economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment
exclusively to Filipino citizens.
Supremacy of the constitution
The constitution is the basic and paramount law to
which all must conform and to which all persons
including the highest officials officials of the land
must defer. No act shall be valid, however noble its
intentions, if it conflicts with the Constitution . The
constitution must ever remain supreme. Right or
wrong, the Constitution must be upheld as long as
the sovereign people have not changed it.
Separation of powers
Separation of powers, therefore, refers to the
division of responsibilities into distinct branches to
limit any one branch from exercising the core
functions of another. The intent is to prevent the
concentration of power and provide for checks and
balances.
Territory
As the Presidential Legal Counsel, your advice is
sought by the Secretary of the Department of
Foreign Affairs (DFA) on the following concerns:
A) What are the legal rights of the Philippines in
these circumstances and the bases thereof?
Ans: The Philippines has the right to exploit the
resources at the Scarborough Shoal region of the
Spratlys. Except for innocent passage, the
Philippines can also exclude China from the region
on the following bases:
1. The Scarborough Shoal region of the Spratlys is
part of the Philippines. While it is outside the
archipelagic baselines, it is covered in the phrase,
and all other territories over which the Philippines
has sovereignty and jurisdiction as defined in
Article I of the 1987 Constitution. Precisely, we
include this regime of islands under RA 9522 (New
Baselines Law).
2. Under UNCLOS of which the Philippines and
China are signatories, the archipelagic coastal
state has the sovereign right over its exclusive
economic zone (EEZ) which is within 200 miles
from the straight baselines for the purpose of
exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing
the natural resources, whether living or non-living.
Scarborough Shoal region of the Spratlys is within
the EEZ of the Philippines.
3. Section 2, Article XII, 1987 Constitution- The
State shall protect the nations marine wealth in its
archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive
4. Section 7, Article XIII- The State shall protect
the rights of subsistence fishermen, especially of
local communities, to the preferential use of the
communal marine and fishing resources, both
inland and offshore. XXX.
(Note: Answer should be able to mention items 1
and 2 plus one of either 3 and 4 to to get a full
credit)
Archipelagic Doctrine
The waters around, between, and connecting the
islands of the archipelago, regardless of their
breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal
waters of the Philippines.
Grace Poe Case
1. Incorporation -
Under international law, foundlings are citizens.
Generally accepted principles of international law
which include international customs form part of the
laws of the land. The common thread of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
Convention on the Rights of the Child and the
International Convent on Civil and Political Rights
obligates the Philippines to grant nationality from
birth and to ensure that no child is stateless.
2. Citizenship
The COMELEC arrogantly disregarded
jurisprudence on the matter of repatriation which
states that repatriation results in the recovery of the
original nationality. A natural born citizen before he
lost his Philippine nationality will be restored to his
former status as natural born Filipino after
repatriation (Benson v. HRET, Pareno v.
Commission on Audit etc). In passing R.A. 9225,
Congress saw it fit to decree that natural born
citizenship may be reacquired even if it has been
lost. It is not for the COMELEC to disagree with the
Congress determination.
3. residency /Domicile
5) Whether Poe is a resident of the Philippine for
10 years
Poe alleged that her residency should be counted
from May 24, 2005 when she returned for good
from the US. There are three requisites to acquire a
new domicile 1. Residence or bodily presence in a
new locality 2. Intention to remain (animus
manendi) and 3. Intention to abandon the old
domicile (animus non-revertendi). The purpose to
remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for
an indefinite period of time, the change of
residence must be voluntary and the residence at
the place chosen for the new domicile must be
actual.
Poe presented voluminous evidence showing that
she and her family abandoned their US domicile
and relocated to the Philippines for good. These
evidence include former US passport showing her
arrival on May 24, 2005 and her return to the
Philippines every time she travelled abroad, email
correspondences with freight company to arrange
for the shipment of household items as well as with
the pet Bureau; school records of her children
showing enrolment in the Philippine to the
Philippine schools starting on June 2005 etc.
COMELEC refused to consider the petitioners
domicile has been timely changed as of May 24,
2005 and maintained that although there is physical
presence and animus manendi, there is no animus
revertendi. Respondents contend that the stay of
an alien former Filipino cannot be counted until he/
she obtains a permanent resident visa or
reacquired Philippine citizenship since she is still
an American until July 7, 2006 on the basis of
previous cases ruled upon by the Supreme Court.
SC held that the other cases previously decided by
the court wherein residence was counted only from
the acquisition of permanent residence were
decided as such because there is sparse evidence
on establishment of residence. These cases cannot
be applied in the present case. In the case at bar,
there is overwhelming evidence that leads to no to
other conclusion that Poe decided to permanently
abandon her US residence and reside in the
Philippines as early as May 24, 2005.
