Literary peripheries of historical truth

Alicja Bemben (University of Silesia)

The motto: The truth, all the truth, and nothing but the truth 1 lies at the heart of
historical inquiry, avers categorically Henry Houssaye. Most probably, upon hearing such a
statement, crowds of historians would nod eagerly in agreement. Those more brave might also
try to add some off-the-cuff remarks on how different from literary lies their historical truth is.
Such voices characteristic not only for the eighteenth-century historians appear to stem
from blindly following popular misconceptions that history not only has nothing to do with
literature, but that it also has always been a separate branch of knowledge. The fact is,
however, that the very idea of history distancing itself from literature grew up together with
the rise of scientific history in the late nineteenth century. The paradigm of the natural
sciences that had already crystallized at the dawn of the eighteenth century entailed
hierarchical perception of particular branches of knowledge, the perception in which it
became the focal point even for the human sciences. In order to fulfil its aspiration to become
a science, history renounced its literary origin2 and adopted the methodology of the natural
sciences that hailed gaining objective knowledge as their sole aim.
Thus, it is not surprising that in the writings of the most prominent historians of the
age Auguste Comte, Michel Bourdeau, Stuart Mill, Henry Thomas Buckle and, most
importantly, Leopold von Ranke claims that the truth is what they begin and end with;
declarations that imagination has no place in historical texts as they only show wie es
eigentlich gewesen; as well as assertions that hard archival work, iron logic and careful
arrangement of bare facts guarantee objectivity constantly, recur.3 What might actually seem
surprising is that among such natural-science-like ideas on history there also appeared a
diametrical point of view on the writing about the past. Wilhelm Dilthey drew a distinction
between the natural sciences and the human sciences, subsumed history and literature under
one heading and suggested a methodology that, in my view, might be used to demonstrate that
1

Henry Houssaye is quoted in Charles Victor Langlois and Charles Seignobos, Introduction to the study of
history, trans. by G. G. Berry, New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1898, p. 214
2
In Poetics Aristotle offers the umbrella term of imitative arts - i.e. an equivalent of our term literature - which
encompass both poetry and history. Aristotle, The Poetics of Aristotle, trans. by H. Butcher, London: Macmillan
and Co., 1992, p.1. From its Herodotean beginnings up to the late eighteenth century history was considered a
part of literature. Professionalization of history separated it from literature until the series of cultural-intellectual
turns in the second part of the twentieth century undermined this assumption.
3
Joachim Schaper, wie es eigentlisch gewesen: Historical Facts and the Reconstruction of the History of
Ancient Israel, pp. 153-167, in: On Stone and Scroll: Essays in Honour of Graham Ivor Davies Vol. 420
Beihefte zur Zeitschrift fr die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft, ed. James K. Aitken, Katharine J. Dell, Brian A.
Mastin, Berlin and Boston: Walter de Gruyter, 2011, see: p. 154.

it is not only the truth that historians of the positivist 4 era practised their trade with, and that
the heart of history never works alone and such peripheral organs as half-truths,
approximations, plausibilities, as well as deceptions, lies and falsifications in short,
idiosyncrasies of literature are virtually indispensable for its functioning.5 In order to
substantiate this thesis I design my line of arguments around selected concepts offered by
Wilhelm Dilthey and look for literary markers in the historical works of the aforementioned
Henry Houssaye. All this is to give grounds to the conclusion that in the case of the historyand-literature relationship, the hegemonic dependency between the historical centre and
literary peripheries of a historical text is of the type in which the centres existence depends
on incorporating its peripheries.
Diltheys avid interest in the human sciences sensu largo6 made him produce a
plethora of writings out of which for the purpose of the following discussion I would like
to concentrate on those touching upon his ideas on literature and history. Although the
philosopher gave no normative-like theory of aesthetics, he offered a group of concepts that
characterise literary and historical works, i.e. intuitive understanding, authenticity, biography,
the lived experience (Erfahrung), and the creative power of the word. 7 In the following
paragraphs I would like to first, summarize Diltheys understanding of each notion and
suggest how it is possible for these to function in a work of history. Secondly, on the basis of
selected excerpts of Houssayes texts, I intend to demonstrate the way Houssaye employs
them and, finally, show that history writing cannot work without them.
Intuitive Understanding
According to Wilhelm Dilthey understanding has intuitive character due to the fact
that what is given in consciousness are totalities or structures rather than particulars and
hence, [t]he activity of individual consciousness consists not of step-by-step logical thinking,
but of an experiencing of structures. In this process, consciousness is facilitated by intuition
4

