Professional Documents
Culture Documents
On the question of jurisdiction, it is clear under the Rules that an action for
quieting of title may be instituted in the RTCs, regardless of the assessed
value of the real property in dispute. Under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court,
an action to quiet title to real property or remove clouds therefrom may be
brought in the appropriate RTC.
It must be remembered that the suit for quieting of title was prompted by
petitioners August 24, 1998 letter-opposition to respondents application for
registration. Thus, in order to prevent30 a cloud from being cast upon his
application for a title, respondent filed Civil Case No. B-1097 to obtain a
declaration of his rights. In this sense, the action is one for declaratory
relief, which properly falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant to Rule
63 of the Rules (Spouses Celemencio C. Sabitsana, Jr. and Ma. Rosario M.
Sabitsana Vs. Juanito F. Muertegui, represented by his attorney-in-fact,
Domingo A. Muertegui, Jr., G.R. No. 181359. August 5, 2013).
GSIS v VILLAVIZA
Facts: PGM Winston Garcia, as President and General Manager of the
GSIS, filed separate formal charges against respondents and eventually
found them guilty for Grave Misconduct and/or Conduct Prejudicial to the
Best Interest of the Service and meting out the penalty of one (1) year
suspension plus the accessory penalties appurtenant thereto. The charges
contained that respondent, wearing red shirt together with some
employees, marched to or appeared simultaneously at or just outside the
office of the Investigation Unit in a mass demonstration/rally of protest and
support for Messrs. Mario Molina and Albert Velasco, the latter having
surreptitiously entered the GSIS premises.
On appeal, CSC found the respondents guilty of the lesser offense of
Violation of Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations and reduced the
penalty to reprimand, stating that but there was no substantial evidence to
hold them guilty of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. It
found that that the acts of respondents in going to the GSIS-IU office
wearing red shirts to witness a public hearing do not amount to a concerted
activity or mass action proscribed above. CSC added that their actuations
can be deemed an exercise of their constitutional right to freedom of
expression. The CA found no cogent reason to deviate therefrom.
PGM Garcia filed a petition for review under Rule 45. Petitioners primarily
question the probative value accorded to respondents' letters of explanation
in response to the memorandum of the GSIS-IU Manager. The respondents
never filed their answers to the formal charges. The petitioners argue that
there being no answers, the allegations in the formal charges that they filed
should have been deemed admitted pursuant to Section 11, Rule 8 of the
Rules of Court which provides:
SECTION 11. Allegations not specifically denied deemed admitted.Material averment in the complaint, other than those as to the amount of
liquidated damages, shall be deemed admitted when not specifically
denied. Allegations of usury in a complaint to recover usurious interest are
deemed admitted if not denied specifically and under oath.
According to the petitioners, this rule is applicable to the case at bench
pursuant to Rule 1, Section 4 of the Rules of Court which reads:
SECTION 4. In what cases not applicable. - These Rules shall not apply to
election cases, land registration, cadastral, naturalization and insolvency
proceedings, and other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or
in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and
convenient. (underscoring supplied)
Constitution; and, assuming that the period to file criminal charges herefore
is subject to prescription, the prescriptive period should be counted from
the time of discovery of behest loans or sometime in 1992 when the
Committee was constituted.
ISSUES:
WoN the crimes charged against petitioners have already prescribed-NO
Sub-Issues: When has prescription set in?
WoN Sec 15 Art XI applies to criminal cases- NO
WoN the Ombudsmans full discretion to determine whether a criminal case
is to be filed is absolute-NO
HELD:
First Issue: NO.
At the core of the controversy is the Ombudsmans Resolution holding that
prescription had already set-in effectively barring the institution of charges
against the private respondents. The Ombudsman claimed that the alleged
behest loans, transpired in 1976, and, thus, the complaint filed after more
than two decades from the commission thereof or on 8 October 1997, was
well beyond the 10-year prescriptive period provided for under the old
Republic Act No. 3019.
