The Early US Navy:

Private and Public Provisioning

Christopher L. Anderson
Abstract: This inquiry seeks to establish that many of the U.S. Navy Warships were
privately provisioned for the Quasi War with France of 1798-1800 but the most
successful Warships of the War of 1812 were publicly provisioned. Private provisioning
during the Quasi War succeeded for a small scale undeclared war against privateers, but a
war against a nation with a superior navy required publicly provisioned and innovatively
designed warships. These publicly provisioned warships offered a strategic military
advantage to the vastly outnumbered US Navy. The six heavy frigates designed by
Joshua Humphreys succeed in defeating the Royal Navys aura of invincibility if not the
Royal Navy itself.

Keywords: Private Provisioning, Public Provisioning, US Navy, War of 1812, Quasi War,
Frigates

JEL Classifications Codes: H56, H57, N41, N43

This inquiry seeks to establish that many of the U.S. Navy Warships were privately
provisioned for the Quasi War with France of 1798-1800 but the most successful
Warships of the War of 1812 were publicly provisioned. In the Quasi War, merchants
contracted for and built many warships for the U.S. Navy primarily to protect their own
commercial interests. In the War of 1812, the most successful and strategically
advantageous ships were a new class of heavy frigates. These heavy frigates were
designed specifically for potential conflicts with England and France, showing how
public provisioning was critical for strategic naval success in this later war.

The Private Provisioning of U.S. Warships in the Quasi War of 1798-1800

In Privately Funded and Built U.S. Warships in the Quasi-War of 1797-1801, Larry J.
Sechrest argues that government need not solely provide public defense services.
Sechrest (2007, 101) first argues that private warships engaged in privateering are an
example of privately financed war assets used against rival nations merchant ships.
Sechrest (2007, 112) further claims that large capital projects, such as the construction of
naval warships, permit private provisioning; moreover, Sechrest questions the need to use
taxes to fund public goods projects in general.
Sechrest (2007, 102) writes that in 1796 the United States aligned itself with
England and against France under a new treaty. Quickly after this, French naval and
privateering vessels began to seize American cargo ships and even attacked an English
ship inside the Charleston harbor. Next, Sechrest (2007, 103) argues that while the
authorities attempted to ban trade with France, private citizens spontaneously funded
warships to protect American property at sea. The original goal in the construction of

these warships was to protect American interests at sea, and many of the private citizens
funding these ships were the very ship-owners whose property the French attacked.
According to Sechrest (2007, 103), the French captured 316 vessels between October
1796 and a year later and shipping insurance rates soared during this time to reflect the
very real danger of losing a commercial vessel at that time.
Sechrest (2007, 103-104) details that the U.S. Navy barely existed at all during
the initial French attacks. In 1785, the last U.S. navy vessel was sold away. Congress
later funded six heavy frigates for the navy, but by 1797 only three had launched. These
ships were the Constellation, the United States, and the Constitution. By mid-1798
however, none of these vessels was available or equipped for immediate naval service.
According to Sechrest (2007, 104) private citizens then funded, designed, built and
outfitted vessels for the U.S. Navy that later were transferred to public property. Many
historical accounts view these initiatives as initially sponsored by the Act of June 30
1798, which defined compensation to private citizens at 6% interest for completed
warships. Sechrest instead argues that the initiative was bottom-up and not top-down,
showing that the bill had not passed before the ship subscriptions were contracted and in
full swing in many port cities including Newburyport, New York and Philadelphia.
Sechrest (2007, 105) further argues that the private provisioning of naval ships
was very unlikely political rent seeking at the time, and he offers two primary reasons for
this belief. First, the timing just does not work out. For example, the Merrimack, a
sloop-of-war, was contracted for and committed to before the act offering reimbursement
had passed. Second, the compensation for the ships was below market rates of interest.
Sechrest (2007, 105) claims that the private provisioning was not motivated by a profit

