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SABITSANA v MUERTEGUI

On the question of jurisdiction, it is clear under the Rules that an action for
quieting of title may be instituted in the RTCs, regardless of the assessed
value of the real property in dispute. Under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court,
an action to quiet title to real property or remove clouds therefrom may be
brought in the appropriate RTC.
It must be remembered that the suit for quieting of title was prompted by
petitioners August 24, 1998 letter-opposition to respondents application for
registration. Thus, in order to prevent30 a cloud from being cast upon his
application for a title, respondent filed Civil Case No. B-1097 to obtain a
declaration of his rights. In this sense, the action is one for declaratory
relief, which properly falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant to Rule
63 of the Rules (Spouses Celemencio C. Sabitsana, Jr. and Ma. Rosario M.
Sabitsana Vs. Juanito F. Muertegui, represented by his attorney-in-fact,
Domingo A. Muertegui, Jr., G.R. No. 181359. August 5, 2013).
GSIS v VILLAVIZA
Facts: PGM Winston Garcia, as President and General Manager of the
GSIS, filed separate formal charges against respondents and eventually
found them guilty for Grave Misconduct and/or Conduct Prejudicial to the
Best Interest of the Service and meting out the penalty of one (1) year
suspension plus the accessory penalties appurtenant thereto. The charges
contained that respondent, wearing red shirt together with some
employees, marched to or appeared simultaneously at or just outside the
office of the Investigation Unit in a mass demonstration/rally of protest and
support for Messrs. Mario Molina and Albert Velasco, the latter having
surreptitiously entered the GSIS premises.
On appeal, CSC found the respondents guilty of the lesser offense of
Violation of Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations and reduced the
penalty to reprimand, stating that but there was no substantial evidence to
hold them guilty of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. It
found that that the acts of respondents in going to the GSIS-IU office
wearing red shirts to witness a public hearing do not amount to a concerted
activity or mass action proscribed above. CSC added that their actuations
can be deemed an exercise of their constitutional right to freedom of
expression. The CA found no cogent reason to deviate therefrom.
PGM Garcia filed a petition for review under Rule 45. Petitioners primarily
question the probative value accorded to respondents' letters of explanation
in response to the memorandum of the GSIS-IU Manager. The respondents
never filed their answers to the formal charges. The petitioners argue that
there being no answers, the allegations in the formal charges that they filed
should have been deemed admitted pursuant to Section 11, Rule 8 of the
Rules of Court which provides:
SECTION 11. Allegations not specifically denied deemed admitted.Material averment in the complaint, other than those as to the amount of
liquidated damages, shall be deemed admitted when not specifically
denied. Allegations of usury in a complaint to recover usurious interest are
deemed admitted if not denied specifically and under oath.
According to the petitioners, this rule is applicable to the case at bench
pursuant to Rule 1, Section 4 of the Rules of Court which reads:
SECTION 4. In what cases not applicable. - These Rules shall not apply to
election cases, land registration, cadastral, naturalization and insolvency
proceedings, and other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or
in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and
convenient. (underscoring supplied)

Issue: WoN an administrative tribunal may apply suppletorily the provisions


of the rules of court on the effect of failure to deny the allegations in the
complaint and failure to file answer, where the respondents in the
administrative proceedings did not file any responsive pleading to the
formal charges against them.
Held:
The Court does not subscribe to the argument of the petitioners.
Petitioners' own rules, Rule XI, Section 4 of the GSIS' Amended Policy and
Procedural Guidelines No. 178-04, specifically provides:
If the respondent fails to file his Answer within five (5) working days from
receipt of the Formal Charge for the supporting evidence, when requested,
he shall be considered to have waived his right to file an answer and the
PGM or the Board of Trustees, in proper cases, shall render judgment, as
may be warranted by the facts and evidence submitted by the prosecution.
A perusal of said section readily discloses that the failure of a respondent to
file an answer merely translates to a waiver of "his right to file an answer."
There is nothing in the rule that says that the charges are deemed
admitted. It has not done away with the burden of the complainant to prove
the charges with clear and convincing evidence.
It is true that Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides that the rules can be
applied in a "suppletory character." Suppletory is defined as "supplying
deficiencies."10 It means that the provisions in the Rules of Court will be
made to apply only where there is an insufficiency in the applicable rule.
There is, however, no such deficiency as the rules of the GSIS are explicit
in case of failure to file the required answer. What is clearly stated there is
that GSIS may "render judgment as may be warranted by the facts and
evidence submitted by the prosecution."
Even granting that Rule 8, Section 11 of the Rules of Court finds application
in this case, petitioners must remember that there remain averments that
are not deemed admitted by the failure to deny the same. Among them are
immaterial allegations and incorrect conclusions drawn from facts set out in
the complaint. Thus, even if respondents failed to file their answer, it does
not mean that all averments found in the complaint will be considered as
true and correct in their entirety, and that the forthcoming decision will be
rendered in favor of the petitioners. We must not forget that even in
administrative proceedings, it is still the complainant, or in this case the
petitioners, who have the burden of proving, with substantial evidence, the
allegations in the complaint or in the formal charges.1
A perusal of the decisions of the CA and of the CSC will reveal that the
case was resolved against petitioners based, not on the absence of
respondents' evidence, but on the weakness of that of the petitioners. Thus,
the CA wrote:

Petitioners correctly submitted the administrative cases for resolution


without the respondents' respective answer to the separate formal charges
in accordance with Section 4, Rule XI of the RPAI. Being in full control of
the administrative proceeding and having effectively prevented respondents
from further submitting their responsive answer and evidence for the
defense, petitioners were in the most advantageous position to prove the
merit of their allegations in the formal charges. When petitioner Winston
Garcia issued those similarly worded decisions in the administrative cases
against the respondents, it is presumed that all evidence in their favor were
duly submitted and justly considered independent of the weakness of
respondent's evidence in view of the principle that ''the burden of proof
belongs to the one who alleges and not the one who denies."

On 10 May 1976, MINCOCO applied for a Guarantee Loan Accommodation


with the NIDC for the amount of approximately P30,400,000.00, which the
NIDCs Board of Directors approved on 23 June 1976.

MIGUEL DELA PENA BAREIRO v OP and MST MARINE SERVICES,


June 15, 2011

The above mentioned transactions, were, however, discovered only in


1992 after then President Fidel V. Ramos (President Ramos), in an effort to
recover the ill-gotten wealth of the late President Marcos, his family, and
cronies, issued Administrative Order No. 13 creating the Presidential Ad
Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans (the Committee), with the
Chairman of the Philippine Commission on Good Government (PCGG) as
the Committees head. The Committee was directed, inter alia, to inventory
all behest loans, and identify the lenders and borrowers, including the
principal officers and stockholders of the borrowing firms, as well as the
persons responsible for the granting of loans or who influenced the grant
thereof/

FACTS: Petitioner signed a contract as chief mate of M/T Haruna for 6


months. after one week he disembarked on ground that his boarding M/T
Haruna was a sea trial only. MST his manning agent, filed case at POEA.
POEA suspended petitioner for one year for breach of contract. On appeal,
DOLE reduced suspension to six months. Petitioner appealed to the Office
of the President (OP). OP dismissed the case on the ground that appeal
can be brought to them only if case involves national security.
ISSUE: WON appeal to OP was proper
HELD: NO. APPEALS TO THE OP IN LABOR CASES HAVE BEEN
ELIMINATED, EXCEPT THOSE INVOLVING NATIONAL INTEREST
OVER WHICH THE PRESIDENT MAY ASSUME JURISDICTION.
Following settled jurisprudence, the proper remedy to question the
decisions or orders of the Secretary of Labor is via Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65, not via an appeal to the OP. For appeals to the OP in labor
cases have indeed been eliminated, except those involving national interest
over which the President may assume jurisdiction. The rationale behind
this development is mirrored in the OPs Resolution of June 26, 2009 the
pertinent portion of which reads:
. . . [T] he assailed DOLEs Orders were both issued by Undersecretary
Danilo P. Cruz under the authority of the DOLE Secretary who is the
alter ego of the President. Under the Doctrine of Qualified Political
Agency, a corollary rule to the control powers of the President, all
executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive
Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants
and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief
Executive is required by Constitution or law to act in person or the
exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious
executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed
by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the
Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the
regular course of business are, unless disapproved or reprobated by
the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.
It cannot be gainsaid that petitioners case does not involve national
interest.
PRESIDENTIAL AD HOC FACT-FINDING COMMITTEE ON BEHEST
LOANS v DESIERTO, G.R. No. 135715
April 13, 2011
FACTS
Respondents Mohammad Ali Dimaporo, Abdullah Dimaporo, and Amer
Dianalan, were stockholders and officers of the Mindanao Coconut Oil Mills
(MINCOCO), while respondents Panfilo O. Domingo, Conrado S. Reyes,
Enrique M. Herboza, and Ricardo Sunga, were then officers of the National
Investment and Development Corporation (NIDC).