These evidence, coupled with her eventual
application to reacquire Philippine citizenship is
clear that when she returned in May 2005, it was
for good.
The stamp in her passport as a balikbayan does
not make Poe an ordinary transient.
Poe was able to prove that her statement in her
2012 COC was only a mistake in good faith. Such a
mistake could be given in evidence against her but
it was by no means conclusive considering the
overwhelming evidence submitted by Poe.
Considering that the COMELEC failed to take into
consideration these overwhelming evidence, its
decision is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
The decision of the COMELEC is hereby annulled
and set aside. Poe is thus declared qualified to be
a candidate for President in the National and Local
Election on May 9, 2016.
Jacot vs Dal
Ruling:
No. R.A 9225 requires that natural-born citizens of
the Philippines, who are already naturalized
citizens of a foreign country, must take the following
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines to reacquire or retain their Philippine
citizenship. It specifically provides that public office
in the Philippines should meet the Constitutional
requirements and existing laws. At the time of the
filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath. Filipinos
reacquiring or retaining their Philippine citizenship
under Republic Act No. 9225 should not only take
their oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, but also to explicitly renounce their
foreign citizenship if they wish to run for elective
posts in the Philippines. A candidate in Philippine
elections must only have one citizenship, that is,
Philippine citizenship. This the petitioner fails to do.
A candidate who failed to comply with the election
requirements applicable to dual citizens and
received the highest number of votes for an
elective position does not dispense with, or amount
to a waiver of, the citizenship requirement.The will
of the people as expressed through the ballot
cannot cure the ineligibility, especially if they
mistakenly believed that the candidate was
qualified. The rules on citizenship qualifications of a
candidate must be strictly applied. The application
of the constitutional and statutory provisions on
disqualification is not a matter of popularity. The
appeal wasDISMISSED. Comelec Resolution was
AFFIRMED and petitioner wasDISQUALIFIED.
Partylist
Atong Paglaum Guidelines
. (1) Three different parties or organizations
may participate in the party-list system: (a)
national; (b) regional; or (c) sectoral;
. (2) National and regional parties or orgs do
not need to (a) organize along sectoral lines
or (b) represent any marginalized or
underrepresented sector;
. (3) Political parties may participate in the
party-list system provided: (a) they register
under the party-list system; (b) they do not
field candidates in legislative district
elections.
(i) A party that participates in the legislative
district elections may still participate in the
party-list through a sectoral wing.
 (ii) The sectoral wing can be part of the
political partys coalition, but the former
must be registered independently in the
party-list system.
. (4) Sectoral parties or orgs may either be (a)
marginalized or underrepresented (e.g.
labor, peasant, fisherfolk); or (b) lacking in
well-defined political constituencies (e.g.
professionals, women, elderly, youth)
. (5) The nominees of sectoral parties or orgs,
of either type, must (a) belong to their
respective sectors, or (b) have a track record
of advocacy for their respective sectors.
Majority of the members of a sectoral party,
of either type, must belong to the sector they
represent.
. (6) National, regional, or sectoral parties or
orgs shall not be disqualified if some of their
nominees are disqualified, provided they have
at least one (1) nominee who remains
qualified.
Disqualified parties:
(1) Religious Sects
(2) Foreign Organizations
(3) Those Advocating Violence or Unlawful Means
. (4) It is receiving support from any foreign
government,
foreign political party, foundation,
organization, whether directly or through
any of its officers or members or indirectly
through third parties for partisan election
purposes.
. (5) It violates or fails to comply with laws,
rules or regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding
elections or fails to obtain at least 2 per centum of the
votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2)
preceding elections for the constituency in which it
has registered.
Suability of the state
Implied consent
(1) When the State enters into a business contract or
itself
commences litigation;
(2)If the govt files a complaint, defendant may file a
counterclaim against it. When the state files
complaint, suability will result only where the
government is claiming affirmative relief from the
defendant.
(3) When it would be inequitable for the State to
invoke its immunity.
(4) In instances when the State takes private property
for public use or purpose.
Specific Rules
Suits against Government Agencies Depends on
whether the agency is incorporated (i.e. there is a
separate charter) or unincorporated (i.e. no separate
personality).
(1) Incorporated If the charter provides that the
agency can sue, then suit will lie. The provision in the
charter constitutes express consent. [See SSS v. Court
of Appeals (1983)]
(2) Unincorporated There must be an inquiry unto
the principal functions of government.
(a) If governmental: NO suit without consent. [Bureau
of Printing v. Bureau of Printing Employees
Association (1961)].
(b) If proprietary: Suit will lie, because when the state
engages in principally proprietary functions, it
descends to the level of a private individual, and may,
therefore be vulnerable to suit. [Civil Aeronautics
Administration v. Court of Appeals (1988)]. State may
only be liable for proprietary acts (jure gestionis) and
