State Minimum Wage Laws:

Examining the Case of Illinois

H. Luke Shaefer

ABSTRACT. As of August 2005, seventeen states have raised their

minimum wages above the federal level of $5.15. Using Kingdons
agenda setting model, this article analyzes lessons from a case study of
Illinois, the first Midwestern state to raise its minimum, up to $6.50 in
January 2005. This legislative success was a result of a mix of factors including a change in the States political environment with the election of
a new governor, and collaboration between advocates and researchers
who provided a rigorous analysis of the potential effects of raising the
minimum wage. The paper makes recommendations for future research,
as efforts are underway in multiple states to consider wage raises
through open referendums and traditional legislative channels in 2006.
doi:10.1300/J134v10n04_04 [Article copies available for a fee from The
Haworth Document Delivery Service: 1-800-HAWORTH. E-mail address:
<docdelivery@haworthpress.com> Website: <http://www.HaworthPress.com>
2006 by The Haworth Press, Inc. All rights reserved.]

KEYWORDS. Social policy, political processes, minimum wage, advocacy, coalitions

H. Luke Shaefer is a PhD candidate at the University of Chicago, School of Social

Service Administration (SSA). He received his AM from SSA in June of 2005 and has
worked as a professional public policy advocate in Chicago.
Address correspondence to: H. Luke Shaefer, 1030 Grenoble Circle, Lansing, MI
48917 (E-mail: lshaefer@uchicago.edu).
The author thanks Julia R. Henly and Evelyn Z. Brodkin for their very helpful comments.
Journal of Poverty, Vol. 10(4) 2006
Available online at http://jpov.haworthpress.com
2006 by The Haworth Press, Inc. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1300/J134v10n04_04

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One of the most heated and commonly recurring social policy debates in the United States has centered on the minimum wage. Its
constant reemergence over the course of the last century reinforces
Kingdons quoting of Ecclesiastes that There is no new thing under the
sun (2003, p. 141). Today is an important time for rigorous study of
current events and future directions for this policy idea, and research on
this issue must draw heavily on the agenda setting and policy formation
literatures. As of August 2005, seventeen states have adopted minimum
wages above the federal level, by far the most to do so at one time since
the New Deal coalition first legislated a federal minimum in 1938.
These events have effectively devolved to the states an issue that for the
past sixty years has largely been debated at the federal level. Furthermore, Florida and Nevada have passed minimum wage hikes through
open referendums on the 2004 ballot, and as many as nine states are
expected to follow suit in 2006 (Cauchon, 2005). While ballot referendums are being used in some states, still other states including
Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Iowa are expected to or are currently considering raises in upcoming legislative sessions. The large number of
current state minimum wage efforts present research opportunities for
case studies of states and cross-state comparisons of minimum wage
initiatives that utilize both ballot referendums and traditional legislative
channels.
Using Kingdons (2003) agenda-setting model, the current study
seeks to build knowledge about minimum wage initiatives and inform
future research through an in-depth case study of Illinois, the first Midwestern state to raise its minimum, up to $6.50 in January 2005. The
analysis uses a pluralist frame, highlighting the roles of issue formation,
agenda setting, and politics in policymaking. It asks, what factors led to
the successful passage of a state minimum wage? What interest groups
were important in determining the issues fate? Analysis of this case is
undertaken to address these questions and set the stage for future
minimum wage research.
BACKGROUND
Kingdons theoretical framework (2003) is a comprehensive account
of public policy agenda setting. He begins with the question How does
an ideas time come? (p. 1) When policy proposals seem to be constantly reinvented, why do some subjects and policy solutions gain attention while others do not, sometimes seemingly at random? Kingdon

