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Bruce J.

Dickson

The Survival Strategy of the


Chinese Communist Party

China watchers are often obsessed with the prospects for regime
change in that country. During the post-Mao period in China, the ruling
Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or simply the Party) has liberalized its control
over the economy while protecting its monopoly on political power. Although
an increasingly market economy may seem incompatible with a Leninist political
system, this is the combination Chinas leaders have pursued for almost four
decades.
This has led to a vigorous debate among specialists on Chinese politics regard-
ing the fate of the Party and the regime it governs. Some argue that it is fragile,
incapable of change, and in danger of collapse.1 According to this view, the
Party has not been willing or able to accommodate the social and political
changes its economic reforms have brought about. As a result, it has become stag-
nant and increasingly out of touch with a modernizing China. Others see it as
adaptable, even resilient, and note that it faces no imminent threats from an orga-
nized opposition.2 In response to societal changes, it has updated its policy agenda
and devised new channels for interactions between state and society. While the
Party may be slow to identify crisis situations and clumsy in its response to
them, it has been flexible enough to remain in power.
Much of this debate centers on elite politics, policymaking, and other insti-
tutional features of Chinas party-state. In the previous issue of this journal,
David Shambaugh and Minxin Pei offered new contributions to this debate.3
They identified a variety of challenges facing the Party such as elite debates on
economic policy, leadership succession, and its relationship with an increasingly

Bruce J. Dickson is professor of political science and international affairs and chair of the pol-
itical science department at the George Washington University. His most recent book is Dicta-
tors Dilemma: The Chinese Communist Partys Strategy for Survival (Oxford, 2016), from which
this article is adapted. He can be reached at bdickson@gwu.edu.
Copyright 2016 The Elliott School of International Affairs
The Washington Quarterly 39:4 pp. 2744
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2016.1261563

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Bruce J. Dickson

diversified society. Indeed, similar trends have been identified in the past without
the dire consequences that previous authors predicted. Shambaugh and Pei are
more circumspect: they believe the full effects of the trends they highlight may
not be known for decades to come. Such a long-term perspective, however,
does not provide much of a guide as to what may happen in the immediate
future. While we should watch for signs of regime decay, we should also take
note of what has allowed the regime to survive as long as it has.
What is often overlooked in the debate over regime change in China is the
nature of public opinion in China. Various studies have shown high levels of
popular support, higher and steadier than most outside observers recognize.4
These studies also reveal that the Chinese public is dissatisfied with specific
policy issues such as the environment, food safety, and the cost and quality of
health care and educationsimilar to the concerns of many American citizens.
But popular dissatisfaction with these policy issues is counter-balanced with
other sources of regime support such as rising
M ost Chinese do standards of living and nationalist sentiments.
As a result, most Chinese do not seek regime
not seek regime change; instead, they prefer that the current
change. regime do a better job dealing with these pro-
blems. The growing numbers of protests in
China are typically about the quality of govern-
ance and working conditions, not about broader issues favoring political reform or
democratization. For the foreseeable future, the Party faces no organized opposi-
tion and no imminent threats to its hold on power coming from society. Some
in China certainly prefer democratization, but they face repression from the
state and enjoy little popular support. While we need to be attentive to the possi-
bility that public opinion will turn against the regime or that the growing middle
class will seek democratizing reforms, we must also acknowledge that these shifts
have not yet occurred.
In assessing the prospects for regime change in China, we need to consider the
Partys survival strategy, how society responds to it, and what dilemmas its strategy
creates. The examples presented below are taken from two nationwide public
opinion surveys conducted in 2010 and 2014.5 The surveys were designed to be
representative of Chinas urban areas, where the majority of the population now
lives and where the Party has concentrated most of its attention in the post-
Mao era. These surveys provide surprising insights into the views of Chinese
living in the countrys cities.
The Partys survival strategy is made up of three elements: repression, legitima-
tion, and co-optation. This survival strategy is not unique to China. Most author-
itarian regimes rely on some combination of these three elements in order to stay
in power, although the emphasis on each element will vary over time and in

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The Survival Strategy of the Chinese Communist Party

different countries. For autocrats as well as analysts, the optimal combination of


these three elements is unknownboth too much and too little can create pro-
blems for dictators. Moreover, each of these elements in the Partys survival strat-
egy presents a dilemma. They may have short-term benefits, but may also create
new and unexpected long-term challenges.

Repression

Repression is a key characteristic of the Partys survival strategy, as it is for all


authoritarian regimes. It harasses political activists, limits free speech and organiz-
ation, censors the media and Internet, and engages in propaganda to shape public
opinion. These are familiar tools used by autocrats to preempt, and when necessary
punish, criticism and resistance to their regimes.