When MINCOCOs mortgage liens were about to be foreclosed by the


government banks due its outstanding obligations, Eduardo Cojuangco
issued a memorandum, bearing the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos
(President Marcos) marginal note, disallowing the foreclosure of
MINCOCOs properties. The government banks were not able to recover
any amount from MINCOCO and President Marcos marginal note was
construed by the NIDC to have effectively released MINCOCO, including its
owners, from all of its financial liabilities.

The Committee found that twenty-one corporations, including MINCOCO,


obtained behest loans. It claimed that the fact that MINCOCO was undercollateralized and undercapitalized; that its officers were identified as
cronies; that the late President Marcos had marginal note, effectively
waiving the governments right to foreclose MINCOCOs mortgage liens;
and, that the Guarantee Loan Accommodation were approved in an
extraordinary speed of one month, bore badges of behest loans.
Subsequently, the Committee filed with the Ombudsman a sworn complaint
against MINCOCOs Officers and NIDCs Board of Directors for violation of
Section 3(e) and (g) of Republic Act No. 3019,as amended.
OMBs Contention:
The Ombudsman motu prorio dismissed the complaint on the grounds
that, first, there was insufficient evidence to warrant the indictment of
the persons charged; and, second, the alleged offenses had
prescribed. He explained,
For the perpetration of the acts being complained of, the respondents are
charged of violations of Sections 3(e) and (g) of Republic Act No. 3019. The
instant case however will no longer prosper for the offenses have already
prescribed. xx
Be it remembered that MINCOCO applied for and was granted
loans/guarantees way back in 1976. Thus, these acts are governed by the
law in force at the time of their commission, which is the old R.A. No. 3019
before its amendment by Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 in March 1982.
Offenses perpetrated prior to the enactment of this latter law prescribed ten
(10) years later. And since the case was filed against the respondents only
in September 1997, the offenses have long prescribed in 1986.
Prescription commenced to run in 1976 when the assailed transaction
happened. x x x.
Petitioners Contention:
Petitioners filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court.
The petitioner argued that the right of the State to recover behest loans as
ill-gotten wealth is imprescriptible under Section 15, Article XI of the 1987

Constitution; and, assuming that the period to file criminal charges herefore
is subject to prescription, the prescriptive period should be counted from
the time of discovery of behest loans or sometime in 1992 when the
Committee was constituted.
ISSUES:
WoN the crimes charged against petitioners have already prescribed-NO
Sub-Issues: When has prescription set in?
WoN Sec 15 Art XI applies to criminal cases- NO
WoN the Ombudsmans full discretion to determine whether a criminal case
is to be filed is absolute-NO
HELD:
First Issue: NO.
At the core of the controversy is the Ombudsmans Resolution holding that
prescription had already set-in effectively barring the institution of charges
against the private respondents. The Ombudsman claimed that the alleged
behest loans, transpired in 1976, and, thus, the complaint filed after more
than two decades from the commission thereof or on 8 October 1997, was
well beyond the 10-year prescriptive period provided for under the old
Republic Act No. 3019.
In resolving the issue of prescription, the following shall be considered: (1)
the period of prescription for the offense charged; (2) the time the period of
prescription started to run; and (3) the time the prescriptive period was
interrupted.
The period of prescription for the crime charged in this petition, committed
in 1976 and prior to the amendment of Republic Act No. 3019, is ten (10)
years.
Section 1126 of Republic Act No. 3019 as amended by Batas Pambansa
Blg. 195, provides that the offenses committed under Republic Act No.
3019 shall prescribe in fifteen (15) years; prior to this amendment, however,
under the old Republic Act No. 3019, this prescriptive period was only ten
(10) years. In People v. Pacificador,the Court held that the longer
prescriptive period of 15-years does not apply in crimes committed prior to
the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, which was approved on 16
March 1982, because, not being favorable to the accused, it cannot be
given retroactive effect. Considering that the alleged crime was committed
in 1976, and in line with the Courts ruling in Pacificador, the prescription
period should be ten (10) years.
Prescription of crime shall begin to run from the day of its commission, and
if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the
institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
Second
While we sustain the Ombudsmans contention that the prescriptive period
for the crime charged herein is 10 years and not 15 years, we are not
persuaded that in this specific case, the prescriptive period began to run in
1976, when the loans were transacted.
The time as to when the prescriptive period starts to run for crimes
committed under Republic Act No. 3019, a special law, is covered by Act
No. 3326,28 Section 2 of which provides that:
Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of
the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the
discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment.

The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted


against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings
are dismissed for reasons not constituting double jeopardy.
Generally, the prescriptive period shall commence to run on the day the
crime is committed. That an aggrieved person "entitled to an action has no
knowledge of his right to sue or of the facts out of which his right arises,"
does not prevent the running of the prescriptive period. 29 An exception to
this rule is the "blameless ignorance" doctrine, incorporated in Section 2
of Act No. 3326. Under this doctrine, "the statute of limitations runs only
upon discovery of the fact of the invasion of a right which will support a
cause of action. In other words, the courts would decline to apply the
statute of limitations where the plaintiff does not know or has no reasonable
means of knowing the existence of a cause of action." It was in this accord
that the Court confronted the question on the running of the prescriptive
period in People v. Duque which became the cornerstone of our 1999
Decision in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans
v. Desierto (G.R. No. 130149),32 and the subsequent cases which
Ombudsman Desierto dismissed, emphatically, on the ground of
prescription too. Thus, we held in a catena of cases, that if the violation of
the special law was not known at the time of its commission, the
prescription begins to run only from the discovery thereof, i.e.,
discovery of the unlawful nature of the constitutive act or acts.
Corollary, it is safe to conclude that the prescriptive period for the
crime which is the subject herein, commenced from the date of its
discovery in 1992 after the Committee made an exhaustive
investigation.35 When the complaint was filed in 1997, only five years have
elapsed, and, hence, prescription has not yet set in. The rationale for this
was succinctly discussed in the 1999 Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding
Committee on Behest Loans,36 that "it was well-high impossible for the
State, the aggrieved party, to have known these crimes committed prior to
the 1986 EDSA Revolution, because of the alleged connivance and
conspiracy among involved public officials and the beneficiaries of the
loans."37 In yet another pronouncement, in the 2001 Presidential Ad Hoc
Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto (G.R. No.
130817),38 the Court held that during the Marcos regime, no person would
have dared to question the legality of these transactions.
Second Issue: NO
The provision found in Section 15, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution that
"the right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public
officials or employees, from them or from their nominees or transferees,
shall not be barred by prescription, laches or estoppels," has already been
settled in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v.
Desierto (G.R. No. 130140), where the Court held that the above cited
constitutional provision "applies only to civil actions for recovery of illgotten wealth, and not to criminal cases."
Third Issue; NO
While the Ombudsman has the full discretion to determine whether a
criminal case is to be filed, the Court is not precluded from reviewing
the Ombudsmans action when there is a grave abuse of discretion.
True, the Ombudsman is a constitutionally created body with
constitutionally mandated independence. Despite this, however, the
Ombudsman comes within the purview of the Courts power of judicial
review a peculiar concept of Philippine Ombudsman, embodied in Article
VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution which serves as a safety net
against its capricious and arbitrary acts. Thus, in Garcia-Rueda v.
Pascasio, the Court held that "while the Ombudsman has the full discretion

