Journal of Organizational Behavior Education 4: 79-92.

2011 NeilsonJournals Publishing.

Author Version

BP and the Gulf Oil Spill (A)

Dan Marques, Jonathan Kim, John Mikols, and James S.
ORourke1
University of Notre Dame, USA

Abstract. An April 20, 2010 explosion on board the Deepwater Horizon offshore oil-drilling
platform killed 11 workers, injured 17 and triggered a leak that spilled more than 206 million gallons
of oil over 665 miles of coastline and 4,000 square miles of fishing waters. This case discusses the
events that led to the disaster and oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. It also outlines key figures within
BPs organization and how they factored into the long and difficult corporate communications
process.
Keywords: conflict management, crisis management, customer communication, customer
relations, employee relations, energy, international, investor relations, reputation management.

1. The Event
On the morning of April 20, 2010, crew members of the giant oil rig Deepwater
Horizon were completing their work on an exploratory well known as the
Macondo prospect, in the Gulf of Mexico. The crew was made up of British
Petroleum workers, Transocean oil rig workers, Halliburton cementers,
Schlumberger mud specialists, and various other specialized engineers.
Halliburton engineers had started cementing the bottom of the oil well four days
earlier.2
As part of the completion work, mud specialists were to conduct a host of
inspections on the cementing job. Because all parties involved were initially
satisfied with the mud operations, the BP well team leader, John Guide, decided
1.

2.

This case was prepared by Research Assistants Dan Marques, Jonathan Kim and John Mikols
under the direction of James S. ORourke, Teaching Professor of Management, as the basis for
class discussion rather than to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of an
administrative situation. Information was gathered from corporate as well as public sources.
Copyright 2011. Eugene D. Fanning Center for Business Communication. All rights
reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, used in
a spreadsheet, or transmitted in any form by any means electronic, mechanical,
photocopying, recording, or otherwise without permission.
Internal Halliburton document (HAL-0011208); Testimony of Nathaniel Chaisson, Hearing
before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, Aug. 24, 2010 as cited in Graham,
Bob, et al., Deepwater: The Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling, National
Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, January 2010: page
2.<http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
DEEPWATER_ReporttothePresident_FINAL.pdf>

80

BP and the Gulf Oil Spill (A)

to postpone the inspections until production drilling started. This would save the
BP team a fee of $128,000 and significant amounts of time.3
Further testing that day, however, revealed some pressure problems. One
engineer, Wyman Wheeler, was convinced that something wasnt right.4 His
shift was ending, leaving the matter to other testers. Like Wheeler, subsequent
testers were not able to reach an acceptable pressures level from the main line.
However, they reached zero pressure on a separate pipe, known as the kill line
and concluded that all operations were safe. Workers then started pumping
seawater into the main pipeline to remove mud from the pipeline at 9:20 pm.5
That night, a series of vibrations and hisses alerted the crew that there was a
serious problem. Soon after, mud started spewing on the oil rig. A large explosion
occurred and all power went out. The crew was alerted over a public address
system that there was a fire on board. Chaos reigned. Many people were injured.
Lifeboats were dropped, and individuals were jumping into the ocean. The mud
propelled equipment 50 feet into the air, posing another major threat. A supply
vessel, the Bankston, maneuvered to rescue fallen workers.
Steve Bertone, the oil rigs chief engineer, told a subsea engineer to use the
emergency disconnect switch (EDS) to activate the blowout preventer. Control
panel lights indicated the blowout preventer was activated. But upon further
inspection, the generator would not start.
Coast Guard helicopters arrived at 11:22 pm. By 11:30 pm, final muster was
taken with a result of 11 men missing. By April 22, the rig was turned 180 degrees
and far away from the well.
2. Off Shore Drilling Challenges
In September of 2009, BP discovered 4 to 6 billion gallons worth of oil reservoirs
in the Gulf of Mexico. The reservoirs were 35,000 feet (10,668 meters) beneath
the earths surface. At this depth, water pressure totals 10,000 pounds per square
inch, well temperatures can exceed 350 degrees Fahrenheit (176 degrees Celsius),
and blowout preventers could only be installed by remote-operating vehicles.
Drilling foundations were unstable due to pockets of methane in the sea floor.6
The purpose of offshore oil drilling is to find hydrocarbons that are trapped in
the rock bed of the earth. The deeper the well, the greater the pressure of the
rockbed above the hydrocarbons. Thus, drillers must ensure pressure is in
equilibrium so that hydrocarbons do not shoot out of control to the surface. They
3.
4.
5.

