Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Disclaimer
THIS PRESENTATION IS FOR INFORMATIONAL AND EDUCATIONAL
PURPOSES ONLY AND SHALL NOT BE CONSTRUED TO CONSTITUTE
INVESTMENT ADVICE. NOTHING CONTAINED HEREIN SHALL CONSTITUTE
A SOLICITATION, RECOMMENDATION OR ENDORSEMENT TO BUY OR
SELL ANY SECURITY OR OTHER FINANCIAL INSTRUMENT.
Why Im Cautious
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25
20
15
10
0
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
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This is not a typical Presidential transition: in many ways, Trump is the most unusual
President in history. This might turn out well (I hope it does!) but might not
Trumps promise
Upside
Downside
Characteristics
Business, not political experience
Bloomberg
Berlusconi
Bad decisions
Be unpredictable
Uncertainty/chaos
Policies
Shake things up, drain the
swamp
Political turmoil
Trade war(s)
Benefits U.S.
Reduce regulations
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My presentation
60 Minutes story airs
Note: My original presentation and subsequent ones are posted at: www.tilsonfunds.com/LL.pdf
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My presentation
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My presentation
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Two years ago, I discussed the airlines and concluded: I have invested 10% of
my fund in four airline stocks (in descending order of size): Delta, JetBlue, United
& American
Since then, all four have handily outperformed the market, led by JetBlue (+80%)
I no longer own any of these, but continue to own the airline I pitched at last years
conference, Spirit
JetBlue
My presentation
Delta
United
American
S&P 500
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My presentation
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My presentation
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My presentation
-19-
The U.S. Preventative Services Task Force, in its final recommendation issued in
July, punted on which screening test is best, giving A grades to Cologuard and six
other screening methods, causing Exacts stock to quadruple before falling back to
todays level ~$15, down 37% from when I pitched it (vs. +14% for the S&P 500)
My pain is your gain: I believe the recent rally gives investors another opportunity
to short EXAS
It is currently my largest short position at 3.5%
I recently added to it at current prices after the largest insider sales (nearly $25m) ever
Theres plenty of borrow at minimal cost
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In Q2 14, revenues were zero and net loss was $19.4 million
$10
$0
-$10
-$20
(M)
-$30
-$40
Total Revenue
-$50
Net Income
-$60
-$70
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
TTM
H1 '14
Source: CapitalIQ.
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$10
In Q3 16, revenues were $28.1 million and net loss was $37.8 million
Sales & marketing costs alone in Q3 16 were $26.3 million
-$40 $100
-$50
Total Revenue
$50
Net Income
-$60 (M)
$0
-$70
2001
-$50
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
TTM
H1 '14
-$100
-$150
-$200
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 TTM
Q3 '16
Source: CapitalIQ.
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$0
-$2
-$4
-$6
(M)
-$8
-$10
-$12
-$14
-$16
-$18
-$20
Q3 10 Q4 10 Q1 11 Q2 11 Q3 11 Q4 11 Q1 12 Q2 12 Q3 12 Q4 12 Q1 13 Q2 13 Q3 13 Q4 13 Q1 14 Q2 14
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Cash burn was $154 million in 2015 and is $151 million TTM
Free Cash Flow
$0
-$5
-$10
(M)-$15
-$20
-$25
-$30
-$35
-$40
-$45
-$50
Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3
'10 '10 '11 '11 '11 '11 '12 '12 '12 '12 '13 '13 '13 '13 '14 '14 '14 '14 '15 '15 '15 '15 '16 '16 '16
Note: FCF is operating cash flow minus cap ex
Source: CapitalIQ.
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The share count has more than tripled in the past six years
Diluted Shares Outstanding
90
80
70
(M)
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
Q2 14
Source: CapitalIQ.
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The share count has nearly quadrupled in the past eight years
Diluted Shares Outstanding
110
100
90
(M)
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Q3 '16
Source: CapitalIQ.
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More than 50,000 providers have ordered 270,000 Cologuard tests in the
two years its been available, and the number of tests is growing rapidly
80
40
30
20
10
0
Q4 '14
Q1 '15
Q2 '15
Q3 '15
Q4 '15
Q1 '16
Q2 '16
Q3 '16
Q4 '16 (est.)
