De la Llana vs.

Alba
HELD: To be specific, the Batasang Pambansa is expressly vested with the authority to re
organize inferior courts and in the process to abolish existing ones.
Petitioners would characterize as an undue delegation of legislative power to the President
the grant of authority to fix the compensation and the allowances of the Justices and judges
thereafter appointed. The language of the statute is quite clear. The questioned provisions
reads as follows: "Intermediate Appellate Justices, Regional Trial Judges, Metropolitan Trial
Judges, municipal Trial Judges, and Municipal Circuit Trial Judges shall receive such receive
such compensation and allowances as may be authorized by the President along the
guidelines set forth in Letter of Implementation No. 93 pursuant to Presidential Decree No.
985, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1597." The existence of a standard is thus clear.
To be more specific, petitioners contend that the abolition of the existing inferior courts
collides with the security of tenure enjoyed by incumbent Justices and judges under Article X
, Section 7 of the Constitution. Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from termination
by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After
the abolition, there is in law no occupant. I n case of removal, there is an office with an
occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of
strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise
Bautista vs. Juinio
G.R. No. L-50908, [January 31, 1984] JUSTICE FERNANDO
FACTS: The constitutionality of Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 869, a response to protracted
oil crisis, banning the use of private motor vehicles with H (heavy) and EH (extra heavy)
plates on week-ends and holidays, was assailed for being allegedly violative of the due
process and equal protection guarantees of the Constitution.
Petitioners also contends that Memorandum Circular No. 39 issued by herein respondents
imposing penalties of fine, confiscation of the vehicle and cancellation of license of owners
of the above specified vehicles found violating such LOI, is likewise unconstitutional, for
being violative of the doctrine of undue delegation of legislative power.
Respondents denied the above allegations.
ISSUE: Whether or not Letter of Instruction 869 as implemented by Memorandum Circular
No. 39 is violative of certain constitutional rights.
HELD: NO. There may be instances where a police power measure may, because of its
arbitrary, oppressive or unjust character, be held offensive to the due process clause and,
therefore, may, when challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding, be declared void on its
face. This is not one of them. A recital of the whereas clauses of the Letter of Instruction
makes it clear. What is undeniable is that the action taken is an appropriate response to a
problem that presses urgently for solution. It may not be the only alternative, but its
reasonableness is immediately apparent. Thus, to repeat, substantive due process, which is
the epitome of reasonableness and fair play, is not ignored, much less infringed.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 119761, August 29, 1996
Justice Vitug
FACTS:
Fortune Tobacco Corporation is engaged in the manufacture of different brands of cigarettes.

On various dates, the Philippine Patent Office issued to the corporation separate certificates
of trademark registration over "Champion," "Hope," and "More" cigarettes.
The CIR initially classified 'Champion,' 'Hope,' and 'More' as foreign brands since they were
listed in the World Tobacco Directory as belonging to foreign companies. However, Fortune
changed the names of 'Hope' to Hope Luxury' and 'More' to 'Premium More,' thereby
removing the said brands from the foreign brand category. Fortune also submitted proof the
BIR that 'Champion' was an original register and therefore a local brand. Ad Valorem taxes
were imposed on these brands.
RA 7654 was passed in it was provided that 55% ad valorem tax will be imposed on local
brands carrying a foreign name. Two days before the effectivity of RA 7654, the BIR issued
Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 37-93, in which Fortune was to be imposed 55% ad
valorem tax on the three brands classifying them as local brands carrying a foreign name.
Fortune filed a petition with the CTA which was granted finding the RMC as defective. The
CIR filed a motion for reconsideration with the CTA which was denied, then to the CA, an
appeal, which was also denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not CIR has the power to classify respondents.
HELD: YES. The petitioner was well within her prerogatives, in the exercise of her rulemaking power, to classify articles for taxation purposes, to interpret the laws which she is
mandated to administer. In interpreting the same, petitioner must, in general, be guided by
the principles underlying taxation, i.e., taxes are the lifeblood of Government, and revenue
laws ought to be interpreted in favor of the Government, for Government cannot survive
without the funds to underwrite its varied operational expenses in pursuit of the welfare of
the society which it serves and protects. Private respondent claims that its business will be
destroyed by the imposition of additional ad valorem taxes as a result of the effectivity of
the questioned Circular. It claims that under the vested rights theory, it cannot now be made
to pay higher taxes after having been assessed for less in the past. Of course private
respondent will trumpet its losses, its interests, after all, being its sole concern. What private
respondent fails to see is the loss of revenue by the Government which, because of
erroneous determinations made by its past revenue commissioners, collected lesser taxes
than what it was entitled to in the first place. It is every citizen's duty to pay the correct
amount of taxes. Private respondent will not be shielded by any vested rights, for there are
no vested rights to speak of respecting a wrong construction of the law by administrative
officials, and such wrong interpretation does not place the Government in estoppel to correct
or overrule the same.|||
HOLY SPIRIT HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION vs DEFENSOR
G.R. No. 163980, [August 3, 2006]
JUSTICE TINGA
FACTS: The instant petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
with the prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction, seeks to prevent respondents from enforcing the implementing rules and
regulations of RA No. 9207, otherwise known as the National Government Center Housing
and Land Utilization Act of 2003.
ISSUE: Whether an IRR issued by an administrative office may be reviewed by Courts

HELD: YES. In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an

administrative agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to
court. This principle, however, applies only where the act of the administrative agency
concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed
act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative power. 13
The assailed IRR was issued pursuant to the quasi-legislative power of the Committee
expressly authorized by R.A. No. 9207. The petition rests mainly on the theory that the
assailed IRR issued by the Committee is invalid on the ground that it is not germane to the
object and purpose of the statute it seeks to implement. Where what is assailed is the
validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the administrative agency in the
performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass
upon the same.

PSDSA vs. De Jesus

G.R. No. 157286, [June 16, 2006]
JUSTICE CALLEJO SR
Republic Act No. 9155, otherwise known as the Governance of Basic Education Act 2001,
became a law on August 11, 2001, in accordance with Section 27(1), Article VI of the
Constitution. Under Section 14 of the law, the DepEd Secretary is mandated to promulgate
the implementing rules and regulations within ninety (90) days after the approval of the Act,
provided that the principle of shared governance shall be fully implemented within two (2)
years after such approval.
On March 13, 2003, the PSDSA, the national organization of about 1,800 public school
district supervisors of the DepEd, in behalf of its officers and members, filed the instant
petition for prohibition and mandamus, alleging among others that:
I. THE ACT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION IN REMOVING PETITIONERS
ADMINISTRATIVE SUPERVISION OVER ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS AND ITS PRINCIPALS (SCHOOL
HEADS) WITHIN HIS/HER DISTRICT AND CONVERTING HIS/HER ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTION
TO THAT OF PERFORMING STAFF FUNCTION FOR THE DIVISION OFFICE IS A GROSS
VIOLATION OF REPUBLIC ACT 9155 THE GOVERNANCE OF BASIC EDUCATION ACT OF 2001.
ISSUE: Whether the act of the Department of Education was valid and constitutional.
HELD: YES. It must be stressed that the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules
in the implementation of a statute is necessarily limited to what is provided for in the
legislative enactment. 23 The implementing rules and regulations of a law cannot extend
the law or expand its coverage, as the power to amend or repeal a statute is vested in the
legislature. 24 It bears stressing, however, that administrative bodies are allowed under
their power of subordinate legislation to implement the broad policies laid down in a statute
by "filling in" the details. All that is required is that the regulation be germane to the
objectives and purposes of the law; that the regulation does not contradict but conforms
with the standards prescribed by law. 25 Moreover, as a matter of policy, this Court accords

great respect to the decisions and/or actions of administrative authorities not only because
of the doctrine of separation of powers but also for their presumed knowledgeability and
expertise in the enforcement of laws and regulations entrusted to their jurisdiction. 26 The
rationale for this rule relates not only to the emergence of the multifarious needs of a
modern or modernizing society and the establishment of diverse administrative agencies for
addressing and satisfying those needs; it also relates to the accumulation of experience and
growth of specialized capabilities by the administrative agency charged with implementing a
particular statute.
Secretary of Justice vs. Lantion
[G.R. No. 139465. January 18, 2000.]|||
JUSTICE MELO

FACTS:
Secretary of Justice Franklin Drilon, representing the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines, signed in Manila the extradition Treaty Between the Government of the
Philippines and the Government of the U.S.A. The Philippine Senate ratified the said Treaty.
On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs
U.S Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition of private respondent
Mark Jimenez to the United States.
On the same day, petitioner designated and authorized a panel of attorneys to take charge
of and to handle the case. Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents,
Mark Jimenez through counsel, wrote a letter to Justice Secretary requesting copies of the
official extradition request from the U.S Government and that he be given ample time to
comment on the request after he shall have received copies of the requested papers but the
petitioner denied the request for the consistency of Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty
stated in Article 7 that the Philippine Government must present the interests of the United
States in any proceedings arising out of a request for extradition. The Secretary of Justice
denied the request.
ISSUE: Whether the Secretarys action was valid.
HELD: NO. In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves: (a) taking and
evaluation of evidence; (b) determining facts based upon the evidence presented; and (c)
rendering an order or decision supported by the facts proved.
xxx
The body has no power to adjudicate in regard to the rights and obligations of both the
Requesting State and the prospective extraditee. Its only power is to determine whether the
papers comply with the requirements of the law and the treaty and, therefore, sufficient to
be the basis of an extradition petition. Such finding is thus merely initial and not final. The
body has no power to determine whether or not the extradition should be effected. That is
the role of the court. The body's power is limited to an initial finding of whether or not the
extradition petition can be filed in court.
ABEJO vs. DE LA CRUZ

G.R. No. L-63558. May 19, 1987|||

JUSTICE TEEHANKEE

Pros. Tabao vs. Judge Lilagan

AM No. RTJ-01-1651

September 4, 2001
JUSTICE QUISUMBING
FACTS:
On February 24, 1998, a water craft M/L Hadja, from Bongao, Tawi-tawi, was docked at the
port area of Tacloban City with a load of 100 tons of tanbark. While the cargo was being
unloaded, the NBI decided to verify the shipment's accompanying documents where it was
found to be irregular and incomplete. Consequently, the NBI ordered the unloading of the
cargo stopped. As a result, the tanbark, the boat, and three cargo trucks were seized and
impounded.
The NBI filed a Criminal Complaint for the violation of Section 68 (now Section 78) of P.D.
705. DENR took possession of the cargo, the boat and the three trucks. Hernandez then filed
in the RTC of Leyte a case for replevin to recover the items seized by the DENR.
Judge Frisco T. Lilagan issued a writ of replevin and directed Sheriff IV Leonardo V. Aguilar to
take possession of the items seized by the DENR and to deliver them to Hernandez after the
expiration of five days. Respondent Sheriff served a copy of the writ to the Philippine Coast
Guard station in Tacloban City at around 5:45 p.m. of March 19, 1998. Thus, the filing of this
Administrative complaint against respondent via a letter addressed to the Chief Justice and
dated April 13, 1998, by Atty. Tabao.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Judge Ilagan may validly take over the case from the DENR.

The complaint for replevin itself states that the shipment of tanbark as well as the
vessel on which it was loaded were seized by the NBI for verification of supporting documents.i
It also states that the NBI turned over the seized items to the DENR for official disposition and
appropriate action.ii A copy of the document evidencing the turnover to DENR was attached to
the complaint as Annex D.iii To our mind, these allegations would have been sufficient to alert
respondent judge that the DENR has custody of the seized items and that administrative
proceedings may have already been commenced concerning the shipment. Under the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction, courts cannot take cognizance of cases pending before administrative
agencies of special competence.iv Note, too, that the plaintiff in the replevin suit who seeks to
recover the shipment from the DENR had not exhausted the administrative remedies available to
him.v The prudent thing for respondent judge to have done was to dismiss the replevin suit
outright.
HELD: No.

iiNational Development Corp. vs. HervillaG.R. No. L-65718, [June 30, 1987],

JUSTICE PADILLA
FACTS: On December 28, 1958, Rolando Gabales sold to Hernane Hervilla all his
rights and interest over a four-hectare land located in Palkan, Polomolok, South
Cotabato identified only by its boundaries. It was apparently on the strength of the
Tax Declaration that Hervilla was induced to acquire it. Adjoining occupantclaimant, Fernando Jabagat also sold his interest and rights to Hervilla over
another four hectares of land.
Undoubtedly, while adjoining each other, one of these is situated on Polomolok,
South Cotabato, while the other is in Tupi, South Cotabato. For, at the time of
these transfers, the boundary between these places had not definitely been
settled. Hence, the discrepancy.
Candido de Pedro, predecessor-in-interest of DOLE, filed with the Bureau of Lands
his Free Patent Application. Then, exactly four months after filing his application,
de Pedro ceded all his rights to the National Development Corporation. Hervilla
filed an ejectment suit against DOLE. RTC decided in favor of DOLE and NDC. CA
reversed. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court, in deciding a case involving recovery of

possession, declare null and void title issued by an administrative body or office
during the pendency of such case.
HELD: NO. It is now well settled that the administration and disposition of public
lands are committed by law to the Director of Lands primarily, and, ultimately, to
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. 8 The jurisdiction of the
Bureau of Lands is confined to the determination of the respective rights of rival
claimants to public lands 9 or to cases which involve disposition and alienation of
public lands. 10 The jurisdiction of courts in possessory actions involving public
lands is limited to the determination of who has the actual, physical possession or
occupation of the land in question (in forcible entry cases, before municipal
courts) or, the better right of possession (in accion publiciana in cases before
Courts of First Instance, now Regional Trial Courts).
|||

iiiAtlas Consolidated Mining vs. Factoran

iv[G.R. No. L-75501. September 15, 1987.JUSTICE PARAS

FACTS: Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation registered the

location of its "Master VII Fr." mining claim with the Mining Recorder of Toledo
City. Private respondent Buqueron registered the declarations of location of his
"St. Mary Fr." and "St. Joseph Fr." mining claims with the same Mining Recorder.
Buqueron's "St. Mary Fr." and "St. Joseph Fr." were surveyed and the survey plans
thereof were duly approved by the Director of Mines and Geo Sciences. Notice of
Buqueron's lease application was published.
During the said period of publication, petitioner filed an adverse claim against
private respondent's mining claims on the ground that they allegedly overlapped
its own mining claims. After hearing, the Director of Mines rendered a decision
giving the preferential right to Buqueron.
ISSUE: Whether the decision of the Director of Mines may be overturned by the
Courts.
HELD: NO. This Court has repeatedly ruled that judicial review of the decision of an
administrative official is of course subject to certain guideposts laid down in many
decided cases. Thus, for instance, findings of fact in such decision should not be
disturbed if supported by substantial evidence, but review is justified when there
has been a denial of due process, or mistake of law or fraud, collusion or arbitrary
action in the administrative proceeding, where the procedure which led to factual
findings is irregular; when palpable errors are committed; or when a grave abuse
of discretion, arbitrariness, or capriciousness is manifest.
A careful study of the records shows that none of the above circumstances is
present in the case at bar, which would justify the overturning of the findings of
fact of the Director of Mines which were affirmed by the Office of the President.
On the contrary, in accordance with the prevailing principle that "in reviewing
administrative decisions, the reviewing Court cannot reexamine the sufficiency of
the evidence as if originally instituted therein, and receive additional evidence,

that was not submitted to the administrative agency concerned," the findings of
fact in this case must be respected. As ruled by the Court, they will not be
disturbed so long as they are supported by substantial evidence, even if not
overwhelming or preponderant.

vHEIRS OF EUGENIA V. ROXAS

-- LETS EXCLUDE. CANT FIND CASE ONLINE.
Industrial Power Sales vs. Sinsuat

[G.R. No. L-29171. April 15, 1988.]

JUSTICE NARVASA

|||

FACTS: In April of 1965 two (2) Invitations To Bid were advertised by the Bureau of
Supply Coordination of the Department of General Services. Among the bidders
were Industrial Power Sales, Inc. and Delta Motor Corporation. The bids were
deliberated on by the Committee on Awards which thereafter awarded the same to
Industrial Power Sales. DELTA protested the award to IPSI, by telegram sent to the
Bureau of Telecommunications. It claimed that the trucks offered by IPSI were not
factory built, as stipulated in the specifications contained in the requisition itself
and in the Invitation to Bid. In his decision, the Director ruled that the bidding had
been made in strict compliance with the technical specifications and
requirements. However, Acting Undersecretary Lachica tried to reverse himself.
The Acting Director however reiterated and reaffirmed the conclusions in his.
Secretary Duma Sinsuat later decided in favor of DELTA. IPSI lost no time in
appealing from Secretary Sinsuat's decision to the Office of the President as well
as to the Office of the Auditor General. The appeal notwithstanding, the LetterOrder in favor of DELTA was released to it. IPSI then filed with the Quezon City
Court of First Instance. After trial, the Court rendered judgment dismissing IPSI's
petition and sentencing it and its surety, on the counterclaim, to pay damages to
DELTA.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
applies in the case at bar.

HELD: NO. There are exceptions to the principle known as exhaustion of

administrative remedies, these being: (1) where the issue is purely a legal one, (2)
where the controverted act is patently illegal or was done without jurisdiction or in
excess of jurisdiction; (3) where the respondent is a department secretary whose
acts as an alter ego of the President bear the latter's implied or assumed approval,
unless actually disapproved; or (4) where there are circumstances indicating the
urgency of judicial intervention.
|||

Yee vs. Director of Public Schools

[G.R. No. L-16924. April 29, 1963.

JUSTICE PADILLA
FACTS: Antonia Yee is a civil service eligible serving as a regular public school teacher having
passed the required teachers examination. Antonia Yee has since been serving as a public
school teacher in Buhang Elementary School, Buhang Hamtic, Antique. In 1957, she married a
Chinese citizen, Ng Foo. In the same year, Yee received notice that she is being terminated from
her job by reason of her marriage, and subsequent loss of citizenship. Yee then filed a Petition for
Mandamus to compel the Director of Public Schools to reinstate her.
ISSUE: Whether or not Yee should be reinstated.

HELD: NO. There is no doubt that her removal as a public school teacher because

of loss of Filipino citizenship is legal. Not being included in section 671 of the
Revised Administrative Code which enumerates the officers and employees
constituting the unclassified service, teaching in a public school is in the classified
service a public function which may be performed by Filipino citizens only. An
applicant for admission to examination for entrance into the civil service must be
a citizen of the Philippines ( section 675 of the Revised Administrative Code). And
after he had qualified himself to be eligible for appointment to a civil service
position and had been appointed to such position, he must continue to be such
citizen. A voluntary change of citizenship or a change thereof by operation of law
disqualifies him to continue holding the civil service position to which he had
qualified and had been appointed. Such being the case, upon the appellee's
marriage on 10 August 1957 to Ng Foo alias Pio Chet Yee, a Chinese citizen, the
appellee ceased to be a citizen of the Philippines, and for that reason she is no
longer qualified to continue holding the civil service position to which she had
qualified and had been appointed.
|||

Laurel vs. Desierto

GR No. 145368, 12 April 2002

JUSTICE KAPUNAN
FACTS: The Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau of the Office of the

Ombudsman directed petitioner, Chairman of the National Centennial

Commission (NCC), to submit his counter affidavit on the charges of anomalies
found by the Senate Blue Ribbon and Saguisag Committees. The Blue Ribbon
Committee recommended his prosecution for violation of the rules on public
bidding on the award of centennial contracts and manifest bias in the issuance of
the Notice to Proceed in the absence of a valid contract, while the Saguisag
Committee recommended the further investigation of petitioner for violations of
Section 3 (e) of RA. No. 3019, Section 4 (a) in relation to Section 11 of R.A. 6713,
and Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner moved to dismiss on ground
of lack of jurisdiction claiming that he is not a public officer and that NCC is a
private organization. The motion was denied by the Ombudsman, hence, the
instant recourse.
|||

ISSUE: Whether the PETITIONER, BOTH AS CHAIRMAN OF THE NCC AND OF EXPOCORP
WAS NOT A "PUBLIC OFFICER" AS DEFINED UNDER THE ANTI-GRAFT & CORRUPT
PRACTICES ACT.
|||

HELD: Clearly, the NCC performs sovereign functions. It is, therefore, a public
office, and petitioner, as its Chair, is a public officer.
That petitioner allegedly did not receive any compensation during his tenure is of
little consequence. A salary is a usual but not a necessary criterion for
determining the nature of the position. It is not conclusive. The salary is a mere
incident and forms no part of the office. Where a salary or fees is annexed, the
office is provided for it is a naked or honorary office, and is supposed to be
accepted merely for the public good. 23 Hence, the office of petitioner as NCC
Chair may be characterized as an honorary office, as opposed to a lucrative office
or an office of profit, i.e., one to which salary, compensation or fees are attached.
24 But it is a public office, nonetheless.

REGALA vs. CFI OF BATAAN

GR No. L-781; November 29, 1946
JUSTICE PABLO

FACTS: The appellant was accused in the criminal case No. 4307 of the Court of First
Instance of Bataan for the crime of murder. It pleaded not guilty. On the day appointed for the
hearing, the provincial prosecutor instead of adducing his evidence file a complaint amended
as defendants including the witnesses named in the complaint, Wenceslao Cruz and Conrado
Maalac. It was alleged in the amended complaint that there was conspiracy between the two
defendants. The trial judge, however, acceded to the request that Cruz and Manalac be used
as prosecution witnesses, and thereafter, the same issued an order. The appellant filed an
appeal against the order but was denied. It filed a motion of reconsideration but was also
denied. It filed a petition for certiorari, claiming that the trial judge acted without jurisdiction,
since his appointment has not been approved by the Appointments, as published in a
newspaper of the same date.
Issue: Whether the decision of the de facto judge was valid.
HELD: Yes. File does not show that the judge was aware of such disapproval before issuing
its order and was contested illegal. A judge who demists office before hearing the disapproval
of his appointment is a de facto judge. All official actions as a judge de facto, are as valid for
all legal purposes and for all kinds of issues, such as a de jure judge.
Xxx
In addition, if the judge acted in breach of Regulation, it was at most a procedural error, not an
abuse of discretion, or excess or lack of jurisdiction. Such an error, if it is in reality, can be
corrected, after final judgment rendered in the first instance, not certiorari on appeal.
Certiorari is only an appropriate remedy when a court in the execution of his judicial duties,
acted without jurisdiction or in excess of it or grave abuse of discretion and, in the ordinary
procedures, does not have the recurring simple and speedy remedy of appeal. If for every
mistake made by a court of certiorari, matters would be endless.
SOLIS VS CA
GR Nos. L-29777-83; March 26, 1971
JUSTICE REYES
FACTS: Petitioner Gregorio Solis and several other co-accused were indicted, tried

and found guilty of malversation of public funds in the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Sur. The judgment was penned and signed on 19 June 1954 by the
Honorable Jose N. Leuterio, then Judge-at-Large assigned to Camarines Sur.
All the accused were summoned to appear for promulgation of the judgment on
19 June 1954, but no court proceeding was had on that day, as the President of
the Philippines had declared it a special public holiday.
On 20 June 1954, Republic Act No. 1186, which abolished all existing positions of
Judges-at-Large, took effect without Executive approval.

Petitioner Solis appealed the judgment to the Court of Appeals, where he raised in
issue and attacked the validity of the promulgation of the judgment of the lower
court, for having been made by another judge after the incumbency of the judge
who rendered it had ceased.
The Solicitor-General's brief, in the Court of Appeals, agreed that the
promulgation was illegal and void. However, the CA decided to affirm the trial
courts judgment.
ISSUE: Whether the decision promulgated was valid.
HELD: No. The main ground upon which the Court of Appeals held the contested
judgment of the Court of First Instance to be valid is that "since the approval of
Republic Act 1186, effective 20 June 1954, was not yet publicly or generally known
on 21 June 1954, Judge Leuterio should be considered as a judge de facto of said
court and the promulgation of his appealed decision on said date is valid and
legally effective." This is a misapplication of the doctrine laid down in the very
case cited by the Court of Appeals. In Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez, supra, a judge de
facto was defined as one who has the reputation of being the officer he assumes
to be and yet is not a good officer in point of law because there exists some defect
in his appointment or his right to exercise judicial functions at the particular time;
but it is "essential to the validity of the acts of a de facto judge, that he is actually
acting under some color of right". In the present case, Judge Leuterio did not
actually act or perform or exercise the duties of judge when his decision was
promulgated, as he had ceased to be one, and the decision was promulgated
under another presiding judge. The other cases cited by the Court of Appeals
were similarly misapplied, as said decisions refer to the acts of a de facto judge,
not to a case where he did not act.

PINEDA VS CLAUDIO
GR NO. L-29661; May 13, 1969
JUSTICE CASTRO

FACTS: In 1968, the Chief of Police of Pasay City died. Then Mayor Jovito Claudio
appointed State Prosecutor Francisco Villa as the replacement. The Deputy Chief of
Police, Basilio Pineda, assailed the appointment of Villa as he claimed that he has
preferential rights over Villa because he is next in line. Pinedas position is supported
by the Civil Service Commissioner Abelardo Subido who held in abeyance the
appointment of Villa. Subido further stated that according to the Civil Service Act as
well as in a previous Supreme Court decision (Millares vs Subido, August 10, 1967), in
filling up vacancies in local offices the order of priority is as follows:
1.

Promotion (next in rank)

2.

Transfer (lateral movement)

3.

Reinstatement/Reemployment

4.

Certification (usually certified outsiders)

That in case the next in line cannot be promoted due to special reasons, only then
can someone be promoted in the subsequent order of transfer, reinstatement, or
certification. Subido pointed out that Claudio did not provide a special reason why he
chose Villa over Pineda.
Claudio replied by stating that Pinedas track record shows that he was not able to
solve the sagging inefficiency of the local police organization.
The DOJ Secretary supported Claudios position and he pointed out that in as far as
filling up a vacancy in the police department is concerned, what governs is the Police
Act of 1966 and in said law, it is provided that it is within the mayors discretion as to
who he should appoint to said office.

ISSUE: Whether or not Pineda has a preferential right to the said public office.
HELD: No. The granting of equal opportunity for government employment to all
qualified citizens and the exertion of positive efforts to attract the best qualified to

enter the service may be implemented effectively only through the judicious
exercise of the best judgment and discretion of the appointing authority.
Resolving the issue squarely presented, we hold that it is neither mandatory nor
ministerial for the mayor of Pasay City to promote to the vacant position of chief
of police the incumbent deputy chief of police Pineda, and that the appointment
to said position of the respondent Villa, who has been certified as qualified and
eligible, although an "outsider" and not the next-in-rank employee, is valid, in the
same manner that the appointment of Pineda, although an "outsider" and not the
next-in-rank, to the position of deputy chief of police was valid.
The Civil Service Act does not peremptorily require the mayor to promote the
officer next in rank. Section 23 thereof does not require that vacancies must be
filled by promotion, transfer, reinstatement, reemployment or certification, in that
order. That would be to construe the provision not merely as a legislative
prescription of qualifications but as a legislative appointment, repugnant to the
Constitution. What it does purport to say is that as far as practicable the person
next in rank should be promoted, otherwise the vacancy may be filled by transfer,
reinstatement, reemployment or certification, as the appointing power sees fit,
provided the appointee is certified to be qualified and eligiblewhich is the basic
requirement of the Civil Service Act, as well as of the Police Act and the
Decentralization Law.
National Service Corporation vs. NLRC

G.R. No. 69870. November 29, 1988.

JUSTICE PADILLA
FACTS: Eugenia C. Credo was an employee of the National Service Corporation
(NASECO), a domestic corporation which provides security guards as well as
messengerial, janitorial and other similar manpower services to the Philippine
National Bank (PNB) and its agencies. She was first employed with NASECO as a
lady guard on. Through the years, she was promoted to Clerk Typist, then
Personnel Clerk until she became Chief of Property and Records.
Sometime before 7 November 1983, Credo was charged administratively,
stemming from her non-compliance with a memorandum. Credo was called to
explain her side in connection with the administrative charges filed against her.
After said meeting, on the same date, Credo was placed on "Forced Leave" status

for 15 days.
Before the expiration of said 15-day leave, Credo filed a complaint before the
Ministry of Labor. While Credo was on forced leave, NASECO's Committee on
Personnel Affairs deliberated and evaluated a number of past acts of misconduct
or infractions attributed to her. The committee recommended her termination,
with forfeiture of benefits. For her failure to explain her side in connection with
the charges filed against her, she was handed a Notice of Termination.
Credo filed a supplemental complaint for illegal dismissal. The labor arbiter
rendered a decision: 1) dismissing Credo's complaint, and 2) directing NASECO to
pay Credo separation pay equivalent to one half month's pay for every year of
service.
Both parties appealed to respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
which rendered a decision to reinstate Credo. In NASECO's comment, it is
belatedly argued that the NLRC has no jurisdiction to order Credo's reinstatement
because NASECO is as a government corporation (by virtue of its being a
subsidiary of the National Investment and Development Corporation (NIDC), a
subsidiary wholly owned by the Philippine National Bank (PNB), which in turn is a
government owned corporation), the terms and conditions of employment of its
employees are governed by the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Civil Service has jurisdiction over the case involving
NASECO, a government owned and controlled company without original charter.
HELD: No. On the premise that it is the 1987 Constitution that governs the instant
case because it is the Constitution in place at the time of decision thereof, the
NLRC has jurisdiction to accord relief to the parties. As an admitted subsidiary of
the NIDC, in turn a subsidiary of the PNB, the NASECO is a government-owned or
controlled corporation without original charter.
GARCIA vs COMMISSION ON AUDIT
[G.R. No. 75025. September 14, 1993.]
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO

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FACTS: Herein petitioner Vicente Garcia was employed as a Supervising lineman at the
Bureau of Telecommunications. He was accused of stealing some materials in their company.
Thus, public respondents filed a criminal case against him for qualified theft before a court
and on the same ground respondents also filed an administrative case in which petitioner was
found guilty and was later dismissed from the service. With respect to the criminal offense,

petitioner was acquitted by the court due to insufficiency of evidence. Petitioner was then
reinstated from his work and is now claiming before the COA for his back salaries from the
time of his dismissal up to present. But COA on the other hand reluctantly denied his
pleadings. Meanwhile, petitioner was extended an executive clemency (absolute pardon) by
the President. Still, respondent COA strongly refused to give due course to petitioners claim.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner is entitled to back salaries and reinstatement.

HELD: Yes. In the case at bar, petitioner was found administratively liable for
dishonesty and consequently dismissed from the service. However, he was later
acquitted by the trial court of the charge of qualified theft based on the very same
acts for which he was dismissed. The acquittal of petitioner by the trial court was
founded not on lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt but on the fact that
petitioner did not commit the offense imputed to him. Aside from finding him
innocent of the charge, the trial court commended petitioner for his concern and
dedication as a public servant. Verily, petitioner's innocence is the primary reason
behind the grant of executive clemency to him, bolstered by the favorable
recommendations for his reinstatement by the Ministry of Transportation and
Communications and the Civil Service Commission. The bestowal of executive
clemency on petitioner in effect completely obliterated the adverse effects of the
administrative decision which found him guilty of dishonesty and ordered his
separation from the service. This can be inferred from the executive clemency
itself exculpating petitioner from the administrative charge and thereby directing
his reinstatement, which is rendered automatic by the grant of the pardon. This
signifies that petitioner need no longer apply to be reinstated to his former
employment; he is restored to his office ipso facto upon the issuance of the
clemency.
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SANTOS VS CA
[G.R. No. 139792. November 22, 2000
JUSTICE DAVIDE JR
FACTS: Petitioner was appointed Judge of the MeTC of Quezon City and thereafter
assumed office. Subsequently, petitioner optionally retired from the Judiciary
under R.A. 910, as amended, and received his retirement gratuity under the law
for his entire years in the government service, and five years thereafter he has
been regularly receiving a monthly pension. On 1 March 1995, Congress enacted
R.A. No. 7924 which reorganized the Metropolitan Manila Authority (MMA) and

renamed it as Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA).

Subsequently, the MMDA issued a Resolution which authorized the payment of
separation benefits to the officials and employees of the former MMA who would
be separated as a result of the implementation of R.A. 7924. Petitioner was
informed by the MMDA that having opted to be separated from the service, he
would be entitled to separation benefits equivalent to one and one-fourth (1-1/4)
monthly salary for every year of service under Sec. 11 of the MMDA law. In his
Position Paper, petitioner asserted that since the retirement gratuity he received
under R.A. 910, as amended, is not an additional or double compensation, all the
years of his government service, including those years in the Judiciary, should be
credited in the computation of his separation benefits under R.A. No. 7924. The
Civil Service Commission (CSC) held that petitioner cannot be paid retirement
benefits twice one under R.A. 910, as amended, and another under R.A. No.
7924 for the same services he rendered as MeTC Judge. Petitioner then filed
with the Court of Appeals a Petition to set aside the resolution of the CSC. The
Court of Appeals ruled that the CSC was correct in dismissing petitioner's appeal
from the opinion of the CSC-NCR Regional Office. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner may still claim his retirement benefits
under RA 910.
HELD: No. To credit his years of service in the Judiciary in the computation of his
separation pay under R.A. No. 7924 notwithstanding the fact that he had received
or has been receiving the retirement benefits under R.A. No. 910, as amended,
would be to countenance double compensation for exactly the same services, i.e.,
his services as MeTC Judge. Such would run counter to the policy of this Court
against double compensation for exactly the same services. More important, it
would be in violation of the first paragraph of Section 8 of Article IX-B of the
Constitution, which proscribes additional, double, or indirect compensation.
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CSC VS DACOYCOY
G.R. No. 135805, [April 29, 1999],
George P. Suan, Vice-President of Citizens Crime Watch, Allen Chapter, Northern
Samar, filed with petitioner Civil Service Commission (CSC) a complaint against
respondent, Pedro Dacoycoy, the Vocational School Administrator of Balicuatro
College of Arts and Trade, Allen, Northern Samar, for habitual drunkenness,

misconduct and nepotism. After investigation, the CSC found respondent guilty
only of nepotism on two counts as a result of the appointment of his two sons as
driver and utility worker of the school and their assignment under respondent's
immediate supervision and control. Consequently, the CSC dismissed respondent
from the service. Respondent filed a special civil action for certiorari with
preliminary injunction before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed
and set aside the decision of the CSC ruling that respondent did not appoint or
recommend his two sons, hence, he was not guilty of nepotism. The appellate
court further ruled that it is "the person who recommends or appoints who
should be sanctioned, as it is he who performs the prohibited act. Hence, this
appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not Dacoycoy is guilty of nepotism.
HELD: Yes. We agree with the Civil Service Commission that respondent Pedro O.
Dacoycoy was guilty of nepotism and correctly meted out the penalty of dismissal
from the service. Respondent Dacoycoy is the Vocational School Administrator,
Balicuatro College of Arts and Trades, Allen, Northern Samar. It is true that he did
not appoint or recommend his two sons to the positions of driver and utility
worker in the Balicuatro College of Arts and Trades. In fact, it was Mr. Jaime
Daclag, Head of the Vocational Department of the BCAT, who recommended the
appointment of Rito. Mr. Daclag's authority to recommend the appointment of
first level positions such as watchmen, security guards, drivers, utility workers, and
casuals and emergency laborers for short durations of three to six months was
recommended by respondent Dacoycoy and approved by DECS Regional Director
Eladio C. Dioko, with the provision that such positions shall be under Mr. Daclag's
immediate supervision. On July 1, 1992, Atty. Victorino B. Tirol II, Director III, DECS
Regional Office VIII, Palo, Leyte, appointed Rito Dacoycoy driver of the school. On
January 3, 1993, Mr. Daclag also appointed Ped Dacoycoy casual utility worker.
However, it was respondent Dacoycoy who certified that "funds are available for
the proposed appointment of Rito Dacoycoy" and even rated his performance as
"very satisfactory." On the other hand, his son Ped stated in his position
description form that his father was "his next higher supervisor." The
circumvention of the ban on nepotism is quite obvious. Unquestionably, Mr.
Daclag was a subordinate of respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy, who was the school
administrator. He authorized Mr. Daclag to recommend the appointment of first
level employees under his immediate supervision. Then Mr. Daclag recommended

the appointment of respondent's two sons and placed them under respondent's
immediate supervision serving as driver and utility worker of the school. Both
positions are career positions. To our mind, the unseen but obvious hand of
respondent Dacoycoy was behind the appointing or recommending authority in
the appointment of his two sons. Clearly, he is guilty of nepotism.
TABUENA VS SANDIGANBAYAN
[G.R. Nos. 103501-03. February 17, 1997.
JUSTICE FRANCISCO
FACTS: Luis Tabuena as General Manager of MIAA received direct order from Marcos to pay directly
to his office sum of 55mio in cash to pay for MIAAs liability to PNCC. He then received Presidential
Memorandum from Fe Gimenez (secretary). The money was delivered in cash in three withdrawals, no
vouchers prepared to support the disbursement although Gimenez issued a receipt on the third delivery
for the entire amount. Tabuena was accused and convicted of the crime of malversation by
Sandiganbayan for defrauding the government, taking and misappropriating money when there is no
outstanding obligation between MIAA and PNCC. Petitioner contended that he was acting in good faith
when the office of the president directed him to deliver the said amount to his office person who acts
in obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose.
ISSUE: Whether or not Tabuena is criminally liable.
HELD: No. Good faith is a valid defense in a prosecution for malversation for it

would negate criminal intent on the part of the accused.

In so far as Tabuena is concerned, with the due presentation in evidence of the
MARCOS Memorandum, we are swayed to give credit to his claim of having
caused the disbursement of the P55 Million solely by reason of such
memorandum. Tabuena had no other choice but to make the withdrawals, for
that was what the MARCOS Memorandum required him to do. He could not be
faulted if he had to obey and strictly comply with the presidential directive, and to
argue otherwise is something easier said than done. Marcos was undeniably
Tabuena's superior the former being then the President of the Republic who
unquestionably exercised control over government agencies such as the MIAA
and PNCC. In other words, Marcos had a say in matters involving intergovernment agency affairs and transactions, such as for instance, directing
payment of liability of one entity to another and the manner in which it should be
carried out. And as a recipient of such kind of a directive coming from the highest
official of the land no less, good faith should be read on Tabuena's compliance,
without hesitation nor any question, with the MARCOS Memorandum. Tabuena

therefore is entitled to the justifying circumstance of "Any person who acts in

obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose." The
subordinate-superior relationship between Tabuena and Marcos is clear. And so
too, is the lawfulness of the order contained in the MARCOS Memorandum, as it
has for its purpose partial payment of the liability of one government agency
(MIAA) to another (PNCC). The MARCOS Memorandum is patently legal (for on its
face it directs payment of an outstanding liability) and that Tabuena acted under
the honest belief that the P55 million was a due and demandable debt and that it
was just a portion of a bigger liability to PNCC. Thus, even if the order is illegal if it
is patently legal and the subordinate is not aware of its illegality, the subordinate
is not liable, for then there would only be a mistake of fact committed in good
faith. The principles underlying all that has been said above in exculpation of
Tabuena equally apply to Peralta in relation to the P5 Million for which he is being
held accountable, i.e., he acted in good faith when he, upon the directive of
Tabuena, helped facilitate the withdrawal of P5 Million of the P55 Million of the
MIAA funds.

Correa vs. CFI

[G.R. No. L-46096. July 30, 1979.]

JUSTICE ANTONIO

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FACTS: Two policemen were illegally dismissed by Eufemio Correa, municipal

mayor of Norzagaray, Bulacan during his incumbency. The CFI of Bulacan
rendered judgment in favor of the policemen and ordered personally to pay the
salaries which the policemen failed to receive by reason of their illegal dismissal
from office until they are actually reinstated. The CA affirmed the decision of the
CFI which became final and executory. The petitioner filed a Motion to Quash
Write of Execution. Thus, petitioner came to this court, maintaining that he could
no longer be required to pay the back salaries of the private respondents because
payment on his part presupposes his continuance in office, which is not the case.
He contends that it is the Municipality of Norzagaray that is liable for said
payment.
ISSUE: Whether or not Correa as a public official who illegally dismissed an
employee during his incumbency is still personally liable.

HELD: Yes. A public officer who commits a tort or other wrongful act, done in
excess or beyond the scope of his duty, is not protected by his office and is
personally liable therefor like any private individual. 9 This principle of personal
liability has been applied to cases where a public officer removes another officer
or discharges an employee wrongfully, the reported cases saying that by reason of
non-compliance with the requirements of law in respect to removal from office,
the officials were acting outside their official authority. 10
Respondent Court, therefore, did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying
petitioner's motion to quash writ of execution. The writ was strictly in accordance
with the terms of the judgment.

Ocampo vs. Office of the Ombudsman

[G.R. No. 114683. January 18, 2000.]

JUSTICE

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FACTS: Petitioner Jesus Ocampo is the Training Coordinator of NIACONSULT, INC.,

a subsidiary of the National Irrigation Administration. An administrative charge for
serious misconduct and/or fraud or willful breach of trust was filed against him
before the Office of the Ombudsman by NIACONSULT through its president, the
private respondent, Maximino Eclipse. Petitioner was required by respondent
Ombudsman to file his counter-affidavit within ten (10) days from receipt with a
caveat that failure to file the same would be deemed a waiver of his right to
present evidence. Despite notice, petitioner failed to comply with the order. A year
later, the respondent Ombudsman issued another order giving petitioner another
chance to file his counter-affidavit. Again, petitioner failed. Thereafter, the
respondent Ombudsman issued a resolution recommending the discharge of
petitioner from the service. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, claiming that he
was denied due process in that the administrative case was resolved solely on the
basis of the complainant's evidences without affording him the opportunity to file
his counter-affidavit. The Ombudsman denied the motion. Aggrieved, petitioner
filed the present petition. While the case was pending, petitioner filed a
manifestation stating that the criminal complaint filed against him based on the
same facts or incidents which gave rise to the administrative case was dismissed
by the Regional Trial Court. With the dismissal of the criminal case, petitioner
manifested that the administrative case can no longer stand on its own and

should be dismissed.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ocampo remains administratively liable.
HELD: Yes. The dismissal of the criminal case will not foreclose administrative
action filed against petitioner or give him a clean bill of health in all respects. The
Regional Trial Court, in dismissing the criminal complaint, was simply saying that
the prosecution was unable to prove the guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable
doubt, a condition sine qua non for conviction. The lack or absence of proof
beyond reasonable doubt does not mean an absence of any evidence whatsoever
for there is another class of evidence which, though insufficient to establish guilt
beyond reasonable doubt, is adequate in civil cases; this is preponderance of
evidence. Then too, there is the "substantial evidence" rule in administrative
proceedings which merely requires such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Thus, considering the
difference in the quantum of evidence, as well as the procedure followed and the
sanctions imposed in criminal and administrative proceedings, the findings and
conclusions in one should not necessarily be binding on the other.
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OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs. ENRIQUEZ,

A.M. No. P-89-290, [January 29, 1993])
JUSTICE

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FACTS: Elidoro C. Cruz of Compania Maritima, Inc. informed this Court that the
company's lawyer filed with the Tanodbayan a complaint for falsification of a
public document, use of falsified documents, robbery and the violation of R.A. No.
3019 against respondent Ramon G. Enriquez, Deputy Sheriff of Branch XXXI of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila and others. Court Administrator Leo D.
Medialdea sent a letter to Cruz, informing the latter that as a meter of policy, the
administrative aspect of the case "will be undertaken by this Office upon the filing
of a corresponding information by the Tanodbayan before the Sandiganbayan."
Consequently, an Information for falsification of a public document was filed
against the respondent with the Sandiganbayan. The Court Administrator
Meynardo A. Tiro, pursuant to this Court's en banc and on the basis of the
Information filed with the Sandiganbayan, administratively charged respondent
with the crime of falsification of a public document and with conduct prejudicial to

the best interest of the service. The respondent was directed to file his
answer/explanation within ten (10) days from receipt of the charge.
Instead of filing the answer/explanation, the respondent forwarded to the Court
Administrator a letter informing the latter that Criminal Case No. 12987 was still
pending resolution before the Sandiganbayan and that therefore, he (respondent)
should not be held administratively liable. The Sandiganbayan then dismissed the
case against respondent for insufficiency of evidence. Thereafter, respondent filed a
manifestation and praying the dismissal of the case by virtue of the decision of the
Sandiganbayan. Upon investigation by the RTC, it was found that respondent sold a
vessel with public bidding. The trial judge recommended that the respondent be
dismissed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent is administratively liable.

HELD: Yes. It is unfortunate that the Sandiganbayan failed to appreciate these
illegal acts and despicable maneuverings. Be that as it may, its dismissal of the
criminal case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence was never meant, as
respondent doggedly believed and arrogantly asserted, to foreclose
administrative action against him or to give him a clean bill of health in all
respects. The Sandiganbayan, in dismissing the same, was simply saying that the
prosecution was unable to prove the guilt of the respondent beyond reasonable
doubt, a condition sine qua non for conviction 2 because of the presumption of
innocence which the Constitution guarantees an accused. 3 Lack or absence of
proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean an absence of any evidence
whatsoever for there is another class of evidence which, though insufficient to
establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt, is adequate in civil cases; this is
preponderance of evidence. 4 Then too, there is the "substantial evidence" rule in
administrative proceedings which merely requires in these cases such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.
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Chavez vs. Sandiganbayan

[G.R. No. 91391. January 24, 1991

Justice Gutierrez Jr

FACTS: A Civil case was filed against Enrile in the Sandiganbayan for alleged illegal activities
made byEnrile during the Marcos era. Enrirle filed a motion to dismiss and compulsory
counter-claim. In thecounter-claim Enrile moved to implead Chavez and other PCGG officials
on the basis that the casefield agaisnt him was a harassment suit. The motion to implead
Chavez and others was granted bythe Sandiganbayan.Chavez and the PCGG officials raised
the defense that they are immune from suit by virtue of Sec. 4 of Executive Order NO. 1. It
was found in the records of the PCGG, declared by Jovito Salonga,the there are no proof
linking Enrile with the illegal activities performed by Marcos. It was further averred that the
case filed against Enrile was instigated by Sol. Gen. Chavez.Sol. Gen. Chavez defended
himself by saying that he was acting as a counsel and cannot bymade a defendant in a
counter-claim.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sol. Gen. Chavez can be made liable for damages in filing the suit
against Enrile.
HELD: Yes. Immunity from suit cannot institutionalize irresponsibility and non-

accountability nor grant a privileged status not claimed by any other official of the
Republic.
Where the petitioner exceeds his authority as Solicitor General, acts in bad faith,
or, as contended by the private respondent, "maliciously conspir(es) with the
PCGG commissioners in persecuting respondent Enrile by filing against him an
evidently baseless suit in derogation of the latter's constitutional rights and
liberties" (Rollo, p. 417), there can be no question that a complaint for damages
may be filed against him. High position in government does not confer a license to
persecute or recklessly injure another. The actions governed by Articles 19, 20, 21,
and 32 of the Civil Code on Human Relations may be taken against public officers
or private citizens alike.
Lecaroz vs. Sandiganbayan

[G.R. No. 130872. March 25, 1999

Justice Bellosillo

Facts: Petitioner Francisco M. Lecaroz was the Municipal Mayor of Santa Cruz,
Marinduque, while his son and co-petitioner Lenlie Lecaroz, was the outgoing
chairman of the Kabataang Barangay (KB) of Barangay Bagong Silang, Santa Cruz,

and currently a member of its Sangguniang Bayan (SB) representing the

Federation of Kabataang Barangays. In the 1985 election of the Kabataang
Barangay Jowil Red won as the KB Chairman of Barangay Matalaba, Santa Cruz.
Red was appointed by then President Marcos as member of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Santa Cruz representing the KBs of the municipality. However, Mayor
Lecaroz informed Red that he could not yet sit as member of the municipal
council until the Governor of Marinduque had cleared his appointment. When Red
finally received his appointment papers, President Aquino was already in power.
But still Red was not allowed to sit as sectoral representative in the Sanggunian.
Meanwhile with the approval of the Mayor, Lenlie continued to receive his salary
for more than a year. Finally Red was able to secure appointment papers from the
Aquino administration after three years and nine months from the date he
received his appointment paper from President Marcos
ISSUE: Whether or not Lenlie Lecaroz was validly removed from office.
HELD: No. To be sure, an oath of office is a qualifying requirement for a public
office; a prerequisite to the full investiture with the office. 15 Only when the public
officer has satisfied the prerequisite of oath that his right to enter into the
position becomes plenary and complete. Until then, he has none at all. And for as
long as he has not qualified, the holdover officer is the rightful occupant. It is thus
clear in the present case that since Red never qualified for the post, petitioner
Lenlie Lecaroz remained KB representative to the Sanggunian, albeit in a carry
over capacity, and was in every aspect a de jure officer, 16 or at least a de facto
officer 17 entitled to receive the salaries and all the emoluments appertaining to
the position. As such, he could not be considered an intruder and liable for
encroachment of public office.
Estrada vs. Macapagal-Arroyo
GR No. 146738, 2 March 2001
JUSTICE PUNO
FACTS: This involves petitions of Joseph Ejercito Estrada challenging the respondent Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo as the de jure 14th President of the Republic. A short outline of events that
precipitated thecase at bar thus follows:
1. Petitioner won in the May 1998 national elections as president, the respondent as vicepresident.

2. On October 4, 2000, Ilocos Sur Governor Chavit Singson accused the petitioner and
hisfamily of receivingmillions of pesos from jueteng lords. Such expose ignited several
reactions of rage.
3. There became a built up of a call for petitioner to resign from office and his officials one
byone resignedwithdrawing their support.
4. In November 20 Impeachment Trial of the petitioner was opened, in December
7Impeachment Trial began.
5. January 19 people lined up in EDSA showing a greater call for the resignation of
thepresident.
6. January 20 was the day of petitioner's surrender. At 12:00 noon Chief Justice Hilario
Davideadministeredoath to respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. At 2:30
pm petitioner leftMalacanang and issueda press statement and a letter transmitting the
executive power upon him, thepresident to the vice president becoming the acting
president
7. The Monday after the oath, Arroyo discharged powers of the President.
8. Criminal cases have been filed against the petitioner after he stepped down into
presidency.
ISSUE: Whether or not Estrada resigned from office.
HELD: Yes. In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write any

formal letter of resignation before he evacuated Malacaang Palace in the

afternoon of January 20, 2001 after the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo.
Consequently, whether or not petitioner resigned has to be determined from his
acts and omissions before, during and after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of
prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a
material relevance on the issue.
Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as President.
Collantes vs. CA

[G.R. No. 169604. March 6, 2007

JUSTICE CHICO NAZARIO

FACTS: Petitioner Nelson was appointed as Undersecretary for Peace and

Order of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG).
Collantes allegedly received word from persons close to then President
Ejercito Estrada to give up his position so that the President could appoint
his key officials. As such, Collantes relinquished his post at the DILG.
Thereafter, the President appointed him as Undersecretary for Civilian
Relations of the Department of National Defense (DND). As it happened,
his stint in the DND was short lived. Collantes was supposedly ordered by
then Secretary Orlando Mercado to renounce his post in favor of another
presidential appointee, General Orlando Soriano. In deference, he
resigned from office believing that he will soon be given a new
assignment.
Unfortunately, Collantes was not given any other post in the government.
In fact, he received a letter from President Estrada terminating his
services. He then requested the assistance of the Career Executive Service
Board relative to the termination of his services. The termination of
Collantes' services, notwithstanding, the President accorded Collantes the
highest rank in the CES ranking structure, CESO Rank I, on 17 July 1999.
But then, despite this promotion in rank, Collantes did not receive new
appointment.
He filed a petition for quo warranto and mandamus and sent a letter to
the CSC. The RTC dismissed the case but the CSC held that Collantes' relief
as Undersecretary of DND amounted to illegal dismissal as he was not
given another post concomitant to his eligibility.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER MAY BE REMOVED FROM HIS POSITION AS
UNDERSECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE WITHOUT THE
CONCOMITANT TRANSFER TO A POSITION EQUIVALENT IN RANK OR BE REMOVED THEN,
BE FLOATED PERPETUALLY, WHICH IS TANTAMOUNT TO A CONSTRUCTIVE DISMISSAL, IN
VIOLATION OF HIS RIGHT TO SECURITY OF TENURE AS A CAREER EXECUTIVE SERVICE
ELIGIBLE.
HELD: YES. It would be absurd for us to rule that a civil servant who resigns from

his position can compel the President to appoint him to another position. Such a
ruling would effectively derogate the discretion of the appointing authority, 26 as it
will give the CESO the option to choose which position he or she wants, by the
simple expediency of resigning from the position he or she does not want.
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General Manager, PPA vs. Monserate

GR No. 129616, 17 April 2002
JUSTICE Sandoval-Gutierrez
FACTS: When respondent Julieta Monserate was appointed to the permanent

position of Manager II in the Resource Management Division of PPA, petitioner

Ramon Anino, who ranked second for the position, protested the same to the PPA
Appeals Board. Thereafter, respondent was replaced by petitioner Anino and
reassigned to the position of Administrative Officer, a position even lower than
respondent's previous position before she was appointed as Division Manager.
ISSUE: Whether or not Monserate was validly terminated from public office.
HELD: No. From all indications, it is indubitable that substantial and procedural
irregularities attended respondent's demotion from the position of Manager II,
Resource Management Division, to the lower position of Administrative Officer.
Indeed, her demotion, tantamount to a revocation of her appointment as
Manager II, is a patent violation of her constitutional rights to security of tenure
and due process. In Aquino vs. Civil Service Commission, 20 this Court emphasized
that "once an appointment is issued and the moment the appointee assumes a
position in the civil service under a completed appointment, he acquires a legal,
not merely equitable, right (to the position) which is protected not only by statute,
but also by the constitution, and cannot be taken away from him either by
revocation of the appointment, or by removal, except for cause, and with previous
notice and hearing."
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SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF SAN ANDRES VS CA

[G.R. No. 118883. January 16, 1998.]
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN
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FACTS: Private respondent Augusto Antonio was appointed as member of the

Sangguniang Bayan being the president-elect of the Association of Barangay
Councils (ABC) for the Municipality of San Andres, Catanduanes. While serving as
such, he was designated in a temporary capacity as member of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of the Province of Catanduanes. As a result of which he resigned as
member of the Sangguniang Bayan. His designation as member of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan was declared void by the Supreme Court hence, he

wrote the Sangguniang Bayan of San Andres expressing his desire to reassume his
position as sectoral representative therein, but the latter issued a resolution
declaring that he had no legal basis to resume office.
The RTC, in an action for certiorari and mandamus, ruled that Antonio's resignation
from the Sangguniang Bayan was ineffective as there, was no acceptance made by
the proper authorities, hence he should be allowed to resume office. The CA, on
appeal, affirmed the trial court's ruling.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a complete and effective resignation.

HELD: No. Under established jurisprudence, resignations, in the absence of

statutory provisions as to whom they should be submitted, should be tendered to
the appointing person or body. Private respondent, therefore, should have
submitted his letter of resignation to the President or to his alter ego, the DILG
Secretary. Although he supposedly furnished the latter a copy of his letter, there is
no showing that it was duly received, much less, that it was acted upon. The third
requisite being absent, there was, therefore, no valid and complete resignation.
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Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary

[G.R. No. 83896 83815; February 22, 1991.]

JUSTICE FERNAN

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FACTS: Both petitions were consolidated and are being resolved jointly as both seek a
declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 issued by President Corazon
C. Aquino on July 25, 1987.
Executive Order No. 284, according to the petitioners allows members of the Cabinet, their
undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other than government offices or positions
in addition to their primary positions. The pertinent provisions of EO 284 is as follows:
Section 1: A cabinet member, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive
officials of the Executive Department may in addition to his primary position, hold not more
than two positions in the government and government corporations and receive the
corresponding compensation therefor.
Section 2: If they hold more positions more than what is required in section 1, they must
relinquish the excess position in favor of the subordinate official who is next in rank, but in no
case shall any official hold more than two positions other than his primary position.
Section 3: AT least 1/3 of the members of the boards of such corporation should either be a
secretary, or undersecretary, or assistant secretary.
The petitioners are challenging EO 284s constitutionality because it adds exceptions to
Section 13 of Article VII other than those provided in the constitution. According to the

petitioners, the only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in
government are those provided in the Constitution namely: 1. The Vice President may be
appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Section 3 par.2 of Article VII. 2. The secretary of
justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec. 8 of article VIII.

ISSUE: Whether or not EO no. 284 is constitutional.

HELD: No. Going further into Section 13, Article VII, the second sentence provides:
"They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other
profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract
with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries." These sweeping, all-embracing
prohibitions imposed on the President and his official family, which prohibitions
are not similarly imposed on other public officials or employees such as the
Members of Congress, members of the civil service in general and members of
the armed forces, are proof of the intent of the 1987 Constitution to treat the
President and his official family as a class by itself and to impose upon said class
stricter prohibitions. (Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 83896,
83815, [February 22, 1991], 272 PHIL 147-172)
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