Applied Engineering Organizations and Impacts On Risk

Deepwater Horizon Study Group White Paper
New Domain in Deepwater Drilling: Applied Engineering and Organizational Impacts on Uncertainties and Risk
The New Domain in Deepwater Drilling: Applied Engineering

and Organizational Impacts on Uncertainties and Risk
David M. Pritchard i and Kenneth J. Kotow ii
Successful Energy Practices International, LLC
Abstract
The Macondo blowout highlights the need for well designs capable of consistently obtaining
commercial and technical well objectives while improving safety for personnel and the environment.
But in order to identify a problem, it must be recognized that there is a problem.
This paper discusses key issues concerning setting and aligning safety objectives to achieve an
acceptable balance among a plethora of risks and maintaining a healthy deep-water drilling industry.
In particular we focus on how this impacts performance and, more importantly, safe well designs.
It is important to fully realize how well-drilling objectives and their associated uncertainties are
linked to the safe drilling margin. At first blush, this issue may be viewed as a purely technical matter
but it is primarily a human one, grounded in the forces that inspire to create false choices in risk and
reward.
This paper illustrates how just one key uncertainty can lead to an unsafe well design, e.g., how
the Rig Schedule plays into routinely ignoring warning signs and how risk-taking behavior can
insidiously infect a risk-adverse goal. The symptoms of this infection of an otherwise healthy safety
management system can lead to operator manipulation of both company design practices and also
regulatory requirements under the assumption that any increase in risk or error in judgment is
manageable by last resort safety systems. Inevitably, in this environment, black swan disasters will
eventually occur. iii
Successful Energy Practices International, LLC 2010
David M. Pritchard, Successful Energy Practices International, LLC. Mr. Pritchard is a

Registered Professional Petroleum Engineer associated with the Petroleum industry since 1970. He
has extensive experience managing, planning and supervising worldwide drilling and production
operations.
ii
Kenneth J. Kotow, Successful Energy Practices International, LLC. He has a B.Sc. in Mineral
Engineering from the University of Alberta, with a specialization in Petroleum Engineering, and is a
professional engineer with the Association of Professional Engineers, Geologists and Geophysicists
of Alberta (APEGGA). Mr. Kotow is a SEPI associate.
iii
Black Swan Theory is a philosophical and mathematical theory founded by Nassim Nicholas
Taleb. It describes randomness and uncertainty. The theory was described in Taleb's book The Black
Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable. Its name originates in the assumption in Medieval Europe
that black swans could not exist, when in fact, they are rare, but do exist.
From http://www.mahalo.com/black-swan-theory.
1
mlov0.3

The New Domain in Deepwater Drilling: Applied Engineering and Organizational Impacts on Uncertainties and Risk
Table of Contents
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.0
8.0
9.0
9.1
9.2
9.3
10.0
11.0
12.0
Forward ........................................................................................................................................................ 3
Rig Schedule and The Macondo Prospect.............................................................................................. 4
The Rig Schedule and Compromised Designs - A Design Example .............................................. 11
What are the solutions to the rig schedule dilemma? ......................................................................... 13
What are the options for the rig schedule dilemma? .......................................................................... 14
More on Casing Seat Depth Fundamentals.......................................................................................... 14
How Did Casing Seats Influence the Completion of the Macondo Well: A Story Not Heard ... 16
Understanding Wellbore Instability - Well Listening And The Rig Team Interactive Factors .... 23
Discussion of Key Hazards Leading to Wellbore Instability............................................................. 24
Ballooning or Wellbore Charging .......................................................................................................... 24
Fluids Losses: Lost Circulation and Stuck Pipe ................................................................................... 27
Stuck Pipe .................................................................................................................................................. 27
Analyzing the Risk of Deepwater Drilling: The Metrics Of Wellbore Instability .......................... 28
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................................. 31
References .................................................................................................................................................. 32
Figures
Figure 2.1 The difference between long casing and liner: the 13 in liner.................................................... 5
Figure 2.2 First mistake, fewer barriers to gas flow............................................................................................ 6
Figure 3.3 Second mistake,, fewer centralizers to evenly distribute the cement. ........................................... 7
Figure 2.4 Third mistake, a bond log was dismissed as being unnecessary. ................................................... 7
Figure 2.5 Fourth mistake, the pressure test results were misinterpreted....................................................... 8
Figure 2.6 Fifth mistake, the mud barrier to well pressure was removed early. ............................................ 9
Figure 2.7 Sixth mistake, the blowout preventer failed to close the well...................................................... 10
Figure 3.1 Acona WellPro Macondo Mini Seminar, August 2010. ................................................................ 11
Figure 3.2 Type Dodson MRI 5 Deepwater Well............................................................................................. 12
Figure 6.1 Typical Deepwater Riserless Casing Seat Rationale. ..................................................................... 15
Figure 6.2 Fundamentals of Casing Seat Optimization. .................................................................................. 15
Figure 7.1 Acona WellPro Macondo Mini Seminar, August 2010. ................................................................ 16
Figure 7.2 Hydrocarbon Zones and Potential Flow Paths.............................................................................. 21
Figure 7.3 BP knew they had a tight margin...................................................................................................... 22
Figure 9.1 Downhole pressure during fluid feedback from formation. ........................................................ 26
Figure 10.1 Graphic of Total Days of Wellbore Instability. ........................................................................... 29
Figure 10.2 NPT for 263 wells drilled in less than 600 ft of water. ............................................................... 29
Figure 10.3 NPT for 99 non-subsalt wells drilled in greater than 3000 ft of water. ................................... 30
Figure 10.4 NPT for 65 wells subsalt wells drilled in greater than 3000 ft of water. .................................. 30
Tables
Table 3.1 Summary table for the Dodson Deepwater Mechanical Risk Index............................................ 12
Table 3.2 A caption from a deepwater well program ....................................................................................... 13
Table 7.1 Deepwater Well Example ................................................................................................................... 17
Table 8.1 Interpretive Well Listening: The Human Factors ........................................................................... 23
Table 9.1 Deepwater Ballooning Case History ................................................................................................. 25
Table 10.1 - Days of Wellbore Instability as a percent of total time (exclusive of weather) ......................... 28

1.0
Forward
The Macondo blowout highlights the need for well designs capable of consistently obtaining
commercial and technical well objectives while improving safety for personnel and the environment.
In order to identify a problem, it must be recognized that there is a problem. Examining deep
water operations in the Gulf of Mexico (GOM) indicate that there are unidentified and,
consequently, reoccurring systemic risk management problems unique to complex deepwater well
development that have not as yet been fully understood or effectively treated by some offshore
operators. 1 Fundamentally this stems from a deficient safety culture and a resulting dysfunctional
safety management system.
Professor Andrew Hopkins2 has analyzed high-performing organizations and found that
organizational mindfulness is a key leading indicator of such problems, i.e., a mindset that exists in
some organizations that support a culture of denial, as characterized by following:
A belief that it can't happen here. It usually will, especially when in denial.
A tendency to dismiss warning signs. Many deepwater well operators experience an frequent
subsurface problems that have risk implications that are not fully analyzed or
appreciated.
A tendency to normalize warning signs. At what point are abnormal operations considered
routine and safe? Recognizing a conditioned behavioral response by the crew due to
frequency of occurrence is a function of a successful safety management system.
Rather than proving that an activity is unsafe, there is a tendency to prove that an activity is safe
(important distinction). The safety of the complex operations should not be assumed.
Group think. The tendency to ignore the dissenting voice and move towards the loudest
or more popular choice without fully regard of the issue. How many times does this
happen?
From an organizational perspective, drilling management equals risk management. As