Positivism is understood here as a set of philosophical assumptions on history conceived in terms of structural
and nomological categories. Apart from Dilthey also Nietzsche criticised positivism heavily. However, as my
intention is to discuss works of Henry Houssaye one of the best known French historians of his age I
selected Diltheys ideas, on the one hand, due to his Anglo-French intellectual roots and, on the other, due to his
theories that touch upon both history and literature.
5
Stating that literary elements might appear in historical works is one thing it has already been noted by
Hayden White, Frank Ankersmit, etc. another thing is to argue in favour of indispensability of such literary
elements in historical works.
6
Dilthey follows Schleiermachers division of the human and natural sciences. History belongs, for him, to the
human sciences.
7
He offers more idiosyncrasies, however, to discuss them all is beyond the scope of an academic essay.

which helps with embracing and locating these totalities or structures in proper frameworks,
with filling in or smoothing potential gaps, inconsistencies or incongruities in the information
we receive.8 Diltheyan intuition is what facilitates and organizes our understanding, what
makes information appear coherent.
Should we agree with Dilthey and consider his concept in the context of the history
and literature relation we might notice that although intuition is typically ascribed to the
province of literature and thus, the supposedly correct division, i.e. literature-intuition
versus history-proving facts might be considered justifiable for Dilthey, it is also the base
for historical accounts. Regardless of the account of the past we want to produce, both the
literary and historical one requires understanding of what is to be written. If this is so, then
Diltheyan claim implies that literary intuition is a part of how we understand and therefore,
also how we reconstruct the historical past.
However, at this point historians may argue that even though this is what the Diltheyan
theory advances, their techniques revise intuitive elements in the causal chains they work on
and replace them with logical dependencies between facts. In other words, that in the process
of crosschecking the links they create between facts become rigorously logic-determined. 9 Let
us then have a look at a fragment of historical work of the aforementioned Henry Houssaye
and study whether the causal chains he offers are in fact strictly logic-determined or whether
some intuition-derived knowledge can be found in his texts.
In one of his best known works, i.e. a study on Cleopatra, Houssaye writes as follows:
By deposing Lepidus, Octavius had changed the triumvirate into a duumvirate, and the empire became divided
between himself and Antony. But the domination of the East satisfied the pride of Antony no better than the
domination of the West sufficed for the ambition of Octavius. Though twice deferred, the civil war remained
inevitable. In his extreme caution, Octavius would still have delayed it; in his folly, Antony precipitated it. He
despised Octavius as a general; his flatterers and his soldiers, who adored him, predicted victory to his arms;
Cleopatra, who retained the angry recollection of the insolent reception by the Romans, burned to avenge it 10

The causal chain offered in this fragment is a structure that treats pride as the link between the
division of the Roman Empire and the war between Octavius and Anthony. Interestingly, out
of many potential reasons that might have triggered the war especially that Luvias
manoeuvres or veterans pressures are widely considered its official reasons 11 Houssaye
8

Ilse N. Bulh, Structure and Change in Wilhelm Diltheys Philosophy of History, pp. 21-32, in History and
Theory, Vol. 15, No. 1, Feb., 1976, Wiley for Wesleyan University p. 22.
9
This argument, however, does not demonstrate that intuition is absent in historical understanding, it merely
downgrades its role.
10
Henry Houssaye, Cleopatra. A study, trans. by A. F. D. New York: Duprat & Co., 1890, p. 68.
11
Allison Jean Weir, A Study of Fluvia, MA Thesis, Kingston, Ontario: Queens University, December 2007,
<https://qspace.library.queensu.ca/bitstream/1974/966/1/Weir_Allison_J_200712_MA.pdf>, p. 135 and G. Bryan
Natali, The Perusine War in its Historiographic and Literary Context, MA Thesis, Ottawa: Library and Archives

