Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Column Headings
Column
Letter
Operational Phase A Categorization of the hazard scenario by operational phase.
UBD/MPD/Both C Identification of whether the hazard applies to UBD, MPD or Both (B)
Single jeopardy statement used to identify potential problems due to failure in pre-job planning, training, procedures, or
Hazard Scenario What If D
equipment failure.
Applicable E Choose "Y" if "Hazard Scenario What If" applies to operation and "N" if it does not.
Threats/Consequences F A list of the potential consequences (HSE and NPT) of the "what if" occurring.
HSE G The risk of a situation/event with the potential to cause harm (to people, assets, or the environment).
NPT H The risk of Non Productive Time (NPT), including lost time and costs, formation damage and/or any deviation from the plan.
Controls/safeguards, and detailed recommended practices for high risk HSE items and referenced to specific prescriptive
Required HSE Critical Controls / Safeguards O
IRP 22 enforced requirements.
Recommendations, considerations, and informational statements on how to reduce, eliminate, or manage Medium/Low
Considerations J
Risk HSE items and all NPT items.
List of actions required to reduce/eliminate the potential occurrence and/or severity if the hazard cannot be eliminated
entirely.
Actions to be Taken / By Who and When K
Who = Party/parties responsible for each action assigned.
When = Date by which the action is to be completed.
Primary Responsible Party L Categorization of the hazard scenario by primary responsible party.
Primary Category M Categorization of the hazard scenario by primary category (equipment, well program, etc.)
Additional items may be added to each section by the IRP committee or the end user. The list of items in the register is not exhaustive and will change with time as
additional hazards are identified. Last item number used (as of 2015-03-11) is: 228 Begin any additional numbering with 229. Note that #152 was deleted as it was
redundant.
The IRP 22 Committee invites organizations to share lessons learned and additions to the Risk Register by emailing safety@enform.ca
Use alt+enter to create multiple line items within a single cell
Validations of operational phase, relevance, primary responsible party, primary category and y/n columns use the data in the tabs mathcing their name. All validations are
set up to validate any value from the entire column so when adding a new item it will automatically be included in the validation.
To subscript for H2S, O2, N2 etc, select the character to subscript, right click and choose format cells, check of subscript
Applicable
Relevance Required HSE Primary
Operational Hazard Scenario Primary
HSE
NPT
Item (UBD/MPD/B Threats/Consequences Critical Controls / Considerations Responsible
Phase What If ? Category
oth) Safeguards Party
Actions to be taken / By Who and When
Use hex kelly, square kelly not recommended.
RCD leakage.
Use power swivel instead of kelly.
Injury to personnel.
22.1.3.2 Use top drive instead of kelly.
Improper kelly (square Unable to run square kelly through
1. Planning 1 BOTH Y 22.2.2.3 Use coiled tubing. Rig Contractor Rig Equipment
vs. hex) RCD.
22.2.6.3 RCD supplier standard operating procedures /
Delay in drilling well (lost time and
risk register.
cost).
Drill string diagram.
1 1
1 1
Membrane nitrogen is
High corrosion rate. Consider use of service gas that does not contain Operating
1. Planning 7 UBD used in sour Y 22.1.3.1 Well Program
Potential flammable conditions. oxygen. Company
environment 1 1
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Applicable
Relevance Required HSE Primary
Operational Hazard Scenario Primary
HSE
NPT
Item (UBD/MPD/B Threats/Consequences Critical Controls / Considerations Responsible
Phase What If ? Category
oth) Safeguards Party
Actions to be taken / By Who and When
Consider 2 barrier when pipe is static.
Loss of Barrier. High H2S content should make barrier policy more Operating
1. Planning 10 BOTH Barrier Failure Y Well Program
Potential for injury/death. Company
1 1 visible.
Insufficient tank farm 22.1.3.4 Operating
1. Planning 11 BOTH Y Release of drilling fluid to environment. Applicable provincial regulations to be followed. Separation
berms 1 1 22.3.14 Company
Equipment spacing, venting and issues regarding
General H2S concerns Operating
1. Planning 12 BOTH Y Potential for injury/death. 22.3.13 personnel safety must be addressed throughout the Lease Management
Company
1 1 entire lease for the entire operation.
Eliminate one element of the requirements for
Air Drilling - LEL and combustion (fuel, oxygen, or ignition source).
