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Robin Wrights Audacious Remapping of the Middle East

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Martin W. Lewis
I was taken aback this past Sunday (September 29) by
Robin Wrights colorful map of a politically re-divided Middle
East in the New York Times, which illustrated her article
Imagining a Remapped Middle East. The map, entitled
How 5 Could Become 14, shows a hypothetical future
division of Libya, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia into
14 potential new countries along with two additional citystates. I was immediately reminded of Ralph Peters
troublesome remapping of the same region. As explained in
a previous GeoCurrents post, Peters intriguing mental
exercise in redrawing national boundaries was widely
misinterpreted across the Muslim world as indicating a
nefarious plot to enhance US power. As a result, the regions
pronounced anti-Americanism was further inamed.
Wrights article, however, shows that her purpose is dierent
from that of Peters. Whereas Peters sought to depict a more
rationally constituted political map, Wright rather speculates
about a map that might be developing on its own, regardless
of her personal preferences, much less her countrys geostrategic designs. In this regard, the map has much to
recommend it. Libya, Syria, Yemen, and Iraq could well be
in the process of disintegration, splitting into de facto states
or state-like entities that might bear some resemblance to
the territories depicted by Wrights map. The likelihood of
Iraq and Syria regaining stability as eective states within
their internationally recognized boundaries seems remote,
given the viciousness of the conicts currently being waged.
As things already stand, the non-country of Iraqi Kurdistan is almost as much of a state as Iraq itself, and
arguable more of a nation. Whether Libya and Yemen can politically reintegrate is also an open matter. Mapping
how the Middle East appears today, rather than how the international political community thinks it should be
congured, is thus an essential task. Thinking about where such processes might lead is equally important.
Wrights thoughts on the subject are generally insightful, and her map has many pertinent and intriguing features.
I commend the New York Times for publishing such a provocative piece.

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But that said, I do have a few quibbles, and a couple of


serious misgivings, about the manner in which Wright has
remapped the region. To take the minor points rst, the
Jabal al-Druze could not form a realistic city-state simply
because it is too large and too rural (under the French
mandate of Syria in the 1920s, the semi-autonomous Druze
state was roughly the same size as both Lebanon and the
semi-autonomous Alawite state). A second minor issue
concerns Wrights division of Yemen into two rather than
three states; the Houthi rebellion among the Zaidi
(sometimes mistakenly called Fiver Shiites) rebels of
northwestern Yemen has as much pertinence as the
rebellion that that would revive South Yemen in the
southern and eastern parts of the country. A nal quibble
concerns Wrights Alawitestan, which would actually be a
minority Alawite state, barring the massive ethnic cleansing
of Sunnis and Christians.
My serious misgivings concern Wrights treatment of Saudi
Arabia. She realizes that she goes out on a limb here, noting
that The most fantastical ideas involve the Balkanization of
Saudi Arabia Unlike the other countries that she remaps,
Saudi Arabia is a relatively stable state, with no serious
challenges to its territorial integrity. Imagining the division of
this country thus does not involve speculating about the
possible end-points of processes already in motion, as is the
case in the other countries considered. It is not at all clear,
moreover, why Wright has divided Saudi Arabia as she has,
as her article is largely silent here. Presumably, her division
is based on the idea that the non-Wahhabi peripheries of the
country could detach themselves from the Wahhabi core,
potentially resulting in the emergence of the new states of
North Arabia, Eastern Arabia, South Arabia, and Western
Arabia.
As a purely mental exercise, there is nothing wrong with imagining the possible division of a relatively stable
country such as Saudi Arabia, even if it willas Wright herself admitsinfuriate Arabs who suspect foreign
plots to divide and weaken them Saudi Arabias stability, moreover, might not be a solid as it appears. The
entire country, after all, is something of an anachronism; as the personal domain and namesake of the Al Saud
family, its essence is premodern. The lack of a regular system of succession in an absolute monarchy based on