selects pride. The question to be considered here is not whether he was right or not, but what
made him arrive at this decision and ignore other factors that might have contributed to the
commencement of the war as well. Should we argue in favour of logic, then a possibly
insurmountable quandary might appear: if other factors that might have contributed to the war
were widely recognised and selecting any other of them would be equally logical, then what
was the decisive factor for the historian? Logic was, for him, undoubtedly necessary to obtain
a set of data about the war even in terms of data gathering, arriving at certain conclusions as
well as rejecting some farfetched assumptions. However, being given an array of equally
important facts Houssaye opts for pride and does not offer any arguments supporting his
decision. Apparently, apart from logic his choices must have also been influenced otherwise.
It might be argued then that although the historians decisions on what links events are to a
significant extent driven by logic, logic per se is not enough to reach certain conclusions.
Should we follow the Diltheyan idea of intuition that facilitates understanding, then it is
justifiable to claim that coming up with pride as the reason of the war is a consequence of
Houssayes relying also on his intuition.
Authenticity
On authenticity Dilthey writes that it is the prerequisite for art. Artists are not only to
have a clear and strong sense of authenticity of the experience (Erlebnis) they recount, 12 but,
moreover, they should also try to present the original feelings as accurately as possible so that
a work of art becomes a mirror of their experience. This, however, it no to mean that literary
works offer an access to the real. In fact, despite the widespread applause for objectivity in the
late-nineteenth century Europe, Dilthey might be considered one of the first thinkers to notice
the dependency between the subject and his or her theory as well as historical determinism of
understanding.13
For we wish to contemplate reality, and the course of our epistemological enquiry will show that reality as it is,
in its actual being, unaltered by any medium, exists for us only in this world of the mind. And indeed we find in
the contemplation of human affairs an interest not of intellect alone, but of the heart, of sympathy, of enthusiasm,
in which Goethe rightly saw the fairest fruit of historical vision. Self-surrender makes the inner being of the true
born historian into a universe which mirrors the whole historical world. In his universe of moral forces the
unique and singular has a quite different significance from what it has in external nature. The apprehension of it
Canada,
Heritage
Branch
and
The
University
of
Manitoba,
2005,
<
http://mspace.lib.umanitoba.ca/bitstream/1993/20696/1/Natali_The_perusine.pdf>, p. 18.
12
Although Dilthey suggests that the above is applicable to all forms of art, my discussion of Erlebnis is limited
to literature and history writing
13
Zbigniew Kuderowicz, Dilthey, Warszawa: Wiedza Powszechna, 1987, p. 7.

is not a means, but an end in itself; for the desire on which it rests is ineradicable as is involved in what is highest
in nature. That is why historians eye also fastens with a natural preference upon the extraordinary. Without
wishing it, often without knowing it, he too performs a continual abstraction.14

Selected words in the above quotation allow one to discern the actual standpoint Dilthey
adopts on comprehension of the real and, in further perspective, on its literary and/or
historical depictions. The words exists for us only in this world of the mind suggest that if,
in Diltheyan optics, the real exists in our mind, then its literary and historical descriptions,
being the aftermaths of this way of perceiving the world, cannot pretend to the objectivity
natural sciences hailed in the eighteenth century. If what we see is translated into a set of
mental concepts, consequently, such set is slightly different for every person. Renouncing
objectivity does not, however, mean that the philosopher opts for subjectivity. The claim that
epistemological enquiry will show that reality as it is, in its actual being excludes reaching
such conclusion. The sentence: Self-surrender makes the inner being of the true born
historian into a universe which mirrors the whole historical world seems to pinpoint the
actual stance adopted by Dilthey. The words self and inner being suggest, on the one
hand, an individual, subjective attitude that one takes towards the world. On the other hand, if
this subjective attitude is to be surrendered but not eradicated and surely not changed to the
objective one then it seems that, for Dilthey, one is simply to subjectively recognize and
share certain selected meanings, frameworks, definitions that the whole historical world
offers. This, in other words, means the philosopher espouses intersubjectivity.15
If we consider the question of Diltheyan intersubjective authenticity in the context of
the relationship of literature and history, then consequently, it seems to be methodologically
viable to maintain that these modes of writing might appear to be authentic in quite a similar
way. Both, historian and historical novelist usually try to reconstruct past events with the
greatest accuracy possible. Inasmuch as they cannot produce purely objective accounts of
events, they can produce ones that are intersubjectively authentic. In the end, for a historical
account as well as for a historical novel it is obligatory to follow selected meanings,
frameworks, definitions that the whole historical world shares and not to go astray in their
interpretations of the past. Exaggerated diversion from these would mean for a work of
14