Flammable mixture, potential for 22.1.3.7 Operating
1. Planning 13 UBD UEL within flammable Y Consider inert gas operations. Well Program
fire/explosion. 22.3.15 Company
limits Never flow returns to a closed separator.
1 1
Add inert gas to reduce flammability.
Air Drilling - Unexpected Use inert gas if the risk of creating conditions suitable for
Potential for downhole fire and/or 22.1.3.7 Operating
1. Planning 14 UBD hydrocarbon zone Y combustion exists. Well Program
ignition at surface. 22.3.15 Company
encountered Consider inert gas operations.
1 1
Air Drilling - Mud ring Potential for dowhnole ignition. Monitor hole cleaning and fluid influx carefully while
Operating
1. Planning 15 UBD occurs with combustible Y Loss of BHA, damage to equipment, 22.3.15 drilling. Well Program
Company
mixture in hole. potential for injury/death, loss of well. Consider inert gas operations.
1 1
Gas/fluid release at rig floor (potential Carefully define coil operating limits.
hydrocarbon release/ignition/fire). Monitor coil fatigue life.
Coiled Tubing - Coil
Harm to personnel. 22.3.16 Pressure test coil before job. Coil Tubing
1. Planning 18 BOTH string failure (surface Y Well Program
Formation damage if well must be IRP 21 Use appropriate corrosion inhibitor package. Contractor
washout)
killed. Minimize high pressure coil cycling.
Environmental damage. Run leak point back into well if possible.
1 1
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Applicable
Relevance Required HSE Primary
Operational Hazard Scenario Primary
HSE
NPT
Item (UBD/MPD/B Threats/Consequences Critical Controls / Considerations Responsible
Phase What If ? Category
oth) Safeguards Party
Actions to be taken / By Who and When
Possible inadequate returns
monitoring and/or flow modeling fails
to recognize losses in zone of greater
Failure to note losses,
depletion/lower pore pressure than Ensure adequate monitoring, early recognition of losses,
1. Planning 21 BOTH possibly leading to Y 22.3.12 Rig Contractor Mud System
planned for. well planned well control procedures.
loss/kick situation
Possibility of well kick exceeding
equipment rating, personnel injury,
equipment damage or loss of well.
1 1
Unclear lines of Risk to personnel, equipment, All lines of authority to be clearly defined in program/pre- Operating
1. Planning 24 BOTH Y 22.2.3 Well Program
authority environment. 1 2 spud. Company
Inadequate fire Operating Lease
1. Planning 25 BOTH Y Injury, loss of equipment. 22.1.3.7
protection 1 2 Company Requirements
Identify potentially oxygen deficient areas and include in
Oxygen deficient onsite orientation.
1. Planning 26 UBD Y Potential for injury. 22.3.3 All N/A
environments Workers in high risk areas must wear appropriate
1 2
monitoring device.
Response to alarm
Confusion on location increases HSE Clearly define response to alarm conditions and Operating Lease
1. Planning 27 BOTH condition is not clearly Y 22.3.3
risks. communicate the response to personnel on location. Company Requirements
defined 1 2
Multiple alarm systems Confusion on location increases HSE Clearly define response to alarm conditions and Operating Lease
1. Planning 28 BOTH Y 22.3.3
on location risks. 1 2 communicate the response to personnel on location. Company Requirements
Use enclosed cutting separation process.
H2S - Toxic gas released Vacuum degas fluid/solids stream before cuttings
UBD/MPD
1. Planning 29 BOTH during cuttings Y Potential for injury/death. 22.3.13 separation. Separation
Service Provider
separation process. Monitor/alarm any area where there is a potential for a
1 2
sour gas release.
H2S - Toxic gas release 22.3.13 Purge with non-toxic or inert gas before opening UBD/MPD
1. Planning 31 BOTH Y Potential for injury/death. Separation
when sampling cuttings 22.1.3.2 sampler. Service Provider
1 2
H2S - Improper sour Full review of NACE MR 0175/NACE 15156 for H2S
Rapid degradation of steel - not fit for Operating
1. Planning 32 BOTH service material Y 22.3.13 wells. Well Program
service. Company
selection 1 2 Review IRP 1 Critical Sour Drilling
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Applicable
Relevance Required HSE Primary
Operational Hazard Scenario Primary
HSE
NPT
Item (UBD/MPD/B Threats/Consequences Critical Controls / Considerations Responsible
Phase What If ? Category
oth) Safeguards Party
Actions to be taken / By Who and When
Calculate volume of gas released from separator
Oil Based Mud - pressure to atmospheric pressure.
