D-Day +1

Omaha Beach
by Brian Williams

The US 1st Army, V Corps had the mission of securing the beachhead between Port-en-Bessin
and the Vire River and to advance towards St. Lo. The Corps was to arrive in 4 stages with the
1st Division (with the 29th attached) leading the landings with about 34,000 men in the
morning, followed by another 25,000 men after noon. The 1st Division was a veteran unit
which had served through the campaigns of North Africa and Sicily. While for the most part,
Normandy would be the 29th Division's first experience in combat. Two American Regimental
Combat Teams (RCTs) of four rifle companies each, were tasked with the initial landing (the
US 29th 116th RCT and the US 1st 16th RCT), followed by the remainder of the 1st and 29th
Infantry Divisions. Fire support included naval gunfire from the battleships, cruisers, and
destroyers offshore, heavy bombing by B-24 Liberators, the 741st and 743rd DD (dual-drive
amphibious) tank battalions, several battalions of engineers and naval demolition personnel,
and several howitzer battalions.

Terrain
The beach at Omaha Beach sector was about 7,000 yards long with a gentle slope that forms
a crescent with bluffs located at each end. The tidal range averaged about 300 yards between
the low and high water mark. At the high water mark, the ocean ends at a shingle that
reaches up to several feet high. On the western part of the sector, the shingle had piled
against a seawall which ranged in height anywhere between 4 to 12 feet. Behind the sea wall
was a paved beach road from Exit D-1 to Exit D-3. At the middle of the beach, approximately
200 yards stands between the seawall and the bluffs. Near Exit D-1 stood a small number of
villas and at Exit D-3 stood the small village of les Moulins. At four points along the beach
were small draws (or valleys) which were thought to offer protected exits off the beach (these
were actually heavily defended). At Exit D-1
(the exit to Vierville), the draw had a paved
road. The draws offered the only way for
armor to reach the high ground. Inland from the beach stood the three farming villages of St.
Laurent, Colleville, and Vierville with the hedgerow country beginning immediately behind the
beaches.

Objectives
The immediate objective of the Omaha landings was to secure a beachhead between Port-en-
Bessin and the Vire river and then to advance southwards towards St. Lo. Another objective
of the V Corps was link with the VII Corps to the east (via the small town of Isigny). Isigny
was a small town where the highway from Paris to Cherbourg crossed the Aure river. This
highway, as did most that were located near the beach, ran east to west. The Corps was also
to advance beyond the Aure river and towards the Cerisy Forest area to the south.
Enemy Defenses
32 fortified areas were located between the Vire River and Port-en-Bessin. Especially fortified
were the Vire Estuary, Grandcamp, and Port-en-Bessin. In all, 12 strongpoints were able to
direct fire on Omaha beach. Obstacles of three sorts were existent on Omaha Beach. These
consisted of gate-like structures (approximately 10 feet high and strapped with mines) placed
about 250 yards from the high-water line. Next, about 200 yards from shore, heavy logs were
driven into the beach floor at an angle with mines strapped to the ends and along the logs.
These were followed by the 5 tall metal hedgehogs that were buried in the sand. There
were no mines in the tidal sand, so if the troops could reach the shingle, they could reach
relative safety (although enfilade fire made this position precarious at best). Beyond the
shingle, the Germans had placed mines (in most cases these were marked) and barbed wire.
In spots where the sea wall was above the shingle, the barbed wire was placed on its top.

The gentle crescent curve of the shoreline allowed for excellent fields of fire against any
landing troops. Since the Germans had prepared their defenses for quite some time, they were
able to train their guns accurately onto the beach. Most of the strong points protecting Omaha
beach were located near the entrance of the draws and contained machine guns as the main
armament as well as light artillery pieces. In addition, in this sector, there were 8 concrete
casements and 35 pillboxes which contained gun sizes up to 88mm guns.

No coastal batteries or heavy guns were present in the Omaha sector, although 6 155-mm
howitzers were believed to be located at Point du Hoc. The defenses in this sector were
designed to be almost entirely on the beach or just behind it with almost no defensive
positions beyond this point. For the German defenders, it was expected that defensive
reserves would be rushed to counter any landings.

The 716th Infantry Division occupied a 50-mile sector between the Orne River and the Vire
Estuary. It was considered a static unit and thought to be composed of over 50% foreign
troops (Russians and Poles). Reinforcements were expected to come from the 352nd Infantry
Division which was thought to be stationed in and around St. Lo. The 352nd was a veteran
unit of the Russian front and was expected to provide the main opposition to the V Corps. The
Allies had expected the German Air Force to mount an all-out offensive against the D-Day
landings and they were believed to be able to mount 1,500 sorties that day. The German navy
was not expected to conduct any appreciable attempts at hampering the invasion force.

Pre-Landing Bombardment
Omaha Beach was to be bombarded by air and naval guns one half-hour before landings. As
part of the entire program, so as not to give away the true locations of the landings, the entire
coast had consistently been bombed.