Internal BP document (BP, presentation to Commssion, Aug. 9, 2010, slides 5 & 12 as cited in
Deepwater: The Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling, page 4.
Brian Morel, e-mail message to Richard Miller and Mark Hafle, April 14, 2010, 13:31 as cited
in Deepwater: The Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling, page 6.
BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, Testimony of Chris Pleasant, pages
118-119, as cited in Deepwater: The Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling,
page 7.

Journal of Organizational Behavior Education 4

81

do this by pumping mud into the wellbore to act as a counter balance. If the
pressure is too great, the rock bed will break. If its too low, fluids and gas will
enter the well and produce a kick or jolt.7
To ensure situations would not get out of control, blowout preventers could
seal the well by squeezing the drill pipe shut. The blowout preventer had five sets
of rams to cut the drill pipe. It would be initiated by an automated system known
as the deadman system.
Cementing operations are necessary to bind the casing string to the
hydrocarbon rockbed. The casing string is the apparatus used to draw the
hydrocarbons from the rockbed. Cement is pumped through the casing string, and
mud will force the cement out and around the string to the surrounding annular
for a tight seal. This would ensure that the equipment is tightly sealed to the ocean
floor so no pressure can escape.8
BP and Halliburton made a number of compromises in the planning phase,
such as limiting the amount and rate that Halliburton could pump down the
annulars, to ensure that the process would produce maximum gains while
reducing risk. Engineers feared that a larger amount of cement would cause a
structural problem within the well.9 Thus, a less than conventional amount of
cement was used to seal the annular.
3. Key Entities
3.1. British Petroleum
British Petroleum was tottering on the brink of bankruptcy in the early 1990s. It
was exiled by Nigeria and the Middle East. Sir John Browne was the force that
turned the company around and ventured into the Gulf of Mexico for new oil well
explorations.10 In August 2002, BP pumped $15 billion into the Gulf of Mexico
drilling. In March 2008, BP paid more than $34 million to the Minerals
6.

Bureau of Ocean Energy Management Regulation, and Enforcement (BOEMRE), Gulf of

Mexico Oil and Gas Leasing Offering, <http://www.gomr.boemre.gov/homepg/Isesale/
swiler/swiler.html> as cited in Deepwater: The Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore
Drilling, pages 51-52. Also, Priest, Tyler, The Offshore Imperative: Shell Oils Search for
Petroleum in Postwar America (College Station: Texas A & M Press, 2007, pages 81-91 as
cited in Deepwater: The Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling, pages 51-52.
7. Deepwater: The Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling, page 91.
8. Ibid, pages 94-99.
9. Testimony of John Guide, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team,
July 22, 2010, page 87 and John Gisclair, Sperry Sun data, April 20, 2010 (annotations, Sept.
20, 2010). Commission calculation based on internal Halliburton document (HAL 10994) as
cited in Deepwater: The Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling, pages 99-100.
10. Agis Salpukas, BP Amocos Leader Remakes An Oil Giant, Again, New York Times, April
1, 1999 as cited in Deepwater: The Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling, page
45.

82

BP and the Gulf Oil Spill (A)