to determine whether or not a criminal case is to be filed, the Court is not


precluded from reviewing the Ombudsmans action when there is grave
abuse of discretion." This is because, "while the Ombudsman enjoys, as it
must, complete independence, it cannot and must not lose track of the law,
which it is bound to uphold and obey."
After reviewing the cases records, the Court finds that the present petition
calls for the exercise of its power of judicial review.
The duty of the Ombudsman in the conduct of a preliminary investigation is
to establish whether there exists probable cause to file information in court
against the accused.64 A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on
evidence showing that more likely than not, the accused committed the
crime. Considering the quantum of evidence needed to support a finding of
probable cause, the Court holds that the Ombudsman gravely abused its
discretion when it dismissed the complaint against herein respondents.
Preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive
display of the parties evidence.It is for the presentation of such evidence
only as may engender a well founded belief that an offense has been
committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. 67 The validity and
merits of a partys accusation or defense, as well as admissibility of
testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated during the trial proper.
In conclusion, the offenses ascribed to respondents "involve behest loans
which bled white the economy of the country, one of the excesses of the
authoritarian regime that led to the EDSA revolution, a serious evil that the
1987 Constitution aimed to extirpate." It involves nothing less than the
interest of the people whose transgressed rights are supposed to be
vindicated by their protector the Ombudsman. As protector of the people,
the Ombudsman should be pro-active in making use of its vast arsenal of
powers to "bring the lamp of scrutiny to otherwise dark places even over
the resistance of those who would draw the blinds."
OTHER DOCTRINE: The remedy from an adverse resolution of the
Ombudsman is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court;
what was filed with the Court, however, was a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45. Nevertheless, the Court will treat this petition as
one filed under Rule 65 since a reading of its contents shows that the
Committee imputes grave abuse of discretion to the Ombudsman for
dismissing the complaint.This was how we also treated the previous cases
marred by the same procedural lapse, the latest of which is the 2009
Presidential Ad-Hoc Fact Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto
(G.R. No. 135703) ---- BAKA ITO PALA TALAGA ANG ISSUE
MENDOZA v VILLAS
In the 2007 barangay elections, Mendoza obtained the highest votes for the
position of Punong Barangay of Barangay Balatasan, Bulalacao, Oriental
Mindoro, while respondent Liwanag Herato obtained the highest number of
votes for the position of Barangay Kagawad. Mayor Enrilo Villas was the
incumbent Mayor of Bulalacao, Oriental Mindoro at the time of
the barangay elections.
After the elections, the COMELEC proclaimed Mendoza as the dulyelected Punong Barangay of Balatasan. Thus, the losing candidate,
Thomas Pajanel, filed a petition for quo warranto with the MTC.
The MTC issued a Decision, disqualifying Mendoza and declaring that
Herato was entitled to succeed him as Punong Barangay with Herato
garnering the highest number of votes as a Barangay
Kagawad. Mendoza appealed the MTC Decision to the COMELEC.

On February 28, 2008, Villas administered the Oath of Office to


Herato. Then, Villas issued Memorandum No. 2008-03-010 dated March 3,
2008, directing all department heads of the Municipal Government to act
only on documents signed or authorized by Herato.
Meanwhile, Mendoza sought the advice of the DILG as to who should
exercise the powers of Punong Barangay of Balatasan given the prevailing
controversy.
In a letter dated April 11, 2008,[7] DILG Undersecretary Austere A. Panadero
responded to Mendozas inquiry informing Villas that Mendoza should
occupy the post of Punong Barangay as there was no Writ of Execution
Pending Appeal of the MTC Decision.
Nevertheless, the Bulalacao Municipal Administrator, Edezer Aceron, by the
authority of Villas, issued a letter dated April 23, 2008 [8] to respondent
Marlon de Castro, Manager, Pinamalayan Branch, Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP), requesting that transactions entered into by Mendoza in
behalf of Barangay Bulalacao should not be honored. In the same letter,
Aceron dismissed the DILG letter dated April 11, 2008, saying that it is
merely advisory and not binding on the municipal government of Bulalacao
and the LBP.
In response, de Castro issued Villas and Mendoza a letter dated April 24,
2008,[9] advising both parties that the LBP shall not honor any transaction
with regard the accounts of Barangay Balatasan.
Thereafter, petitioners filed a Petition dated May 5, 2008 for Mandamus
with Damages and Prayer for the Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction,
docketed as Special Civil Action No. 08-10 pending with the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 43 in Roxas, Oriental Mindoro. Petitioners prayed that the
LBP be directed to release the funds of Barangay Balatasan to them in
order to render necessary, basic public services to the inhabitants of
the barangay.
Thus, Villas and Herato filed an Answer dated May 16, 2008 interposing the
following affirmative defenses: (1) that the petition for mandamus was
defective, being directed against two or more different entities and requiring
to perform different acts; and (2) that Mendoza does not have any clear and
legal right for the writ of mandamus.
On the other hand, the LBP also filed its Answer dated June 5, 2008,
stating that its decision of withholding the barangay funds was a mere act
of prudence given the controversy surrounding the true Punong
Barangay of Balatasan while manifesting that it will release the funds to
whom the Court directs it to.
Thereafter, Villas and Herato filed a Motion to Dismiss dated November 7,
2008. In the Motion, a copy of the COMELEC Resolution dated September
8, 2008 in COMELEC Case No. SPA-07-243-BRGY was attached. This
case originated from a disqualification case against Mendoza filed with the
COMELEC by Senen Familara before the conduct of the
2007 barangay elections. In
the
Resolution,
the
COMELEC
disqualified Mendoza as
a
candidate
for Punong
Barangay of Barangay Balatasan in the 2007 barangay elections for having
already served three (3) consecutive terms for the same position. In
response, Mendoza presented a Certification dated February 27,
2009[10] from the COMELEC which stated that COMELEC Case No. SPA07-243-BRGY is still pending with the Commission.
In an attempt to clarify the issues on the matter, Mendoza again sought the
opinion of the DILG regarding the controversy. Thus, the DILG issued
another letter, denominated as DILG Opinion No. 5, Series of 2009 dated
January 2009,[11] reiterating its stance that the MTC Decision dated
February 23, 2008 has not yet become final and executory.
Nevertheless, the RTC issued the assailed order dated February 2, 2009
dismissing the petition on the strength of the COMELEC Resolution dated
September 8, 2008 disqualifying Mendoza from running in the 2007
elections. As stated, petitioners motion for reconsideration of the Order
dated February 2, 2009 was denied in an Order dated March 17, 2009.

From such orders the petitioners went directly to this Court.