In resolving the issue of prescription, the following shall be considered: (1)
the period of prescription for the offense charged; (2) the time the period of
prescription started to run; and (3) the time the prescriptive period was
interrupted.
The period of prescription for the crime charged in this petition, committed
in 1976 and prior to the amendment of Republic Act No. 3019, is ten (10)
years.
Section 1126 of Republic Act No. 3019 as amended by Batas Pambansa
Blg. 195, provides that the offenses committed under Republic Act No.
3019 shall prescribe in fifteen (15) years; prior to this amendment, however,
under the old Republic Act No. 3019, this prescriptive period was only ten
(10) years. In People v. Pacificador,the Court held that the longer
prescriptive period of 15-years does not apply in crimes committed prior to
the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, which was approved on 16
March 1982, because, not being favorable to the accused, it cannot be
given retroactive effect. Considering that the alleged crime was committed
in 1976, and in line with the Courts ruling in Pacificador, the prescription
period should be ten (10) years.
Prescription of crime shall begin to run from the day of its commission, and
if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the
institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
Second
While we sustain the Ombudsmans contention that the prescriptive period
for the crime charged herein is 10 years and not 15 years, we are not
persuaded that in this specific case, the prescriptive period began to run in
1976, when the loans were transacted.
The time as to when the prescriptive period starts to run for crimes
committed under Republic Act No. 3019, a special law, is covered by Act
No. 3326,28 Section 2 of which provides that:
Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of
the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the
discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment.
ISSUE:
WoN failure to serve summons deprives the court of its jurisdiction to try
and decide the case
HELD: NO
We need not belabor the issues on whether lack of jurisdiction was raised
before the CA, whether the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of
respondent, or whether respondent waived his right to the service of
summons. We find that the primordial issue here is actually whether it was
necessary, in the first place, to serve summons on respondent for the court
to acquire jurisdiction over the case. In other words, was the service of
summons jurisdictional? The answer to this question depends on the nature
of petitioners action, that is, whether it is an action in personam, in
rem, or quasi in rem.
An action in personam is lodged against a person based on personal
liability; an action in rem is directed against the thing itself instead of the
person; while an action quasi in rem names a person as defendant, but its
object is to subject that person's interest in a property to a corresponding
lien or obligation. A petition directed against the "thing" itself or the res,
which concerns the status of a person, like a petition for adoption,
annulment of marriage, or correction of entries in the birth certificate, is an
action in rem.
Thus, employees hired after the extended date of October 31, 1989,
pursuant to the above COA decision cannot defy that decision by
filing a petition for mandamus in the lower court. Presidential Decree
No. 1445 and the 1987 Constitution prescribe that the only mode for
appeal from decisions of this Commission is on certiorari to the
Supreme Court in the manner provided by law and the Rules of Court.
Clearly, the lower court had no jurisdiction when it entertained the
subject case of mandamus. And void decisions of the lower court can
never attain finality, much less be executed. Moreover, COA was not
made a party thereto, hence, it cannot be compelled to allow the
payment of claims on the basis of the questioned decision.
CA reversed the RTC and directed immediate implementation of the writ of
execution through garnishment of the funds of petitioners. Court held that it
was grave error for the CA to reverse the RTC and direct immediate
implementation of the writ of execution through garnishment of the funds of
petitioners.
Petitioners, in their Reply,anchor their petition on their allegation that the
RTC Decision had already become final and executory, could no longer be
disturbed, and must be respected by the parties. To support their claim,
they cite Arcenas v. Court of Appeals41 wherein this Court held:
For, it is a fundamental rule that when a final judgment becomes executory,
it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. The judgment may no
longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to
correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and
regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court
rendering it or by the highest Court of the land. The only recognized
exceptions are the correction of clerical errors or the making of socalled nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, and, of
course, where the judgment is void. Any amendment or alteration which
substantially affects a final and executory judgment is null and void for lack
of jurisdiction, including the entire proceedings held for that
purpose.42 (Emphasis ours.)