Management Service for an exclusive lease to drill in Mississippi Canyon Block

252, a nine-square-mile plot in the Gulf of Mexico.11 By 2010, it was the worlds
fourth largest corporation and produced over 4 million barrels of oil per day from
30 countries. In 2010, ten percent of BPs output was drilled from the Gulf of
Mexico.12
3.2. Transocean
Transocean is the largest drilling contractor in the industry. A series of mergers
throughout the 1990s and early 2000s led to the company known as Transocean.
In 2000, it acquired R&B Falcon, whose assets included the Deepwater Horizon,
a semi-submersible under construction.13
Transocean also owned the oil rig Marianas, which had initiated work on the
Macondo well before the Deepwater Horizon took over. (The Marianas was badly
damaged on Nov. 9, 2009 by Hurricane Ida and had to be towed in for repair. The
Deepwater Horizon took over the exploratory drilling in January, 2010).
Transocean produced revenues of $11.6 billion in 2009, and made more than $1
million per day by leasing out the giant rig to BP.
3.3. Halliburton
Halliburton engineers were responsible for cement operations on the rig.14
Cementing was necessary to close the bottom of the oil well from which the
Deepwater Horizon was attempting to extract oil.
3.4. Federal Government
The U.S. government wrestles with two responsibilities that it must meet
concurrently. First, the government operates the National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA), to monitor activities that could pollute public lands, including
offshore drilling. Normally, the Secretary of the Interior would approve offshore
11. John Guide (BP), interview with Commission staff, Sept. 17, 2010 as cited in Deepwater: The
Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling, page 89.
12. Global 500, CNNMoney.com, July 26, 2010, <http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortunre/
global500/2010/full_list/index.html> as cited in Deepwater: The Gulf Oil Disaster and the
Future of Offshore Drilling, page 2.
13. Colton, Tim and Huntziner, LaVar, A Brief History of Shipbuilding in Recent Times
(Alexandria, VA: CNA Corporation, 2002); Hunt, Mike and Gary, Lenny, Gulf of Mexico
Fabrication Yards Built 5,500 Platforms Over 50 Years, Offshore (Jan. 2000) as cited in
Deepwater: The Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling, page 44.
14. Testimony of Nathaniel Chaisson, 411: U.S. Department of Energy as cited in Deepwater: The
Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling, pages 1 and 2.

Journal of Organizational Behavior Education 4

83

drilling and the approval processes would delay initial production for about six
years. At the same time, the federal government also pushes to reduce the
countrys dependence on foreign oil. That pressure stems, in part, from an oil
embargo in 1973 and creation of the Department of Energy in 1977 by the Carter
Administration when laws were passed to promote development of domestic
energy supplies.15
In order to compromise between these competing priorities, the Gulf of
Mexico was given an exception to the NEPA Act because it was deemed that the
oil and gas industry was already mature in the Gulf of Mexico.16
3.5. Minerals Management Services
At the time of the Gulf Oil Spill crisis, the chief federal agency responsible for
overseeing drilling and operations was the Mineral Management Services, or
MMS. MMS was charged with the mandate for environmental protection but also
to drive the U.S. to energy independence. In the Gulf, safety and environmental
oversight was rendered ineffective because of these conflicting priorities. The
agency lacked resources, technical training, and experience in the complicated
world of offshore drilling.17 In other words, The result was that the same agency
became responsible for regulatory oversight of offshore drilling and for collecting
revenue from that drilling.18
Furthermore, the MMS was, in one entity, authority of regulatory
oversight with responsibility for collecting for the US Treasury the billions of
dollars of revenues obtained from lease sales and royalty payments from
producing wells.19
4. A Brief History of British Petroleum
In 1901, William Knox DArcy, a wealthy British miner, secured a concession
from the Grand Vizier of Persia to search for petroleum throughout most of the
Persian Empire. Persia was devoid of infrastructure and politically unstable at the
time, making DArcys search physically challenging and more expensive than he
anticipated. By 1905, DArcy was in critical need of additional capital in order
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Deepwater: The Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling, page 59.
Ibid, page 80.
Ibid, page 67.
Ibid, page 65.
U.S. Department of the Interior, Statement by Secretary of the Interior James Watt Instituting
Changes in the Mineral Royalty Management Program - July 21, 1982, Commion on Fiscal
Accountability of the Nations Energy Resources: Subject Files, 1981-1982, RG 48, Entry
994, Box 1 (National Archives and Records Administraion, Washington, DC) as cited in
Deepwater: The Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling, page 56.

84

BP and the Gulf Oil Spill (A)

