PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ vs. VICENTA F. ESCAO, ET AL. G.R. No.

L19671 July 26, 1966 FACTS Tenchavez and Escao contracted a valid
marriage. A few months after, they became estranged. The latter left for the
US and obtained a final and absolute decree of divorce in Nevada,
acquired American citizenship, and married an American. The decision of
the Court, promulgated on 29 November 1965, in the same case, is being
assailed by Vicenta Escao as to the award of moral damages against her.
She argues that her refusal to perform her wifely duties, her denial of
consortium and desertion of her husband are not included in the
enumeration of cases where moral damages may lie. ISSUE Whether
the desertion by a spouse is an actionable wrong within the contemplation
of Article 21 of the NCC? RULING Yes. The desertion by a spouse is an
actionable wrong within the contemplation of Article 21 of the NCC. The
acts of Vicenta (up to and including her divorce, for grounds not
countenanced by our law, which was hers at the time) constitute a wilful
infliction of injury upon plaintiffs feelings in a manner contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy (Civ. Code, Art. 21) for which Article 2219
(10) authorizes an award of moral damages.

Collector vs Fisher, 110 Phil 686

THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner,
vs.
DOUGLAS FISHER AND BETTINA FISHER, and the COURT OF TAX
APPEALS, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. L-11668
January 28, 1961.
DOUGLAS FISHER AND BETTINA FISHER, petitioner,
vs.
THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE, and the COURT OF TAX
APPEALS, respondents.
{Tax 2 case ang lecheng to. Papasimplehin ko na lang ha.}
FACTS: (This case relates to the determination and settlement of the
hereditary estate left by the deceased Walter G. Stevenson, and the laws
applicable thereto.)
Walter G. Stevenson

Born in the Phils (Aug 9, 1874)

Parents British
Married in City of Manila (1909)
Married to another British subject (Beatrice Mauricia Stevenson)
Died in San Francisco, CA, USA (1951)
Stevenson & wife moved to California since 1945 and established
there their permanent residence.
Executed a will in San Francisco, CA w/c was duly probated in
Superior Court of California
Instituted his wife as sole heiress to various real & personal property
acquired by the spouses while residing in the Phil (including 2 parcels
of land in Baguio & various shares of stock)
Ancillary proceedings were instituted in CFI Manila for the settlement
of the estate of deceased Stevenson and his will was admitted to
probate by our (Phil) court (Ian Murray Statt appointed as ancillary
administrator).
Statt filed a preliminary estate and inheritance tax return with the
reservation of having the properties declared therein finally appraised
at their values six months after the death of Stevenson.
In the meantime, Beatrice Mauricia Stevenson assigned all her rights
and interests in the estate to the spouses, Douglas and Bettina
Fisher, respondents herein.
In the last tax return filed, the estate claimed overpayment and
claimed for refunds (dito na nagsimula ang kaguluhan).
The Collector denied the estate claim.
Ang nag-commence ng action ay yung mga assignees (Spouses
Fisher). Action was commenced in CFI Manila for the recovery of the
amount alleged to be overpaid by the estate of Stevenson to the
government.
Pursuant to Republic Act No. 1125, the case was forwarded to the
Court of Tax Appeals.
CTA Ruling: share of the surviving spouse in the conjugal
partnership property shall be deducted from the estate of Stevenson.
(Madami pang ruling ang CTA tulad ng valuation of real properties,
exemption of intangible personal property, additional deductions and
exemptions. Pero yung share lang ang tutukan natin na may
kinalaman sa Conflict.)