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Exact Sciences has spent $180 million in sales & marketing since
Cologuards launch two years ago to generate only $105 million in
revenues
$35
Revenues
Sales & Mkting
$30
$25
$20
$15
$10
$5
$Q4 '14
Q1 '15
Q2 '15
Q3 '15
Q4 '15
Q1 '16
Q2 '16
Q3 '16
Source: CapitalIQ.
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The valuation is extreme a $1.7 billion market cap for a single diagnostic
product company
Exact Sciences has a legitimate and approved test, but the valuation
implies Cologuard going mainstream, whereas I think it will remain a niche
test for the reasons outlined earlier
While the stock is down by 1/3 since I pitched it two years ago, the market
cap is down less than half of this because of many more shares
outstanding
Analysts project high growth but also high losses for years to come
o I think the latter is far more likely than the former
Thanks to its heavy sales & marketing spend (including a national TV
campaign), Exact Sciences has been able to buy more growth than I
expected, but I think its close to reaching the limit of this approach
Once growth flattens yet losses remain I expect the stock to trade
down to a slight premium to cash, which is $2.58/share
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Year End
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
Q3 '16
Pre-tax EPS
Cash and
Excluding All
Investments Income From Intrinsic Value
Per Share
Investments1
Per Share 2
$47,460
-$1,289
$64,000
$52,507
$1,479
$70,255
$62,273
$2,912
$97,217
$66,967
$3,003
$103,003
$74,129
$3,600
$117,329
$80,636
$5,300
$144,236
$90,343
$5,600
$157,543
$75,912
$5,727
$121,728
$91,091
$3,571
$119,659
$94,730
$7,200
$152,330
$98,366
$8,000
$178,366
$113,786
$8,700
$200,786
$129,253
$9,716
$226,413
$140,123
$12,051
$260,633
$159,794
$12,304
$282,834
3
3
$155,000 + $13,750 x 10 = $292,500
Subsequent
Year Stock
Price Range
$59,600-$78,500
$60,600-$84,700
$81,000-$95,700
$78,800-$92,000
$85,700-$114,200
$107,200-$151,650
$84,000-$147,000
$70,050-$108,100
$97,205-$128,730
$98,952-$131,463
$114,500-$134,060
$139,610-$178,275
$163,038-$229,374
$186,900-$227,470
?
?
1. Unlike Buffett, we included a conservative estimate of normalized earnings from Berkshire's insurance businesses: half of the $2 billion of average
annual profit over the past 12 years, equal to $600/share prior to 2015. Starting in the 2015 AR, Buffett began to include all insurance earnings, so this
is reflected in 2014 and 2015 earnings.
2. Historically we believe Buffett used a 12 multiple, but given compressed multiples during the downturn, we used an 8 in 2008-2010 and 10 since then.
3. Estimates.
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$292,500
$235,400
Intrinsic value*
1996
2000
2004
2008
2012
* Investments per share plus 12x pre-tax earnings per share through 2007, then an 8x multiple from 2008-2010, and a 10x multiple thereafter.
Excludes all income from investments, but including $600/share of insurance earnings
2016
-35-
If interest rates rise, the value of the bond declines, benefitting the short
position (my 3rd largest at 2.6%)
The 20-year Treasury hit a low of 1.69% on July 8th and closed
yesterday at 2.68% TMF has declined by 40% over this period
Over time, investors should also benefit from the decay associated with
levered ETFs
This is only for a small fund or personal account, as the borrow is tight
and currently costs me 12% annually
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Short: Wingstop
Overview
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An estimated half of same store sales growth in recent years has been driven by price
increases, which is likely unsustainable
3) There is little that is proprietary or unique about this business these are
chicken wing restaurants!
There are plenty of competitors, many much larger, with deeper pockets and better
technology: head-to-head (BWW, Wing Street), other fast food chains (KFC, Dominos,
Pizza Hut, Popeyes, Papa Johns), and indirect (supermarkets selling ready-to-eat
wings)
4) I doubt whether Wingstop can nearly triple the number of units in the U.S. to
managements stated goal of 2,500
5) After 22 years (including a dozen owned by two respected private equity firms)
and growth to nearly 1,000 units, the company generated a mere $87 million in
revenues and $15 million in net income in the last 12 months
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Q2 '14
Q3 '14
Q4 '14
Q1 '15
Q2 '15
Q3 '15
Q4 '15
Q1 '16
Q2 '16
Q3 '16
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Why the rush? My guess is that Roark saw a possible fad, oversaturation, and
the signs of slowing growth, so wisely took the opportunity to cash out at an
absurd valuation
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