Risk of fire/explosionq and personnel 22.3.10 UBD/MPD
1. Planning 33 BOTH Solution gas release Y Low pressure separator reduces gas in solution. Separation
exposed to harmful vapors. 22.3.14 Service Provider
from drilling mudqq Use separate fluid storage system with totally enclosed
1 2
and vented tanks.
Muster area is not Increased risk for personnel to search Clearly define muster area during wellsite safety Operating Lease
1. Planning 34 BOTH Y 22.3.3
clearly defined. location for missing workers. 1 3 meetings. Company Requirements
H2S - Elastomer Loss of Barrier. Aniline testing elastomers. Operating
1. Planning 35 BOTH Y 22.3.13 Well Program
failure/incompatibility Potential for injury/death. 1 3
Proper material selection for elastomers. Company
Shortage of experienced
Inability to identify all safety critical Ensure that personnel planning the operation are Operating
1. Planning 36 BOTH people in planning Y N/A
issues in the operation. competent to do so. Company
stages 2 1
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Applicable
Relevance Required HSE Primary
Operational Hazard Scenario Primary
HSE
NPT
Item (UBD/MPD/B Threats/Consequences Critical Controls / Considerations Responsible
Phase What If ? Category
oth) Safeguards Party
Actions to be taken / By Who and When
Consider multiple NRVs in BHA.
Consider metal/metal seals.
NRV seal compatibility
1. Planning 41 BOTH Y Potential for NRV to fail prematurely. Test seals with drilling fluid/reservoir fluid prior to drilling NRV Supplier NRV
with fluid
operation.
2 1
Consider profile nipple down hole as a backup.
Unclear responsibility for Potential equipment failure if not used Determine responsibility during pre-spud and confirm in Operating
1. Planning 48 BOTH Y All
rental equipment properly. 2 2 onsite safety meetings. Company
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Applicable
Relevance Required HSE Primary
Operational Hazard Scenario Primary
HSE
NPT
Item (UBD/MPD/B Threats/Consequences Critical Controls / Considerations Responsible
Phase What If ? Category
oth) Safeguards Party
Actions to be taken / By Who and When
Automatic liquid low level shut-down in separator.
Procedures and equipment in place for managing
Separator gas carry-
Gas at rig tanks. separator level if level no low level shut-down. UBD/MPD
1. Planning 52 BOTH under down the liquid Y 22.1.5.5 Separation
Fire, explosion, personnel exposure. Audible and visual alarm. Service Provider
shipping lines
LEL/UEL gas monitoring and alarming at the shaker
1 2
Liquid shipping to a remote tank system.
Coiled Tubing - Slips fail Tools dropped in hole, resulting in lost Manage risk with appropriate procedures and checks to
Coil Tubing
1. Planning 55 UBD to hold BHA Y time, high-risk fishing operation. IRP21 make sure slips are engaged and holding. Well Program
Contractor
components Potential gas/fluid release at rig floor. Consult IRP21 Coiled Tubing Operations
2 2
Wait on correct NRVs/subs.
No drill string well control.
Drill string NRVs
Delay in drilling well (lost time and
1. Planning 56 BOTH missing or wrong Y NRV supplier standard NRV Supplier NRV
cost).
size/thread operating procedures/risk register.
Drill string damage. 2 3 Drill string diagram.
Flare gun ignites forest Consider using an auto-ignition system if flaring in an UBD/MPD
1. Planning 57 BOTH Y Risk to environment/personnel. Separation
or grassland 2 3 area or time of year when there is a high risk of fire. Service Provider
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Applicable
Relevance Required HSE Primary
Operational Hazard Scenario Primary
HSE
NPT
Item (UBD/MPD/B Threats/Consequences Critical Controls / Considerations Responsible
Phase What If ? Category
oth) Safeguards Party
Actions to be taken / By Who and When
Frequent motor failures or poor
performance increases number of trips
Ensure PDM supplier is aware of downhole operating
required along with the associated
Improperly specified environment for application. Directional
1. Planning 62 BOTH Y risks. PDM
PDMs Inspect Company
Wait on PDMs suitable for UBD/MPD
data for PDMs received vs. order placed.
environment temperature and fluid
compatibility.