J. C. Cunha has observed3:
It is clear to me that drilling management is related closely to risk management and The
correct assessment of all risks involved in drilling operations will provide better planning and will
consequentially improve operational results. Furthermore, A proficient drillingmanagement
process is now more important than ever. This process must permeate all phases of a project, from
early planning to final execution. Risk assessment of all operations must become a routine.
Indeed, risk assessment of all operations must become routine; however, it must also be
performed in a mindful-manner NOT as a matter of routine or with a compliance-mentality.
Drilling performance and safety is a multidisciplinary responsibility. Managing risks begins with well
planning and clearly stated objectives agreed to by all stakeholders and by setting forth clear lines of
responsibility and accountability in the decision-making process.4
This paper discusses key issues concerning setting and aligning objectives, and how this impacts
performance and, more importantly, safe well designs. It is important to fully realize how well3

drilling objectives and their associated uncertainties are linked to the safe drilling margin. At first blush,
this issue may be viewed as a purely technical matter. However, that would be a mistake -- it is not
and this paper illustrates how just one key uncertainty can lead to an unsafe well design, e.g., How
the Rig Schedule plays into routinely ignoring warning signs and how risk-taking behavior can
insidiously infect a risk-adverse goal. The symptoms of this infection of an otherwise healthy safety
management system can lead to operator manipulation of both company design practices and also
regulatory requirements and complacency. Schedule driven decisions create a dynamic characterized
by a tendency to overlook or possibly ignore essential design requirements to ensure a safe drilling
margin and properly manage uncertainties and ancillary risks. Like a virulent virus, as the
contagion spreads, it can and has escalated into an unhealthy co-dependent relationship between
operators and regulators, contaminating the intended system of checks and balances in favor of
doing it cheaper and faster.
2.0
Rig Schedule and The Macondo Prospect
The record shows that BP Macondo well rig schedule and budget over-runs influenced the
casing design decision to forego a tied-back string of 13 in casing to the wellhead in favor of a
single long-string 5 as well as other questionable decisions (all of which increased the risk of a
blowout) were more than causal to the failure. If the 13 in casing had been tied back and
successfully cemented, then this catastrophe could have been avoided as pointed out in Figure 2.1
on the next page.6
Furthermore there would be no issues regarding compromising or breaching the integrity of
shallower string casings. Investigators are now seeking answers to many questions, including why
was the decision made to use a long string to complete the well instead of an inherently more secure
tie-back liner? On this issue the record speaks clearly time and money. 7
A review of the events that occurred during the drilling of the Macondo well reveals that
incidents and gas-kicks were encountered and well control was problematic before the catastrophe
occurred. Various deficiencies in casing seats exacerbated well bore instability events and
complicated equivalent circulating density (ECD) control, making it difficult to manage from the
18 in casing downward. This inability to manage ECD may have contributed to the decision to
nitrify the cement a typical procedure used to minimize ECD management in the very narrow
annuli between casings. Nitrified cement is less dense, therefore lighter and has less resistance to
friction forces while circulating. However, it should be noted that using this type of cement is rare
for these kinds of operations as it also has lower yield strength. The risk of using the nitrogen
foamed cement has been highlighted in the investigation into the Macondo blowout as different
mixtures of the nitrogen foamed cement failed several tests before it was ultimately used to cement
the final casing in the well.8

Figure 2.1 The difference between long casing and liner: the 13 in liner. iv
A summary of the several key factors are highlighted in the following six graphics (Figure 2.2,
Figure 2.3, Figure 2.4, Figure 2.5, Figure 2.6, and Figure 2.7) published in the Times Picayune, New
Orleans, LA. 9 These illustrate the string of six major mistakes that culminated in the well blowout:
fewer barriers to gas flow were used than was prudent,

fewer centralizers that are necessary to keep the cement distributed around the
casing were placed,
no bond log was taken to measure the integrity of the cement,
the well pressure test results were misinterpreted as acceptable when not,
the mud in the well and riser was removed early and enabled gas to uplift, and
the blowout preventer failed to close the well.
Additional details on the Macondo well drilling design plan and additional risk-exacerbating
decisions are described in The Macondo Well by Paul Parsons.10
Acona Wellpro,
http://www.aconawellpro.com/@api/deki/files/251/=MiniSeminar_Macondo_August_2010.pdf, 17.
iv

Figure 2.2 First mistake, fewer barriers to gas flow. v
David Hammer, 6 Fateful Missteps, The Times Picayune, New Orleans, LA, September 5, 2010.

Figure 3.3 Second mistake,, fewer centralizers to evenly distribute the cement. vi
Figure 2.4 Third mistake, a bond log was dismissed as being unnecessary. vii
vi
vii
Hammer, op. cit.

Hammer, op. cit.

Figure 2.5 Fourth mistake, the pressure test results were misinterpreted. viii
viii
Hammer, op. cit.

Figure 2.6 Fifth mistake, the mud barrier to well pressure was removed early. ix
ix
Hammer, op. cit.

Figure 2.7 Sixth mistake, the blowout preventer failed to close the well. x
Hammer, op. cit.
10

3.0
The Rig Schedule and Compromised Designs - A
Design Example
With respect to ECD Management, delineates many of the problems encountered in the drilling
of the Macondo well and illustrates many failures in regard to ECD management, most notably fluid
losses and kicks (well control). The failure to fully honor the pore pressure fracture gradient
relationship in this well resulted in a exceptional amount of casing strings and actually intensified the
drilling risks and mechanical difficulties of dealing with small hole and casing diameters, and narrow
annuli at the extraordinary depths associated with deepwater operations.
Figure 3.1 Acona WellPro Macondo Mini Seminar, August 2010. xi
Increased risk stemming from liner and cementing decisions results from increasingly high ECD,
which exacerbates the ability to obtain viable cement integrity. The management of ECD is critical
and the failure to do so has resulted in an excessive amount of Non-Productive Time (NPT) and
caused unsafe incidents. In addition 11, there are many wells that simply fail to meet technical
objectives and are abandoned. Such wells never become part of the drilling database that is used to
measure drilling performance, thus the industry metrics are worse than reported.
Failure to maximize leak off tolerance 12 with each casing string against the overburden gradient
renders successive hole sections more difficult to manage, shortens the hole section and reduces well
control capabilities. This problem is compounded with each successive casing string. The net result
is that casing sizes are ineffective and diminishes the ability to manage ECD top to bottom,
negatively impacts wellbore stability, and causes other operational issues such as cementing integrity.
In the GOM deepwater environment, wells are ranked by the James K. Dodson & Company
from data supplied the operators. A summary of the ranking is shown in Table 3.1.
xi
Acona Wellpro, op. cit., 14.,
11

Table 3.1 Summary table for the Dodson Deepwater Mechanical Risk Index xii
Key Well Factors - Median
WD
ft ss
(ocean depth)
3,200
4,300
23,000
72
4,400
28,000
5.5
81
6,000
29,500
85
6,700
30,000
7.5
100
Complexity
Level
Well Depth
ft KB xiii
Number of
Casing Strings
Percent of Population
penetrating salt
19,000
78
The following example in Figure 3.2 portrays estimated pressures and fracture gradient
(overburden) profiles from a typical deepwater well. This well is not the Macondo and in fact is
much more complex than the Macondo but nonetheless highlights design gaps based on rig
incapability. This example well would represent the highest degree of complexity (Dodson MRI 5)
encountered in current deepwater drilling operations. A rig suitability evaluation follows using the
data provided in Table 3.2.
Figure 3.2 Type Dodson MRI 5 Deepwater Well. xiv

