SORT

Thucydides
In the Melian dialogue, part of his history of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides relates a
debate over Athens' threat to invade neutral Melos to demonstrate strength. The Melians
present an idealistic appeal to justice, while Athens' argument is starkly realist: relations
between states turn on power, not morality. Thucydides seems take a centrist position.

Machiavelli
Machiavelli is seen to embody the most extreme realism: that of the Athenians in the Melian
dialogue, or Thrasymachus in "The Republic." In "The Prince," he argued that states do and
should act immorally (for he did not reject morality per se) as necessary to achieve state ends,
including power.

Hobbes
Hobbes does not write about IR, but his description of the state of nature as "bellum omnium
contra omnes" has been applied to IR, as has his belief that mankind is inclined to "a
perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that ceaseth only in death."

Morganthau
The father of realism, Morganthau is best known for "Politics Among Nations" (1948), which
argues that statesmen should think in terms of national interest, or "power among powers."
Morality cannot be applied to state actions because a state has an obligation to its own citizens
to prioritize survival.

classical realism
Born in the interwar period as a response to post-WWI idealism. Leading figures included
Niebuhr, Morganthau and Carr. Rejected the "utopian" idealist belief that institutions like the
League of Nations could end war. Three core assumptions: (1) sovereign states are the
essential units of IR; (2) the international sphere is anarchic; and (3) every state is on its own
("self-help").

Waltz as neorealist
Waltz is the founder of neorealism, a response to the liberal challenge that arose with the
postwar rise of international bodies and NGOs. "Theory of International Politics" (1979)
reiterated the classical assumption of anarchy, but argued that states are "fundamentally
undifferentiated," and can be expected to act similarly regardless of culture, ideology, etc.
(Waltz also argued, contra Morganthau and Mearsheimer, that security is the end sought by
states, and power is just one means to that end.)

neorealism
Also known as structural realism, and subdivided into "offensive" and "defensive" branches,
neorealism begins with Waltz's "Theory of International Politics" (1979). It addresses
omissions in classical realism, and doesn't focus on human nature. Some key assumptions:
regime type has little to no effect on IR; war is inevitable; anarchy is the ordering principle of
the international system, constraining states and limiting their cooperation.

bandwagoning
From Waltz's "Theories of International Politics," a situation in which a weaker state aligns
with a stronger one. Schweller argues that weak states bandwagon primarily with the goal of

achieving new gains; Walt, on the other hand, argues that they generally do so to preserve
what they have (i.e., out of fear). Bandwagoning can be contrasted with balancing against a
stronger state. See Finlandization for an example.

unipolarity
Unipolarity exists when there is an anarchic interstate system in which one power faces no
competition. Wohlforth argues unipolarity is peaceful because there is no competition for
hegemony, and it reduces the stakes of balance of power struggles between other nations
(related to hegemonic stability theory).

hegemonic stability theory

The theory that the international system is more likely to remain stable when there is a single
dominant nation-state. Gilpin, a classical realist, argues that a liberal international order
requires the hegemony of a single power (e.g., Britain and US).

unipolar illusion
Layne argues against what he calls "hegemonic exceptionalism," the idea that the US need not
worry about other powers balancing against it, which overlooks subtler balancing by
secondary powers.

defensive realism
Defensive realists -- including Walt, Waltz and Van Evera -- say states are obsessed with
security, which can lead to security dilemmas and thus war. They differ from offensive realists
in believing that states often seek to maximize security (which can be achieved) rather than
relative power; in addition, they are more open to the idea that domestic politics matter (in
contrast with the idea of states as black boxes).

structural realism
See neorealism.

multipolar stability
Classical realists like Carr and Morganthau believed multipolarity is more stable than
bipolarity. Deutsch and Singer (1964) argue that this is because powers have more incentive
and opportunity for cooperation, and their attentions are divided. The Concert of Europe, from
the Napoleonic to Crimean wars, is often cited as an example of multipolarity. Waltz -- like
other Cold War writers -- says bipolarity is more stable, as multipolarity creates more
opportunities for misunderstanding.

power cycle theory

Doran's power cycle theory focuses on the trajectories of major powers, the velocity of these
trajectories, their location on a "cycle" of state power, and how all of these things affect the
conduct of the subject state and of other states. Trajectories often shift quickly, creating
instability, and certain points on the cycle are particularly conducive to radical structural
change.