potential but instead by anger at the French attacks and a patriotic desire to defend the
commerce of the United States. Sechrest (2007, 106) quotes naval Historian Donald L.
Canney who also believes that the provisioning of these ships did in fact flow from the
private sector to the public sector. Andrew M. Swan similarly argues that Congress
responded to the merchants in the contracting and building of these naval warships, not
the other way around.
Next, Sechrest (2007, 108-109) addresses the types of naval ships in use during
the early 19th century and details what types of ships were privately provisioned for the
Quasi War. The largest military ships of the time were the ships-of-the-line, akin to
battleships of later wars and by far the most expensive and largest ships of the era. Until
sometime after the War of 1812 ended however, the U.S. did not posses any ships-of-theline. After ships-of-the-line, the frigates were the next largest and powerful ships. The
power projection of these frigates was based on the number of naval guns on-board
shooting various sizes of shot, typically from 12 to 24 pounders. Frigates typically
carried between 24 and 60 guns compared to the 64-120 guns of ships-of-the-line.
Frigates combined power and speed, and often acted as scouts for larger battle fleets,
escorts for merchant ships, or as independent agents. By 1800, the most powerful ships
in the U.S. Navy were the three 44-gun heavy frigates, the Constitution, the President,
and the United States. The next smaller classes of warships below frigates were the
sloops-of-war. Sloops-of-war functioned similarly to frigates, but were smaller, faster,
and cheaper. Sloops-of-war were designed to be powerful enough to handle merchant
ships and fast enough to run away from frigates and ships-of-the-line which greatly
outgunned them.

Sechrest (2007, 108-109) writes that all the privately provisioned ships started in
1798 for the Quasi War was sloops-of-war or frigates. At the time, sixty-five percent of
the frigates in the U.S. Navy for the Quasi War were privately provisioned, and all four
of the sloops-of-war were. Eight out of the nine frigates were small or medium frigates,
with only one, the Philadelphia a heavy frigate originally of 44 guns (and later
reclassified to 36). The threat during the war was French privateers, and larger ships
such as heavy frigates were not ideal for this type of action. Protecting merchants
required smaller and faster ships.
Sechrest (2007, 111-112) continues to detail how the innovations of the designers
of the privately provisioned ships focused primarily on speed, and how this was quite
successful against privateers and later merchant ships of other nations. The Essex lasted
from the Quasi War into the War of 1812 were it dealt serious damage to the British by
attacking a whaling fleet. The frigate Boston captured eight vessels including a French
frigate during the Quasi War. The Merrimack also captured French vessels and further
recaptured vessels the French had previously taken. These three ships then were all
designed for speed and were successful in a small-scale war, where much of the action
occurred between militarized vessels and civilian ships of roughly the same.
Accepting Sechrests view overall, private provisioning of naval warships in the
Quasi War was successful. Many ships were independently designed, contracted, and
outfitted for the war before the federal government could pass a bill authorizing
compensations to the ship builders, much less before the government could authorize,
design and build publicly provisioned ships of the type needed for the Quasi War. The
privately provisioned ships were highly successful in the small-scale conflicts present in

the Quasi War. In the next war, the War of 1812 with Britain, we see that the stakes,
scale, and needs of the US Navy vary a great deal from the earlier war.

The Success of the Publicly Provisioned Warships in the War of 1812

Ian W. Toll details the success of the six heavy frigates in the War of 1812 in his book
Six Frigates. Toll (2006, 49) writes that Joshua Humphreys, the designer of the six large
heavy frigates for the early U.S. Navy, proposed a class of heavy frigates designed
specifically to be superior to any European frigate. These heavy frigates could outgun
any smaller frigate and additionally have the option to engage ships-of-the-line when sea
conditions permitted an advantage or run away if they did not. Piracy out of Algiers was
the immediate crisis in the late 18th century that caused the frigates to be funded, but
Humphreys, according to Toll (2006, 49-51) intentionally designed these warships for
potential conflict with Europes superpowers, England and France.
Toll (2006, 49-50) details how the naval standard of the time was to primarily
build and outfit two distinct classes of ships: standard frigates, and ships-of-the-line.
Instead of building one of these two types of vessel, Humphreys proposed an unusually
large and heavy frigate that combined some features of both standard frigates and the
larger ships-of-the-line. These heavy frigates would use larger guns than a standard
frigate, but still rate as smaller and sail faster than ships-of-the-line. These ships would
then have a tactical offensive advantage against any English frigates; further, there was
also a strategic advantage, as honor bound English frigate captains could be drawn into a
one on one conflict with ships officially rated the same class as their own. These