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works firmly within a pluralist frame, which assumes all interest groups,
to varying degrees, have tools at their disposal to affect governmental
decisions regarding issues that affect them. Kingdon theorizes that
policymaking follows a garbage can model, a framework originally
developed by Cohen, March, and Olsen (1972). Kingdons adaptation
of the model consists of three separate but loosely related streams affecting the public agenda. There is the problem stream, dealing with
how problems arise and who defines them; the political stream, dealing
with how changes in the political environment (like electoral shifts and
major events such as September 11) change the public agenda; and the
policy stream, dealing with how policy proposals are developed and become attached to specific problems. These three streams converge in a
metaphorical garbage can in various ways to determine the agendas of
formal governmental decision-making bodies. When they align in particular ways, policy windows open up and different actors including
elected officials, interest groups, and researchers try to implement policy change. Kingdon notes that the model is best used in examining the
successes and failures of policy stories.
Moving from the theoretical background toward the history of the
minimum wage, in terms of successful legislation in the United States,
the minimum wage began at the state level, with the first one passing in
Massachusetts in 1912 (Prasch, 1999). Following this law, similar measures spread to a number of other states over the early years of the twentieth century (Levin-Waldman, 2001). However, most of these early
state laws were riddled with exceptions such as exclusions for apprentices and handicapped workers (Waltman, 2000, p. 29). These laws
were invariably impossible to enforce, and most employers were able to
circumvent them. These limitations, however, did not stop proponents
from pursuing the implementation of state-level minimum wages.
After years in which states softened up the ground (Kingdon, 2003,
p. 128), the minimum wage found its way into national rhetoric and
policy discussions, including in Theodore Roosevelts Progressive platform of 1912, and this further paved the way for federal legislation.
However, during the war and the conservative 1920s, changes in the political stream, specifically the national mood, interfered with the successful passage of a federal minimum wage. As Levin-Waldman writes,
It wasnt until the depths of the Great Depression that it came to be
understood that a wage floor would also serve to ensure a measure of
general economic stability (2001, p. 7). The dramatic legislative and
executive shakeup that led to the New Deal provided a policy window
for a wage floor.

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The federal minimum wage program as it exists today was first established as part of the 1938 Fair Labor Standards Act. Advocates had
hoped to establish a living wage that would stabilize the labor market
(Levin-Waldman, 2001). However, due to pluralistic compromise with
business interests that called the proposal a tyrannical industrial dictatorship (Waltman, 2000, p. 32), the bill passed well below a living
wage level, at twenty-five cents an hour with increases of five cents
each year up to forty, the administrations initial recommendation.
At the time of its original implementation, the minimum wage was
regarded as an important labor market policy that would stabilize wages
for all American workers. Today, because of declines in its purchasing
power and increasing wealth among the middle class, it has been transformed into a marginal policy that most people assume has little effect
on the overall economy. Therefore, it has lost social significance for the
general population and is less likely to become an issue that will seriously expand into the arena of a larger public, as defined by Cobb and
Elder (1972).
Since 1938, constantly recurring policy debates regarding the minimum have been waged at the federal level. However, the federal rhetoric around the minimum changed dramatically during the 1980s when a
shift in federal leadership and the national mood stifled any chance for
regular increases. The Reagan administration, armed with arguments by
Milton Friedman (1982) and others, began an assault on policies that
they believed interfered with free markets (Levin-Waldman, 2001).
Conservative advocates have sought to redefine the problems of lowwage workers in such a way as to make it appear that a minimum wage
does more harm than good. This assault is supported by the view of the
minimum wage held by most economists today. Neo- classical economic theory contends that a minimum above the equilibrium wage
hurts employment by raising labor costs, as any economics textbook
will tell you (see Krugman & Wells, 2005, pp. 90-91). Lindbloms lamentations in The market as prison (1982) captures the basis of the
neo-classical argument. Many economists might agree with the goal of
the minimum wage: to increase the earnings of low-wage workers to a
base level. Friedman himself advocated for a minimum family income
in the form of a negative income tax (Bowler, 1974; Levin-Waldman,
2001). However, opponents argue that raising the minimum wage will
only engage the automatic punishing recoil of the free market. Employers assume that their costs will rise because of the wage increase,
and they believe they will be forced to cut labor to compete, so they do
just that. Therefore, economists argue, raising the minimum wage does

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more harm than good. In this way, Lindblom argues that, with the minimum wage and other social policies, the market controls policymakers
because any effort to change the market is stymied by the reaction of the
market itself.
There are, however, notable exceptions to this view among economists. Card and Kruegers studies and especially their book Myth and
Measurement (1995) provide recent evidence in support of the minimum that has been widely influential and hotly debated (see Kosters,
1996). Furthermore, there has been historical support by economists for
the minimum wage. Beyond Keynesian support (see Caporaso & Levine, 1992), during the Progressive Era a vocal group of economists
strongly supported the adoption of a minimum wage because they believed it would help protect markets by giving laborers needed leverage
to bargain with employers (Prasch, 1999).
In terms of the available empirical data, results are mixed. Some
studies support the view that minimum wage hikes lead to labor cuts by
employers or other negative economic outcomes (Colberg, 1981; Deer,
Murphy, & Welch, 1996; Neumark & Wascher, 1996). However, other
studies suggest that minimum wage increases may lead to positive
economic outcomes, including, at times, a small net growth in jobs
(Baiman et al., 2003; Card & Krueger, 1995; Katz & Krueger, 1992).
The latter studies contend that the time series statistical models used in
traditional economic examinations of the minimum wage are flawed
because of inadequate indicators used to represent variables in the models (Bernstein & Schmitt, 2000; Card, 1992; Card & Krueger, 1995).
They advocate the use of updated models such as the Card Test, which
takes into account variations in low-wage employment across states to
measure the effects of an increased minimum wage, or the use of quasiexperimental methodologies that take advantage of different state minimum wages (Bernstein & Schmitt, 2000; Card, 1992; Card & Krueger,
1995).
Leaving the policy stream for the political stream, some critics of the
minimum wage have been especially virulent. In a 1999 online strategy
briefing titled How to Argue Against the Minimum Wage Law, Jim
Cox, then an associate professor of economics at Georgia Perimeter
College, asked, How do we, the good guys, reach them and persuade
them of the truth and light? His suggestion is to:
First, declare them to be phonies. Phony, phony, phony is a good
opening to get their attention and anguish them with some of that
good liberal guilt they suffer from. Then using whats known as

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the Ransberger Pivot . . . agreeing with their stated intentions

but showing them how theres a better way to achieve their desired
outcomescall for de-taxing these workers instead! Denounce the
politicians supporting the increased minimum wage law as greedy
and constantly grabbing at any and all incomes of others. (1999,
pp. 1-2)
With arguments like these, many anti-minimum wage advocates try
to co-opt the problem that the minimum wage has been defined to solve
by: (1) attacking its validity as a solution and (2) suggesting a different
problem and solution. With these types of arguments, critics make the
issue more technical. Does the minimum wage really help low-wage
workers, or do the mysterious workings of the market make it ineffective? Only complex empirical study can answer this question. Cobb and
Elder (1972) suggest that debating the merits of an initiative in a technical way is an effective strategy for keeping it from expansion to the
larger public. In other words, if the general public is forced to consider
the technical merits of a wage increase they are less likely to vigorously
support it.
As a result of stiff opposition at the federal level, wage hikes have been
few and far between, and for marginal hourly amounts. Congress last
passed an increase in 1996 after strenuous advocacy by members of the
Clinton administration, bringing the wage to $5.15 in 1997 (Reich, 1997).
Today the real value of that amount has fallen to $4.31 in 1997 dollars,
the lowest wage level in purchasing power since 1949 (Cauchon, 2005).
The failure of Congress to act, however, cannot be attributed to public opposition to the policy. A recent poll by the Pew Research Center
found that eighty-six percent of respondents in a nationally representative sample supported raising the federal wage to $6.45, and only six
percent of respondents actively opposed such an increase (Cauchon,
2005). Other recent polls lend similar results including a January 2002
labor-sponsored poll that found that 77 percent of likely voters surveyed
support raising the minimum wage from $5.15 to $8.00 per hour
(AFL-CIO, 2005). Furthermore, in that same poll almost 80 percent of
likely voters supported regular increases in the wage to keep pace with
inflation. A 2001 CBS News/New York Times Poll found 84 percent
supported a wage raise above $6.15 (CBS News, 2001), and an October
2001 Gallup, CNN, and USA Today survey (AFL-CIO, 2005) found
support for an unspecified raise by 81 percent of respondents. These
polls suggest that a large majority of the American public favors a
substantial increase in the minimum wage. Furthermore, various polls

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73

show that in almost every demographic group, including upper-income

respondents, the minimum wage enjoys the support of a majority
(Waltman, 2000).
These polls suggest that the failure of the federal government to raise
the minimum cannot be attributed to a lack of public support. However,
to truly get a picture of public opinion regarding this issue, we must
delve deeper. While the above polling data suggest that a majority of
Americans would support a minimum wage increase, they do not, however, indicate that the minimum is an issue that all constituencies are
ready to take up as a top agenda item. In surveys where respondents are
asked to list their top priorities for government action without being
given any choices, the minimum wage rarely breaks the one percent
level. However, when given a list to choose from, the issue becomes
much more popular, routinely ranking in the top three policy choices
(Waltman, 2000). This suggests that the minimum wage in not a topic
that stays in the forefront of the thinking of Americans, but instead is
something they are willing to support when asked.
Interestingly, the public seems to take this stand from a fairly well informed position. While citizens cannot, for the most part, name the
value of the minimum wage off the top of their heads, they are fairly accurate about the range (Waltman, 2000). Perhaps even more surprisingly, most poll respondents appear to believe that they, as consumers,
would bear the costs of a wage hike and claim to be supportive anyway
(Waltman). All this seems to paint a deep and complex story about public opinion on the minimum wage. However, the general conclusions
that we can draw are that people will support increases in the minimum
wage when presented with the opportunity, even if it is not at the top of
their policy agenda in general. Furthermore, they would do so even
though they are aware that economists and businesses caution against it
(Waltman).
STATES TAKE THE INITIATIVE
Because the federal government has failed to act on the minimum
wage for so long, many states have chosen to take back this policy issue
and pass wage raises themselves. Such initiatives go against what recent
urban politics literature might suggest: that in an effort to drive down the
cost-of-doing-business to compete for highly mobile firms, states and urban centers have been loathe to consider redistributive measures including higher minimum wages or tax increases (Mayer, 1994; Peterson,

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1981; Sites, 2003). Nevertheless as of August 2005, seventeen states

plus the District of Columbia have increased their minimum above the
federal rate. These states represent forty-five percent of the U.S. population, and the wage increases have helped cut the number of workers
earning $5.15 or less by more than 2.8 million in the past five years
(Cauchon, 2005). The rates passed by states range from $5.70 in Wisconsin (until June 2006 when it increases to $6.50, see U.S. Department
of Labor, 2005) to $7.63 in Washington State as of January 2006
(Washington State Department of Labor and Industries, 2005). Counting state minimums that will be in effect as of January 2006, the average
increase is to $6.71, approximately 30 percent (or $1.56) above the
current federal level. Most of these wage hikes have passed through
traditional legislative channels, and some states have increased their
minimum wage multiple times, including Hawaii, where the governor
recently allowed the states minimum to increase (without her signature) from $6.25 to $6.75 in January 2006, and then to $7.15 as of January 2007 (KHNL Channel 8, 2005). In a recent trend, minimum wage
advocacy groups have usurped the usual state legislative process and
considered the minimum wage in open referendums during a general
election. In both Florida and Nevada, such initiatives passed resoundingly, by 71 percent and 68 percent, respectively, in states where the
2004 Democratic Party candidate for president, John Kerry, lost the
popular vote (the Democratic Party has historically been more supportive of the minimum wage.) Because of Nevadas constitution, the referendum must pass again in 2006 before becoming law (Dornan, 2005).
In Florida, Republicans control both the state legislature and governors
office, while in Nevada the Governorship and State Senate are Republican. This suggests that the referendum tactic is a viable alternative in
states where public support is strong but there is little chance that legislation will pass through the traditional policy process. Successes in
Florida and Nevada have led activists to work to secure minimum wage
initiatives on the ballot in approximately nine states in 2006, including
Arizona, Michigan, Ohio (Cauchon, 2005), and Arkansas (Bleed, 2005).
Other states are expected to consider minimum wage increases through
traditional legislative channels in upcoming sessions. In 2005 Marylands governor vetoed a raise to $6.15, however, advocates expect that
the General Assembly will override that veto in the fall session (Workplace Fairness, 2005). New Hampshires State Senate recently voted
down a proposed increase by a small margin, although many expect it
will be considered again in the 2006 legislative session (National Federation of Independent Business, 2005). In Iowa, the House Democratic

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75

leadership recently made a minimum wage raise to $6.15 a priority issue

for the General Assembly (confirmed by E. Ditsler of the Iowa Policy
Project, personal communication, December 8, 2005 and P. Lipsman of
the Iowa House Democratic Caucus, personal communication, December 9, 2005). And in Pennsylvania, three bills are currently under consideration and supporters plan to introduce similar measures in future
sessions if necessary (State Representative M. Cohen, personal communication, December 8, 2005).
This study seeks to identify key factors that led to the passage of a
state minimum wage increase in one case, with the goal of informing future research on upcoming initiatives described above. Specifically, the
following case study delves into the circumstances that led to the passage of a minimum wage increase in Illinois in 2003. It draws heavily
on: (1) statewide media coverage of the policy battle; (2) legislative information made available to the public by the Illinois General Assembly; (3) primary resources provided by the major coalition in support of
the wage increase along with opposing interests groups; and (4) the authors own participation as a professional advocate with the coalition
that secured the raise. In an effort to insure an objective lens, major conclusions do not rely only on the authors experience as an advocate, but
have been supported with other data already described.
THE MINIMUM WAGE INCREASE IN ILLINOIS
The story of the minimum wage fight in Illinois reinforces Kingdons
contention that there is no linear process to policy formulation, legislation, and implementation. There were no changing indicators or arising
crises that required immediate action since a similar minimum wage bill
had been introduced but failed to pass in the General Assembly during
the previous year. A persuasive story of Illinoiss increase can be told
using Kingdons adaptation of the garbage can framework, where
many different factors determine the policy result, in this case, a $1.35
wage raise. Such a story is built on a pluralistic framework drawing
from Dahl (1961; 1963) and others (e.g., Judge, 1995). As already discussed, pluralists believe that different groups forward their direct interests through government, and no group is completely disadvantaged in
the system (this is known as dispersed inequality), even while some
groups, like businesses, may have more power in certain areas. In the
case of this particular legislative battle, the major interest groups were
Illinois labor unions and community groups, largely representing low-

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wage workers, Illinois small business and restaurant lobbies, and a candidate and later newly elected governor looking for a popular, offenseminded issue.
The story begins with a policy window to legislate a state minimum
wage in Illinois that opened up through the political stream with the
election of Congressman Rod Blagojevich to the governorship in 2002.
During the election, Blagojevich made a campaign promise to raise the
minimum to $6.50. His campaign rhetoric led to the identification and
framing of a larger problem centering on low-wage work. In campaign
materials, he argued that Illinois workers deserved a long overdue
raise because people that work should be able to support their families
on the wage they earn. In terms of Kingdons analysis, this pledge
linked the problem definition to a sense of fairness, a value to which most
Americans subscribe (Tropman, 1998), arguing that it was not fair that
people could not live on what they make in full-time work. Blagojevichs
campaign attached to this problem definition a solution that was easy to
understandraising the minimum wage to $6.50. This simple policy was
a straightforward political solution for a candidate looking to shore up a
liberal base of support in an election, thus connecting the policy with the
political domain.
Blagojevich won the election decisively and Democrats retook the
State Senate, giving the party control of all three branches of Illinois
state government for the first time in decades. This success led to the
mobilization of political interest groups and policy entities that had supported raising the minimum for years. Illinois has a strong union presence, and the AFL-CIO chose to take on the minimum wage as a
priority. For them it provided a straightforward message to low-wage
workers that the union was looking out for their interests, and therefore
was a clear political winner that would help their constituents, strengthened their credibility and visibility among potential members, and put
some business lobbies on the defensive (as seen in Whitley, 2004). The
Illinois chapter of the Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN) is a community organization and the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) a union who work closely with one
another and both specifically organize low-wage workers. Active support of this measure was an exciting opportunity for them. ACORN had
recently led a successful coalition effort to add a cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) to the city of Chicagos living wage ordinance, so under
the leadership of head organizer Madeline Talbott, ACORN began to
reach out and build a coalition among labor and other advocates, calling
it the Campaign to Reward Work (Talbott, 2005). While the campaign

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was officially separate from the efforts of the AFL-CIO, the parties
worked closely with each other. Together they drafted legislation that
called for an increase of the state minimum to $6.50 in January 2004 for
all workers, including tipped employees who have a much lower percentage rate under federal legislation. After much discussion among the
advocacy campaign, the Illinois AFL-CIO, the Governors office, and
the legislaturefollowed by some confusion as the wrong bill was introduced by a legislator anxious to be the first to proposethe proposed bill
that received consideration in the General Assembly included a COLA.
The COLA would regularly increase the minimum wage by the rate of
inflation by automatically raising it fifty cents every time its real value
drops by that amount.
Other interest groups came from the Chicago advocacy community
and included, among many others, Work Welfare and Families, Women
Employed, Chicago Coalition for the Homeless, Target Area Development Corporation, Developing Communities Project, and Business and
Professional People for the Public Interest (Talbott, 2005). Another important player came to the table from the policy community. The University of Illinois at Chicago, Center for Urban Economic Development
(UIC-CUED) regularly conducts quantitative research on local and
statewide social policy issues and actively joins policy debates in Illinois. They are a case example of what Kingdon calls policy entrepreneurs, their defining characteristic being their willingness to invest
their resourcestime, energy, reputation, and sometimes moneyin hope
of a future return (2003, p. 122). Immediately following Blagojevichs
election, they connected with the advocacy campaign and became active participants in the minimum wage legislation formation and evaluation process, in hopes of implementing what they thought would be a
positive policy change, and perhaps furthering their departmental reputation as a serious player in the policy community.
Like so many political leaders, when making his campaign promise
the new governor was looking for an issue that offered high salience
with low cost (Kingdon, 2003; Price, 1972). Blagojevich knew that
campaigning on a pledge to raise the minimum wage would be popular.
The issues of fairness that he enlisted in his pledge resonated with the
electorate, especially his base. However, the cost in political capital to
actually implement the increase was another matter. While Blagojevichs
labor liaison Catherine Shannon devoted some time to the issue, in practice his administration undertook little advocacy to insure its passage.
This is very similar to the actions of the Clinton administration before
passage of the federal raise in 1996, with the exception of Labor Secre-

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tary Robert Reich, who took it upon himself to lobby inside and out of
the executive branch and softened up the ground for the measure that
few thought was possible (Reich, 1997; Waltman, 2000).
The Illinois bill was strongly opposed by some business lobbies, including the Illinois Retail Merchants Association (IRMA), the Illinois
Chamber of Commerce that represents mostly local businesses and the
restaurant lobby (Whitley, 2004). However, the bill did not receive
much attention from large national corporations, who at the time were
mostly paying their employees above the proposed minimum already,
giving them little to lose with the new rate, and perhaps even something
to gain, since many of their customers would receive the wage raise and
perhaps buy more of their products. However, in the pluralist interest
group environment, concentrated interest appeared to be winning the
day. In this case it appeared early on to advocates that the business lobbies had a distinct advantage in this situation. Schattschneider argues
that Business so dominates the nongovernmental world that it looks
very much like a power system able to compete with the government itself (1964, p. 116). In their efforts to defeat the legislation, the mobilized coalition of small businesses and restaurants used well-known
arguments against increasing the minimum wage. For them the problem
was not that low-wage workers are paid unfair wages, but instead that
minimum wages force employers to hire fewer workers because they
must pay artificially high wages. As already discussed, this argument
connects with Lindbloms The market as prison, where policy decisions,
the political realm, and the scholarly world are boxed in by automatic
punishing mechanisms inherent in capitalism.
In Illinois, these criticisms were magnified by claims that the wage
increase would hobble Illinois in its competition in the region and in the
global marketplace. Press accounts in major outlets tended to focus on
the fears of the business community that an increase would hurt firms,
with bylines like Firms worry as wage hike looms (Schmeltzer &
Garza, 2003; Chase & Long, 2003). The Chicago Tribunes editorial
board voiced opposition to the wage raise in exactly this way calling it
a misguided, inefficient way to help low-wage workers. Worse, as the
state tries to draw jobs in a tough economy, this will put the state at a big
disadvantage to surrounding states (Chicago Tribune Editorial Page,
2003). Doug Whitley, President of the Illinois Chamber of Commerce
in January 2004 said his members called the law one more obstacle to
effectively competing in the international marketplace (Whitley, 2004).
After redefining the problem, minimum wage opponents like Jim
Cox (1999) usually try to attach a policy solution that has been circulat-

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79

ing around conservative policy communities looking for problems to attach tode-taxing the poor by alleviating them from income and
other payroll taxes, as well as sales tax. As even Alinsky (1971) would
point out (although for a different audience), this allows for a public
redirection of the issue to a very identifiable and vulnerable target, in
this case politicians. In Illinois, the business lobby specifically targeted
newly elected downstate (rural Illinois) Democratic state senators,
warning that any such increase would lead downstate businesses to
close down, and this would cause these senators to be defeated in their
next election. Because these were districts won by slim majorities, the
threat was taken seriously. If those state senators were defeated in the
next cycle, the Democrats would also lose control of the State Senate,
and so the threat of losing leadership control of the legislative body led
to a serious stalling of the measure.
It had become clear that passing the wage hike would be challenging.
For Blagojevich, it had served its main purposeto help get him elected.
However, members of the Campaign to Reward Work continued to
work together closely, in partnership with the AFL-CIO. The coalition
believed success of the initiative was dependent on having sound research available on the effects of the proposed wage raise.1 Therefore,
working closely with the coalition members, UIC researchers built a
study around a set of questions the answers to which it was believed
would influence the thinking of the state lawmakers. The research questions were:
Is the minimum wage an effective policy for improving the earnings of low-income households?
Does raising the minimum wage weaken the competitive position
of Illinois industries or impose excessive increases in labor costs?
Does a higher minimum wage result in lower employment levels? (All questions come from, Baiman et al., 2003.)
Following a methodology similar to the Card Test, the UIC-CUED
study utilized Current Population Survey data to look at wage and employment characteristics of Illinois households with low-wage workers.
It also examined employment trends after the implementation of increased minimum wages in other states. Finally, the study examined labor market trends in the low-wage workforce around the 1997 federal
minimum wage raise (Baiman et al., 2003). Baiman and his colleagues
concluded in their study that the raise would improve the earnings of a
significant share of low-income workers and households while impos-

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ing minimal costs to businesses and resulting in a negligible impact on

overall employment (p. i). The UIC-CUED study was the only comprehensive research undertaken on the effects of the proposed increase, and
so while opponents made claims about the negative effects of the wage
raise, coalition advocates were able to point to empirical evidence in
support of the legislation. When the report was released, the group held
a joint press conference, which did not receive the expected level of
coverage. Advocates attributed this to the fact that both major Chicago
daily papers use minimum wage workers for distribution (Talbott, 2005).
However, eventually the report garnered wide coverage through op-ed
pieces, and stories in many state media outlets. The coalition pooled resources to disseminate the results.
Campaign to Reward Work members then began to directly pressure
the leadership in both houses of the General Assembly, and specifically
targeted the same downstate senators who were fearful of losing reelection. Those districts also include a large base of low-wage workers, so
ACORN, SEIU, and other coalition members organized constituents to
directly pressure their legislators by citing the results of the UIC-CUED
study. In large part because of the efforts of this coalition, the wage raise
began to move through the committee structure of the State Senate. Due
to pressure by business interests, the State Senate Democrats caucused
and decided to drop the COLA and the provision on tipped employers,
and raise the wage to $6.50 over two years. Campaign members pressured more, now directly focusing on the Senates President Emil Jones.
Jones believed he was compromising in order to make the bills passage
possible and resented the pressure to include the COLA (Talbott, 2005).
The State Senate eventually passed a bill that removed the COLA, and
decreased the raise for tipped employees. The original legislation included them at $6.50, while the federal minimum wage stipulated a percentage rate of $5.15 for them. When the State Senate dropped this
clause and allowed the wage increase to go up by the same percentage
for tipped employees instead of to $6.50, the restaurant lobby largely
quieted their criticism, mitigating opposition to the raise.
When this compromise bill left the Senate, observers widely thought
that it would pass quickly through the State House, given that the Governor supported it and the State House was controlled by Democrats.
However, Speaker Michael Madigan did not put it on the agenda for
months and as the end of the legislative session neared, advocates began
to worry that the bill would not come to a vote. At this time, advocates
discovered that the Speaker had been working closely with the Illinois
Retail Merchants Association (IRMA), which adamantly opposed the

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bill (Talbott, 2005). As Cobb and Elder might say, Madigan did not
think there was a larger public interested in the raise. At one point, he
reportedly said to Illinois AFL-CIO president Margaret Blackshere,
Other than you, Margaret, who really cares about the minimum wage?
(Talbott) ACORN decided to use a previously scheduled lobby day to
show support for the minimum wage bill. They engaged in a number of
direct actions that got press coverage, but still the Speaker did not agree
to let the bill be heard.
As the end of the session approached, ACORN organizers arranged
to attend a final hearing of the committee that had to vote on the bill
before it was passed onto the House floor. Speaker Madigan had still not
given approval to the committee chairman, Representative Larry McKeon,
to hear and vote on the measure. Prior to the committee hearing, organizers approached Chairman McKeon, who supported the increase, to
let him know that they intended to protest. He agreed that if they did, he
would be forced to order arrests, which advocates believed might provide the publicity needed to push the bill through. Organizers then
informed reporters that ACORN members would be arrested at the
hearing and they should have cameras ready. Three ACORN members,
Christin Howard, Toni Foulkes, and Connie Solano, would be given
time to speak, but when they finished they would refuse to yield the
floor and be arrested.
Minutes before the meeting began, AFL-CIO president Blackshere
came in and told ACORN organizers that Madigan had reached an
agreement with IRMA for a two-phase increase, to $5.50 in January
2004 and $6.50 in January 2005, but Madigan still refused to commit to
calling up the bill. ACORN organizers agreed to the compromises, but
said they must proceed with the action unless the Speaker agreed to let
the bill come to a vote. As the hearing came to order, Representative
McKeon announced that the bill would not be heard (as had been previously planned) and ACORN members began to chant, We cant survive on Five-One-Five. After some time, McKeon offered them time
to speak, and each of the three designees did. But when they had concluded speaking, they refused the yield the floor by resuming their
chanting. Blackshere came rushing into the room to tell organizers that
Speaker Madigan would be furious if there were arrests, but organizers
reiterated that they could not back down unless they had a firm agreement that the bill would be called. It went on, and organizers stalled the
arrests.
McKeon finally said he must move on and order the arrests, and at
that moment, Blackshere came in and announced that the Speaker had

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agreed to call the bill and schedule a vote before the end of the session.
The crowd of ACORN and other activists exploded into cheers (Talbott,
2005). The bill as amended did pass through the House, was reconciled
in the Senate, and the Governor signed it. When the Governor signed
the legislation, he quoted statistics from the UIC-CUED study regarding the impact that increased wages would have on the lives of low-income workers and their families, and the minor costs that businesses
would incur.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
This case study highlights the importance of collaboration between
political interest groups and the policy community in an interesting
variation of Kingdons model. In Chapter six of Agendas, Alternatives,
and Public Policies, Kingdon discusses at length the advantages of a
well-networked and organized policy community. Such communitywide communication generates common outlooks, orientations, and
ways of thinking (p. 119) and allows these communities to approach
consensus on policy proposals. However, in the Illinois case it was
through early partnerships bridging the political stream and the policy
stream, like those discussed by Sabatier (1993,1988), that success was
found, as policy entrepreneurs and advocates were able to match empirical rigor with political effectiveness. The UIC-CUED study was successful because the research questions were built in partnership with
advocates to address important political questions. However, it took a
rigorous empirical methodology that strove for objectivity to make the
study worthwhile. With the study results in hand, advocates were able to
take evidence specific to this legislative proposal and forward it. Advocates were also able to pool resources to get the most public exposure
for the study eventually. This all fits comfortably within the pluralistic
frame. Different interest groups with direct interest in the legislation
came together, either for or against, and the larger and more unified
group won. On the side of the minimum wage, it took researchers to
give empirical credibility and organizers and professional advocates to
make a compelling case. Finally, after all compromises were agreed to,
it took direct action by organized low-wage workers themselves to
move the bill to the front of the agenda. This might appear as a textbook
application of agenda setting in pluralism.
A pluralistic frame, however, simplifies the issue and gives short
shrift to important structural constraints that shaped this legislative bat-