Mearsheimer
The leading offensive realist, Mearsheimer argues (e.g., in "The False Promise of
International Institutions") that institutions have little effect on state action or stability.

The Anarchical Society

This 1977 book by Headley Bull is the founding text of the so-called English School of IR
theory, which accepts the anarchy posited by realists but adds the idea of an international
society. It also includes Bull's new medievalism idea.

The Clash of Civilizations

In a lecture, article and book, Huntington argued that conflict in the post-Cold War era would
break down along civilizational lines. Culture and religion, not ideology or economics, would
predominate. Kingdoms and ideologies had warred within the West, but a new stage in history
has brought about a new fundamental dynamic.

Man, the State and War

Waltz's 1959 book describes (w/ reference to a range of political philosophers) three "images"
of the origins of war: (1) human behavior (e.g., acquisitiveness, aggression, mistake), which
suggests man must be remade to end war; (2) the internal organization of states, which
suggests war can be avoided of individual states are reformed; and (3) international anarchy.
Waltz says the third image describes the framework of world politics, but that the other two
are also important to appreciate.

The Tragedy of Great Power Politics

Mearsheimer's 2001 book sets forth his theory of offensive realism. The "tragedy" is that great
power conflict will never end, as states constantly seek to expand their influence to improve
their security. The book argues for the supremacy of land power, and introduces the idea of
"the stopping power of water," which limits global hegemony.

Politics Among Nations

Morganthau's 1948 book introduces his classical realist theory: morals cannot be applied to
the actions of states, and the statesman must always think in terms of national interest, defined
as power among other powers.

Theory of International Politics

Waltz's 1979 book is the seminal neorealist text.

English School
Associated with Bull's "The Anarchical Society" (1977), this school holds that despite the
anarchic nature of the international system, there is a "society of states," which creates rules
based on shared fears (e.g., unrestricted violence). Sets a middle path between Hobbesian
realism and Kantian "world society," or between realism and liberalism.

deterrence theory
Deterrence is any strategy designed to dissuade an adversary from taking an action not yet
started. Schelling's "Arms and Influence" (1966) proposed that with the introduction of
nuclear weapons, the ability to achieve military victory is now less important than the ability
to successfully deter rivals. Deterrence must be credible to be effective.

critical theory
This includes positivist (e.g., Marxist and neo-Marxist) critiques of the theoretical and
political status quo, as well as "post-positivist" critiques from feminists, post-colonialists,
neo-Gramscians, etc.

brinkmanship

Pushing events to the brink of disaster to achieve a desired outcome. Most famous example is
the Cuban Missile Crisis.

behavioralism
This is apparently the view that IR can be studied in the manner of a natural science.

balance of power
The theory that security is enhanced when military power is distributed so that no one state is
able to dominate all others. It predicts that if one state does appear to be gaining
disproportionate power, others will either balance against it or bandwagon with it. If everyone
bandwagons, the world becomes less secure, as nobody checks the rising power. Chainganging with an ally may increase security (via deterrence) or reduce security (WWI).
Balance of power is how realists explain alliance formation.

Keohane
Keohane is the father of neoliberal institutionalism. He applies rational choice theory and
game theory to show that cooperation in the international sphere is often rational.
Neoliberalism is thereby distinguished from idealism, which says that states should act based
on morality independent of interest.

Westphalian system
The Peace of Westphalia, in 1648, ended the Thirty and Eighty Years Wars, creating the idea
of formally equal sovereign nation states with sole jurisdiction over their own affairs. This
was bolstered by the rise of nationalism in the 19th century.

After Hegemony
Keohane's 1984 book is the great statement of neoliberalism. It adopts a rational choice
model, but argues that rational choice does not necessarily lead to conflict or hegemony, as
realists have said. At the same time, it disregards the liberal tendency to explain cooperation
in terms of idealism rather than rational choice.

idealism
Also known as Wilsonianism, this is the idea that a state should make its internal political
ideology manifest in its foreign policy. Idealists believe in the possibility of an improved
international system: progress. This is a precursor to liberalism, but has no necessary leftliberal valence, nor is it necessarily entirely at odds with realism (see neoconservatism, which
was certainly not institutionalist), although self-described realists don't like the moralism of
idealist foreign policy.