 From CTAs decision, both parties appealed. (Si Collector na ang

petitioner, si Sps Fisher na ang private respondent.
ISSUE: (For purposes of Conflict of Laws, the issue is) whether the
property relations of the spouses Stevenson shall be governed by
Philippine or English law in order to determine to whether the share of
surviving spouse shall be deducted from the estate.
Petitioner Colletors Contention: Following Art 124 of the NCC, the property
relations of spouses Stevenson should be governed by the law of England.
Petitioner alleged that English laws do not recognize legal partnership
between spouses, and that what obtains in that jurisdiction is another
regime of property relation, wherein all properties acquired during the
marriage pertain and belong Exclusively to the husband. In further support
of his stand, petitioner cites Article 16 of the New Civil Code (Art. 10 of the
old) to the effect that in testate and intestate proceedings, the amount of
successional rights, among others, is to be determined by the national law
of the decedent.
HELD: Ang maggo-govern ay Philippine law by virtue of processual
presumption.
The marriage of Stevensons shall be governed by the Old Civil Code
(Art 1325) since 1950 lang lumabas ang New Civil Code.
Both Art 124 and 1325 adhere to nationality theory of determining the
spouses property relations where one is a foreigner and there is no
prior agreement as to the administration, disposition and ownership of
the conjugal partnership. In such a case, the national law of the
husband becomes the dominant law in determining the property
relation of the spouses. Art 124 is applicable regardless of whether
the marriage was celebrated in the Phil or abroad. But Art 1325 is
limited to marriages contracted in a foreign land and it refers to mixed
marriages (between Filipino & foreigner). In this case, both are
foreigners married in the Phils.
Accdg to Manresa, kung both foreigners pero married in the Phils,
ang governing law pa din ay English law. {Parang Art 15 natin di ba}
Ang problem yung pertinent English law, allegedly vesting in the
husband full ownership of the properties acquired during marriage ay
hindi na-prove ni petitioner Collector (as correctly observed by the
CTA). Except for a mere allegation in his answer, which is not

sufficient, the record is bereft of any evidence as to what English law

says on the matter. In the absence of proof, the Court is justified,
therefore, in indulging in what Wharton calls "processual
presumption," in presuming that the law of England on this matter is
the same as our law.
Art 16 is inapplicable because said article does not contemplate the
question of property relations of spouses. Art 16 speaks of amount of
successional rights. (Remember ang issue ay NOT the law of the
place where the property is located, kahit na ang properties subject of
this case ay andito sa Pilipinas. Ang issue ay ibabawas ba ang
kalahati ng share ng asawa bago bayaran ang estate tax so property
relations ang issue.)
The lower court correctly deducted the half of the conjugal property in
determining the hereditary estate left by the deceased Stevenson.
It is well-settled that foreign laws do not prove themselves in our
jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of
them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, as modified in the manner heretofore
indicated, the judgment of the lower court is hereby affirmed in all other
respects not inconsistent herewith. No costs. So ordered.
Additional Notes:
The distinction between domiciliary or principal administration and ancillary
administration serves only to distinguish one administration from the other,
for the two proceedings are separate and independent. The reason for the
ancillary administration is that, a grant of administration does not ex proprio
vigore, have any effect beyond the limits of the country in which it was
granted. Hence, we have the requirement that before a will duly probated
outside of the Philippines can have effect here, it must first be proved and
allowed before our courts, in much the same manner as wills originally
presented for allowance therein.
Serrano vs Solomon, 105 Phil 998
SERRANO V.SOLOMON [105P 998(1959)]Before the marriage, the future husband executed a pur ported donationpropter
nuptias which provides that (1) he donates all his properties to his futurechildren, if
any; or (2) if there are none and he dies before his wife, one-half of hisproperties and

those acquired during the marriage shall go to his brothers andsisters; or (3) if there
are no children and his wife dies before him, one half of all hisproperties and those
acquired during the marriage shall go TO THOSE WHOREARED HIS WIFE
(plaintiff). The wife prede ceased him and plaintiff filed an actionto enforce the
donation. There is no valid donation propter nuptias. While thedonation was made
before the marriage, it was not made in considera tion of marriage, because marriage
was not the only consideration for the donation sinceother conditions were imposed;
and even if in consideration of the marriage, it wasnot in favor of one or both of the
spouses, but IN FAVOR OF 3Ps or persons other than the spouses. It is not a valid
donation inter vivos because it was not acceptedby the donee in the same or a
different instru ment. It is not a donation mortis causabecause it did not comply with
the formalities of wills. Hence, the donation is void.
Solis vs Barroso, 53 Phil 912
SOLIS V. BARR OSO
[53 P 912 (1928)]
A donation propter nuptias of lands in a private instru ment is not valid because
the law requires donations of real property to bemade in a public instrument. A
donation propter nuptias is not onerous and thus mustnecessarily be contained in
a public instrument. While the marriage is indeed itsconsideration it is not
so in the sense of being necessary to give birth to the obligation.In fact, a
donation propter nuptias remains valid even if the marriage does not
take place provided it is not revoked within the period allowed by law. The marriage
indonation propter nuptias is rather a resolutory condi tion which as such
presupposes theexistence of the birth of the obligation.
Mateo vs Lagua, 29 SCRA 864