M. A. Hodges, William Dilthey, International Library of Sociology, Vol. 22 of International library of

sociology. Social theory and methodology, New York: Routledge, 2013, p. 137.
15
Perhaps one of the most insightful remarks on intersubjectivity of historians has been made by George G.
Iggers (p.1): a historical text must be understood with reference to the context to which it refers and that this
context contains an element of objectivity not fully identical with the subjectivity of the historian and an element
of rationality which presumes elements of intersubjectivity in the methods of historical inquiry. See: George G.
Iggers, Rationality and History, in Developments in Modern Historiography, ed. by Henry Kozicki, Palgrave:
New York, 1998, pp. 19-39.

history losing its status and becoming an alternate history. Similarly, for a historical novel, it
would also mean losing its status and becoming a fantasy set in the past. Juxtaposing
Diltheys claims on authenticity with Houssayes texts might allow one to dispel the doubt as
for the latter ones objectivity. A closer look at Henry Houssayes opening paragraph of
Cleopatra might enable us to observe how the historians striving for authenticity looks like in
practice.
After an existence of forty or fifty centuries, the empire of Egypt was expiring under the evil eye of the
Romans. The Greek dynasty, which had given to the country a new strength and reviving brilliancy, had
exhausted itself in debauchery, crimes, and civil wars. It was now sustained only by the good-will of Rome,
whose fatal protection was bought at a high price, and who still designed to tolerate, for a time, at least, the
independence of Egypt. Freed from nearly all military service by the introduction of Hellenic and Gallic
mercenaries the Egyptians had lost their warlike habits. They had suffered so many invasions and submitted to so
many foreign dominations that all that remained for patriotism was the religion of their ancestors. Little mattered
it to them, born servile and used to despotism, whether they were governed by a Greek king or a Roman
proconsul - they would give not an ear of corn less, nor receive a blow the more.16

Even at first glance we might notice overt markers of Houssayes attitude towards
authenticity. The claims of the evil eye, sustained only by the good will, fatal protection
and, most importantly, [l]ittle mattered it to them type hint at it explicitly. The Roman evil
eye might have been evil only from the perspective of the Egyptians or other nations
conquered by them. It cannot be said that the Romans were an inherently wicked nation and
such claim cannot purport to be objective. In his alleged quest to tell the truth, Houssaye
offers only a half-truth to prove his thesis. Similarly, resolving Egypts existence solely to the
dependence on the Romans good will as well as calling their protection fatal are value
judgements. And though they do have their place in works of history, they also require
justifications which Houssaye does not offer. The question that might come to ones mind is
how much Houssayes non-objective claims would differ from claims of a historical novelist
commenting on the very same topic? 17 Without proper argumentation his conclusions remain
plausibilities and/or approximations for, without any tangible proofs, we simply do not know
if this is what really happened.18 Perhaps one of the best examples of non-objectivity that the
16

Henry Houssaye, Cleopatra. A study, trans. by A. F. D. New York: Duprat & Co., 1890, pp. 9-10.
A good example may be Robert Gravess dilogy on Claudius which offer remarks in a very similar style.
Robert Graves, I, Claudius. From the Autobiography of Tiberius Claudius, Emperor of the Romans,
Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1958 and Claudius the God and His Wife Messalina. The Troublesome Reign
of Tiberius Claudius Caesar, Emperor of the Romans (born 10 B.C., died A.D.54), as Described by Himself; also
His Murder at the Hands of the Notorious Agrippina (Mother of the Emperor Nero) and his Subsequent
Deification, as Described by others, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1984.
18
Luke Pitcher terms offering facts without providing their sources the action of the swan and ascribes this
tendency to pre-modern historians as opposed to modern scientific historians who felt obliged to justify their
claims with facts in order to meet the requirement of objectivity. Ironically, modern historians condemned their
predecessors exactly for not adducing sources in their works. As it can be inferred, once again, hailing theoretical
concepts and their practical realizations do not always go hand in hand. Luke Pitcher, Writing Ancient History:
17