In Defense of the National Interest

Morganthau's 1951 book calls for Americans to embrace "national interest" in formulating
foreign policy, and critiques Wilsonianism.

lateral pressure theory

Lateral pressure attempts to explain the ways in which states act outside of their established
borders (that is, exert lateral pressure), where they find themselves in competition with other
states. It posits a close and possibly consistent relationship between a state's internal economic
condition and its actions outside its borders.

Neo-Gramscianism

Rejects a stark agent-structure distinction, seeing the two as intertwined, and considers state
formation as a part of transnational class formation. Gramsci himself was known for his
Marxist theory of cultural hegemony (the ruling class manipulates the prevailing culture to
safeguard the status quo). Neo-Gramscianism in IR defines hegemony as class hegemony, and
says a transnational neoliberal historic bloc now exists.

neo-neo synthesis
Neoliberalism and neorealism are said to have converged since the 1970s. This term is used
derogatorily by liberals who seek to combat the work of Keohane, who is believed to have
moved neoliberalism in a realist direction.

neoliberalism (IR)
Associated with Keohane and Nye, neoliberalism says that states should be concerned with
absolute rather than relative gains in the international arena. But it is similar to neorealism in
considering states and their interests to be at the core of international relations, and in seeing
the international sphere as anarchic. But it defines state interest more broadly, and allows
more opportunities for non-zero-sum competition.

new medievalism
A term coined by Bull in "The Anarchical Society" (1977) to describe the erosion of state
sovereignty in the globalized world. This includes the growth of regional organizations as
well as subnational governments (e.g., Scotland and Catalonia), as well as the increasing
significance of multinational corporations and worldwide religious movements (e.g., political
Islam). All of this challenges the exclusive authority of the state.

nuclear peace
An idea associated with neorealist founder Waltz, who posits that more nuclear states may, in
fact, help guarantee peace. Others critique this view by observing that there is greater risk of
deliberate or accidental nuclear war, or theft by terrorists.

offshore balancing
A strategic concept derived from realism (Mearsheimer), whereby a great power uses a
regional power to check the rise of another power threatening regional hegemony. Examples:
US lend-lease aid to Britain in the 1930s; US support for Iraq in the Iran-Iraq War.

offensive realism
Offensive realism, associated with Mearsheimer, is a response to the "status quo bias" of
Waltz's defensive realism, which posits that states will seek a balance of power to protect their
existing position in the international system. Mearshimer argues states will attempt to
maximize power to the point of hegemony, as hegemony is the greatest possible guarantor of
security.

omnilateralism
Refers to something above and beyond multilateral institutions, such as a more
comprehensive global government, or a view of the world that incorporates NGOs and civil
societies working across borders and with interests distinct from those of states.

positivism (IR)

Non-normative, empiricist IR theory (as contrasted with post-positivism, which says IR

theory should be normative and should focus on issues of gender and race alongside
diplomacy and war).

Wallerstein
Immanuel Wallerstein is credited with founding world-systems theory (or, in his terms,
analysis). It is materialist in nature, and draws heavily on dependency theory. He argues that
the existing capitalist world system does not represent progress over existing systems, that
there will be no convergence between peripheral and core states (the periphery being
necessary for the wealth of the core states), and downplays the significance of culture in favor
of economics.

world-systems theory
The view that the world system, rather than nation-states, should be the primary unit of social
analysis. It divides the world into core, peripheral and semi-peripheral states, based on the
division of labor. Wallerstein, who created WST in response to modernization theory (with its
focus on nation-states), argues for "world systems analysis" as a better term. WST is related to
dependency theory and Marxism.

Copenhagen School
Emphasizes social (non-military) aspects of security. Associated with the idea of
"securitization": the transformation of political questions into security questions by labeling.
Includes the idea of regional security complexes: that security threats tend to be clustered
within geographical regions. On this theory, regions are mini-systems in which all other IR
theories can be applied.