Clamping Down on Civil Society


It is often stated that China does not have a real civil society. If civil society is
defined as political groups promoting democracy and in opposition to the state,
that is true. The Party effectively defends its monopoly on autonomous groups
and democracy activists. It is deeply worried that a vigorous civil society could
lead to a color revolution. The Party has therefore engaged in increased repression
of civil society groups, political activists, and lawyers in recent years.
In July 2015, the Party detained more than 200
lawyers and their support staff. Most were later C hinese NGOs
released, but others were put on trial and imprisoned. seek to work with
The National Peoples Congress passed a law in April
2016 requiring foreign non-governmental organiz- the state, not seek
ations (NGOs), and Chinese NGOs that receive independence from
foreign funding, to register with the Public Security
Bureau, which will then monitor their activities.
it.
The Party has even banned the public discussion of
politically sensitive topics, such as civil rights, civil
society, press freedoms, judicial independence, and past mistakes of the Commu-
nist Party, in order to prohibit the discussion of a wide range of political reforms.
Amidst this crackdown on lawyers, activists, and dissidents, the number of
registered non-governmental organizations has continued to grow. There are
now more than half a million registered NGOs, with estimates of twice that
many unregistered but active NGOs.6 By and large, these NGOs are not organized
for political purposes, but for cultural, social, or economic purposes. Chinese
NGOs lack the autonomy expected of civil society, but in the Chinese political
system, autonomy normally results in weakness rather than strength. Chinese

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Bruce J. Dickson

NGOs seek connections with local officials to get the resources and support they
need to operate. NGOs that seek greater independence from the state are likely to
invite suspicion of their motives and scrutiny of their activities.
Chinese NGOs often partner with local governments to provide necessary
public goods and services such as education and job training, elderly care, basic
health care services, and legal advice for workers, especially migrants from the
countryside. Local governments find it useful to contract out these functions to
groups that are more specialized and motivated to deal with specific needs. To
the extent they are successful in satisfying these types of societal needs, they
may stabilize the regime. Recipients may not care who provides the public
goods and services so long as they do receive them. This does not meet our expec-
tations of the role civil society plays in authoritarian regimes, but highlights the
distinction between civil society groups that challenge the regime and those
that try to steer clear of politics in order to pursue other goals.7 Conversely, if
the crackdown against dissidents and political activists extends to other types of
NGOs, it may deprive society of needed goods and services. This in turn may
lead to greater dissatisfaction with the regimes performance.
Just as the Chinese state is wary of civil society, Chinese society is also skeptical.
Many do not trust groups that are not tied to the state, and NGOs by definition are
not part of the state even if they have personal relationships and organizational ties
with local officials. The vast majority of urban Chinese simply do not trust
Chinese NGOs. In terms of the level of trust, NGOs rank just above outsiders
and strangers, and well below local officials and staff people (see Figure 1). This
is another constraint on the development of Chinas civil society: not only do
Chinese NGOs endure pressure from the state, they also face doubts from the
society they are trying to serve.

Censoring the Flow of Information


Censorship is a hallmark of Chinas authoritarian rule, as it is for most authoritar-
ian regimes. Under Xi Jinping, Chinas censorship efforts have ramped up even
more as his administration tries to limit access to content and prevent people
from sharing news and ideas to which the regime is opposed. China is trying to
create an intra-net in which web users in China will only have access to
Chinese websites and apps, making it easier for the state to control the flow of
information. Whereas the state has always censored content and blocked access
to some foreign websites, it has begun cracking down on the use of proxy
servers, virtual private networks (VPNs), and other techniques to get around
the Great Firewall of China.
How do people react when they encounter Chinas Great Firewall? The expec-
tation is that censorship frustrates Chinas netizens and creates resentment toward
the regime, but the impact is more limited. First of all, about half the population is

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The Survival Strategy of the Chinese Communist Party

Figure 1: Levels of Trust

Source: authors 2014 survey.

not online, although the number of web users continues to grow rapidly.8 Of those
online, most say they do not encounter censorship, including blocked webpages,
deleted posts and forwarded items, inability to post prohibited words or items,
and cancelled accounts. Instead, they go online to shop, watch movies, chat
with friends, follow celebrities, play games, and other innocuous activities. They
do not seek politically sensitive information and prefer Chinese websites to
foreign language sites. Of those who encounter censorship, the most common
response is it doesnt matter (the option most-frequently chosen in my 2014
survey). Most have grown accustomed to censorship
and are either resigned to it or have found ways
around it. There is definitely a segment of the Internet
M
ost Chinese do
population who are angered when they encounter not seek politically
censorship, but this is a relatively small sliver of the sensitive infor-
population (about 8 percent of respondents in the
2014 survey).
mation online or
As censorship expands and impacts a wider range feel they encounter
of web users, censorship may prove counterproductive
censorship.
if it affects peoples professional and social lives. As
previously acceptable websites, news stories, and
opinions become susceptible to censorship, people pursuing innocuous activities
online may become irritated. During pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong in
2014, the Chinese government not only censored coverage of the events

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Bruce J. Dickson

online, it also shut down Instragram entirely. One frustrated blogger wrote, No
one cared before what was happening over there in Hong Kong. We just
wanted to quietly stalk our pop stars and get updates on ball games. But now
that youve done this we have to care.9 This quote highlights the Partys
dilemma in expanding censorship: by irritating people who are not engaged in pol-
itical activities, expanding censorship can also produce resentment toward the
regime, producing a downward spiral.