historian allows himself to present is the aforementioned insight into the minds of the
Egyptians. It is physically impossible for him to know that Egyptians did not care about the
proconsul who governed them.
The above is, however, not to suggest that Houssaye lapses into subjectivity and his
work is just an assemblage of impressions about the ancient world. Although the historian
cannot present an objective picture of the past, his vision is bound to unravel within the
framework of historical knowledge available at his times. The Romans entered and conquered
Egypt and contributed to its fall. Houssaye does recognize these events as a framework of his
(hi)story. Moreover, even the value judgements he expresses are consistent with certain
convictions that historians of his times shared. Just like Dilthey suggests, being neither
perfectly objective nor entirely subjective, a work of history similarly to a historical novel
seems to be an intersubjective vision of the past.
Biography
Although biography typically belongs to the province of literature, 19 Dilthey saw its
role as central to historical studies. He maintained that due to the fact that historians most
suitable subjects are men whose influence on their times has been great, and especially those
whose influence seems to spring from a spiritual depth beyond the ordinary, 20 history writing
should be biography writing. The reason for placing great men at the centre of his inquiries
was that he conceived them as mirrors and instimulatores of their epochs they were
supposed to be the best representatives of their times. What is even more interesting from the
perspective of this study is that apart from working with other, perhaps more typical, source
materials21 Dilthey insisted on using poetry as a source of information about its author.
When taken together, defining biography as a work of art,22 equating history writing with
biography writing, as well as allowing poetry as a source material, have peculiar implications.

An Introduction to Classical Historiography, London: I. B. Tauris, 2009, pp. 5-13.

19
Wilhelm Dilthey, The Formation of the Historical World in the Human Sciences, Vol. 3 of Selected Works,
Wilhelm Dilthey, eds. Rudolf A. Makkreel, Frithjof Rodi, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
2002, p. 266: [B]iography originates as the literary form of understanding other lives.
20
M. A. Hodges, Wilhelm Dilthey, International Library of Sociology Series, New York: Routledge, 2013, pp.
29-30.
21
Wilhelm Dilthey, The Formation of the Historical World in the Human Sciences, Vol. 3 of Selected Works,
Wilhelm Dilthey, eds. Rudolf A. Makkreel, Frithjof Rodi, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
2002, p. 268. Dilthey is also perfectly aware of limitations that using poetry as a source material has, and
considers it only one of the whole array of useful materials.
22
Ibidem, p. 267.

In Diltheyan optics not only does history base upon literary works, it is literature for the
historiographer, the much hailed literature-history opposition appears to be suspended.
I would like to use the above observations to look to Houssayes works and investigate
into their alleged historical purity. First of all, even a cursory glance at the oeuvre of the
historian permits one to doubt it. Out of sixteen works he produced around half of them are
biographies.23 And even though not all his books are typical case studies of great men, these
are prominent historical figures that they all focus on. Perfect examples can be his
1815.Waterloo and La France sous la premire restauration which, although not designed
biographically-like, in fact provide accounts of Napoleon and Louis XVIII, respectively.24
Altogether, it turns out that to a significant extent history writing was for Houssaye just as it
was for Dilthey biography writing.
Secondly, browsing through the Cleopatra text its reader can find a set of remarks on
the choruses of Sophocles or the odes of Sappho,25 or on Tzar Alexander I who appears, for
Houssaye, to be an embodiment of Alexander the Great and takes on the features of the epic
hero.26 Inasmuch as the historian does not quote any work of poetry in his text, bringing up
the heroic element testifies to his drawing from literature.
Thirdly, in order to demonstrate in toto that Houssayes writings are thoroughly
literature-tainted I should also adduce some words of his in which the author admits that
history is an art. This, however, especially with orthodox-like historians such as he is, is
impossible as it has been quoted before history is, for him, allegedly only truth and facts.
Nonetheless, what can be done to make evident that, despite following the widely held
misconception of the binary opposition of literature and history, Houssayes history writing
depends on employing the literary is to cite his opinion on the novel:
Today the novel is constructed with careful notes, direct observations, human documents; invention,
adventure, and romance are scarified to the study of the environment and the analysis of character, the novelists
approach is coming more and more to resemble the historians.27