Marxism in IR
Marxists reject the realist-liberal dispute over state competition versus cooperation, and
instead focus on material conditions and economics as the driving force. The international
system functions for the benefit of the capitalist class, rather than any particular nation.
Closely related to dependency theory and world-systems theory.

imperialism (Marxist view)

Marxists believe that imperialism was the inevitable result of capitalism, which forced
capitalists look abroad to secure resources, markets and investments.

imperialism vs. colonialism

The former is necessarily a concerted effort driven from the center; the latter may simply take
the form of undirected colonization for settlement or commerce.

just war theory

Beginning with Augustine and Aquinas, Catholic theologians began to investigate the idea of
"bellum iustum," which includes the concepts of "jus ad bellum" (justice of initiating war) and
"jus in bello" (conduct in war). Recent contributors have included Niebuhr, Walzer.

legal positivism (IR)

The validity of a law depends on its source, not its merit. Austin's positivism required a
sovereign who issued commands, which led him to question the validity of international law.
Hart added primary and secondary rules, and the internal and external components of rules
and law. Still, legal positivism places international law on a weak foundation.


modernization theory
This theory attempts to determine the characteristics and factors with societies that lead to
economic development, on the belief that underdeveloped countries may experience the same
development process as wealthier ones. It is criticized by world-system and dependency
theorists, who see the maintenance of a "periphery" of poor states as essential to the "core."

power transition theory

Introduced in Organski's "World Politics" (1958), this is the view that war is cyclical, and that
the risk of war is greatest at a time when a challenger to the dominant world power emerges
and seeks to alter the existing international system. Shifting and even distribution of power
and resources is more likely to lead to war, while stable and unequal distributions are more
conducive to peace. A hegemonic power is challenged by a rising great power in cycles of 6090 years.

security dilemma
Strongly identified with neorealism and particularly defensive realism.

supranationalism
A supranational union is a polity lying somewhere between one which is merely a
confederation of states, and one which can be described as a single federated state.
Supranationalism can be contrasted with intergovernmentalism, which accords greater power
to governments.

Schelling
Nobel Prize-winning economist known for his applications of game theory to IR, and
especially his development of deterrence theory in the nuclear age.

The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers

First published in 1987, Kennedy's book argues that power correlates with access to resources
and economic strength, and that decline is often precipitated by military overreach. A nation's
economic trajectory relative to other powers during peacetime is as important as how it fights
during wartime. Kennedy predicts that a combination of slowing growth and military
overreach will lead to US decline.

Guns, Germs and Steel

First published in 1997, Diamond's book argues that gaps in power and technology between
Eurasian and other civilizations result from environmental and geographic differences. Not
ingenuity but opportunity and necessity drove Eurasian success.

Aron
Aron was skeptical that a "science" of IR could ever be achieved. His own view was critical
of both Machiavellians, who allow any action in service of state ends, and idealists, who
imagine that foreign policy can be overcome.

Kant
The original liberal thinker. His "Perpetual Peace" (1795) says peace can be achieved when
states abolish standing armies, practice noninterference and nonaggression, etc. This requires
every state to be republican (a precursor to democratic peace theory), and that there be a
federation of free states.


Mackinder
Mackinder was a geographer who proposed a "World Island" comprising Eurasia and North
Africa, with offshore islands like Britain and Japan, and outlying islands in the Americas and
Australia. His "Heartland" lay at the center of the world island, mostly in present-day Russia.
He argued that control of the "Heartland" is control of the "World Island," which in turn is
control of the world. It puts land power above sea power.

Mahan
Alfred Thayer Mahan was an American naval theorist who argued that Britain's control of the
seas, and the corresponding decline of other European navies, had led to its rise to the top of
world economic as well as power. Mahan argued for the importance of a network of naval
bases around the world, and that naval strength is needed to secure access to international
markets.