to continue his search. With help from the British Admiralty, the Burmah Oil
Company joined D'Arcy in a Concessionary Oil Syndicate in 1905 and supplied
further funds in return for operational control. In May 1908 oil was discovered in
the southwest of Persia at Masjid-i-Suleiman, the first oil discovery in the Middle
East. The following April the Anglo-Persian Oil Company was formed, with the
Burmah Oil Company holding most of the shares.20
Shortly after the discovery, the British Government bought up a majority of
the Anglo-Persian Oil shares, an effort due in no small part to Winston Churchill.
Churchill, who was then the chief of the British Navy, believed that the oil
supplied from the Middle East would fuel the British Fleet through World War I
and far into the future. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) (as it was named
in 1935) made handsome profits throughout the 1920s and 1930s as Western
societies became more and more dependent on automobiles and petroleum
burning manufacturing plants.21 In an effort to keep up with the rapidly growing
demand from the West, The AIOC constructed the largest refinery in the world
near the Iranian city of Abadan. This behemoth of a refinery employed over
200,000 Iranian workers in brutally harsh conditions. Observers recounted the
inequities between the Iranian workers housed in a rickety slum known as
Kaghazabad, or Paper City, and the British officials who supervised from airconditioned offices and lawn-fringed villas. Water fountains were marked Not
for Iranians.22
The refinery became the biggest supplier of oil to the Allied Powers during
World War II, despite shortages of food and outbreaks of diseases throughout the
workers and the region. Conditions became especially grim during the winter
season, as the director of the Iranian Petroleum Institute wrote in 1949, In winter
the earth flooded and became a flat, perspiring lake. The mud in town was kneedeep and canoes ran alongside the roadways for transport. When the rains
subsided, clouds of nipping, small-winged flies rose from the stagnant waters to
fill the nostrils, collecting in black mounds along the rims of cooking pots and
jamming the fans at the refinery with an unctuous glue.23
Horrific working conditions, unequal distribution of revenues, and small
dividends began to fuel Iranian discontent with the AIOC. Additionally, the
Iranian government became increasingly upset when the AIOC signed 50/50
revenue sharing agreements with other oil producing companies such as
Venezuela and Saudi Arabia in 1948 and 1950, respectively. Discontent reached
a tipping point in 1951 when the democratically elected Prime Minister of Iran,
Mohammed Mossadegh, formally nationalized Irans oil industry, effectively
pushing AIOC out of the country.
20. FundingUniverse, The British Petroleum Company plc, <http://www.fundinguniverse.com/
company-histories/The-British-Petroleum-Company-plc-Company-History.html>
21. Tharoor, Ishaan. A Brief History of BP, Time Magazine. June 2, 2010. <http://
www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1993361,00.html>
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.

Journal of Organizational Behavior Education 4

85

A few years of failed negotiations followed, and finally in 1953 the CIA and
British Intelligence staged a coup in a joint effort, which was successful in the
overthrow of Mossadegh. With Mossadegh removed, the newly installed Shah of
Iran allowed the return of AIOC, which was renamed as the British Petroleum
(BP) Company. However, BPs terms of returning to the country were less
favorable than before, as BP held a 40 percent interest in a newly created
consortium of Western oil companies, formed to undertake oil exploration,
production, and refining in Iran.24
Tensions between BP and Iran never cooled as generations of Iranians
believed that the companys intention was always to take advantage of cheap
Iranian labor and exploit the countrys natural resources. These tensions played
a large part in the growing anti-Western attitudes that developed throughout Iran
and eventually helped pave way to the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Amidst growing
anti-Western sentiment throughout the entire Middle Eastern region, BP began to
look in different regions to expand its production, including the British North Sea
and the Alaskan wilderness. In 1977, BP began pumping oil near Prudhoe Bay
in northern Alaska through a 1,200 km-long pipeline that ran all the way to
refineries in the southern part of the state. According to Tharoor Ishaan of Time
magazine, The project became one of the largest infrastructure projects ever
attempted in North America and BP prided itself on the environmental sensitivity
of its planning, which included raised platforms in certain stretches so as to not
impede the natural migrations of caribou.25 Despite having great success beyond
the Middle East, BPs public image has been damaged by flagrant safety
violations, a misleading green marketing campaign, and most recently, the
Deepwater Horizon offshore drilling rig explosion.
5. BP and the Green Marketing Campaign
BP began a massive $200 million marketing campaign in 2000 to re-brand itself
as Beyond Petroleum. BPs shield logo, which had been in use for over 70
years, was redesigned into the BP Helios, a graphic that was intended to
promote warm, green and clean energy sentiments about the company and its
environmental-friendly attitude. BPs CEO at the time, Lord John Browne,
speaking at Stanford University in 2002, stated, I believe the American people
expect a company like BP... to offer answers and not excuses. Additionally,
Lord Browne proclaimed that, Climate change is an issue which raises
fundamental questions about the relationship between companies and society as
a whole, and between one generation and the next. He even said, Companies
24. FundingUniverse, The British petroleum Company plc, <http://www.fundinguniverse.com/
company-histories/The-British-Petroleum-Company-plc-Company-History.html>
25. Tharoor, Ishaan, A Brief History of BP, Time Magazine. June 2, 2010. <http://
www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1993361,00.html>