Fighting Corruption
The ongoing anti-corruption campaign is the signature program of Xi Jinpings
administration. Begun soon after he became the Partys General Secretary in
2012, it is designed to weed out corrupt officials at all levels of the political
hierarchy. Along the way, Xi has promised to capture both flies and tigers,
even mega-tigers; in other words, lowly officials, high-level officials, and even
those at the pinnacle of power. Thousands have been removed from office,
and many of them have been sentenced to long prison sentences. Among
the mega-tigers have been Zhou Yongkang, a former member of the Politburo
Standing Committee and public security czar before his retirement in 2012;
Xu Caihou, a retired General in the Peoples Liberation Army, vice chairman
of the Partys Central Military Commission, and Politburo member; and Ling
Jihua, chief of staff to the previous CCP General Secretary Hu Jintao. As
the campaign has progressed, it has become clear that it is aimed at both era-
dicating corruption as well as removing and discrediting those who are potential
rivals to Xi.
Because corruption is one of the most unpopular issues in China, the anti-cor-
ruption campaign has been very well received. Most people see significant
improvements in the level of corruption in their cities. When asked how respon-
dents thought the level of corruption in their city had changed compared to five
years ago, 60.4 percent in 2014 thought it had improved, compared to just 35.5
percent in 2010.10 Because the campaign has targeted the banquets, limousines,
and other symbols of corrupt behavior, most people are able to see tangible
signs of the anti-corruption drives impact. This result is good for Xi: the campaign
was his initiative, and people see tangible results.
In contrast, another consequence of the anti-corruption campaign negatively
affects the Partys reputation overall. Compared to survey data from 2010,
before the anti-corruption campaign, a much larger percentage of urban
Chinese believe corruption is prevalent at the central level (see Table 1).
Most already believed it was prevalent at the local level, and now
they realize it is also widespread at the top of the party, government, and
military.

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The Survival Strategy of the Chinese Communist Party

Table 1: Popular Beliefs in the Prevalence of Corruption


(numbers in cells are percentages)
Central Local

What do you believe is the scope of corruption among government officials? 2010 2014 2010 2014

Hardly any are corrupt 8.2 3.7 1.4 1.4


Not too many are corrupt 42.1 26.5 21.4 14.5
Somewhat common 41.7 53.1 61.7 60.5
Almost all are corrupt 8.0 16.7 15.5 23.6

Source: authors surveys.

This reflects the Partys dilemma in fighting corruption: while cracking down
on corruption is a popular initiative, truly addressing it reveals how widespread
it is. This is already apparent in the mixed reaction to Xis anti-corruption cam-
paign. People see the situation improving, but now realize how commonplace it
is at the top levels of the state. As Party elder Chen Yun is reported to have
said, corruption left unchecked would ruin the country, but eliminating it
would ruin the Party. Moreover, if people come to believe that the campaign is
really about eliminating Xis rivals and not eradicating corruption, they will
likely grow disillusioned and cynical about it. In an earlier era, supporters of
Mao became disillusioned as they realized the Cultural Revolution was an elite
power struggle, not a principled attack on those deemed to be counter-revolution-
aries. In a similar fashion, Xis campaign may be bad for the Partys reputation in
two ways: first, by exposing the prevalence of corruption, and second, by being
driven by elite conflict more than a genuine effort to fight corruption.

Legitimation

The Party does not remain in power by force alone. It also seeks popular support by
serving the material interests of the people it governs and promoting a particular
set of political values including nationalism, Confucianism, and fear of instability.

Material Interests
Economic growth is a key element in the Partys strategy for survival. When the
Party began the reform era soon after the death of Mao, it replaced class
strugglea key element of the Maoist modelwith a renewed focus on economic
modernization. It used GDP as the measure of reforms progress, setting targets of
doubling and quadrupling GDP within specified periods of time. It made GDP
growth one of the hard targets that local officials had to accomplish in their
annual evaluations.11 This primacy of growth led to growth rates of 10 percent

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Bruce J. Dickson

for much of the post-Mao period, and vaulted China to the second-largest
economy in the world (at least in aggregate terms; in per capita GDP, China
remains an upper-middle-income country, in the company of countries like Bul-
garia, Botswana, and the Dominican Republic).
After the 2007 international financial crisis, the economy steadily slowed and
speculation arose that this may lead to a legitimacy crisis for the Party. This
concern has gone unmet for two reasons. First, according to my 2014 survey,
neither rates of GDP growth nor levels of GDP are correlated with regime support
when controlling for other factors (including
individual variables like age, education, and
R ecently, neither income, and contextual variables like population
rates of GDP size and region of the country).12 These aggregate
indicators of growth may have produced regime
growth nor levels of support earlier in the reform era, but have little
GDP are correlated discernible impact now. Second, although the
economy has slowed in the aggregate, individual
with regime incomes continue to rise, and optimism about the
support. future remains strong (see Table 2).
In the U.S. politics literature, there is a
lively debate over whether voting is most influ-
enced by aggregate sociotropic factorssuch as inflation, unemployment, and
GDP growthor individual pocketbook factors like individual incomes and job
security. A similar dynamic is apparent in China: while levels of GDP and aggre-
gate growth rates are not correlated with levels of regime support, pocketbook
factors definitely are.
How can incomes continue to rise while the economy is slowing? One reason is
the current growth rates of 67 percent per year are still strong enough to produce
income gains. Another reason is that GDP and individual incomes do not rise and
fall in lockstep. During Chinas boom years of 19922007, incomes were not rising