The Mechanical Risk Index is an algorithm developed and owned by the James K. Dodson Company
Kelly Bushing, The heavy bushing at the rotary table, through which the kelly passes, which transmits the rotary
motion of the rotary table to the drill pipe. The top of the bushing is often taken as a depth datum.
xii
xiii
12

Table 3.2 A caption from a deepwater well program
Reach objective casing point of 15,000 to set 16 as deep as possible with respect to hookload
limitations of the drilling rig
Rig Capabilities:
Derrick:
Draw works:
Pumps:
Rated Depth: 8,000 ft and 35,000 ft drilling depth

1,500,000 lbs.
3000 HP
3 at 2200 HP each
Question 1: How can this rig be rated for 35,000 ft when the actual safe margin load requires
much more hookload capacity? This design rating also does not apply a safety factor, and usually
that is 80 % of load, or 1,200,000 lb.
Answer 1: It cannot. This rating is overstated for this example well, and more than likely many
of the more complex wells (Dodson MRIs 3-5).
The hookload requirements for the safest possible well design which honors the complete
uncertainty of the drilling margin is not possible with this rig: the 16 in casing is not deep enough
and the rig is incapable of hoisting deeper loads of 16 in or the 13 in, that is unless the design is
compromised. (Note the planned depth of 15,000 ft.)
Question 2: Is this rating compromised for the most complex of deepwater of wells?
Answer 2: Most probably, depending on the pore pressure and fracture gradient relationship
which determines the safe drilling margin. At the minimum, this rating denies the capability of
managing risk by failing to enable optimization of all casing string depths to bottom. (Note: this is
not the fault of the contractor, rather the operator must ensure that all design criteria are met and
aligned with the capacity of the rig.)
One of the problems with the current design philosophy is that acceptance of P50 pore pressure
criteria (See Figure 3.2) only has chance of becoming the actual well condition and does not honor
the outer boundary of risk and well control. If in fact the P50 pore pressure midpoint noted in
Figure 3.2 for design calculations is exceeded, which is entirely possible, this design is inadequate
and unsafe regarding kick tolerance, burst, and safe load requirements.
4.0
What are the solutions to the rig schedule dilemma?
First, the rig schedule should not drive front end loading or the design, especially if it is deemed
necessary to utilize an under-rated rig just to meet the schedule. This is clearly an organizational
issue and requires objectives alignment from the onset.
xiv
Mechanical Risk Index defined by GOM Dodson Data Base.
13

Second, the design itself (See Figure 3.2) must recognize the outer boundary of drilling margin
uncertainty, which at its worst case scenario is equivalent to the overburden gradient itself. This can
be either in pore pressure prediction or stress, which acts like pore pressure in that it requires mud
weight to counter. Stress can be no greater than overburden itself. Recognizing the maximum outer
boundary of the drilling margin relationship honors the greatest risk possible and that is where risk
management begins.
Third, casing seats design must not be compromised in: 1) seat designs which honor the
maximum uncertainties and 2) casing string weights or grades, again just to accommodate an
underrated rig.
Fourth, the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE)
could consider modifying lease expiration criteria to accommodate operators sincere efforts to meet
the terms of leases.
5.0
What are the options for the rig schedule dilemma?
If the rig schedule cannot be met for the safe and necessary design, then the well should be moved off the schedule
without compromise. Failure to do so violates the essence of risk management.
Another solution that might be considered is to batch-set all casing strings down to salt with rigs
of lesser capacity and completing the drilling operation by later moving in a large capacity rig as
available.
In fact, this option could have an industry advantage as over time as it would optimize the
available fleet, especially since development drilling will become more common place. Rigs of lesser
capacity can be used for shallower batch setting and the more capable rigs used for the deeper and
more complex environments.
6.0
More on Casing Seat Depth Fundamentals
The current practice of seawater jetting in the first string of casing, usually 250 to 300 ft below
the mud line, results in a casing seat set too shallow. This does not supply enough leak-off tolerance
for the drilling of the next hole section due to the very soft formations where there is little strength
or competency for fracture resistance. This first string of casing is commonly referred to as the
structural or Conductor string. Its design purpose is to support the weight of subsequent casing
strings and wellhead and supply resistance for bending moment of riser loading. However, in reality,
its ability to support much of an axial load is limited and it really does not supply much axial or
bending moment resistance until it is coupled to the subsequent casing strings. The first structural
string in current well designs does not take advantage of the growth of the fracture gradient and this
negatively impacts the overall well design by wasting casing diameters. The current well design
then sets additional casing strings above every anticipated drilling hazard which further reduces the
casing diameters and hole sizes available for well depths that routinely exceed 30,000 ft measured
14

depth. Figure 6.1 illustrates the current approach for the shallow casing setting depths in the
riser-less sections of current deepwater wells.
Figure 6.1 Typical Deepwater Riserless Casing Seat Rationale.
Casing seat optimization requires that the first string of casing to not only provide the structural
integrity necessary to support the axial loading the second string of casing, but also takes advantage
of the growth of the fracture gradient below the mud line. This affects leak-off tolerance to continue
drilling for the subsequent drilling and installation of the second string of casing. This rationale
extends to each casing seat to total depth (TD). Figure 6.2 illustrates the rational of setting the casing
seats as a function of the fracture gradient.
Figure 6.2 Fundamentals of Casing Seat Optimization.
15

The design begins with the premise that casing seat placements must all meet not only pore
pressure and fracture gradient leak off requirements, specifically providing an acceptable leak-off for
all subsequent casing string drilling operations, but must also meet structural requirements beginning
with the first casing string.
7.0
How Did Casing Seats Influence the Completion of the
Macondo Well: A Story Not Heard
In order to successfully design such a composite or telescopic string of casings for minimizing
the number of casing strings to obtain the improved well design, the reality is that the first casing
string must provide for, and take advantage of, the natural progressive grow of the fracture gradient.
Therefore, the design of the first string provides both structural integrity as well as leak-off integrity
for the drilling and subsequent placement of next casing, the second casing string. This is a key and
critical design difference of this proposal versus the current practice of simply jetting in the first
casing string and using the first casing string for structural integrity only.
It has already been established by BP that the setting of the 16 in casing was too shallow.
Figure 7.1 Acona WellPro Macondo Mini Seminar, August 2010. xv
xv
Acona Wellpro, op. cit., 14.,
16

It is not possible to determine the exact cause of this shallow setting depth (other than wellbore
instability while drilling), and the data is not available to evaluate the exact cause. The events of
wellbore instability and ballooning (Section 9.1) are not unique in any of these complex wells.
Table 7.1 below details such an example (from another operator) where instability, and the
misinterpretation of ballooning, not only caused the early setting of casing string but also resulted in
the failure to execute the objectives of the well. This of course resulted in a shallow set of the
13 in and the 11 in. It is not physically possible to be any other way from an engineering
perspective as each section can only be drilled as deep as the prior hole-section kick tolerance will
allow.
Table 7.1 Deepwater Well Example
Drilling Record
Static
MW
ECD
Comments
Potential Mitigants and other DHM