86

BP and the Gulf Oil Spill (A)

composed of highly skilled and trained people can't live in denial of mounting
evidence gathered by hundreds of the most reputable scientists in the world.26
With an advertising campaign focused on BPs apparent efforts to invest in solar,
wind, natural gas, and hydrogen sources of energy, BP seemed heavily invested
in a eco-friendly culture and moving away from fossil-fuels. Behind the popular
tag line Its a start, BP successfully branded itself as a new leader in alternativeenergy research and production.
6. BPs Recent Safety Record
BPs recent string of mishaps, excluding the Gulf of Mexico disaster, seems to
strongly contradict its environmental and safety friendly marketing effort. In
2005, a major explosion occurred at the BP Texas City refinery, in which 15
workers died and 170 were seriously injured. The ensuing investigations by the
federal government strongly suggested that BP leadership was heavily focused on
reducing maintenance and capital costs at the expense of a proper safety
environment.27 The U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board
organized an independent investigation, which was headed by former Secretary
of State James Baker. The findings of the commission suggested that BP
promoted a culture in which occupational safety and process safety could not
be differentiated. Since the accident, there have been four subsequent safety
violations in which workers have been injured at the same Texas City refinery,
further suggesting that BPs culture has not changed.
In August of 2006, an estimated 5,000 barrels of crude oil began leaking from
one of BPs pipelines in Prudhoe Bay, Alaska. Investigators determined that
corrosion in a number of pipelines caused the leak. The public began to doubt that
BPs self-proclaimed environmentally friendly culture was sufficient enough to
prevent future disasters. Finally, in a three-year time span prior to the Gulf of
Mexico disaster, the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration stated
that BP racked up 760 willful and egregious safety violations, which constituted
97% of all industry safety violations during the period.
7. Tony Haywards Ascent
Tony Hayward received a PhD from the University of Edinburgh and began his
career with BP in 1982.28 He excelled in his initial assignments and was given
26. Frey, Darcy, How Green is BP?, The New York Times, Dec 08, 2002. <http://
www.nytimes.com/2002/12/08/magazine/how-green-is-bp.html>
27. Goodwyn, Wade, Previous BP Accidents Blamed on Safety Lapses, www.npr.org, May 6,
2010. <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=126564739>
28. Cronin, Jon, Tony Hayward BPs New Boss, BBC News, January 12th, 2009. <http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/6257149.stm>

Journal of Organizational Behavior Education 4

87

positions of greater responsibility throughout Europe and Asia in the first decade
of his career. While attending a leadership conference in the United States in the
early nineties, Hayward caught the eye of (then) BP CEO Lord Browne. After
serving as an executive assistant to Browne for a couple of years, Hayward began
to rise quickly through the ranks.29 He served as President of BPs operations in
Venezuela, as a director of BP exploration, a group Vice President and eventually
as group treasurer, where he was responsible for a variety of key financial
decisions that affected the entire company. Hayward replaced Lord Browne as
CEO in May of 2007 after the Texas City Refinery explosion killed 15 people and
wounded nearly 200 others.
Prior to assuming the role as CEO, Hayward made it clear that he intended to
integrate all levels of leadership in the decision making process. He believed, as
he said in 2006, that the top of the organization doesnt listen hard enough to
what the bottom of the organization is saying.30 Taking charge of the company,
Hayward vowed to intensify BPs safety efforts, improve its financial
performance and adhere to core BP values.31 With such considerable experience
throughout the company, it seemed as though Hayward was poised to follow
through with his ambitious vision.
8. Initial Communications
Word got back to BP headquarters soon after the April 20 explosion. After a
tumultuous evening, Tony Hayward released a brief statement on BPs website.
In his statement he offered condolences to the families of the 11 men who were
killed, and offered support to Transocean as it tried to make sense of the
disaster.32 The statement conveyed BPs genuine sincerity, but it also indicated
that BP initially intended to play a supporting role in the recovery and clean-up
effort. BP released its quarterly earnings report on April 27 and briefly mentioned
the spill after a thorough discussion about robust earnings.33 On April 30, in a
surprising change of tone, Hayward was quoted as saying that BP assumes full
responsibility for the spill.34 Then, on May 2, Tony Hayward appeared on the
Today show remarking: Its not our accident.35 He then went on to say that
29. Tony Hayward biography, <www.BP.com>, Also from Bio.True Story, Tony Hayward
Biography. <http://www.biography.com/articles/Tony-Hayward-586098>
30. Hayward Shares Candid Views on 2006, The Telegraph, December 18th, 2006. <http://
www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/2952547/Hayward-shares-candid-views-on-2006.html>
31. Ibid.
32. BP Offers Full Support to Transocean After Drilling Rig Fire, April 21st, 2010 <http://
www.bp.com/genericarticle.do?categoryId=2012968&contentId=7061458>
33. BP p.l.c. Group Results, First Quarter 2010, page 4. <http://www.bp.com/liveassets/
bp_internet/globalbp/STAGING/global_assets/downloads/B/bp_first_quarter_2010_results.
pdf>
34. Bergin, Tom, Exclusive: BP CEO says will pay oil spill claims, Reuters, April 30th, 2010
<http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/04/30/us-bp-oilspill-idUSTRE63T2VR20100430>