BONIFACIA MATEO vs. GERVACIO LAGUA

29 SCRA 864
October 30, 1969

FACTS:

Sometime in 1917, the parents of Alejandro Lagua donated two

lots to him in consideration of his marriage to petitioner Bonifacia Mateo.
The marriage was celebrated on May 15, 1917 and thereafter the couple
took possession of the lots, but the certificates of title remained in the
donors name.
In 1923, Alejandro died, leaving behind his widow Bonifacia with
their infant daughter, who lived with the father-in-law Cipriano Lagua who in
turn undertook to farm on the donated lots. At first, Cipriano gave to
Bonifacia the share from the lots harvests, but in 1926 he refused to deliver
to petitioner the said share, which reason prompted her to initiate an action
and won for her possession of the lots plus damages.
On July 31, 1941, Cipriano executed a deed of sale of the said
lots in favor of his younger son, herein respondent Gervacio. Petitioner
learned of this only in 1956 when Cipriano stopped giving to petitioner her
share to the harvest. A Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) was issued under
respondents name by the Registry of Deeds (ROD) of Pangasinan.
The CFI of Pangasinan declared the TCT issued to respondent
null and void and ordered cancelled by the ROD, and for respondent to
vacate and deliver the lots to petitioner. In 1957, Gervacio and Cipriano
filed with the CFI for the annulment of the donation of the two lots. While
the case was pending, Cipriano died in 1958. It was dismissed for
prescription, having been filed after the lapse of 41 years. When appealed,
the CA in 1966 held that the donation to Alejandro of the two lots with the
combined area of 11,888 sq. m. exceeded by 494.75 sq. m. his legitime
and the disposable portion that Cipriano could have freely given by will, and
to the same extent prejudiced the legitime of Ciprianos other heir,
Gervacio. The donation was thus declared inofficious and herein
petitioners were ordered to reconvey to Gervacio a portion of 494.75 sq. m.
from any convenient part of the lots.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly reduced the
donation propter nuptias for being inofficious.
HELD:
Decision of CA based on unsupported assumptions set aside;
trial courts order of dismissal sustained.

Before the legal share due to a compulsory heir may be reached,

the net estate of the decedent must be ascertained, by deducting all
payable obligations and charges from the value of the property owned by
the deceased at the time of his death; then, all donations subject to
collation would be added to it. With the partible estate thus determined, the
legitimes of the compulsory heirs can be established, and only thereafter
can it be ascertained whether or not a donation had prejudiced the
legitimes. Certainly, in order that a donation may be reduced for being
inofficious, there must be proof that the value of the donated property
exceeds that of the disposable free portion plus the donees share as
legitime in the properties of the donor. In the present case, it can hardly be
seen that, with the evidence then before the court, it was in any position to
rule on the inofficiousness of the donation involved here, and to order its
reduction and reconveyance of the deducted portion to the respondents.
Article 908. To determine the legitime, the value of the property
left at the death of the testator shall be considered, deducting all debts and
charges, which shall not include those imposed in the will.
To the value of the hereditary estate, shall be added the value of
all donations by the testator that are subject to collation, at the time he
made them.