3 2
Higher and/or unstable BHP. Consider magnet/junk basket run to clean out casing
Re-entry - Casing exit Tight hole or stuck pipe. exit. Operating
1. Planning 66 BOTH Y Well Program
debris in well Plugged choke/separator dump valves. Monitor torque/drag carefully throughout drilling and Company
Damage to bit and/or BHA. tripping through exit.
3 2
Environmentally responsible disposal AER Directive 50: Drilling Waste Management (see
Solids - waste Operating
1. Planning 67 BOTH Y of H S contaminated cuttings www.aer.ca) Lease Management
management Company
2
3 3
Operating Company waste management policies
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Applicable
Relevance Required HSE Primary
Operational Hazard Scenario Primary
HSE
NPT
Item (UBD/MPD/B Threats/Consequences Critical Controls / Considerations Responsible
Phase What If ? Category
oth) Safeguards Party
Actions to be taken / By Who and When
Consider heat tracing and/or warm air/N2 circulation to Operating
2. Rig Up / Possible freezing in piping dead legs,
Ambient temperatures maintain clear lines. Company /
Pressure Test / 72 BOTH Y liquid traps, etc. with resultant Lease Management
below freezing Avoid liquid traps in installation, utilize "clear line" start UBD/MPD
Commissioning blockage.
1 1
up procedure. Service Provider
Inadequate or non-
2. Rig Up / Improperly or non-grounded Implement an electrical grounding plan for the
existent electrical
Pressure Test / 73 BOTH Y equipment skids leading to personnel installation. All All
grounding of equipment
Commissioning injury and equipment downtime. Inspect and test installation for electrical grounding.
skids 1 1
Inadequate or non-
2. Rig Up / Personnel injury, equipment damage
existent electrical
Pressure Test / 74 BOTH Y when prematurely powering up Implement electrical lockout/tagout procedures. All All
lockout/tagout
Commissioning electrical circuits.
procedures. 1 1
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Applicable
Relevance Required HSE Primary
Operational Hazard Scenario Primary
HSE
NPT
Item (UBD/MPD/B Threats/Consequences Critical Controls / Considerations Responsible
Phase What If ? Category
oth) Safeguards Party
Actions to be taken / By Who and When
Possibly pressurize mud pump system
2. Rig Up / Failure to install check Discuss requirements in pre-spud. Operating
through nitrogen injection line (suction
Pressure Test / 82 UBD valve on each injection Y Check valve to be installed downstream of all pumping Company / UBD Compression
line may fail).
Commissioning line equipment in operations using a service gas. Service Provider
Gas lock mud pump. 2 1
Surface equipment may not be Offsets to be analyzed as a guide for planning the
2. Rig Up / Well parameters suitable for handling sour fluid. operation.
different from program - Operating
Pressure Test / 83 BOTH Y Additional concerns with regards to Assume worst-case scenario when planning the well. Well Program
H2S Company
Commissioning HSE for safe operations, fluid Plan for sour operations if there is even a small potential
transportation, etc. 2 1
of encountering sour gas.
2. Rig Up /
Harm to personnel. Supervisors have obligation to stop unsafe Operating
Pressure Test / 84 BOTH Poor weather Y Lease Management
Lost time and cost. work/activities. Company
Commissioning 2 2
Equipment damage, and lost time. Adequate fuel filtering system to be in place for all critical Operating
2. Rig Up /
Poor quality diesel fuel Pump/compressor failure during components. Company /
Pressure Test / 88 BOTH Y Compression
on location UBD/MPD operations may result in Inspect rental fuel storage tanks before filling (especially UBD/MPD
Commissioning
well control issues. 400 bbl tanks not normally used for fuel storage). Service Provider
3 1
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Applicable
Relevance Required HSE Primary
Operational Hazard Scenario Primary
HSE
NPT
Item (UBD/MPD/B Threats/Consequences Critical Controls / Considerations Responsible
Phase What If ? Category
oth) Safeguards Party
Actions to be taken / By Who and When
Ensure hand signals are in place for important
communications.