Comments
Drill 26 hole: Riserless

Drill 7060-8548
Drill 8548-9145
11
DKD
13
DKD,
9.6
MW
NR
9.729.78
Set and cement 20 casing for

riser
Drill and open 18 hole secttion

Run in hole (RIH) with a 18 1/8 x
21 Bottom Hole Assembly (BHA)
below Blow Out Preventer (BOP)
test assembly. Test BOPs. Pull
out of the hole (POH)
RIH w/ 18 1/8 X 21 BHA to
9012. Drill float shoe to 9100.
Wash & ream to 9145. Drill 10 to
9155. Formation Interval Test on
22 to 11.31 ppg. Drill 9155 -9265
with shakers blinding off.
Circulate and condition (C&C) to
clear shaker loading due to heavy
Gumbo. Increase mud weight
(MW) to 10.92 ppg. Control drill
9405 -9723
Drill 9723 9781, Equivalent

Circulating Density (ECD) 10.97 11.0ppg. Drill 9781 10053,
weight up to 10.8 ppg due to
increase in background gas, ECD
11.1 ppg. Drill 10053 -10163
reported flow flowed back 11.5
Bbls in 31 min, no shut in
pressure, C&C and monitor no
flow or pressure.
Continue to monitor no flow.
C&C with ECD down to 11.08 ppg.
Drill 10,205 10,230. ECD 11.02
11.04 ppg. Flow check no flow.
ECD 11.02 11.07 ppg
Drill to 10,360, ECD 11.05-11.09
ppg. C&C due to high gas at Kelly
10.60
NR
10.90
The previous hole section was

finished with 9.65 PPG MW.
Why was this increased a full
1.0 PPG before drill out? A
leak-off test was not conducted.
Consider drilling out with the same mud

weight and do not raise the mud weight until
hole conditions dictate. A leak-off test is
important to determine the true casing seat
integrity and establish the maximum ECD
for the next hole section.
The mud weight was raised

again
Don not raise mud weight unless hole

conditions dictate
10.83
Heavy gumbo due to shale

hydration. Raising the mud
weight increases the ionic rate
of hydration, making gumbo
10.97- worse. Control drilling improves
10.98 the ability for the rig equipment
to clean the gumbo but keeps
the hydrated shale in the hole
longer as the hole is continues
to slough while drilling.
10.80
11.00
10.80
ECD is varying and rising.

11.08- Circulation to remove gas is
11.02 necessary to avoid re-cycling
the gas.
11.00
11.06- Drag indicates the hole is

11.07 swelling in the presence of
ECD of 11.o is ballooning the

formation. This is a balloon
event.
17
Do not raise the mud weight unless hole

conditions dictate. Doing so can increase
the potential for ballooning and fluid
losses. Consider improving mud inhibitive
properties, improve rig fluids cleaning and
handling capacity. Know the cuttings
characteristics: fluffy, sticky shale is
indicative of wetting, versus cuttings
characterization of underbalanced shale:
splintered, concave and solid.
Mud weight was increased due to an
increase in background gas. Background
gas will always increase in shale and no
amount of mud weight will mitigate this
condition. Always consider the totality of
drilling data before raising the mud weight.
Inducing a ballooning condition can actually
become dangerous if the formation or shoe
(which was not tested,) breaks down. This is
also an unsafe drilling scenario and not a
good practice.
Manage ECD better and maintain a low
solids mud. Circulating to condition is
always a good practice, but again, the mud
weight was too high to begin with
compounding the shale wetting, solids and
gumbo problems.
Hole section mitigants: Keep mud weight at
the shoe for drill out the same as prior

Drilling Record
Static
MW
down. Continue drilling to 10400,

ECD 11.06 11.07 ppg. Pump
and sweep, raise MW to 10.9 ppg.
Flow check, no flow. Pump 50
Bbls sweep 13.0 ppg. ECD 11.2
-11.4 ppg. Large amount of
cuttings. Cont. cC&C w/ sweeps,
ECD 11.ww ppg. Pump and spot
60 Bbls, 16 ppg pill. Flow check
OK POOH. 17 Bbls over
displacement required. Had 40K
drag at 10300 -10400.
POOH. Run 18 casing.
Note Cemented liner w/full
returns

Comments
while shale. The over displacement
casing seat. Conduct a leak-off test. Do not
drilling, indicates that the formation was raise mud weight until hole conditions
11.4 overbalanced, yet mud weight dictate. Keep solids low. Circulate more to
avoid re-cycling gas, or improve surface gas
maxim was raised again.
um.
separation capabilities. Improve rig cleaning
capabilities. Improve mud inhibition
characteristics. Conduct rig training to
understand ballooning vs. flow events.
ECD
Comments
Hole section mitigants: Maintain the same mud weight at the shoe for drill out as was the prior casing seat. Conduct
a leak-off test. Due not raise mud weight until hole conditions dictate: background gas alone is not a reason to raise
mud weight and can be unsafe. Keep mud solids low. Circulate more to avoid re-cycling gas, or alternatively improve
surface gas separation. Improve rig cleaning capabilities. Improve the mud inhibition characteristics. Know the
cuttings characteristics: fluffy, sticky shale is indicative of wetting, versus cuttings characterization of underbalanced
shale: splintered, concave and solid. Conduct rig crew training to understand ballooning vs. flow events. The
inordinately high mud weight through this section resulted in failure to get the section deep enough and created
ballooning and fluids loss events. The hole section was compromised: the section was not optimized. Furthermore,
without a leak-off test, this section was essentially drilled blind with no knowledge of the safe tolerance for the seat if
a real well control event had occurred.
16.5 hole section
Run in Hole (RIH) w/ 16 X 19
BHA. Raise MW to 11.4 ppg, tag
and drill cement and shoe track.
Wash & Ream (W&R) to 10,400
ECD 11.78 ppg. Drill to 10410.
ECD 11.72 ppg. C&C, reduce
ECD to 11.63 ppg. Flow check.
OK. Perform FIT 12.13 ppg. W&R
10375 10410. EDC 11.7 11.74
ppg.
Drill 10,506 11407. ECD 11.76
ppg. C&C due to high gas a Kelly
down. Drill 11,407 11416. C&C
at 11,438 due to high gas.
Drill 11,416 11,438. ECD 11.75
ppg. C&C, flow check 1.5 bbl
back. C&C raising mud weight to
11.6 ppg @ 11,438. Flow Check,
gain 3.3 Bbls and then static.
C&C, ECD 11.81 ppg. Flow
Check, gained 9.4 Bbls, then
static. Pump 350 Bbls of 14 ppg
and spot. Flow Check, gained 3.7
Bbls, then static. Had to make
partial trip to 6109 to retrieve a
broken Drill Pipe screen.
Displacement was 5 Bbls over.
POH to re-configure BHA.
11.40
The mud weight at the base of

the shoe was proven too high
11.78as losses were induced, yet
11.63
was raised again prior to drill
out to 11.4 PPG.
11.50
11.76
11.60
Trip in Hole (TIH), W&R f/10,359

11,629, ECD 11.9 ppg. W&R to
11.60
bottom, ECD 11.93 ppg.
C&C to reduce the ECD to 11.88

ppg. W&R to 11,363. C&C to
11.70
reduce ECD. W&R to 11,438 ppg.
FC static. Drill 11,438 11,529.
Again, mud weight is too high, and there

was not a leak-off test conducted.
With the mud weight so high,

mere circulating is ballooning
the wellbore. On the trip for the
This is non-productive time (NPT). It is also
11.75 - drill pipe screen and to
wasted time, or for future operations,
11.81 reconfigure the BHA, losses
Removable Lost Time (RLT).
are incurred. This is further
evidence that the mud weight
was too high.
The mitigants are the same as above: Keep

the mud weight low as hole conditions
Reaming indicates that the hole dictate. The problem is that once the mud
11.9 - is swelling. This is to be
weight is raised too high, this creates an
11.93 expected in these shale
irresolvable problem in that it increases ion
sections.
exchange, exacerbates creating gumbo by
wetting the shale more, and fosters
associated hole problems.
This was not a flow event,
It is critical for the rig team to understand
11.88 rather a ballooning event. The
the difference between well control and
11.83 gas was increasing as a result
ballooning.
of the balloon surge back.
18