English captains would be drawn into a fight they could not win when facing an
American frigate.
Toll (2006, 51-52) writes that in 1794 as the bill to fund the six frigates was still
in congress, the conservative shipwright establishment harshly criticized Humphreys
heavy frigate design. One such critic was Josiah Fox, the lone shipwright in the United
States who had apprenticed in the English Royal Dockyard. Fox deemed Humphreys
design too long and structurally weak for a successful vessel. Secretary Henry Fox also
asked for design reviews from various experts and was dismayed at a lack of consensus
view on Humphreys design. Yet finally, on April 15, some two weeks after the frigate
bill passed through congress, Knox recommended Humphreys design to the president.
Know saw that the heavy frigate design would really be superior to anything out of
Europe, ignoring various technical critiques leveled at the design by other designers.
Toll (2006, 115-118) tells us that by 1799 the Constellation was in action during
the Quasi War with France. In the West Indies, the Constellation came upon an unknown
frigate and chose to come in to signaling distance. The Constellation was chasing the
French frigate LInsurgente, a modern and fast ship rated at 36-guns in comparison to the
44-gun of the Constellation. The LInsurgente attempted to flee but during a gale, the
main topmast snapped. The Constellation shot 24-pound balls while the LInsurgente
had 12-pounders and was thoroughly outgunned. The conflict with the LInsurgente
showed how the heavier, larger frigate in use by the US Navy did in fact outgun the
standard European frigates and would battle them at an advantage in solo combat. After
many broadsides exchanged between the two ships the LInsurgente was severely
damaged while the Constellation remained mostly undamaged. The LInsurgente was

eventually captured and brought under American colors. Many similar encounters
occurred in the next naval war between the United States and a European power, the War
of 1812 with Britain.
Toll (2006, 270-71) writes that the English system of impressment was the main
issue, which caused a new conflict between England and the United States and lead to the
War of 1812. In 1792, there were roughly 10,000 men in the British fleets but by 1812,
this number was 140,000. The American merchants similarly grew in naval employment
during this time, going from 10,000 to 70,000 men. With such a strong demand for
sailors, the British began to engage in the practice of impressment, where captains forced
sailors into service on their vessels. A further problem for American sailors was that
British and American seamen were interchangeable. Further documentation could be
easily forged that would declare a sailor American who was in fact British in an attempt
to avoid being pressed. With impressment, some captains, in desperate need of
manpower, did not care to spend too much time deciding whether a sailor really was
English or American. In fact, Toll writes (2006, 272) that the Royal Navy actively
wanted to recover as many British-born sailors as possible. Toll (2006, 278) writes that
by 1806 the Royal Navy was conducting peacetime blockades just outside New York
Harbor and checking every ship leaving or entering for seamen to impress or contraband
cargo (to or from nations Britain was at war with) to confiscate.
Toll (2006, 331-333) writes that by the declaration of war with Britain, the U.S.
navy, excluding gunboats, had nineteen vessels, and only sixteen were in service. There
were seven frigates and the rest sloops, brigs or old enough to have no official rating.

The Royal Navy had over 600 vessels at the time. The Halifax station alone had nine
frigates, a battle-ship and more than twenty unrated ships.
Toll (2006, 335-336) offers an account of the first battle between an American
heavy frigate and a British ship. In June of 1812, Commodore Rodgers commanding the
heavy frigate President encountered a merchant vessel that informed the Commodore that
it had been recently boarded by a British frigate known as the Belvidera. The next
morning the President sighed a sail and chased. It was the Belvidera. The President and
all the other heavy frigates designed by Humphreys, was especially fast ship, and rapidly
closed in on the Belvidera. The Belvidera rated as a 32-gun frigate and was much lighter
and smaller than the President. By 4:20pm on June 23 1812, the first shot of the newly
declared war was fired from the President. Unfortunately, a mishap occurred and a gun
on the President exploded, damaging the ship and letting the Belvidera escape. The first
encounter of a US heavy frigate and a British frigate in 1812 did not fare well for the
Americans, but many later encounters would end up quite differently.
Next, Toll (2006, 347-354) details an encounter between an American frigate and
a British one that shocked the British Royal Navy. On August 16 1812, the Constitution
went in search of the British frigate Guerrire. The Guerrire had chased a 14-gun
privateer brig, which told the Constitution that the Guerrire was near and alone. The
Captain of the Guerrire had even left a challenge to the President specifically in
merchant brigs register earlier, and it seems the Guerrire was spoiling for a fight with
one of the American heavy frigates. On August 19, the Constitution would give the
Guerrire such an opportunity as it sighted a sail of a large vessel and the two vessels
closed into each other for battle. The Captain of the Guerrire, Captain Dacres, was so