A donation
propter nuptias
may be revoked for being inoffi cious. It is wrong to saythat a donation propter
nuptias has an onerous consideration, the marriage in this case being
merely the occasion or motive, not the causa. Being liberalities,
they remainsubject to reduction for being inofficious upon the do nor's death if it
infringes on thelegitime of any of the donor's heirs. The DPN in this case was not
annuled in itsentirety, but only to the extent that it infringed on the legitime of the
donor's heir. Note that under Art 43(3), a donation is revoked by operation of
law, under thecircumstances therein provided. However, Art. 86(1) provides
that any revocation inelective, not automatic
Sumbad vs CA 308 SCRA 575
SUMBAD v. CA

308 SCRA 75
Nature:
Petition for review on certiorari of decision of CA
Facts:
Agata Tait died in 1936. Afterwards, Agatas husband, George Tait, Sr.,
lived in a common-law marriage with Maria Tait.In 1974, he donated a
certain parcel of unregistered land in Sitio Sum-at, Bontoc. George died in
1977. From 1982 to 1983,Maria Tait sold lots included within the Sumat property in favor of the private respondents who purchased the
lots on thestrength of a Tax Declaration over the Sum-at property
showing the seller, Maria, to be the owner of the property in question.In
1989, petitioners Emilie Sumbad and Beatrice Tait brought an action for
quieting of title, nullification of deeds of sale, andrecovery of possession
with damages against private respondents, alleging that they are the
children and compulsory heirs of George and Agata. They claim that after
the death of their mother, their father sold the Otucan property and used
the proceedsthereof to purchase a residential lot in Sum-at, Bontoc and
that from 1982 to 1983, Maria sold lots included within the Sum-atproperty
to private respondents without their knowledge and consent. They further
alleged that although the private respondentswere warned that the Sum-at
property did not belong to Maria they still purchased the lots from Maria
and that Maria had noright to sell the Sum-at property so the deeds of sale
are null and void and did not transfer title to private respondents. Duringthe
trial, petitioners and defense presented several witnesses.
Issues:1 . W O N t h e t e s t i m o n y o f Sh i r l e y E i l l en g e r
w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e f o r g e r y o f t h e d e ed o f
d o n a t i o n s h o u l d b e g i ve n credence.
No. The court agreed with the trial and appellate courts decision that
Eillengers testimony is vague and incredible andincapable of impugning
the validity of the public document. Forgery should be proven by clear and
convincing evidence, andwhoever alleges it has the burden of proving the
same. Not only is Shirley Eillengers testimony difficult to believe, it
showsis had been rehearsed as she anticipated the
questions of petitioners counsel. Petitioners should
have presentedhandwriting experts to support their claim that Georges
signature on the deed of donation was indeed a forgery.
2 . W O N t h e d e e d o f d o n a t i o n i s i n va l i d u n d e r Ar t . 7 4 9 o f
t h e C i v i l Co d e , w h i c h r e q u i r e s a p u b l i c i n s t r u m e n t
a s a requisite for the validity of donations of immovable property.

No. Petitioners contend that the person who notarized the deed had no
authority to do so. However, the acknowledgmentclause states that the
person who notarized it was the deputy clerk of court who acted for and in
the absence of the clerk of court who is authorized, under Sec. 21 of the
Revised Administrative Code of 1917, as amended by C.A. Nos. 270 and
641,to administer oaths. In accordance with the presumption that official
duty has been regularly performed, it is to be presumedthat the deputy
clerk of court who notarized the deed of donation in this case was duly
authorized by the clerk of court.
3 . W O N d e e d o f d o n a t i o n co n t r a ve n e s Ar t 13 3 , C C
No. Art 133 provides that every donation between spouses during the
marriage shall be void. This prohibition does notapply when the
donation takes effect after the death of the donor. Neither does this
prohibition apply to moderate gifts whichthe spouses may give each other
on the occasion of any family rejoicing. This prohibition extends to
common-law relations(Matabuena v. Cervantes). In fact, Art 87, FC
provides that every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage,
direct or indirect, between the spouses during the marriage shall be void,
except moderate gifts which the spouses may give eachother on the
occasion of any family rejoicing. The prohibition shall also apply to persons
living together as husband and wifewithout a valid marriage. However, this
point is being raised for the first time in the SC. Litigants cannot raise an
issue for the first time on appeal as this would contravene the basic rules of
fair play and justice.Even assuming that they are not thus precluded,
petitioners were unable to present evidence in support of such a claim.The
evidence on record does not show whether George was married to Maria
and, if so, when the marriage took place. If Maria was not married to
George, evidence should have been presented to show that at the time the
deed of donation wasexecuted, George and Maria were still maintaining
common-law relations. Beatrice taits (one of the witnesses
presented)testimone is only to the effect that in 1941, Maria became their
stepmother. There is no evidence on record that George andMaria
continuously maintained common-law relations until the date when the
donation was made (April 2, 1974)
4.WON the petitioners claim that they only learned of the sales
to the private respondents in 1988 when they visitedMaria
because she was seriously ill is admissible
No. Petitioners waited for twelve years before claiming their inheritance and
are thus guilty of laches which precludes themfrom assailing the donation
made by their father in favor of Maria. Laches is the failure or neglect for an