Drilling Record
Static
MW
FC gain 3,8 Bbls then flow rate

dropped to zero, Monitor no Drill
Pipe or csg pressure. Open
annular, C&C, ECD 11.86 ppg and
dropped to 11.83 ppg. Gas levels
increasing during C&C.. Shut in
drill pipe pressure, 0 PSIG. Start
well kill operations w/ 11.7 ppg.
Continue circulating and
increasing MW to 11.8 ppg due to
gas levels. While raising the mud
weigh during well control, had fluid
losses. Lowered circ rate starting
pumped LCM. Lost 323 Bbls
during well kill, heavy gas cut mud 11.80
to 11.1 Pump LCM in sweeps. Had
excess torque at 11, 475
11,529. C&C work tight spots, gas
down to 150 units, mud cut to 11.6
ppg. FC OK. Continue C&C at
reduced flow rate.
Continued C&C w/319 Bbls
losses. POH to 10323, 15 Bbls
over displacement. FC static.
RIH on trip tank, 35 Bbls over.
W&R to 11,505, set down 20K.
W&R to 11,529. C&C, loss of 82
11.80
Bbls. Pump 440 Bbls 14 ppg pill
and spot. No losses. POH to
10343;, displaced OK. C&C and
FC at shoe OK. Pump 100 Bbls
LCM, spot at shoe, total loss 102
Bbls. POH.
Continued to Pull Out of Hole
(POH). Ran 16 casing total mud
losses, 2474 Bbls. Run & cement 11.80
casing. No returns while
cementing
ECD
Comments

Comments
Raised the mud weight again.

Why would well control be
initiated with zero pressure on
annulus and drill pipe?
Heavy gas is from the

cumulative reaction of
ballooning the shale section,
then flow back of all of the gas
entrained in the cuttings of
swelled gumbo. This hazard
was induced.
These mud losses are sever

and created by high mud
weight too high from the
beginning of the hole section.
Hole section mitigants: The mitigants for this hole section are much the same as the above hole section.
Furthermore, well control was initiated for all the wrong reasons resulting in fracturing the wellbore.
14.75 hole section
RIH w/ 14 X 17 BHA. Drill
shoe track. FC static. Cleaned
up rat hole to 11,529. Drill 11,529
11,530. Pump 50 bbl Loss
Circulation Material (LCM) sweep.
C&C. FIT to 12.67 ppg, 401 psi,
pumped 15 Bbls, bled back 5 Bbls.
Pump to 12,85 ppg (no bleed back
shown on report). Drill 11,472
11,539. FIT 12.67 ppg. Torque 28k, ECD 12.21 12.25 ppg. Drill to
11,663. Att. To open reamer with
hole packing off, and working pipe.
Had to work with 100k over pull.
W&R, excess torque and stalling.
Working pipe to 125k over. Weight
up to 12.1 ppg. Open hole to
11,539.
ECD 12.26 ppg. Reduced to 12.4
ppg. D/11,663 11,843, ECD
12.26 12.42 ppg. Drill 11,843
11967, ECD 12.55 ppg. Raise
MW to 12.3 Drill 11,967 12,024,
ECD 12.6 ppg. Hole packing off.
Back ream to 11,930. At. To wash
down to 11,930 with total loss of
12.00
When a mud weight of 11.8 in

the prior hole section resulting
in fracturing the wellbore, why
12.21 was it raised to 12.0 PPG?
12.25
Again, there was no leak-off
test, but there was a formation
interval test.
Continuing to raise the mud

weight with the hole packing
off.
19
Formation interval tests are not accurate

and are always higher than a leak-off test
giving a false sense of security. All this does
is pump mud solids against the formation,
so it will show a higher result than a leak-off
test. This is not save and is inadequate for a
casing seat test. Given that there were not
returns while cementing and that the
wellbore had obviously been at the
minimum compromised or at the worst
fractured there is also no clear evidence that
the cement had any integrity. This relegates
this hole section to little more than unsafe
blind drilling.
The pack-off condition could be a result of

hole collapse or simply gumbo exacerbated
by the extraordinary high mud weight. The
fact that losses were severe and continuing
is clear evidence that underbalanced was
not the problem. The shale are being wetted
and the hole fracturing.

Drilling Record
returns. Pump out of hole, at
11,900, pipe pulled free with 100
K lb over. Continue pumping out
with 197 Bbls losses at 26 Strokes
Per Minute (SPM).
W&R 11,665 12,024 ECD 12.72
ppg. Pump 100 Bbls sweep, C&C.
Flow check no flow. Pump 100
Bbls sweep, ECD 12.72 ppg. Drill
12,063 12,075, ECD 12.63 ppg.
Stuck pipe. Work pipe 200klb over,
had 10 bbl gain. Shut in., 0 on csg,
DP 58 psi bled DP to zero with
no flow. Well control. Pump 12.3
ppg with LCM sweeps. Pumped
861 Bbls, lost 506 Bbls.
Monitor. Pump 234 Bbls. Well
static, pipe stuck. Work stuck pipe
on jars, 6 up, one down, with
315Klb over. Pulling to 11,470.
Started well control and pumping
into well. Shut in. Bled 1 bbl into
tank. Boost riser cap w/ 235 Bbls
of 16 ppg to C&C to 12.3 ppg.
Performed bleed backs
Continue well control procedures.
Stabilized well, pull out of hole
(POH) for BHA change 11,470 to
9470. Flow Check bled 1 bbl.
POH to 975. Fill up OK. Change
BHA. RIH.
RIH w/ 14 X 17 BHA to
11,504. Close annular and
displace riser cap. Mud cut to 11.9
ppg+. Flow 9.6 Bbls in 5 minutes.
SI. With no pressure. C&C. W&R
to 11,820. Mud cut to 11.9 ppg+,
ECD 12.6 ppg. W&R at 11,880
and attempting to manage ECD.
W&R 11,820 11,924; Tight
spots. Hole stated packing, pipe
free w/110Klb over. W&R to
11,951. C&C to reduce ECD to
12.68 ppg. W&R to 12,075, ECD
12.65 ppg. Bit stalling and packing
off. Had to jar up 3 times, free
w/200 K lb over.
Pump 75 Bbls 14.3 ppg sweep.
C&C. W&R to 12,077 ECD 12.65
ppg. Packing off, pulled free w/
138 Klb over. ECD 12.74 ppg.
Pump 75 Bbls sweep, W&R to
bottom and packed off at 12,071
Static
MW
ECD
Comments