88

BP and the Gulf Oil Spill (A)

although BP was not responsible for the incident, it would play a direct role in
containing the oil spill. The first few days following the incident were certainly
marred by confusion and contradiction on BPs part.
In the same two week period following the explosion, the federal government
took a much more active role in finding fault and placing blame. In a special
televised address on May 2, President Obama said BP is responsible for this; BP
will be paying the bill.36 Two days earlier, President Obama appointed Admiral
Thad Allen as National Incident Commander and gave him the authority to
engage the public regarding current recovery efforts. Admiral Allen, highly
regarded as an expert in disaster recovery, carried the full weight of the federal
government when he spoke about the deepwater crisis. BP would often have to
work closely with Admiral Allen or even under his guidance during certain parts
of the recovery.
9. BPs Communications Strategy
In addition to daily press conferences and remarks from senior leadership, BP
used three key communications methods to engage local, national and global
audiences.
9.1. Social Media
Prior to April 20, 2010, BP posted very few items and updates to its Twitter and
Facebook accounts. In the week following the explosion, BP was silent on the
social media scene. On April 27 at 8:26 pm, BP posted a message on its Twitter
account, simply saying BP PLEDGES FULL SUPPORT FOR DEEPWATER
HORIZON PROBES.37 After the initial post on Twitter, BP gave daily Twitter
updates to interested followers. BP used Twitter to list important contact
information for each of its emergency response teams as well as to provide key
updates on the search, rescue and recovery processes.
BP used Facebook in a similar way. On May 2, BP America entered its first
Facebook post, announcing that BP officials had established a hotline for those
who would like to support with the cleanup and recovery efforts in the Gulf.38
BPs Facebook page provided those who liked BPs page with a detailed
35. The Today Show, Interview with Tony Hayward, May 2nd 2010. TPM Muckraker, May 4,
2010. <http://tpmmuckraker.talkingpointsmemo.com/2010/05/bp_chief_claims_oil_spill_
wasnt_our_accident.php>
36. Obama, Barack, Presidential Remarks on the Oil Spill, The White House, May 2nd 2010,
Louisiana, USA. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-oil-spill>
37. BP Twitter account, April 27th, 2010, <http://twitter.com/BP_America/status/12984677193>
38. BP America Facebook page, May 2nd, 2010 <http://www.facebook.com/topic.php?uid=
121928837818541&topic=133>