Overpressure at surface, dead-
3. Drill Out and Poor communications Establish radio protocol in safety meeting. Operating
92 BOTH Y heading pumps and other HSE 22.3.2.2 Lease Management
Hole Conditioning during well conditioning Supply sufficient head sets for men working in high-noise Company
concerns.
environments.
1 2
Review roles in safety meeting.
Formation integrity test Unable to apply UBD/ MPD program. May require additional casing string or redesign of
3. Drill Out and Operating
96 BOTH insufficient for planned Y Possible well control concerns, lost MPD/UBD operation. Well Program
Hole Conditioning Company
operations time or harm to personnel. Remedial cement job/re-drill and test.
2 2
NRV not installed near Excessive bleed-off time/connection Reference and review drill string diagram.
Operating
3. Drill Out and surface prior to time. Discuss in safety meeting and confirm installation
99 UBD Y Company / UBD NRV
Hole Conditioning conditioning with Possibly require re-conditioning hole visually before commencing operations.
Service Provider
compressible fluid after long bleed-off time to install NRV. Add drill string floats.
3 2
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Applicable
Relevance Required HSE Primary
Operational Hazard Scenario Primary
HSE
NPT
Item (UBD/MPD/B Threats/Consequences Critical Controls / Considerations Responsible
Phase What If ? Category
oth) Safeguards Party
Actions to be taken / By Who and When
Failure to consider the shutdown Operating
No strategy for sequence may result in hole problems, Company /
4. Drilling 101 BOTH Y 22.3.9 Add contingency plans. Well Program
"unplanned" shut downs high pressures at surface, UBD/MPD
unnecessary well kill, etc. 1 1
Service Provider
Separation equipment certification must be current.
Gas release and harm to 22.1.3.5 PSVs installed and relief lines rigged up. UBD/MPD
4. Drilling 102 BOTH Separator fails Y Separation
personnel/environment. 22.2.4.5 Rig's well control equipment rigged in and operational in Service Provider
1 1
case of catastrophic failure.
Over time pipe wall erodes or corrodes Implement pipe inspection procedures and
leading to reduction in pressure documentation prior to each rig up, and NDT wall
Pipe wall thickness 22.2.2.4 UBD/MPD
4. Drilling 105 BOTH Y integrity, possible leak or rupture with thickness inspections at vulnerable points throughout Separation
erosion 22.2.2.1 Service Provider
resultant personnel, equipment and operation.
environmental consequences. UT testing when possible.
1 1
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Applicable
Relevance Required HSE Primary
Operational Hazard Scenario Primary
HSE
NPT
Item (UBD/MPD/B Threats/Consequences Critical Controls / Considerations Responsible
Phase What If ? Category
oth) Safeguards Party
Actions to be taken / By Who and When
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Applicable
Relevance Required HSE Primary
Operational Hazard Scenario Primary
HSE
NPT
Item (UBD/MPD/B Threats/Consequences Critical Controls / Considerations Responsible
Phase What If ? Category
oth) Safeguards Party
Actions to be taken / By Who and When
Hoses to be certified for hydrocarbon liquid service when
using OBM.
Circulating through Failure of hoses results in release of
Pressure test hoses prior to starting operations.
4. Drilling 111 BOTH flexible hoses/shock Y hydrocarbons, potential injury to 22.2.2.1 Rig Contractor Rig Equipment
Use a hose certified for gas service in high risk
hose personnel.
operations (natural gas injection, etc.).
1 1
Use hard line whenever possible.
Kill fluid must be available on site, as per regulatory
Formation damage.
Well has to be killed for 22.1.3.2 requirements. Operating
4. Drilling 112 BOTH Y Ignition and explosion risks. Well Control
well control 22.1.3.5 Flow control matrix in place, and observed. Company
Potential harm to personnel.
1 1
Well control procedure in place and rehearsed.