Clausewitz
In "On War" (1832), Clausewitz argued that war has no purpose of its own, and is rather the
continuation of politics by other means. All else being equal, war will favor the side that is
better prepared, physically and psychologically, and also tends to favor defenders. Greatly
influenced Lenin and Mao, in particular. Advanced a realist power-politics perspective of
perpetual struggle, and zero-sum conception of international relations.

functionalism
Arose during the interwar years -- see, e.g., Wilson's Fourteen Points. Leans towards
transnational government and the decline of strong sovereignty (Kant), and analyzes the role
of common interests and non-state actors. Neofunctionalism, based on the work of Haas,
attempts to bring back functionalism in a regional (rather than global) context.

mercantilism
The view that government control of trade is vitally important to military security, and that a
positive balance of trade (i.e., net exporter status) must be maintained. High tariffs and
imperial expansion are associated with mercantilism, as was accumulation of precious metals
(even to the point where they were barred from export). It was embraced by most European
powers, and was a form of economic warfare, in which total world trade was imagined as
fixed. Adam Smith was a major and early critic.

dependency theory
The idea, associated with world-systems theory, that resources flow to a "core" of wealthy
states from a "periphery" of poorer ones. It emerged as a reaction to modernization theory,
and is associated with world-systems theory.

regime theory
Regime theory, closely associated with liberalism and neoliberalism, holds that international
institutions or "regimes" can affect state behavior, and that cooperation is possible even in the
anarchic world system (as the existence of regimes itself indicates).

A.J.P. Taylor
In "War by Timetable" (1969), Taylor argued that none of the great powers sought war prior to
1914, but developed elaborate mobilization timetables to deter enemy attack. This created
inexorable movement towards a war that none of Europe's leaders actually sought.


After Hegemony
Keohane's "After Hegemony" (1989) is the leading text of neoliberalism. International
regimes are not weak substitutes for world government, but devices for facilitating
decentralized cooperation between self-interested actors.

Nye
Nye is generally as the founder, with Keohane, of neoliberalism in their 1977 book "Power
and Interdependence." He is also known as the originator of "soft power" and "smart power."

Power and Interdependence

This 1977 book by Nye and Keohane is considered a classic of neoliberalism. It introduces
the idea of "complex interdependence" between states.

The End of History

In "The End of History and the Last Man" (1992), Fukuyama suggested that Western liberal
democracy might be the endpoint of mankind's ideological evolution. This Hegelian /
teleological view does not say all rivals to liberalism have been defeated in practice, but
suggests no universalistic rival political theory exists or will emerge. Critics cite, inter alia,
the persistence of cultural differences and resulting strife.

terrorism
Cronin discusses the effect of globalization on terrorism around the world, and the challenges
that it poses for enforcement; she calls for greater coordination. Hoffman discusses the history
of the word "terrorism," which has its origins in the French Revolution, and attempts a clear
definition: "deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of
violence in the pursuit of political change."

democratic peace theory

The democratic (or liberal) peace theory posits that democracies are hesitant to go to war with
other states they recognize as democratic or liberal (i.e., enlightened). Its roots go back to
Kant and Payne, but its best-known recent proponent is Michael Doyle. There is a debate
about the roots of the (democratic norms and ideology vs. institutions, or both), while critics
doubt the available evidence. Theory is at odds w/ realism, which says regime types are
essentially irrelevant. Posits rising powers that are democratic are viewed as less threatening.

commercial peace theory

Commercial peace theory, or commercial liberalism, is the belief that free trade and economic
interdependence are the road to peace; it is at the heart of many Western nations' foreign
policy. Associated with Schumpeter.

Schumpeter
In "State Imperialism and Capitalism" (1919), Schumpeter says imperialism is objectless
expansion, driven by a "warrior" class that was initially created to defend the state, but must
justify its existence via various exaggerated crises. This is a social-psychological theory of
imperialism, rather than a materialist theory. (Contrast w/ Lenin's "Imperialism, the Highest
Stage of Capitalism.")

agent-structure problem

In many social sciences, there is disagreement about the role of agency vs. structure in
shaping behavior. Wendt says both neorealism and world-systems theory are structuralist, in
that they see the world structure as constraining state actors. But neorealism envisions the
actors as existing prior to that structure, whereas WST sees actors as products of the world
(capitalist) system. Wendt argues against both, each of which makes the mistake of trying to
find a primitive unit.

Friedberg on China
Friedberg combines realism and liberalism to arrive at a positive-sum theory of IR. He does
not see conflict with China as inevitable, and thinks security dilemmas can be managed via
international institutions. China's goal, he says, is to "win without fighting," displacing the US
as East Asia's preeminent power without war.