Table 2: Income Gains (numbers in cells are percentages)


Family income now
compared to five years ago Expect family income five
is: years from now to be:

2010 2014 2010 2014

Much better 8.0 10.3 13.6 15.1


Better 61.0 65.7 69.0 68.0
No difference 19.5 18.5 14.0 13.8
Worse 10.6 4.9 3.2 2.6
Much worse .9 .7 .3 .4

Source: authors surveys.

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The Survival Strategy of the Chinese Communist Party

as fast as GDP. Now that GDP is slowing, incomes can still rise. So long as the
Party can achieve a soft landing for the economy, slower grower need not be a
threat to its legitimacy. The Party is attempting to transition from an economic
model driven by infrastructure spending and exporting to one based on consumer
spending.13 That original reform model produced huge amounts of debt at all
levels of government that limit their ability to provide greater amounts of
needed public goods such as education, health care, and social welfare programs.
The corruption, illegal land grabs, and other heavy-handed tactics that were
characteristic of that model also produced popular resentment and growing
numbers of protests. If the consumption-based model can replace those unsavory
elements, slower growth may prove to enhance regime support.
However, such a successful transition is by no means guaranteed. Powerful
interest groups within the central and provincial governments have been resisting
the transition because they benefit so much from the status quo. Moreover, relying
on pocketbook factors as a source of regime support is risky. If incomes stagnate or
fall, regime support will also likely decline. This is an important reason why the
government took such drastic actions when the Chinese stock market crashed
in early 2015. Because it had aggressively encouraged all Chinese, regardless of
income levels, to invest in the stock market, it was partially responsible for the
devastating impact on investors when the market crashed. The close link
between pocketbook factors and regime support is also why the government is
so concerned about rising housing costs and why it has implemented several pol-
icies to stem real estate speculation, such as limiting the number of homes and
condos that individuals can own. The regime cannot take for granted that
incomes will continue to rise, or that rising living costshousing, education,
health carewill not reduce standards of living even when incomes are rising.
The bottom line is this: it is pocketbook factors, not sociotropic conditions, which
produce regime support. But this also presents a dilemma for the Party: rising incomes
are a fragile source of support, dependent on economic conditions that the Party does
not fully control. Wage stagnation or a hard landing could still lead to a sudden drop
in regime support. Authoritarian regimes are particularly vulnerable to economic
declines. That is why the Party also seeks other sources of support.

Nationalism
Nationalism has been a prominent feature of modern China, and the CCP has
used nationalism to seek support from Chinese people. China specialists debate
whether nationalism in China is stoked by the Partys propaganda and education
policies,14 or is a bottom-up process that originates within society and may even
pose a threat to regime stability.15 While the causes of Chinese nationalism
remain open to debate, the prominence of nationalism is readily apparent.

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Table 3: Nationalist Sentiments in China (numbers in table are percentages)


Strongly Strongly
Patriotism: Agree Agree Disagree Disagree

1. Even if I could pick any country in the 23.7 61.2 13.4 1.6
world, I still want to be a Chinese citizen.
2. When other people criticize China, it is as 20.0 60.8 17.3 1.9
though they are criticizing me.
3. Generally speaking, China is better than 16.8 63.6 17.5 2.1
most other countries.
Strongly Strongly
Victimization: Agree Agree Disagree Disagree

1. Unless China becomes modern, foreign 27.0 56.5 15.1 1.4


countries will try to exploit it.
2. Chinas early modern encounter with 26.5 58.5 13.3 1.6
Western imperial powers was a history of
humiliation in which the motherland was
subjected to the insult of being beaten
because we were backwards.
3. The century of humiliation not only 23.7 52.5 21.5 2.4
describes Chinas past history, it also
describes foreigners actions toward China
today.

Source: authors 2014 survey

While recognizing the importance of nationalism in China, it is also critical to


distinguish different types of nationalism. On one hand, there is a strong sense of
patriotic pride in the countrys rapid development and growing influence in global
affairs (see top half of Table 3). On the other hand, there is a separate strand of
nationalism based on anti-foreign sentiment. These sentiments are in large part
derived from the so-called century of humiliation, the period from the Opium
Wars in the mid-19th century to the formation of the Peoples Republic of
China in 1949. During these years, Western powers took advantage of Chinas
backwardness to impose unequal treaties. Beginning in 1934, Japan invaded and
occupied large areas of China and inflicted atrocities best symbolized by the
Rape of Nanking in 19371938. These past events still influence how many
in China view the actions of foreign countries today (see bottom half of Table 3).
In the United States, patriotism and anti-foreign sentiments often go hand in
hand: the most patriotic Americans are also more likely to have negative views
of foreigners. But in China, these are distinct though overlapping sets of atti-
tudes.16 The people waving flags during the Olympics in 2008 were not necessarily
the same ones smashing Japanese cars with hammers during anti-Japanese protests
a few years later.17 Moreover, the sense of victimization associated with the
century of humiliation has little impact on attitudes about most foreign countries,
with the important exception of Japan. In that case, the stronger the sense of