The USS Texas and Arkansas 14-inch and 12-inch guns were to fire from 18,000 yards off
shore at pillboxes, casements, and the battery at Pointe du Hoc. 3 cruisers and 8 destroyers
also would be able to approach nearer and support the landings. After the landings, the
bombardment would move inland or be directed by naval shore fire control parties who
accompanied the landings.

The Approach
Enemy guns had been sited to cover every part of the beach; nevertheless, there were sectors
where units landed which met very little opposition. Furthermore, of the nearly 200 craft
carrying the assault infantry to shore in the first 2 hours, only about 10 are known to have
been hit by artillery before debarking their troops, none were sunk by this fire, and in only a
few cases were the casualties serious. Larger craft, particularly
LCI's, appear to have been a favored target by the Germans and
appear to have incurred more damage. More startling to the
assaulting troops was the fact that the beach had not been hit by
the air bombardment. The reason for this turned out to be due to
overcast -- the pilots did not want to endanger the landing troops
by releasing their bombs too close.

The Landings
The sectors of Omaha beach were given the codenames of Charlie,
Dog, Easy, and Fox (west to east). The first wave of landings,
scheduled for 0630 at dawn, was to consist of 96 tanks, the
Special Engineer Task Force, and eight companies of assault
infantry.

The Special Engineer Task Force was comprised of both Army and Navy demolition specialists
whose mission was to clear paths through the obstacles in preparation for the remainder of
the landing force. The accompanying tanks and assault infantry were to provide covering fire.

Along the beach, a strong current flowed parallel to the coast from west to east at speeds as
strong as 5 miles per hour. This caused nearly every team to land further to the east than
anticipated. In some cases, in addition to landing in the wrong areas, the teams of engineers
landed where no tanks or infantry were able to provide protective fire. The teams, of course,
were laden with equipment and explosives. They were often dropped in deep water and
weighted down which made them especially dangerous targets. And, since the landings were
launched at the beginning of low tide, they found that the tide was already beginning to cover
some of the obstacles. But, despite so much lost equipment and a 41 percent casualty rate,
the engineers were able to blow six gaps in the obstacles, although many of these could not
be properly marked and thus, became useless during high tide.

The infantry landed at the same time and most ran aground well before their intended landing
points. As they approached, they could hear the bullets hitting the ramps that had yet to be
lowered. Many were weakened from seasickness and once reaching shore, had to cover
another 200 yards of open beach until reaching the seawall.

29th Infantry Division (116th RCT)

Dog Green was located directly in front of enemy positions guarding the Vierville
draw. Company A of the 116th was due to land on this sector with Company C of the 2nd
Rangers on its right flank. Several LCAs were hit and others had devastating fire brought upon
them. Some reached the beach only to find there was no cover for them to hide behind and
many returned to the water and the nearest obstacles. The enemy positions on the bluffs
above were able to inflict heavy casualties. Fifteen minutes after landing, Company A was out
of action for the day. Estimates of its casualties range as high as 66%. A Ranger company of
64 men (in two LCA's) landed shortly after near the Vierville draw. An antitank gun hit one LCA
and a dozen men were killed while a machine gun opened up on the second LCA as the men
debarked. When the Rangers reached the base of the cliff, they had lost 35 men.

To the east of the Les Moulins draw, small grass fires had been started and obscured the
landings in this area. The units landing in this area met relatively less resistance. Company
G of the 116th RCT landed east of Dog Red instead of Dog White and was able to reach the
shingle with little loss due to the smoke. But, they were significantly off their intended landing
areas and were unsure of what to do next.

At Easy Green, another section of Company G encountered heavier fire and one team lost 14
men before they reached the shingle, but overall were intact.Company F landed according to
plan astride the Les Moulins (D-3) draw and ran directly into the heavily fortified position. But,
because they were downwind of the grass fires, they escaped the disastrous fate that befell
Company A. But, some sections encountered heavy fire from the Germans and encountered
over 50% casualties.

Only two boats managed to land on Easy Red (between E-1 and E-3). These men encountered
very light resistance. Further to the east, only about reached the shingle.
After the first hour, only about a hundred men and only 4 DD tanks were on
Easy Red Beach.

Company E was supposed to land at Easy Green, but drifted nearly a mile to
the east and found itself 3/4 of a mile east from the nearest 29th Division unit.
To make matters worse, men were scattered over two sectors. Two LCVPs
were able to make land without any incidences and deliver their men right on
the beach, while the other four boats took heavy fire.

The 29th Infantry had sustained heavy casualties and the first-wave seemed to
have failed from onlookers who were able to witness it. Also, only two gaps
had been made through the obstacles and the tide was rising quickly. This meant that
reinforcements would that much more difficult.

1st Infantry Division (16th RCT)

Only 2 boats of out of 12 landed where they were supposed to. At Fox Green, all units that
were supposed to land on this sector landed to the east. Instead, sections of Company E and
Company F (who were supposed to land in Easy Red), along with sections from 116th
Company E (who had drifted from the west) landed in this sector. Unfortunately, they landed
astride a heavily defended area with almost no cover available (there was no sea wall
available).