Kagan
In "Power and Weakness" (2002) Kagan contrasts Kantian Europeans, who prefer
multilateralism, international law and institutions, with Hobbesian Americans, more likely to
see a need to act unilaterally or use military force. Kagan argues the European perspective is
flawed, insofar as it derives partly from European weakness, and fails to recognize advantages
accorded by US military protection.

Kaplan
In "The Coming Anarchy" (1994), Kaplan argues that the post-Cold War era will be
characterized by increasing conflict over limited resources, driven by ethnic rivalry and state
decline. Fukuyama's Last Man may exist in developed nations; the rest of the world will be
the land of Hobbes's First Man. Kaplan cites Huntington to say that culture clash will replace
ideological and state conflict, and Anderson, for the point that states are a recent phenomenon.

Jervis
In "War and Misperception" (1988), he argues war almost always stems from misperception:
overestimating a rival's hostility, and underrating his capability. In "From Balance to Concert"
(1985), he notes differences between former and latter, a true concert (i.e., one that actually
alters states' perceptions of self interest) having existed only for short periods in history. WWI
and WWII produced concerts lasting only a single year, before at least one major power opted
out.

lessons of Munich
Traditionally, "the lesson of Munich" was that enemies will interpret restraint as proof of a
lack of will or capability. Beck's "Munich's Lessons Reconsidered" looks at the various ways
in which this historical example has been interpreted and used.

groupthink
Although realists see the state as a "black box," some IR theorists have begun to look at the
role of human psychology in IR. Janis, e.g., has written on groupthink, the phenomenon
whereby desire for harmony or conformity within a group leads to an undesirable outcome.

IR as an "American" social science

In 1977, Hoffmann argued that IR had developed in the US after WWII because the US had
risen to preeminence, faced a rival in the USSR, and was looking for an intellectual compass.
Hoffmann said that this was also a product of institutional factors in the US. He noted it had
led to near-total US dominance of IR, with a bias towards neorealism.


Arms and Influence
A 1966 book by Schelling, in which he proposes that in the nuclear age, military power is less
important in practice than as a threat. It is bargaining power, to be used in "the diplomacy of
violence." He argues, with reference to the Berlin airlift and Cuban missile crisis, that recent
US history illustrates the importance of signaling and coercion (in contrast with actual tactical
military advantage) in our foreign policy.

E.H. Carr
In "The Twenty Years Crisis" (1939), Carr examined the previous two decades of IR. He
criticized the "utopianism" of idealists who failed to realize that IR is characterized by
incessant struggle between "have" and "have not" nations. Carr argued against the idea that a
"harmony of interests" between nations will render power politics obsolete. He later became a
Marxist.

Wendt
In "Anarchy is What States Make of It" (1992), Alexander Wendt kicked off the constructivist
movement, which critiques both neorealism and neoliberalism as excessively materialist. It
identifies the interests of international actors as determined by shared ideas -- and not simply
power as defined in fixed, and usually materialist, terms (whether military or economic).

constructivism
The 1990s-era theory that the international system is historically and socially constructed, and
that interactions between states depend on norms, ideas and identities ("social facts"). This
can be contrasted with the neorealist view that the anarchic structure of the international
system determines state interaction, and also stands in opposition to rational actor
assumptions and any form of materialism. Key theorists include Wendt and Ruggie.

institutionalism
A broad category encompassing a number of other schools of thought (including
functionalism, neofunctionalism, regime theory), and related to neorealism and neoliberalism.
It argues for the significance of the structure of the international system in affecting state
behavior, and can thus be contrasted with the pure realist view that the international system is
necessarily anarchic.

Haas
German-born founder of neofunctionalism, which recognizes the importance of nation-states,
but also emphasizes the role of regional interest groups and bureaucracies. Haas sought to
explain growing regional integration, especially in Europe.

Kennan
A classical realist, Kennan was anti-Wilsonian, and believed that the US had wrongly entered
the Cold War with a utopian, legalistic, self-righteous and moralizing outlook. He authored
containment, which posited that the US should focus on arresting the spread of communism,
creating a "cordon sanitaire" around the Soviets. Intermediate between rollback and
appeasement; emphasized the protection of industrial centers (not the whole world) and the
division of communist world.