23

See: Henry Houssaye entry in the Academie Francaises catalogue of historians, <http://www.academiefrancaise.fr/les-immortels/henry-houssaye>.
24
Henry Houssaye, 1815. Waterloo, trans. by S. B. Willis, Kansas City, Mo.: Franklin Hudson Publishing Co.,
1905 and La France sous la premire restauration, kindle edition available online <
http://www.amazon.com/France-premi%C3%A8re-restauration-French-Edition-ebook/dp/B00JRIZ4JI>.
25
Henry Houssaye, Cleopatra. A study, trans. by A. F. D., New York: Duprat & Co., 1890, p. 52.
26
Henry Houssaye, Napoleon and the campaign of 1814, trans. by R.S. McClintock, London: Hugh Rees, Ltd.,
1914, p. 489.
27
Henry Houssaye quoted in: Peter Novick, That Noble Dream: The 'Objectivity Question' and the American
Historical Profession, Vol. 13 of Ideas in Context, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, p. 40.

Even though it is not stated explicitly, it might be deduced from the above that the difference
between the novelist and historians writings might not, after all, be so vast for the author. It
seems that, for Houssaye, they are both supposed to write about what happened to certain
individuals and they radically diverge when the novelists thrills to invention, adventure, and
romance. Also, just as the interest in the fate of an individual underlies both modes of writing
about the past, so do careful notes, direct observations and human documents. In the end,
using these to create a piece of writing does not automatically produce a work of history,
historical novelists use them as well. Historians like to appropriate certain notions (truth,
working with source materials, etc.) as if they belonged nowhere else but to history writing
and this is what Houssaye does. What he does not do is notice that his thinking reveals also
what history and literature have in common.
The Lived Experience
According to Dilthey, the lived experience is the key concept of history writing. It
permeates the philosophers thought and reveals itself at different levels of his historical
world. Out of a plethora of the definitions of the lived experience that the philosopher
acquaints his readers with, I would like to focus on two that are most directly connected with
the literature-history relationship.28 On the one hand, Dilthey tells us that [t]he germinal cell
of the historical world is the lived experience in which the subject discovers itself in a
productive life-nexus with its environment. By the lived experience he means Erfahrung (as
opposed to Empiricismus) which is the experience one gains not only via senses but also
extrasensorily.29 Diltheys claim is then that when inquiring into the past, historians aim is to
look to what is empirically testable, but also to the psychological-philosophical aspects of the
event in question. Inasmuch as empirically testable data leave no doubt as for the province
they belong to, the interest in psychological-philosophical implications of happenings seems
to be more typical for a scholar of literature rather than for a scientific historian.

28

One of the most renowned works of Wilhelm Dilthey is The Formation of the Historical World in the Human
Sciences, Vol. 3 of Selected Works, Wilhelm Dilthey, eds. Rudolf A. Makkreel, Frithjof Rodi, Princeton, New
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2002. It describes the structure of the human sciences. Whatever aspect of
these is discussed a reference to the concept of lived experience appears. My intention is to discuss two
Diltheyan definitions of the lived experience. One reason I have named above. The second reason is that the
notion of the lived experience cannot be discussed thoroughly within the confines of an academic article.
29
Wilhelm Dilthey, The Formation of the Historical World in the Human Sciences, Vol. 3 of Selected Works,
Wilhelm Dilthey, eds. Rudolf A. Makkreel, Frithjof Rodi, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
2002, p. 182.