The instant petition is a direct recourse to this Court from the
assailed orders of the RTC. Notably, petitioners did not cite the rule under
the Rules of Court by which the petition was filed. If the petition is to be
treated as a petition filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the petition
must be dismissed outright for having been filed prematurely.
In Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations, Inc.
(CREBA) v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,[12] a petition for certiorari filed
under Rule 65 was dismissed for having been filed directly with the Court,
violating the principle of hierarchy of courts, to wit:

either of the following: an ordinary appeal if the case was originally


decided by the RTC; or a petition for review under Rule 42, if the case
was decided under the RTC's appellate jurisdiction.
Nonetheless, a direct recourse to this Court can be taken for a
review of the decisions, final orders or resolutions of the RTC, but only on
questions of law. Under Section 5 of Article VIII of the Constitution, the
Supreme Court has the power to
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or
certiorari as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments
and orders of lower courts in:
xxxx

Primarily, although this Court, the Court of Appeals and


the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs
of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus
and injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner
unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. In Heirs of Bertuldo
Hinog v. Melicor, citing People v. Cuaresma, this Court made the
following pronouncements:
This Courts original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari
is not exclusive. It is shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts
and with the Court of Appeals. This concurrence of jurisdiction
is not, however, to be taken as according to parties seeking
any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice
of the court to which application therefor will be directed.
There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is
determinative of the venue of appeals, and also serves as a
general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the
extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial
hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the
issuance of extraordinary writs against first level (inferior)
courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those
against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct
invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to issue
these writs should be allowed only when there are special and
important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in
the petition. This is [an] established policy. It is a policy necessary
to prevent inordinate demands upon the Courts time and attention
which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive
jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Courts
docket. (Emphasis supplied.)
Similarly, there are no special and important reasons that
petitioners cite to justify their direct recourse to this Court under Rule 65.
On the other hand, direct recourse to this Court has been
allowed for petitions filed under Rule 45 when only questions of law are
raised, as in this case. Thus, the Court ruled in Barcenas v. Tomas:[13]
Section 1 of Rule 45 clearly states that the following may
be appealed to the Supreme Court through a petition for review by
certiorari: 1) judgments; 2) final orders; or 3) resolutions of the Court
of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or similar
courts, whenever authorized by law. The appeal must involve only
questions of law, not of fact.
This Court has, time and time again, pointed out that it is
not a trier of facts; and that, save for a few exceptional instances, its
function is not to analyze or weigh all over again the factual findings
of the lower courts. There is a question of law when doubts or
differences arise as to what law pertains to a certain state of facts,
and a question of fact when the doubt pertains to the truth or falsity
of alleged facts.
Under the principle of the hierarchy of courts, decisions, final
orders or resolutions of an MTC should be appealed to the RTC
exercising territorial jurisdiction over the former. On the other hand, RTC
judgments, final orders or resolutions are appealable to the CA through

(e) All cases in which only an error or question


of law is involved.
This kind of direct appeal to this Court of RTC
judgments, final orders or resolutions is provided for in Section
2(c) of Rule 41, which reads:
SEC. 2. Modes of appeal.
xxxx
(c) Appeal by certiorari.In all cases where only
questions of law are raised or involved, the appeal shall be
to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in
accordance with Rule 45.
Procedurally then, petitioners could have
appealed the RTC Decision affirming the MTC (1) to this
Court on questions of law only; or (2) if there are factual
questions involved, to the CA -- as they in fact did. Unfortunately
for petitioners, the CA properly dismissed their petition for review
because of serious procedural defects. This action foreclosed
their only available avenue for the review of the factual findings
of the RTC. (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, the Court shall exercise liberality and consider the instant
petition as one filed under Rule 45. In Artistica Ceramica, Inc. v. Ciudad Del
Carmen Homeowners Association, Inc.,[14] citing Republic v. Court of
Appeals,[15]the Court noted that it has the discretion to determine whether a
petition was filed under Rule 45 or 65 of the Rules of Court:
Admittedly, this Court, in accordance with the liberal
spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in the interest of justice,
has the discretion to treat a petition for certiorari as having been
filed under Rule 45, especially if filed within the reglementary
period for filing a petition for review.
Nevertheless, even providing that the petition was not filed
prematurely, it must still be dismissed for having become moot and
academic.
[16]

In Gunsi, Sr. v. Commissioners, The Commission on Elections,


the Court defined a moot and academic case as follows:

A moot and academic case is one that ceases to


present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening
events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical
value. As a rule, courts decline jurisdiction over such case, or
dismiss it on ground of mootness.
With the conduct of the 2010 barangay elections, a supervening
event has transpired that has rendered this case moot and academic and
subject to dismissal. This is because, as stated in Fernandez v.

Commission on Elections,[17]whatever judgment is reached, the same can


no longer have any practical legal effect or, in the nature of things, can no
longer be enforced. Mendozas term of office has expired with the conduct
of last years local elections. As such, Special Civil Action No. 08-10, where
the assailed Orders were issued, can no longer prosper. Mendoza no
longer has any legal standing to further pursue the case, rendering the
instant petition moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED
UNITED CLAIMANTS ASSOC of NEA v NEA
G.R. No. 187107
January 31, 2012
Petitioners are former employees of NEA
On August 28, 2002, former President Gloria Macapagal- Arroyo issued
Executive Order No. 119 directing the NEA Board to submit a
reorganization plan. Thus, the NEA Board issued the assailed Resolution
Nos. 46 and 59, dated July 10, 2003 and September 3, 2003,
respectively,otherwise known as the National Electrification Administration
(NEA) Termination Pay Plan, issued by respondent NEA Board of
Administrators (NEA Board).
On September 17, 2003, the Department of Budget and Management
approved the NEA Termination Pay Plan.
Thereafter, the NEA implemented an early retirement program denominated
as the "Early Leavers Program," giving incentives to those who availed of it
and left NEA before the effectivity of the reorganization plan. The other
employees of NEA were terminated effective December 31, 2003. .
Petitioners were terminated from their employment with the implementation
of the assailed resolutions.
Petitioners Contention:
1. The NEA Board has no power to terminate all the NEA employees;
2. Executive Order No. 119 did not grant the NEA Board the power to
terminate all NEA employees; and
3. Resolution Nos. 46 and 59 were carried out in bad faith.
Respondents Contention:
1. The Court has no jurisdiction over the petition;
2. Injunction is improper in this case given that the assailed resolutions of
the NEA Board have long been implemented; and
3. The assailed NEA Board resolutions were issued in good faith.
Petitioners filed an original action for Injunction to restrain and/or prevent
the implementation of Resolution Nos. 46 and 59, dated July 10, 2003 and
September 3, 2003, respectively.
ISSUES: WON court has jurisdiction over the case.
HELD: YES. Respondents essentially argue that petitioners violated the
principle of hierarchy of courts, pursuant to which the instant petition should
have been filed with the Regional Trial Court first rather than with this Court
directly.
We explained the principle of hierarchy of courts in Mendoza v.
Villas, stating:
In Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations, Inc. (CREBA) v.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform, a petition for certiorari filed under Rule 65
was dismissed for having been filed directly with the Court, violating the
principle of hierarchy of courts, to wit:
Primarily, although this Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial
Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence
does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.
In Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor, citing People v. Cuaresma, this Court
made the following pronouncements:

This Courts original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari is not exclusive. It


is shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts and with the Court of
Appeals. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as
according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained
freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed.
There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the
venue of appeals, and also serves as a general determinant of the
appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming
regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for
the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior") courts
should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter,
with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts
original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there
are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out
in the petition. This is [an] established policy. It is a policy necessary to
prevent inordinate demands upon the Courts time and attention which are
better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to
prevent further over-crowding of the Courts docket. (Emphasis supplied.)
Evidently, the instant petition should have been filed with the RTC.
However, as an exception to this general rule, the principle of
hierarchy of courts may be set aside for special and important
reasons. Such reason exists in the instant case involving as it does
the employment of the entire plantilla of NEA, more than 700
employees all told, who were effectively dismissed from employment
in one swift stroke. This to the mind of the Court entails its attention.
Moreover, the Court has made a similar ruling in National Power
Corporation Drivers and Mechanics Association (NPC-DAMA) v. National
Power Corporation (NPC).2 In that case, the NPC-DAMA also filed a petition
for injunction directly with this Court assailing NPC Board Resolution Nos.
2002-124 and 2002-125, both dated November 18, 2002, directing the
termination of all employees of the NPC on January 31, 2003. Despite such
apparent disregard of the principle of hierarchy of courts, the petition was
given due course. We perceive no compelling reason to treat the instant
case differently.
OTHERS: Petitioners Failed to Prove that the NEA Board Acted in Bad
Faith
PETITION is DISMISSED. Resolution Nos. 46 and 59, dated July 10, 2003
and September 3, 2003, respectively, issued by the NEA Board of Directors
are hereby UPHELD.
LUCAS v LUCAS
FACTS:Petitioner, Jesse Lucas filed a Petition to Establish Filiation with a
Motion for the Submission of Parties to DNA Testing before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC.
Respondent Jesus Lucas was not served with a copy of the petition.
Nonetheless, respondent learned of the petition to establish filiation. His
counsel therefore went to the trial court on August 29, 2007 and obtained a
copy of the petition.
Petitioner filed with the RTC a Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the
Case. Hence, on September 3, 2007, the RTC, finding the petition to be
sufficient in form and substance, issued the Order3 setting the case for
hearing and urging anyone who has any objection to the petition to file his
opposition. The court also directed that the Order be published once a
week for three consecutive weeks in any newspaper of general circulation
in the Philippines, and that the Solicitor General be furnished with copies of
the Order and the petition in order that he may appear and represent the
State in the case.

Unaware of the issuance of the September 3, 2007 Order, Jesus filed a


Special Appearance and Comment. He manifested inter alia that: (1) he did
not receive the summons and a copy of the petition; (2) the petition was
adversarial in nature and therefore summons should be served on him as
respondent; (3) should the court agree that summons was required, he was
waiving service of summons and making a voluntary appearance; and (4)
notice by publication of the petition and the hearing was improper because
of the confidentiality of the subject matter.
Jesse filed a Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case which the RTC
found to be sufficient in form and hence set the case for hearing. Jesus filed
a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that DNA testing cannot be had on
the basis of a mere allegation pointing to him as Jesses father.
Acting on Jesus Motion for Reconsideration, the RTC dismissed the case
and held that Jesse failed to establish compliance with the four procedural
aspects for a paternity action enumerated in the case of Herrera
v. Alba namely, a prima faciecase, affirmative defences, presumption of
legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the putative father and the
child.
This prompted Jesse to file a Motion for Reconsideration which the RTC
granted. A new hearing was scheduled where the RTC held that ruling on
the grounds relied upon by Jesse for filing the instant petition is premature
considering that a full-blown trial has not yet taken place. Jesus filed a
Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the RTC. He then filed a
petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA ruled in favour
of Jesus, it noted that Jesse failed to show that the four significant aspects
of a traditional paternity action had been met and held that DNA testing
should not be allowed when the petitioner has failed to establish a prima
facie case.
Petitioners Contention: Court of appeals erred when it resolved the issue
of lack of jurisdiction over the person of herein respondent albeit the same
was never raised in the petition for certiorari

ISSUE:
WoN failure to serve summons deprives the court of its jurisdiction to try
and decide the case
HELD: NO
We need not belabor the issues on whether lack of jurisdiction was raised
before the CA, whether the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of
respondent, or whether respondent waived his right to the service of
summons. We find that the primordial issue here is actually whether it was
necessary, in the first place, to serve summons on respondent for the court
to acquire jurisdiction over the case. In other words, was the service of
summons jurisdictional? The answer to this question depends on the nature
of petitioners action, that is, whether it is an action in personam, in
rem, or quasi in rem.
An action in personam is lodged against a person based on personal
liability; an action in rem is directed against the thing itself instead of the
person; while an action quasi in rem names a person as defendant, but its
object is to subject that person's interest in a property to a corresponding
lien or obligation. A petition directed against the "thing" itself or the res,
which concerns the status of a person, like a petition for adoption,
annulment of marriage, or correction of entries in the birth certificate, is an
action in rem.

In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the


defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and decide the case.
In a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court,
provided that the latter has jurisdiction over the res. Jurisdiction over
the res is acquired either (a) by the seizure of the property under legal
process, whereby it is brought into actual custody of the law, or (b) as a
result of the institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of the
court is recognized and made effective.
The herein petition to establish illegitimate filiation is an action in rem.
By the simple filing of the petition to establish illegitimate filiation
before the RTC, which undoubtedly had jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the petition, the latter thereby acquired jurisdiction over the
case. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication.
Publication is notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for its
object to bar indefinitely all who might be minded to make an objection of
any sort to the right sought to be established.Through publication, all
interested parties are deemed notified of the petition.
If at all, service of summons or notice is made to the defendant, it is
not for the purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction, but merely
for satisfying the due process requirements.This is but proper in order
to afford the person concerned the opportunity to protect his interest if he
so chooses. Hence, failure to serve summons will not deprive the court of
its jurisdiction to try and decide the case. In such a case, the lack of
summons may be excused where it is determined that the adverse party
had, in fact, the opportunity to file his opposition, as in this case. We find
that the due process requirement with respect to respondent has been
satisfied, considering that he has participated in the proceedings in this
case and he has the opportunity to file his opposition to the petition to
establish filiation.
AGRA
V
COA
On July 1, 1989, Republic Act No. 6758 (the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989) took effect, Section 12 of which granted rice
allowance to employees of the National Electrification Administration (NEA).
A group of NEA employees who were hired after October 31, 1989 claimed
that they did not receive meal, rice, and childrens allowances. Thus, on
July 23, 1999, they filed a special civil action for mandamus against NEA
and its Board of Administrators before the RTC, alleging violation of their
right to the equal protection clause under the Constitution. RTC rendered
decision in their favour and ordering the implementation of a writ of
execution against funds of NEA.
NEA questioned before the Court of Appeals the Orders of the lower court.
CA rendered a Decision declaring null and void the Order of the RTC.
Meanwhile, the RTC held in abeyance the execution of its December 15,
1999 Decision pending resolution of this Court of the review on certiorari in
National Electrification Administration v. Morales, to allow the parties
recourse to the processes of the COA
COA denied the grant of rice allowance to employees of the National
Electrification Administration (NEA) who were hired after June 30,
1989 (petitioners)
Meanwhile, in an Indorsement, the Commission on Audit (COA) advised
NEA against making further payments in settlement of the claims of
Morales, et al. Apparently, COA had already passed upon claims
similar to those of Morales, et al. xxx

Thus, employees hired after the extended date of October 31, 1989,
pursuant to the above COA decision cannot defy that decision by
filing a petition for mandamus in the lower court. Presidential Decree
No. 1445 and the 1987 Constitution prescribe that the only mode for
appeal from decisions of this Commission is on certiorari to the
Supreme Court in the manner provided by law and the Rules of Court.
Clearly, the lower court had no jurisdiction when it entertained the
subject case of mandamus. And void decisions of the lower court can
never attain finality, much less be executed. Moreover, COA was not
made a party thereto, hence, it cannot be compelled to allow the
payment of claims on the basis of the questioned decision.
CA reversed the RTC and directed immediate implementation of the writ of
execution through garnishment of the funds of petitioners. Court held that it
was grave error for the CA to reverse the RTC and direct immediate
implementation of the writ of execution through garnishment of the funds of
petitioners.
Petitioners, in their Reply,anchor their petition on their allegation that the
RTC Decision had already become final and executory, could no longer be
disturbed, and must be respected by the parties. To support their claim,
they cite Arcenas v. Court of Appeals41 wherein this Court held:
For, it is a fundamental rule that when a final judgment becomes executory,
it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. The judgment may no
longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to
correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and
regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court
rendering it or by the highest Court of the land. The only recognized
exceptions are the correction of clerical errors or the making of socalled nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, and, of
course, where the judgment is void. Any amendment or alteration which
substantially affects a final and executory judgment is null and void for lack
of jurisdiction, including the entire proceedings held for that
purpose.42 (Emphasis ours.)
Petitioners likewise cite Panado v. Court of Appeals 43 wherein the Court
held that "[i]t is axiomatic that final and executory judgments can no longer
be attacked by any of the parties or be modified, directly or indirectly, even
by the highest court of the land."44 From the foregoing jurisprudence,
petitioners conclude that the acts of COA in disallowing the claims and
ordering refund of benefits already received clearly constitute grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction inasmuch as said acts
frustrated the final and executory decision of the trial court.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not the immutability of final decision doctrine must prevail
over the exclusive jurisdiction of [the COA] to audit and settle
disbursements of funds; and
2. Whether or not the NEA employees hired after June 30, 1989 are entitled
to rice allowance.
HELD:
1. As to the first issue, the immutability rule applies only when the decision
is promulgated by a court possessed of jurisdiction to hear and decide the
case. Undoubtedly, the petition in the guise of a case for mandamus is a
money claim falling within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of this
Commission. Noting the propensity of the lower courts in taking cognizance
of cases filed by claimants in violation of such primary jurisdiction, the
Supreme Court issued Administrative Circular 10-2000 dated October 23,
2000 enjoining judges of lower courts to exercise caution in order to
prevent "possible circumvention of the rules and procedures of the