Melian dialogue

In the Melian dialogue, part of his history of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides relates a
debate over Athens' threat to invade neutral Melos to demonstrate strength. The Melians
present an idealistic appeal to justice, while Athens' argument is starkly realist: relations
between states turn on power, not morality. Thucydides appears to take an intermediate
position.

Morganthau's six principles of political realism

From the second edition of "Politics Among Nations": (1) it is possible to identify laws of IR
stemming from immutable human nature; (2) by emphasizing power, realism enables a
rational, objective theory of IR; (3) power is the control of man over man; (4) realism is aware
of the moral significance of political action (and tensions this creates); (5) moral rules
governing individuals do not govern state action; and (6) the political sphere is autonomous,
and can be abstracted from other spheres of human life.

soft power
The ability to co-opt and attract rather than coerce. This stems not only from a state's public
diplomacy, but culture, ideals, norms and other components of reputation.

absolute vs. relative gains

Liberals generally believe states seek to maximize absolute economic and security gains,
while realists believe states attempt to maximize their relative power vis-a-vis other states.
Liberals emphasize the availability of non-zero-sum outcomes in the international system;
realists see more zero-sum competition.

preemptive vs. preventative war

A preemptive war is a first strike in the face of an imminent attack; a preventative war, on the
other hand, is undertaken to prevent a future attack without evidence that such an attack is
necessarily imminent.

chain ganging
The creation of alliances which elevate the risk of a multinational conflict (e.g., WWI).

buck passing
Waiting for another state to take action against a shared threat. This can create problems
(nobody wanted to confront Nazi Germany in the 1930s), but can also yield advantages to an
individual state (the US benefitted from entering the war later).

billiard ball model

The realist theory of interstate relations has been described as a "billiard ball" model, in
contrast with the "cobweb" model preferred by liberals.

Mearsheimer on China
Mearsheimer believes that major powers will always seek to establish hegemony over their
own region, while preventing other powers from establishing hegemony elsewhere, and the
goal of every state is to maximize its share of world power. States do not merely want to be
the greatest power, but the global hegemony. Like '30s Japan, China will seek its own Monroe
Doctrine, while other regional powers will align w/ US to balance against its rise.

Ikenberry on China

He argues that rising states, including China, may still have an interest in living in a liberal
international order, to which they owe their success and in which they are now stakeholders.
Even non-democracies have an interest in frameworks like the WTO, which they can use to
shield their interests. China is not necessarily a revisionist state bent on overturning the
system. He cites Japan's rise as illustrative.

balance vs. concert

In "From Balance to Concert" (1985), Jervis notes differences between former and latter, a
true concert (i.e., one that actually alters states' perceptions of self interest) having existed
only for short periods in history. WWI and WWII produced concerts lasting only a single
year, before at least one major power opted out.

neoconservatism and democratic peace

Transitions to democracy are often characterized by turmoil, which calls into question
whether forced regime change to achieve democratic peace is a good idea.

Machtpolitik
Power politics: i.e., when sovereign states attempt to achieve their desired ends by threatening
one another with military, economic or political aggression.

Realist-Idealist Great Debate

In the 1930s, realists and idealists debated how to respond to Germany's rise, with the latter
pushing for institutions like the League of Nations.

reflectivism
A broad term for those opposing rational choice theory as applied to IR, and even positivism
more broadly. It incorporates the view that institutions shape actors, as well as actors
institutions.

rationalism in IR
Those who adopt a rational-choice model for analysis of IR include realists, neorealists,
liberals, neoliberals and anyone using game theory.

power, per Morganthau

Anything used to extend control over others. The capacity of one actor to make another do
what it wants.

first fundamental claim of realism

IR has laws that are objective and unchanging, because they are based on human nature. As a
result, the study of history is vitally important.

the neorealist "system"

Neorealism differs from classical realism in its emphasis on the international "system" -- i.e.,
the relationship between two or more states interacting with one another. The system is an
important part of what determines state actions. And the ordering principle of the system is
anarchy.

the appeal of realism

(1) Focuses exclusively on IR, not domestic politics; (2) it's a simple explanation of war and
state interaction; (3) it's abstract and big picture rather than specific to individual state
relationships.