A large section of the landing sector at Easy Red was situated between two stongpoints (WN
64 and WN 62). The Engineers here were able to open 4 gaps through the approach. This
was important because on all of Omaha Beach, only 6 gaps total would be opened. The 37th
and 149th Engineer Combat Battalions worked furiously to get these obstacles cleared, while
Company E, 16th RCT was able to take WN 64 from the rear. Two destroyers had been
instrumental in neutralizing strongpoints between Les Moulins to Fox Red and at least 5
destroyers had moved in to support the landing troops. The USS Frankford was especially
effective against the strongpoints covering the E-1 and by 1000 hours, it was secured.
Following the first landings, the 18th RCT was to land at 0930, but was delayed due to
congestion on the beach and strong currents. They lost 28 landing craft to underwater
obstacles, but overall landed in much better condition than the 16th RCT. The 18th RCT found
pillbox west of the E-1 draw still active, but with the continuation cooperation of the
destroyers, they were able to neutralize it. The Engineers were also to move to clearing the
inland obstacles. This later became the main route off Omaha beach on D-Day.

Fox Beach on the other hand fared much worse. Company E of the 16th RCT and company E
of the 116th RCT landed on the western section of Fox Green and most were caught in the
machine gun crossfire as the ramps lowered. Company F of 16th RCT was scattered from E-3
to over a thousand yards to the east. About 1/3 were casualties before the could make it to
the shingle.

Nearly all units drifted east of their intended targets. Others that did not land on time, were
delayed. Dog White and Easy Red had almost no troops on its beaches.
Subsequent Landings
The 2nd wave started landing at 0700 and found much of the same situation. Very little
progress had been made since the first landings and very little had been done to silence the
enemy defenses. Companies had landed so far from their intended targets and were so
intermixed, that organization was very poor. In the cases where the landings took place
directly in front of the enemy strongpoints, casualties were extremely high - especially among
officers and NCO's.

As subsequent personnel and equipment landed, they found the beach more and more
crowded. The shingle was nearly completely occupied and those coming in had to remain on
the open beach. In most cases, the different units on the beaches were on their own to make
their way off the beaches. Despite the chaotic situation and the large casualties, the units
managed to slowly make their way off the beach and up to the bluffs. Nearly every unit had
landed at the wrong areas and was forced to adapt to the current situation. Groups of men of
20 or 30 slowly worked their way through the beach defenses. Notably, the teams bypassed
the draws and assaulted directly over the bluffs. This was probably due to landing in the wrong
areas and the forced improvisation that was needed to penetrate inland, and the well-placed
enemy positions guarding the draws. Unfortunately, this meant that the routes to be used by
the armor and vehicles were not open.

By 0730, General Cota of the 116th command group had landed at Dog White along with
Colonel Canham. They found most of the 29ers huddled behind the seawall - unable to move.
Knowing that the position was vulnerable to German artillery, they split up to gather men and
find a way off the beach.

Conclusion
The landings at Omaha Beach had incurred significant casualties and in fact, the enemy
defenses were stronger than expected. Very little progress had been made in the push to the
interior and this caused significant backups on the beach. Of the 2,400 tons that were planned
to arrive on the beach on D-Day, only 100 tons were delivered. Operations on the 7th and 8th
of June would be spent deepening the bridgehead.

Understandingly, casualties were high among those first units, which landed on Omaha Beach.
Casualties for V Corps that day were about 3,000 (killed, wounded, and missing) with the 16th
and 116th sustaining about 1,000 casualties each.

German response
The Germans were found to be unable to launch any significant counterattacks. The 352nd
itself was so stretched that the best it could hope for was to hold onto the ground it held. In
many places, if the Germans had been able to put together a coordinated counterattack, the
Americans would've been in a serious predicament. But, it appears the unit was intent on
stubborn defense, in anticipation of reinforcements from the rear. It had significantly delayed
the schedule at Omaha, but unless the delay was followed up with a swift counterattack, it
would be meaningless.

By evening on D-Day, General Gerhardt landed, set up his command post near the Vierville
exit, and waited to take over command of the 29th Division. Pointe du Hoc was still isolated
and known to have sustained heavy casualties. 1st Battalion of the 116th, along with the 5th
Ranger battalion, companies A, B, and C of the 2nd Ranger Battalion, and several tanks moved
west along the Grandcamp highway towards Pointe du Hoc. It just failed to reach the Rangers
at Point du Hoc by the end of June 7th due to stiff enemy resistance.

Gold Beach
by Brian Williams

Gold Beach was the code name for the center of the landings on the Normandy coast. The
British 50th (Northumbrian) Infantry Division of the 2nd Army under Lieutenant General Miles
Dempsey was to land at H-Hour + 1 (0730), seize Arromanches and drive inland to capture
the road junction at Bayeux. Its additional objectives were to make contact with the US forces
to the west at Omaha Beach and the Canadians to their east at Juno Beach. In addition to the
50th, the 47th Royal Marine Commandos were to land on sector Item and to attack south of
Arromanches and Longues and take Port-en-Bessin from the rear.