Poor understanding of
the relationship of the Failure in well control procedure may On-site orientation and training is to include well control RCD Supplier /
4. Drilling 113 BOTH UBD/MPD kit and the rig Y result in well control problems, loss of 22.1.5 considerations. UBD/MPD Well Control
kit with regards to well control, injury or death. Discuss at pre-job safety meeting. Service Provider
control events 1 1
Inaccurate flow Potential to operate outside of flow Review fluid data and simulation software use with UBD UBD/MPD
4. Drilling 116 BOTH Y Well Control
simulation control matrix due to wrong input data. service provider. Service Provider
2 2
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Applicable
Relevance Required HSE Primary
Operational Hazard Scenario Primary
HSE
NPT
Item (UBD/MPD/B Threats/Consequences Critical Controls / Considerations Responsible
Phase What If ? Category
oth) Safeguards Party
Actions to be taken / By Who and When
Improper use of NRVs are a leading cause of HSE
NRV bleed-off hose in Possible injury or loss of life if hose incidents in UBD/MPD operations. Operating
4. Drilling 120 BOTH Y 22.2.3.1 NRV
poor condition fails. Review supplier's SOPs and implement their use in Company
1 1
accordance with the RP referenced.
Improper use of NRVs are a leading cause of HSE
NRV bleed-off hose is Hose may whip and injure/kill incidents in UBD/MPD operations. Operating
4. Drilling 121 BOTH Y 22.2.3.1 NRV
not securely anchored personnel on the rig floor. Review supplier's SOPs and implement their use in Company
1 1
accordance with the RP referenced.
Improper use of NRVs are a leading cause of HSE
incidents in UBD/MPD operations.
Retrievable NRV Unseated NRV can cause serious Review supplier's SOPs and implement their use in
4. Drilling 122 BOTH Y 22.2.3.1 NRV Supplier NRV
unseats under pressure damage to equipment or injury/death. accordance with the RP referenced.
Do not allow unqualified personnel to seat, inspect, or
1 1
touch retrievable NRVs.
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Relevance Required HSE Primary
Operational Hazard Scenario Primary
HSE
NPT
Item (UBD/MPD/B Threats/Consequences Critical Controls / Considerations Responsible
Phase What If ? Category
oth) Safeguards Party
Actions to be taken / By Who and When
Operating
Unclear responsibilities Delay in implementing well control A diagram containing key personnel roles,
Company /
4. Drilling 140 BOTH of key personnel on Y procedures may increase the potential 22.3.2 responsibilities, and reporting structure improves Lease Management
UBD/MPD
location. for a severe well control incident. communications and data dissemination on location.
1 2
Service Provider
Operating
Unclear reporting Delay in implementing key decisions A diagram containing key personnel roles,
Company /
4. Drilling 141 BOTH lines/structure on Y may result in well control incidents, 22.3.2 responsibilities, and reporting structure improves Lease Management
UBD/MPD
location exceeding equipment ratings, etc. communications and data dissemination on location.
1 2
Service Provider
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Applicable
Relevance Required HSE Primary
Operational Hazard Scenario Primary
HSE
NPT
Item (UBD/MPD/B Threats/Consequences Critical Controls / Considerations Responsible
Phase What If ? Category
oth) Safeguards Party
Actions to be taken / By Who and When
Improper use of NRVs are a leading cause of HSE
Failure to bleed off float Operating
Any trapped pressure below the NRV incidents in UBD/MPD operations.
4. Drilling 142 BOTH down to atmospheric Y 22.2.3.1 Company / NRV NRV
poses a risk to personnel. Review supplier's SOPs and implement their use in
pressure Provider
1 2
accordance with the RP referenced.
Bleed-off to atmosphere Improper use of NRVs are a leading cause of HSE
is located in an area Workers are exposed to flying debris, incidents in UBD/MPD operations. UBD/MPD
4. Drilling 143 BOTH Y 22.2.3.1 NRV
where workers are hazardous mist. Review supplier's SOPs and implement their use in Service Provider
present 1 2
accordance with the RP referenced.
Release of gas/fluids at rig floor.
Top drive seal and/or
4. Drilling 144 BOTH Y Ignition/explosion risk. 22.3.10 Service and inspect before job. Rig Contractor Rig Equipment
wash pipe failure
Potential harm to personnel. 1 3
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Applicable
Relevance Required HSE Primary
Operational Hazard Scenario Primary
HSE
NPT
Item (UBD/MPD/B Threats/Consequences Critical Controls / Considerations Responsible
Phase What If ? Category
oth) Safeguards Party
Actions to be taken / By Who and When
Lost time and cost. Procedure in place for unplanned and planned shutdown
Higher BHP than planned. of gas injection system.
UBD Service
4. Drilling 162 UBD Mist pump failure Y Unstable BHP. Function test prior to starting operations. Well Program
Provider
Stuck pipe/poor hole cleaning. Install screens in the suction line and ensure clean fluid
MWD failure. 3 1
is being pumped.