Commission on Audit" and reiterating the basic rule that: "All money claims
against the Government must be filed with the Commission on Audit which
shall act upon it within sixty days. Rejection of the claim will authorize the
claimant to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court on certiorari and in
effect sue the State thereby."
Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, when an administrative body is
clothed with original and exclusive jurisdiction, courts are utterly without
power and authority to exercise concurrently such jurisdiction. Accordingly,
all the proceedings of the court in violation of that doctrine and all orders
and decisions reached thereby are null and void. It will be noted in the cited
Supreme Court Circular that money claims are cognizable by the COA and
its decision is appealable only to the Supreme Court. The lower courts have
nothing to do with such genus of transactions.
Anent the issue of entitlement to rice allowance by employees hired after
June 30, 1989, this Commission is left with no option but to affirm the
disallowance in the face of the explicit provisions of DBM-CCC No. 10. After
its publication on March 9, 1999 in the Official Gazette, rice allowance was
allowed only for incumbents as of July 1, 1989. Obviously, there is no
violation of the equal protection clause as cited in the PITC case, supra,
because whatever increments the incumbents are enjoying over those of
non-incumbents are transitory, for the same law provides that such
difference shall be deducted from the salary increase the former should
receive under Section 17. Thus, the equalization or standardization of what
the two categories of employees will be receiving in terms of benefits is
ensured.
2. We agree with the findings of the COA.
In National Electrification Administration v. Morales, the order of
garnishment against the NEA funds to implement the RTC Decision was in
issue, and we said that the COA had exclusive jurisdiction to decide on the
allowance or disallowance of money claims arising from the implementation
of Republic Act No. 6758. We observed therein that "the RTC acted
prudently in halting implementation of the writ of execution to allow the
parties recourse to the processes of the COA." 47 In fact, we even stated
there that "it is not for this Court to preempt the action of the COA on the
post-audit to be conducted by it per its Indorsement dated March 23,
2000."48
We find that the COA had ruled in accordance with law and jurisprudence,
and we see no reason to reverse its decision.
Stare Decisis
The doctrine "stare decisis et non quieta movere (Stand by the decisions
and disturb not what is settled)" is firmly entrenched in our jurisprudence.
Once this Court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain
state of facts, it would adhere to that principle and apply it to all future
cases in which the facts are substantially the same as in the earlier
controversy.
SUN INSURANCE V ASUNCION DIGEST
G.R. Nos. 79937-38 February 13, 1989
Facts:
Petitioner Sun Insurance (or SIOL) files a complaint for the annulment of a
decision on the consignation of fire insurance policy. Subsequently, the
Private Respondent (PR) files a complaint for the refund of premiums and

the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment in a civil case against SIOL.


In addition, PR also claims for damages, attorneys fees, litigation costs,
etc., however, the prayer did not state the amount of damages sought
although from the body of the complaint it can be inferred to be in amount
of P 50 million. Hence, PR originally paid only PhP 210.00 in docket
fees.The complaint underwent a number of amendments to make way for
subsequent re-assessments of the amount of damages sought as well as
the corresponding docket fees. The respondent demonstrated his
willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees as
required.
Issue: Did the Court acquire jurisdiction over the case even if private
respondent did not pay the correct or sufficient docket fees?
Held: YES.
It was held that it is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate
initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that
vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of
the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by
payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a
reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or
reglamentary period. Same rule goes for permissive counterclaims, third
party claims and similar pleadings.
In this case, obviously, there was the intent on the part of PR to defraud the
government of the docket fee due not only in the filing of the original
complaint but also in the filing of the second amended complaint. However,
a more liberal interpretation of the rules is called for considering that, unlike
in Manchester, the private respondent demonstrated his willingness to
abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees as required.
Where a trial court acquires jurisdiction in like manner, but subsequently,
the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified
the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing
fee shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of
the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and
assess and collect the additional fee.
TACAY VS RTC OF TAGUM
GR Nos. 88075-77
December 20, 1989
Facts:
These were 2 separate cases originally filed by Godofredo Pineda at the
RTC of Tagum for recovery of possession (acciones publiciana) against 3
defendants, namely: Antonia Noel, Ponciano Panes, and Maximo Tacay.
Pineda was the owner of 790 sqm land evidenced by TCT No. T-46560.
The previous owner of such land has allowed the 3 defendants to use or
occupy the same by mere tolerance. Pineda, having himself the need to
used the property, has demanded the defendants to vacate the property
and pay reasonable rentals therefore, but such were refused.
The complaint was challenged in the Motions to Dismiss filed by each
defendant alleging that it did not specify the amounts of actual, nominal,
and exemplary damages, nor the assessed value of the property, that being
bars the determination of the RTCs jurisdiction in deciding the case.
The Motions to Dismiss were denied but the claims for damages in the
complaint were expunged for failure to specify the amounts. Thus, the
defendants filed a Joint Petition for certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, and
temporary restraining order against the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not the amount of damages claimed and the assessed value of

the property are relevant in the determination of the courts jurisdiction in a


case for recovery of possession of property?
Held:
NO. Determinative of the courts jurisdiction in a recovery of possession of
property is the nature of the action (one of accion publicaina) and not the
value of the property, it may be commenced and prosecuted without an
accompanying claim for actual, nominal or exemplary damages and such
action would fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC. The
court acquired jurisdiction upon the filing of the complaint and payment of
the prescribed docket fees.
HEIRS OF THE LATE RUBEN REINOSO SR., V. CA (2011)
Doctrine: A reiteration of the more liberal Sun Insurance case. Where the
party does not deliberately intend to defraud the court in payment of docket
fees, and manifests its willingness to abide by the rules by paying additional
docket fees when required by the court, the liberal doctrine enunciated in
Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., and not the strict regulations set in Manchester,
will apply.
Facts: In 1979, Ruben Reinoso was a passenger in a jeepney traversing E.
Rodriguez Ave. The jeepney owned by Tapales, collided with a truck
owned by Guballa.