Gold Beach spanned nearly 10 miles long although the areas where landings were to occur
were about 5 miles wide. Gold was characterized mainly by the 3 sea villages of La Rivire, Le
Hamel, and the small port of Arromanches to the west. The Allied sectors were designated
from west to east: How, Item, Jig, and King. Of these four sectors, only the easternmost 3
were to actually become assault sectors.

Units of the German 716th Division and elements of the veteran 1st Battalion of the
352nd Division defended the coast in the beach houses along the coast with
concentrations at Le Hamel and Le Riviere. Fortunately for the Allies, these houses
proved to be vulnerable to naval and air bombardment. In addition, an observation
post and battery of four 155mm cannon was located at Longues-sur-Mer.

Despite fierce opposition initially, the British forces broke through the German
defenses with relatively light casualties. Of note, the 79th Armoured Division made
use of specially equipped vehicles termed "Hobart's Funnies", named after their inventor,
Major General Percy Hobart. These vehicles were various vehicles that performed special
functions such as the Sherman Flail tank for clearing minefields, thirty-foot bridge-carrying
tanks, bulldozer tanks, Churchill crocodile tanks which acted as flamethrowers, tanks which
carried fascines (large bundles of wood meant for crossing anti-tank ditches), tanks equipped
with matting to be laid down on the sand,
and finally Shermans with twenty-five-
pounder cannons.

Considerable opposition from inland enemy batteries and mortars hampered landings
somewhat, but by 1000, La Rivire was captured and a couple hours later, Le Hamel fell. The
Royal Commandos were able to reach within a kilometer of Port-en-Bessin after finding that
the Loungue battery had been destroyed in a duel with the HMS Ajax.

German defenses had consisted of several OST battalions comprised mainly of Russian
conscripts. Kampfgruppe Meyer, the 352nd's division reserve, had been in an ideal position to
counterattack the landings at Gold Beach at the beginning of June 6th. But, General Kraiss,
the Commander of the 352nd, interpreted misdropped US 101st landings near the Vire estuary
and sent the force at 0400 to deal with this perceived threat. By the time Kraiss realized his
error, several hours had been spent retracing the 30 or so kilometers back towards the real
threat at Gold Beach. Now instead of being able to counterattack, it found itself in a mainly
defensive position.

By the evening of June 6, the 50th Division had landed 25,000 men with only 400 casualties.
They had penetrated six miles inland and met up with the Canadians at Juno Beach, but were
unable to take Bayeux. But, overall, the landings at Gold could be considered a great
success.

Counterattack
by John Barratt

As Rommel had recognised, Germany's main chance of

defeating the invasion lay in prompt counterattacks,
particularly by her panzer forces. However, for a variety of
reasons, the powerful striking force within easy reach of the
invasion beaches which he had called for was not immediately
available. A major problem resulted from a lack of clarity in
the panzer command structure. The newly formed 47th Panzer Corps was still in process of
taking over command of 21st, 116th and 2nd Panzer Divisions, whilst administrative and
supply matters remained under Panzer Group West, with both responsible to Rommel's Army
Group B. To complicate matters further, Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, Commander in
Chief West, was powerless to commit the strategic reserve without the authority of OKW,
meaning in effect Hitler.

The differences between Rommel and von Rundstedt over the best deployment of the panzer
reserves meant that on June 6th, only one unit, 21st Panzer Division, stationed outside Caen,
was in a position to counterattack that day.

21st Panzer had gained its reputation as part of Rommel's famous Afrika Korps. However it
had been virtually completely destroyed in the spring of 1943 in Tunisia. It had been reformed
later that year in Brittany, with a cadre of veterans drawn from the Eastern Front, its ranks
filled out with new recruits from Germany. Shortage of equipment had been a major problem,
with much use being made of obsolete material captured from the French in 1940. By the
beginning of June 1944, the situation was improving, and 21st Panzer had received in the
region of 90 Panzer Mark IVs, which with a number of variants, made up over 70% of its
armoured strength. However the position of other units in the Division was less satisfactory.
Assault Gun Battalion 200, for example, was equipped with modified French tracked chassis
carrying 75mm anti-tank guns and 105 mm field howitzers. The motorised infantry battalions
were also far from satisfactory; though some troops had armored half-tracks, others had to
make do with lorries.

There is also evidence of some lack of unity among the Division's officers. Its commander,
Generalleutnant Edgar Feuchtinger was not regarded with great respect. He was by training an
artillery officer, not a tank man, and was thought by some to have too great a fondness for the
bright lights of Paris. He would later be accused, by officers of 12th SS Panzer Division, of
displaying indecision.