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the 15,000-strong House of Saud further clouds the countrys future. (Similar problems exist in neighboring
Oman, as explored in a previous GeoCurrents post.) Saudi Arabias religions minorities, moreover, are sternly
repressed and deeply restive in several peripheral areas. The fact that Saudi Arabias main Shiite zone along the
Gulf is also the site of its main oilelds is an added complication, one that provokes Saudi fear about Iranian
power and political-religious design.
The possible future division of Saudi Arabia is thus conceivable if unlikely, but it is a much further stretch to
imagine that it would split into the units that Wright has mapped. Detaching the core region of the country,
homeland of both the Saud family and the Wahhabi religion establishment, from the peripheries does make a
certain amount of sense, but one must wonder whether such a maneuver is based more on rational analysis or
wishful thinking. Considering the harsh nature of Wahhabi beliefs and practices, coupled with the fact that Saudi
state struggles to spread those beliefs and practices across the Muslim world, it is understandable that an
American scholar such as Wright would want to see the territorial reach of the Wahhabi establishment cut down
to size. (Note that her map results in a landlocked Wahhabistan, unlike that of Peters, which at least gives her
hypothetical rump Saudi Homelands access to the sea.) But shorn of its oil revenues as well as those
stemming from the Hajj, it is highly questionable whether this region could maintain a stable state. Local
resources and enterprises would not be nearly large enough to support central Arabias current population.
A deeper problem stems from the fact that much of Wrights
Wahhabistan is not actually majority Wahhabi, as can be
seen in a comparison of her map with that of M. Izady (who
idiosyncratically excludes Wahhabism from Sunni Islam).
The key area here is Hail province, a historically nonWahhabi area nonetheless ceded by Wright to
Wahhabistan. Not only do most of the people of Hail
practice a more mainstream version of Sunni Islam than
those of Riyadh and Al-Qassim, but their province was the
historical center of resistance in central Arabia against both
the House of Saud and the Wahhabi clerics. Hail was the
seat of the Rashidis, historical enemies of the Saudis, who
were noted for their friendly tolerance of Shiites, a branch of
Islam despised by the Wahhabis. Hail would thus t much
better with Wrights North Arabia than with her
Wahhabistan. Nor is it clear why Wright divides her North
Arabia from her Western Arabia, as both regions are mostly mainstream Sunni in orientation.
Wrights South Arabia, composed of four Saudi provinces
and small section of a fth, is also problematic. This region is
indeed distinctive from the rest of Saudi Arabia, and is thus
occasionally claimed as part of a would-be Greater Yemen.
Yet little exists that would potentially hold this region
together and provide glue for a new national identity. Most of
this region is majority Sunni, but important Zaidi Shia
communities are found near the border with Yemen
(although Izadys map might exaggerate their extent). Of all
the sects of Shiite Islam, Zaidiyya is closest in form and
content to Sunni Islam, but it also has a heritage of political
autonomy that has nurtured the protracted rebellion across
the border in northern Yemen. In Najran Province in the
eastern portion of Wrights South Arabia, however, a dierent religious community is demographically dominant:
Ismaili Islam. This sect is invisible on Izadys map, as it also falls into the general category of Shiism. But the
Ismaili sect is quite distinctive from other varieties of Shiism, noted globally for its cosmopolitanism, devotion to
secular education, and relative liberalism and gender egalitarianism. Not surprisingly, Ismailis in Najran have
been deeply persecuted by the Saudi establishment. As noted by Human Rights Watch:

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The Ismailis, a religious and ethnic minority with historic roots in Najran province of southwestern
Saudi Arabia, face increasing threats to their identity as a result of ocial discrimination. With the
arrival of Prince Mishal bin Saud as the governor of Najran in 1996, tension between local
authorities and the Ismaili population increased, culminating in a confrontation between armed
Ismaili demonstrators and police and army units outside the Holiday Inn hotel in Najran city in
April 2000. The ensuing crackdown continues to reverberate throughout the region to this day.
Ocial discrimination in Saudi Arabia against Ismailis encompasses government employment,
religious practices, and the justice system. Government ocials exclude Ismailis from decision
making, and publicly disparage their faith. Following the clashes in April 2000, Saudi authorities
imprisoned, tortured, and summarily sentenced hundreds of Ismailis, and transferred hundreds of
Ismaili government employees outside the region. Underlying discriminatory practices have
continued unabated.

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