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The Survival Strategy of the Chinese Communist Party

victimization, the more negative the views about Japan. The same is not the case
for the United States, United Kingdom (which initiated the Opium Wars), or
Russia.18
Whether measured in terms of patriotism or victimization, nationalism is a
strong source of regime support in China. This may also pose a dilemma for the
Party. Nationalism is often described as a double-
edged sword: it can create support for the regime,
but if its leaders are seen as insufficiently vigilant
N
ationalism is a
against foreign threats and insults, it can quickly strong source of
lose that support. Nationalism may therefore compli- regime support, but
cate Chinas foreign relations. Whether the source of
nationalism is state initiatives or popular attitudes, it it can complicate
may constrain the governments ability to adopt Chinas foreign
more conciliatory policies toward foreign countries,
fearful that such policies would prompt a public
relations.
19
outcry.

Confucianism
When the CCP first came to power in 1949, it was committed to eradicating Con-
fucian traditions. Confucian values and practices were seen as feudal and unsuitable
to the Partys new agenda of transforming China. During the Cultural Revolution in
particular, the Party attempted to eradicate Confucianism and other old customs,
old culture, old habits, and old ideasthe so-called Four Olds.
In the post-Mao period, however, CCP leaders have drawn upon Confucian
slogans to legitimize their reform policies. Deng Xiaoping resurrected the slogan
seek truth from facts, a phrase that Mao had written above his doorway in
Yanan, but whose origins go back to the Book of Han, completed in 111 CE. This
served two purposes: it drew upon a classic saying from ancient China, while also
gaining legitimacy via its association with Mao. While Jiang Zemin was CCP
General Secretary (19892002), he pursued rapid and sustained economic develop-
ment in order to achieve an economically comfortable society, a phrase with Con-
fucian origins. Under Hu Jintao (20022012), the Party was focused on combining
growth with a more equitable distribution of wealth in order to maintain a harmo-
nious society, a phrase also drawn from Confucius. Xi Jinpings signature slogan has
been the China Dream, which is not Confucian but revives the dream from the
19th century of creating an economically wealthy and militarily powerful
country.20 During the post-Mao period, as the Party became less beholden to
Marxist ideology, it once again sought legitimacy in Chinese history.
While Confucianism is one of Chinas best-known traditions, it is a controver-
sial legacy. Beginning in the 19th century, Chinese officials and intellectuals

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Bruce J. Dickson

debated whether it was a valued tradition that should be revived and strengthened,
or if it was an obstacle to progress that should be abandoned in favor of modern
ways. Today, it remains a source of continued controversy. While some argue its
approach to governance (especially the appointment of officials based on merit
and not democratic elections) is superior to democracy and more suitable to the
Chinese context,21 others see it as outdated. In 2011, a statue of Confucius was
erected in front of the National Museum overlooking Tiananmen Square, but
within a few days was surreptitiously moved inside the museum in the dead of
night. Soon after, it disappeared altogether without explanation. That same
year, the government heavily promoted a film on Confucius, released to coincide
with the 60th anniversary of the founding of the CCP. But the film was panned
critically and attracted few ticket buyers.22
Among respondents in my surveys, support for Confucian values was mixed.
Confucianism can refer to a wide variety of beliefs and practices, including adher-
ence to orthodoxy, deference to authority, meritocracy, and self-improvement. To
separate Confucian values from the concept of regime support, the questions in my
surveys focused on social obligations, where respect for elders is the top priority.
The majority of respondents agreed that elders should be consulted when disputes
arise, but majorities also disagreed with the idea that children should comply with
parents requests even when they are unreasonable, or that a husband should ask
his wife to concede to his mothers wishes even when the mother is in the wrong.
Those with college degrees are less likely to hold Confucian values, as are
younger cohorts who have been raised in the post-Mao era of reform. Most inter-
estingly, migrants have less support for Confucian social values than those who are
registered in the cities where they live. (In China, people are registered where they
are born. Some cities have been experimenting with changes to the official hukou
registration system, but it generally remains in effect.) Those who have migrated to
their current locale are removed from their traditional social networks. As a result,
traditional values and norms are less relevant for them in their new cities.23
In short, the Party may be re-embracing Chinas Confucian traditions, but those
traditions do not resonate with large segments of the population. If the appeal of
Confucianism continues to wane throughout Chinese society, the Partys embrace
of it may come to seem outdated.

