
mentally retarded private complainants testimony irregardless of her
"monosyllabic responses and vacillations between lucidity and
ambiguity," this Court held:
A mental retardate or a feebleminded person is not, per se, disqualified
from being a witness, her mental condition not being a vitiation of her
credibility. It is now universally accepted that intellectual weakness, no
matter what form it assumes, is not a valid objection to the

competency of a witness so long as the latter can still give a fairly

intelligent and reasonable narrative of the matter testified to.
It cannot then be gainsaid that a mental retardate can be a witness,
depending on his or her ability to relate what he or she knows. If his or
her testimony is coherent, the same is admissible in court.
To be sure, modern rules on evidence have downgraded mental
incapacity as a ground to disqualify a witness. As observed by
McCormick, the remedy of excluding such a witness who may be the
only person available who knows the facts, seems inept and primitive.
Our rules follow the modern trend of evidence.
Thus, in a long line of cases, this Court has upheld the conviction of the
accused based mainly on statements given in court by the victim who
was a mental retardate

UNDER C:
Rule 130, Testimonial Evidence, Disqualifications, Marital DQ, Case No. 2

PEOPLE V. CASTANEDA
G.R. No. L-46306 | February 27, 1979

FACTS:
Benjamin Manaloto was charged with the crime of Falsification of Public
Document. The complaint was filed by his wife, Victoria Manaloto.
That on or about the 19th day of May, 1975, in the Municipality of San
Fernando, province of Pampanga, Philippines, Benjamin falsified in a
deed of sale the house and lot belonging to the conjugal partnership in
favor of Ponciano Lacsamana, making it appear that his spouse gave
her marital consent to said sale.
At the trial, the prosecution called the wife to the witness stand but the
defense moved to disqualify her as a witness, invoking Sec. 20, Rule
130. The prosecution stated that it is a criminal case for a crime
committed by one against the other. Notwithstanding such opposition,
respondent Judge granted the motion, disqualifying Victoria.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the criminal case for Falsification of Public Document
may be considered as a criminal case for a crime committed by a
husband against his wife and, therefore, an exception to the rule on
marital disqualification.
HELD:
No. The case is an exception to the marital disqualification rule. WHEN
AN OFFENSE DIRECTLY ATTACKS, OR DIRECTLY AND VITALLY IMPAIRS,
THE CONJUGAL RELATION, IT COMES WITHIN THE EXCEPTION to the
statute that one shall not be a witness against the other except in a
criminal prosecution for a crime committed (by) one against the other.
In the case, it must be noted that had the sale of the said house and
lot, and the signing of the wifes name by her husband in the deed of
sale, been made with the consent of the wife, no crime could have
been charged against said husband. It is the husbands breach of his
wifes confidence which gave rise to the offense charged. And it is this
same breach of trust which prompted the wife to make the necessary
complaint.
With more reason must the exception apply to the instant case where
the victim of the crime and the person who stands to be directly
prejudiced by the falsification is not a third person but the wife herself.
And it is undeniable that the act had the effect of directly and vitally
impairing the conjugal relation. This is apparent not only in the act of
the wife in personally lodging her complaint with the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal, but also in her insistent efforts in connection with the
instant petition, which seeks to set aside the order disqualifying her
from testifying against her husband.
Taken collectively, the actuations of the witness-wife underscore the
fact that the martial and domestic relations between her and the
accused-husband have become so strained that there is no more
harmony to be preserved said nor peace and tranquility which may be
disturbed. In such a case, identity of interests disappears and the
consequent danger of perjury based on that identity is nonexistent.
Likewise, in such a situation, the security and confidence of private life
which the law aims at protecting will be nothing but ideals which,
through their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home.

UNDER C:
Rule 130, Testimonial Evidence, Disqualifications, Death or Insanity, Case No. 1
RAZON V. CA
UNDER C:
Rule 130, Testimonial Evidence, Disqualifications, Death or Insanity, Case No. 2

SUNGA-CHAN V. CHUA
G.R. No. 143340 | August 15, 2001
FACTS:
Respondent alleged that, he verbally entered into a business
partnership with Jacinto. Respondent and Jacinto allegedly agreed to
register the business name of their partnership, under the name of
Jacinto as a sole proprietorship. The partnership allegedly had Jacinto
as manager, assisted by Josephine Sy, a sister of the wife respondent,
Erlinda Sy.
Upon Jacinto's death, his surviving wife, petitioner Cecilia and
particularly his daughter, petitioner Lilibeth, took over the operations,
control, custody, disposition and management of Shellite without
respondent's consent. Despite respondent's repeated demands upon
petitioners for accounting, inventory, appraisal, winding up and
restitution of his net shares in the partnership, petitioners failed to
comply.
Petitioners filed their Answer with Compulsory Counter-claims,
contending that they are not liable for partnership shares, unreceived
income/profits, interests, damages and attorney's fees, that
respondent does not have a cause of action against them, and that the
trial court has no jurisdiction over the nature of the action, the SEC
being the agency that has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the
case. As counterclaim, petitioner sought attorney's fees and expenses
of litigation.
The trial court rendered its Decision ruling for respondent. Petitioners
filed a Notice of Appeal with the trial court, the CA dismissed the
appeal. Hence, this petition.
Petitioners question the correctness of the finding of the trial court and
the Court of Appeals that a partnership existed between respondent
and Jacinto from 1977 until Jacinto's death. In the absence of any
written document to show such partnership between respondent and

