1.) SIASOCO v.

NARVAJA-BALOG (MIKAEL ONG)

G.R. No. 130460

Facts

David Siasoco was the registered owner of Lot Nos. 29 and 30, Block 2 of the Saint John Village, Sta.
Rosa, Laguna, covered by TCT Nos. T-38343 and T-28344. Petitioners are the heirs of David Siasoco, who
allegedly died on November 23, 1982. On August 20, 1984, petitioners, represented by petitioner Rodolfo A.
Siasoco, sold the two lots to respondent Narvaja.
Respondent later filed a complaint for specific performance against petitioner in the Housing and Land
Use Regulation Board (HLURB). The HLURB Arbiter ordered petitioners to accept the amount of P105,320.00
as balance for the purchase of the 2 questioned parcels of land; and to execute the Deed of Absolute Sale of the
property in question.
Petitioners appealed to the HLURB Board of Commissioners, but their appeal was dismissed on the
ground of failure to prosecute. The HLURB Board of Commissioners ordered HLURB Arbiter to accept the
amount from Narvaja-Balog in trust for respondent Siasoco which amount represents the balance for the
purchase of Lots 29 and 30; and to execute the Deeds of Absolute Sale in favor of Narvaja relative to the
aforementioned parcels of land.
The Registrar of Deeds of Laguna was directed to transfer the titles to Lot Nos. 29 and 30 to respondent.
Accordingly, a deed of absolute sale, covering the properties in question, was executed by respondent on the
one hand and HLURB Arbiter, acting in behalf of petitioner, on the other hand. However, the Registrar of
Deeds refused to register the said deed of absolute sale until the owners duplicate certificates covering the
properties in question had been presented to him. Upon the refusal of petitioner to deliver the owners duplicate
certificates in his possession, respondent filed a petition before the trial court to require the former to surrender
the same.
Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss and another motion to suspend proceedings. They contended that
the trial court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the petition and that another case involving the same issue and the
same parties was still pending in the HLURB. The trial court denied petitioner's motions. Petitioners then filed a
special civil action for certiorari in the Court of Appeals which, however, dismissed the action.
Issue

Does the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board have original and exclusive jurisdiction over the instant
case?

Ruling

YES. The HLURB has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of unsound real estate business
practices; claims involving refund filed against project owners, developers, dealers, brokers, or salesmen; and
cases of specific performance. It is the HLURB, not the trial court, which has jurisdiction over complaints for
specific performance filed against subdivision developers to compel the latter to execute deeds of absolute sale
and to deliver the certificates of title to buyers. (United Housing Corporation v. Dayrit )

2. BENIN V. TUASON (RAPHAEL PATAJO)

Facts:

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 The plaintiffs Benin, Alcantara and Pili filed three separate complaints and alleged that they were the
owners and possessors of the three parcels of agricultural lands, located in the barrio of La Loma (now
San Jose) in the municipality (now city) of Caloocan, that they inherited said parcels of land from their
ancestor Sixto Benin, who in turn inherited the same from his father, Eugenio Benin;

Plaintiffs uniformly alleged, that sometime in the year 1951 while they were enjoying the peaceful
possession of their lands, the defendants, J.M. Tuason and Co. Inc. through their agents and
representatives, with the aid of armed men, by force and intimidation, using bulldozers and other
demolishing equipment, illegally entered and started defacing, demolishing and destroying the dwellings
and constructions of plaintiffs lessees, as well as the improvements.

They made inquiries regarding the probable claim of defendants, and in 1953 they discovered for the
first time that their lands, had either been fraudulently or erroneously included, in what appears as Parcel
No. 1 (known as Santa Mesa Estate) in Original Certificate of Title No. 735 of the Land Records of the
province of Rizal in the names of the original applicants for registration, now defendants, Mariano
Tuason.

The plaintiffs alleged that the registered owners had applied for the registration of two parcels of land
(known as the Santa Mesa Estate and the Diliman Estate; that the registration proceedings were
docketed as LRC No. 7681 of the Court of Land Registration; They allege that the application for
registration in LRC No. 7681, containing the boundaries, technical descriptions and areas of parcel No.
1 (Santa Mesa Estate) and parcel No. 2 (Diliman Estate) was published in the Official Gazette;

That before the decision was handed down in LRC No. 7681, the area, boundaries and technical
descriptions of parcel No. 1 were altered and amended; that the area of parcel No. 1 as mentioned in
Decree No. 17431 is bigger than the area of parcel No. 1 appearing in the application for registration as
published in the Official Gazette; that the amendments and alterations, which were made after the
publication of the original application, were never published; that a decision was rendered in LRC No.
7681 based on the amended plan; that pursuant to the decision, a decree of registration was issued,
known as Decree No. 17431, decreeing the registration in the names of the applicants of the two parcels
of land (Santa Mesa Estate and Diliman Estate).

The plaintiffs prayed the court to declare them owners and entitled to the possession of the parcel, or
parcels, of land and to revoke the decision of the Court of Land Registration, in LRC No. 7681, and to
declare Decree No. 17431, dated July 6, 1914 null and void from the beginning with respect to Parcel
No. 1 (Santa Mesa Estate) in Original Certificate of Title No. 735 which include the lands of the
plaintiffs;

The three cases were tried together, and decided in one joint decision, by the Court of First Instance of
Rizal; were jointly appealed directly to the Supreme Court because of the value of the property involved
in each case.

The Court of First Instance declared that the decision, the decree and the title issued in LRC No. 7681,
are null and void, ab initio, and of no effect whatsoever and that Original Certificate of Title No. 735
found on page 136 Vol. A-7 of the Registration Book of Rizal is null and void from the very beginning
and of no effect whatsoever;

ISSUE:

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 Whether or not the decree and title issued by the LRC are null and void?

HELD:

NO, as soon as the decree of title has been registered in the office of the Register of Deeds, the property
included in said decree shall become registered land, and the certificate shall take effect upon the date of
the transcription of the decree. The certificate of title is a true copy of the decree of registration. The
OCT must contain the full transcription of the decree of registration. Any defect in the manner of
transcribing the technical description should be considered as formal, and not a substantial defect.

What matters is that the original certificate of title contains the full transcription of the decree of
registration, and that the required data provided for in Section 40 of Act 496 are stated in the original
certificate of title.

We, therefore, hold that the formal defect in the transcription of Decree of Registration No. 17431 in the
Registration Book did not render null and void Original Certificate of Title No. 735.

The joint decision of the Court of First Instance, appealed from, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

3.) BALBIN vs REGISTER of ILOCOS (SHAYNE RAMIREZ)

4. ENG, represented by ENEDINO H. FERRER, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, JACINTO

VELEZ, JR., CARMEN VELEZ TING, AVENUE MERCHANDISING, INC., FELIX TING AND
ALFREDO GO, respondents.
(MARY JANE SECRETARIA)

FACTS:

(Novation is never presumed; it must be sufficiently established that a valid new agreement or obligation
has extinguished or changed an existing one. The registration of a later sale must be done in good faith to entitle
the registrant to priority in ownership over the vendee in an earlier sale.)

The Velezes, owners of a lot and commercial building, through Carmen Velez Ting wrote a letter to the
petitioners, the lessees of the said building, offering to sell the subject property for P1,050,000.00. The
petitioners sent a reply-letter to the Velezes accepting the offer to sell.

Petitioner Emilia Uraca went to see Carmen Ting about the offer to sell but she was told by the latter that the
price was P1,400,000.00 in cash or managers check and not P1,050,000.00 as erroneously stated in their letter-
offer after some haggling. Emilia Uraca agreed to the price of P1,400,000.00 but counter-proposed that payment
be paid in installments with a down payment of P1,000,000.00 and the balance of P400,000 to be paid in 30
days. Carmen Velez Ting did not accept the said counter-offer of Emilia Uraca. No payment was made by the
petitioners to the Velezes.

The Velezes sold the subject lot and commercial building to the Avenue Group, Private Respondent,
for P1,050,000.00 .

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At the time the Avenue Group purchased the subject property on July 13, 1985 from the Velezes, the certificate
of title of the said property was clean and free of any annotation of adverse claims or lis pendens.

On July 31, 1985, the petitioners filed the instant complaint against the Velezes. On August 1, 1985, petitioners
registered a notice of lis pendens over the property in question with the Office of the Register of Deeds.

The Avenue Group filed an ejectment case against petitioners ordering the latter to vacate the commercial
building standing on the lot in question.

TRIAL COURT: there were two perfected contracts of sale between the Velezes and the petitioners. The first
sale was for P1,050,000.00 and the second was for P1,400,000.00. Hence, the Velezes were not free to sell the
properties to the Avenue Group. It also found that the Avenue Group purchased the property in bad faith.

Private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals.

CA: ruled that there was a perfected contract of sale of the property for P1,050,000.00 between the Velezes and
the petitioners but such perfected contract of sale was subsequently novated. the original contract. However, the
same was mutually withdrawn, cancelled and rescinded by novation, and was therefore abandoned by the
parties when Carmen Velez Ting raised the consideration of the contract making the price P1,400,000.00. Since
there was no agreement as to the second price offered, there was likewise no meeting of minds between the
parties, hence, no contract of sale was perfected.

ISSUES:

1. WON there was a novation

2. WON the petitioners have better rights to buy and own the Velezes property for registering their notice of lis
pendens ahead of the Avenue Groups registration of their deeds of sale taking into account Art. 1544, 2nd
paragraph, of the Civil Code.

RULING:

First Issue: No Extinctive Novation

The Court notes that the petitioners accepted in writing and without qualification the Velezes written offer
to sell at P1,050,000.00 within the three-day period stipulated therein. Hence, from the moment of acceptance
on July 10, 1985, a contract of sale was perfected since undisputedly the contractual elements of consent, object
certain and cause concurred.
Novation is effected only when a new contract has extinguished an earlier contract between the same
parties. In this light, novation is never presumed; it must be proven as a fact either by express stipulation of the
parties or by implication derived from an irreconcilable incompatibility between old and new obligations or
contracts. In this case, there was no novation.
The petitioners and the Velezes clearly did not perfect a new contract because the essential requisite of
consent was absent, the parties having failed to agree on the terms of the payment. The first sale of the property
in controversy, by the Velezes to petitioners for P1,050,000.00, remained valid and existing.

Second Issue: Double Sale of an Immovable

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 double sale -- first, to the petitioner; second, to the Avenue Group.
Article 1544 of the Civil Code provides:

Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first
recorded it in the Registry of Property.

Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was first in the
possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith.

The prior registration of the disputed property by the second buyer does not by itself confer ownership or a
better right over the property. Article 1544 requires that such registration must be coupled with good faith. The
governing principle is primus tempore, potior jure (first in time, stronger in right). Knowledge gained by the
first buyer of the second sale cannot defeat the first buyers rights except where the second buyer registers
in good faith the second sale ahead of the first.

