Rev

Oblicon - Pineda Reviewer Following Misons syllabus plus Case List Doctrines : Anton Mercado and Sabrina DAYAO
1-E
Prescription of Ownership: (Articles 1117 1138)

Article 1117.
Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary.
Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in good faith
and with just title for the time fixed by law. (1940a)
Requisites of Acquisitive
Prescription
Ordinary Prescription
Extraordinary Prescription
Persons who are capable of acquiring property or rights by the other legal modes
may acquire the same by means of prescription.
Capacity to acquire prescription
Minors and other incapacitated persons may acquire property or rights by
prescription, either personally or through their parents, guardians or legal
representatives.
A thing capable of acquisition by

prescription
All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of
prescription, unless otherwise provided.
Property of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall
not be the object of prescription.
Possession of the thing under certain

conditions
Lapse of time provided by law
1. Good faith and with just title

2. In the concept of an owner
3. Open, exclusive, and uninterrupted
ownership
1. Bad faith
2. In the concept of an owner
3. Open, exclusive, and uninterrupted
ownership
Movable / personal property 4 years

Immovable property 10 years
Movable property 8 years

Immovable property 30 years
Acquisitive Prescription:
Acquisitive prescription may be ordinary or extraordinary.

Ordinary prescription requires uninterrupted possession for the required statutory period of years in good
faith and with a just title.
Extraordinary prescription likewise requires an uninterrupted possession for the statutory period of years
but without need of just title and good faith on the part of the possessor.
Godinez vs. Court of Appeals

Felix Bergado owned a lot located in Lapulapu City. It was inherited by his seven children.
Cadastral Judge ordered the registration of the lot in the names of seven sets of transferees to each of
whom he adjudicated a 1/6 share instead of 1/7. Because of that error and other clerical errors, no decree
was issued and the land remained unregistered.
5/7 portion of the lot were transferred to the Magsumbol spouses, which was subsequently sold to the
Igots after 28 years.
38 years after the registration order of the cadastral judge, the land finally became registered and OCT
No.8 was issued through the initiative of the Bergado heirs.
Iwanan mo na ang Egypt mo at sumama ka na sakin. Please lang. hindi mo pagsisisihan. Anton Mercado
Oblicon - Pineda Reviewer Following Misons syllabus plus Case List Doctrines : Anton Mercado and Sabrina DAYAO 1-E
Igot brothers sued some of the Bergado heirs for the reconveyance of Lot 655-A (5/7 portion) which is
covered by OCT No. 8. CA held that the Magsumbols had acquired Lot 655-A by prescription under
section 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure. That right was in turn transmitted to the Igots by the
subsequent sale, and the Bergado heirs can no longer acquire the property.
Was the land rightfully acquired by the Magsumbols thru prescription? - YES
The Court held that CA did not err in dismissing the claim of the petitioners for Lot 655-A which has
been in the adverse, continuous, uninterrupted and notorious possession of the Magsumbols and the Igots
in the concept of owner for more than half a century. Law and the canons of common sense are on the
side of the Igots.
Heirs of Amarante vs. Court of Appeals

Petitioners aver that the land in question was originally owned and cultivated by late Malonis Infiel, a
native Aeta. According to them, Infiel had been occupying the land even before WWII, and planted no
less than 300 coconut trees, mango trees and bamboo groves on the land.
Upon Infiels death, the land was divided and inherited by Amarante and other relatives of Infiel, taking
Lot 1236, and Malonis, taking Lot 1237.
In 1953, Gregorio Bolo proceeded to occupy Lot 1236 claiming to have purchased it from the Malonis
heirs. Heirs of Amarante contend that the Malonis heirs had no right to sell Lot 1236, because what had
been given to them was only Lot 1237.
Who has the rightful possession over Lot 1236? Heirs of Amarante
The Court held in favor of the petitioners. According to the NCC, the period for extraordinary
prescription to possess a property is 30 years.
In this case, when possession of Malonis Infiel is tacked on to that of petitioners, it exceeds 30 years,
therefore, petitioners have right possession over Lot 1236 (the coconut trees planted by Infiel were
already 70 years of age, and the trunks of the mango trees had circumference of 3 arm lengths, indicating
their oldness).
Under the Public Land Act, alienable public land held by a possessor, personally or through his
predecessor-in interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for the prescribed statutory period (30 years
under the Public Land Act, as amended) is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion
of said period of ipso jure . Public Land Act also supports the petitioners possession.
Article 1118.
Possession has to be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful and uninterrupted. (1941)
Owner:
Possession must be in the concept of an owner. This means that the possessor asserts dominion on the
property to the exclusion of all others. It must be an adverse possession.
Thus, a mere lessee or a mere mortgagee does not hold the property in the concept of an owner.
Thus, mere possession with a juridical title, such as, to exemplify, by a usufructuary, a trustee, a lessee,
an agent or a pledgee, not being in the concept of an owner, cannot ripen into ownership by acquisitive
prescription, unless the juridical relation is first expressly repudiated and such repudiation has been
communicated to the other party.
Acts of possessory character executed due to license or by mere tolerance of the owner would likewise be
inadequate. Possession, to constitute a foundation of a prescriptive right, must be en concepto dueno, or,
to use the common law equivalent of the term, that possession should be adverse, if not, such possessory
acts, no matter how long, do not start the running of the period of prescription.
Public:
Possession must be public. This means that there must be a notorious holding of the property known to
the community. It must not be of a surreptitious character because it must be in the concept of an owner.
Peaceful:
It must likewise be peaceful in that, for the period of years required by law for acquisitive prescription to
apply, there must be no valid interference from others claiming or asserting their rights to the property.
"Consider this our mic drop" Sabrina dayao
Uninterrupted:
It must likewise be uninterrupted. This means that there must be continuity in the holding of the property.
An uninterrupted possession strengthens the adverse right of the possessor.
Possession can however be interrupted naturally or civilly.
Article 1119.
Acts of possessory character executed in virtue of license

or by mere tolerance of the owner
shall not be available for the purposes of possession. (1942)
Assertion of Ownership:
The fact that the possessor holds the property by virtue of the consent of the owner shows that such
possessor acknowledges that somebody else owns the property.
Possession by tolerance therefore does not imply an assertion of ownership, and thus produces no effect
with respect to possession or prescription
Where the statutory period for ordinary acquisitive prescription passed, the Supreme Court rejected the
application of prescription because the possession was merely one of tolerance.
2. Concept of Possession:
Republic vs. Court of Appeals
The heirs of Domingo Baloy(private respondents) applied for registration of their land. CFI-Zambales
denied their application but CA reversed such decision.
The claim of the heirs of Baloy is anchored on the possessory information coupled with their continuous,
adverse and public possession over the land in question which Domingo Baloy had acquired through the
Spanish Mortgage Law.
The republic in this case, opposed such decision alleging that the subject land had become public land
(area was declared within the US Naval Reservation) thru operation of Act 627 of the Philippine
Commission. Possession of the said land by the Baloys was then interrupted by the occupancy of the
U.S. Navy.
Was the occupancy of the US Navy over the subject land in the concept of an owner, hence, such
possession can be acquired by prescription? NO
SC stated that the occupancy of the U.S. Navy was not in the concept of owner. It partakes of the
character of a commodatum. It cannot therefore militate against the title of Domingo Baloy and his
successors-in-interest.
One's ownership of a thing may be lost by prescription by reason of another's possession if such
possession be under claim of ownership, not where the possession is only intended to be transient, as in
the case of the U.S. Navy's occupation of the land concerned, in which case the owner is not divested of
his title, although it cannot be exercised in the meantime.
Ramos vs. Court of Appeals
Salud Ramos (petitioner) was the daughter of Catalina Ramos. She filed a case against respondent for the
reconveyance of the lot of her mother which was sold to private respondents.
She claimed that the sale was fictitious because respondents simulated the deed of sale by telling Catalina
that the document was merely to guarantee payment (lot was mortgaged in favor of PNB) and not a deed
of sale. However, the case was filed 39 years after the said sale.
Has the cause of action prescribed? YES
The instant case, not having been filed within 10 years from the time the cause of action accrued because
the complaint was filed only about 39 years later.
Even from the standpoint of acquisitive prescription, which seems to be more decisive, it appears too
clear that private respondents have acquired title to the land in suit by virtue of possession in the concept
of an owner.
It is of record that private respondents have been in continuous possession of the litigated parcel of land
since they bought the same in 1934 and since then, have been paying the real estate taxes due thereon and
had declared said property in their name for taxation purposes.
While tax declaration and tax receipts are not necessarily evidence of title, they are strong evidence of
possession for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes year after year for a property that is not in
his actual possession.
Coronado vs. Court of Appeals