H. Luke Shaefer

83

tle. Compromises on the COLA and on tipped employees were essential

to making this an acceptable bill for arguably the most powerful opponents. Only three state minimum wage increases include a COLA of any
sort: Washington State, Oregon, and Florida (U.S. Department of Labor,
2005). Without the COLA, the minimum wages effects are quickly
dulled. For example, the federal increase in 1997 from $4.25 to $5.15
was erased five years later. Critics of pluralism like Piven and Cloward
(1979; 1993) might argue that an increase like the federal one in 1997
and in Illinois in 2003 are mere token gestures, just enough to quiet discontent among low-wage workers, but not enough to affect businesses.
We can see this trend in the case study above. Advocates of the minimum wage increase never had to confront powerful corporations, because what did pass was most certainly no more than what the most
powerful interests, major low-wage employers and restaurants, were
willing to accept. Nationally in 2003, workers in the lowest tenth percentile of the labor market made an average of $7.00 an hour, well
above the Illinois rate of $6.50 (Mishel, Bernstein, & Allegretto, 2005).
Illinoiss raise did not greatly affect major low-wage employers, who
were paying above that level anyway.
Even within these constraints, however, the Illinois case study provides compelling evidence that the advocacy coalition supporting the
minimum wage was crucial in getting the legislation passed. If viewed
from Piven and Clowards model (1979), advocates took the structural
circumstances, and made the best of it. Baiman et al. (2003) found the
raise would affect 450,000 residents. At the time of its passage, Illinois
was the only Midwestern state with a minimum above the federal level.
Furthermore, in terms of context, this case study also seems to fit better
in Kingdons model than in Piven and Clowards. There was no massunrest leading to the change. Minimum wage workers in Illinois were
not protesting at any level greater than they were before, and most major
decisions in this campaign, as well as advocacy efforts, were designed
and carried out by professionals. The bills successful passage is much
more clearly the result of the opening of a policy window and the
successful organization of a diverse group of advocates.
Today, there are opportunities for further research on state minimum
wage efforts. As mentioned earlier, the economic effects of state minimum wages on low-wage employment and state economies are still
hotly debated, and rigorous and thoughtful study is needed to determine
the economic outcomes of the minimum wage. In terms of studies
building on the one presented here, referendums are expected to appear
on ballots in at least nine states in 2006, and still others will consider a

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raise through traditional legislative channels. This confluence of state

initiatives provides the context necessary for a quasi-experimental
design. By studying states with similar characteristics but somewhat
different political structures and environments, research may further determine what the central components in Kingdons garbage can are for
this policy issue. Furthermore, the advent of the referendum strategy offers an interesting opportunity to test some of Schattschneiders theories (1964). He argues that in general, those in power prefer to keep it
and debate issues in a controlled environment instead of allowing issues
of importance to be debated by the larger public. With these referendums, researchers should pay special attention to any of the states that
have a referendum with a particularly high-proposed minimum. The
question becomes whether state governments will pre-empt the referendum by passing a smaller increase that protects business interests while
mollifying advocates. In general, research on the minimum wage could
take the form of comparable case studies in states considering a wage
raise. Perhaps such research could include examples of states that implement a wage raise through traditional legislative procedures and
states with these ballot referendums.
Several questions are important to consider with further study. They
include but are not limited to: How much do organized groups of advocates affect the passage or defeat of a state minimum wage? Are there
other examples of early bridges between the political stream and the
policy stream like the one in Illinois, and, if so, what affect do they
have? Will any state pass a hike above the average wage paid by major
corporations that employ low-wage employees? Will minimum wages
passed by ballot referendum be more or less likely to include a COLA,
the component that seems to be met with the most opposition by businesses? Identifying these specific questions was made possible by this
in-depth case study. Answering them will taken further research that
builds on the agenda setting and policy formation literatures to provide
both depth and breadth to our understanding of advances in minimum
wage policy.

NOTE
1. Evidence of this is available in coalition correspondence and meeting notes.

H. Luke Shaefer

85

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