Jacinto, petitioners argues that these courts were proscribes from

hearing the testimonies of respondent and his witness, Josephine, to
prove the alleged partnership three years after Jacinto's death. To
support this argument, petitioners invoke the "Dead Man's Statute' or
"Survivorship Rule" under Section 23, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioners thus implore this Court to rule that the testimonies of
respondent and his alter ego, Josephine, should not have been
admitted to prove certain claims against a deceased person (Jacinto),
now represented by petitioners.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the "Dead Man's Statute" applies to this case so as to
render respondent's testimony and that of Josephine inadmissible.
RULING:
The "Dead Man's Statute" provides that if one party to the alleged
transaction is precluded from testifying by death, insanity, or other
mental disabilities, the surviving party is not entitled to the undue
advantage of giving his own uncontradicted and unexplained account
of the transaction. But before this rule can be successfully invoked to
bar the introduction of testimonial evidence, it is necessary that:
"1. The witness is a party or assignor of a party to case or persons in
whose behalf a case in prosecuted.
2. The action is against an executor or administrator or other
representative of a deceased person or a person of unsound mind;
3. The subject-matter of the action is a claim or demand against the
estate of such deceased person or against person of unsound mind;
4. His testimony refers to any matter of fact of which occurred before
the death of such deceased person or before such person became of
unsound mind."
Two reasons forestall the application of the "Dead Man's Statute" to
this case.
First, petitioners filed a compulsory counterclaim against respondents
in their answer before the trial court, and with the filing of their
counterclaim, petitioners themselves effectively removed this case
from the ambit of the "Dead Man's Statute". Well entrenched is the rule
that when it is the executor or administrator or representatives of the

estates that sets up the counterclaim, the plaintiff, herein respondent,

may testify to occurrences before the death of the deceased to defeat
the counterclaim. Moreover, as defendant in the counterclaim,
respondent is not disqualified from testifying as to matters of facts
occurring before the death of the deceased, said action not having
been brought against but by the estate or representatives of the
deceased.
Second, the testimony of Josephine is not covered by the "Dead Man's
Statute" for the simple reason that she is not "a party or assignor of a
party to a case or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted."
Records show that respondent offered the testimony of Josephine to
establish the existence of the partnership between respondent and
Jacinto. Petitioners' insistence that Josephine is the alter ego of
respondent does not make her an assignor because the term
"assignor" of a party means "assignor of a cause of action which has
arisen, and not the assignor of a right assigned before any cause of
action has arisen." Plainly then, Josephine is merely a witness of
respondent, the latter being the party plaintiff.

UNDER C:
Rule 130, Testimonial Evidence, Disqualifications, Death or Insanity, Case No. 3

BORDALBA V. CA
G.R. No. 112443 | January 25, 2002
Facts:
In 1980, herein petitioner was granted a Free Patent and was issued an
Original Certificate of Title over the herein subject lot. Shecaused the
subdivision and titling of the said lot into 6 parcels, as well as the
conveyance of the two parcels thereof. Private respondents,however,
claimed ownership over the same lot by virtue of an extrajudicial
partition made as early as 1947. Hence, they filed a complaint
todeclare void the Free Patent as well as the cancellation of the titles
issued. The trial court, finding that fraud was employed by petitioner
inobtaining the Free Patent, declared said free patent and title void and
ordered its cancellation. However, the purchaser and mortgagee ofthe
two parcels conveyed were declared in good faith, hence, upheld their
rights over the property. Both petitioner and private
respondentsappealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed with

modification the decision of the trial court. It ruled that private

respondents areentitled only to 1/3 portion of the lot and petitioner
should be ordered to reconvey only 1/3 of the lot to the private
respondents. Petitionercontends that the testimonies given by the
witnesses for private respondents which touched on matters occurring
prior to the death of hermother should not have been admitted by the
trial court, as the same violated the dead man's statute. Likewise,
petitioner questions theright of private respondents to inherit from the
late Nicanor Jayme and Asuncion Jayme-Baclay, as well as the identity
between thedisputed lot and the parcel of land adjudicated in the Deed
of Extra-judicial Partition.

Issue:
Whether or not there is a violation of dead mans statute?

Held:
No. The dead man's statute does not operate to close the mouth of a
witness as to any matter of fact coming to his knowledge in anyother
way than through personal dealings with the deceased person, or
communication made by the deceased to the witness.
Since the claim of private respondents and the testimony of their
witnesses in the present case is based, inter alia, on the 1947 Deed of
Extra-judicial Partition and other documents, and not on dealings and
communications with the deceased, the questioned testimonies were
properly admitted by the trial court.
Likewise untenable is the claim of petitioner that private respondents
are not legal heirs of Nicanor Jayme and Asuncion Jayme-Baclay. Other
than their bare allegations to dispute their heirship, no hard evidence
was presented by them to substantiate their allegations. Besides, in
order that an heir may assert his right to the property of a deceased,
no previous judicial declaration of heirship is necessary.

UNDER C:
Rule 130, Testimonial Evidence, Hearsay Evidence Rule, Case No. 1