The property subject of this case is a parcel of land situated in Nagcarlan, Laguna. Juana Albovias claims
that the property in question is a portion of a bigger lot that she inherited from her grandfather. The
southern portion in turn was partitioned between JUANA and her brother. The part allocated to her
brother was later sold by him to one Dalmacio Monterola, owner of the adjoining property. Moreover,
JUANA claims that her property was included together with the two parcels of land owned by Dalmacio
Monterola, which were sold by Monterola's successor-in-interest Leonida Coronado.
Coronado claims that Monterola's continued possession of the said property for over ten years since 1934
ripened into full and absolute ownership.
Has Dalmacio Monterola acquired the property by acquisitive prescription? NO
The Court held that Monterola never claimed ownership over the property in question. As a matter of fact,
one of the deeds of donation executed by Monterola in favor of Leonida Coronado acknowledged that the
boundary owner on the property conveyed to her is JUANA.
Accordingly, he could not have acquired said property by acquisitive prescription. It follows that Leonida
Coronado could not have derived ownership of the land in question from her predecessor-in-interest
Dalmacio Monterola, whether by prescription or by some other title. Possession, under the Civil Code, to
constitute the foundation of a prescriptive right, must be possession under claim of title (en concepto de
dueno), or to use the common law equivalent of the term, it must be adverse .
Acts of possessory character performed by one who holds by mere tolerance of the owner are clearly not
en concepto de dueno, and such possessory acts, no matter how long so continued, do not start the
running of the period of prescription.
Corpus vs. Padilla
The rice-land in question was sold by Pedro Domingo to Corpuz, Sr. then, it was later sold to Benjamin
Padilla who declared the same for taxation purposes.
Mariano Corpuz now claims that his father had declared the same land for taxation purposes. He
recognized, during the trial, that lot 4 of the plan of the land belongs to Pedro Domingo.
Now, the heirs of Mariano Corpuz claims lot 4.
Has Corpuz sufficiently proven possession to claim prescription over the lot 4? NO
For prescription to set in, the possession must be adverse, continuous, public and to the exclusion of all.
These circumstances do not obtain in the case under consideration.
When the deed of sale was executed in 1937, the portion of two hectares mentioned therein already
formed part of the property of Mariano Corpuz, Sr. and included in his title to lot No. 2, which portion
Pedro Domingo was claiming. By so providing in the deed of sale, that the land of two hectares was the
property of Pedro Domingo, Corpuz expressly admitted the title to lot 4 or whatever remained of it, of
Pedro Domingo.
Article 1120.
Possession is interrupted for the purposes of prescription, naturally or civilly. (1943)
Article 1121.
Possession is naturally interrupted when through any cause

it should cease for more than one year.
The old possession is not revived if a new possession should be exercised
by the same adverse claimant. (1944a)
Article 1122.
If the natural interruption is for only one year or less,

the time elapsed shall be counted in favor of the prescription. (n)
Interruption illustrated:
For example, A is in possession of an unregistered property in the concept of an owner in good faith and
with a just title. The land is formerly owned by B. The property is sold in a public auction to satisfy Bs
indebtedness from the government. A is the successful bidder.
The document evidencing the title has not yet been finished and registered with the Government. A
however is already in possession for a period of 4 years. Z appears and claims that the property is his. Z
requests A to vacate the premises so that he will not be entangled in a possible suit. To avoid
complications, A left the place.
It turns out however, that Z is a defrauder, and it is M who has previously bought the property from B
before A made his purchase. Upon learning that Z is a defrauder, A returns to the property after two years.
He stays there for another 7 years. M now claims the property and requests A to leave the place.
A cannot invoke acquisitive prescription. While he may have possession of the property for a total period
of 11 years, it is interrupted. When he left the property for two years, his subsequent possession of seven
years cannot be added to his previous four years.
In effect, the period which is material for purposes of prescription is the subsequent 7 years. Obviously,
said seven-year period have not yet complied with the 10-year period required by law for ordinary
acquisitive prescription.
However, if the interruption is not two years but only one year or less, acquisitive prescription will have
already set in, in favor of A because the law clearly provides that if the natural interruption is for only one
year or less, the time elapsed shall be counted in favor of the prescription.
Article 1123.
Civil interruption is produced by judicial summons to the possessor. (1945a)
Article 1124.
Judicial summons shall be deemed not to have been issued and shall not give rise to interruption:
(1) If it should be void for lack of legal solemnities;
(2) If the plaintiff should desist from the complaint or should allow the proceedings to lapse;
(3) If the possessor should be absolved from the complaint.
In all these cases, the period of the interruption shall be counted for the prescription. (1946a)
Receipt of Judicial Summons:
When
It is not the filing of the complaint in court which interrupts the possession.
It is interrupted upon receipt of the possessor of the judicial summons after the filing of the complaint.
When the possessor receives the judicial summons and the copy of the complaint, it is only during that
time that jurisdiction is acquired by the court of the person of the possessor and it is at that time that
possession is interrupted.
However there are instances provided by law that judicial summons shall be deemed not to have been
issued, thereby not giving rise to interruption.
the judicial summons is void for lack of legal solemnities
The first case is when the judicial summons is void for lack of legal solemnities. Hence, if the judicial
summons as well as the copy of the complaint have been served by a person not authorized by the court,
it shall be deemed as not issued, thereby allowing the possession to run uninterrupted.
When
the plaintiff should desist from the complaint or should allow the proceedings to lapse
Second is when the plaintiff should desist from the complaint or should allow the proceedings to lapse.
Desistance from the complaint by the plaintiff means voluntarily having the case dismissed, while
allowing the proceeding to lapse clearly manifests the lack of interest to prosecute the case. In both cases,
the possessor should not be prejudiced. There will be no interruption.
When the possessor is absolved from the complaint
Third is when the possessor is absolved from the complaint. Absolution means that the complaint have
not been fully substantiated to support any adverse claim by the complainant and therefore this should not
prejudice the possessor who must always be presumed to be in good faith.
Article 1125.
Any express or tacit recognition which the possessor may make of the owner's right
also interrupts possession. (1948)
Nature of interruption
interrupted
uninterrupted
Naturalany cause except civil
For a period more than one year.
If the time elapsed is one year or

less.
Civilcomes in the form of judicial

summons to the possessor
interruption occurs upon receipt of the
judicial summons, and not the date of
filing of a complaint
It shall be considered an interruption:

1) If the judicial summons is valid,
2) If the plaintiff pursues the
complaint to its end, and
3) Upon a final decision against the
possessor.
It shall not be considered an

interruption:
1) If the judicial summons is void,
2) If the plaintiff desists and
proceedings elapse, and
3) Upon a final decision absolving the
possessor.
Express or tacit recognition by

possessor of owners rightone
cannot recognize the right of another
and at the same time claim adverse
possession which can ripen into
ownership.
When the possessor him/herself

declares or recognizes non-ownership
E.g., where the sale is subject to the
owners right of redemption,
prescription runs only after the
expiration of the redemption period.
When a third person declares

non-ownership by the possessor
Express or tacit recognition interrupts the possession because possession must always be in the concept of
an owner to the exclusion of all others.
Hence, one cannot consider himself possessing a property adversely in the concept of an owner if he
recognizes somebody else as having a superior right as an owner.
One cannot recognize the right of another and at the same time claim adverse possession which can ripen
to ownership, thru acquisitive prescription. For prescription to set in, the possession must be adverse,
continuous, public and to the exclusion of all.
Article 1126.
Against a title recorded in the Registry of Property, ordinary prescription of ownership

or real rights shall not take place to the prejudice of a third person,
except in virtue of another title also recorded;
and the time shall begin to run from the recording of the latter.
As to lands registered under the Land Registration Act,
the provisions of that special law shall govern. (1949a)
However, although prescription will not apply to registered property, the doctrine of laches is applicable.
Laches is the rule of in effectivity of stale demands.
No title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or
adverse possession.
3. Prescription over registered properties:

Reyes vs. Court of Appeals
A Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Settlement of a land registered in the name of their father
Bernardino was allegedly entered into by petitioner Florentino and his sisters (private respondents).
However, the sisters of Florentino contend that it was fraudulently prepared by the Florentino and that
their signatures were forged. Trial court and CA ruled in favor of the sisters. Petitioner now contends that
even if there was forgery, he has become the absolute owner of the subject land by virtue of acquisitive
prescription, citing Arts.1117 and 1134 of CC (that he is a possessor in good faith, with a just title and in
possession of 10 years).
Was the petitioner the rightful owner of the land? - NO
SC ruled that having forged the Deed and simulated the signatures of private respondents, petitioner is in
bad faith. It is therefore null and void and cannot serve as a just title. Moreover, there can be NO
acquisitive prescription considering that the subject land is titled property in the name of the late
Bernardino, this fact was not denied by the petitioner.
Article 1127.
The good faith of the possessor consists in the reasonable belief that the person
from whom he received the thing was the owner thereof,
and could transmit his ownership. (1950a)
4. Good Faith:
Negrete vs. CFI of Marinduque
Negrete filed a forcible entry suit against Maderazo alleging, among others, that Maderazo unlawfully
entered the northern portion of the land she claims to be hers since 1945. Lower court held that the
defendant has not unlawfully entered the land. Instead of appealing from the decision of the municipal
court, Negrete filed after the lapse of 10 years an action for recovery of ownership of property
(reivindicacion) against Maderazo. Maderazo averred that the action had been barred by the statute of
limitation.
CFI dismissed the case on the ground that the defendant has been in possession of the land since 1954 and
therefore even if there was a flaw in their title, the defendant would still have acquired the land thru
acquisitive prescription, having possessed the land in good faith within 10 years.
There is good faith because the defendant's possession of the land is by virtue of a deed of sale.
Can the deed of sale be considered as a valid basis for good faith and as a just title, in order to justify
the acquisition of the disputed land by ordinary prescription thru adverse possession of only 10 years. NO
The Court held that a deed of sale, to constitute a just title and to generate good faith for the ordinary
acquisitive prescription of 10 years, should refer to the same parcel of land, which is adversely possessed.
In this case, the deed of sale covers a parcel of land patently different from the disputed land owned by
plaintiff-appellant as to area, location and boundary owners.
Maderazo is conclusively presumed to have read the deed of sale, which clearly states that the southern
half portion located in Barrio Puyog, Boac, Marinduque was the parcel he acquired from Tito Oriendo
while the disputed land is in Barrio Puting Buhangin, Mogpog, Marinduque.
Hence, not being a possessor in good faith, defendant-appellee can acquire ownership over the disputed
parcel only by extraordinary acquisitive prescription thru an uninterrupted adverse possession of 30 years.
Magtira vs. Court of Appeals