Journal of Organizational Behavior Education 4

89

account of how much oil had been recovered that day and since the beginning of
the spill. It also provided a variety of information regarding the compensation
claims process, key Coast Guard updates and commerce in the Gulf area. BP
officials would update Facebook followers several times a day (even on
weekends and holidays) in order to make their efforts and intentions as
transparent as possible.
On May 5, BP began releasing official Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill updates on
its website.39 Each update was linked to the Twitter and Facebook pages so that
all users could funnel towards the official www.bp.com website to receive their
information. The updates were robust and offered a detailed account of the days
recovery efforts as well as a wealth of pictures, maps, graphics, diagrams,
comments and assessments. All of this information would eventually lead to the
creation of the Gulf of Mexico Response tab on the BP website. Anyone who
wanted an update on the Gulf spill could easily and quickly get one from the BP
website or through its social media outlets.
9.2. Paid Media: We Will Make This Right
BP invested in a massive print and television campaign in order to make its case
as a responsible company that was willing to do the right thing at all costs and
against all odds. The campaign began on June 3 with a television advertisement
featuring Tony Hayward. In the advertisement, which aired in markets all over
the United States, Hayward outlined BPs immense recovery effort and pledges
to stay in the Gulf as long as it takes to fix the problem.40 In addition to the
national television campaign, BP also ran print advertisements in high visibility
newspapers, including The New York Times, USA Today, The Wall Street
Journal and The Washington Post.41 This comprehensive advertisement strategy,
designed to appeal to a national audience, carried with it a $50 million price tag.42
According to a spokesman with BP, Tony Hayward justified the cost of the
campaign by alluding to his obligation to keep the public informed about ongoing
recovery efforts.
Not everyone was pleased with the information Hayward communicated, at
least not at a cost of $50 million dollars. President Obama, upon hearing an
estimated cost of the campaign, said What I dont wanna hear is when theyre
spending that kind of money on TV advertising and theyre nickel and diming
fishermen.43 Mr. Obama was referring to the way that BP had been handling
compensation claims for fishermen who were out of work as a result of the spill.
39. Update on Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill Response, <www.bp.com>, May 5th, 2010.
40. A Message from Tony Hayward, You Tube, June 3, 2010 <http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=KKcrDaiGE2s>
41. Smith, Aaron. BPs Television Ad Blitz, CNN Money, June 4th, 2010. <http://
money.cnn.com/2010/06/03/news/companies/bp_hayward_ad/index.htm>
42. Ibid.

90

BP and the Gulf Oil Spill (A)

He felt that the money may have been better spent supporting the people directly
affected by the disaster, as opposed to financing a campaign to appeal to
seemingly unaffected people.
10. Spillcam
Congressman Ed Markey, the representative from Massachusettss 7th District,
began criticizing BP for not giving the public access to its 24-hour camera feed of
the oil spill. He believed that the public should have full disclosure to each
camera angle in order to get a better idea of just how severe the spill really was.44
On May 18, BP made such footage available via its website. Spillcam, as the
live feed eventually became known, drew immense fascination across the
country. In the days following Spillcams release, more than 300,000 people
visited BPs website to view the feed. BP oil spill live feed and top kill video
were both among the most popular Google searches after Spillcams release.45 BP
disclosed the footage in an effort to prove its willingness to disclose vital
information to the public and to highlight its cooperation with federal agencies.
While Spillcam certainly represented transparency, it also gave the public a clear
picture of the staggering oil flow that plagued the Gulf.
11. Missteps Along the Way
11.1. Downplaying the Effects
A week after the Deepwater Horizon disaster, BP released noticeably upbeat
quarterly earnings. In the notes section following the impressive earnings report,
the Gulf oil spill was casually mentioned in a mere three sentences.46 The oil spill
acknowledgment was sandwiched in between detailed descriptions of lucrative
acquisitions and operating results. On the same day that BP went public with
Spillcam, Tony Hayward did an interview with SkyNews. In the interview, he
contended that the overall effects of the spill would be very, very modest47 and
43. Reid, Chip, Obama Lashes Out at BPs PR Spin, CBS News, June 4, 2010 <http://
www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/06/04/eveningnews/main6549303.shtml>
44. Wheaton, Sarah, Gulf Reality Show Draws a Big Web Audience, The New York Times, May
26 2010. <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/27/us/27spillcam.html>
45. Ibid.
46. BP p.l.c. Group Results, First Quarter 2010, Page 4. <http://www.bp.com/liveassets/
bp_internet/globalbp/STAGING/global_assets/downloads/B/
bp_first_quarter_2010_results.pdf>
47. Milam, Greg, BP Chief: Oil Spill Impact Very Modest, SkyNews, May 18, 2010. <http://
news.sky.com/skynews/Home/World-News/BP-Oil-Spill-In-Gulf-Of-Mexico-Will-HaveVery-Modest-Environmental-Impact-Says-Firms-CEO/Article/201005315633987>