Reinoso died as a result of the collision. His heirs filed the


instant case for Damages against Tapales and Guballa
IN 1988, RTC found the Truck liable and held Guballa liable for
damages sustained by the Heirs of Reinoso and the jeepney
owner
Case litigated before the RTC which rendered a decision
In 1994, CA motu propio dismissed the petition on the ground of
nonpayment of docket fees pursuant to the 1987 Manchester
ruling
Reinosos defense: Manchester should not be made to apply
retroactively to their case as the case was filed prior to the
promulgation of Manchester ruling

ISSUE: WON the dismissal by the CA was proper due to the nonpayment
of docket fees?
HELD: NO

The Court reiterates the ruling in Sun Insurance v. Asuncion


the case at bench has been pending for more than 30 years and
the records thereof are already before this Court, a remand of
the case to the Court of Appeals (CA) would only unnecessarily
prolong its resolution
In Manchester v. Court of Appeals, it was held that a court
acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the
prescribed docket fee. The strict application of this rule was,
however, relaxed two (2) years after in the case of Sun
Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion
The Court also takes into account the fact that the case was filed
before the Manchester ruling came out. Even if said ruling could
be applied retroactively, liberality should be accorded to the
petitioners in view of the recency then of the ruling. Leniency
because of recency was applied to the cases of Far Eastern
Shipping Company v. Court of Appeals
RTC decision was reinstated

DBP v CASTILLO
FACTS:

Siblings Corazon and Gonzalo co-owned a real property. They mortgaged


the property to DBP. For failure to pay the loan, DBP foreclosed the
mortgage. Corazon died. Her daughter Cristina found out that the property
is already in the name of DBP. She filed a case for reconveyance on the
ground that DBP and Gonzalo connived so the property will be owned
solely by Gonzalo. Her proofs: her mother was not informed of the
foreclosure and thus was deprived of her right to redeem; Gonzalo
executed buy-back agreement with DBP over the property. She asked for
TRO and injunction to prevent the sale of the property at public auction.
DBP filed motion to dismiss and opposed TRO and injunction on the ground
that there is no cause of action because when Cristina became heir the
property was already in the name of DBP. RTC granted TRO and later
injunction and denied motion to dismiss. DBP moved for reconsideration.
RTC denied. DBP filed an answer ad cautelam and also filed petitions at
CA re the TRO, injunction and denial of motion to dismiss. CAdenied
petitions for being filed out of time. CA also denied the motion to dismiss for
being moot because DBP subsequently filed an answer.

On July 25, 2001, Dr. Babaran filed a complaint for Damages against PDI
because of the two column articles printed by it. She alleged that:

On Sept. 13, 2001, PDI filed their answer with counterclaims and araised
the following defenses:

ISSUE: WAS THE DENIAL OF THE MOTION TO DISMISS CORRECT?

Yes but not because it was moot but because it was without merit

She wrote a letter to PDIs editor after learning about the Aug. 1
article but did not receive a response
The 2nd article was published, again singling her out as
erroneously diagnosing the illness of Caldez
The DOH Fact-Finding Committee concluded that her diagnosis
was not erroneous, but this was not published
PDI acted in bad faith because of the above.

Complaint states no cause of action


Complaint fails and omits to state factual premises to support that
there was malice on PDIs part in publishing the questioned news
Babaran failed to allege actual malice
a case for actionable libel with claims for damages has not been
adequately stated in the complaint
complaint fails to establish basis of PDIs liability.

since the complaint of Cristina states a cause of action.


A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of
another. A complaint states a cause of action when it contains three
essential elements: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means
and whatever law it arises; (2) the correlative obligation of the defendant to
respect such right; and (3) the act or omission of the defendant violates the
right of the plaintiff. If any of these elements is absent, the complaint
becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state
a cause of action.
If any of these elements is absent, the complaint becomes vulnerable to a
motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action.
Evidently, all the above elements of a cause of action are alleged in the
complaint: (1) the legal right of the respondent over the subject property
foreclosed premised on the fact that she is the sole heir of one of the
owners who is entitled to the right of redemption; (2) the correlative
obligation of defendant DBP, as the foreclosing entity, to respect such right
of redemption; and (3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of
the legal right, i.e., the act of DBP and its co-defendant Zarate to cause the
ostensible foreclosure of the subject property and the subsequent
execution of a deed of conditional sale between the defendants even prior
to the lapse of redemption period to deprive respondents mother of her
right over the property.
PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER V. ALAMEDA. G.R. No. 160604, March 28,
2008
FACTS:
Philippine Daily Inquirer (PDI) published an article entitled, After Bong,
whos next? in its August 1, 2000 issue. The article narrated the death of
Expedito Bong Caldez, who was a photo correspondent in the Cagayan
branch of PDI. Here, the family of Caldez lamented his death due to the
erroneous diagnosis of Dr. Luz Babaran.
On Sept. 29, 2000, the PDI published another article, DOH orders probe of
fotogs death, where they reported that the regional Department of Health
(DOH) in Tuguegarao City has started investigating the death of Expedito
Caldez following an order from the DOHs Bureau of Licensing and
Regulation.

Pre-trial was held and terminated, and PDI filed a Motion for a
Preliminary Hearing on Affirmative Defense Raised in the Answer
(which is also a ground for a motion to dismiss). In said motion, it was
alleged that at the pre-trial, the court noted that one of the defenses raised
by PDI was that Babaran has not delineated the participation of each of
petitioners in the publication of the alleged libelous articles. Thereupon,
Babarans counsel asked for a few days to determine whether the
complaint should be amended to cure its defects. However, Babaran had
not moved to amend the complaint, hence, PDI filed the motion. PDI
contended that:

in libel charges, the participation of each


defendant must be specifically alleged in the
complaint, which Babaran failed to do.

Allegations in complaint are mere conclusions of


law and opinions of Babaran.
PDI asked that a preliminary hearing be conducted on their
affirmative defense that the complaint failed to state a cause of action;
and after that, that the complaint be dismissed.
Babaran filed a Comment/Opposition to such Motion and
averred that at the pre-trial, the issue of whether or not the complaint states
a cause of action was not raised, thus is no longer an issue to be litigated.
RTC ruled in favor of Babaran, denying said Motion by PDI, and
said Babarans complaint properly stated a sufficient cause of action and
was supported by the documentary evidence she produced. PDI filed a MR,
but it was denied.
CA: PDI filed a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the CA
and prayed that the RTC decision be annulled and set aside because it was
rendered with GADALEJ; that the case be dismissed for failure to state a
cause of action. CA dismissed PDIs petition.
ISSUE: W/N a complaint which fails to validly and sufficiently state a cause
of action for libel should be dismissed because:
a. the participation of each defendant is not specifically set out in
the complaint

b. the material allegations of the complaint are conclusions of


law and just opinions of Babaran, not a statement of ultimate facts
HELD:

NO
There are 3 essential elements of a cause of action:

1
2
3

right in favor of the plaintiff


obligation on the part of the defendant to respect or not to violate
such right
Act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation of the
right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of
the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an
action for recovery of damages or other appropriate relief.

Of the three, the most important is the last element since it is


only upon the occurrence of the last element that a cause of action arises,
giving the plaintiff the right to maintain an action in court for recovery of
damages or other appropriate relief. In determining whether an initiatory
pleading states a cause of action, the test is as follows: admitting the
truth of the facts alleged, can the court render a valid judgment in
accordance with the prayer? To be taken into account are only the
material allegations in the complaint; extraneous facts and
circumstances or other matters aliunde are not considered. The court
may however consider, in addition to the complaint, the appended annexes
or documents, other pleadings of the plaintiff, or admissions in the records.
When a defendant seeks the dismissal of the complaint through a
motion to dismiss, the sufficiency of the motion should be tested on
the strength of the allegations of facts contained in the complaint and
on no other basis. The issue of whether or not the complaint failed to
state a cause of action, warranting its dismissal, must be passed upon
on the basis of the allegations stated therein assuming them to be
true and the court cannot inquire into the truth of the allegations and
declare them to be false; otherwise, it would be a procedural error and
a denial of due process to the plaintiff.
This Court finds that petitioners raised the threshold question of whether
the complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action. Hence, the trial court
should have granted petitioners motion for a preliminary hearing on the
affirmative defenses raised in the answer based on failure to state a cause
of action. This procedure is designed to prevent a tedious, if not traumatic,
trial in case the complaint falls short of sufficiently alleging a cause of
action.
CALIMLIM vs. HON. RAMIREZ
G.R. No. L-34362, November 19, 1982