Isidro Magtira and Zacarias Pangan executed Kasulatang Sanglaan (or Exhibit A) in 1926, which,
according to its provisions, actually pertains to a sale with right to repurchase.
Zacarias took possession and paid taxes of the property that same year.
In 1945 , Zacarias executed an Affidavit for Consolidation of Ownership, and in 1953, Isidro died,
leaving petitioner Sofia as his sole heir. According to Sofia, it was only in 1955 did she find out about
Zacarias affidavit. And in 1956 , Sofia commenced this action for recovery ownership.
Was Sofia guilty of laches? YES
The Court ruled that Sofia was guilty of laches for instituting the case 30 years after the execution of
Exhibit A.
Furthermore, acquisitive prescription bars Sofia to institute any action: from the time Zacarias filed the
affidavit (1945) till the time Sofia filed this case (1956), the former enjoyed an uninterrupted, peaceful,
adverse, and public possession of the property, and according to Art. 1134, it ripened to an ownership by
ordinary prescription through possession of at least 10 years.
Also, the prescriptive period must be computed from the date of filing of the affidavit, because it
constitutes a constructive notice to the whole world of Zacarias possession.
Article 1128.
The conditions of good faith required for possession in articles 526, 527, 528, and 529
of this Code are likewise necessary for the determination of good faith
in the prescription of ownership and other real rights. (1951)
Good Faith:
The following provisions of the 1950 Civil Code on possession shall likewise be necessary in determining
good faith on matters of prescription:
Article 526. He is deemed a possessor in good faith who is not aware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition
any flaw which invalidates it. He is deemed a possessor in bad faith who possesses in any case contrary to the foregoing.
Mistake upon a doubtful or difficult question of law may be the basis of good faith.
Article 527. Good faith is always presumed, and upon him who alleges bad faith on the part of a possessor rests the
burden of proof.
Article 528. Possession acquired in good faith does not lose this character except in the case and from the moment facts
exist which show that the possessor is not unaware that he possesses the thing improperly or wrongfully.
Article 529. It is presumed that possession continues to be enjoyed in the same character in which it was acquired, until
the contrary is proved.
The essence of the bona fides or good faith, therefore, lies in the honest belief in the validity of ones
right, ignorance of a superior claim, and absence of intention to overreach another.
A deed of sale, to constitute a just title and to generate good faith for the ordinary acquisitive prescription
of ten (10) years, should refer to the same parcel of land, which is adversely possessed.
Knowingly using a forged document to base ones just title for purposes of acquisitive prescription is an
act of bad faith.
Good faith cannot likewise be invoked if the claimant has actual or constructive notice of the legal and
valid rights of possession of another during the prescriptive period.
When the possessor is not aware of any flaw that exists in the title or mode of acquisition
Mistake upon a doubtful or difficult question of law
Always presumed, and the burden of proof lies in one the party alleging bad faith
Does not lose its character until the moment when facts show that the possessor is aware of that he or she
possesses the thing wrongfully
Cannot be invoked in the following examples: knowingly using a forged document to establish ones
possession by acquisitive prescription, or receiving constructive notice of the legal and valid rights of the
possession of another during the prescriptive period
Article 1129.
For the purposes of prescription, there is just title when the adverse claimant
came into possession of the property through one of the modes recognized by law
for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights,
but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right. (n)
Just Title:
An act which has for its purpose the transmission of ownership, and which would have actually
transferred ownership if the grantor had been the owner.
Thus, just title in prescription is understood in the sense of a titulo colorado such title where, although
there was a mode of transferring ownership, still something is wrong because the grantor is not the owner
(Solis v. CA)
5. Just Title:
Doliendo vs. Biarnesa
Daliendo (petitioner) bought a parcel of land in Iloilo (land in question) from Ventura Belarmino.
Later, Ventura died and thereafter proceedings were instituted against his estate on account of certain
alleged shortages in his official accounts as cabeza de barangay, which resulted in a sale at a public
auction of certain real and personal property.
The parcel of land in question was included in the property sold in the auction. Biarnesa (defendant) was
the purchaser of the subject land and later he took possession of such by virtue of his purchase at said
public auction. Doliendo contends that Biarnesa was not in possession of a just title.
Was Biarnesa in possession of a just title? YES
Biarnesa had been in possession more than ten years prior to the institution of this action and he must,
therefore, be held to have acquired a title by prescription under the provisions of article 1957 of the Civil
Code (now art. 1130) if it appear that this possession was with good faith and fair title.
The evidence conclusively establishes that the public auction did, in fact, take place; that the defendant
was the highest bidder for the property sold and was declared to be the purchaser and that he took
possession of the land in question under and by virtue of said sale.
Granting that Doliendo was the owner of the property at the time of the sale, this sale of land at public
auction by a commissioner appointed for the making of such sales and the payment of the purchase price
and occupation of the land purchased were sufficient to transfer the ownership to the purchaser provided
these proceedings where had in accordance with law ; and since there was no evidence which tended to
show that the defendant occupied the land in bad faith, or that he had any reason to believe that the
commissioner selling it had no authority to sell, or that he could not lawfully purchase at the sale, he must
be deemed to have purchased in buenafe (good faith).
Solis vs. Court of Appeals
Antonio Solis in this case was claiming the land in which he claimed that he only allowed Jose Solis to
stay until their financial conditions permit. Respondent refused to vacate the property saying that he
owned the property because it was donated to him by his father.
Petitioner questioned the validity of such donation because there was no evidence to prove how it was
transferred to respondents father coming from the original owner who was the petitioners father.
Was Jose Solis the rightful owner of the land? YES
Private respondents were in possession of the property for more than thirty (30) years.
On the basis of the records of this case found that private respondents' possession of the premises way
back in 1933 was adverse, continuous, open, public, peaceful and uninterrupted in the concept of an
owner until tills case was filed on May 30, 1967.
The "just title" required for acquisitive prescription to set in is not "tituloverdadero y valid" -or such
title which by itself is sufficient to transfer ownership Without necessity of letting the prescriptive period
elapse but only "titulocolorador" such title where, although there was a mode of transferring
ownership, still something is wrong because the grantor is not the owner.
The lapse of more than twenty (20) years of adverse possession by private respondents is sufficient to
confer ownership on them of the disputed portion under the Old Civil Code which requires only ten (10)
years of adverse possession.
Article 1130.
It is evident that by a true and valid title in this connection we are not to understand a title which of
itself is sufficient to transfer the ownership without the necessity of the lapse of the prescriptive period;
and we accept the opinion of a learned Spanish law writer who holds that the titulo verdadero y
valido as used in this article of the code prescribes a titulo colorado and not merely putative,
a titulo colorado being one which a person has when he buys a thing, in good faith, from one whom
he believes to be the owner, and
a titulo putativo being one which is supposed to have preceded the acquisition of a thing, although in
fact it did not, as might happen when one is in possession of a thing in the belief that it had been
bequeathed to him.
Article 1131.
The title for prescription must be true and valid. (1953)
For the purposes of prescription, just title must be proved; it is never presumed. (1954a)
In Doliendo vs. Biarnesa, where a person bought property in a valid public auction , took and continued
possession of the property thereafter for more than ten years, and where, prior to the sale made in the
public auction, there was a first purchaser of the property previous to the death of the original owner, the
Supreme Court ruled that the person who bought the property at the public auction already acquired the
property by acquisitive prescription as he was able to show by concrete evidence the holding of such
public auction from which he based his just title.
Article 1132.
The ownership of movables prescribes

through uninterrupted possession for four years in good faith.
The ownership of personal property also prescribes
through uninterrupted possession for eight years, without need of any other condition.
With regard to the right of the owner to recover personal property lost
or of which he has been illegally deprived,
as well as with respect to movables acquired in a public sale, fair, or market,
or from a merchant's store the provisions of articles 559 and 1505 of this Code shall be observed.
(1955a)
Period for Ordinary and Extraordinary:
The period for ordinary acquisitive prescription for movables is four years coupled with good faith.
Possession must likewise be in the concept of an owner, adverse, public and uninterrupted.
For extraordinary prescription, a period of eight years is required without need of any other condition.
In Dira vs. Tanega, where an active partner conducted himself as the absolute owner of the printing
equipment of the partnership after the delinquent partner ignored the demand to pay his obligations, and
where such active partner also assumed ownership of the shares of stock pledged by the delinquent
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partner in connection with his obligations, and where such delinquent partner filed a case for accounting
of the partnership only after 14 years from the time the active partner conducted himself as owner of the
shares and equipment of the partnership, the Supreme Court rejected the claim of the delinquent partner
that a trust relationship existed between him and the active partner by stating that the latter had already
acquired the movables by acquisitive prescription,
Personal Property:
The law likewise provides that, with regard to the right of the owner to recover personal property lost or
of which he has been illegally deprived, as well as with respect to movables acquired in a public sale, fair
or market, or from a merchants store the provisions of Articles 559 and 1505 of this Code shall be
observed.
Article 559. The possession of movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one
who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof, may recover it from the person in possession of
the same.
If the possessor of a movable lost or of which the owner has been unlawfully deprived, has acquired it in good faith
at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid therefor.
Article 1505. Subject to the provisions of this Title, where goods are sold by a person who is not the owner thereof,
and who does not sell them under authority or with the consent of the owner, the buyer acquires no better title to the
goods than the seller had, unless the owner of the goods is by his conduct precluded from denying the sellers
authority to sell.
Nothing in this Title, however, shall affect:

(1) The provisions of any factors acts, recording laws, or any other provisions of law enabling the
apparent owner of goods to dispose of them as if he were the true owner thereof;
(2) The validity of any contract of sale under statutory power of sale or under the order of a court of
competent jurisdiction;
(3) Purchases made in a merchants store, or in fairs, or markets, in accordance with the Code of
Commerce and special laws.
Article 1133.
Movables possessed through a crime can never be acquired

through prescription by the offender. (1956a)
No one must benefit from an evil act. Hence, if A stole Bs car, A cannot acquire title to it even if the
prescriptive period have already lapsed and even if B did not make a demand for the return of the car.
This is true in ordinary and extraordinary prescriptions.
Please note that under the above Article, the benefits of prescription are denied to the offender;
nonetheless, if the thing was in the meanwhile passed to a subsequent holder, prescription begins to run
(four or eight years, depending on the existence of good faith)
6. Prescription over illegally acquired movables:

Tan vs. Court of Appeals
Continental Bank, where Vicente Tan was employed, declared insolvency and reorganized under its new
name, Interbank.
Vicente Tan was arrested and detained by military authorities during the Martial Law. During his
detention, he transferred and assigned several shares of stock of Continental Bank to other corporations.
After more than 12 years, Tan filed this case seeking reconveyance of the shares of stock. Central Bank
contends that the action is barred by statute of limitations or prescription. The trial court and the CA ruled
against Tan saying that this present action had prescribed because it was commenced more than twelve
years after the closure of Continental Bank.
Was Tan's action barred by prescription? - YES
The Court provided that both acquisitive and extinctive prescription set in: (1) after four years, provided
there is good faith; (2) 8 years if bad faith is present; (3) imprescriptible if the thing is acquired through a
crime. In this case, there is nothing to suggest that the loss of shares was made possible through a crime.
At most, this is a case that falls under bad faith (abuse of authority), which has a prescriptive period of 8
years.
Clearly, since the complaint was filed more than 12 years after, the action has already prescribed. The
running of the period commenced from the date of the closure of the Continental Bank. The Court also
cannot accept Tans contention that the running of the prescriptive period was interrupted by Martial Law,
which is in the nature of a force majeure. The Court cannot make a sweeping statement like this without
affecting other transactions made during this period.
Article 1134.
Only 10 years of possession by the adverse claimant are needed for ordinary acquisitive prescription. The
possession, however, must be by virtue of a just and valid title, in the concept of an owner, uninterrupted,
adverse, and public
Article 1135.
Possession in wartime, when the civil courts are not open,

shall not be counted in favor of the adverse claimant. (n)
During wartime where the civil courts are closed, there is no way by which any person claiming title over
a certain property can file a case to recover the same from the person in adverse possession of the
property. Hence, the possession of the adverse claimant during that time shall not be counted. However, it
must be observed that the civil courts must be closed. Therefore, even if there is war but the civil courts
are functioning, the possession of the adverse claimant may be counted in his favor.
Article 1137.
In case the adverse claimant possesses by mistake an area greater,

or less than that expressed in his title, prescription shall be based on the possession. (n)
The extent of property subject to the prescription shall be the one actually possessed or held by the
claimant regardless of the size indicated or described in the title.
For instance, it has been ruled that when one sells or buys real property a piece of land, for example
one sells or buys the property as he sees it, in its actual setting and in its physical metes and bounds, and
not by the mere lot number assigned to it in the certificate of title.
Article 1136.
Ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired
by ordinary prescription through possession of ten years. (1957a)
Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe

through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years,
without need of title or of good faith. (1959a)
In the case of Heirs of Celso Amarante vs. Court of Appeals where it was shown that, even previous to
the war, a person occupied a particular alienable public land where he planted various coconut trees,
mango trees and bamboo trees and that his grandchildren and descendants continued occupying the place
until the trees were already 70 years of age, the Supreme Court ruled that acquisitive prescription had
already set in.
In Parcotilo vs. Parcotilo where a person had adverse possession of a particular land by virtue of an
invalid will for thirty years, the Supreme Court ruled that extraordinary prescription had set in thus: even
if the document Exh. 1-a was not executed with all the requisites of a valid will or of a valid donation
mortis causa the said document supplied the basis for the claim of ownership by the defendant Demetrio
Parcotilo of the two parcels of land in question after the death of the spouses. The ownership by Demetrio
Parcotilo, coupled with his open, continuous and adverse possession for a period of thirty eight years had
ripened into a title by prescription.
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Article 1138.
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In the computation of time necessary for prescription the following rules shall be observed:
(1) The present possessor may complete the period necessary for prescription
by tacking his possession to that of his grantor or predecessor in interest;
(2) It is presumed that the present possessor who was also the possessor at a previous time,
has continued to be in possession during the intervening time,
unless there is proof to the contrary;
(3) The first day shall be excluded and the last day included. (1960a)
First Rule:
The first rule provides that the present possessor may complete the period necessary for prescription by
tacking his possession to that of his grantor or predecessor in interest.
The words grantor and predecessor in interest connote a transfer in a manner provided by law of
property from one person to another. Thus, if A donated to B a property which was previously in the
possession of B for 8 years, A can make use of the said 8 years for purposes of prescription. Hence, if A
already was in possession of the property for three years, the period of his possession may be considered
to have been for 11 years already. For purposes of ordinary acquisitive prescription, he has already
complied with the statutory period.
Also, in South City Homes, Inc. vs. Republic, where a possessor of a strip of land designated as Lot No.
5005 claimed the same despite the fact that such land was not transferred to him when he bought two
adjacent lands, Lot No. 2381 and Lot No. 2386-A, and where he claimed that his possession should be
tacked in with the possession of the previous possessors, the Supreme Court rejected such contention.
However, tacking possession is allowed only when there is a privity of contract or relationship between
the previous and present possessors. In the absence of such privity, the possession of the new occupant
should be counted only from the time it actually began and cannot be lengthened by connecting it with the
possession of the former possessors.
Thus, it has been held: The deed, in itself, creates no privity as to land outside it calls. Nor is privity
created by the bare taking of possession of land previously occupied by the grantor. It is therefore the
rule, although sharply limited, that a deed does not of itself create privity between the grantor and the
grantee as to land not described in the deed but occupied by the grantor in connection therewith, although
the grantee enters into possession of the land not described and uses it in connection with that conveyed.
Where a grantor conveys a specific piece of property, the grantee may not tack onto the period of his
holding an additional piece of property the period of his grantors occupancy thereof to make up the
statutory period. His grantor did not convey such property or his interest therein, and there is no privity.
Second Rule:
The second rule provides the presumption that the present possessor who was also the possessor at a
previous time, have continued to be in possession during the intervening time, unless there is proof to the
contrary. A presumption proceeds from a set of facts. For the presumption provided in this rule to exist,
there must be a prior showing of the fact that the person presently possessing the property was also the
one in possession of the same property before the intervening time. Hence, if a person was in possession
of the property in 1997 and it was shown that he was also in possession of the property in 1988, it shall be
presumed that he was in possession from 1989 to 1996. However, this presumption can be destroyed if
evidence can be adduced to show that he was not in possession during the interval.
Third Rule:
The third rule provides that the first day shall be excluded and the last day included. For example, if a
person possessed the property on January 1, 1980 up to January 15, 1990, the counting of the prescriptive
period shall start on January 2, 1980 up to January 15, 1990.
7. Computation of Time:
South City Homes vs. Republic
The subject of this dispute is a strip of land (referred to as Lot No. 5005) between two lots owned by the
petitioner.
It is the position of the petitioner that Lot No. 5005 should be registered in its name because it had
acquired the property by prescription through uninterrupted possession thereof in concept of owner, by
itself and its predecessors-in-interest, for more than forty years.
Has the petitioner acquired the lot by acquisitive prescription? NO
The Court held that the length of possession claimed by the petitioner is not sufficient to vest prescriptive
title in it. Petitioner cannot tack possession form the previous owner of the subject lot since ownership
over said land was not transferred to it. As such, the possession of petitioner should be counted only from
the time it actually began and cannot be lengthened by connecting it with the possession of the former
possessors.
Thus, in the case of the herein petitioner, possession should begin from 1981 when it acquired the two
adjacent lots and occupied as well the lot in question thinking it to be part of the other two. It follows that
when the application for registration of the lot in the name of the petitioner was filed in 1983, the
applicant had been in possession of the property for less than three years.
This was far too short of the prescriptive period required for acquisition of immovable property, which is
ten years if the possession is in good faith and thirty years if in bad faith, or if the land is public.
Chapter 3: Prescription of Actions (Articles 1139 1155)