Fears of Instability
The Party uses threats of instability as a key rationale for its harmonious society
and stability maintenance policies.24 As noted earlier, it is fearful of the political
realm of civil society and the potential for color revolutions in China. Chinese
society has similar fears of instability, and those fears grew between the two
waves of the survey in 2010 and 2014 (see Table 4). Whether these fears were

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The Survival Strategy of the Chinese Communist Party

genuine or stoked by Party propaganda is hard to determine, but it is fair to say that
the states propaganda finds a receptive audience. More importantly, fears of
instability are closely correlated with regime support:
the more respondents agreed that the presence of
diverse social groups, a multi-party system, and rising
F ears of instability
numbers of protests threatened stability, the more are closely corre-
likely they were to support the status quo. lated with regime
Fears of instability may be widespread, but cracking
down on threats to political and social stability pre-
support.
sents a dilemma for the Party. As noted above, if it
relies too heavily on repression to suppress or elimin-
ate threats to regime survival, it may produce disillusionment and even resentment
among those affected by the expanded crackdown but who pose no real threat.25

Co-optation

Recruitment priorities have been a prominent theme of party politics throughout


the Partys history. As the Party alternated between ideologically motivated goals
and development-oriented policies, it alternated between recruiting those skilled
in mass mobilization and those with technical expertise. In the post-Mao period,
the Partys focus was squarely on economic development, and it mainly recruited
from the urban population of well-educated youth. Over the past few decades, the
percent of Party members with high school and college degrees has steadily risen,

Table 4: Perceived Threats to Stability in China

Source: authors surveys

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Bruce J. Dickson

Table 5: Civic and Political Behavior in China


Party members Nonmembers

Vote in peoples congress elections 53.0 23.2


Donate money or goods 65.3 51.2
Donate blood 25.0 18.2
Do volunteer work 20.5 14.7

Source: authors 2014 survey

while the percentage of peasants and workers has steadily declined. College stu-
dents are now the largest source of new party members.26 This may seem risky,
because college students are often the source of opposition to the state, especially
in authoritarian regimes.27 (The Party discovered this in 1989 during student-led
protests in Tiananmen Square.)
During the 1980s, the Party had little presence on college campuses and
recruited few students. One of the lasting legacies of the 1989 demonstrations
has been the priority given to recruiting college students. This is a dramatic
shift from the traditional base of peasants, workers, and soldiers. But it is a recog-
nition of the Partys focus on urban development and economic modernization.
The Party is no longer just the vanguard of the proletariat, but a party of urban
elites.
The Party expects loyalty from its members, but most new members join
because they expect it to benefit their careers, not because they are ideologically
committed to the Partys mission. At a time of challenge, will these new Party
members remain loyal supporters and defenders of the regime?
Recruiters on college campuses readily admit this dilemma. The 1989 demon-
strations witnessed many defections, as people who worked in the government,
media, and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) showed their support for protestors.
Throughout the 1990s, the Party also debated whether it was appropriate to
allow private entrepreneurs to join the Party, or whether admitting capitalists
would allow them to change the Party from within.28 In more recent years,
Party members have led many local protests.29
The Party therefore has to mobilize its members to demonstrate loyalty. They are
more likely to vote in local peoples congress elections, more likely to donate time
and money to charity, even more likely to donate blood (see Table 5). Even if they
are not inclined to act in these ways, the Party mobilizes them to show support for
the Partys priorities and to be an example to the rest of society.
The main dilemma posed by co-opting urban elites into the Party is that they may
try to change the Party from within. The Party hopes to obtain their loyalty by bring-
ing them into the organization, but since most people nowadays join the Party out of
self-interest, there is no guarantee that they will be committed to the Partys goals or

40 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY WINTER 2017


The Survival Strategy of the Chinese Communist Party

support the regime at a time of crisis. Instead, they may


try to push the Party to become more open to contend- The main dilemma
ing voices and less intrusive into economic and social of co-opting urban
affairs. This was one of the objections raised in the
1990s against admitting capitalists into the Party,
elites is that they
although those fears seem to have been unwarranted may try to change
the red capitalists did not push the Party further the Party from
than it was willing to go. But it remains the inherent
danger of co-optation: it may change potential opposi- within.
tion into supporters, but it may also allow the opposi-
tion to change the Party. So far, the Party has been
willing to run that risk, but the risk remains.

Why It Matters

These examples of Chinese public opinion raise doubts about the conventional
wisdom on China. While many claim there is no civil society in China, the
number of NGOs has steadily grown over the past decade or more. Most do not
engage in political activities, but do offer useful cultural and social goods and services.
The Party aggressively censors social media and the Internet, but most people claim
they do not encounter censorship while online, and of those who do, the most
common response is it doesnt matter, not outrage. While most outside observers
and Party leaders themselvesposit that economic growth is the primary source
of the Partys legitimacy, GDP growth is uncorrelated with regime support.
Instead, pocketbook factors, in particular recent gains in family income and expec-
tations of additional gains in the near future, are a prominent source of regime
support. The main tenet of modernization theorythat economic modernization
leads to democracydoes not yet fit the Chinese case. China may come to experi-
ence what is often called a revolution of rising expectations that will generate societal
pressure for democratization, but there is scant evidence of that as of yet.
The prospects for regime change depend on more than just popular support, of
course. Elite splits, coups, civil wars, and crises (like defeat in war and economic
decline) are more often the triggers for regime change. But the findings presented
here, consistent with other surveys in China, indicate that the regime currently
does not face insurmountable challenges to the status quo from society. Chinese
elites may not have a full consensus on their policy goals or how to achieve
them, but they also do not have to cope with a society impatient for political
change. The Party does have to contend with dissidents and other political acti-
vists, but these individuals seem to have little popular support.
When public opinion is generally content with the status quo and optimistic
about the direction of the country, we should not anticipate a revolutionary

THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY WINTER 2017 41


Bruce J. Dickson

moment is imminent. In this kind of context, China watchers should not interpret
each local protest as a portent of regime change. Protests are mostly limited to
material demandspayment of wages and pensions, illegal land-grabs by local offi-
cials, opposition to industrial and commercial development plans, the cover-up of
local corruption and malfeasanceand are often successful. In fact, these protests
provide useful information to higher-level officials about what is happening at the
local level.30 Officials are often willing to make concessions on these types of
material demands, while also singling out a few alleged protest leaders for punish-
ment. The Party may be willing to address the demands of protestors, but it does
not want to encourage other people to engage in strikes and other public protests.
Rather than an indicator of opposition to the regime, protests may be a valuable
source of feedback. There are certainly risks in using protests as feedback, but local
protests have not yet coalesced into organized social movements. That would be a
much more threatening development for the Party, which is why it prevents
groups with similar interests from engaging in organized collective action.
We should also not assume that the only alternative to communist rule in
China is a liberal democracy. Since the end of the Cold War, regime change
has not guaranteed democratization.31 Instead, the fall of one authoritarian
regime more often leads to the formation of a new authoritarian regime. While
regime change in China does not seem likely in the near future, a comparative per-
spective suggests that any new regime is more likely to be a new form of autocracy,
a military dictatorship, or a hybrid regime with some democratic institutions such
as an elected legislature, but lacking in the other features of liberal democracy such
as rule of law, free speech, an independent media, and free and fair elections. But
there is little point in speculating about what might come after the end of com-
munism in China without knowing how that transition will happen, much less
a better understanding of the prospects for regime change in the first place.

Notes

1. Gordon Chang, The Coming Collapse of China (Random House, 2001); Susan Shirk, China:
Fragile Superpower: How Chinas Internal Politics Could Derail Its Peaceful Rise (Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2007); Minxin Pei, Is CCP Rule Fragile or Resilient? Journal of Democracy
23, no. 1 (January 2012), pp. 27-41; Cheng Li, The End of the CCPs Authoritarian Resi-
lience? A Tripartite Assessment of Shifting Power in China, China Quarterly, no. 211
(September 2012), pp. 595-623; David Shambaugh, Chinas Future (Cambridge, UK:
Polity, 2016).
2. Andrew J. Nathan, Authoritarian Resilience, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 14, no. 1
(January 2003), pp. 6-17; Dali L. Yang, Remaking the Chinese Leviathan: Market Transition
and the Politics of Governance in China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004); Joseph
Fewsmith, The Logic and Limits of Political Reform in China (New York: Cambridge

42 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY WINTER 2017


The Survival Strategy of the Chinese Communist Party

University Press, 2013); Ann M. Florini, Lai Hairong, and Yeling Tan, China Experiments:
From Local Innovations to National Reform (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2012).
3. David Shambaugh, Contemplating Chinas Future, The Washington Quarterly 39, no. 3 (Fall
2016), pp. 121-130, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0163660X.2016.1232639;
Minxin Pei, The Beginning of the End, Washington Quarterly 39, no. 3 (Fall 2016),
pp. 131-142, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/0163660X.2016.1232640.
4. Jie Chen, Popular Political Support in Urban China (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
2004); Tianjian Shi, The Cultural Logic of Politics in Mainland China and Taiwan
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015); Wenfang Tang, Populist Authoritarianism:
Chinese Political Culture and Regime Sustainability (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016)
5. For details on the survey design and methodology, see Dictators Dilemma: The Chinese
Communist Partys Strategy for Survival (Oxford, 2016), appendix 1.
6. Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Blue Book of Civil Organizations (Beijing: Social
Science Academic Press, 2012). The total number of NGOs includes social organizations
(), non-state (literally, people-run), non-enterprise units (), and
foundations ().
7. Yanqi Tong, State, Society, and Political Change in China and Hungary, Comparative
Politics 26, no. 3 (April 1994), pp. 333-353; Gordon White, Jude Howell, and Shang
Xiaoyuan, In Search of Civil Society: Market Reform and Social Change in Contemporary
China (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); Michael W. Foley and Bob Edwards,
The Paradox of Civil Society, Journal of Democracy 7, no.3 (July 1996), pp.38 52.
8. For estimates of Chinas Internet users, see http://www.internetworldstats.com/top20.htm.
9. William Wan, How One Night of Tear Gas in Hong Kong Just Shut Down Instagram in
China, The Washington Post, September 29, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/
worldviews/wp/2014/09/29/how-one-night-of-tear-gas-in-hong-kong-just-shut-down-all-
instagram-in-china/.
10. Authors surveys.
11. Kevin J. OBrien and Lianjiang Li, Selective Policy Implementation in Rural China,
Comparative Politics 31, no. 2 (January 1999), pp 167-186. Hard targets included economic
growth, tax collection, enforcing the one-child policy, and later maintaining stability. Soft
targets included environmental protection and implementing the village election law,
targets that were both harder to measure and less important than the hard targets.
12. This is based on a multivariate analysis not shown here; see Dictators Dilemma, chapter 5
and appendix 2.
13. Bruce J. Dickson, Updating the China Model, The Washington Quarterly 34, no. 4 (Fall
2011), pp. 39-58, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0163660X.2011.608335.
14. Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower; Suisheng Zhao, A State-Led Nationalism: The Patriotic
Education Campaign in Post-Tiananmen China, Communist and Post-Communist Studies
31, no. 3 (September 1998), pp. 287302; Zheng Wang, Never Forget National Humiliation:
Historical Memory in Chinese Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012).
15. Peter Hays Gries, Chinas New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy (Berkeley: Uni-
versity of California Press, 2004); James Reilly, Strong Society, Smart State (New York, NY:
Columbia University Press, 2012).
16. Peter Gries, Qingmin Zhang, H. Michael Crowson, and Huajian Cai, Patriotism, Nation-
alism and Chinas US Policy: Structures and Consequences of Chinese National Identity,
China Quarterly 205 (April 2011), pp. 1-17.

THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY WINTER 2017 43


Bruce J. Dickson

17. For more on these protests, see Jeremy L. Wallace and Jessica Chen Weiss, The Political
Geography of Nationalist Protest in China, China Quarterly, no. 222 (June 2015),
pp. 403-429.
18. The survey asked respondents to indicate they attitudes about a variety of counties using a
0100 feeling thermometer: 0 meant they had very negative (cold) feelings and 100
meant they had very positive (warm) feelings. Most countries average temperature
was about 50, the midpoint of the scale; however Japans average temperature was only
25.4. For details, see Jackson S. Woods and Bruce J. Dickson, Victims and Patriots: Dis-
aggregating Nationalism in Urban China, Journal of Contemporary China, forthcoming.
19. Reilly, Strong Society, Smart State. Jessica Chen Weiss makes the opposite argument: the
Chinese government may use the threat of a popular outcry to convince other govern-
ments that it cannot be more accommodating. See her Powerful Patriots: Nationalist
Protest in Chinas Foreign Relations (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014).
20. Orville Schell and John Delury, Wealth and Power: Chinas Long March to the 21st Century
(NY: Random House, 2014).
21. Pan Wei, Toward a Consultative Rule of Law Regime in China, in Zhao Suisheng, ed.,
Debating Political Reform in China: Rule of Law vs. Democratization (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E.
Sharpe, 2006); Daniel A. Bell, The China Model: Political Meritocracy and the Limits of
Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015).
22. Andrew Jacobs, Confucius Statue Vanishes Near Tiananmen Square, The New York
Times, April 23, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/23/world/asia/23confucius.
html?action=click&contentCollection=International%20Arts&module=
RelatedCoverage&region=Marginalia&pgtype=article.
23. On this point, see also Jeffrey Becker, Social Ties, Resources, and Migrant Labor Contention
in Contemporary China: From Peasants to Protestors (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2014).
24. Yuhua Wang and Carl Minzner, The Rise of the Chinese Security State, China Quarterly,
no. 222 (June 2015), pp. 339-360.
25. Evgeny Finkel, The Phoenix Effect of State Repression: Jewish Resistance during the
Holocaust, American Political Science Review 109, no. 2 (May 2015), pp. 339-353.
26. Bruce J. Dickson, Who Wants to Be a Communist? Career Incentives and Mobilized
Loyalty in Contemporary China, China Quarterly, no. 217 (March 2014), pp. 42-68.
27. Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century
(Norman,OK: Oklahoma University Press, 1991); Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and
George W. Downs, Development and Democracy, Foreign Affairs 84, no. 5 (Septem-
ber/October 2005), pp. 77-86.
28. Bruce J. Dickson, Red Capitalists in China: The Party, Private Entrepreneurs, and Prospects for
Political Change (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
29. Lianjiang Li and Kevin J. OBrien, Protest Leadership in Rural China, China Quarterly,
no. 193 (March 2008), p. 11; Juan Wang, Shifting Boundaries between the State and
Society: Village Cadres as New Activists in Collective Petition, China Quarterly, no.
211 (September 2012), pp. 697-717.
30. Yongshun Cai, Power Structure and Regime Resilience: Contentious Politics in China,
British Journal of Political Science 38, no. 3 (July 2008), pp. 411-432.
31. Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Erica Frantz, How Autocracies Fall, The Washington Quar-
terly, 37, no. 1 (Spring 2014), pp. 35-47, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/
0163660X.2014.893172?tab=permissions&scroll=top.

44 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY WINTER 2017

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