Facts:
Independent Mercantile Corporation filed a petition in the
respondent Court to compel Manuel Magali to surrender the owner's
duplicate of TCT No. 9138 in order that the same may be cancelled and a
new one issued in the name of the said corporation. Not being the
registered owner and the title not being in his possession, Manuel Magali
failed to comply with the order of the Court directing him to surrender the
said title. This prompted Independent Mercantile Corporation to file an exparte petition to declare TCT No. 9138 as cancelled and to issue a new title
in its name. The said petition was granted by the respondent Court and the
Register of Deeds of Pangasinan issued a new title in the name of the

corporation, TCT No. 68568. Petitioner, upon learning that her husband's
title over the parcel of land had been cancelled, filed a petition with the
respondent Court, sitting as a cadastral court, praying for the cancellation
of TCT No. 68568 but the court dismissed the petition.
Petitioner thereafter filed in the LRC Record No. 39492 for the
cancellation of TCT No. 68568 but the same was dismissed therein.
Petitioners then resorted to the filing of a complaint in for the cancellation of
the conveyances and sales that had been made with respect to the
property, covered by TCT No. 9138, against Francisco Ramos who claimed
to have bought the property from Independent Mercantile Corporation.
Private respondent Francisco Ramos, however, failed to obtain a title over
the property in his name in view of the existence of an adverse claim
annotated on the title thereof at the instance of the herein petitioners.
Francisco Ramos filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the same is
barred by prior judgement or by statute of limitations. Resolving the said
Motion, the respondent Court dismissed the case on the ground of estoppel
by prior judgment.

Issue:
Whether or not dismissal of the case is proper on the ground of
estoppel by prior judgment

Held:
No. It is error to consider the dismissal of the petition filed by the
herein petitioner in LRC Record No. 39492 for the cancellation of TCT No.
68568 as a bar by prior judgment against the filing of the subsequent civil
case. In order to avail of the defense of res judicata, it must be shown,
among others, that the judgment in the prior action must have been
rendered by a court with the proper jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
proceeding in which the prior judgment or order was rendered. If there is
lack of jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the suit or of the parties, the
judgment or order cannot operate as an adjudication of the controversy.
This essential element of the defense of bar by prior judgment or res
judicata does not exist in the case.
The petition filed by the petitioners in LRC Record No. 39492
was an apparent invocation of the authority of the respondent Court sitting
as a land registration court. Reliance was apparently placed on Section 112
of the Land Registration Act wherein it provides that a Court of First
Instance, acting as a land registration court, is a court of limited and special
jurisdiction. As such, its proceedings are not adequate for the litigation of
issues pertaining to an ordinary civil action, such as, questions involving
ownership or title to real property.
DO-ALL METALS
CORPORATION

INDUSTRIES,

INC.

V.

SECURITY

BANK

Non-payment of additional filing fees due on additional claims do not divest


the Court of the jurisdiction it already had over the case. However, afterjudgment lien for said unpaid filing fees only applies to cases (1) where the
filing fees were incorrectly assessed or paid or (2) where the court has
discretion to fix the amount of the award. None of these are present in this
case and award was in fact already specified. Also, ONLY the Supreme
Court can grant exemptions to the payment of the fees due the courts.
Parties or even the trial court cannot waive payment of fees.
Facts: Spouses Lim took a loan from Security Bank. Unable to pay on time,
the Lims assigned to the Bank their real properties including a building and
lot. The Bank then offered to lease said property to the Lims through Do-All
Metals Industries, Inc. (DMI) primarily for business and partly as Lim's
residence. A 2-year lease contract was executed on the condition that the
Bank has the right to pre-terminate the lease and should the Bank decide to
sell the property, DMI shall have the right of first refusal.

Months before the lease was up, the Bank notified DMI that it was preterminating it. While negotiations were ongoing, the Lims claim that they
continued to use the property but the Bank posted security guards at the
said place and the guards, on instructions of the Bank, padlocked the
entrances and barred the Lims and DMIs employees from entering, even
pointing gun at one employee. Because of this, DMI was unable to close
several projects with potential clients and Lims were unable to retrieve
personal items left at the property. DMI and Lims (DMI) then filed a
complaint with RTC Pasig for damages with prayer for the issuance of a
TRO or preliminary injunction against the Bank.
RTC directed the Bank to allow DMI to enter the building and get their
machineries, equipment and personal things but DMI was unable to find
their properties. In a supplemental complaint, DMI alleged that the Bank
surreptitiously took such properties, resulting in additional actual damages
of over P27M. RTC ruled in favor of DMI, ordering the Bank to pay the
P27M actual damages, + moral damages, exemplary damages, and
attorneys fees.
The Bank moved for reconsideration of the decision, questioning among
other things the RTCs authority to grant damages considering DMIs failure
to pay the filing fees on their supplemental complaint. The RTC denied the
motion. On appeal, CA ruled in favor of the Bank and denied the
subsequent MR, hence this petition.
Issues:
1. W/N the RTC acquired JURISDICTION on the supplemental complaint
against the Bank considering DMI and Lims' failure to pay the filing fees on
the amounts of damages they claim in it; YES.
2. Whether or not the Bank is liable for the intimidation and harassment
committed against DMI. YES.
3. W/N the Bank is LIABLE to DMI for the machineries, equipment, and
other properties they allegedly lost after they were barred from the property.
NO.
Held:
(1) YES. The RTC acquired jurisdiction over their action from the moment
they filed the original complaint accompanied by the payment of the filing
fees due on the same. Their non-payment of the additional filing fees due
on their additional claims did not divest the RTC of the jurisdiction it already
had over the case.

(2) YES. The Bank belittles the testimonies of the DMIs witnesses for
having been presented ex parte but the ex parte hearing, having been
properly authorized, cannot be assailed as less credible. It was the Banks
fault that it was unable to attend the hearing. It cannot profit from its lack of
diligence. Employees of DMI testified regarding the Bank guards
unmitigated use of their superior strength and firepower and such were
never refuted. Police testified finding Lim locked in the building and being
told by a Bank representative that they had instructions to prevent anyone
from taking any property out of the premises. While the lease may have
already lapsed, the Bank had no business harassing and intimidating the
Lims and DMI employees.
(3) NO. DMI's stand is that the RTC correctly admitted the supplemental
complaint even if they had not paid the filing fees due on it since such fees
constituted a lien anyway on the judgment award. But this after-judgment
lien, which implies that payment depends on a successful execution of the
judgment, applies to cases (1) where the filing fees were incorrectly
assessed or paid or (2) where the court has discretion to fix the amount of
the award. NONE of these circumstances are present in this case.
Here, the supplemental complaint specified from the beginning the actual
damages that DMI sought against the Bank. Still DMI paid no filing fees on
the same and gave no reason for their omission nor offered to pay the
same, merely saying that they did not yet pay the fees because the RTC
had not assessed them for it. But a supplemental complaint is like any
complaint and the rule is that the filing fees due on a complaint need to be
paid upon its filing. The rules DO NOT require the court to make special
assessments in cases of supplemental complaints. Although the Bank
brought up the question of their failure to pay additional filing fees in its
motion for reconsideration, DMI made no effort to make at least a late
payment before decision. Consequently, the trial court should have treated
their Supplemental Complaint as not filed.
DMI argues that the Bank raised the issue of non-payment of additional
filing fees only after the RTC had rendered its decision, thus waiving its
objection. But it is not for a party to the case or even for the trial court to
waive the payment of the additional filing fees due on the supplemental
complaint. Only the Supreme Court can grant exemptions to the payment of
the fees due the courts and these exemptions are embodied in its rules.
Court reinstated the RTC decision and ordered the bank to pay damages,
but deleted the claim for the P27M actual damages in the supplemental
complaint.

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