Comments
Well control for ballooning

Well control for the wrong reasons and no
response, even in the presence indications that there was a well control
event.
of sever losses.
12.30
12.65
12.30
12.68
The failure to execute this well was primarily a result of inordinately high mud weight, from the initiation of the first
casing sections below installation of the riser. These problems compounded with each hole section. Furthermore, for
the last hole section, a case could be built for blind drilling without knowledge of the integrity of the prior casing seat.
This is a dangerous practice. DHM summary: Proper mud weight with improved inhibition and raise the mud weight
only when the totality of hole conditions dictate, have good gas removal and cleaning equipment at the surface as all
shale has entrained gas and higher mud weight will not mitigate this condition. Practice well listening techniques and
proper well control, including a leak-off test at each casing seat. Ballooning was a major issue and induced hazards.
Train rig teams to avoid ballooning, and this begins with recognizing the difference between ballooning and well
control which was initiated with no indicators of a well control event. Failure to optimize the drilling margin for each
hole section resulted in wasted casing and burned casing diameters. The net effect was that drilling margins were
not optimized, rather compromised and the well ran out of casting options early objectives were not met and the
well junked.
Plug and abandon well
20

For the Macondo, the net result was a string of 11 in casing set 2000 ft above the reservoir.
The following should be considered as a conclusion given we do not have pore pressure (PP) or
fracture strength (FG) data, but with at least 14.6 ppg mud weight (MW):
There was a pressure regression into reservoir of 12.8 (not uncommon in this earth model
environment
This is a differential of 1.8 lb/gal (PPG): up to 1800 psi across the cement into a highly
porous and permeable reservoir
Did this compromise yielding of the cement?
Did gas then mitigate from above cement and honey comb? Who knows? Did it at least
exacerbate?
According to BP, this influenced their decision to use nitrified cement.
Figure 7.2 Hydrocarbon Zones and Potential Flow Paths.
21

Figure 7.3 BP knew they had a tight margin.
Recommendations as possible design mitigates include:

Case-off ramp reversal demands minimum casing strings and this begins at top hole.
Do not burn casing string due to tight margin and failure to honor the outer boundary of
fracture gradient from top hole down.
MOC: we do not know drilling conditions of 11 in cased section but was this an
early set?
If so, under MOC, why was an oversized shoe not considered on 11 in section? It is
possibly expandable if the collapse strength is OK through negative ramp. The purpose
is to conserve hole size and eliminate the lower ECD of nitrified cement.
In summary, conclusions and questions remaining from this analysis are:
Early casing sets exacerbated drilling in all deeper hole sections so a case can be made
that this also created sidetrack event in 13 in section.
Early sets including 11 in failed to protect up to 1.8 PPG of pressure ramp reversal
into reservoir.
This also begs the question of what was the correct drill out weight below 11 in. Was it
14.6 ppg? This was probably too high.
Other questions in the execution process remain as well. What was the stable mud weight
immediately prior to setting the 11 in casing? Was this 14.6 ppg applied mud weight an arbitrary
weight? Why were drilling conditions not used to determine an at balance weight? Would a
mitigating technology be Controlled Pressure Drilling on choke to enable correct mud weight
applications?
22

The 14.6 ppg mud weight created unavoidable differential across the cement a minimum of
1800 psi while curing. Consequently, we cannot discount that honey-combed cement exacerbated
creating micro-annulus resulting in a flow path for nitrogen separation.
8.0
Understanding Wellbore Instability - Well Listening
And The Rig Team Interactive Factors
Although not an exhaustive list of drilling hazards, the following discussion does represent a
major portion of nonproductive time (NPT) in drilling operations.
Best practices used while drilling is a fundamental principle of ensuring wellbore stability. Some
drilling hazards can be induced by failure to recognize or misinterpreting the dynamics of the drilling
margin.
Well listening engages the human factor and requires considerable skill and training to
understand what drilling operations related to the well conditions are communicating.
Understanding these basic drilling conditions are critical to safe and successful operations.
Table 7.1 lists several key indicators of well drilling state that the driller must track, interpret,
and respond to in order to maintain well control.
Table 8.1 Interpretive Well Listening: The Human Factors
Indicators for Mud Weight (ECD)xvi Too Low

Unexpected high ROPxvii
Torque/Drag Increase
Cavings Particularly "concave" or splintered
Flow rate increase
Shut in drilling pipe pressure + Well control
Drilling Break gas failing to "fallout" after circulating
BHA drift (principles stress vectors)
Hole fill-up (sloughing or collapsing hole)
Indicators for Mud Weight (ECD) Too High
Unexpected low ROP.
High Bit Wear.
"Over wet" shale, lessen chemical inhibitive effectiveness and increases shale stress due
to fluid penetration.
xvi
xvii
Equivalent Circulating Density (ECD)

Rate of Penetration (ROP)
23

Creates unnecessary fluid losses, differential sticking, and risk of fracturing softer
formations.
Increase opportunities for "Ballooning," possibly creating unsafe drilling conditions.
Other Hazard Indicators
D exponents: Changing drillable trends (analogue of mud weight, ROP, and WOB xviii)
Pinched bits, elliptical hole ( principle stress vectors)
Fluffy, wetted shale (chemical instability)
9.0
Discussion of Key Hazards Leading to Wellbore
Instability
Misinterpreting any of the dynamic factors listed in Table 7.1 can result from simple fluid losses
to catastrophic failure. Singular interpretation of conditions from any of these dynamics can be
counterproductive to maintaining a safe and stable wellbore and result in actually inducing hazards.
The following is an abbreviated discussion of key hazards leading to wellbore instability. The
reason why understanding these hazards is so crucial is that any event of wellbore instability has a
high likelihood of becoming a well control event.
The following discussions regarding drilling hazards are not meant to comprise an exhaustive
list. These hazards are the primary precursors of wellbore instability. However, through good drilling
practices such as outlined, these hazards can be recognized, understood, managed, and either
avoided or effectively mitigated.
9.1
Ballooning or Wellbore Charging
Ballooning is a phenomenon and consequence associated with high ECD. Resultant flowback
can often be confused with influx due to a pore pressure greater than mud balance. This
interpretation is often further complicated by gas entrained in shale, common especially in mottled
shale, with the operator weighting up the mud to counter the shale gas. This further complicates
ballooning. Arbitrarily increasing mud weight in the presence of shale gas alone can result in
fracturing the formation below or at the shoe. The consequence can be catastrophic.13
Failure to recognize ballooning versus well control is a common mistake made in drilling
operations. It is one of the leading causes of unnecessarily expending casing strings in narrow
margin drilling operations.
Table 8.1 represents an actual deepwater example where high ECD resulted in ballooning and
raising the mud weight resulted in fracturing the formation. The higher ECD further complicating
correct wellbore stability conditions by increasing the cyclic bleed offs. Ultimately, the mud weight
xviii
Weight on Bit (WOB)
24

was increased to where fracturing occurred and massive and unsafe losses were sustained before
regaining control of the well. The misinterpretation of ballooning required setting casings before
their time.
Table 9.1 Deepwater Ballooning Case History
16.5 hole section
Run in Hole (RIH) w/ 16 x 19 BHA.
Raise MW to 11.4 ppg, tag and drill cement
and shoe track. Wash & Ream (W&R) to
10,400 ECD 11.78 ppg. Drill to 10410. ECD
11.72 ppg. C&C, reduce ECD to 11/63 ppg.
Flow check. OK. Perform FIT 12.13 ppg.
W&R 10375 -103=410. Drill 10410
10740.ECD 11.7 0 11.74 ppg.
Drill 10,506 -113407. ECD 11.76 ppg. C&C
due to high gas at Kelly down. Drill 11,407 11416. C&C at 11,438 due to high gas.
Drill 11,416 11,438. ECD 11.75 ppg. C&C,
flow check 1.5 bbl back. C&C raising mud
weight to 11.6 ppg @ 11,438. Flow Check,
gain 3.3 Bbls and then static. C&C, ECD 11.81
ppg. Flow Check, gained 9.4 Bbls, then static.
Pump 350 Bbls of 14 ppg and spot. Flow
Check, gained 3.7 Bbls, then static. Had to
make partial trip to 6109 to retrieve a broken
Drill Pipe screen. Displacement was 5 Bbls
over. POH to re-configure BHA.
Trip in Hole (TIH), W&R f/10,359 11,629,