unreasonable lengthof time to do that which, by exerting due diligence,

could or should have been done earlier.
5.WON Lanoy Takayengs testimony that Georde gave Fani-is
money to purchase the Sum-at property means thatthe money
came from the proceeds of the sale of the Otucan property.
No. Lanoy could not state with certainty when the alleged meeting took
place, the amount of money given by George toFani-is and when
the purchase took place or if the sale was consummated in accordance
with Georges instructions.
Held:
Petitioners have not sufficiently shown the nullity of private respondents
title to the lots purchased by them. Decision of CA affirmed
Rosete vs Provincial Sheriff, 95 Phil 560
The rule in article 1396 of the old Civil Code, now article 148, that property
acquired by one spouse by right of redemption or that which is purchased
with exclusive money belonging to him or her becomes his or her separate
property was applied in the case of Rosete v. Provincial Sheriff of
Zambales. so The facts of this case are that four parcels of land, belonging
to the conjugal partnership, were sold on execution to satisfy the civil
indemnity imposed on the husband who was convicted of murder; that the
wife redeemed two of the said four parcels of land with money which she
borrowed from her father; that after the redemption, the sheriff levied once
more on two of the said four parcels, in order to satisfy the balance of the
indemnity still unpaid; and that the wife contested the right of the sheriff to
make the levy. The question was whether lands redeemed by the wife
became her paraphernal property which cannot be reached to satisfy the
balance of her husband's personal liability. The Supreme Court held that
the lands were paraphernal property of the wife because she redeemed
them as her husband's successor in interest and because property
redeemed by the wife or acquired by her with her own money becomes her
separate property.
Held: The property is now the exclusive
property of the wife by virtue of the right
of redemption as successor in interest of
her husband. It has ceased to be the
property of the judgment debtor. It can
no longer therefore be the subject of

execution under a judgment exclusively

affective the personal liability of the
latter.
Castro vs Miat, 397 SCRA 271
SPOUSES VIRGILIO and MICHELLE CASTRO, MOISES B. MIAT and
ALEXANDER V. MIAT, petitioners, vs. ROMEO V. MIAT, respondent.
PUNO, J.:
FACTS: Father of two children, Moises, widower (wife died in 1978),
originally intended his two properties, one in Paco and the other in
Paranaque for his offspring but reverted to keeping the latter for himself
while in Dubai, UAE. He modified the original agreement upon return to the
Philippines in 1984.
Proof of this was given by Moises brother, Cerefino Miat, who said testified
the original agreement that Paco would go to Moises sons. This was
reiterated at the death bed of Moises wife and affirmed upon Moises
return to the Philippines.
The Paco property, being the land in dispute, was paid for on an installment
basis from May 17, 1977 to December 14, 1984. Full payment was made
on the latter date and title was secured under Moises name as widower.
Romeo and Alexander, sons of Moises, lived on the property with their
wives and paid its realty taxes and fire insurance premiums. Alexander and
his wife, however, left the property in August 1985 for personal reasons.
February 1988, Romeo learns from godmother of his wedding that son of
godmother, Virgilio Castro (VC, petitioner), who happens to be Romeos
neighbor, that the Paco property was being sold to VC. A thirty thousand
peso downpayment was made by godmother to Moises for her son.
April 1988, Alexander agrees to sell his share of the Paco property for
P42,750.00; a partial payment was made in the sum of P6,000 by Romeo
but Alexander did not execute a deed of assignment in favor of his brother
because he had lots of work to do and the title was already in Romeos
possession.
Downpayment information corroborated by Virgilio Miat (brother of Moises)
and Pedro Miranda (who worked with Moises in two hotels: Bayview Hotel
and Hotel Filipinas) but Alexander later said that he did not consider the
money to be a downpayment but a personal debt due to Romeo.
Romeo had possession of the title because he borrowed it from his father
when he mortgaged the land to his friend Lorenzo. But when Moises ran