Article 1139.
Actions prescribe by the mere lapse of time fixed by law.
Article 1140.
Actions to recover movables shall prescribe eight years from the time
the possession thereof is lost, unless the possessor has acquired ownership by prescription
for a less period, according to Articles 1132, and without prejudice to the provisions
of Articles 559, 1505, and 1133.
Illustration:
A person can recover lost personal or movable property which he claims belong to him within a period of
eight years. However, if all the requisites of an ordinary acquisitive prescription of movable property are
present, the possessor of the same becomes the owner of the movable property after only four years
uninterrupted possession in good faith.
Meaning of Without Prejudice:
without prejudice means that if a possessor has acquired ownership, no action to recover may be filed,
even though there may still be several years remaining in the prescribed 8 years.
Good Faith vs. Bad Faith:

Dira v. Tanega
Dira, Tanega, and Pagulayan entered into a partnership for the purpose of engaging in a printing business.
Terms of the partnership said that the partnership was for a period of 5 years from organization.
Dira was appointed President while Tanega served as the manager-treasurer.
Dira alleged that he was not paid his salary as President as well as other liabilities of the partnership to
him.
Tanega contends that he became the sole owner of the partnership since 1947 after he purchased
Palugayan's share and took over Dira's share after Dira failed to pay a certain sum as liability. He also
contends that since 1947, the business was transferred by him and renamed Tanega Press. He states that
he has been operating openly and publicly from 1947 without any intervention or participation from Dira
and without Dira making any claim of any kind.
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Tanega mainly argues that Dira's action is barred by prescription because Dira failed to demand or contest
any claim after Tanega openly and publicly took over the printing press.
Has Dira's action prescribed? - YES.
Dira's action has been barred by the statute of limitations.
Article 1132 of the Civil Code is applicable in this case. Tanega has acquired clear ownership of Dira's
share after eight (8) years of actual adverse possession. Whether or not Tanega's possession was in good
or bad faith is not material to this case.
Dira's 14-year inaction cannot be favored by the Court.
Even if prescription were not properly applicable, Dira would still be guilt of laches.
Article 1141.
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Real actions over immovables prescribe after thirty years.
This provision is without prejudice to what is established for the acquisition of ownership and other real
rights by prescription.
Explanation:
The prescriptive period in connection with immovables is thirty years.

However, if within the thirty-year period, all the requisites for ordinary acquisitive prescription are
already present in favor of the possessor, then the possessor shall be considered the owner of the property
after 10 years of uninterrupted, adverse, public possession of the property in the concept of owner in good
faith.
In extraordinary acquisitive prescription, if the immovable property is adversely in the possession of the
possessor for 30 years, the right to sue prescribes with the acquisition of the title.
Article 1142.
A mortgage action prescribes after ten years.
Definition of Mortgage
A mortgage is an accessory contract constituted to serve a debt so if the debtor fails to pay the principal
obligation, the creditor can foreclose on the mortgage by selling the same in a public sale and using the
proceeds to pay off the debt and interest.
If there is any deficiency, the creditor can still go against the debtor.
The action to file a claim for the deficiency is a mortgage action.
Article 1143.
The following rights, among others specified elsewhere in the Code,

are not extinguished by prescription:
To demand a right of way, regulated in Article 649;

To bring an action to abate a public or private nuisance.
Article 1144.
The following actions must be brought within ten (10) years

from the time the right of action accrues:
1. Upon a written contract;
2. Upon an obligation created by law;
3. Upon a judgment.
Applicability; When Cause of Action Occurs:
For a contract to fall under this article, the agreement must be in writing.
The cause of action for a written contract occurs when there is a breach of such contract
Article 1145.
The following actions must be commenced within six (6) years:

1. Upon an oral contract;
2. Upon a quasi-contract.
Definition of Quasi-Contract:
A quasi-contract is a juridical relation characterized by certain lawful, voluntary, and unilateral acts to the
end that no one should be unjustly enriched at the expense of another.
Example: solutio indebiti receiving something one has no right to demand of, the object having been
unduly delivered through mistake, thereby giving rise to the obligation to return what has been unduly
received.
Article 1146.
The following actions must be instituted within four (4) years:

1. Upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff;
2. Upon a quasi-delict.
Defintion of Quasi-Delict:
A quasi-delict is a contractual relation where whoever by act of omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
Article 1147.
The following actions must be filed within one (1) year:

1. For forcible entry and detainer;
2. For defamation.
Article 1148.
The limitations of action mentioned in Articles 1140 to 1142, and 1144 to 1147 are without
prejudice to those specified in other parts of this Code,
in the Code of Commerce, and in special laws.
Meaning of Without Prejudice:
without prejudice means that in proper cases, the prescriptive period in this chapter may be availed of
notwithstanding other provisions in other laws.
Prescriptive Periods:
Espanol v. Philippine Veterans Administration
Petitioner Maria Espanol was the widow of veteran German Espanol who died in the service during
WWII. (as in his name is German. He's not from Germany.)
Maria received a monthly pension under RA 65 with respondent Philippine Veteran's Administration.
In 1951, in pursuance of its administrative policy, PVA cancelled Maria's pension.
In 1974 (23 years later), Maria filed with CFI-Manila against PVA for the restoration of her pension
effective from date of cancellation.
PVA contends that action has already prescribed as it was filed more than 10 years from cancellation.
PVA depends on Article 1144 of NCC which provides that actions based on obligations created by law
shall be brought within 10 years from the time the right of action accrues.
Has Maria's action been barred by the 10-year prescription period? - NO.
The 10-year prescription period should be counted from June 1973 when Del Mar v. PVA case was
promulgated and not from Nov 1951, the date of cancellation by PVA of Maria's pension.
It was in the case of Del Mar v. PVA where the presumption of legality of the administrative policy (same
the canceled Maria's pension) was rebutted.
It was only after the promulgation of this decision when it can be said that PVA's act was in violation of
Maria's right to receive her monthly pension. Thus, Maria's cause of action only existed after
promulgation of Del Mar decision.
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Kramer Jr. v. Court of Appeals