The Division began the day in dispersed positions around Caen, intended to operate against
airborne or commando landings. Feuchtinger was under strict orders not to commit any forces
against a major sea borne invasion without orders from Army Group B.

It may have been around 1 am on June 6th

that Feuchtinger first received word of
British paratroop landings east of the Orne. His two motorised infantry battalions were
committed to support units of 716th Division in dealing with these, whilst his reconnaissance
battalion was tasked with searching for further paratroop landings south of Caen. At 4-30 am,
Army Group B released the entire Division for operations against the British paratroops east of
the Orne, a decision which drew a considerable part of its strength further away from the
coast. By 9 am, the bulk of 21st Panzer's armor was moving steadily north-eastwards away
from Caen.

Then at 10-30 am, General Marcks, commanding 84th Corps, changed Feuchtinger's orders.
He was to direct his main effort against the British and Canadian sea borne landings.

This belated change of objective resulted in what was to prove to be fatal confusion. Many of
21st Panzer's men were inextricably committed against the paratroops, and in an order issued
at 1pm, Feuchtinger attempted to make the best of a bad situation. His armored units were to
divide their efforts, three of his panzer battalions were to move against the sea borne
landings, whilst the fourth, with Panzergrenadier regiment 125, and attached elements, was to
continue operations against the paratroops. Three "kampe gruppes" (battlegroups) , named
after their commanders, were improvised, two of them to take charge of operations against
the sea borne invaders. Panzerkampegruppe "Oppeln " consisted of two panzer battalions, one
panzergrenadier, one engineer and one armored artillery battalion; Panzerkampgruppe
"Rauch" was formed from two panzergrenadier battalions, supported by armored engineers
and artillery.
The result of this probably inevitable compromise was that only two-thirds of 21st Panzer
Division was available for the vital counter attack towards the coast. Chances of success were
further reduced by the time lost in re-grouping the Division. It took precious hours to bring
men and vehicles over the limited number of crossings of the River Orne, whilst the streets of
Caen were blocked with rubble as a result of continuous Allied air and naval bombardment, as
well as by crowds of fleeing civilian refugees. As the first tanks eventually emerged from the
western suburbs of the town, they were themselves subjected to air attack by rocket-firing
Typhoons, and six were knocked out.

It was not until about 4pm that Oppeln's group began deploying near the village of Lebussey,
north of Caen. At the same time, General Marcks, commanding 84th Corps took personal
charge of the deployment of Group Rauch, which would face the dominating high ground of
Periers Rise, still thought to be German-held. Underlining how vital the attack was, Marcks told
Oberst von Oppeln-Bronikowski: "If you don't succeed in throwing the British into the sea, we
will have lost the war."

At about 4-20 pm, the German assault began. By now, as we have seen, unbeknown to 21st
Panzer, Perriers Rise had been occupied by troops of the British Shropshire Light Infantry,
equipped with 6 pounder anti-tank guns, and supported by 17 pounder SP guns of the 20th
Anti-Tank Regiment. With some trepidation, the British saw a formation of some 40 Panzer IV's
rapidly approaching their position. They held their fire until the German tanks began to climb
the slope of the Rise, and then opened a devastating fire from their concealed positions. In
quick succession, six of the 25 Mark IV's attacking on the right were knocked out. The German
advance ground to a halt as surviving tanks sought shelter in patches of woodland. Further to
the west, around the village of Mathieu, the 1st Panzer Regiment suffered a similar fate, with
around nine tanks knocked out. As a German account admitted: " The fire of the English, from
their outstandingly well-sited defence positions, was murderous within a brief space of time
the armoured regiment of 21st Panzer Division had lost a total of 16 tanks, a decisive defeat,
from which, especially in morale, it never recovered."

Further to the left, however, PanzerKampfegruppe "Rauch" had found the gap between the
British and Canadian forces, and drove unchecked right through to the coast. Here they linked
up with the 111th Battalion of Infantry Regiment 736, which was still holding coastal positions
to the west of the village of Lion sur Mer. It was a seemingly dramatic breakthrough, which
would however require substantial reinforcement if it were to exploit its initial success.

The psychological effects on British troops of the counter-attack were greater than its material
results. It did, however, effectively halt for the day the already faltering Allied advance
towards Caen, and caused Montgomery to abandon his planned direct assault on the city in
favour of a much more time-consuming enveloping movement.

For the Germans, the day ended in frustration. There were no reserves available to exploit the
breakthrough at Lion. At about 9 pm, as dusk fell, the men of Group "Rauch" heard the roar of
approaching aero engines, as wave after wave of transport aircraft, some towing gliders, came
into view, carrying the remainder of the British 6th Airborne Division. These were on their way
to reinforce the earlier landings east of the Orne, but the German troops at Lion believed that
they were about to be cut off. Apart from a few men of Panzergrenadier Regiment 192, who
reinforced the defenders of the isolated Douvres strongpoint, both battlegroups of 21st Panzer
were ordered to pull back to positions north of Caen.