Petitioners likewise cite Panado v. Court of Appeals 43 wherein the Court
held that "[i]t is axiomatic that final and executory judgments can no longer
be attacked by any of the parties or be modified, directly or indirectly, even
by the highest court of the land."44 From the foregoing jurisprudence,
petitioners conclude that the acts of COA in disallowing the claims and
ordering refund of benefits already received clearly constitute grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction inasmuch as said acts
frustrated the final and executory decision of the trial court.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not the immutability of final decision doctrine must prevail
over the exclusive jurisdiction of [the COA] to audit and settle
disbursements of funds; and
2. Whether or not the NEA employees hired after June 30, 1989 are entitled
to rice allowance.
HELD:
1. As to the first issue, the immutability rule applies only when the decision
is promulgated by a court possessed of jurisdiction to hear and decide the
case. Undoubtedly, the petition in the guise of a case for mandamus is a
money claim falling within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of this
Commission. Noting the propensity of the lower courts in taking cognizance
of cases filed by claimants in violation of such primary jurisdiction, the
Supreme Court issued Administrative Circular 10-2000 dated October 23,
2000 enjoining judges of lower courts to exercise caution in order to
prevent "possible circumvention of the rules and procedures of the
Commission on Audit" and reiterating the basic rule that: "All money claims
against the Government must be filed with the Commission on Audit which
shall act upon it within sixty days. Rejection of the claim will authorize the
claimant to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court on certiorari and in
effect sue the State thereby."
Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, when an administrative body is
clothed with original and exclusive jurisdiction, courts are utterly without
power and authority to exercise concurrently such jurisdiction. Accordingly,
all the proceedings of the court in violation of that doctrine and all orders
and decisions reached thereby are null and void. It will be noted in the cited
Supreme Court Circular that money claims are cognizable by the COA and
its decision is appealable only to the Supreme Court. The lower courts have
nothing to do with such genus of transactions.
Anent the issue of entitlement to rice allowance by employees hired after
June 30, 1989, this Commission is left with no option but to affirm the
disallowance in the face of the explicit provisions of DBM-CCC No. 10. After
its publication on March 9, 1999 in the Official Gazette, rice allowance was
allowed only for incumbents as of July 1, 1989. Obviously, there is no
violation of the equal protection clause as cited in the PITC case, supra,
because whatever increments the incumbents are enjoying over those of
non-incumbents are transitory, for the same law provides that such
difference shall be deducted from the salary increase the former should
receive under Section 17. Thus, the equalization or standardization of what
the two categories of employees will be receiving in terms of benefits is
ensured.
2. We agree with the findings of the COA.
In National Electrification Administration v. Morales, the order of
garnishment against the NEA funds to implement the RTC Decision was in
issue, and we said that the COA had exclusive jurisdiction to decide on the
allowance or disallowance of money claims arising from the implementation
of Republic Act No. 6758. We observed therein that "the RTC acted
prudently in halting implementation of the writ of execution to allow the
parties recourse to the processes of the COA." 47 In fact, we even stated
there that "it is not for this Court to preempt the action of the COA on the
post-audit to be conducted by it per its Indorsement dated March 23,
2000."48
We find that the COA had ruled in accordance with law and jurisprudence,
and we see no reason to reverse its decision.
Stare Decisis
The doctrine "stare decisis et non quieta movere (Stand by the decisions
and disturb not what is settled)" is firmly entrenched in our jurisprudence.
Once this Court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain
state of facts, it would adhere to that principle and apply it to all future
cases in which the facts are substantially the same as in the earlier
controversy.
SUN INSURANCE V ASUNCION DIGEST
G.R. Nos. 79937-38 February 13, 1989
Facts:
Petitioner Sun Insurance (or SIOL) files a complaint for the annulment of a
decision on the consignation of fire insurance policy. Subsequently, the
Private Respondent (PR) files a complaint for the refund of premiums and
ISSUE: WON the dismissal by the CA was proper due to the nonpayment
of docket fees?