Such knowledge of the first buyer does not bar her from availing of her rights under the law, among them, to
register first her purchase as against the second buyer. But in converso knowledge gained by the second buyer
of the first sale defeats his rights even if he is first to register the second sale, since such knowledge taints his
prior registration with bad faith. Before the second buyer can obtain priority over the first, he must show that
he acted in good faith throughout (i.e. in ignorance of the first sale and of the first buyers rights) ---- from the
time of acquisition until the title is transferred to him by registration or failing registration, by delivery of
possession.

The Court finds that bad faith tainted the Avenue Groups purchase on July 13, 1985 of the Velezes real property
subject of this case, and the subsequent registration thereof on August 1, 1995. The Avenue Group had actual
knowledge of the Velezes prior sale of the same property to the petitioners, a fact antithetical to good faith. For
a second buyer like the Avenue Group to successfully invoke the second paragraph, Article 1544 of the Civil
Code, it must possess good faith from the time of the sale in its favor until the registration of the same.

The Avenue Group, whose store is close to the properties in question, had known the petitioners to be the
lessee-occupants of the said property. Felix Ting admitted to have a talk with Ong Seng about the properties.
Manuel Ting also admitted that about a month after Ester Borromeo allegedly offered the sale of the properties
Felix Ting went to see Ong Seng again. If these were so, it can be safely assumed that Ong Seng had
consequently told Felix about the offer on to buy the properties for P1,000,000.00 and of their timely
acceptance to buy the same at P1,050,000.00.

5.) MILLENA VS. CA, G.R. No. 127797, January 31, 2000 (MARY GRACE CRUZ)

Facts:

The case involves a 3,934 sq. meter parcel of land in barangay Balinad, Daraga, Albay. Such land was
part of Lot 1874, which is a land subject of cadastral proceeding in the 1920s before the Court of First Instance
in Albay. Among its claimants are the following: (1) Gregoria Listana; (2) Potenciana Maramba (her sister in
law); and (3) with the latters 7 children (all surnamed Listana).

On August 17, 1926, the claimants reached an agreement to divide Lot 1874 among themselves; went
to Gregoria Listana while the remaining to Potenciana Maramba and her 7 children. Such agreement was then
submitted to the cadastral court. Thus, the northern portion of Lot 1874 was awarded to Gregoria Listana.

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 At the time, Gregoria Listana was ill due to tuberculosis. Hence, she executed a power of attorney in
favor of her cousin (Antonia Lipato); authorized attorney in fact to sell the portion of lot 1874 belonging to his
principal. With that, the proceeds of the sale would be used for her interment. As an attorney in fact, Lipato sold
the portion to Gaudencio Jacob. Thereafter, Jacob entered the lot sold to him and started harvesting.

Upon learning Jacobs entry of said lot, Potenciana Maramba confronted him. Thus, the latter filed an
ejectment case against Jacob. However, the Justice of Peace dismissed the case. Thereafter, upon the dismissal
of the case, Jacob continued possession of the property for over 40 years until April 4, 1966. On November
1981, Felisa Jacob (Daughter of Gaudencio Jacob) discovered that Florencio Listana (son of Potenciana
Maramba) had acquired from the Bureau of Lands a free patent certificate covering the entire 14,284 sq. meter
area Lot 1874; thus, includes the portion of Felisa Jacob. The latter, thereafter, filed a protest before the Bureau
of Lands.

After the death of Florencio Listana, the heirs of the latter sold the entire lot 1874 including the portion
sold by Gregoria Listana to Gaudencio Jacob to Alejandro Millena. Thus, Felisa Jacob filed a complaint against
Alejandro Millena for annulment of title.

Issue:

Whether or not prescription has now barred the action for reconveyance.

Held:

An action for reconveyance can be barred by prescription. If it is based on fraud, it must be filed within
4 years from the discovery of fraud, and such discovery is deemed to take place from the issuance of the
original certificate of title. On the other hand, an action for reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust
prescribes in 10 years from the date of the issuance of the original certificate of title or transfer certificate of
title.

But, it must be stressed that prescription cannot be invoked in n action for reconveyance when the
plaintiff is in possession of the land to be reconveyed. Moreover, under article 253 of the civil code, possession
is the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right. In order to possess, one must first have control of the thing
and, second, a deliberate intention to possess it. In this case, Felisa Jacob had exercised dominion over the
contested parcel of land.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

6.) GATIOAN vs GAFFUD (ROSEMARIE KHOLOMA)

7.) BAYOCA vs NOGALES (RENIER HIPOLITO)

Facts:

The heirs of spouses Juan Canino and Brigida Domasig inherited a parcel of land located in Prieto-Diaz Sorsogon
in an assessed value of P500.

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 Tomas Canino being a minor at 17 yrs old is under the custody of his sister Preciosa Canino and her husband
Emilio Deocareza
December 15, 1947 Preciosa executed an unnotarized deed of sale of real property with right to repurchase with
an area of 5,000sqm in favor of her sister in law Julia Deocareza for P200, right to repurchase is within 5 years
from the execution of the deed.
February 2, 1948 Preciosa and Tomas executed an unnotarized in favour of Julia covering 5,330sqm for P60,
right to repurchase within 1yr.
August 29, 1948 Preciosa executed another unnotarized deed over the entirety of the property in favour of Julia
for P270, right to repurchase within 2 years.
On January 31, 1951, Preciosa executed a notarized deed over the entirety of the land for P800, right to
repurchase within 1 year.
Tax declaration was issued in the name of Julia, she then allowed her brothers Ambrosio and Emilio to
occupy the said property. Preciosa failed to repurchase the land
Gaudioso Nogales acquired the property on the east side of the land and installed a tenant thereon.
April 29, 1968 Julia executed an unnotarized compromise agreement in favour of Gaudioso whereby she sold
21,080 sqm to Gaudioso for P3,500. Julia also executed an absolute sale of real property in favour of Gaudioso
for P3,000. She promised to have her brothers vacate the said property.
Emilio and Preciosa refused to vacate the property upon demand of Gaudioso. Latter filed a complaint with the
RTC Sorsogon against Emilio and Julia for recovery of possession of property. RTC ruled in favour of Gaudioso
Gaudioso discovered that petitioners claims ownership of the said property. Nonito Dichoso and Francisco
Bayoca constructed their house on the portion of the property.
Siblings Canino executed deed of partition on the said property on June 2, 1971, neither Julia nor Gaudioso
conformed.
June 21, 1971 Isidra Canino executed a deed of absolute sale in favour of Pio Dichoso and Lourdes Donor for
P750 on the area of 5,929sqm, Isidra showed them the deed of partition.
Pio Dichoso and Lourdes Donor applied for a free patent over the property they purchase from Isidra.
Preciosa Canino executed a deed of absolute sale In favour of Erwin Bayoca with an area of 6,550sqm for P4,000
Consolacion Canino executed a deed of absolute sale in favour of Nonito Dichoso over an area of 5959sqm for
P1,300
Dolores Canino executed a deed of absolute sale of real property in favour of Francisco Bayoca over an area of
7090sqm for P5,000.
Preciosa executed a deed of absolute sale of real property in favour of Erwin Bayoca for P5,000.
Gaudioso filed a case against petitioners for Accion Reinvindicatoria with damages in RTC.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioners claim of ownership will prevail over the respondent

Held: No, the petitioners does not have a better right over the property against the respondent.

Nogales was the first to buy the subject property from Julia Deocareza, who in turn bought the same from the
Canino brothers and sisters. Petitioners, however, rely on the fact that they were the first to register the sales of
the different portions of the property, resulting in the issuance of new titles in their names. Petitioners insist that
they have a better right over respondent Nogales

Article 1544 of the Civil Code governs the preferential rights of vendees in cases of multiple sales, as follows:

Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the
person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property.

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Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first
recorded it in the Registry of Property.

Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was first in the
possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith.

Following the above-quoted law, in the double sales of immovables, ownership is transferred in the order
hereunder stated to -

(a) the first registrant in good faith;

(b) the first in possession in good faith; and

(c) the buyer who presents the oldest title in good faith.

8.) CRUZ vs CABANA (AMEIR MUKSAN)

FACTS:

In June 1965, respondent Leodegaria Cabaa sold the subject property to respondent spouses Teofilo Legaspi
and Iluminada Cabaa (spouses Legaspi) under their contract entitled Bilihang Muling Mabibili which
stipulated that Cabaa can repurchase the land within one year from December 31, 1966. The said land was not
repurchased, however, so the spouses Legaspi took possession of the said property. Later, Cabaa requested that
the land title be lent to her in order to mortgage the property to the Philippine National Bank (PNB), to which
the spouses Legaspi yielded. On October 21, 1968, Cabaa formally sold the land to spouses Legaspi by way of
an absolute sale. The spouses Legaspi then attempted to register the deed of sale, but failed because they could
not present the owner's duplicate of title which was still in the possession of the PNB as mortgage.
Subsequently, they were able to register the document of sale on May 13, 1969 under Primary Entry No.
210113 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon Province.

On November 29, 1968, Cabaa sold the same property to herein petitioner Abelardo Cruz (now deceased),
who, in turn, tried to register the deed of sale on September 3, 1970. However, he was informed that Cabaa
had already sold the property to the spouses Legaspi, so he was only able to register the land in his name on
February 9, 1971. The CFI of Quezon Province declared the spouses Legaspi as the true and rightful owners of
the subject property and the land title that Cruz had acquired as null and void. The Court of Appeals affirmed
said decision, but ordered Cabaa reimburse to Cruz's heirs the amounts of P2,352.50, which the late petitioner
Abelardo Cruz paid to PNB to discharge the mortgage obligation of Cabaa in favor of said bank, and the
amount of P3,397.50, representing the amount paid by said Abelardo Cruz to her as consideration of the sale
with pacto de retro of the subject property.

ISSUE:
Who is the rightful owner of the subject property?

Held:
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The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the appellate court with modification ordering and sentencing
respondent Leodegaria Cabaa to reimburse and pay to petitioner's heirs the total sum of P5,750.00.

There is no question that spouses Legaspi were the first buyers, first on June 1, 1965 under a sale with right of
repurchase and later on October 21, 1968 under a deed of absolute sale and that they had taken possession of the
land sold to them; that Abelardo Cruz was the second buyer under a deed of sale dated November 29, 1968,
which to ail indications, contrary to the text, was a sale with right of repurchase for ninety (90) days. There is no
question, either, that spouses Legaspi were the first and the only ones to be in possession of the subject
property.

The knowledge of the first sale Abelardo Cruz had gained defeats his rights even if he is first to register the
second sale, since such knowledge taints his prior registration with bad faith. This is the price exacted by Article
1544 of the Civil Code. Before the second buyer can obtain priority over the first, he must show that he acted in
good faith throughout (i.e. in ignorance of the first sale and of the first buyer's rights) - from the time of
acquisition until the title is transferred to him by registration or failing registration, by delivery of possession.
The second buyer must show continuing good faith and innocence or lack of knowledge of the first sale until his
contract ripens into full ownership through prior registration as provided by law."

9.) DAGUPAN vs. MACAM (NEAL CAJETA-DROPPED)

FACTS:

Sammy Maron and his seven brothers and sisters were pro-indiviso owners of a parcel of unregistered land
located in Pangasinan. Pending their application for registration of said land under Act No. 496, they
executed two deeds of sale conveying the property to Macam, who took possession and introduced
substantial improvements to it. One month later an OCT was issued in the name of the Maron's, free from
all liens and encumbrances.
By virtue of a final judgment rendered in a civil case of the MTC of Manila against Maron in favor of the
Manila Trading and Supply Company, levy was made upon whatever interest he had in the property. The
interest was sold at public auction to the judgment creditor. The corresponding notice of levy, certificate of
sale and the Sheriff's certificate of final sale in favor of the Manila Trading and Supply Co. because
nobody exercised the right of redemptions were duly registered. Manila Trading and Supply company
sold all its rights and title to the property to Dagupan.

ISSUE:
Who has the better right as between Dagupan Trading Company, and Rustico Macam to the one-eighth share of
Sammy Maron in the subject property?

HELD: Dagupan

RATIO:
If the property were unregistered land, Macam would have the better right because his claim would then be
based on a prior sale coupled with public, exclusive and continuous possession as owner.
If the property were registered land, Dagupan would have a better right. The Court consistently held that in
case of conveyance of registered real estate, the registration of the deed of sale is the operative act that gives
validity to the transfer.
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 The deeds of sale executed in Macams favor were not registered while the levy in execution and the
provisional certificate of sale as well as the final deed of sale in favor of Dagupan were registered.
Consequently, this registered conveyance must prevail although posterior to the one executed in favor of
Macam, and Dagupan must be deemed to have acquired such right, title and interest as appeared on the
certificate of title issued in favor of Sammy Maron, subject to no lien, encumbrance or burden not noted
thereon.
The present case, however, does not fall within either, situation. Here, the sale in favor of Macam was
executed before the subject land was registered, while the conflicting sale in favor of Dagupan was executed
after the same property had been registered.
Section 35, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court: Upon the execution and delivery of the final certificate of sale in
favor of the purchaser of land sold in an execution sale, such purchaser "shall be substituted to and acquire
all the right, title, interest and claim of the judgment debtor to the property as of the time of the levy.
At the time of the levy, Maron had no interest and claim on the 1/8 portion of the property inherited by him
and his co-heirs because for a considerable time prior to the levy, his interest had already been conveyed to
Macam. Consequently, subsequent levy made on the property for the purpose of satisfying the judgment
rendered against Sammy Maron in favor of the Manila Trading Company was void and of no effect.
The unregistered sale and the consequent conveyance of title and ownership in favor of Macam could not
have been cancelled and rendered of no effect upon the subsequent issuance of the Torrens title over the
entire parcel of land.
To quote the CA decision:
... . Separate and apart from this however, we believe that in the inevitable conflict between a right of
ownership already fixed and established under the Civil Law and/or the Spanish Mortgage Law
which cannot be affected by any subsequent levy or attachment or execution and a new law or system
which would make possible the overthrowing of such ownership on admittedly artificial and technical
grounds, the former must be upheld and applied.
As stated, upon the execution of the deed of sale in his favor by Maron, Macam took possession of the land
as owner, and introduced considerable improvement. To deprive him now of the same by sheer force of
technicality would be against both justice and equity.

10.) TOMADA VS. TOMADA, 20SCRA1028 (ALLEN CABURAL)

FACTS:

On June 18, 1963 the spouses Teotimo T. Tomada and Rosalia Tan filed a petition with the court a quo alleging:
that they were the registered owners of two parcels of land known as Lot No. 166-B and Lot No. 167-A, both of
the Ormoc Cadastre, with Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 4631 and 4630, respectively, and one-seventh (1/7)
of Lot No. 1691, also of the Ormoc Cadastre, with Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3649; that they acquired the
said properties from Felisa T. Tomada (Tan) Hilton, a resident of 1903 Wendover Drive, Fayetteville, North
Carolina, U.S.A., under a deed of sale executed on April 5, 1963 by her attorney-in-fact, Atty. Bruno A.
Villamor; that the deed of sale was not registered by the Register of Deeds of Ormoc City because the special
power-of-attorney, which was executed in the United States, was not authenticated by a Philippine consul in
said country; that on April 6, 1963, Vicente Tomada, by virtue of a general power- of-attorney granted to him
by Felisa Tomada (Tan) Hilton, executed in favor of the respondent a deed of sale over several parcels of land,
including the aforementioned properties; that on April 10, 1963 the respondent executed an affidavit of adverse
claim over the properties sold to him and registered the claim on the corresponding certificates of title on April
16, 1963; that on May 8, 1963 the petitioners remitted to Felisa T. Tomada (Tan) Hilton the sum of $1,775.00
representing the purchase price of the properties sold to them; that on May 22, 1963 a new special power-of-
attorney in favor of Atty. Bruno A. Villamor, with the same terms as the first one, was executed by Felisa T.
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Tomada (Tan) Hilton, and this time duly authenticated by the Philippine Consul-General in Washington D.C.,
U.S.A.; that by virtue of the new special power-of-attorney, Atty. Bruno A. Villamor executed another deed of
sale, dated June 5, 1963, confirming the sale made to the petitioners on April 5, 1963; that on June 7, 1963 the
petitioners registered this confirmatory deed of sale in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Ormoc City; that
the corresponding certificates of title Nos. 4631 and 4630 over Lots Nos. 166-B and 167-A, respectively, were
issued in their favor while their rights and interests over the one-seventh (1/7) share in Lot No. 1691 were duly
annotated on TCT No. 3649. The adverse claim of the respondent was also annotated on the aforementioned
transfer certificates of title.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the validity of the adverse claim should be cancelled or allowed to remain as an annotation to
the tilles; and

Whether or not the CFI/RTC as a land registration court can decide the question of ownership of the lots subject
of the case.

RULING:

It is to be noted that in their petition the appellees not only asked the lower court to cancel the adverse claim of
the appellant but also asked that they be declared the lawful purchasers of Lots Nos. 166-B, 167-A, and 1/7 of
Lot No. 1691 by virtue of the deed of sale which was executed in their favor on April 5, 1963 by the attorney-
in-fact of the former owner, and registered on June 7, 1963. In opposition, the appellant claimed ownership of
the same lots by virtue of the sale effected in his favor on April 6, 1963 by another attorney-in-fact of the
former owner, which sale was registered as adverse claim on April 16, 1963. It is, therefore, evident that the real
issue in this case is not only the validity of the adverse claim for purposes of determining whether it should be
cancelled or allowed to remain as an annotation on the titles, but in reality one of ownership, and involves other
corollary issues, namely, the validity of a sale under a supposed general power-of-attorney with authority to
sell, as well as the conflict of rights between two different vendees of the same properties. These issues are
beyond the jurisdiction of a land registration court acting on a petition filed under Section 110 of the Land
Registration Act. "Questions which involve the ownership of the litigated lands are not within the province of a
court of land registration. These properly pertain to the court acting under their ordinary civil jurisdiction." 2
The reason is obvious: the proceedings provided in the Land Registration Act being summary in nature, they are
inadequate for the litigation of issues properly pertaining to civil actions.

11.) THE HEIRS OF CLARO LAURETA VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, MARCOS
MATA AND CODICI MATA (CARLO TABANGCURA)

FACTS: Petitioners are all heirs of the late Claro Laureta, substituting for their father, who died, when during
the litigation of the case in the lower court.

Marcos and Codici Mata are spouses and when Marcos Mata passed away during the pendency of the case, his
heirs likewise substituted for him.

Page 11 of 34

June 10, 1945- Marcos Mata conveyed a large tract of agricultural land in favor of Claro Laureta. The deed of
absolute sale in favor of Laureta was not registered because it was not acknowledged before a notary public or
any authorized officer, since no one was available to do so because the civil government in Tagum, Davao was
not yet organized.

Mata delivered to Laureta, the land together with pertinent papers like the owners duplicate of the OCT, sketch
plan, tax declaration, tax receipts and other papers. Since then, Laureta has been in continuous occupation of
said land without being disturbed by Mata. Laureta has also been paying the realty taxes thereon and had
introduced improvements on the property.

May 5, 1947, the same land was sold by Mata to Fermin Caram, Jr. The deed of sale was acknowledged before
Atty. Aportadera.

May 22, 1947, Marcos Mata filed with the CFI-Davao, a petition for the issuance of a new Owners duplicate of
OCT alleging that the title was lost in the evacuation place of Mata in Tagum, Davao City. A new Owners
duplicate of title no. 3019 was issued and declaring the lost title as null and void.

Dec. 9, 1947- the second sale was registered with the Register of Deeds and TCT No. 140 was issued in the
name of Caram.

June 25, 1959- Laureta filed in CFI-Davao an action for nullity, recovery of ownership and/or reconveyance
with damages against Sps. Mata and Caram and the Register of Deeds of Davao., docketed as Civil case no.
3083.

The trial court ruled in favor of Laureta. It ordered the Register of Deeds for the City and Province of Davao to
cancel TCT No. 140 in the name of Caram. The Register of Deeds was directed to issue a new title in favor of
Laureta upon presentation of the deed executed by Mata in his favor, duly acknowledged by him and approved
by the Sec. of Agriculture and Natural Resources.

The CA likewise affirmed in full the decision of the CFI- Davao.

From this decision of the CA, two separate petitions were filed before the SC:

Petition filed by the Mata spouses against Laureta- denied for lack of merit. Became final and executory
on July 26, 1968 when entry of judgment was made.
Page 12 of 34

 Petition of Caram against Laureta- given due course. February 24, 1981, the petition of Caram was
dismissed and decision of CA was upheld. Judgment became final and executory on Feb. 12, 1982.

The new deed of sale was acknowledged by the Clerk of Court , approved by the Minister

Of Natural Resources and TCT No. T 46346 was issued in the name of Laureta.

February 23, 1979, the Sps. Mata filed with CFI- Davao an action for recovery of ownership and possession of
said land, docketed as Civil Case No. 1071. Deed of sale executed by Marcos Mata in favor of Laureta was
null and void and or unenforceable since the same had not been approved by the Sec. of Agriculture as required
by law and as directed by CFI-Davao. Said decision cannot be enforced for having prescribed.

April 20, 1983- Trial court rendered a decision on the Civil Case returning the land to the Matas. On appeal,
the court affirmed this decision in toto.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners could still validly execute, enforce and/or comply with the judgment
rendered by the CFI-Davao on February 29, 1964 in Civil Case no. 3083 at the time private respondents filed
Civil case No. 1071 against the petitioners on February 23, 1979.

HELD: YES.

Both the CFI and CA adopted the ten year statutory limit based on the date of entry of judgment , which is July
26, 1968. The Matas contention was that the date should be Feb. 24, 1982, when Carams petition was
dismissed by this Court.

The matter was adjudicated in favor of Laureta on July 26, 1968, with finality. Caram had no participation in
the case between Laureta and Matas. In the event that the matter was adjudicated in favor of Caram, he can get
back ownership from Laureta. Caram, however, eventually lost.

This case did not involve several or separate judgments, but one complete integrated judgment, against all the
appellants and their claims therein could not be the subject of separate executory processes.

Page 13 of 34

The Court ruled in favor of the first sale made to Laureta and against the legality of the subsequent sale to
Caram. Carams validity of title depended largely on whether he had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the
prior sale to Laureta.

The ten year period commenced to run only on February 12, 1982 when the decision denying Carams petition
became final and executory and the judgment appealed from is reversed and set aside. Civil case no. 1071 of
the RTC-Davao is dismissed.

CHAPTER V:

1.) CAVILLES, JR. VS BAUTISTA (ANNA DERLA)

FACTS

1. On September 22, 1982, petitioners-appellees, the spouses Alendry and Flora Caviles, Jr. filed with the then
Court of First Instance of Manila, Civil Case No. 82-12668 against Renato C. Plata for recovery of a sum of
money. The complaint contained an application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment. On
September 24, 1982, the CFI issued the writ prayed for and on October 4, 1982 Deputy Sheriff Jaime L. de
Leon issued a Notice of Attachment over a piece of real estate owned by Plata covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. S-33634 of the Pasay City (now Las Pias) Registry.

2. The Notice of Attachment was entered in the Primary Entry Book (also known as Day Book) on October 6,
1982, but was not annotated on TCT No. S-33634 by the Register of Deeds, nor did the deputy sheriff or the
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 82-12668, now herein petitioners-appellees, take any step to annotate the attachment
on the TCT No. S-33634.

3. On October 18, 1982, Plata sold the property covered by TCT No. S-33634 to herein respondents-appellants,
the spouses Evelyn and Ramon Bautista, free, of course, from the attachment or any encumbrance, and on the
same date Platas TCT No. S-33634 was cancelled and in lieu thereof TCT No. 57006 was issued in the name of
respondents-appellants. From then on, respondents-appellants appear to have taken over and resided in the
property.

4. No action was taken by petitioners-appellees to annotate the attachment as indeed they remained ignorant that
the property had been sold and a new title issued until very much later when, after obtaining a favorable
judgment in Civil Case No. 82-12668 on September 30, 1983, they attempted execution. Thus, even as
petitioners-appellees were able to obtain a writ of execution on February 3, 1984, the levy effected on February
21, 1984, was in (sic) still in regard to the by-then-cancelled TCT No. S-3364. The Notice of Levy was entered
in the Day Book on February 22, 1984.

5. On March 30, 1987, close to 4 years after the property was bought by respondents-appellants, and 3 years
after levy on execution was effected, the property was sold on execution to petitioners-appellees.

6. The Certificate of Sale was entered in the Day Book on April 2, 1987, but when its inscription was sought to
be made - the first time such idea entered petitioners-appellees mind, apparently - it was found out that Platas

Page 14 of 34

certificate had been cancelled and a new one issued to respondents-appellants. The entry was made nonetheless
on the title of respondents-appellants which annotation the Register of Deeds, however, refused to sign. Upon
the matter being elevated on consulta to the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration, the
Administrator thereof, the Honorable Teodoro G. Bonifacio, opined on February 23, 1988, that the certificate of
sale may be annotated on respondents-appellants TCT No. 57006.

7. Due to the refusal of respondents-appellants to surrender their owners copy of TCT No. 57006, the
proceedings below were initiated on January 30, 1989, with petitioners-appellees invoking Section 107 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, which insofar as herein pertinent speaks of an action to compel surrender of the
owners duplicate of title for annotation of a voluntary instrument. In any event, on June 2, 1990, a decision was
handed down by Branch 145 of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region stationed in
Makati and presided over by the Honorable Job B. Madayag, ordering, inter alia, respondents-appellants to
surrender their owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 57006 for inscription or annotation of the certificate of sale,
and for the subsequent cancellation of said certificate of title and the issuance of a new certificate of title in
favor of petitioners-appellees

ISSUE

Whether or not the right of one party to acquire title to registered land from the moment of inscription of an
attachment on the day book (or entry book) on one hand; and on the other, the right of the other party to rely on
what appears on the owners duplicate certificate of title for purposes of voluntary dealings with the same parcel
of land.

HELD

The Court of Appeals stated that the petitioners did not take any step to annotate the attachment on TCT No. S-
33634 and that No action was taken by petitioners-appellees to annotate the attachment. The respondents
likewise contend that the problem in this case would not have arisen were it not for the negligence and very
long delay on the part of petitioners in annotating their attachment in the original certificate of title in the
possession of the Register of Deeds.

In the case at bar, the notice of attachment covering the subject property was annotated in the entry book of the
Register of Deeds of Pasay City on October 6, 1982, while the new transfer certificate of title in the name of
respondent spouses was issued on October 18, 1982, the date when Plata sold the property to said
respondents. Petitioners levy on preliminary attachment was put into effect when the property was sold on
execution to petitioners, after the latter obtained a writ of execution by virtue of a favorable judgment in Civil
Case No. 82-12668.

Wherefore, the appealed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 27758 dated September 20,
1991, and its Resolution dated November 4, 1991, are hereby SET ASIDE, and the Decision of Branch 145 of
the Regional Trial Court of Makati dated June 2, 1990, is hereby AFFIRMED and REINSTATED.
No pronouncement as to costs.

2.) HEIRS OF MANLAPAT V. C.A, 2005 (RUSSEL RODRIGUEZ)

Page 15 of 34

Facts: The case involves a 1,058 sqm parcel of land at Bulacan. This had been originally in the possession of
Eduardo's grandfather. It remained unregistered until 1976 when OCT was issued in the name of Eduardo
pursuant to a free patent issued.

Before the lot was titled, Eduardo sold a portion thereof with an area of 553 square meters to Ricardo. The sale
is evidenced by a deed of sale. Another Deed of Sale conveying another portion of the lot consisting of 50
square meters as right of way was executed by Eduardo in favor of Ricardo in order to reach the portion covered
by the first sale.

Banaag, father-in-law of Eduardo, executed a mortgage with the (RBSP) with the lot as collateral. He deposited
the owner's duplicate certificate of OCT with the bank. Ricardo died without learning of the prior issuance of
OCT in the name of Eduardo. His heirs, the Cruzes, were not immediately aware of the consummated sale
between Eduardo and Ricardo.

Eduardo died. Neither did the heirs of Eduardo inform the Cruzes of the prior sale in favor of their predecessor-
in-interest, Ricardo. Upon learning of their right to the lot, the Cruzes immediately tried to confront petitioners
on the mortgage and obtain the surrender of the OCT. Petitioners, however, were unwilling to surrender the
OCT.

Having failed to physically obtain the title from petitioners, the Cruzes instead went to RBSP which had
custody of the owner's duplicate of the OCT. The Cruzes sought to borrow the owner's duplicate for the purpose
of photocopying the same and thereafter showing a copy thereof to the Register of Deeds. The Cruzes returned
the owner's duplicate on the same day after having copied the same. The Cruzes hired geodetic engineers to
prepare the corresponding subdivision plan.

After the Cruzes presented the owner's duplicate, along with the deeds of sale and the subdivision plan, the RD
cancelled the OCT and issued in lieu thereof TCT covering 603 square meters in the name of Ricardo and TCT
covering the remaining 455 square meters in the name of Eduardo.

The Cruzes went back to the bank and surrendered TCT in the name of Eduardo and retrieved the title they had
earlier given as substitute collateral. After securing the new separate titles, the Cruzes furnished petitioners with
a copy of TCT. Banaag went to RBSP, intending to tender full payment of the mortgage obligation. It was only
then that he learned of the dealings of the Cruzes with the bank which eventually led to the subdivision of the
subject lot and the issuance of two separate titles thereon. RTC ruled for the petitioners by voiding the 2 TCTs
and ordering the RD to restore the OCT under the name of Eduardo. CA reversed RTC

Issue: Was the cancellation of the OCT in the name of Eduardo Manlapat and its splitting into two separate
titles, one for the petitioners and for the respondent proper?

Ruling: Yes. Section 53 of P.D 1529 has never been clearer on the point that as long as the owner's duplicate
certificate is presented to the Register of Deeds together with the instrument of conveyance, such presentation
serves as conclusive authority to the Register of Deeds to issue a transfer certificate or make a memorandum of
registration in accordance with the instrument.

The records of the case show that despite the efforts made by the Cruzes in persuading the heirs of Eduardo to
allow them to secure a separate TCT on the claimed portion, the heirs adamantly rejected the notion of separate

Page 16 of 34

titling. This prompted the Cruzes to approach the bank manager of RBSP for the purpose of protecting their
property right. They succeeded in persuading the latter to lend the owner's duplicate certificate. Despite the
apparent irregularity in allowing the Cruzes to get hold of the owner's duplicate certificate, the bank officers
consented to the Cruzes' plan to register the deeds of sale and secure two new separate titles, without notifying
the heirs of Eduardo about it.

Further, the law on the matter, specifically P.D. No. 1529, has no explicit requirement as to the manner of
acquiring the owner's duplicate for purposes of issuing a TCT. Section 53 of P.D. No. 1529 simply requires the
production of the owner's duplicate certificate, whenever any voluntary instrument is presented for registration

Quite interesting, however, is the contention of the heirs of Eduardo that the surreptitious lending of the owner's
duplicate certificate constitutes fraud within the ambit of the third paragraph of Section 53 which could nullify
the eventual issuance of the TCTs. Yet we cannot subscribe to their position.

Impelled by the inaction of the heirs of Eduardo as to their claim, the Cruzes went to the bank where the
property was mortgaged. Through its manager and legal officer, they were assured of recovery of the claimed
parcel of land since they are the successors-in-interest of the real owner thereof. Relying on the bank officers'
opinion as to the legality of the means sought to be employed by them and the suggestion of the Central Bank
officer that the matter could be best settled between them and the bank, the Cruzes pursued the titling of the
claimed portion in the name of Ricardo. The Register of Deeds eventually issued the disputed TCTs.

The Cruzes resorted to such means to protect their interest in the property that rightfully belongs to them only
because of the bank officers' acquiescence thereto. The Cruzes could not have secured a separate TCT in the
name of Ricardo without the bank's approval.

3.) DURAN vs IAC (ANALYN PANGCATAN)

Facts:

Petitioner Duran owned 2 parcels of land. She left the Philippines in June 1954 and returned in May 1966. On
1963, a Deed of Sale was made in favor of the petitioners mother. On December 1965, Durans mother
mortgaged the same property to private respondent Erlinda Marcelo-Tiangco. When Duran came to know about
the mortgage made by her mother, she wrote the Register of Deeds informing the latter that she had not given
her mother any authority to sell or mortgage any of her properties in the Philippines. Meanwhile, foreclosure
proceedings were initiated by Tiangco upon the failure of Durans mother to redeem the mortgaged
properties.Duran claims that the Deed of Sale is a forgery, saying that at the time of its execution in 1963 she
was in the United States. Respondent Court ruled that there is a presumption of regularity in the case of a public
document.

Issue: Whether private respondent was a buyer in good faith and for value?

Held:

Yes. Good faith consists in the possessors belief that the person from who he received the thing was the owner
of the same and could convey his title (Arriola v. Gomez Dela Serna, 14 Phil. 627). Good faith, while it is
always to be presumed in the absence of proof to the contrary, requires a well-founded belief that the person
from whom title was received was himself the owner of the land, with the right to convey it (Santiago v. Cruz,
Page 17 of 34

19 Phil. 148).The mortgagee has the right to rely on what appears in the certificate of title and, in the absence of
anything to excite suspicion, he is under no obligation to look beyond the certificate and investigate the title of
the mortgagor appearing on the face of the said certificate. Every person dealing with registered land may safely
rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefore and the law will in no way oblige him to go
behind the certificate to determine the condition of the property. If the rule were otherwise, the efficacy and
conclusiveness of the Torrens Certificate of Titles would be futile and nugatory. Thus the rule is simple: the
fraudulent and forged document of sale may become the root of a valid title if the certificate has already been
transferred from the name of the true owner to the name indicated by the forger.While it is true that under
Article 2085 of the Civil Code, it is essential that the mortgagor be the absolute owner of the property
mortgaged, and while as between the daughter and her mother, it was the daughter who still owns the lots,
STILL insofar as innocent third persons are concerned the owner was already the mother inasmuch as she had
already become the registered owner.

4.) DBP vs ACTING REGISTER OF DEEDS OF NUEVA ECIJA (MARKY SALES)

Case:
Discuss the true meaning and intendment of Section 56 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, which in part reads:

Sec. 56. Primary Entry Book; fees, certified copies. Each Register of Deeds shall keep a primary entry book
in which, upon payment of the entry fee, he shall enter, in the order of their reception, all instruments including
copies of writs and processes filed with him relating to registered land. He shall, as a preliminary process in
registration, note in such book the date, hour and minute of reception of all instruments, in the order in which
they were received. They shall be regarded as registered from the time so noted, and the memorandum of each
instrument, when made on the certificate of title to which it refers, shall bear the same date: Provided, that the
national government as well as the provincial and city governments shall be exempt from the payment of such
fees in advance in order to be entitled to entry and registration.

Facts:
On June 13, 1980, the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) presented for registration to the
Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija, Cabanatuan City, a sheriff's certificate of sale in its favor of two parcels of
land, both in the names of the spouses Andres Bautista and Marcelina Calison, which said institution had
acquired as the highest bidder at an extrajudicial foreclosure sale.

The transaction was entered as Entry No. 8191 in the Registry's Primary Entry Book and DBP paid
the requisite registration fees on the same day. Annotation of the sale of the certificates of title could not be
effected because the original certificates were missing from the files of the Registry.

On the advice of the Register of Deeds, DBP instituted proceedings in the Court of First Instance of
Nueva Ecija to reconstitute said certificates, and reconstitution was ordered by that court in a decision rendered
on June 15, 1982. For reasons not apparent on the record, the certificates of title were reconstituted only on June
19,1984.

On June 25, 1984, DBP sought annotation on the reconstituted titles of the certificate of sale on the
basis of that same four-year-old entry. The Acting Register of Deeds, being in doubt of the proper action to take
on the solicitation, took the matter to the Commissioner of Land Registration by consulta questioning whether
the certificate of sale could be registered using the old Entry No. 8191 made in 1980 notwithstanding the fact
that the original copies of the reconstituted certificates of title were issued only on June 19, 1984

Page 18 of 34

 The resolution on the consulta rendered that Entry No. 8191 had been "... ineffective due to the
impossibility of accomplishing registration at the time the document was entered because of the non-availability
of the certificate of title involved. For said certificate of sale to be admitted for registration, there is a need for it
to be re-entered now that the titles have been reconstituted upon payment of new entry fees," and by-passed the
second query as having been rendered moot and academic by the answer to the first.

The DBP appealed the resolution to the Court of Appeals which forwarded the appeal to Supreme
Court as it is involving a question of law.
Issue:
Whether the effect of entry produces the effect of registration

Held:
There is no necessity to present the owner's duplicates of the certificates of title affected for purposes
of primary entry, since the transaction sought to be recorded was an involuntary transaction, and again it is to be
presumed that said duplicates were presented by DBP, the petitioner in the reconstitution proceedings.

There is no need to require DBP to repeat the process of primary entry, paying anew the entry fees as
the appealed resolution disposes, in order to procure annotation which through no fault on its part, had to be
deferred until the originals of the certificates of title were found or reconstituted.
The Aballe ruling stated that the entry in the day book, even without the corresponding annotation on the
certificate of title, is equivalent to, or produces the effect of, registration to voluntary transactions, provided the
requisite fees are paid and the owner's duplicates of the certificates of title affected are presented.

The entry alone produces the effect of registration, whether the transaction entered is a voluntary or
involuntary one, so long as the registrant has complied with all that is required of him for purposes of entry and
annotation, and nothing more remains to be done but a duty incumbent solely on the Registry of Deeds

To hold said entry "ineffective," as does the appealed resolution, amounts to declaring that it improper
and unjustified, and does not, protect the registrant (DBP) from claims arising, or transactions made, thereafter
which affects the rights created or conveyed by the transaction entered.

Disposition:

WHEREFORE, the appealed resolution of the Acting Commissioner of Land Registration is SET
ASIDE. The respondent-appellee Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija, or his successor, is ordered to annotate on
the originals of the reconstituted Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. NT-149033 and NT-149034 of his Registry
a memorandum of the certificate of sale in favor of appellant Development Bank of the Philippines as entered
under Entry No. 8191 dated June 13, 1980 of the Primary Entry (Day) Book of said Registry. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

5.) Bel Air Village Association, Inc. vs Virgilio Dionisio (KRYSTLE ABRIOL)

G.R. L-383454 June 30, 1989

Facts:

The Transfer Certificate of Title covering the subject parcel of land issued in the name of Virgilio Dionisio, the
petitioner contains an annotation to the effect that the lot owner becomes an automatic member of Bel-Air
Village Association, the respondent, and must abide by such rules and regulations laid down by the
Page 19 of 34

Association in the interest of the sanitation, security and the general welfare of the community. The petitioner
questioned the collection of the dues on the following grounds: the questioned assessment is a property tax
outside the corporate power of the association; the association has no power to compel the petitioner to pay the
assessment for lack of privity of contract; the questioned assessment should not be enforced for being
unreasonable, arbitrary, oppressive, confiscatory and discriminatory; the respondent association is exercising
governmental powers which should not be sanctioned.Issue:Whether or not the association can lawfully collect
duesRuling:The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. It held that the purchasers of a
registered land are bound by the annotations found at the back of the certificate of title covering the subject
parcel of land. The petitioners contention that he has no privity with the respondent association is not
persuasive. When the petitioner voluntarily bought the subject parcel of land it was understood that he took the
same free of all ecumbrances except annotations at the back of the certificate of title, among them, that he
automatically becomes a member of the respondent association. One of the obligations of a member is to pay
certain amounts for the operation and activities of the association. The mode of payment as well as the
purposes for which the dues are intended clearly indicates that the dues are not in the concept of a property tax
as claimed by the petitioner. They are shares in the common expenses for necessary services. A property tax is
assessed according to the value of the property but the basis of the sharing in this case is the area of the lot. The
dues are fees which a member of the respondent association is required in hiring security guards, cleaning and
maintaining streets, street lights and other community projects for the benefit of all residents within the Bel-Air
Village. These expenses are necessary, valid and reasonable for the particular community involved. The
limitations upon the ownership of the petitioner do not contravene provisions of laws, morals, good customs,
public order or public policy. The constitutional proscription than no person can be compelled to be a member
of an association against his will applies only to governmental acts and not to private transactions like the one
in question. The petitioner cannot legally maintain that he is compelled to be a member of the association
against his will because the limitation is imposed upon his ownership of property. If he does not desire to
comply with the annotation or lien in question, he can at any time exercise his inviolable freedom of disposing
of the property and free himself from the burden of becoming a member of the association.

6.) LEVISTE VS NOBLEJAS : April 30, 1979 (HERA CERILLO)

Facts:

The property involved, situated in Paraaque, Rizal has a total area of approximately 1.6 hectares and is
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 108425 of the Province of Rizal in the name of Z. Garcia Realty,
Inc, a corporation duly organized and existing under our laws. The property was converted into a subdivision
called the Garville Subdivision. This subdivision has blocks and certain lots and the controversy in this case
centers on Lot 6, Block 4 (subsequently Lot 16). Garcia Realty and respondent Villanueva consummated a
contract of sale over the disputed lot. Respondent Villanueva sought to have the sale registered and title issued
in her favor, free of any encumbrance, but petitioners Leviste and Berthelsen objected alleging that they had
registered adverse claims and attachments. The Register of Deeds refused to issue a new title to Villanueva
without carrying over (A) the two annotations registered prior to Villanueva's adverse claim, namely, the notice
of lis pendens and the adverse claim of Leviste, and (B) the attachments covering the entire property annotated
on the title subsequent to Villanueva's adverse claim. The Land Registration Commission ordered that the deed

Page 20 of 34

of sale may be registered and a new certificate of title covering Lot 16 may be issued to Maria Villanueva free
of any encumbrance.

Issue:

Whether Villanueva's adverse claim is, in fact, registerable, and if so, whether it can be preferred over
the attachments

Ruling:

It does not appear that Villanueva attempted to register the agreement to sell under Section 52 of Act
No. 496 and that the registered owner, Garcia Realty, refused to surrender the duplicate certificate for the
annotation of said instrument. Instead, Villanueva merely filed an adverse claim based on said agreement to sell
considering that Section 62 of the Land Registration Act prescribes the procedure for the registration of
Villanueva's interest less than an estate in fee simple on the disputed lot and there being no showing of her
inability to produce the owner's duplicate certificate, the remedy provided in Section 110 of Act 496, which was
resorted to by Villanueva, is, therefore, ineffective for the purpose of protecting her right or interest on the
disputed lot.

Inasmuch as the adverse claim filed by Villanueva was not valid, the same did not have the effect of a
conveyance of her right or interest on the disputed lot and could not prejudice any right that may have arisen
thereafter in favor of third parties. Consequently, the attachments of Berthelsen and Leviste covering the
disputed lot are superior to that acquired by Villanueva and will have to be carried over to the new title to be
issued in her favor.

Act 496 provides that, if at the time of any transfer there appear upon the registration book
encumbrances or claims adverse to the title of the registered owner, they shall be stated in the new certificate or
certificates, except so far as they may be simultaneously released or discharged.

7.) Bel Air Village Association, Inc. vs Virgilio Dionisio (JOSEPH CABANIT)

G.R. L-383454 June 30, 1989

Facts:

The Transfer Certificate of Title covering the subject parcel of land issued in the name of Virgilio Dionisio, the
petitioner contains an annotation to the effect that the lot owner becomes an automatic member of Bel-Air
Village Association, the respondent, and must abide by such rules and regulations laid down by the
Association in the interest of the sanitation, security and the general welfare of the community.

The petitioner questioned the collection of the dues on the following grounds: the questioned assessment is a
property tax outside the corporate power of the association; the association has no power to compel the
petitioner to pay the assessment for lack of privity of contract; the questioned assessment should not be
enforced for being unreasonable, arbitrary, oppressive, confiscatory and discriminatory; the respondent
association is exercising governmental powers which should not be sanctioned.

Issue:
Page 21 of 34

Whether or not the association can lawfully collect dues

Whether or not he is bound by the annotations at the back of the certificate?

Ruling:

Sec. 39. Every person receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of registration, and every
subsequent purchaser of registered land who takes a certificate of title for value in good faith shall hold the
same free of all encumbrances except those noted on said certificate ...

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. It held that the purchasers of a registered land are
bound by the annotations found at the back of the certificate of title covering the subject parcel of land. The
petitioners contention that he has no privity with the respondent association is not persuasive. When the
petitioner voluntarily bought the subject parcel of land it was understood that he took the same free of all
encumbrances except annotations at the back of the certificate of title, among them, that he automatically
becomes a member of the respondent association. One of the obligations of a member is to pay certain amounts
for the operation and activities of the association.

The mode of payment as well as the purposes for which the dues are intended clearly indicates that the dues are
not in the concept of a property tax as claimed by the petitioner. They are shares in the common expenses for
necessary services. A property tax is assessed according to the value of the property but the basis of the sharing
in this case is the area of the lot. The dues are fees which a member of the respondent association is required in
hiring security guards, cleaning and maintaining streets, street lights and other community projects for the
benefit of all residents within the Bel-Air Village. These expenses are necessary, valid and reasonable for the
particular community involved.

The limitations upon the ownership of the petitioner do not contravene provisions of laws, morals, good
customs, public order or public policy. The constitutional proscription than no person can be compelled to be a
member of an association against his will applies only to governmental acts and not to private transactions like
the one in question.

The petitioner cannot legally maintain that he is compelled to be a member of the association against his will
because the limitation is imposed upon his ownership of property. If he does not desire to comply with the
annotation or lien in question, he can at any time exercise his inviolable freedom of disposing of the property
and free himself from the burden of becoming a member of the association.

8.) Veronica Gonzales vs. Judge Lucas Bersamin (JP ULIGAN)

[A.M. No. RTJ-96-1344. March 13, 1996] (254 SCRA 652)

Facts:

Petitioner filed an administrative case against Judge Lucas Bersamin of Quezon City Regional Trial Court
Branch 96 for grave misconduct and knowingly rendered a unjust judgement and malicious refusal to implead
complainant as an indispensable party in a lot with TCT No. 319410. This case is all about on when on 1st early
case (People vs. Zoilo Cruz), Zoilo Cruz were ordered to pay spouses Gonzales amounting of P600,000.00.
Page 22 of 34

Prior to that 1st case, another case was rendered judgement in favor of the spouses again but by this time, the
liability now includes the wife of Zoilo Cruz. The latter was ordered to pay complainant spouses Gonzales
amounting to P 3,700,000.00. To satisfy the total amount, two notices of levy were presented in the record of
the real property of spouses Cruz. It is unfortunately however, that at that time, TCT No. 319410 is pending for
reconstitution. On December 3, 1991 TCT No. 319140 was reconstituted and a new title (TCT No. RT-48658
(319140)) was issued in the name of the spouses Cruz.

On August 23, 1994 the spouses Gina Chan and Salvador Chan filed a case against the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City, for Cancellation of Notice of Levy with Damages with Prayer for the Immediate Issuance of a
Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction. This case was docketed and was raffled to respondent judge.

In their complaint spouses Chan alleged that the property subject of the levy had been previously purchased by
them from the spouses Cruz by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale dated March 21, 1991. For the same reason
that the title of spouses Cruz was still being reconstituted, the deed of sale was provisionally registered on April
1, 1991, several months before the provisionally registration of the notices of levy.

Thereafter, by virtue of the deed of sale, a new title (TCT No. 50572) was issued in the name of spouses Gina
Chan and Salvador Chan.

In his answer, the Register of Deeds justified his action on the ground that it was his ministerial duty to transfer
the annotations on the reconstituted title to the new title. He interposed no objection, however, to the issuance of
any mandatory injunction issued to him because it is precisely such a judicial order x x x that will authorize the
Register of Deeds to annotate a memorandum x x x cancelling the notices of levy thereon x x x.

The spouses Chan moved for a judgment on the pleadings. The Register of Deeds manifested that he was
submitting to the discretion of the court and that he had no objection to the cancellation of the annotations
because the notices of levy were entered subsequent to the recording of the sale of the property.

Respondent judge thereafter rendered a decision on October 13, 1994 ordering the Register of Deeds to cancel
the annotations of the notices of levy on TCT No. 50572.

After this decision, complainant Veronica filed administrative case against the judge for un - willfully favoring
the spouses Chan.

Issue:

Whether or not Judge Bersamin committed unjust judgement?

Held:

No. The court states that respondent judge did not act with inordinate haste in rendering judgment in a summary
manner because according to Judge Bersamin, the registrars were given an opportunity to contest the action. He
alleges that complainant was not an indispensable party and that she had no priority of right over the plaintiffs
in relation to the property. The court also cited that if there was any duty to notify complainant, that duty
devolved on the Register of Deeds.

Page 23 of 34

 However, respondent judge should have ordered notice to be given to complainant and petitioner to
implead complainant since it appears that she had an adverse interest annotated on the back of their certificate
title. P.D. No. 1529 reads in part:

108. Amendment and alteration of certificates. -No erasure, alteration or amendment shall be made upon the
registration book after the entry of a certificate of title or of a memorandum thereon and the attestation of the
same by the Register of Deeds, except by order of the proper Court of First Instance. A registered owner or
other person having an interest in registered property, or, in proper cases, the Register of Deeds with the
approval of the Commissioner of Land Registration, may apply by petition to the court upon the ground that the
registered interests of any description, whether vested, contingent, expectant inchoate appearing on the
certificate, have terminated and ceased; or that new interest not appearing upon the certificates have arisen or
been created; or that an omission or error was made in entering a certificate or memorandum thereon, or on any
duplicate certificate; x x x or upon any other reasonable ground; and the court may hear and determine the
petition after notice to all parties in interest, and may order the entry or cancellation of a new certificate, the
entry or cancellation of a memorandum upon a certificate, or grant any other relief upon such terms and
conditions, requiring security or bond if necessary, as it may consider proper.

Decision:

The court rendered its decision that respondent judge is ADMONISHED (warned) to be more careful and
diligent in the discharge of judicial function.

9.) LLOYD'S ENTERPRISES V DOLLETON (MIKAEL ONG)

G.R. No. 171373

Facts

Spouses Dolleton were the registered owners of a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 153554 with a
four-door apartment building being leased to various tenants. Respondents mortgaged the property to a certain
Santos to secure a loan in the amount of P100,000.00. Upon payment of the loan on 15 August1994, Santos
executed a release and cancellation of the mortgage. The same was annotated on the TCT.
TCT No. 153554 in the name of respondents was cancelled and a new TCT No.197220 was issued in the
name of Gagan on the basis of a Deed of Absolute Sale dated 5 August 1994 whereby respondents purportedly
sold to Gagan the subject property for the sum of P120,000.00.
Gagan and Gueverra mortgaged said property with TCT No. 197220 to petitioner LECC for second loan
of P542,928.00 and was annotated on said Title. However, Gagan and Guevarra failed to pay the loan upon
maturity. Thus, petitioner foreclosed mortgaged property being the highest bidder and was not redeemed within
the one-year period. Hence, ownership was consolidated in favor of petitioner and was issue a new TCT No.
210363 cancelling TCT No. 197220.
Petitioner then sent notices to the apartment tenants on the transfer of ownership and rentals were not
remitted to respondents anymore, prompting the latter to cause the annotation of an adverse claim on TCT No.
210363.
Respondents prayed for the restoration of TCT No. 153554 and nullification of the Deed of Absolute
Sale, and the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings. They denied having executed the Deed of Absolute Sale and
alleged that they had merely offered to sell to Gagan the subject property for P900,000.00 on installment basis
so that they could pay their loan obligation to Santos. After Gagan hadinitially paid P200,000.00, they entrusted
the owner's copy of TCT No. 153554 to him. Gagan was unable to pay the balance of the purchase price, rather
she caused the fraudulent cancellation of TCT No.153554 and the issuance of TCT No. 197220 in her name,
Page 24 of 34

and of eventually using TCT No. 197220 tosecure the loans obtained from petitioner.
Respondents also faulted petitioner for failing to make adequate inquiries on the true ownership of the
property considering the suspicious circumstances surrounding Gagan's and Guevarra's request for loan
immediately after the issuance of the new certificate of title.
The RTC declared the Deed of Absolute Sale between Gagan and Dolleton as spurious and directed the
reconveyance of the property to the true and genuine owners, the spouses Dolleton. CA affirmed RTCs
decision.

Issue

Did the CA err in not declaring petitioner as mortgagee in good faith?

Ruling

NO. Petitioner is not mortgagee in good faith. Petitioner's claim that it should not be required to look
beyond the certificate of title for flaws in the ownership of the property in view of the presumption that a
Torrens title is regularly issued and that the burden is on respondents to rebut the presumption of good faith is
erroneous. Petitioner is engaged in the business of extending credit to the public and is, thus, expected to
exercise due diligence in dealing with properties offered as security. In Expresscredit Financing Corporation v.
Spouses Velasco, the Court held that entities engaged in the business of offering real estate loans must exercise
a higher degree of caution in accepting properties as security.
The Court affirmed the reconveyance of the property to respondents Dolleton as petitioner is not a
mortgagee in good faith, hence, foreclosure was not valid. Petitioner failed to verify the actual condition of the
property, particularly as to who is in actual possession and if the premises are leased to third persons,who is
receiving the rental payments therefore.

10.) Sps BELO VS PNB & Sps ESLABON (RAPHAEL PATAJO)

Facts:

Eduarda Belo owned an agricultural land in Timpas, Panitan, Capiz, which she leased a portion to
Spouses Marcos and Arsenia Eslabon in connection with the said spouses sugar plantation business.

To finance their business venture, Respondent spouses Eslabon obtained a loan from PNB secured by a
real estate mortgage on their own four (4) residential houses located in Roxas City, as well as on the
land owned by Eduarda Belo. Special Power of Attorney was executed by Eduarda Belo as to the
mortgage of her property

Sps Eslabon failed to pay mortgages and extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings against the mortgaged
properties were instituted by PNB. PNB was the highest bidder at the auction sale (P447,632.00).

PNB appraised Eduarda Belo of the sale at public auction of her agricultural land. She had one-year
period to redeem the land.

Eduarda Belo sold her right of redemption to petitioner Sps Enrique and Florencia Belo under a deed of
Page 25 of 34

 absolute sale of proprietary and redemption rights.

Sps Belo tendered payment for the redemption of the agricultural land for (P484,482.96), which
includes the bid price of respondent PNB, plus interest and expenses as provided under Act No. 3135.

PNB rejected payment contending that redemption price should be the total claim of the bank on the
date of the auction sale and custody of property plus charges accrued and interests (P2,779,978.72).

Sps Belo filed action to annul the mortgage, with an alternative cause of action to compel PNB to
accept offer of spouses Belo which is based on the winning bid price of PNB (P447,632.00) plus interest
and expenses.

RTC: Granted alternative cause of action of Sps Belo P447,632.00, plus interest and other charges

CA: Modified TC ruling that the petitioners should pay the entire amount due to PNB under the
mortgage deed at the time of the foreclosure sale plus interest, costs and expenses. As assignees of
Eduarda Belos right of redemption, the appellees succeed to the precise right of Eduarda including all
conditions attendant to such right. Moreover, the indivisible character of a contract of mortgage (Article
2089, Civil Code) will extend to apply in the redemption stage of the mortgage.

Issue:

1. WON SPA, real estate mortgage contract, the foreclosure proceedings and the subsequent auction sale
involving Eduarda Belos property are valid.

2. WON the petitioners are required to pay, as redemption price, the entire claim of respondent PNB
(P2,779,978.72)?

Held:

1. YES. The subject SPA, the real estate mortgage contract, the foreclosure proceedings and the subsequent
auction sale of Eduarda Belos property are valid and legal.

The findings of trial courts which are factual in nature must not be disturbed.

It is stipulated in paragraph three (3) of the SPA that Eduarda Belo appointed the Eslabon spouses as her
agents. The accommodation real estate mortgage over her property is merely an accessory contract.

An accommodation mortgage is not necessarily void simply because the accommodation mortgagor did
not benefit from the same. The validity of an accommodation mortgage is allowed under Article 2085 of

Page 26 of 34

 the New Civil Code which provides that (t)hird persons who are not parties to the principal obligation
may secure the latter by pledging or mortgaging their own property.

The letter of Eduarda Belo addressed to respondent PNB manifesting her intent to redeem the property is
a waiver of her right to question the validity of the SPA, etc.

2. NO. This Court finds the petitioners position on that issue to be meritorious.

There is no doubt that Eduarda Belo, assignor of the petitioners, is an accommodation mortgagor.
Mortgagor in Section 25 of P.D. No. 694 pertains only to a debtor-mortgagor and not to an
accommodation mortgagor. Respondent PNB maintains that Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 694
(right to redeem the property by paying all claims of the Bank against him on the date of the
sale)Petitioners assert to follow Section 6 of Act No. 3135 & Section 28 of Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court (by paying the purchaser the amount of his purchase plus interest & other expenses)

The interpretation accorded by respondent PNB to Section 25 of P.D. No. 694 is unfair and unjust to
accommodation mortgagors and their assignees. Forcing an accommodation mortgagor like Eduarda
Belo to pay for what the principal debtors (Eslabon spouses) owe to respondent bank is to punish her for
the accommodation and generosity she accorded to the Eslabon spouses. Also, PNBs application for
extrajudicial foreclosure and public auction sale of Eduarda Belos mortgaged property was filed under
Act No. 3135 and none of the proceedings thereafter mentioned P. D. No. 694 as the basis for
redemption.

Similar rulings:

Sy v. Court of Appeals and other caseThe General Banking Act and P.D. No. 694 shall prevail over Act
No. 3135 with respect to the redemption price. accommodation mortgagors as such are not in anyway
liable for the payment of the loan or principal obligation of the debtor/borrower. The liability of the
accommodation mortgagors extends only up to the loan value of their mortgaged property and not to the
entire loan itself.

While the petitioners, as assignees of Eduarda Belo, are not required to pay the entire claim of
respondent PNB against the principal debtors, spouses Eslabon, they can only exercise their right of
redemption with respect to the parcel of land belonging to Eduarda Belo, the accommodation mortgagor.
Thus, they have to pay the bid price less the corresponding loan value of the foreclosed four (4)
residential lots of the spouses Eslabon.

Page 27 of 34

 PNB contends to allow petitioners to redeem only the property belonging to their assignor, Eduarda
Belo, would violate the principle of indivisibility of mortgage contracts (Art 2089). The indivisibility
concept does not apply to the right of redemption of an accommodation mortgagor and her assignees.

Indivisibility arises only when there is a debt, that is, there is a debtor-creditor relationship. But, this
relationship is wanting in the case at bar in the sense that petitioners are assignees of an accommodation
mortgagor and not of a debtor- mortgagor. Hence, it is fair and logical to allow the petitioners to redeem
only the property belonging to their assignor, Eduarda Belo.

Redemption only extends to the subject property of Eduarda Belo for the reason that the notice of the
sale limited the redemption to said property. Petition is partially granted: Petitioner Sps Belo are allowed
to redeem only the property of Eduarda Belo, by paying only the bid price less the corresponding loan
value of the foreclosed four (4) residential lots of the respondents Sps Eslabon, consistent with the RTC

11.) SAJONAS vs CA (SHAYNE RAMIREZ)

12.) DIAZ-DUARTE vs ONG (MARY JANE SECRETARIA)

ROGELIA P. DIAZ-DUARTE, petitioner, vs. SPS. BEN and ETHYL ONG, and the COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
FACTS:

Macario Diaz married Encarnacion Reyes. Out of this union, Trinidad Diaz was born. Sometime in 1903,
Encarnacion Reyes died. In 1905, Macario Diaz married Cristina Pedrosa.Out of this union, Rogelia-Diaz
Duarte was born in 1910.

Trinidad Diaz, married Filomeno Arteche. They had nine children, including Encarnacion Arteche and all the
other plaintiffs in the case. Trinidad Arteche died.

In a Cadastral Case, Judge Ortiz adjudicated Lot 1208 (26,738 square meters) to `Macario Diaz married to
Cristina Pedrosa. The decision having become final, a decree was issued by the General Land Registration
Office and Original Certificate of Title No. 19486 was issued.

Macario Diaz and his second wife Cristina died. Rogelia Diaz-Duarte sold the property to Wilfredo M.
Corregidor. By virtue of the sale, OCT of Macario Diaz was cancelled and a new TCT in favor of Wilfredo was
issued.

Wilfredo Corregidor sold back Lots 1208, 3332, and 3364 to. Rogelia Diaz-Duarte.

Mrs. Rogelia Diaz-Duarte executed an adverse claim to Lot 1208 covered by TCT of Wilfredo Corregidor on
the basis of the deed of sale executed by Wilfredo to her.

Page 28 of 34

30 days having elapsed, the affidavit of adverse claim of Diaz-Duarte was cancelled by the Register of
Deeds, albeit erroneously, pursuant to Sec. 70 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the
Property Registration Decree of the Philippines.

Notwithstanding the resale of the property made by him in favor of Mrs. Rogelia Diaz-Duarte in 1979, Wilfredo
Corregidor sold again Lot 1208 to Ben S. Ong and his wife Ethyl Ong.

Ben S. Ong mortgaged Lot 1208 and some other properties to the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation to
secure a loan.

Encarnacion A. Arteche and the other children and heirs of the deceased Trinidad Diaz-Arteche, filed a civil
case for recovery of Lot 1208 against petitioner Rogelia Diaz-Duarte, Wilfredo Corregidor and his wife, Ben S.
Ong and his wife, and the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation and Pablo G. Amascual Jr., the Register of
Deeds of Tacloban City.

Regional Trial Court: decided the civil case for the recovery of Lot 1208 in favor of Encarnacion Arteche.

CA: awarded Lot 1208 to appellant-spouses Ben and Ethyl Ong after a finding that they were buyers in good
faith and for value.

ISSUE: Who between petitioner Rogelia Diaz-Duarte and respondent spouses Ong, has a better right over Lot
1208.

RULING:

The good faith of appellant-spouses rests heavily on whether the notice of adverse claim on Lot 1208 was
validly cancelled by the Registrar of Deeds. A notice of adverse claim remains valid even after the lapse of the
30-day period provided by Section 70 of P.D. No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree. Section 70
provides:

"Whoever claims any part or interest in registered land adverse to the registered owner, arising subsequent to
the date of the original registration, may, if no other provision is made in this Decree for registering the same,
make a statement in writing, setting forth fully his alleged right or interest, and how or under whom acquired, a
reference to the number of the certificate of title of the registered owner, and a description of the land in which
the right or interest is claimed.

"The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall state the adverse claimant's residence, and a place at
which all notices may be served upon him. This statement shall be entitled to registration as an adverse claim on
the certificate of title. The adverse claim shall be effective for a period of thirty days from the date of
registration. After the lapse of said period, the annotation of adverse claim may be cancelled upon filing of a
verified petition therefor by the party in interest. Provided, however that after cancellation, no second adverse
claim based on the same ground shall be registered by the same claimant."

For as long as there is yet no petition for its cancellation, the notice of adverse claim remains subsisting.

In a petition for cancellation of adverse claim, a hearing must first be conducted. The hearing will afford
the parties an opportunity to prove the propriety or impropriety of the adverse claim. Petitioner was unlawfully
denied this opportunity when the Registrar of Deeds automatically cancelled the adverse claim. Needless to
state, the cancellation of her adverse claim is ineffective.

Page 29 of 34

 Appellant spouses alleged good faith is negated by the evidence on record. At the trial court, respondent
spouses declared that they retained Atty. Reyes to assist them in buying Lot 1208. According to Atty. Reyes, his
clients asked him to verify the status of the land from the Register of Deeds. However, he failed to do so. Had
he done so, he would have discovered the adverse claim of the petitioner over the lot. Respondent spouses
are bound by the negligence of their lawyer.
A purchaser in good faith and for value is one who buys the property of another without notice that some
other person has a right to or interest in such property and pays a full and fair price for the same, at the time of
such purchase, or before he has notice of the claims or interest of some other person in the property. The adverse
claim of petitioner Rogelia Diaz-Duartewas annotated in Corregidor's title as early as October 17, 1979. It was
existing when Corregidor sold the property to respondents Ong. Hence, respondent spouses cannot be
considered innocent purchasers for value and in good faith. Their claim over Lot 1208 must yield to the lien in
favor of petitioner.

13.) NICANOR SANTOS VS. ROSA GANAYO, G.R. No. L-31854, September 9, 1982 (MARY GRACE
CRUZ)

Facts:

Petitioner is the registered owner of Lot 147, a residential lot of 10,000 sq. meters situated at Residential
section B, Pacdal, Baguio City. Prior to the latters ownership of said property, the lot belonged to the following
owners, to wit: (1) to the heirs of Molintas; and (2) to Justo Leano but after his death, the same was
adjudicated to Magdalena Leano.

On January 1960, the above mentioned co owners sold the lot to Pacita Jocson, who had sold the same
to the petitioner on June 11, 1960. Thereafter, of July 15, 1960, a transfer certificate of title was issued in
petitioners name. On October 31, 1959, Magdalena Leano executed an affidavit which provides that she owned
Lot 147 consisting of 10, 000 sq. meters; before world war II she sold 750 sq. meters to Rosa Ganayo.

However, on December 31, 1961, Magdalena Leano repudiated the affidavit and executed another one
denying the she sold to Rosa Ganayo the 750 sq. meters claimed by her. By May 18, 1959, Rosa Ganayo
(respondent) was able to secure the annotation of an adverse claim on transfer certificate of title in the name of
Magdalena Leano. In the Affidavit of Adverse Claim the agreement between Rosa Ganayo with Pulmano
Molintas could not be registered because the land was without any indication as to the number of the title of the
vendor.

On June 11, 1960, when petitioner acquired Lot 147, TCT No. 4583 was issued in his name. then, said
title carried over the adverse claim of respondent Ganayo. Then, on June 21, 1962, petitioner filed with the
Court of First Instance a petition for the cancellation of adverse claim of Rosa Ganayo.

Issue:

Whether or not the oppositor Rosa Ganayo had any right at all on the 750 sq. meters she claims.

Held:

Page 30 of 34

 The Petitioner (Nicanor Santos) is the true and lawful owner of the whole area of 10,000 sq. meters as
covered by the certificate of title. It is evident that there was no final conveyance and transfer of the area
consisting of 750 sq. meters covered by transfer certificate of title No. 4583 of the Register of Deeds of Baguio
City. Since Magdalena Leano confirmed that her husband never sold the portion of the 10,000 sq. meters to
Rosa Ganayo before, during, and after the last war. Under section 121 of Rule 123 of the Rules of Court, an
agreement for the leasing for a longer period than 1 year or for the sale of real property or of interest therein
must be evidenced by writing.

14.) VIEWMASTER vs MAULIT (ROSEMARIE KHOLOMA)

15.) PEOPLE vs RTC of MANILA (REINER HIPOLITO)

16.) TANCHOCO vs HIPOLITO (AMEIR MUKSAN)

17.) YARED VS LLARDE (CAJETA)

18.) ROMERO VS. CA 458 SCRA 483 (ALLEN CABURAL)

Facts:

Private respondent entered into a Conditional Deed of Sale with petitioner over a parcel of land in Paranaque,
the latter advancing P50,000 for the eviction of squatters therein. An ejectment suit was then filed by the private
respondent against the squatters. Although successful, private respondent sought the return of the downpayment
she received because she could not get rid of the squatters.

Issue:

May the vendor demand the rescission of a contract for the sale of a parcel of land for a cause traceable to his
own failure to have the squatters on the subject property evicted within the contractually-stipulated period?

Held:

A perfected contract of sale may either be absolute or conditional depending on whether the agreement is
devoid of, or subject to, any condition imposed on the passing of title of the thing to be conveyed or on the
obligation of a party thereto. When ownership is retained until the fulfillment of a positive condition the breach
of the condition will simply prevent the duty to convey title from acquiring an obligatory force. If the condition
is imposed on an obligation of a party which is not complied with, the other party may either refuse to proceed
or waive said condition. Where, of course, the condition is imposed upon the perfection of the contract itself,
the failure of such condition would prevent the juridical relation itself from coming into existence.
In determining the real character of the contract, the title given to it by the parties is not as much significant as
its substance. For example, a deed of sale, although denominated as a deed of conditional sale, may be treated
as absolute in nature, if title to the property sold is not reserved in the vendor or if the vendor is not granted the
right to unilaterally rescind the contract predicated on the fulfillment or non-fulfillment, as the case may be, of
the prescribed condition. The term "condition" in the context of a perfected contract of sale pertains, in reality,
to the compliance by one party of an undertaking the fulfillment of which would beckon, in turn, the
demandability of the reciprocal prestation of the other party. The reciprocal obligations referred to would
normally be, in the case of vendee, the payment of the agreed purchase price and, in the case of the vendor, the
fulfillment of certain express warranties (which, in the case at bench is the timely eviction of the squatters on
the property).
It would be futile to challenge the agreement here in question as not being a duly perfected contract. A sale is at
Page 31 of 34

once perfected when a person (the seller) obligates himself, for a price certain, to deliver and to transfer
ownership of a specified thing or right to another (the buyer) over which the latter agrees. From the moment the
contract is perfected, the parties are bound not only to the fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated but
also to all the consequences which, according to their nature, may be in keeping with good faith, usage and law.
Under the agreement, private respondent is obligated to evict the squatters on the property. Private respondent's
failure "to remove the squatters from the property" within the stipulated period gives petitioner the right to
either refuse to proceed with the agreement or waive that condition in consonance with Article 1545 of the Civil
Code. This option clearly belongs to petitioner and not to private respondent.
In contracts of sale particularly, Article 1545 of the Civil Code allows the obligee to choose between proceeding
with the agreement or waiving the performance of the condition. Here, evidently, petitioner has waived the
performance of the condition imposed on private respondent to free the property from squatters.
The right of resolution of a party to an obligation is predicated on a breach of faith by the other party that
violates the reciprocity between them. It is private respondent who has failed in her obligation under the
contract. Petitioner did not breach the agreement. He has agreed, in fact, to shoulder the expenses of the
execution of the judgment in the ejectment case and to make arrangements with the sheriff to effect such
execution.

19.) AFP MUTUAL BENEFIT VS CA (CARLO TABANGCURA)

FACTS:
This case involved Solid Homes Inc's MR of the SC's decision reversing the CA's decision and ordering the
RD to cancel the notice of lis pendens on the titles issued to AFPMBAI, declaring it as buyer in good faith
and for value. Investco Inc and Solid Homes Inc entered into a contract to sell. During this time, the titles to
the Quezon City and Marikina properties had not been transferred in the name of Investco Inc as asignee of
the owners, Angela Perez Staley and Antonio Perez. Thus, Investco Inc merely agreed to sell and Solid
Homes to buy the former's rights and interest in the properties.
However, Solid Homes Inc. reneged or defaulted on its obligation. Thus, Investco Inc rescinded extra-
judicially such contract to sell. After such event, AFPMBAI and Investco Inc entered into a contract of
absolute sale, wherein the former paid in full, causing the transfer of titles in its name.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Investco Inc properly rescinded its contract to sell and buy with Solid Homes Inc
HELD:
YES. Upon Solid Homes Inc's failure to comply with its obligation under the contract, there was no need to
judicially rescind the contract. Failure by one of the parties to abide by the conditions in a contract to sell
resulted in the rescission of the contract.
In Salazar v. Court of Appeals, we explained the distinction between a contract to sell and a contract of sale:
In a contract of sale, the title to the property passes to the vendee upon the delivery of the thing sold; in a
contract to sell, ownership is, by agreement, reserved in the vendor and is not to pass to the vendee until full
payment of the purchase price. Otherwise stated, in a contract of sale, the vendor loses ownership over the
property and cannot recover it until and unless the contract is resolved or rescinded; whereas in a contract to
sell, title is retained by the vendor until full payment of the price. In the latter contract, payment of the price

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 is a positive suspensive condition, failure of which is not a breach but an event that prevents the obligation
of the vendor to convey title from becoming effective.
Upon Solid Homes, Inc.s failure to comply with its obligation thereunder, there was no need to judicially
rescind the contract to sell. Failure by one of the parties to abide by the conditions in a contract to sell
resulted in the rescission of the contract.
Unquestionably, Solid Homes, Inc. reneged on its obligation to pay the installments for the purchase of the
Quezon City and Marikina property of Investco, Inc. on the dates specified in the contract to sell

20.) GONZALES VS. ORDONEZ-BENITEZ (ANNA DERLA)

FACTS

In the first marriage, Rodolfo Gonzales had 4 children: Salvador, Eduardo, Ramon and Pacita. After the
death of the first wife, Rodolfo married Dr. Luz Dizon. Two (2) children were begotten of this second
marriage, namely: Maria Luisa and Isabel.

Rodolfo P. Gonzalez and his second wife executed an "Agreement for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership
and for Establishment of Separation of Property," for the declared purpose of avoiding "confusion and/or
differences among the two sets of heirs (of said Rodolfo Gonzalez) in the settlement of the estates of the
said spouses in case of death." They then filed a petition with the Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court of
Manila for approval of their agreement, entitled "In the Matter of the Voluntary Dissolution of Conjugal
Partnership, Rodolfo P. Gonzalez's children by his first marriage moved for, and were granted leave, to
intervene in the case.

Salvador R. Gonzalez, the eldest of the four children of the first marriage, instituted in the same Court
proceedings to place under guardianship the property of his father Rodolfo P. Gonzalez, grounded on the
latter's alleged incapacity "to manage and direct his financial and ownership status" resulting from the
deterioration of his mental faculties on account of illness and advanced age. On May 1975, Rodolfo and Luz
drew up a contract of sale over 2 parcels of property mortgaged in favor of Phil. Trust and Co. the
mortgagee banks were not willing to accede to the assumption by the vendees of the spouses' mortgage
obligations. What the vendor spouses did, on July 16, 1975, was to cause annotation of the sales as adverse
claims on the corresponding certificates of title.

Salvador caused notices of lis pendens to be annotated on some of the properties of Rodolfo and Luz,
including the 2 parcels of land already sold. The annotation was based on the pendency of the guardianship
proceeding. Rodolfo filed a petition to cancel the annotation on the ground that the property was his and
Luzs conjugal property. The RTC denied Rodolfos petition. MR was also denied

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS

Whether notice of lis pendens is properly based on the guardianship proceeding?

HELD

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Yes.

The children of the first marriage indisputably have an interest in the property of the first marriage, as well as in
the property of the second. They have a right to allege and prove in the appropriate proceeding in the proper
forum that their father, Rodolfo P. Gonzalez, had brought property acquired by him and his first wife into his
second marriage with Luz Dizon, and also that all or certain of the property acquired during said second
marriage is conjugal in character. And they have the right to challenge in the appropriate proceeding in the
proper forum their father's capacity to make dispositions of property acquired during either of his marriages.
The issues necessarily involved are factual, i.e., the degree of Rodolfo P. Gonzalez' alleged incapacity; the
manner and other circumstances of the acquisition of the properties during the first and second marriages; the
attendance of fraud, or undue pressure or influence on any dispositions or attempts at disposition by Rodolfo P.
Gonzalez of any property. Obviously, these issues cannot be resolved without evidence which, to be sure, may
not be received and passed upon by this Court in the first instance. And until these issues are resolved, there is
clearly a need to warn any person interested in any property titled in the name of Rodolfo P. Gonzalez, among
others, of the pendency of the proceedings which might eventually result in the invalidation of any transaction
made by said Rodolfo P. Gonzalez affecting such property.

As Mr. and Mrs. Rodolfo P. Gonzalez point out, "the effect of the notices of lis pendens . . .are not delimited to
the properties of Dr. RODOLFO P. GONZALEZ, but extend to the proprietary interests of Dra. LUZ DIZON-
GONZALEZ, . . . who is not personally involved in the proceedings for guardianship." This is true, but it cannot
be helped, since the latter's name does in fact appear in the titles together with her husband's, and under the law,
no disposition of property can be made alone by either of them.

Whether the person whose property is sought to be placed under guardianship be sole owner, or co-owner of
property is immaterial. If shown to be non compos mentis, any disposition made by him under either
supposition would be equally defective. The argument that anyway, Mrs. Luz Dizon-Gonzalez is required by
law to "concur and co-sign" and hence, there "could be no instance . . . that Dr. Gonzalez might be influenced to
execute deeds of transfers to his prejudice," would appear to beg the question since the accusation is that it is
precisely the wife who has influenced and might continue to influence him "to his prejudice.

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