confident he informed his crew that the battle should last less than 30 minutes. The
Guerrire was also nominally rated as a 44-gun frigate, the same as the Constitution.
After some time, the ships closed to 75 yards for short-range fire. The Guerrires 18pounders fired one by one at the Constitution, while Captain Hull of the Constitution
waited to fire an entire broadside into the Guerrire at once. After the broadside, one of
the masts on the Guerrire was gone and Captain Hull reportedly exclaimed immediately
that the Guerrire would be taken that day. Many of the gun crews on the Guerrire
were killed or wounded after the close-in broadsides and the ship could no longer
maintain much fire. The Constitution, like her other heavy frigate sister ships, had heavy
live oak framing and many of the 18-pounder from the Guerrire simply bounced off,
leading to the well-known nickname of Old Ironsides for the vessel. The
Constitutions 24-pound guns wrecked total havoc on the smaller frigate. The Guerrire
lacking mobility with a lost mast and badly outgunned attempted to ram and board the
American vessel, but it was too late. The total American casualties were seven wounded
and seven killed vs. the British numbers of fifty-six wounded and twenty-three killed.
Toll (2006, 370-382) writes that the British public was outraged and scandalized
at the losses to the Americans, and by January 1813, two frigates had been lost. No
longer did the British public view the Royal Navy as invincible. The Chronicle
published the specifications of the Guerrire and the Constitution detailing how much
larger the Constitution was. When the details were let out, Lord Liverpool was criticized
for the perceived naval failure and inferiority to the American navy, even though the total
ship count of the British ships assigned to just the Caribbean was 85 vs. a total of
fourteen American ships. In addition, by March 20, 1813, a third British frigate struck

colors to the Americans. Further, an estimated 500 hundred merchant ships had fallen to
the American in the first months of the war. By Christmas Eve of 1814, the treaty of
Ghent was signed and hostilities officially ceased, though the British loss to Andrew
Jackson occurred after this time due to delays in communication. While no concessions
by the British were made on the important issue of impressment, we can say the few
American frigates did influence the outcome by destroying the mystical aura of the
British Royal Navy, outraging the British public, and destroying the Royal Navys aura
of invincibility.
While private provisioning of naval warships in the Quasi War was successful,
the situation differed in the War of 1812. Large capital ships that were publicly
provisioned made the lion share of important victories, and further created a strategic and
political advantage for the Americans in the war. These few heavy frigates could not
destroy the Royal Navy but did manage to destroy the Royal Navys aura of invincibility
after multiple British frigates fell in one-on-one combat to the new American ships.
These technologically innovative capital ships were specifically designed to challenge the
binary nature of the British Royal Navy that depended on standard frigates and giant
ships-of-the-line. No private individual or concern could have or would have designed,
financed and deployed these new and innovative warships. The emerging nation state of
America, at that time so far away, small and vulnerable in conflicts with European
powers, had to publicly provision these ships.
This inquiry has sought to establish that private provisioning of U.S. Navy
Warships was successful in the Quasi War with France while public provisioning was
successful in the War of 1812 with Britain.

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References
Toll, Ian W. Six frigates: The epic history of the founding of the U.S. Navy.
New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2006.
Sechrest, L. J. Privately Funded and Built U.S. Warships in the Quasi-war of
1797-1801. Independent Review, 12(1), 101-113, 2007
Symonds, Craig L. The Naval Institute Historical Atlas of the U.S. Navy. Annapolis, Md.:
Naval Institute, 1995.

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