On the other hand, the philosopher avers that historians are to investigate the lived
experiences in order to recreate their meanings, values, purposes, as well as their relationships
with the individuals volitional attitude, intellectual and religious trends of the era. 30 Unlike
his fellows positivist and classical historians, Dilthey is interested not only in facts, but
foremost in the meaning of these facts. Diltheyan historian is to indulge in an activity typical,
again, more of a literary scholar, i.e. interpretation of the provided data.
On the basis of the above, it might be said that the procedure of historical analysis
designed by the author of The Structure of the Historical World in the Human Sciences has
quite a literary character. It departs from acquiring the data on a given situation and proceeds
to interpreting them. Let us see if Henry Houssayes texts would not display the same
tendency. In Napoleon and the campaign of 1814 the author offers the following description
of decision-making on the German side:
At this moment Muffling so says Muffling, who always attributes good advice to himself suggested that it
would be well to crush the left wing of the French deployed in front of Semilly. This would force them to show
their hand; if they retired it would mean that they meant to move towards their right to join the troops coming
from Festieux; if they held their ground stubbornly it would mean that the Festieux troops were intended to move
to the westward.31

The pitfall that troubles the German field marshals is their lack of knowledge on the intentions
of the French side. The solution offered by Muffling consists in inferring these intentions on
the basis of, firstly, pushing the French side to action, and secondly, interpreting their
manoeuvre. Only then would the Germans decide on their action. From the above excerpt it
transpires that an event (attacking the left wing of the French) is not directly followed by yet
another event (the Germans deciding on their strategy). In between the cause and the effect
there is also an interpretation of the cause which leads to the effect. Somewhat nigglingly,
Houssaye might be pointed out that hailing [t]he truth, all the truth, and nothing but the
truth32 is what he avers. What he in fact does is attempt to show the truth; the manoeuvre
which ends with presenting not all the truth or even a bit more than the truth.
Although historians struggle not to admit to interpretative tendencies tooth and nail,
their disavowal can be relatively easily disarmed by scrutinizing their works. Hayden White
has observed that the difference between a bullet-list chronicle and a history lies in the story30

Wilhelm Dilthey, The Formation of the Historical World in the Human Sciences, Vol. 3 of Selected Works,
Wilhelm Dilthey, eds. Rudolf A. Makkreel, Frithjof Rodi, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
2002, passim.
31
Henry Houssaye, Napoleon and the campaign of 1814, trans. by R.S. McClintock, London: Hugh Rees, Ltd.,
1914, pp. 168-169.
32
Henry Houssaye is quoted in Charles Victor Langlois and Charles Seignobos, Introduction to the study of
history, trans. by G. G. Berry, New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1898, p. 214.

making33 element, the element of linking events by arranging, and hence, interpreting, them
into a meaningful whole. To gain its final readerly shape history requires interpretation of
events.
The Creative Power of the Word
The fifth Diltheyan concept that I shall refer to is the creative power of the word.
According to the philosopher, the aim of art is to evoke a sense of meaningfulness both in the
writer and in the reader. To achieve it the writer is to produce a meaningful whole that
reflects, on the one hand, congruously developing drives, on the other, energy of human
nature as well as harmony of human psyche and nature. In Diltheyan optics, only when such
a whole is produced, its reader perceives it as meaningful.34
Although the claim refers to the case of a typically literary composition, thinking
about literature in terms of meaningful wholes might be paralleled by thinking about history
in the same terms.35 A work of history is also to offer a meaningful whole. Unless it is a very
specific case of history writing, each historical work refers more or less to what motivated
people in their decisions both on the rational and emotional level what the condition of
humanity was at a given time, and what the relation between people and their environment
was. Telling stories about the past, regardless of whether in literary or historical form, seems,
for Dilthey, to be based on the same principle, i.e. it consists in producing a meaningful whole
that tells about the human.
A closer look at yet another fragment of Houssayes study on Cleopatra will show that
in the case of his history writing, again, literary wholeness permeates it. In chapter two
Houssaye writes as follows:
In Alexandria, where for more than two centuries unnumbered colonies had settled, the native race dwelt
together in the ancient Egyptian city of Rhakotis, but they composed at the most only one-third of the
population. The Jews, who inhabited a distinct quarter where they had their ethnarch and their Sanhedrim, were
in the proportion of one to three. From the Pharos to the Serapium, from the gate of the Necropolis to the
Canopic gate were seen as many foreigners as Egyptians. They composed a noisy and variegated crowd of
Greeks, Jews, Syrians, Italians, Arabs, Illyrians, Persians, and Phenicians. In the streets and on the wharves every

33

Hayden White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination In Nineteenth-Century Europe. Baltimore and
London: John Hopkins University Press, 1975, pp. 1-9.
34
Zbigniew Kuderowicz, Dilthey, Warszawa: Wiedza Powszechna, 1987, p. 144.
35
Wilhelm Dilthey, The Formation of the Historical World in the Human Sciences, Vol. 3 of Selected Works,
Wilhelm Dilthey, eds. Rudolf A. Makkreel, Frithjof Rodi, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
2002, p. 330. For Dilthey, history was not a branch of the natural sciences, together with literature it was
subsumed under the heading of the human sciences.

language was spoken, in the temples every god was worshiped. Into this Babel each race brought its own
passions.36

It can be guessed that Houssayes intention in this excerpt is to present us with an

intersection of the populace of Alexandria. Obviously, facts such as the names of places and
nationalities contribute to its creation, but we may also ask about the function of the phrases
that recount seeing people passing through the city, hearing the noises they make and the
languages they use, as well as knowing what gods they worship and what their passions are.
By mentioning sensual stimuli that he could not have experienced, the author introduces lies
into his work and it might be worth to ponder why. Should we look at this piece of text and
note down only the facts it offers, we might compose a list of nationalities and places in
which they resided. However, a bulleted list is not necessarily a meaningful picture of a past
situation.37 As it was mentioned by Dilthey, for a whole to be meaningful some fillers linking
presented facts are necessary. Consequently, of the Houssayean lies it might be said that their
function in this case is to imbue the described situation with meaning via facilitation of
arranging facts into a whole story.
Conclusion
Taking all the aforementioned observations into consideration, the following might be
suggested. Although the main aim of history, its centre and heart is telling the truth about what
happened, establishing facts and arranging them into larger structures seems to unavoidably
require literary components. The relation between two events is not of the two-plus-twoalways-gives-four type. Whether and how facts are linked is a question of choice that
historians make. In this choice they are guided by logic which imposes certain frameworks for
them to move within. However, moving within these frameworks requires a sparkle of
intuition to link one fact with another. Without intuition history writing might put itself at risk
of becoming a bullet list of events. Secondly, if objectivity is not achievable for both writers
and historians, then they require replacing it, and according to Dilthey, they do replace it with
intersubjectivity. In other words, failing to maintain its core idiosyncrasy as methodologically
viable, history allows itself to stitch into that place (inter)subjectivity from its literary
peripheries. Yet another type of stitching that is performed by historians consists in drawing
from literature by either using it as a source material about ones life or by using poetic
36

Henry Houssaye, Cleopatra. A study, trans. by A. F. D. New York: Duprat & Co., 1890, pp. 16-17.
Nietzsche described such type of history writing as belonging to the Antiquarian tradition. He criticized it
heavily for shallowness and superficiality.
37

language to make their compositions more compelling. Thirdly, although the widely held
misconception of historians is that they provide only facts, history seems to be more than the
Antiquarian bullet-listing as Nietzsche might say. Dilthey postulates and Houssaye confirms
that, for data, to be turned into a hi/story they need to be imbued with some meaning.
Fourthly, if writing about the past consists in producing meaningful accounts of past events
and these accounts are to be indeed meaningful, then it seems impossible for history to
resolve to showing only the rational side of events. Actions of humans are never driven solely
by rational thinking and its seems that showing also the irrational sides of our decisions can
give a fuller picture and insight into our actions.
I would like to finish my discussion with a set of questions that will hopefully show
explicitly that components of the literary province cannot be only present in, but are in fact
indispensable for history writing. Can we imagine history writing without a sparkle of
intuition? Is it viable for historians to ignore non-empirical data? Is it methodologically
possible for a work of history to be purely objective? Can historians avoid interpreting facts?
Would it make sense to offer meaningless accounts of the past? It should come as no surprise
that the answer to all these questions is no, 38 at least should we consider them through the
Diltheyan lens. It might be argued that just as it happens with any branch of knowledge
due to constant changes in the state of knowledge, history needs to redefine, abandon or
replace certain devalued notions it has adhered to. To do so and, hence, to keep its
methodological consistency it reaches to other disciplines among other things to literature
and incorporates its categories. Consequently, for history writing it is not possible to avoid
literary components as its functioning depends on them.

38

Norman J. Wilson, History in Crisis? Recent Directions in Historiography, Prentice Hall: Upper Saddle River,
1999, p. 31.