On April 8, 1976, a fishing boat owned by petitioner Kramers sank due to a collision with a vessel owned
by private respondent Trans-Asia Shipping Lines, Inc. The Kramers's boat and fish catch sank as a
consequence.
On May 30, 1985 (almost 9 years later), petitioners instituted a Complaint for damages against private
respondent.
Private respondent sought for dismissal of the Complaint on grounds of prescription. Used Article 1146
of the Civil Code which provides that the prescriptive period for instituting a complaint for damages
arising from a quasi-delict (like a maritime collision) is four (4) years.
Petitioner argues that running of the prescriptive period was tolled by filing of maritime protests and that
their cause of action only accrued on April 29, 1982 when the Board of Marine Inquiry decision
ascertaining the negligence of Trans-Asia crew became final.
Has the Complaint for damages been barred by statute of limitations? - YES.
Under Article 1146, the prescriptive period for an action based on a quasi-delict begins from the day the
quasi-delict is committed.
In an action for damages arising from the collision of two vessels, the 4-year prescription period must be
counted from the day of collision.
Aggrieved party need not wait for a determination by an administrative body like a Board of Marine
Inquiry before he can filed an action for damages.
Vda De Borromeo v. Pogoy
Building leased by petitioner Petra is owned by the estate of the late Vito Borromeo, administered by
respondent Reyes.
In August 1982, Reyes sent Petra a letter demanding that she pay the overdue rentals for the period of
March to Sept 1982 and that she vacate the premises.
Petra failed to oblige. Reyes filed an ejectment case in September 1982.
Petra contends that under PD 1508, Reyes's action was erroneous because it should have been filed with
the Barangay Lupon.
Reyes contends that his omission is justified as per Par 4, Sec 6 of PD 1508 which allows direect filing of
action in court where the same may otherwise be barred by the Statute of Limitations.
Is Reyes's omission justified under PD 1508 which allows direct filing of action in court which may
otherwise be barred by the Statute of Limitations? - NO. But PD 1508 only applies to natural
individuals, not juridical entities like estates as in this case.
Under Art 1147, period for filing actions for forcible entry and detainer is 1 year, counted from demand to
vacate the premises. Under PD 1508, the proceeding before the Barangay Court should take no more than
60 days. This gives Reyes 9 more months to bring his case before the proper court should the proceeding
fail. Thus, this case would not be barred by the Statute of Limitations.
But under PD 1508, referral of a dispute to the Barangay Lupon is required only where the parties are
individuals. The law only applies to cases involving natural persons. It is, thus, not applicable in this case
and Reyes is allowed to file the action directly in court.
Callanta v. Carnation Phils.
Virgilio Callanta was emloyed by Carnation Phils, Inco as a salesman in the Agausan del Sur area.
Carnation filed with the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE) an application for clearance to
terminate the employment of Callanta on the alleged grounds of serious misconduct and misappropriation
of company funds.
In June 1979, upon approval of MOLE, Carnation terminated employment of Callanta.
In July 1982, Callanta filed with MOLE for complaint for illegal dismissal with claims for reinstatement,
backwages, and damages against Carnation.
MOLE ruled in favor of Carnation. It stated that action for Callanta had prescribed because the provisions
of the Labor Code provide that offenses under such code prescribe in 3 years.
Callanta argues that the Labor Code is silent as to the prescriptive period of an action for illegal dismissal
for claims for reinstatement, backwages, and damages and that the applicable law is Article 1146 of NCC
which provided for a 4-year prescriptive period for an action predicated upon an injury to the rights of
the plaintiff.
Does an action for illegal dismissal prescribe in 3 years pursuant to Articles 291 and 292 of the Labor
Code? - NO.
Callanta's action has not been barred by prescription. The provision of the Civil Code shall be applicable
in this case since the action of Callanta is upon an injury to his rights.
Termination of an employment without just or valid cause is not categorized as an unlawful practice
covered by the Labor Code.
One's employment is considered a property right and the wrongful interference therewith is an
actionable wrong.
When one is arbitrarily and unjustly deprived of his job or means of livelihood, the action instituted to
contest the legality of one's dismissal from employment constitutes an action as contemplated by Article
1146 of the NCC. Such action prescribes in 4 years.
Article 1149.
All other actions whose periods are not fixed in this Code
or in other laws must be brought within five (5) years
Article 1150.
The time for prescription for all kinds of actions,

when there is no special provision which ordains otherwise,
shall be counted from the day they may be brought.
Article 1151.
The time for the prescription of actions which have for their object the enforcement of obligations
to pay principal with interest or annuity runs from the last payment
of the annuity or of the interest.
Article 1152.
The period for prescription of actions to demand the fulfillment of obligation

declared by a judgment commences from the time the judgment becomes final.
Rationale:
It is only when the judgment becomes final that the same can be effectively enforced. Hence, the
prescriptive period is not counted from the time the judgment was rendered but from the time it became
final.
Purpose of the revival of judgment is to give a creditor a new right of enforcement from the date of the
revival.
The rule seeks to protect judgment creditors from wily and unscrupulous debtors who, in order to evade
attachment and execution, cunningly conceal their assets and wait until the statute of limitations set in.
Article 1153.
The period for prescription of actions to demand accounting runs

from the day the persons who should render the same cease in their functions.
The period for the action arising from the result of the accounting runs from the date when said result was
recognized by agreement of the interested parties.
General Rules and Exceptions (Articles 1150 1153):
General Rule: Article 1150

Exceptions: Articles 1151, 1152, and 1153.
Article 1154.
The period during which the obligee was prevented by a fortuitous event
from enforcing his right is not reckoned against him.
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When Period Begins to Run:

Tolentino v. Court of Appeals
Petitioner Constancia Tolentino is the present legal wife of Arturo Tolentino and brought this case to stop
respondent Consuelo David, Arturo's former wife, from using the surname of Arturo.
Respondent Consuelo and Arturo were legally divorced during the Japanese occupation on the ground of
desertion and abandonment by the wife.
Respondent Consuelo alleges that Constancia's action against her has prescribed.
Petitioner Conctancia claims that her cause of action was imprescriptible.
Has Constancia's cause of action already prescribed? - YES.
Absent a special provision, the time for prescription for all kinds of action shall be counted from the day
they may be brought (Article 1150, NCC).
Unless the law makes an action imprescriptible, it is subject to a prescription period of 5 years from the
time the right of action accrues when no other period is provided for by law (Article 1149, NCC)
Given that petitioner has waited 20 years to bring the action to court, it has already prescribed.
Provident v. Court of Appeals
In 1967, Spouses Guarin obtained a loan from Provident Bank secured by a real estate mortgage.
In 1972, Provident Bank was placed under receivership by the Central Bank wherein Provident was
prohibited from doing business. This lasted until 1981 when the SC set aside the receivership.
Provident informed Guarin that their property was to be sold at a public auction. Guarin said that he
would pay for the outstanding debt. Provident replied that the mortgage title could not be released to him
even after the payment of his personal obligation because the same property also served as security for the
indebtedness of L.Y. Guarin Manufacturing Co, Guarin's company
As a result of the judgment in a Civil Case between Chua and Guarin, Guarin informed Provident that he
would be buying the property from the Guarins and requested Provident's conformity to the assignment.
He also expressed willingness to pay for the obligation so that the title would be released to him.
Provident did not agree unless Chua could also pay for the debt of L.Y. Guarin Manufacturing.
Chua requested that Guarin's copy of TCT be released to him by Provident so that he could register the
sale and have the title to the property transferred his name. He likewise informed Provident that it had lost
whatever right or action against the Guarins because of prescription.
In 1986, Chua filed a complaint against Provident to compel it to release the real estate mortgaged by
Guarins. Chua invokes prescription as a defense since 10 years has already lapsed since 1967, the year the
loan was contracted.
Can Provident still foreclose the subject realty? - YES.
Running of prescriptive period was interrupted when Provident was placed under receivership.
Also, respondent's letter requesting that it be allowed to pay the loan was tantamount to an express
acknowledgement of the obligation and had the effect of interrupting the prescription for the second time.
Tan v. Court of Appeals
Vicente Tan was arrested by military authorities for alleged irregular transactions at Continental Bank
where he was employed.
Continental Bank declared insolvency and reorganized under its new name, Interbank.
During Tan's detention, he executed certain agreements transferring and assigning several shares of stock
of Continental Bank to other corporations.
After more than 12 years, Tan filed this case seeking reconveyance of the shares of stock.
Central Bank contends that action is barred by statute of limitations or prescriptions.
Trial Court and CA ruled against Tan saying that this present action had prescribed because it was
commenced more than 12 years after the closure of Continental Bank
Has Tan's action been barred by prescription? - YES.
This case is, at most, one where the loss of shares was made possible by bad faith which carries a
prescription period of 8 years.
Since complaint was filed more than 12 years later, the action has already prescribed.
Running date commenced from date of the closure of Continental Bank.
Also, contrary to Tan's claims, SC cannot consider Martial Law as force majeure that would interrupt the
running of prescription. Such a sweeping statement would affect other transactions made during this
period.
Article 1155.
The prescription of actions is interrupted when they are filed before the court,
when there is a written extrajudicial demand by the creditors,
and when there is any written acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor.
Effect of Interruption:
The interruption renews or starts a new period of prescription. It is not a mere suspension.
When Does Period of Prescription Run Anew?