ECD 11.9 ppg, W&R to bottom, ECD 11.93
ppg.
Static
MW
ECD
11.40
11.7811.63
11.50
11.76
11.60
11.60
C&C to reduce the ECD to 11.88 ppg. W&R

to 11,363. C&C to reduce ECD. W&R to
11,438 ppg. FC static. Drill 11,438 11,529.
FC gain 3,8 Bbls then flow rate dropped to
zero, Monitor no Drill Pipe or csg pressure.
Open annular, C&C, ECD 11.86 ppg and
dropped to 11.83 ppg. Gas levels increasing
during C&C. Shut in drill pipe pressure, 0
PSIG. Start well kill operations w/ 11.7 ppg.
11.70
Continue circulating and increasing MW to

11.8 ppg due to gas levels. While raising the
11.80
11.7511.81
11.9 11.93
11.8811.83
25
The mud weight at the

base of the shoe was
proven too high as
losses were induced, yet
was raised again prior to
drill out to 11.4 ppg.
Again, mud weight is

too high, and there was
not a leak-off test
conducted
With the mud weight so

high, mere circulating is
ballooning the wellbore.
On the trip for the drill
pipe screen and to
reconfigure the BHA,
losses are incurred. This
is further evidence that
the mud weight was too
high
This is non-productive
time. It is also wasted
time, or for future
operations, Removable
Lost Time.
Reaming indicate that

the hole is swelling. This
is to be expected in
these shale sections.
This was not a flow

event, rather a
ballooning event. The
gas was increasing as a
result of the balloon
surge back. Raised the
mud weight again. Why
would well control be
initiated with zero
pressure on annulus and
drill pipe?
Heavy gas is from the
cumulative reaction of
The mitigating factors

are the same as above:
Keep the mud weight
low as hole conditions
dictate. The problem is
that once the mud
weight is raised too
high, this creates an unresolvable problem in
that it increased ion
exchange, exacerbates
wets the shale more
creating gumbo and
associated hole
problems.
It is critical for the rig

team to understand the
difference between well
control and ballooning.

16.5 hole section

mud weigh during well control, had fluid
losses. Lowered circ rate starting pumped
LCM. Lost 323 Bbls during well kill, heavy gas
cut mud to 11.1 Pump LCM in sweep. Had
excess torque at 11,475 11,529. C&C work
tight spots, gas down to 150 units, mud cut to
11.6 ppg. FC OK. Continue C&C at reduced
flow rate.
Continued C&C w/ 319 Bbls losses. POH to
10323, 15 Bbls over displacement. FC static.
RIH on trip tank, 35 Bbls over. W&R to
11,505. Set down 20K. W&R to 11,529. CYC,
loss of 82 Bbls. Pump 440 Bbls 14 ppg pill and
spot. No losses. POH to 10343, displaced
OK. C&C and FC at shoe OK. Pump 100
Bbls LCM, spot at shoe, total loss 102 Bbls.
POH.
Static
MW
ECD
ballooning the shale

section, then flow back
of all of the gas
entrained in the cuttings
of swelled gumbo. This
hazard was induced.
11.80
These mud losses are

sever and created by
11.80
high mud weight too
high from the beginning
of the hole section.
Hole section mitigants: The risk mitigation for these hole sections are much the same as the above. Furthermore,
well control was initiated for all the wrong reasons resulting in fracturing of the wellbore.
Continued to Pull Out of Hole (POH). Ran
16 casing total mud losses, 2474 Bbls. Run
& cement casing. No returns while cementing.
When ballooning is recognized, care must be taken to avoid unnecessarily weighting up.
Bleeding back trapped pressure as a result of ballooning is critical.
Best Practice
The best practice revolves around "well listening" and integrating all drilling dynamic factors to
make the correct hazard management and avoidance decisions. Interpreting ballooning is crucial to
narrow margin drilling operations and ensuring safe and efficient drilling operations.
Figure 9.1 Downhole pressure during fluid feedback from formation.
26

9.2
Fluids Losses: Lost Circulation and Stuck Pipe
Fluid losses can range from slight to catastrophic and result in wellbore failure or well-control
events. The primary cause of fluid loss is exceeding the outer boundary of the drilling margin
depicted in Figure 8.1. This can be the result of ballooning, or in porous formations, merely the
result of applying an unnecessarily high mud weight and resultant ECDs. Maintaining an ECD low
enough to ensure fluid volume integrity and uncompromised drilling barrier, while high enough to
exceed the lower boundary necessary for wellbore integrity, is critical. Applying well listening
techniques is a rig team interactive predecessor to making correct decisions driven by drilling
conditions.
Best Practice
The best practice and first line of defense is to avoid overweighting the hole and avoiding
ballooning events. Typical fluid-loss, decision-tree processes can and should be created.
9.3
Stuck Pipe
Stuck pipe is a drilling hazard that can be associated with ballooning and fluid losses. Generally,
stuck pipe is avoidable if drilling margins are honored.
Primary Causes:
Differential sticking - most common

Key seating and hole geometry
Pack-off / bridging
Reactive formations (swelling shale)
Secondary Causes:
Coal sections
Tar
Under gauge hole and pseudo stresses.
Permeable sections, high fluid loss
Cuttings buildup
Salt creep
Collapsed casing
Junk
Green cement
Recognition and avoidance of stuck pipe requires some of the same well listening techniques:
Geometry or volume of shaker cuttings, trends in mud properties,

or drilling parameters
Out-of-balance mud weight or high ECD
27

Hole caving
Splintered cuttings
Concave-shaped cuttings
Sloughing shale, chemical shale wetting, and instability
Tectonic or pseudo-induced stresses
Best Practice
The best practices to avoid stuck pipe are much the same as ballooning and fluids loss, that is,
recognizing the conditions within the drilling margins and events and reacting correctly. In addition,
other factors such as Bottom Hole Assembly (BHA) xix and drill string configuration and the
inhibitive characteristics of the formations being drilled should be considered.
10.0 Analyzing the Risk of Deepwater Drilling: The Metrics

Of Wellbore Instability
To further analyze the metrics of wellbore instability related events, Table summarize time spent
on Deepwater wells in less than 600 ft of water, the wells in non-subsalt wells in water depths
greater than 3000 ft and subsalt wells greater than 3000 ft water depth.
Table 10.1 - Days of Wellbore Instability as a percent of total time (exclusive of weather).
General
Populations: 263 65 subsalt 99 non subsalt
Events realted to
wellbores in less wells: WD >
wells
Wellbore Instablity
than 600' of
3,000'
WD>3,000'
water
Stuck Pipe
Wellbore stability
Loss Circulation
Kick
%
Total Wellbore Instability D
Total NPT Days
Instalbity % of NPT Days
Average Days to Drill
Kick DAYS
xix
Toolstring on coiled tubing or drill pipe
28
2.20%
0.70%
2.30%
1.20%
6.40%
2.24
2.90%
2.90%
2.40%
1.90%
10.10%
9.797
0.70%
0.90%
2%
0.80%
4.40%
2.376
4
56.00%
35
0.42
29
33.78%
97
1.843
9
26.40%
54
0.432

Figure 10.1 Graphic of Total Days of Wellbore Instability.
Over four times as much time is spent on the more complex wells combating wellbore instability
events. Even more revealing is that over four times as much time is also spent on the blowout
preventer (BOP) combating kicks.
Figure 10.2 NPT for 263 wells drilled in less than 600 ft of water.xx
xx
James K. Dodson Company
29

Figure 10.3 NPT for 99 non-subsalt wells drilled in greater than 3000 ft of water. xxi
Figure 10.4 NPT for 65 wells subsalt wells drilled in greater than 3000 ft of water.xxii
Any event of wellbore instability has the potential of becoming a well control event.
xxi
xxii
Dobson, op. cit.