German reaction to the Allied landings had been fatally slow. The other nearest mobile
reserves, 12th SS Panzer and Panzer Lehr Divisions, were not released by OKW to 7th Army
until 7 pm, too late for either, harassed as they were by air attacks, to intervene that day.
Germany's last chance to split the British and Canadian landings had been lost.
Battle of Normandy: The Fight for the Foothold
by John Barratt

Situation Report

By nightfall on June 6th 1944-D-Day, Hitler's Atlantic Wall on the coast of Normandy
had been breached. The Allies, at a cost of 9,500 casualties compared with 4-10,000
Germans, were ashore in Fortress Europe. But their position remained precarious;
the beachheads had less depth than had been hoped for, and British and US forces
had not yet linked up. Supplies and reinforcements were not coming ashore as
rapidly as had been planned, and the initially slow and piecemeal enemy reaction
could not be expected to remain so favorable.

The Allies had to link up and expand their currently insecure toeholds into something
more substantial as rapidly as possible.

For Germany, the result of the first day of fighting had been disappointing, but was
not viewed as disastrous. Partly as a result of Hitler's hesitancy, and also as a
consequence of virtually complete Allied air supremacy over the approaches to the
battle area, 21st and 12th SS Panzer Divisions, forming the immediate mobile
reserve, had not intervened effectively on June 6th. Indeed losses from enemy air
attack were so substantial that it is unlikely that their earlier release would have
made any significant difference.

Rommel, absent in Bavaria during the opening hours of the battle, arrived back at
Army Group B Headquarters late in the evening, and began re-organising the
currently fragmented command structure. Panzer Group West of General Geyr von
Schweppenberg, took over from 7th Army command of the front between the Rivers
Vire and Orne, and was tasked with organising a powerful armoured counterstroke.
Meanwhile Rommel, in an order endorsed by Hitler on June 11th, ordered his troops
to maintain a static defence and hold their ground. This would, it was hoped, reduce
the effects of Allied air power and keep open the possibility of a panzer
counteroffensive. Rommel was faced
with a situation in which the
uncompleted Atlantic Wall had failed to repulse the invasion, and he now had to
devise a new defensive strategy which would also allow for major armoured
counterstrokes. But Allied air power and naval gun support, and the virtual non-
existence of the Luftwaffe in the theater, meant that Rommel could hardly hope to
win a full scale mobile battle . Instead he would have to use all the advantages of
terrain to fight a defensive action.

Most of the terrain over which the battle of the coming weeks would
be fought was well-suited to such a strategy. In particular, Normandy
was noted for the bocage, a dense chequerboard of small fields,
surrounded by thick hedges and earth banks, with narrow sunken
lanes running between them. German defensive skills soon proved to
have the ability to turn every field into a potential death trap for
Allied armor and infantry. The bocage extended for up to 50 miles
inland, excellent country for anti-tank warfare which would also use
up attacking infantry at a very high rate. Clever use of concealment in the woods and
hedgerows also reduced the effects of Allied air attack by up to 75%. In these
conditions determined infantrymen armed with rockets or the deadly panzerfaust ,
supported by the redoubtable dual-purpose 88mm AA/AT gun , could wait in
concealment until an enemy tank was at very close range before opening fire.

About 20 miles south of Bayeux, the bocage turned into an area of

thickly wooded ridges with the key feature of Mont Pincon, a 1200
foot hill 20 miles south-west of Caen. Another important observation
post was Hill 112, 5 miles to the south-west of Caen. Also significant
in this area were another series of ridges, extending to the south and
south-east as far as Falaise, of which the most important, providing
an excellent defensive position against attack by armor, and blocking the road to
Paris, was Bourgebus Ridge, 3 miles to the south of Caen and dominating the town.

On the American front, the main objectives were the port of Cherbourg on the tip of
the Cotentin Peninsula, and the important road junction town of St Lo, whose capture
would open up the possibility of a drive deep into the French interior.

Despite the defensive advantages of the bocage, and his success on June 6th in
preventing Montgomery from taking Caen, Rommel had no illusions concerning the
probable long term outcome of the struggle. At best he could buy time, either for
Hitler to produce powerful reserves from elsewhere, such as the powerful units of
15th Army still deployed in the Pas de Calais awaiting another invasion, or until
another defensive position was prepared further into the interior, along the Seine, or
even on the line of the much-vaunted West Wall along the German frontier. Just how
much time Rommel had would depend as much upon Allied actions as his own.

Fighting Resumes

On June 7th 21st Panzer Division, which had performed the only
significant counterattack on D-Day, was caught up in defensive
fighting outside Caen. It was left to the dynamic, newly-promoted
General Kurt Meyer, with his fanatical Hitler Youth recruited 12th SS,
to attempt to strike back. From the beginning his efforts were
impeded by enemy air attack. It took his leading units 10 hours to
cover the 40 miles to their jump-off point, suffering casualties in the
process. The attack by 12th SS directed against Canadian troops
between Caen and Bayeaux, met with some initial limited success,
gaining some ground and taking some prisoners (23 of whom were
executed in cold blood, making 12th SS the most hated of the Allies' opponents in
Normandy). However a combination of massed artillery fire and naval gun support
quickly stalled the German advance, forcing them back to their start line with the
loss of 31 tanks. The next nearest panzer reserve formation , Panzer Lehr Division,
was also struggling to reach the scene of action in the face of almost continuous
attacks from the air , and in the course of the day had a total of 40 petrol tankers,
90 trucks, 5 tanks and 84 half-tracks and self-propelled guns knocked out.

