IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION FOR MICHAEL AND MICHELLE

LIM
FACTS:
The following facts are undisputed. Petitioner is an optometrist by
profession. On 23 June 1974, she married Primo Lim (Lim). They
were childless. Minor children, whose parents were unknown, were
entrusted to them by a certain Lucia Ayuban (Ayuban). Being so
eager to have a child of their own, petitioner and Lim registered the
children to make it appear that they were the childrens parents. The
children were named Michelle P. Lim (Michelle) and Michael Jude P.
Lim (Michael). Michelle was barely eleven days old when brought to
the clinic of petitioner. She was born on 15 March 1977. Michael was
11 days old when Ayuban brought him to petitioners clinic. His date of
birth is 1 August 1983.
The spouses reared and cared for the children as if they were their
own. They sent the children to exclusive schools. They used the
surname Lim in all their school records and documents.
Unfortunately, on 28 November 1998, Lim died. On 27 December
2000, petitioner married Angel Olario (Olario), an American citizen.
Thereafter, petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the
amnesty given under Republic Act No. 8552 (RA 8552) to those
individuals who simulated the birth of a child. Thus, on 24 April 2002,
petitioner filed separate petitions for the adoption of Michelle and
Michael before the trial court docketed as SPL PROC. Case Nos.
1258 and 1259, respectively. At the time of the filing of the petitions
for adoption, Michelle was 25 years old and already married, while
Michael was 18 years and seven months old.
Michelle and her husband gave their consent to the adoption as
evidenced by their Affidavits of Consent. Michael also gave his
consent to his adoption as shown in his Affidavit of
Consent. Petitioners husband Olario likewise executed an Affidavit of
Consent for the adoption of Michelle and Michael.

In the Certification issued by the Department of Social Welfare and

Development (DSWD), Michelle was considered as an abandoned
child and the whereabouts of her natural parents were unknown. The
DSWD issued a similar Certification for Michael.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner, who has remarried, can singly adopt.
RULING:
No. It is undisputed that, at the time the petitions for adoption were
filed, petitioner had already remarried. She filed the petitions by
herself, without being joined by her husband Olario. We have no
other recourse but to affirm the trial courts decision denying the
petitions for adoption. Dura lex sed lex. The law is explicit. Section 7,
Article III of RA 8552 reads:
SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. - The following may adopt:
(a) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of full
civil capacity and legal rights, of good moral character,
has not been convicted of any crime involving moral
turpitude, emotionally and psychologically capable of
caring for children, at least sixteen (16) years older than
the adoptee, and who is in a position to support and care
for his/her children in keeping with the means of the
family. The requirement of sixteen (16) year difference
between the age of the adopter and adoptee may be
waived when the adopter is the biological parent of the
adoptee, or is the spouse of the adoptees parent;
(b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above
stated for Filipino nationals: Provided, That his/her
country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the
Philippines, that he/she has been living in the Philippines
for at least three (3) continuous years prior to the filing of
the application for adoption and maintains such residence
until the adoption decree is entered, that he/she has been
certified by his/her diplomatic or consular office or any
appropriate government agency that he/she has the legal

capacity to adopt in his/her country, and that his/her

government allows the adoptee to enter his/her country as
his/her adopted son/daughter: Provided, further, That the
requirements on residency and certification of the aliens
qualification to adopt in his/her country may be waived for
the following:
(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a
relative within the fourth (4 th) degree of
consanguinity or affinity; or
(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate
son/daughter of his/her Filipino spouse; or
(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and
seeks to adopt jointly with his/her spouse a relative
within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or
affinity of the Filipino spouses; or
(c) The guardian with respect to the ward after the
termination of the guardianship and clearance of his/her
financial accountabilities.
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the
following cases:
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate
son/daughter of the other; or
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own
illegitimate son/daughter: Provided, however, That
the other spouse has signified his/her consent
thereto; or
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each
other.
In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse
adopts the illegitimate son/daughter of the other, joint

parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses.

(Emphasis supplied)
The use of the word shall in the above-quoted provision means
that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory. This is
in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the
child which is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is
elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require
the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between
the spouses.[12]
The law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity. Petitioner, having
remarried at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, must jointly
adopt. Since the petitions for adoption were filed only by petitioner
herself, without joining her husband, Olario, the trial court was correct
in denying the petitions for adoption on this ground.
Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions
enumerated in Section 7. First, the children to be adopted are not the
legitimate children of petitioner or of her husband Olario. Second, the
children are not the illegitimate children of petitioner. And third,
petitioner and Olario are not legally separated from each other.
The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as shown in his
Affidavit of Consent does not suffice. There are certain requirements
that Olario must comply being an American citizen. He must meet the
qualifications set forth in Section 7 of RA 8552 such as: (1) he must
prove that his country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of
the Philippines; (2) he must have been living in the Philippines for at
least three continuous years prior to the filing of the application for
adoption; (3) he must maintain such residency until the adoption
decree is entered; (4) he has legal capacity to adopt in his own
country; and (5) the adoptee is allowed to enter the adopters country
as the latters adopted child. None of these qualifications were shown
and proved during the trial.