HELD: NO
DBP v CASTILLO
FACTS:
On July 25, 2001, Dr. Babaran filed a complaint for Damages against PDI
because of the two column articles printed by it. She alleged that:
On Sept. 13, 2001, PDI filed their answer with counterclaims and araised
the following defenses:
Yes but not because it was moot but because it was without merit
She wrote a letter to PDIs editor after learning about the Aug. 1
article but did not receive a response
The 2nd article was published, again singling her out as
erroneously diagnosing the illness of Caldez
The DOH Fact-Finding Committee concluded that her diagnosis
was not erroneous, but this was not published
PDI acted in bad faith because of the above.
Pre-trial was held and terminated, and PDI filed a Motion for a
Preliminary Hearing on Affirmative Defense Raised in the Answer
(which is also a ground for a motion to dismiss). In said motion, it was
alleged that at the pre-trial, the court noted that one of the defenses raised
by PDI was that Babaran has not delineated the participation of each of
petitioners in the publication of the alleged libelous articles. Thereupon,
Babarans counsel asked for a few days to determine whether the
complaint should be amended to cure its defects. However, Babaran had
not moved to amend the complaint, hence, PDI filed the motion. PDI
contended that:
NO
There are 3 essential elements of a cause of action:
1
2
3
Facts:
Independent Mercantile Corporation filed a petition in the
respondent Court to compel Manuel Magali to surrender the owner's
duplicate of TCT No. 9138 in order that the same may be cancelled and a
new one issued in the name of the said corporation. Not being the
registered owner and the title not being in his possession, Manuel Magali
failed to comply with the order of the Court directing him to surrender the
said title. This prompted Independent Mercantile Corporation to file an exparte petition to declare TCT No. 9138 as cancelled and to issue a new title
in its name. The said petition was granted by the respondent Court and the
Register of Deeds of Pangasinan issued a new title in the name of the
corporation, TCT No. 68568. Petitioner, upon learning that her husband's
title over the parcel of land had been cancelled, filed a petition with the
respondent Court, sitting as a cadastral court, praying for the cancellation
of TCT No. 68568 but the court dismissed the petition.
Petitioner thereafter filed in the LRC Record No. 39492 for the
cancellation of TCT No. 68568 but the same was dismissed therein.
Petitioners then resorted to the filing of a complaint in for the cancellation of
the conveyances and sales that had been made with respect to the
property, covered by TCT No. 9138, against Francisco Ramos who claimed
to have bought the property from Independent Mercantile Corporation.
Private respondent Francisco Ramos, however, failed to obtain a title over
the property in his name in view of the existence of an adverse claim
annotated on the title thereof at the instance of the herein petitioners.
Francisco Ramos filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the same is
barred by prior judgement or by statute of limitations. Resolving the said
Motion, the respondent Court dismissed the case on the ground of estoppel
by prior judgment.
Issue:
Whether or not dismissal of the case is proper on the ground of
estoppel by prior judgment
Held:
No. It is error to consider the dismissal of the petition filed by the
herein petitioner in LRC Record No. 39492 for the cancellation of TCT No.
68568 as a bar by prior judgment against the filing of the subsequent civil
case. In order to avail of the defense of res judicata, it must be shown,
among others, that the judgment in the prior action must have been
rendered by a court with the proper jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
proceeding in which the prior judgment or order was rendered. If there is
lack of jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the suit or of the parties, the
judgment or order cannot operate as an adjudication of the controversy.
This essential element of the defense of bar by prior judgment or res
judicata does not exist in the case.
The petition filed by the petitioners in LRC Record No. 39492
was an apparent invocation of the authority of the respondent Court sitting
as a land registration court. Reliance was apparently placed on Section 112
of the Land Registration Act wherein it provides that a Court of First
Instance, acting as a land registration court, is a court of limited and special
jurisdiction. As such, its proceedings are not adequate for the litigation of
issues pertaining to an ordinary civil action, such as, questions involving
ownership or title to real property.
DO-ALL METALS
CORPORATION
INDUSTRIES,
INC.
V.