into financial difficulties, he mortgaged for P30,000.00 the Paco property to

parents of petitioner VC.
December 1, 1988, Romeo and VC met in MTC Manila to discuss status of
Paco property. On the 16th, a letter from petitioners lawyer informed
Romeo that the Paco property had been sold to VC by Moises by virtue of
a deed of sale dated Dec. 5, 1988 for P95,000.00. Buyer, petitioner, VC
admitted that the title of the property was with Romeo but bought it anyway
on the assurance of Moises that hed be able to retrieve it from his son.
Romeo files in the RTC action to nullify sale and compel Moises and
Alexander to execute deed of conveyance/assignment. RTC ordered (1)
Alexander to pay the remaining balance due his brother, (2) Romeo to
recognize sale made by Moises, (3) dismissal of defendants counterclaim
and (4) defendants to pay the costs of suit. Both parties appealed to the CA
which modified the decision by saying that: (1) the deed of sale was
nullified, (2) Moises and Alexander had to execute a deed of conveyance,
and (3) or defendants to pay cost of suit (as applied for by the petitioner).
VC subsequently brings the action to the SC.
ISSUES/HELD/RATIO:
(1) WON Paco property is conjugal or capital.
Although petitioners allege that property was paid for by Moises and at the
time it was paid, his wife had long been dead, the SC disagrees on the
grounds of the new Civil Code (which was applicable because marriage
was celebrated before FC):
Art 153 (1) The following are conjugal partnership property:
(1) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of
the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only
one of the spouses; x x x.
Records show that property was acquired by onerous title during the
marriage out of the common fund. It is clearly conjugal property.
Petitioners also overlook Article 160 of the New Civil Code. It provides that
all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband
or to the wife. This article does not require proof that the property was
acquired with funds of the partnership. The presumption applies even when
the manner in which the property was acquired does not appear.
In the case at bar (as opposed to petitioners reliance on Lorenzo v.
Nicolas), Moises and Concordia bought the Paco property during their
marriage Moises did not bring it into their marriage, hence it has to be
considered as conjugal.

(2) WON valid oral partition between Moises and his sons involving the said
property is valid.
Yes. The validity of the agreement is apparent in (a) latter of the father to
his sons (the one which stated that he didnt favor any of his sons), (b) the
testimony (see above) of Moises brother, Ceferino, and the oral agreement
between the brothers to divide the property between themselves (attested
to by extended Family members).
We also hold that the oral partition between Romeo and Alexander is not
covered by the Statute of Frauds. It is enforceable for two reasons. Firstly,
Alexander accepted the six thousand (P6,000.00) pesos given by Romeo
as downpayment for the purchase of his share in the Paco property.
Secondly, Romeo and his witnesses, Ceferino Miat and Pedro Miranda,
who testified regarding the sale of Alexanders share to Romeo, were
intensely questioned by petitioners counsel.
(3) WON Castro spouses were buyers in good faith.
Ruling of the CA which was affirmed by the SC:
In the case at bench, the said spouses have actual knowledge of the
adverse claim of plaintiff-appellant. The most protuberant index that they
are not buyers in good faith is that before the sale, Virgilio Castro