For about the next 48 hours, the main immediate concern for the Allies remained the
situation at "Omaha" beach. Fortunately, the German forces in the immediate
vicinity, consisting of the battered 352nd Infantry Division and the 30th Mobile
Brigade, were in no condition to present a serious threat, and as Allied
reinforcements continued to pour into the beachhead the situation steadily improved.
Early on June 8th British troops from "Gold" beach linked up with the American
forces from "Omaha", whilst the US forces continued to expand the "Utah"
bridgehead. By early on June 9th, with 11 Allied Divisions ashore, the immediate
crisis was over.
Still heavily outnumbering their immediate opponents, troops of US V Corps were
making steady, if unspectacular, progress inland from "Omaha" against light
opposition towards St Lo and Carentan. By the evening of June 11th 1st and 2nd US
Divisions had advanced 14 miles, although supply shortages were beginning to be
felt. Next day General Omar C. Bradley (1st US Army) ordered V Corps to launch a
renewed drive on St Lo, but the American forces were not strong enough to break
through the solidifying German defence lines. On June 15th 29th US Division began a
new thrust, but this was brought to a halt three days later only 5 miles short of St
Lo.

The other immediate American objective was to link up the "Utah" and "Omaha"
bridgeheads. The main obstacle in the way of this was the town of Carentan, fiercely
defended by men of the German 6th Parachute Regiment. Rommel regarded holding
Carentan as critical, and ordered its defenders to be reinforced by II Parachute Corps
from Brittany and 17th SS Panzergrenadier Division moving up from the south.

The next few days saw bitter fighting. Link-up thrusts by the lightly armed 101st
Airborne from "Utah" and 29th Division from "Omaha" were halted by the German
paratroopers after a tough battle. Fortunately for the Allies, Rommel's promised
reinforcements were severely delayed by a combination of air attacks and sabotage
by the Resistance. On June 11th, just as the first elements of 17th SS were arriving
in the area, 101st Airborne renewed the attack on Carentan, with massive air and
naval support , and finally drove out the defenders early next day. The link-up of the
Allied bridgeheads was complete.

Villers-Bocage : The British Repulsed

Despite the disappointing results of the initial German counter-attacks, Hitler still
planned a major German counteroffensive directed at the British and Canadian beach
heads. Von Schweppenberg's Panzer Group West was tasked with organising this,
and set up a field headquarters in orchards near the village of Thury Harcourt, 12
miles south of Caen. Among its equipment were several powerful radio transmitter
trucks. The signals sent out by these were picked up by British Traffic Analysis
monitors, and on June 10th Allied Typhoons and Mitchells hit the German HQ. Von
Schweppenberg was injured and many of his staff killed. With Panzer Group West HQ
for the moment out of action, responsibility for directing the German offensive was
handed over to "Sepp" Dietrich of 1 SS Panzer Corps, who quickly decided that for
the moment potential Allied opposition was too strong to make such an operation
feasible.

Both Montgomery and the British Official History would claim in years to come that
the Allied plan from the beginning had been for British 2nd Army to adopt an overall
defensive strategy, aimed at drawing against it around Caen the bulk of the German
panzer divisions and so easing the task of US 1st Army in expanding the bridgehead
to the west and eventually breaking out. In fact, there is convincing evidence that for
several weeks at least after D-Day, Montgomery still hoped to take Caen and thrust
armored columns deep beyond it towards Falaise. By June 10th he was planning a
major offensive intended to trap Caen and its defenders in the jaws of a double
envelopment. Whilst 51st Highland Division and 4th Armored Brigade performed a
short hook east of the city in the Orne valley, in the west the right pincer consisting
of British XXX Corps spearheaded by 7th Armored Division, would take the key road
junction of Villers Bocage. It would then turn east to link up with the 1st British
Airborne Division which would be dropped in the Odon Valley, trapping the defenders
of Caen.

However Montgomery's plan ran into immediate difficulties. Air Chief Marshal Trafford
Leigh-Mallory, commanded the AEAF (Allied Expeditionary Air Force) refused to carry
out the drop of 1st Airborne on the grounds that the operation would be too
dangerous for his aircrews. German counterattacks east of Caen reinforced the view
that opposition to the paratroops was likely to be too strong.