SECURITY
BANK
Months before the lease was up, the Bank notified DMI that it was preterminating it. While negotiations were ongoing, the Lims claim that they
continued to use the property but the Bank posted security guards at the
said place and the guards, on instructions of the Bank, padlocked the
entrances and barred the Lims and DMIs employees from entering, even
pointing gun at one employee. Because of this, DMI was unable to close
several projects with potential clients and Lims were unable to retrieve
personal items left at the property. DMI and Lims (DMI) then filed a
complaint with RTC Pasig for damages with prayer for the issuance of a
TRO or preliminary injunction against the Bank.
RTC directed the Bank to allow DMI to enter the building and get their
machineries, equipment and personal things but DMI was unable to find
their properties. In a supplemental complaint, DMI alleged that the Bank
surreptitiously took such properties, resulting in additional actual damages
of over P27M. RTC ruled in favor of DMI, ordering the Bank to pay the
P27M actual damages, + moral damages, exemplary damages, and
attorneys fees.
The Bank moved for reconsideration of the decision, questioning among
other things the RTCs authority to grant damages considering DMIs failure
to pay the filing fees on their supplemental complaint. The RTC denied the
motion. On appeal, CA ruled in favor of the Bank and denied the
subsequent MR, hence this petition.
Issues:
1. W/N the RTC acquired JURISDICTION on the supplemental complaint
against the Bank considering DMI and Lims' failure to pay the filing fees on
the amounts of damages they claim in it; YES.
2. Whether or not the Bank is liable for the intimidation and harassment
committed against DMI. YES.
3. W/N the Bank is LIABLE to DMI for the machineries, equipment, and
other properties they allegedly lost after they were barred from the property.
NO.
Held:
(1) YES. The RTC acquired jurisdiction over their action from the moment
they filed the original complaint accompanied by the payment of the filing
fees due on the same. Their non-payment of the additional filing fees due
on their additional claims did not divest the RTC of the jurisdiction it already
had over the case.
(2) YES. The Bank belittles the testimonies of the DMIs witnesses for
having been presented ex parte but the ex parte hearing, having been
properly authorized, cannot be assailed as less credible. It was the Banks
fault that it was unable to attend the hearing. It cannot profit from its lack of
diligence. Employees of DMI testified regarding the Bank guards
unmitigated use of their superior strength and firepower and such were
never refuted. Police testified finding Lim locked in the building and being
told by a Bank representative that they had instructions to prevent anyone
from taking any property out of the premises. While the lease may have
already lapsed, the Bank had no business harassing and intimidating the
Lims and DMI employees.
(3) NO. DMI's stand is that the RTC correctly admitted the supplemental
complaint even if they had not paid the filing fees due on it since such fees
constituted a lien anyway on the judgment award. But this after-judgment
lien, which implies that payment depends on a successful execution of the
judgment, applies to cases (1) where the filing fees were incorrectly
assessed or paid or (2) where the court has discretion to fix the amount of
the award. NONE of these circumstances are present in this case.
Here, the supplemental complaint specified from the beginning the actual
damages that DMI sought against the Bank. Still DMI paid no filing fees on
the same and gave no reason for their omission nor offered to pay the
same, merely saying that they did not yet pay the fees because the RTC
had not assessed them for it. But a supplemental complaint is like any
complaint and the rule is that the filing fees due on a complaint need to be
paid upon its filing. The rules DO NOT require the court to make special
assessments in cases of supplemental complaints. Although the Bank
brought up the question of their failure to pay additional filing fees in its
motion for reconsideration, DMI made no effort to make at least a late
payment before decision. Consequently, the trial court should have treated
their Supplemental Complaint as not filed.
DMI argues that the Bank raised the issue of non-payment of additional
filing fees only after the RTC had rendered its decision, thus waiving its
objection. But it is not for a party to the case or even for the trial court to
waive the payment of the additional filing fees due on the supplemental
complaint. Only the Supreme Court can grant exemptions to the payment of
the fees due the courts and these exemptions are embodied in its rules.
Court reinstated the RTC decision and ordered the bank to pay damages,
but deleted the claim for the P27M actual damages in the supplemental
complaint.