1. The filing of an action;
2. Written extrajudicial demand by the creditor;
3. Written acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor.
Interruptions of Periods:
Ledesma v. Court of Appeals and Rizal Commercial Banking Corp (RCBC)
In 1980, RCBC filed a Civil Case against petitioner to enforce their Trust Receipt agreement that
petitioner failed to comply with. Case was dismissed on March 1981.
In 1988, RCBC instituted another Civil Case in RTC against petitioner on the same matter. RTC ruled in
favor of RCBC.
Petitioner contends that the second action filed had already prescribed. He insisted that in case of the
filing of an action, the prescriptive period is merely tolled and continues to run again, with only the
balance of the remaining period.
Is petitioner's interpretation correct? - NO.
A period of prescription begins to run anrew when interrupted by the filing of an action as provided by
Article 1155, NCC.
Cabrera v. Tinio
Ciriaco Posetas and Gregoria Blanco were parents of five children: Isabelo, Lourdes, Clemente, Josefina,
and Cresencia. Gregoria and Clemente died before World War II.
In July 2, 1947, Ciriaco Postetas, with Isabelo, Lourdes, and Josefina, purportedly sold an agricultural
land to defendant Tiano. At time of sale, Cresencia was a minor and Josefina did not know about the
transaction.
On June 20, 1957 (alsmot 10 years later), Josefina and Cresencia filed an action for Partition and
Recovery of Real Estate with Damages against Tiano alleging that they were entitled to a portion of the
land since Josefina did not sign the sale and Cresencial was a minor.
Tiano alleged that he was the absolute owner of the land by acquisitive prescription of 10 years from date
of purchase. Tiano insists that prescription began from the date the summons was served on him (July 2,
1957).
However, complaint for recover was filed on June 20, 1957.
Is the prescription of actions interrupted when they are filed before the court? - YES.
Civil code provides that presctiption of actions is interrupted when they are filed in court (Article 1155).
Since sale took place in July 2, 1947, the 10-year period within which to file the action had not yet
elapsed on June 20, 1957, when the complaint was presented.
Contention that period was not interrupted until after defendant received summons is without legal basis.
20
21
Olympia International v. Court of Appeals

Petitioner Olympia sold several typewriters to private respondent Alpha.
Petitioner instituted an action for writ of replevin for alleged non-payment by the respondent.
On December 15, 1972, lower court dismissed without prejudice (with finality) the case on the ground
that the parties would settle the dispute out of court.
Negotiations failed and Olympia filed a motion to revive the case which the lower court granted on
December 1973.
In January 1974, lower court reinstated December 1972 decision and lifted Olympia's motion to revive
the case.
Olympia filed a case against the lower court contesting its jurisdiction over the case.
CA affirmed lower court's jurisdiction and told Olympia that its right to replevin died with the dismissal
in 1972.
Does Olympia have the right to institute a new case after the first one was dismissed with finality by the
lower court? - YES. But the right has long prescribed.
SC affirmed CA's decision. Since case was dismissed with finality, the lower court's jurisdiction was also
terminated. Any subsequent action filed in accordance with the reservation cannot be considered a
continutation of the first action which was dismissed.
Remedy of the petitioner is to institute a new action.
Unfortunately, the right to file a new action has long expired. Although the commencement of a civil
action stops the running of the statute of prescription or limitations, its dismissal or voluntary
abandonment by Olympia leaves the parties in exactly the same position, as though no action had been
instituted at all.
Ramos v. Condez
On June 1952, spouses Condez sold a parcel of land to spouses Ramos.
In 1956, spouses Ramos decided to cultivate the land. However, they discovered that the land was not
owned by spouses Condez.
Spouses Ramos demanded that spouses Condez deliver to them the land in question.
Emiliano Condez then wrote a letter to Alfonso Ramos on or about Nov 10, 1956 promising to deliver the
land in question.
However, the land was never delivered and spouses Ramos instituted an action to order the respondents to
deliver the land or actual market value thereof.
Spouses Condez argue that the action has prescribed. They alleged that the Deed of Sale was executed on
June 25, 1952 and the action was filed on May 22, 1963, more than 10 years after the accrual of the cause
of action.
Petitioner Ramos contends that admitting the cause of action accrued on June 25, 1952, defendants'
written acknowledgement of the validity of the deed of absolute sale and promise to deliver land sold (as
expressed in Nov 10 letter), the running of prescriptive period for commencement of the action was tolled
on that date.
Has the action for spouses Ramos prescribed? - NO.
Under Article 1144 of NCC, an action upon a written contract must be brought within 10 years from the
time the cause of action accrues.
There is no denying that in the instant case, the plaintiff's cause of action, under the deed of absolute sale,
has accrued on June 25, 1952 but in view of th Nov 10, 1956 letter, the running of the period of limitation
of action was interrupted on that date.
Considering that the action was filed on May 22, 1963, the cause of action has not yet prescribed because
it was filed within the period of limitation of actions.

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Oblicon - Pineda Reviewer Following Misons syllabus plus Case List Doctrines : Anton Mercado and Sabrina DAYAO

Prescription of Ownership: (Articles 1117 1138)

A thing capable of acquisition by

Possession of the thing under certain

Lapse of time provided by law

1. Good faith and with just title

Movable / personal property 4 years

Movable property 8 years

Acquisitive prescription may be ordinary or extraordinary.

Godinez vs. Court of Appeals

Heirs of Amarante vs. Court of Appeals

"Consider this our mic drop" Sabrina dayao

Acts of possessory character executed in virtue of license

Coronado vs. Court of Appeals

Possession is interrupted for the purposes of prescription, naturally or civilly. (1943)

Possession is naturally interrupted when through any cause

"Consider this our mic drop" Sabrina dayao

If the natural interruption is for only one year or less,

Civil interruption is produced by judicial summons to the possessor. (1945a)

Receipt of Judicial Summons:

the judicial summons is void for lack of legal solemnities

When the possessor is absolved from the complaint

Naturalany cause except civil

For a period more than one year.

If the time elapsed is one year or

Civilcomes in the form of judicial

It shall be considered an interruption:

It shall not be considered an

Express or tacit recognition by

When the possessor him/herself

When a third person declares

"Consider this our mic drop" Sabrina dayao

Against a title recorded in the Registry of Property, ordinary prescription of ownership

3. Prescription over registered properties:

Magtira vs. Court of Appeals

"Consider this our mic drop" Sabrina dayao

The title for prescription must be true and valid. (1953)

The ownership of movables prescribes

Period for Ordinary and Extraordinary:

"Consider this our mic drop" Sabrina dayao

Nothing in this Title, however, shall affect:

Movables possessed through a crime can never be acquired

6. Prescription over illegally acquired movables:

Possession in wartime, when the civil courts are not open,

In case the adverse claimant possesses by mistake an area greater,

Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe

"Consider this our mic drop" Sabrina dayao

Chapter 3: Prescription of Actions (Articles 1139 1155)

Actions prescribe by the mere lapse of time fixed by law.

Meaning of Without Prejudice:

Good Faith vs. Bad Faith:

"Consider this our mic drop" Sabrina dayao

Real actions over immovables prescribe after thirty years.

The prescriptive period in connection with immovables is thirty years.

A mortgage action prescribes after ten years.

The following rights, among others specified elsewhere in the Code,

To demand a right of way, regulated in Article 649;

The following actions must be brought within ten (10) years

Applicability; When Cause of Action Occurs:

The following actions must be commenced within six (6) years:

The following actions must be instituted within four (4) years:

The following actions must be filed within one (1) year:

Meaning of Without Prejudice: