Intestate Estate of Don Mariano San
Pedro v. Court of Appeals, GR No.
103727, Dec. 1, 1996
FACTS:
The case involves two petitions
which were consolidated by the
court in its decision.
1. GR 103727
Engracio San Pedro, as heir-
judicial administrator of Plaintif
Intestate, filed a complaint for
recovery of real property/
reconveyance with damages
and prayer for preliminary
injunction against private
defendants Ocampo, Buhain and
dela Cruz.
San Pedro alleged that
defendants acquired portion of
the subject estate by employing
fraud, bad faith and
misrepresentation.
RTC of QC dismissed the
complaint saying that the
defendants are already the
registered owners covered by
the Torrens Title - which cannot
be defeated by the alleged
Spanish Title of San Pedro. The
Spanish Title also stated that
the estate shall be excluded
from the coverage of Titulo
Propriedad No. 4136. The court
ordered Plaintif Intestate to pay
each defendant the amount of
5,000 and atty fees.
Motion for Recon was denied.
Petitioner filed an appeal, CA
dismissed.
2. GR 106496
Engracio San Pedro and Justino
Benito filed a petition for letter
of administration over the
intestate to be appointed as
administrator and co-
administrator. Judge Echeverri
appointed San Pedro as
administrator and the court
issued letter of administration in
his favor upon posting a bond of
10,000.
Republic of the Philippines filed
a motion for intervention and
opposition to the petition,
claiming that the Titulo de
Propriedad is inadmissible and
inefective proof of ownership in
court and it is invalid.
Republic filed a motion to
suspend the proceedings but
the Republics opposition to the
petition for letter of
administration was dismissed.
Republic filed Motion for Recon.
The Judge declared Titulo de
Propriedad as null and void and
excluded all lands covered from
the inventory of the estate of
the late Mariano San Pedro.
bPetitioner-heirs appealed to CA.
CA dismissed.
ISSUES:
1.Whether or not the lower court
committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in settling the issue
of ownership of the estate
covered by Titulo de Propriedad
No. 4136?
2. Whether or not the lower
court committed error in
excluding from the inventory of
the estate all lands covered by
Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 on
the ground that it is null and
void?
RATIO:
1.NO. It is within the jurisdiction
of the lower court functioning as
probate court. The jurisdiction of
the Probate Court is not limited
to the determination of who the
heirs are and what shares are
due them. Their main function is
to settle and liquidate the estate
of the deceased so as to rule on
whether the inventory of the
estate properly included them
for distribution of the net assets
estate to lawful heirs.
2.NO. The lower court did not
commit any error when it
declared Titulo de Propriedad
No. 4136 as null and void,
consequently excluding all lands
covered by the said title from
the inventory of the estate.
Under PD 892, the system of
registration under Spanish
Mortgage Law was abolished
and all holders of Spanish Titles
should cause their lands to be
registered under Land
Registration Act within 6 months
from date of efectivity or until
August 16, 1976.
In both cases, petitioner-heirs
did not adduce evidence to
show that Titulo de Propriedad
No. 4136 was brought under the
operation of PD 892. There was
no certificate of title shown.
Also, Titulo de Propriedad No.
4136, under PD 892, is
inadmissible and inefective as
evidence of private ownership in
special proceedings case. Since
the Titulo was not registered
under Land Registration Act,
said Titulo is inferior to the
registered title of defendants
Ocampo, Buhain and dela Cruz.
Torrens title of the latter enjoys
the conclusive presumption of
validity.
Petitioner-heirs failed to present
neither the original Titulo nor a
genuine copy thereof (only an
alleged illegible copy was
presented). Even the secondary
evidence presented was also not
admissible.
RULING:
The Titulo de Propriedad is null
and void and no rights can be
derived therefrom. All lands
covered by said Titulo are
excluded from inventory of the
estate. The petition for letter of
administration closed and
terminated. The heirs are
disallowed to exercise any act of
possession or ownership and
ordered to vacate.
 furthermore averred that the
subject parcel of land is
timberland and therefore not
susceptible of private
ownership.
The respondents presented
evidence that they inherited a
bigger parcel of land from their
mother who acquired it by virtue
of a deed of sale. That in 1988 a
potion thereof was occupied by
ANCF and converted into a
fishpond for educational
purpose. Respondent heirs
asserted that they were
previously in possession of the
disputed land in the concept of
an owner. To prove possession,
Republic v Sin respondents presented several
G.R. No. 157485, March 16, tax declarations, the earliest of
2014 Facts: which was in the year 1945.
Respondents claim that they are The MCTC, the RTC and the
the lawful heirs of the late Court of Appeals unanimously
Maxima Lachica Sin who was the held that respondents retain
owner of a parcel of land private rights to the disputed
situated at Barangay Tambac, property by virtue of their and
New Washington, Aklan. On their predecessors open,
August 26, 1991, they continuous, exclusive and
respondent heirs instituted in notorious possession amounts to
the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan a an imperfect title, which should
complaint against Aklan be respected and protected.
National College of Fisheries Issue: Whether or not the claim
(ANCF) for recovery of of the respondents amounts to
possession, quieting of title, and judicial confirmation of
declaration of ownership with imperfect title.
damages claiming that the latter Held:
usurped their rights over the No. At the outset, it must be
property. noted that respondents have not
ANCF countered that the subject filed an application for judicial
land was the subject of confirmation of imperfect title
Proclamation No. 2074 of then under the Public Land Act or the
President Ferdinand E. Marcos Property Registration Decree.
allocating the area of said Section 48(b) of the Public Land
property as civil reservation for Act and Section 14(1) of the
educational purposes of ANCF. Property Registration Decree
The ANCF Superintendent provide the requisites for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title:
(1) open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject land
by himself or through his
predecessorsininterest under
a bona fide claim of ownership
since time immemorial or from
June 12, 1945; and (2) the
classification of the land as
alienable and disposable land of
the public domain.
Under the Regalian doctrine,
which is embodied in our
Constitution, all lands of the
public domain belong to the
State, which is the source of any
asserted right to any ownership
of land. All lands not appearing
to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to
belong to the State. Accordingly,
public lands not shown to have
been reclassified or released as
alienable agricultural land or
alienated to a private person by
the State remain part of the
inalienable public domain.
Unless public land is shown to
have been reclassified as
alienable or disposable to a
private person by the State, it
remains part of the inalienable
public domain. Property of the
public domain is beyond the
commerce of man and not
susceptible of private
appropriation and acquisitive
prescription. Occupation thereof
in the concept of owner no
matter how long cannot ripen
into ownership and be
registered as a title.
The burden of proof in
overcoming the presumption of
State ownership of the lands of
the public domain is on the
person applying for registration
(or claiming ownership), who
must prove that the land subject
of the application is alienable or
disposable. To overcome this
presumption, incontrovertible
evidence must be established
that the land subject of the
application (or claim) is
alienable or disposable.
There must be a positive act
declaring land of the public
domain as alienable and
disposable. To prove that the
land subject of an application for
registration is alienable, the
applicant must establish the
existence of a positive act of the
government, such as a
presidential proclamation or an
executive order; an
administrative action;
investigation reports of Bureau
of Lands investigators; and a
legislative act or a statute. The
applicant may also secure a
certification from the
government that the land
claimed to have been possessed
for the required number of years
is alienable and disposable.
In the case at bar, it is therefore
the respondents which have the
burden to identify a positive act
of the government, such as an
official proclamation,
declassifying inalienable public
land into disposable land for
agricultural or other purposes.
Since respondents failed to do
so, the alleged possession by
them and by their predecessors
ininterest is inconsequential
and could never ripen into
ownership. Accordingly,
respondents cannot be
considered to have private
rights within the purview of
Proclamation No. 2074 as to
prevent the application of said
proclamation to the subject
property.
Republic v. Remnan Enterprises,
Inc., GR No. 199310, Feb. 19,
2014
REYES, J.
FACTS:
On December 3, 2001, Remman
Enterprises filed an application
with the RTC for judicial
confirmation of title over two
parcels of land situated in
Taguig, Metro Manila, identified
as Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077,
Mcadm-590-D, Taguig Cadastre,
with an area of 29,945 square
meters and 20,357 sq m,
respectively.
The RTC found the application
for registration sufficient in form
and substance and set it for
initial hearing on May 30, 2002.
The Notice of Initial Hearing was
published in the Official Gazette
and was likewise posted in a
conspicuous places.
On the day of the hearing, only
the Laguna Lake Development
Authority (LLDA) appeared as
oppositor. Hence, the RTC issued
an order of general default
except LLDA, which was given
15 days to submit its
comment/opposition to the
respondents application for
registration. Sometime after, the
Republic of the Philippines
(petitioner) likewise filed its
Opposition, alleging that the
respondent failed to prove that
it and its predecessors-in-
interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession of the
subject parcels of land since
June 12, 1945 or earlier.
During the trial, the testimonies
of the respondents witnesses
showed that the respondent and
its predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious
possession of the said parcels of
land long before June 12, 1945.
The respondent purchased Lot
Nos. 3068 and 3077 from
Conrado Salvador and Bella
Mijares, respectively, in 1989.
The subject properties were
originally owned and possessed
by Veronica Jaime, who
cultivated and planted diferent
kinds of crops in the said lots,
through her caretaker and hired
farmers, since 1943. Sometime
in 1975, Jaime sold the said
parcels of land to Salvador and
Mijares, who continued to
cultivate the lots until the same
were purchased by the
respondent in 1989. The
respondent likewise alleged that
the subject properties are within
the alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain, as
evidenced by the certifications
issued by the Department of
Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR).
In support of its application, the
respondent, inter alia, presented
the following documents: (1)
Deed of Absolute Sale dated
August 28, 1989 executed by
Salvador and Mijares in favor of
the respondent; (2) survey plans
of the subject properties; (3)
technical descriptions of the
subject properties; (4) Geodetic
Engineers Certificate; (5) tax
declarations of Lot Nos. 3068
and 3077 for 2002; and (6)
certifications dated December
17, 2002, issued by Corazon D.
Calamno, Senior Forest
Management Specialist of the
DENR, attesting that Lot Nos.
3068 and 3077 form part of the
alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain
For its part, the LLDA alleged
that the respondents
application for registration
should be denied since the
subject parcels of land are not
part of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public
domain; it pointed out that
pursuant to Section 41(11) of
R.A. No. 4850, lands,
surrounding the Laguna de Bay,
located at and below the
reglementary elevation of 12.50
meters are public lands which
form part of the bed of the said
lake. Engr. Magalonga, testifying
for the oppositor LLDA, claimed
that, upon preliminary
evaluation of the subject
properties, based on the
topographic map of Taguig,
which was prepared using an
aerial survey conducted by the
then Department of National
Defense-Bureau of Coast in April
1966, he found out that the
elevations of Lot Nos. 3068 and
3077 are below 12.50 m. That
upon actual area verification of
the subject properties on
September 25, 2002, Engr.
Magalonga confirmed that the
elevations of the subject
properties range from 11.33 m
to 11.77 m.
On rebuttal, the respondent
presented Engr. Flotildes, who
claimed that, based on the
actual topographic survey of the
subject properties he conducted
upon the request of the
respondent, the elevations of
the subject properties, contrary
to LLDAs claim, are above
12.50 m. Particularly, Engr.
Flotildes claimed that Lot No.
3068 has an elevation ranging
from 12.60 m to 15 m while the
elevation of Lot No. 3077 ranges
from 12.60 m to 14.80 m.
The RTC ruled in favor of
respondent. The RTC pointed out
that LLDAs claim that the
elevation of the subject
properties is below 12.50 m is
hearsay since the same was
merely based on the
topographic map that was
prepared using an aerial survey
on March 2, 1966; that nobody
was presented to prove that an
aerial survey was indeed
conducted on March 2, 1966 for
purposes of gathering data for
the preparation of the
topographic map.
Further, the RTC posited that the
elevation of a parcel of land
does not always remain the
same; that the elevations of the
subject properties may have
already changed since 1966
when the supposed aerial
survey, from which the
topographic map used by LLDA
was based, was conducted. The
RTC likewise faulted the method
used by Engr. Magalonga in
measuring the elevations of the
subject properties.
Even supposing that the
elevations of the subject
properties are indeed below
12.50 m, the RTC opined that
the same could not be
considered part of the bed of
Laguna Lake. The RTC held that,
under Section 41(11) of R.A. No.
4850, Laguna Lake extends only
to those areas that can be
covered by the lake water when
it is at the average annual
maximum lake level of 12.50 m.
Hence, the RTC averred, only
those parcels of land that are
adjacent to and near the
shoreline of Laguna Lake form
part of its bed and not those
that are already far from it,
which could not be reached by
the lake water. The RTC pointed
out that the subject properties
are more than a kilometer away
from the shoreline of Laguna
Lake; that they are dry and
waterless even when the waters
of Laguna Lake is at its
maximum level. The RTC
likewise found that the
respondent was able to prove
that it and its predecessors-in-
interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession of the
subject properties as early as
1943.
The CA affirmed the RTC
Decision.
ISSUE:
Is respondent entitled to the
registration of title to the
subject properties?
HELD: NO
That the elevations of the
subject properties are above the
reglementary level of 12.50 m is
a finding of fact by the lower
courts, which this Court,
generally may not disregard.
This Court is not a trier of facts
and will not disturb the factual
findings of the lower courts
unless there are substantial
reasons for doing so. That the
subject properties are not part
of the bed of Laguna Lake,
however, does not necessarily
mean that they already form
part of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public
domain. It is still incumbent
upon the respondent to prove,
with well-nigh incontrovertible
evidence, that the subject
properties are indeed part of the
alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain.
While deference is due to the
lower courts finding that the
elevations of the subject
properties are above the
reglementary level of 12.50 m
and, hence, no longer part of
the bed of Laguna Lake, the
Court nevertheless finds that
the respondent failed to
substantiate its entitlement to
registration of title to the
subject properties.
"Under the Regalian Doctrine,
xxxx all lands of the public
domain belong to the State,
which is the source of any
asserted right to any ownership
of land. All lands not appearing
to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to
belong to the State. Accordingly,
public lands not shown to have
been reclassified or released as
alienable agricultural land, or
alienated to a private person by
the State, remain part of the
inalienable public domain. The
burden of proof in overcoming
the presumption of State
ownership of the lands of the
public domain is on the person
applying for registration, who
must prove that the land subject
of the application is alienable or
disposable. To overcome this
presumption, incontrovertible
evidence must be presented to
establish that the land subject of
the application is alienable or
disposable."
The respondent filed its
application for registration of
title to the subject properties
under Section 14(1) of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1529. Under said Section,
applicants for registration of title
must sufficiently establish:
1) that the subject land forms
part of the disposable and
alienable lands of the public
domain;
2) that the applicant and his
predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of
the same; and
3) that it is under a bona fide
claim of ownership since June
12, 1945, or earlier
The first requirement was not
satisfied in this case. To prove
that the subject property forms
part of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public
domain, the respondent
presented two certifications
issued by Calamno, attesting
that Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077
form part of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public
domain "under Project No. 27-B
of Taguig, Metro Manila as per
LC Map 2623, approved on
January 3, 1968."
reiterate the ruling in T.A.N.
Properties. Here, Roche did not
present evidence that the land
she applied for has been
classified as alienable or
disposable land of the public
domain. She submitted only the
survey map and technical
description of the land which
bears no information regarding
the lands classification. She did
not bother to establish the
status of the land by any
certification from the
appropriate government agency.
Thus, it cannot be said that she
complied with all requisites for
registration of title under
Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529.

However, the said certifications The DENR certifications that

presented by the respondent are were presented by the
insufficient to prove that the respondent in support of its
subject properties are alienable application for registration are
and disposable. In Republic of thus not sufficient to prove that
the Philippines v. T.A.N. the subject properties are
Properties, Inc., the Court indeed classified by the DENR
clarified that, in addition to the Secretary as alienable and
1) certification issued by the disposable. It is still imperative
proper government agency that for the respondent to present a
a parcel of land is alienable and copy of the original classification
disposable, applicants for land approved by the DENR
registration must 2) prove that Secretary, which must be
the DENR Secretary had certified by the legal custodian
approved the land classification thereof as a true copy.
and released the land of public Accordingly, the lower courts
domain as alienable and erred in granting the application
disposable. They must 3) for registration in spite of the
present a copy of the original failure of the respondent to
classification approved by the prove by well-nigh
DENR Secretary and 4) certified incontrovertible evidence that
as true copy by the legal the subject properties are
custodian of the records. alienable and disposable.

In Republic v. Roche, the Court Nevertheless, the respondent

deemed it appropriate to claims that the Courts ruling in
T.A.N. Properties, which was present sufficient evidence to
promulgated on June 26, 2008, prove that it and its
must be applied prospectively, predecessors-in-interest have
asserting that decisions of this been in open, continuous,
Court form part of the law of the exclusive, and notorious
land and, pursuant to Article 4 possession and occupation of
of the Civil Code, laws shall have the subject properties since June
no retroactive efect. The 12, 1945, or earlier.
respondent points out that its
application for registration of To prove that it and its
title was filed and was granted predecessors-in-interest have
by the RTC prior to the Courts been in possession and
promulgation of its ruling in occupation of the subject
T.A.N. Properties. properties since 1943, the
respondent presented the
The Court does not agree. testimony of Cerquena which
Notwithstanding that the are but unsubstantiated and
respondents application for self-serving assertions of the
registration was filed and possession and occupation of
granted by RTC prior to the the subject properties by the
Courts ruling in T.A.N. respondent and its
Properties, the pronouncements predecessors-in-interest; they
in that case may be applied to do not constitute the well-nigh
the present case; it is not incontrovertible evidence of
antithetical to the rule of non- possession and occupation of
retroactivity of laws pursuant to the subject properties required
Article 4 of the Civil Code. It is by Section 14(1) of P.D. No.
elementary that the 1529. Indeed, other than the
interpretation of a law by this testimony of Cerquena, the
Court constitutes part of that respondent failed to present any
law from the date it was other evidence to prove the
originally passed, since this character of the possession and
Courts construction merely occupation by it and its
establishes the predecessors-in-interest of the
contemporaneous legislative subject properties.
intent that the interpreted law
carried into efect. "Such judicial For purposes of land registration
doctrine does not amount to the under Section 14(1) of P.D. No.
passage of a new law, but 1529, proof of specific acts of
consists merely of a ownership must be presented to
construction or interpretation of substantiate the claim of open,
a pre-existing one." continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and
Anent the second and third occupation of the land subject of
requirements, the Court finds the application. Applicants for
that the respondent failed to land registration cannot just
ofer general statements which
are mere conclusions of law
rather than factual evidence of
possession. Actual possession
consists in the manifestation of
acts of dominion over it of such
a nature as a party would
actually exercise over his own
property.
Further, assuming ex gratia
argumenti that the respondent
and its predecessors-in-interest
have indeed planted crops on
the subject properties, it does
not necessarily follow that the
subject properties have been
possessed and occupied by
them in the manner
contemplated by law. The
supposed planting of crops in
the subject properties may only
have amounted to mere casual
cultivation, which is not the
possession and occupation
required by law.
"A mere casual cultivation of
portions of the land by the
claimant does not constitute
possession under claim of
ownership. For him, possession
is not exclusive and notorious so
as to give rise to a presumptive
grant from the state. The
possession of public land,
however long the period thereof
may have extended, never
confers title thereto upon the
possessor because the statute
of limitations with regard to
public land does not operate
against the state, unless the
occupant can prove possession
and occupation of the same
under claim of ownership for the
required number of years."
Further, the Court notes that the
tax declarations over the subject
properties presented by the
respondent were only for 2002.
The respondent failed to explain
why, despite its claim that it
acquired the subject properties
as early as 1989, and that its
predecessors-in-interest have
been in possession of the
subject property since 1943, it
was only in 2002 that it started
to declare the same for
purposes of taxation. "While tax
declarations are not conclusive
evidence of ownership, they
constitute proof of claim of
ownership." That the subject
properties were declared for
taxation purposes only in 2002
gives rise to the presumption
that the respondent claimed
ownership or possession of the
subject properties starting that
year.
WHEREFORE, respondent's
application for registration is
denied.
Solid Estate Multi-Products
Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
GR No. 83383, May 6, 1991
Arceo v. Court of Appeals, GR
No. 81401, May 18, 1990

G.R. No. 81401 May 18, 1990

VIRGINIA FRANCO VDA. DE
ARCEO, CARMELITA ARCEO,
ZENAIDA ARCEO, ROMEO
ARCEO, RODOLFO ARCEO and
MANUEL ARCEO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS
(Former 16th Division), PEDRO
M. ARCEO, SOTERA ARCEO,
LORENZO ARCEO, and ANTONIO
ARCEO, respondents.

Facts: Spouses Abdon Arceo &

Escolastica Geronimo were
owners of 4 parcels of land in
Bulacan.( actually 6 but only 4
were in dispute) Escolastica
died on 1942; Abdon died on
1953 while their son Esteban
died of 1941. Esteban had 5
children- Jose, Pedro, Lorenzo,
Antonio & Sotera. Jose is
married to Virginia Franco and
together they had 6 children.
Virginia together with her
children are the petitioners in
this case while the siblings of
Jose are the respondents in this
case. On 1972, Virginia and
children filed with the cadastral
court and application for
registration of the 4 disputed
parcels of land, which was
opposed by Joses siblings.
Petitioners are contending that
on September/October 27, 1941
Abdon and Escolastica executed
a deed of donation inter vivos
marked as exhibit J in which the
spouses bestowed the
properties in favor of Jose. That
since 1942 Jose has been paying
the taxes. Another deed of
donation inter vivos was also
executed by the spouses
marked as exhibit T, which
further disposed the properties
to Jose. On the other hand,
respondents rely on a deed of
donation mortis causa executed
by the spouses on October 3,
1941 marked as exhibit 1 which
disposed all their properties to
all their grandchildren including
Jose. They contend that said
deed revoked the earlier
donation made by the spouses.
(pertaining to exhibit J) The
cadastral court rejected the 3
documents and distributed the
properties according to the law
of intestate succession CA
affirmed Petitioners contend
that the cadastral court does not
have the power to determine
conflicting claims of ownership
and that its authority was
merely to confirm an existing
title.
Issue: W/N the RTC acting as
cadastral court has the power to
determine conflicting claims of
ownership?
YES
Ruling: Section 2 of Presidential
Decree No. 1529, The Property
Registration Decree, viz: Nature
of registration proceedings;
jurisdiction of courts. --- Judicial
proceedings for the registration
of lands throughout the
Philippines shall be in rem and
shall be based on the generally
accepted principles underlying
the Torrens system. Courts of
First Instance (now Regional Trial
Courts) shall have exclusive
jurisdiction over all applications
for original registration of title to
lands, including improvements
and interest therein, and over all
petitions filed after original
registration of title, with power
to hear and determine all
questions arising upon such
applications or petitions. The
court through its clerk of court
shall furnish the Land
Registration Commission with
two certified copies of all
pleadings, exhibits, orders, and
decisions filed or issued in
applications or petitions for land
registration, with the exception
of stenographic notes, within
five days from the filing or
issuance thereof. The Decree
has eliminated the distinction
between the general jurisdiction
vested in the regional trial court
and the limited jurisdiction
conferred upon it by the former
law when acting merely as a
cadastral court." The
amendment was "aimed at
avoiding multiplicity of suits, the
change has simplified
registration proceedings by
conferring upon the required
trial courts the authority to act
not only on applications for
'original registration' 'but also
'over all petitions filed after
original registration of title, with
power to hear and determine all
questions arising from such
applications or petitions. G.R.
No. 101387. March 11, 1998]
SPOUSES MARIANO and
ERLINDA LABURADA,
represented by their attorney-in-
fact, MANUEL SANTOS, JR.,
petitioners, vs. LAND
REGISTRATION AUTHORITY,
respondent. Facts: Petitioners,
Spouses Laburada were
applicants for registration of Lot
3A which is a portion of Lot 3
Block 159 located in
Mandaluyong City. On January
8, 1991 the trial court acting as
land registration court confirmed
and ordered the registration of
their title. After the finality of
the decision, TC upon motion of
petitioners issued an order on
March 15, 1991 requiring the
Land Registration Authority to
issue corresponding decree of
registration. LRA refused the
issuance. Thereafter petitioners
filed for mandamus contending
that there was unlawful neglect
in the performance of LRA duty.
Silverio Perez, Director of LRA
explained that after plotting the
aforesaid plan sought to be
registered, it was found that it
might be a portion of the parcels
of land decreed in Court of Land
Registration (CLR) Case Nos.
699, 875 and 817, as per
plotting of the subdivision plan
(LRC) Psd-319932. The records
on file in this Authority show
that CLR Case Nos. 699, 875 &
917 were issued Decree Nos.
240, 696 and 1425 on August
25, 1904, September 14, 1905
and April 26, 1905, respectively;
(take note of the dates) After
verification of the records on file
in the Register of Deeds for the
Province of Rizal, it was found
that Lot 3-B of the subdivision
plan Psd-1372 being a portion of
Lot No. 3, Block No. 159, Plan
S.W.O. -7237, is covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No.
29337 issued in the name of
Pura Escurdia Vda. de Buenaflor,
a copy is attached as Annex F
hereof. Said TCT No. 29337 is a
transfer from Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 6595. However, the
title issued for Lot 3-A of the
subdivision plan Psd-1372
cannot be located because TCT
No. 6595 consisting of several
sheets are incomplete. For this
Authority to issue the
corresponding decree of
registration sought by the
petitioners pursuant to the
Decision dated January 8, 1991
and Order dated March 15,
1991, it would result in the
duplication of titles over the
same parcel of land, and thus
contravene the policy and
purpose of the Torrens
registration system, and destroy
the integrity of the same. Issue:
W/N mandamus is the proper
remedy? NO Ruling: LRA
hesitates in issuing a decree of
registration is understandable.
Rather than a sign of negligence
or nonfeasance in the
performance of its duty, the
LRAs reaction is reasonable,
even imperative. Considering
the probable duplication of titles
over the same parcel of land,
such issuance may contravene
the policy and the purpose, and
thereby destroy the integrity, of
the Torrens system of
registration. In Ramos vs.
Rodriguez, this Court ruled that
the LRA is mandated to refer to
the trial court any doubt it may
have in regard to the
preparation and the issuance of
a decree of registration. In this
respect, LRA officials act not as
administrative officials but as
officers of said court, and their
act is the act of the court. They
are specifically called upon to
extend assistance to courts in
ordinary and cadastral land
registration proceedings. The
issuance of a decree of
registration is part of the judicial
function of courts and is not a
mere ministerial act which may
be compelled through
mandamus. Thus, this Court
held in Valmonte and Jacinto vs.
Nable: Moreover, after the
rendition of a decision by a
registration or cadastral court,
there remain many things to be
done before the final decree can
be issued, such as the
preparation of amended plans
and amended descriptions,
especially where the decision
orders a subdivision of a lot, the
segregation therefrom of a
portion being adjudicated to
another party, to fit the said
decision. As said by this Court in
the case of De los Reyes vs. De
Villa, 48 Phil., 227, 234 Note:
During the discussion, Maam
said that the spouses Laburada
should have exhausted all
administrative remedies before
filing for mandamus. [G.R. No.
154409. June 21, 2004] Spouses
NOEL and JULIE ABRIGO,
petitioners, vs. ROMANA DE
VERA, respondent. Facts: On
May 27, 1993, Gloria Villafania
sold a house and lot located at
Banaoang, Mangaldan,
Pangasinan and covered by Tax
Declaration No. 1406 to Rosenda
Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-
Go. The said sale became a
subject of a suit for annulment
of documents between the
vendor and the vendees. The
parties thereafter, entered into a
compromise agreement which
provides that Gloria has a period
of one year to buy back the
house and lot. However, Gloria
failed to do so. Unknown,
however to Rosenda Tigno-
Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go,
Gloria Villafania obtained a free
patent over the parcel of land
involved [on March 15, 1988 as
evidenced by OCT No. P-30522].
The said free patent was later
on cancelled by TCT No. 212598
on April 11, 1996. On October
16, 1997, Rosenda Tigno-Salazar
and Rosita Cave-Go, sold the
house and lot to the herein
[Petitioner-Spouses Noel and
Julie Abrigo]. On October 23,
1997, Gloria Villafania sold the
same house and lot to Romana
de Vera x x x. Romana de Vera
registered the sale and as a
consequence, TCT No. 22515
was issued in her name. On
November 12, 1997 De Vera
filed an action for forcible entry
against Abrigo spouses but was
dismissed. On November 21,
1997, petitioners filed the
instant case with the Regional
Trial Court of Dagupan City for
the annulment of documents,
injunction, preliminary
injunction, restraining order and
damages against respondent
and Gloria Villafania. TC
awarded the property to Abrigo.
CA on its amended decision,
found respondent De Vera to be
a purchaser in good faith and for
value. The appellate court ruled
that she had relied in good faith
on the Torrens title of her vendor
and must thus be protected.
Issue: Who between de Vera and
Spouses Abrigo has the better
right? Romana De Vera This
case involves a double sale by
Gloria to : May 27, 1993
Rosenda and Rosita October 23,
1997- Romana Rivera Art. 1544.
If the same thing should have
been sold to diferent vendees,
the ownership shall be
transferred to the person who
may have first taken possession
thereof in good faith, if it should
be movable property. Should it
be immovable property, the
ownership shall belong to the
person acquiring it who in good
faith first recorded it in the
Registry of Property. Should
there be no inscription, the
ownership shall pertain to the
person who in good faith was
first in the possession; and, in
the absence thereof, to the
person who presents the oldest
title, provided there is good
faith. Otherwise stated, the law
provides that a double sale of
immovables transfers ownership
to (1) the first registrant in good
faith; (2) then, the first
possessor in good faith; and (3)
finally, the buyer who in good
faith presents the oldest title.
There is no ambiguity in the
application of this law with
respect to lands registered
under the Torrens system. This
principle is in full accord with
Section 51 of PD 1529 which
provides that no deed,
mortgage, lease or other
voluntary instrument -- except a
will -- purporting to convey or
afect registered land shall take
efect as a conveyance or bind
the land until its registration.
Thus, if the sale is not
registered, it is binding only
between the seller and the
buyer but it does not afect
innocent third persons In the
instant case, both Petitioners
Abrigo and respondent
registered the sale of the
property. Since neither
petitioners nor their
predecessors (Tigno-Salazar and
Cave-Go) knew that the
property was covered by the
Torrens system, they registered
their respective sales under Act
3344. For her part, respondent
registered the transaction under
the Torrens system because,
during the sale, Villafania had
presented the transfer
certificate of title (TCT) covering
the property Soriano v. Heirs of
Magali, held that registration
must be done in the proper
registry in order to bind the
land. Since the property in
dispute in the present case was
already registered under the
Torrens system, petitioners
registration of the sale under
Act 3344 was not efective for
purposes of Article 1544 of the
Civil Code. Therefore, 1544 does
not apply to Spouses Abrigo. De
Vera under 1544 is considered
to have registered the property
in good faith first which is under
the torrens system. De Vera is in
good faith since she had no
notice of the earlier sale of the
land to [petitioners]. She
ascertained and verified that her
vendor was the sole owner and
in possession of the subject
property by examining her
vendors title in the Registry of
Deeds and actually going to the
premises. There is no evidence
in the record showing that when
she bought the land on October
23, 1997, she knew or had the
slightest notice that the same
was under litigation.
Sec. of DENR v. Yap, GR No.
167707, Oct. 8, 2008
FACTS: On November 10, 1978,
then President Marcos issued
Proc. No. 1801 declaring
Boracay Island, among other
islands, caves and peninsulas in
the Philippines, as tourist zones
and marine reserves under the
administration of the Philippine
Tourism Authority (PTA).
President Marcos later approved
the issuance of PTA Circular 3-82
dated September 3, 1982, to
implement Proclamation No.
1801.
Claiming that Proclamation No.
1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82
precluded them from filing an
application for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title or
survey of land for titling
purposes, respondents-
claimants Mayor . Yap, Jr., and
others filed a petition for
declaratory relief with the RTC in
Kalibo, Aklan
In their petition, respondents-
claimants alleged that Proc. No.
1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82
raised doubts on their right to
secure titles over their occupied
lands. They declared that they
themselves, or through their
predecessors-in-interest, had
been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation in
Boracay since June 12, 1945, or
earlier since time immemorial.
They declared their lands for tax
purposes and paid realty taxes
on them. Respondents-claimants
posited that Proclamation No.
1801 and its implementing
Circular did not place Boracay
beyond the commerce of man.
Since the Island was classified
as a tourist zone, it was
susceptible of private
ownership. Under Section 48(b)
of the Public Land Act, they had
the right to have the lots
registered in their names
through judicial confirmation of
imperfect titles.
The Republic, through the OSG,
opposed the petition for
declaratory relief. The OSG
countered that Boracay Island
was an unclassified land of the
public domain. It formed part of
the mass of lands classified as
public forest, which was not On August 10, 2006, petitioners-
available for disposition claimants Sacay,and other
pursuant to Section 3(a) of the landowners in Boracay filed with
Revised Forestry Code, as this Court an original petition for
amended. The OSG maintained prohibition, mandamus, and
that respondents-claimants nullification of Proclamation No.
reliance on PD No. 1801 and PTA 1064. They allege that the
Circular No. 3-82 was misplaced. Proclamation infringed on their
Their right to judicial prior vested rights over
confirmation of title was portions of Boracay. They have
governed by Public Land Act and been in continued possession of
Revised Forestry Code, as their respective lots in Boracay
amended. Since Boracay Island since time immemorial.
had not been classified as
alienable and disposable, On November 21, 2006, this
whatever possession they had Court ordered the consolidation
cannot ripen into ownership. of the two petitions

On July 14, 1999, the RTC
rendered a decision in favor of
respondents-claimants,
declaring that, PD 1810 and
PTA Circular No. 3-82 Revised
Forestry Code, as amended.
ISSUE: the main issue is whether
private claimants have a right to
secure titles over their occupied
portions in Boracay.

The OSG moved for

reconsideration but its motion
was denied. The Republic then
appealed to the CA. On In 2004,
the appellate court affirmed in
toto the RTC decision. Again, the
OSG sought reconsideration but
it was similarly denied. Hence,
the present petition under Rule
45.
On May 22, 2006, during the
pendency the petition in the trial
court, President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo issued
Proclamation No. 1064
classifying Boracay Island partly
reserved forest land (protection
purposes) and partly agricultural
land (alienable and disposable).
HELD: petitions DENIED. The CA
decision is reversed.
Except for lands already covered
by existing titles, Boracay was
an unclassified land of the public
domain prior to Proclamation
No. 1064. Such unclassified
lands are considered public
forest under PD No. 705.
PD No. 705 issued by President
Marcos categorized all
unclassified lands of the public
domain as public forest. Section
3(a) of PD No. 705 defines a
public forest as a mass of lands
of the public domain which has
not been the subject of the
present system of classification
for the determination of which
lands are needed for forest
purpose and which are not.
Applying PD No. 705, all
unclassified lands, including
those in Boracay Island, are ipso
facto considered public forests.
PD No. 705, however, respects
titles already existing prior to its
efectivity.
The 1935 Constitution classified
lands of the public domain into
agricultural, forest or timber,
such classification modified by
the 1973 Constitution. The 1987
Constitution reverted to the
1935 Constitution classification
with one addition: national
parks. Of these, only agricultural
lands may be alienated. Prior to
Proclamation No. 1064 of May
22, 2006, Boracay Island had
never been expressly and
administratively classified under
any of these grand divisions.
Boracay was an unclassified
land of the public domain.
A positive act declaring land as
alienable and disposable is
required. In keeping with the
presumption of State ownership,
the Court has time and again
emphasized that there must be
a positive act of the
government, such as a President
presidential proclamation or an
executive order; an
administrative action;
investigation reports of Bureau
of Lands investigators; and a
legislative act or a statute. The
applicant may also secure a
certification from the
government that the land
claimed to have been possessed
for the required number of years
is alienable and disposable. The
burden of proof in overcoming
such presumption is on the
person applying for registration
(or claiming ownership), who
must prove that the land subject
of the application is alienable or
disposable.
In the case at bar, no such
proclamation, executive order,
administrative action, report,
statute, or certification was
presented to the Court. The
records are bereft of evidence
showing that, prior to 2006, the
portions of Boracay occupied by
private claimants were subject
of a government proclamation
that the land is alienable and
disposable. Matters of land
classification or reclassification
cannot be assumed. They call
for proof.
Proc. No. 1801 cannot be
deemed the positive act needed
to classify Boracay Island as
alienable and disposable land. If
President Marcos intended to
classify the island as alienable
and disposable or forest, or
both, he would have identified
the specific limits of each, as
Arroyo did in
Proclamation No. 1064. This
was not done in Proclamation
No. 1801.
NOTES:
1. Private claimants reliance on
Ankron and De Aldecoa is
misplaced. Ankron and De
Aldecoa were decided at a time
when the President of the
Philippines had no power to
classify lands of the public
domain into mineral, timber,
and agricultural. At that time,
the courts were free to make
corresponding classifications in
justiciable cases, or were vested
with implicit power to do so,
depending upon the
preponderance of the evidence.
Act No. 2874, promulgated in
1919 and reproduced in Section
6 of Public Land Act, gave the
Executive Department, through
the President, the exclusive
prerogative to classify or
reclassify public lands into
alienable or disposable, mineral
or forest. Since then, courts no
longer had the authority,
whether express or implied, to
determine the classification of
lands of the public domain.
2. Each case must be decided
upon the proof in that particular
case, having regard for its
present or future value for one
or the other purposes. We
believe, however, considering
the fact that it is a matter of
public knowledge that a majority
of the lands in the Philippine
Islands are agricultural lands
that the courts have a right to
presume, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, that in
each case the lands are
agricultural lands until the
contrary is shown. Whatever
the land involved in a particular
land registration case is forestry
or mineral land must, therefore,
be a matter of proof. Its
superior value for one purpose
or the other is a question of fact
to be settled by the proof in
each particular case
Forests, in the context of both
the Public Land Act and the
Constitution classifying lands of
the public domain into
agricultural, forest or timber,
mineral lands, and national
parks, do not necessarily refer
to large tracts of wooded land or
expanses covered by dense
growths of trees and
underbrushes. The discussion in
Heirs of Amunategui v. Director
of Forestry is particularly
instructive:
A forested area classified as
forest land of the public domain
does not lose such classification
simply because loggers or
settlers may have stripped it of
its forest cover. Parcels of land
classified as forest land may
actually be covered with grass
or planted to crops by kaingin
cultivators or other farmers.
Forest lands do not have to be
on mountains or in out of the
way places. Swampy areas
covered by mangrove trees,
nipa palms, and other trees
growing in brackish or sea water
may also be classified as forest
land. The classification is
descriptive of its legal nature or
status and does not have to be
descriptive of what the land
actually looks like. Unless and
until the land classified as
forest is released in an official
proclamation to that efect so
that it may form part of the
disposable agricultural lands of
the public domain, the rules on
confirmation of imperfect title
do not apply.
There is a big diference
between forest as defined in a
dictionary and forest or timber
land as a classification of lands
of the public domain as
appearing in our statutes. One
is descriptive of what appears
on the land while the other is a
legal status, a classification for
legal purposes. At any rate, the
Court is tasked to determine the
legal status of Boracay Island,
and not look into its physical
layout. Hence, even if its forest
cover has been replaced by
beach resorts, restaurants and
other commercial
establishments, it has not been
automatically converted from
public forest to alienable
agricultural land.
3. All is not lost, however, for
private claimants. While they
may not be eligible to apply for
judicial confirmation of
imperfect title under Section
48(b) of CA No. 141, as
amended, this does not denote
their automatic ouster from the
residential, commercial, and
other areas they possess now
classified as agricultural.
Neither will this mean the loss of
their substantial investments on
their occupied alienable lands.
Lack of title does not necessarily
mean lack of right to possess.
For one thing, those with lawful
possession may claim good faith
as builders of improvements.
They can take steps to preserve
or protect their possession. For
another, they may look into
other modes of applying for
original registration of title, such
as by homestead or sales
patent, subject to the conditions
imposed by law.
More realistically, Congress may
enact a law to entitle private
claimants to acquire title to their
occupied lots or to exempt them
from certain requirements under
the present land laws. There is
one such bill now pending in the
House of Representatives.