Journal of Organizational Behavior Education 4

91

that the spill would be relatively small compared to the entire ocean.48 In early
June, (months before the leak was sealed) Doug Suttles, BPs Chief Operating
Officer, remarked that the oil flow will be down to a relative trickle within a
few days.49 A week later, oil was still flowing from the leak at a rate of 10,000
to 35,000 barrels per day. Suttles then went on to say I would eat fish from these
waters.50 He made the comment about a month before the well was sealed and
while many fishermen were still out of business. The comment, though likely
true, continued to aggravate people whose lives had been greatly disrupted by the
disaster.
11.2. Self-Inflicted Wounds
BPs extensive communications and advertisement effort would likely have been
much more successful had it not been for a few avoidable mistakes. Tony
Hayward, in an attempt to apologize to Gulf residents, said Theres no one who
wants this thing to be over more than me. Id like my life back.51 He made the
statement just three days before releasing the We will make this right
advertisement. Many Gulf residents felt the comment was unbelievably
insensitive, especially considering the fact that 11 men actually lost their lives in
the incident. Two weeks before that statement, Tony Hayward was spotted at an
exclusive yacht race off the coast of England, apparently on vacation with his son.
The jet-setting lifestyle complete with luxurious yacht races was countered by the
hardships and struggles Gulf residents were enduring every day. Many people
affected by the spill were appalled by Haywards seemingly flippant and arrogant
behavior. Hayward was not the only one to make a serious gaffe after the spill.
Carl Henric Svanberg, BPs Chairman of the Board, told President Obama that
BP cares about Americas small people.52 The comment was not received well
by Gulf residents, who detected a hint of superiority and arrogance in the
comment.

48. Webb, Tim, BP boss admits job on the line over Gulf oil spill, May 14, 2010, The Guardian.
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2010/may/13/bp-boss-admits-mistakes-gulf-oil-spill>
49. The Today Show, Interview with Doug Suttles, June 9, 201, Video available on The Huffington
Post. <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/06/09/underwater-plumes-doug-su_n_
605613.html>
50. Weber, Harry R., BP executive says he would eat fish from Gulf of Mexico, Associated
Press, Aug. 1, 2010. <http://blog.al.com/live/2010/08/bp_executive_says_he_would_eat.
html>
51. The Today Show, May 30, 2010 available from You Tube, BP CEO Tony Hayward: Id Like
My Life Back, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MTdKa9eWNFw&feature=player_
embedded>
52. Bazinet, Kenneth, R., BP boss Svanberg says we care about the small people after oil spill
faceoff with President Obama, NYDailyNews.com, June 17, 2010. <http://
articles.nydailynews.com/2010-06-17/news/27067379_1_small-people-oil-spill-toby-odone>

92

BP and the Gulf Oil Spill (A)

On July 20, in the midst of another attempt to plug the oil flow, BP digitally
altered a photo of employees viewing data screens in a command and control
center. The photo was prominently displayed on the company website and was
intended to show how closely BP was monitoring the situation. An online blogger
noticed that the image had been photoshopped to make it appear as though the
employees were monitoring more screens than they actually were.53 BP had to
admit to the embarrassing mistake and apologize to the public once again.
12. Moving Forward
Bob Dudley replaced Tony Hayward on October 1 as BPs CEO. After enduring
the companys most devastating accident and a number of public relations gaffes,
Dudley has to rebuild BPs image and regain credibility with customers and
investors. In the aftermath of such a disaster, he must find a way to convince the
public that BP is still a valuable energy company that will help solve global
energy problems in the future.
Discussion Questions
1. What might have influenced BPs present day culture and general
attitude toward safety and operational procedures?
2. How would you assess the effectiveness of BPs Green campaign?
3. What should BP have communicated to the world immediately
following the explosion?
4. Who should BP have used as the public relations pointman during
the cap effort?
5. Will America ever forgive BP?
6. Will BP be able to repair its image and convey a new attitude of safety
consciousness?
7. How does BP ensure a similar crisis does not occur in the future?
8. What is Bob Dudleys greatest challenge as he tries to improve BPs
public image and grow profitability?
53. Mufson, Steven, Altered BP photo comes into question, The Washington Post, July 20, 2010
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/19/AR2010071905256.
html>