talked with Romeo Miat on the supposed sale. Virgilio testified that together
with Romeo, Alexander and Moses Miat, they went to Judge Anunciacion of
Manila in order to find out if Romeo has a right over the property. Romeo
told Virgilio in that meeting that Romeo has a right over the Paco property
by virtue of an oral partition and assignment. Virgilio even admitted that he
knew Romeo was in possession of the title and Romeo then insisted that
he is the owner of the property.
Virgilio Castro is further aware that plaintiff is in possession of the property,
they being neighbors. A purchaser who was fully aware of another persons
possession of the lot he purchased cannot successfully pretend to be an
innocent purchaser for value.
Lorenzo vs Nicolas 91 phil 686
Agapito Lorenzo vs. Florencio Nicolas Et Al.
Facts:
Prior to 1910, Magdalena Clemente was the surviving widow of the
deceased Gregorio Nicolas,
Manuel Lorenzo, former husband of the deceased Carlosa Santamaria,
was also at that time a
widower. On January 16, 1910, Magdalena Clemente and Manuel Lorenzo
contracted marriage.
Manuel Lorenzo died on January 7, 1929, while Magdalena died on
January 31, 1934. During
their coverture, the two had no children. In his first marriage, however,
Manuel Lorenzo left, as
heirs, the plaintiffs Agapito and Marcela Lorenzo and Policarpio Lorenzo,
deceased, who had
been succeeded by his children, the plaintiffs Faustina, Federico, Guillermo
and Manuel all
surnamed Lorenzo; while Magdalena Clemente, in her first marriage, left as
heirs, the deceased
Gerardo Nicholas, father of the defendants Florencio, Elena, Felix,
Trinidad, Cecilia and
Basilisa, all surnamed Nicolas.
As to Parcel of land No. 6. This parcel of land which is lot No. 72 of the
Friars Land
Subdivision in Guiguinto, Bulacan, was purchased in her own name by
Magdalena Clemente, for
her own exclusive benefit on October 17, 1908, prior to her marriage with
Manuel Lorenzo. She

had paid the sum of P169.16 on account of the purchase price before her
marriage with Lorenzo
and, according to the terms of the contract of the sale, the balance of
P833.32 was payable on
installments, namely: P25.32 on June 1, 1909, and the balance in annual
payment of P42.00
each, payable on the first day of June of each year, plus interest of 4% per
annum. . The amount
spent for the payments of installments due during the marriage, or
obligations affecting the
separate property of Magdalena Clemente, is certainly a useful
expenditures because it preserves
her right to the ownership of the land, and is, therefore, a credit which
belongs to the conjugal
partnership, and must be reimbursed to it by her.
As to Parcel of land No. 5. This parcel was also purchased by
Magdalena Clemente from the
Bureau of Lands on October 17, 1908 for P967.16, of which amount
P116.84 had previously
been paid by her, before her marriage to Manuel Lorenzo. According to the
terms of the sale, the
balance of P850.32 was payable by installments: namely, P52.32 on June
1, 1909, and P42.00
annually on June 1, of each succeeding year. Payments on account of the
installments were made
by her, the receipts therefor were issued in her own name by the Bureau of
Lands. On October 7,
1933 or 4 years after the death of Manuel Lorenzo, the final, certificate of
sale was executed
by the Director of Lands in her favor and in her name. By virtue thereof,
Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 13269 was issued in the sole name of Magdalena Clemente. The
legal principles
hereinabove discussed apply with equal force to this parcel of land No. 5.
Issue:
Whether or not that parcels of land no. 5 and 6 held to be a paraphernal
properties or exclusive
property of Magdalena Clemente.
Held:

In case of death of a holder of a certificate which is only an agreement to

sell it is not the heirs
but the widow who succeeds in the parcels of land to be sold by the
Government. Only do the
heirs succeed in the rights of the deceased holder of a certificate if no
widow survives him. The
petitioner, the heirs of the late Manuel Lorenzo, are not entitled to one-half
of the two parcels of
land. But the installments paid during coverture are deemed conjugal, there
being no evidence
that they were paid out of funds belonging exclusively to the late
Magdalena Clemente.
Upon these grounds and reasons the judgment of the Court of Appeals
under review is affirmed,
without cost.