not for sovereign acts (jure imperii).
Incorporated - governmental or propriety can be sued
if charter allows
Unicorporated- Governmental cannot be sued unless
consent is given
proprietary can be sued
PDAF -
Separation of powers - Only the executive may
implement the law but under the PDAF system
once the GAA was enacted , the legislator
themselves dictate to which projects the PDAF
should be allocated to - a clear act of
implementing the law they enacted. A violation
of principle of powers
Non -deligability of legislative power - Under PDAF
the individual legislator indentifies the projects
to which PDAF money should go. is a violation
of non deligability of power. The power to
appropriate funds is solely vested in congress
collectively and not lodged in individual
members .
Principles of check and balances - The presidential
power to veto is undermined in the PDAF
system because once the GAA is approved, the
legislator can now identify the project to which
he will appropriate the PDAF . The president
cant veto because appropriation is made after
the approval of the GAA.
Presidential pork barrel -
Undue Delegation.
On a related matter, petitioners contend that
Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power since the phrase
"and for such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President" gives the President
"unbridled discretion to determine for what purpose
the funds will be used.
DAP -
1. The transferts made through the DAP were
unconstitutional . The president is allowed
by the constitution to make realignment of
funds, however such transfer should only
be made within their respective offices .
Thus no cross border transfer /
augmentation may be allowrd. But under
the DAP this was violated because funds
appropriated by the GAA for the Executive
were being transferred to the legislative
and other non- executive agencies.
Further transfer of funds within respective offices
contemplates realignment of funds to an
existing project in the GAA .
Savings:
These DAP transfers are not savings contrary to
what was being declared by the Executive. Under the
definition of savings in the GAA, savings only occur,
among other instances, when there is an excess in
the funding of a certain project once it is completed,
finally discontinued, or finally abandoned. The GAA
does not refer to savings as funds withdrawn from a
slow moving project. Thus, since the statutory
definition of savings was not complied with under
the DAP, there is no basis at all for the transfers.
Further, savings should only be declared at the end
of the fiscal year. But under the DAP, funds are already
being withdrawn from certain projects in the middle
of the year and then being declared as savings by
the Executive particularly by the DBM.
IV.No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be
used as money source for the DAP because under the
law, such funds may only be used if there is a
certification from the National Treasurer to the effect
that the revenue collections have exceeded the
revenue targets. In this case, no such certification was
secured before unprogrammed funds were used.
V. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which
recognizes the legal effects of an act prior to it being
declared as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, is
applicable. The DAP has definitely helped stimulate
the economy. It has funded numerous projects. If the
Executive is ordered to reverse all actions under the
DAP, then it may cause more harm than good. The
DAP effects can no longer be undone. The
beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be asked to return
what they received especially so that they relied on
the validity of the DAP. However, the Doctrine of
Operative Fact may not be applicable to the authors,
implementers, and proponents of the DAP if it is so
found in the appropriate tribunals (civil, criminal, or
administrative) that they have not acted in good faith.
The suspension contemplated in the Constitution is
different from the suspension prescribed in the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019). The
former is punitive in nature while the latter is
preventive. [Defensor-Santiago v. Sandiganbayan
(1995)].

Martial law 1935/1973 - (2) The President shall be

commander-in-chief of all armed forces of the
Philippines, and, whenever it becomes Operative fact doctrine
necessary, he may call out such armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion,
insurrection, or rebellion. In case of invasion,
insurrection, or rebellion or imminent danger Under the operative fact doctrine, the law is
recognized as unconstitutional but the effects of the
thereof, when the public safety requires it, he
unconstitutional law, prior to its declaration of
may suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas nullity, may be left undisturbed as a matter of equity
corpus, or place the Philippines or any part and fair play.
thereof under Martial Law.

Discipline -

Santiago vs. Sandigan bayan

In here, the order of suspension prescribed by RA.

3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to
discipline its own ranks under the Constitution. The
suspension contemplated in the above
constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is
imposed upon determination by the Senate or the
Lower House, as the case may be, upon an erring
member. This is quite distinct from the suspension
spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a
penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure,
prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being
imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as a Member
of the Senate.

Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its

coverage the members of Congress and that,
therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus
decreeing the assailed preventive suspension
order.