EFFECT OF

ECONOMIC
CHALLENGES
ON MARINE
CORPS
READINESS
2/10/17
By Sgt. Maj. Brandon Eckardt, USMC

The following narrative is submitted in order to report information and

provide insight from my perspective regarding personal observations of
issues that have created myriad dilemmas for the United States Marine
Corps as a result of the economic downturn that began in 2008.

Manpower Crisis/Return to Normalcy

Discussion: During the initial phases of Operation Iraqi

Freedom/Operation Enduring Freedom (OIF/OEF) it was determined that
the United States Marine Corps (USMC) did not have a large enough
force to effectively fulfill its assigned mission adequately. This
determination initiated an aggressive recruiting and retention
campaign that sought to expand the USMC from approximately
174,000 to 202,000. Although there were significant consequences to
this undertaking, it did provide the USMC with a resolution to the
manpower dilemma as unceasing deployment cycles continued for
more than a decade. This expansion was unsustainable however, and
as the deployment cycles in support of (ISO) the War on Terrorism
slowed, and the operating budgets began to diminish significantly, it
became obvious that downsizing, or force shaping, (the preferred term)
be utilized to reduce the Marine Corps to a force of around 174,000, a
number the USMC had not been at since 2002. This period of rapid
growth followed by rapid contraction created problems with the
traditional pyramid shaped manpower model because the middle of
the pyramid became bloated. As units were shuttered, budgets were
cut and large scale OIF/OEF deployments came to an end, what
remained was an unaffordable and expendable group of Marines that
were primarily part of the original expansion process that began as far
back as 2003. While the USMC has introduced a host of new programs
in compliance with Department of Defense (DOD) requirements that
assist transitioning service members returning to civilian life the real
issue is that USMC leadership has postponed the force reduction
requirements banking that sequestration would be lifted. When this
did not occur, unprecedented actions such as Staff Sergeant Retention
Boards, Voluntary Enlisted Early Release Program (VEERP) and
Temporary Early Retirement Authority (TERA) were initiated.

Recommendation: The rapid expansion of the Marine Corps followed

by rapid reduction is not new. From 1945-1950 the USMC shrank from
a force of almost 470,000 to less than 75,000. That was during a time
of conscription and different dynamics however, and does not always
compare well. A central problem is that aside from accepted
commands, no USMC unit is operating with its full complement of
personnel. I believe that the Marine Forces Reserve (MARFORRES) has
been completely underutilized in this regard. The DOD budget already
provides for the recruitment, training and sustainment of MARFORRES
Units. If they were used to augment active duty units preparing for
combat deployments the USMC could capitalize on the investment
made and enhance the combat power of deploying units. This would
give deploying units greater flexibility and depth. Additionally,
returning these Marines back to their organic reserve units upon
conclusion of their active duty period would provide a level of
experience and proficiency for those commands that cannot be
garnered any other way. This is expansion, with built in contraction,
done in a sustainable way that actually yields long term benefits,
provides for professional development and gives the USMC decision
space to evaluate and incorporate responsible methods for more
permanent expansion or contraction.

The Five Year Plan

Discussion: The USMC is a constantly evolving entity and as such our

needs from an infrastructure standpoint are always changing. Despite
this readily acknowledged fact our method for addressing our
infrastructure needs is archaic. Typically a building project is
forecasted in a five-year plan that is incapable of adapting to the
constant change that occurs. The process is too rigid and binding and
often results in facilities that are inadequate for our long-term needs or
are even no longer necessary. Additional problems are encountered
when facilities maintenance is reluctant, or even refuses, to address
current maintenance issues citing either a lack of funding or that due
to planned future renovations no funds will be expended to make
repairs. Yet operational units are still required to house their Marines in
these unacceptable conditions. Reduction in funding has impacted
every component of the USMC but what Marines see in this regard is
an unwillingness to provide them even the simplest of
accommodations that are up to date and serviceable. Significant
disparity exists between other USMC installations and other services as
well. Occasionally well-intended building/renovation contracts are
approved and scheduled only to become victims of shrinking budgets
as promised funds are ultimately not delivered. This compounds the
problem as maintenance issues in current facilities accumulate
creating a back log that facilities maintenance then claims is too large
for them to rectify in a timely manner. Frankly, we have outsourced
the decision-making capacity on what gets fixed and what does not to
civilians who are not even stakeholders in ensuring the welfare of our
Marines. This is unacceptable. The five-year plans, along with budget
reductions and unaccountable facilities maintenance supervisory staff,
have been primary contributors to the negative perceptions and
opinions shared by Marines of all ranks.

Recommendation: Proposed building or renovation projects once

approved must have committed funding. Recognize that things
change and incorporate a sustainable process for evaluating proposed
projects to determine if changes to a scheduled project are viable and
affordable. A competent project manager can do this and does so
frequently in commercial building projects outside of the military.
Maintenance issues in existing facilities have to be addressed swiftly.
This is a non-negotiable and is a price for doing our business that we
have been getting by without paying for too long. The quasi-privatized
facilities maintenance process that is currently under use has no
accountability and too many layers of bureaucracy for operational units
to actually get an acceptable turnaround time for repairs. A more
efficient and accountable process must be established. Maintenance
issues that are not addressed in a reasonable amount of time must
have significant justification or accountability must be enforced. No
organization of our scope and scale should allow its primary work force
to be treated so callously.

Extensive Overuse of USMC Aviation Assets

Discussion: Since the onset of OIF/OEF there has been significant

discourse on the impacts of continual deployments on military
personnel. These concerns are myriad, difficult to mitigate and require
nonstandard thinking to address sufficiently. The negative impact to
equipment is much easier to understand. Overuse leads to
accelerated degradation. Constant demand means that equipment
often cannot be taken out of service for modifications mandated by
technical directives. Transitioning from an amphibious force that is
primarily charged with projection of combat power from the sea to a
long term occupational force provided the USMC a great opportunity to
evaluate its equipment arsenal in a combat theatre defined by harsh
environmental conditions. It also hastened the life cycle of equipment
that now requires substantial maintenance to be returned to ready for
service condition. A good example of this can be observed in the USMC
aviation community, which is currently struggling mightily to maintain
readiness levels in F/A-18 and MV-22 squadrons. Despite shrinking
operational budgets and acquisition programs (F-35) demanding the
lions share of available funding, the demand for units to deploy ISO
national objectives has not stopped. Compounding the issue is the fact
that the aviation industry itself is transitioning their production and
maintenance efforts to support anticipated new Type/Model/Series
(T/M/S) aircraft to ensure their viability for the future. Simply put, the
old T/M/S aircraft have no future and the organizations that make parts
for repair observe this and have initiated their own transition. Fewer
companies making parts means those parts are scarce. The demand
for spare parts has increased though due to equipment overuse and
with greater demand and fewer suppliers the price increases
exponentially. In an era of decreasing budgets this does not bode well
for readiness.

Recommendation: Incentives encouraging companies to continue

making repair parts for current operational aircraft that support and
fulfill our nations deployment requirements should be considered.
Domination of the sky has been a key reason for our success in combat
during OIF/OEF. Until new T/M/S aircraft are deemed operational and
ready for assignment to real missions, sufficient funding and support
for those units charged with providing the combatant commanders the
inherent capability necessary to achieve national objectives must be
delivered.

Point of Contact in this matter is Sergeant Major Brandon S. Eckardt at

brandon.eckardt@usmc.mil.