Nevertheless Montgomery put the rest of his plan into operation on June 10th, when
51st Highland Division opened its attack east of Caen, only to be firmly repulsed by
21st Panzer. With his planned left hook stalled, Montgomery's hopes of success
rested on the drive to Villers Bocage, headed by 7th Armored. Initial progress here
also proved slow. But on the evening of June 11th it became apparent that there was
an opportunity to outflank Panzer Lehr which had been fiercely opposing 7th
Armored around Tilly sur Seulles, and drive through a gap which existed between
Lehr's left and the 352nd Infantry Division opposing the US V Corps' drive on
Caumont.

Speed was essential. Unfortunately Lieutenant-General G.C. Bucknall, commanding

XXX Corps, lacked the necessary drive. It was not until midday on 12th June, urged
on by General Richard Dempsey, Commanding 2nd Army, that Bucknell ordered Maj-
General Robert Erskine of 7th Armored, too disengage around Tilly and move round
Lehr's flank, heading for Villers Bocage.

Valuable time had been lost, and although the operation began well, it soon became
clear that the 7th Armored, famed as the "Desert Rats" in the North African
campaign, were ill at ease in the confined surroundings of the bocage. Erskine would
claim later that he had been given his orders to exploit the gap 24 hours too late.
Even so, an opportunity still remained. Immediate opposition consisted of two
armored and four infantry battalions of Panzer Lehr, reinforced by 501st SS Heavy
Tank Battalion. With a 10-mile front to defend, the Germans could have been
seriously stretched by an assault on a broad front, but fortunately XXX Corps elected
to drive a narrow spearhead, headed by 7th Armored directly along the route to
Villers Bocage.

The attack was headed by Brigadier Robert Hinde's 22nd Armored Brigade. Hinde
was a fearless commander who believed in leading from the front. Pushing forward
with reasonable speed, 22nd Armored was within 5 miles of Villers Bocage by the
evening of June 12th, when Hinde, uncertain of enemy strength, halted for the night.
Early next morning the advance was resumed, and Villers Bocage occupied to a
rapturous reception from its inhabitants.

Hinde ordered "A" Squadron of the 4th County of London Yeomanry (Sharpshooters),
supported by the motorized infantry of "A" Company of the Rifle Brigade, to secure
high ground, known as Hill 213, which lay about a mile north-east of the town. The
commander of the Sharpshooters, Lieutenant-Colonel Cranley was
concerned about the lack of adequate reconnaissance before he made
his advance, but was urged to haste by Hinde. Whilst Cranley moved
forward, four of his tanks and the motorized Riflemen remained
parked in the road leading out of Villers Bocage.

Cranley's fears were about to be savagely confirmed. Moving forward

to defend the same high ground around Hill 213 was German armor, including No 2
Company, 501st SS Heavy Tank Battalion, commanded by the panzer ace
Obersturmfuhrer Michael Wittmann, who had already earned himself a formidable
reputation on the Eastern Front. During a period lasting no more than about five
minutes, Wittmann's company of four Tigers and one Panzer IV, using every
advantage of concealment provided by the hedgerows, carried out a devastating
surprise attack on the British column on the road from Villers Bocage. By the end of
the day, in this and renewed fighting, Wittmann had knocked out at least 20
Cromwell tanks, 4 Fireflys, 3 light tanks, 3 scout cars and a half track, and inflicted
about 150 casualties.

Although in a renewed attack on Villers Bocage, Wittmann was repulsed with the loss
of four of his tanks, he had brought 7th Armored to a complete halt. As
reinforcements from 2nd Panzer moved up to strengthen the German defences, the
position of 7th Armored, lacking infantry support, became increasingly dangerous. An
attack by 50th Infantry Division around Tilly had failed to gain ground, and there was
an increasing possibility that 7th Armored might be cut off in Villers Bocage. Early in
the evening of June 13th Erskine pulled back about a mile west of the town in an
attempt to hold high ground around Hill 174. If he received infantry support from
XXX Corps, Erskine still hoped to make a stand here.

Unfortunately General Bucknall seems to have failed to grasp the urgent need to
reinforce 7th Armored with infantry, and ordered that 50th Division continue its
unsuccessful attacks to dislodge Panzer Lehr from around Tilly. By the afternnon of
June 14th it was obvious that Panzer Lehr was not going to be dislodged, and
Bucknall ordered 7th Armored to pull back to new positions east of Caumont.

Though not fully admitted at the time or later, the failure at Villers Bocage was
crucial to events over the next few weeks. Bucknall, soon to be replaced as
commander of XXX Corps by the more dynamic and thrusting Brian Horrocks, had
cost the British their last real chance of staging a major breakthrough in the Caen
sector before German defences solidified.

Though the Allies were safely ashore, and their bridgehead, unless they made a
major error, unlikely to be threatened, a grim battle of attrition lay ahead. The first
major task was to complete the capture of Cherbourg, for nature was about to
demonstrate the frightening vulnerability of the Allied forces until they held a major
port.

EXTRA BITS
U.S. General Omar Bradley, following orders from General Eisenhower, links up American troops from
Omaha Beach with British troops from Gold Beach at Colleville-sur-Mer