These requirements on residency and certification of the aliens

qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Section
7. The children or adoptees are not relatives within the fourth degree
of consanguinity or affinity of petitioner or of Olario. Neither are the
adoptees the legitimate children of petitioner.

NERY v. SAMPANA
FACTS:
In her verified complaint filed on 18 June 2010,1 Nery alleged that in
June 2008, she engaged the services of Sampana for the annulment
of her marriage and for her adoption by an alien adopter. The petition
for annulment was eventually granted, and Nery paid P200,000.00 to
Sampana. As for the adoption, Sampana asked Nery if she had an
aunt, whom they could represent as the wife of her alien adopter.
Sampana then gave Nery a blurred copy of a marriage contract,
which they would use for her adoption. Thereafter, Nery paid
Sampana P100,000.00, in installment: (a) P10,000.00 on 10
September 2008; (b) P50,000.00 on 2 October 2008; and (c)
P40,000.00 on 17 November 2008. Nery no longer asked for receipts
since she trusted Sampana. On 14 February 2009, Sampana sent a
text message informing Nery that he already filed the petition for
adoption and it was already published. Sampana further informed
Nery that they needed to rehearse before the hearing. Subsequently,
Sampana told Nery that the hearing was set on 5 March 2010 in
Branch 11 of Malolos, Bulacan. When Nery asked why she did not
receive notices from the court, Sampana claimed that her presence
was no longer necessary because the hearing was only jurisdictional.
Sampana told Nery that the hearing was reset to 12 March 2010. On
11 March 2010, Nery inquired from Branch 11 of Malolos, Bulacan
about the status of the petition for adoption and discovered that there
was no such petition filed in the court. Thus, in the afternoon of the
same day, Nery met Sampana and sought the reimbursement of the
P100,000.00 she paid him. Sampana agreed, but said that he would
deduct the filing fee worth P12,000.00. Nery insisted that the filing fee
should not be deducted, since the petition for adoption was never
filed. Thereafter, Nery repeatedly demanded for the reimbursement of
the P100,000.00 from Sampana, but the demands were left
unheeded. In an Order dated 25 February 2011,3 the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), through
Commissioner Atty. Eldrid C. Antiquiera (Commissioner Antiquiera),
stated that Sampana failed to file his answer to the complaint and to
appear during the mandatory conference. Thus, both parties were
directed to submit their position papers.
In her position paper, Nery reiterated her allegations in the complaint.

On the other hand, in his position paper dated 25 March 2011,5

Sampana argued that Nerys allegations were self-serving and
unsubstantiated. However, Sampana admitted receiving one
package fee from Nery for both cases of annulment of marriage and
adoption. Sampana alleged that he initially frowned upon the
proposed adoption because of the old age, civil status and nationality
of the alien adopter, but Nery insisted on being adopted. Thus,
Sampana suggested that if the [alien] adopter would be married to a
close relative of [Nery], the intended [adoption by an alien] could be
possible. Sampana, then, required Nery to submit the documents,
including the marriage contracts and the certification of the aliens
qualification to adopt from the Japanese Embassy (certification). Nery
furnished the blurred marriage contract, but not the certification.
Sampana alleged that he prepared the petition for adoption but did
not file it because he was still waiting for the certification. Sampana
denied that he misled Nery as to the filing of the petition for adoption.
Sampana claimed that Nery could have mistaken the proceeding for
the annulment case with the petition for adoption, and that the
annulment case could have overshadowed the adoption case. In any
case, Sampana committed to refund the amount Nery paid him, after
deducting his legal services and actual expenses.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent is guilt of malpractice
RULING:
Yes. The recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors is welltaken, except as to the penalty. Acceptance of money from a client
establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives rise to the duty of
fidelity to the clients cause.8 Every case accepted by a lawyer
deserves full attention, diligence, skill and competence, regardless of
importance. A lawyer also owes it to the court, their clients, and other
lawyers to be candid and fair. In the present case, Sampana admitted
that he received one package fee for both cases of annulment and
adoption. Despite receiving this fee, he unjustifiably failed to file the
petition for adoption and fell short of his duty of due diligence and
candor to his client. Sampanas proffered excuse of waiting for the
certification before filing the petition for adoption is disingenuous and
flimsy.

In his position paper, he suggested to Nery that if the alien adopter

would be married to her close relative, the intended adoption could be
possible. Under the Domestic Adoption Act provision, which Sampana
suggested, the alien adopter can jointly adopt a relative within the
fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of his/her Filipino spouse,
and the certification of the aliens qualification to adopt is waived.11
Having no valid reason not to file the petition for adoption, Sampana
misinformed Nery of the status of the petition. He then conceded that
the annulment case overshadowed the petition for adoption. Verily,
Sampana neglected the legal matter entrusted to him. He even kept
the money given him, in violation of the Codes mandate to deliver the
clients funds upon demand. A lawyers failure to return upon demand
the funds held by him gives rise to the presumption that he has
appropriated the same for his own use, in violation of the trust
reposed in him by his client and of the public confidence in the legal
profession

CASTRO v. GREGORIO
FACTS:
The case originally stemmed from the adoption of Jose Maria Jed
Lemuel Gregorio (Jd) and Ana Maria Regina Gregorio (Regina) by
Atty. Jose G. Castro (Jose). Jose is the estranged husband of
Rosario Mata Castro (Rosario) and the father of Joanne Benedicta
Charissima M. Castro (Joanne), also known by her baptismal name,
"Maria Socorro M. Castro" and her nickname, "Jayrose."
Rosario alleged that she and Jose were married on August 5, 1962 in
Laoag City. Their marriage had allegedly been troubled. They had a
child, Rose Marie, who was born in 1963, but succumbed to
congenital heart disease and only lived for nine days. Rosario
allegedly left Jose after a couple of months because of the
incompatibilities between them.
Rosario and Jose, however, briefly reconciled in 1969. Rosario gave
birth to Joanne a year later. She and Jose allegedly lived as husband
and wife for about a year even if she lived in Manila and Jose stayed
in Laoag City. Jose would visit her in Manila during weekends.
Afterwards, they separated permanently because Rosario alleged
that Jose had homosexual tendencies. 5 She insisted, however, that
they "remained friends for fifteen (15) years despite their separation".
On August 1, 2000, Jose filed a petition for adoption before the
Regional Trial Court of Batac, Ilocos Norte. In the petition, he alleged
that Jed and Regina were his illegitimate children with Lilibeth
Fernandez Gregorio (Lilibeth), whom Rosario alleged was his
erstwhile housekeeper.9 At the time of the filing of the petition, Jose
was 70 years old.
On October 16, 2000, the trial court approved the adoption, having
ruled that "[n]o opposition had been received by this Court from any
person including the government which was represented by the
Office of the Solicitor General." A certificate of finality was issued on
February 9, 2006.
On October 18, 2007, Rosario and Joanne filed a petition for
annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
with the Court of Appeals, seeking to annul the October 16, 2000

decision of the trial court approving Jed and Regina's adoption. On

May 26, 2009, the Court of Appeals denied the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the consent of spouse is mandatory
RULING:
Yes. Under Rule 47, Section 1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a party
may file an action with the Court of Appeals to annul judgments or
final orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts.
This remedy will only be available if "the ordinary remedies of new
trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no
longer available through no fault of the petitioner."
As a general rule, the husband and wife must file a joint petition for
adoption. The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted provision
means that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory.
This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over
the child which is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is
elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require
the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between
the spouses.
The law provides for several exceptions to the general rule, as in a
situation where a spouse seeks to adopt his or her own children born
out of wedlock. In this instance, joint adoption is not necessary.
However, the spouse seeking to adopt must first obtain the consent of
his or her spouse.
In the absence of any decree of legal separation or annulment, Jose
and Rosario remained legally married despite their de facto
separation. For Jose to be eligible to adopt Jed and Regina, Rosario
must first signify her consent to the adoption. Jose, however, did not
validly obtain Rosario's consent. His submission of a fraudulent
affidavit of consent in her name cannot be considered compliance of
the requisites of the law. Had Rosario been given notice by the trial
court of the proceedings, she would have had a reasonable
opportunity to contest the validity of the affidavit. Since her consent
was
not
obtained,
Jose
was
ineligible
to
adopt.

The law also requires the written consent of the adopter's children if
they are 10 years old or older. The consent of the adopter's other
children is necessary as it ensures harmony among the prospective
siblings. It also sufficiently puts the other children on notice that they
will have to share their parent's love and care, as well as their future
legitimes, with another person.
It is undisputed that Joanne was Jose and Rosario's legitimate child
and that she was over 10 years old at the time of the adoption
proceedings. Her written consent, therefore, was necessary for the
adoption to be valid.

BARTOLOME v. SSS
FACTS:
John Colcol was employed as electrician by Scanmar Maritime
Services, Inc. Unfortunately, in June 2008, an accident occurred on
board the vessel whereby steel plates fell on John, which led to his
untimely death the following day. At the time of his death, John was
childless and unmarried. Thus, petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome,
Johns biological mother, filed a claim for death benefits under PD
626 with the Social Security System (SSS). However, the SSS denied
the claim on the ground that Bartolome is no longer the parent of
John as he was legally adopted by Cornelio Colcol. On appeal, the
Employees Compensation Commission (ECC) affirmed the ruling.
Aggrieved, Bartolome filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which
waslikewise denied by the ECC. Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Are the biological parents of the covered, but legally adopted,
employee considered secondary beneficiaries and, thus, entitled, in
appropriate cases, to receive the benefits under the ECP?
RULING:
Yes. To begin with, nowhere in the law nor in the rules does it say that
legitimate parents pertain to those who exercise parental authority
over the employee enrolled under the ECP. It was only in the assailed
Decision wherein such qualification was made. In addition, assuming
arguendo that the ECC did not overstep its boundaries in limiting the
adverted Labor Codeprovision to the deceaseds legitimate parents,
and that the commission properly equated legitimacy to parental
authority, Bartolome can still qualify as Johns secondary beneficiary.
True, when Cornelio, in 1985, adopted John, then about two (2) years
old, Bartolomes parental authority over John was severed. However,
lest it be overlooked, one key detail the ECC missed, aside from
Cornelios death, was that when the adoptive parent died less than
three (3) years after the adoption decree, John was still a minor, at
about four (4) years of age. The manner of terminating the adopters
parental authority, unlike the grounds for rescission, justifies the
retention of vested rights and obligations between the adopter and
the adoptee, while the consequent restoration of parental authority in

favor of the biological parents, simultaneously, ensures that the

adoptee, who is still a minor, is not left to fend for himself at such a
tender age.

ILUSORIO v. BILDNER

FACTS:
Erlinda Kalaw Ilusorio is the wife of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio.
Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age possessed of extensive
property valued at millions of pesos. For many years, lawyer
Potenciano Ilusorio was Chairman of the Board and President of
Baguio Country Club.
On July 11, 1942, Erlinda Kalaw and Potenciano Ilusorio contracted
matrimony and lived together for a period of thirty (30) years. In 1972,
they separated from bed and board for undisclosed reasons.
Potenciano lived at Urdaneta Condominium, Ayala Ave., Makati City
when he was in Manila and at Ilusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country
Club when he was in Baguio City. On the other hand, Erlinda lived in
Antipolo City.
On December 30, 1997, upon Potencianos arrival from the United
States, he stayed with Erlinda for about five (5) months in Antipolo
City.
On February 25, 1998, Erlinda filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Antipolo City a petition for guardianship over the person and property
of Potenciano Ilusorio due to the latters advanced age, frail health,
poor eyesight and impaired judgment.
On May 31, 1998, after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio City,
Potenciano Ilusorio did not return to Antipolo City and instead lived at
Cleveland Condominium, Makati.
On March 11, 1999, Erlinda filed with the Court of Appeals a petition
for habeas corpus to have the custody of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio.
She alleged that respondents(their children) refused petitioners
demands to see and visit her husband and prohibited Potenciano
from returning to Antipolo City
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus
is proper.
RULING:

No. As heretofore stated, a writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases

of illegal confinement or detention, or by which the rightful custody of
a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. It is available
where a person continues to be unlawfully denied of one or more of
his constitutional freedoms, where there is denial of due process,
where the restraints are not merely involuntary but are unnecessary,
and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has later become
arbitrary. It is devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve
persons from unlawful restraint, as the best and only sufficient
defense of personal freedom.
The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to
inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint, and to relieve a person
therefrom if such restraint is illegal.
To justify the grant of the petition, the restraint of liberty must be an
illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. The illegal
restraint of liberty must be actual and effective, not merely nominal or
moral.
The evidence shows that there was no actual and effective detention
or deprivation of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorios liberty that would justify
the issuance of the writ. The fact that lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio is
about 86 years of age, or under medication does not necessarily
render him mentally incapacitated. Soundness of mind does not
hinge on age or medical condition but on the capacity of the individual
to discern his actions.
After due hearing, the Court of Appeals concluded that there was no
unlawful restraint on his liberty.
The Court of Appeals also observed that lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio
did not request the administrator of the Cleveland Condominium not
to allow his wife and other children from seeing or visiting him. He
made it clear that he did not object to seeing them.
As to lawyer Potenciano Ilusorios mental state, the Court of Appeals
observed that he was of sound and alert mind, having answered all
the relevant questions to the satisfaction of the court.

Being of sound mind, he is thus possessed with the capacity to make

choices. In this case, the crucial choices revolve on his residence and
the people he opts to see or live with. The choices he made may not
appeal to some of his family members but these are choices, which
exclusively belong to Potenciano. He made it clear before the Court
of Appeals that he was not prevented from leaving his house or
seeing people. With that declaration, and absent any true restraint on
his liberty, we have no reason to reverse the findings of the Court of
Appeals.