Dodson, op. cit.
30

11.0
Conclusion
The BP tragedy in the Gulf of Mexico (GOM) has clearly revealed two major categories of the
consequences of risk the incident itself and the resultant environmental disaster. These risk
consequences are quite obvious. Risk in any endeavor cannot be eliminated entirely, but it can be
successfully managed if it is recognized and the consequences are fully understood.
In order to have a meaningful outcome for future deepwater drilling, the mindsets identified by
Andrew Hopkins must be addressed, and one must first understand that there is a problem, and
then focus on solving the problem.
This paper offers design improvement suggestions through applied engineering, considering risk
as the first step towards developing a safer and more reliable deepwater drilling environment. This
begins with recognizing the metrics of drilling operations and looking at the common denominator
of failures: the design itself in regard to how casing seats are determined and the consequential
hazards of failing to adequately determine casing seats.
This design weakness begins with the very first Conductor string and is compounded with
depth. If kick tolerance is not maximized at each casing seat, by definition it cannot be maximized in
the next hole section and subsequent casing seat. This in and of itself leads to many direct well
control events and execution failures, including deeper ECD management and subsequent
operations such as cementing liners or casing..
Industry efforts to tweak execution systems include enlarging the well hole, fluids
improvements, and efforts to improve critical issues like ECD management in these difficult narrow
margin drilling environments. Although some industry professionals will disagree with how risk
should be managed, the failure to recognize the design as critical to the facts of the metrics denies
what a high-performance, high-reliability organization should represent.
Avoiding a repeat of the current situation and changing the climate of denial can be achieved
with a dose of common sense. Solutions must consider and actively apply the following:
look at the facts of the metrics in context of well complexity,

work together and collaborate as an industry,
recognize where the problems really are and address them from a risk management
perspective, and
focus on solving those problems and work with regulators to focus on the solutions.
The current design model must be challenged. Sound and unbiased engineering design is the
fundamental precursor to safety, sustained success and full life cycle reliability. If we solve the
problem wells, then by definition of risk management, the rest of the well population is mitigated.
31

12.0
References
1. David Pritchard and Kenneth Kotow, Deepwater Well Complexity: The New Domain,
DHSG White Paper, Successful Energy Practices International, LLC, September 2010.
2. Andrew Hopkins, biography, http://www.professorandrewhopkins.com/biography.
3. J.C. Cunha, Drilling Management, Society of Petroleum Engineers, JPT, September 2010,
72.,
4. David M. Pritchard, et al., Drilling Hazard Management: Excellent performance begins with
planning, World Oil, August 2010.
5. David Hammer, 5 key human errors, colossal mechanical failure led to fatal Gulf oil rig
blowout, The Times Picayune, September 5, 2010.
6. Totte Lager and Terje Magnussen, The Deepwater Horizon accident on well Macondo
#1, Acona Wellpro, Mini Seminar, August, 2010,
http://www.aconawellpro.com/@api/deki/files/251/=MiniSeminar_Macondo_August_2010.pdf.
7. cite to testimonial record
8. Ben Casselman and Siobhan Hughes, Contractor Accused of Flawed Job on Rig, Wall
Street Journal, October 29, 2010,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303362404575580420328930294.html?mod=ITP
_pageone_0#project%3DOILRIGS1004%26articleTabs%3Darticle.
9. David Hammer, 6 Fateful Missteps, The Times Picayune, New Orleans, LA, September 5,
2010.
10. Paul Parsons, The Macondo Well, Energy Training Resources, LLC, July 15, 2010,
https://www.energytrainingresources.com/data/default/content/Macondo.pdf.
11. Pritchard, Kotow, op. cit.
12. Kenneth Kotow and David Pritchard, Casing Optimization and Riserless Drilling, OTC,
May 2009.
13. B. W. Swanson, et al., Measurement of Hydrostatic and Hydraulic Pressure Changes During
HPHT Drilling on Erskine Field, Society of Petroleum Engineers, Offshore Europe, September 912, 1997.
32

Applied Engineering Organizations and Impacts On Risk

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Applied Engineering Organizations and Impacts On Risk

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Deepwater Horizon Study Group White Paper

The New Domain in Deepwater Drilling: Applied Engineering

David M. Pritchard, Successful Energy Practices International, LLC. Mr. Pritchard is a

Deepwater Horizon Study Group White Paper

Deepwater Horizon Study Group White Paper

From an organizational perspective, drilling management equals risk management. As

Deepwater Horizon Study Group White Paper

Rig Schedule and The Macondo Prospect

Deepwater Horizon Study Group White Paper

fewer barriers to gas flow were used than was prudent,

Deepwater Horizon Study Group White Paper

Figure 2.2 First mistake, fewer barriers to gas flow. v

Deepwater Horizon Study Group White Paper

Hammer, op. cit.

Deepwater Horizon Study Group White Paper

Hammer, op. cit.

Deepwater Horizon Study Group White Paper

Hammer, op. cit.

Deepwater Horizon Study Group White Paper

Hammer, op. cit.

Deepwater Horizon Study Group White Paper

Figure 3.1 Acona WellPro Macondo Mini Seminar, August 2010. xi

Acona Wellpro, op. cit., 14.,

Deepwater Horizon Study Group White Paper

Key Well Factors - Median

Figure 3.2 Type Dodson MRI 5 Deepwater Well. xiv

Deepwater Horizon Study Group White Paper

Table 3.2 A caption from a deepwater well program

Rated Depth: 8,000 ft and 35,000 ft drilling depth

What are the solutions to the rig schedule dilemma?

Mechanical Risk Index defined by GOM Dodson Data Base.

Deepwater Horizon Study Group White Paper

What are the options for the rig schedule dilemma?

More on Casing Seat Depth Fundamentals

Deepwater Horizon Study Group White Paper

Figure 6.1 Typical Deepwater Riserless Casing Seat Rationale.

Figure 6.2 Fundamentals of Casing Seat Optimization.

Deepwater Horizon Study Group White Paper

Figure 7.1 Acona WellPro Macondo Mini Seminar, August 2010. xv

Acona Wellpro, op. cit., 14.,

Deepwater Horizon Study Group White Paper

Potential Mitigants and other DHM

Drill 26 hole: Riserless

Set and cement 20 casing for

Drill and open 18 hole secttion

Drill 9723 9781, Equivalent

The previous hole section was

Consider drilling out with the same mud

The mud weight was raised

Don not raise mud weight unless hole

Heavy gumbo due to shale

ECD is varying and rising.

11.06- Drag indicates the hole is

ECD of 11.o is ballooning the

Do not raise the mud weight unless hole

Deepwater Horizon Study Group White Paper

down. Continue drilling to 10400,

Potential Mitigants and other DHM

The mud weight at the base of

Trip in Hole (TIH), W&R f/10,359

C&C to reduce the ECD to 11.88

Again, mud weight is too high, and there

With the mud weight so high,