hegemony and public good

Security is a public good. In a hegemonic system, the cost of this public good is incurred by
the hegemon.

four big changes in technology

(1) Gunpowder (16th century; France, Spain and later Britain rise); (2) industrial revolution
(18th century; invention of the steam engine in 1781 allows for extra-regional competition;
Prussia and Russia rise, culminating in WWI); (3) second industrial revolution (19th century);
(4) information revolution. The first three of these all benefitted larger powers.

four strains / themes of liberalism

(1) Individual (cooperation is possible because people are not as selfish as realists claim); (2)
commercial (cooperation occurs through trade, which makes war less likely); (3) democratic
(democratic peace theory); and (4) international (regimes and institutions can promote peace).

realist and liberal views of history

The former views history as a good guide because IR dynamics are essentially static; the latter
looks to history for signs of progress.

regime (liberalism)
This refers to any general pattern of international activity following a set of rules.

institution (liberalism)
An arrangement created by states that sets forth rules AND procedures.

means by which institutions affect state behavior

(1) Reduce uncertainty; (2) reduce transaction costs; (3) solve collective action problem.

reconciling realism and liberalism

One way to reconcile these is to say that the former explains conflict, while the latter explains
cooperation.

constructivism and anarchy

Constructivism doesn't say that the international sphere isn't anarchic, but rather that this
anarchy is created by states.

organizational process theory

A challenge to state rationality based on the idea that states are not unitary, but divided into
units that defend their own turf and are not in tune with state interests.

bureaucratic actor model

A challenge to state rationality based on the idea that state actions are the product of
bureaucratic negotiation.

direct deterrence
Deterrence of an attack on oneself.


extended deterrence
Deterrence of an attack on others.

immediate deterrence
Deterrence of an action that may be about to happen.

general deterrence
Deterrence not attached to a specific issue.

deterrence by denial
Demonstrating to an enemy that its goals cannot be achieved -- usually by increasing one's
own defensive capabilities.

second-strike capabilities and stability

According to Waltz, second-strike capabilities are an important source of security because
they mean that no state will be able to destroy another with nuclear weapons but not be hit
back. This reduces any incentive to use such weapons offensively.

Napoleon's invasion of Russia (1812)

Napoleon realized he could not beat Britain militarily, so he sought to create a Continental
Blockade. When Russia refused to cooperate, he invaded.

Congress of Vienna (1814-1815)

This was an attempt by the Great Powers (Austria, France, Britain, Russia, Prussia) to resolve
issues arising from the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars, as well as the breakup of the
Holy Roman Empire. Created spheres of influence. Prussia and Russia split Poland, more or
less. France is not harshly punished, and Britain is given overseas territories. Recurring
meetings under a grand alliance. Kissinger wrote his doctoral thesis on the Congress.

path to WWI alliances

Germany was unified in 1871, after Prussia had defeated France in the Franco-Prussian War.
France and Russia become allies; Germany responds w/ Schlieffen Plan (get France first, then
slower-to-mobilize Russia). It also begins developing a navy and seeking overseas
possessions (1890s). France and UK sign Entente Cordiale in 1904, strengthened by
subsequent Morocco Crisis. By 1907, alliances are set.

Bismark
1871-1890. PM of Prussia.

immediate origins of WWI (1914)

Ferdinand is killed in Sarajevo in 1914. Austria-Hungary, allied w/ Germany, declares war on
Serbia. Russia declares war on Austria. Germany declares war on Russia -- but in keeping
with Schlieffen, need to hit allied France first, and thus declare war.

realism and WWI

Classical realists see Germany's rise as the proximate cause of the war: a shift in the balance
of power. Neorealists emphasize the insecurity created by this rise, which led to the creation
of alliances; on this model, war is a part of the balancing act. Constructivists posit a "cult of
the offensive": a faith that attackers would be triumphant.


realism and Clash of Civilizations
The "clash" thesis is essentially realist, but changes the basic units.

G-Zero
The idea that the G7 and even G20 are growing less relevant, and that there is an emerging
vacuum of international power. It posits developing nations will focus on domestic power, and
will not seek to become major international players.

failure of theory
IR theories are held to have failed to predict the end of the Cold War.