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Relevance Required HSE Primary
Operational Hazard Scenario Primary
HSE
NPT
Item (UBD/MPD/B Threats/Consequences Critical Controls / Considerations Responsible
Phase What If ? Category
oth) Safeguards Party
Actions to be taken / By Who and When
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Relevance Required HSE Primary
Operational Hazard Scenario Primary
HSE
NPT
Item (UBD/MPD/B Threats/Consequences Critical Controls / Considerations Responsible
Phase What If ? Category
oth) Safeguards Party
Actions to be taken / By Who and When
Drill string ejected from well. Pipe light calculations to be updated based on current
Damage to equipment and/or well parameters. Operating
5. Tripping 172 BOTH Pipe light Y 22.3.7 Well Program
injury/death of personnel. Pipe light calculations need to be done befofe tripping Company
Pipe buckling. 1 1
out of the hole.
22.1.3.1 Determine decision points for when various equipment is
Increased RCD wear, pipework Operating
5. Tripping 173 UBD High flow rate from well Y 22.1.3.5 required, including push-pull equipment, and rig assisted Well Program
erosion. Company
1 1 22.2.2.4 snubbing units.
Operate RCD within supplier's specifications.
Immediate release of gas/wellbore Inspect RCD element before tripping.
RCD failure - stripping 22.2.2.3
5. Tripping 174 BOTH Y fluids to the rig floor. Consider replacing RCD element when bit is back at the RCD Supplier RCD
through RCD 22.1.3.5
Risk of ignition, injury or death. shoe.
1 1
Flow well to reduce the flowing well head pressure.
Operate RCD within supplier's specifications.
Equalizing procedure Immediate release of gas/wellbore Follow procedure recommended by RCD supplier when
22.2.2.3
5. Tripping 175 BOTH not implemented for Y fluids to the rig floor. equalizing pressure. RCD Supplier RCD
22.2.3.17
changing RCD elements Risk of ignition, injury or death. Review BOP diagram during prespud.
1 1
Vent bleedoff to a safe area.
Operate/install snubbing adaptor as per supplier's
Immediate release of gas/wellbore specifications.
RCD failure - with
5. Tripping 176 BOTH Y fluids to the rig floor. 22.3.7 Inspect/pressure test integrity of snubbing adaptor RCD Supplier RCD
snubbing adaptor
Risk of ignition, injury or death. pressure seal on RCD before commencing snubbing
1 1
operations.
Release of gas/wellbore fluids to the
RCD seal integrity is 22.2.2.3 Wear device should "leak" rather than fail
5. Tripping 177 BOTH Y rig floor. RCD Supplier RCD
unknown 22.3.7 catastrophically.
Risk of ignition, injury or death. 1 1
Release of injection gas at rig floor. Improper use of NRVs are a leading cause of HSE
Possible injury/death to personnel if 22.2.3.1 incidents in UBD/MPD operations.
5. Tripping 179 BOTH NRV Bleed-off tool fails Y NRV Supplier NRV
bleed-off tool fails mechanically or 22.3.7 Review supplier's SOPs and implement their use in
hose comes lose. 1 1
accordance with the RP referenced.
Pipe light calculations and associated equipment
Reservoir pressure is Deeper pipe light point. 22.1.3.1 Operating
5. Tripping 180 BOTH Y requirements to be updated based on current well Well Control
higher than anticipated Increased RCD wear/failure potential. 22.1.3.5 Company
1 1 parameters.
Snubbing unit to be equipped with fail safe slip design to
prevent pipe light condition.
Pre-job inspection minimizes the potential for equipment Snubbing
5. Tripping 181 UBD Snubbing unit failure Y Lost time and cost. 22.3.7 Well Program
downtime. Contractor
Unsupported pipe length buckling calculations shall be
1 1
made.
Consider the use of variable pipe rams as backup to the
Potential gas release to surface.
annular.
5. Tripping 182 BOTH Annular BOP failure Y Potential loss of well control 22.2.2.1 Rig Contractor Well Control
Cannot change RCD element until Annular BOP (and a
equipment.
1 1
second barrier) are both operational.
20 of 29 03/05/2017 DRAFT
IRP 22 - Hazard and Risk Assessment Register
G
Y
R G
Y
R
Applicable
Relevance Required HSE Primary
Operational Hazard Scenario Primary
HSE
NPT
Item (UBD/MPD/B Threats/Consequences Critical Controls / Considerations Responsible
Phase What If ? Category
oth) Safeguards Party
Actions to be taken / By Who and When
Washout in primary Higher surface pressure if well has to 22.3.7 Procedure in place (and rehearsed) to divert to UBD/MPD
5. Tripping 183 BOTH Y Choke/Flowline
flowline (while Stripping) be shut in. 22.3.9 secondary flow line to fix leak. Service Provider
1 2
Failure in
Possible damage to equipment.
communications during Procedures to be reviewed in a safety meeting prior to Operating
5. Tripping 190 UBD Y Injury to personnel. Lease Management
stripping/snubbing commencing stripping/snubbing operations. Company
Gas/well bore fluids release to surface.
operations
2 2
Complex BHAs, tubular BHA tools/drawings are required in the planning stages.
Snubbing
5. Tripping 192 UBD dimensions and inability Y Gas release at rig floor. Only strippable components, or components that can be Well Program
Contractor
to stage tools staged in the hole easily should be installed.
2 2 .
Uncertainty with regards to whether Bleed off string, inflow test and continue tripping if BHA
Near Surface NRV Operating
5. Tripping 193 UBD Y near surface, or BHA NRVs are NRV integrity exists. NRV
failure Company
leaking may take some time. 3 3 Only BHA NRVs are a major concern when tripping.
21 of 29 03/05/2017 DRAFT
IRP 22 - Hazard and Risk Assessment Register
G
Y
R G
Y
R
Applicable
Relevance Required HSE Primary
Operational Hazard Scenario Primary
HSE
NPT
Item (UBD/MPD/B Threats/Consequences Critical Controls / Considerations Responsible
Phase What If ? Category
oth) Safeguards Party
Actions to be taken / By Who and When
Wireline lubricator Gas/wellbore fluids release at surface. Low probability of occurrence. Wireline
6. Wireline 195 UBD Y Wireline Tools
leaks/fails. Potential harm to personnel. Pressure test with water or nitrogen before equalizing. Contractor
2 2
22 of 29 03/05/2017 DRAFT
IRP 22 - Hazard and Risk Assessment Register
G
Y
R G
Y
R
Applicable
Relevance Required HSE Primary
Operational Hazard Scenario Primary
HSE
NPT
Item (UBD/MPD/B Threats/Consequences Critical Controls / Considerations Responsible
Phase What If ? Category
oth) Safeguards Party
Actions to be taken / By Who and When
7. Suspend Well Potential for bridge plug Pressure at surface while rigging out
22.3.8 A double barrier is required when rigging out the BOP Operating
for Rig Out or 204 UBD to leak after pressure Y BOP can have catastrophic HSE Well Program
22.3.9 stack. Company
Completion testing results. 1 2
Gas flow at surface without well Maintain the ability to flow the well to the separation
7. Suspend Well Dognut leaks when
control. package until the well head is secured. Operating
for Rig Out or 205 UBD BOPs are being rigged Y 22.3.8 Well Program
Possible loss of well, injury/death to Check for leaks continuously while unbolting BOPs. Company
Completion out
personnel. Keep nuts on well head studs while first raising BOPs.
1 2
7. Suspend Well Ensure good hole cleaning on last trip out of the hole
Tight hole or stuck pipe Time and cost. Operating
for Rig Out or 208 BOTH Y with drillpipe/bit. Well Program
when running tubing Potentially have to kill the well. Company
Completion Conduct scraper run prior to running production packers.
2 2
23 of 29 03/05/2017 DRAFT
IRP 22 - Hazard and Risk Assessment Register
G
Y
R G
Y
R
Applicable
Relevance Required HSE Primary
Operational Hazard Scenario Primary
HSE
NPT
Item (UBD/MPD/B Threats/Consequences Critical Controls / Considerations Responsible
Phase What If ? Category
oth) Safeguards Party
Actions to be taken / By Who and When
Onsite orientation and training.
Supervisors to ensure that all personnel have been
trained in the various components of the rig up
operation.
Crew shortage and/or Harm to personnel.
8. Rig Out 215 BOTH Y Identify tasks in tool box safety meetings. All Training
inexperience Lost time and cost.
Ensure all workers understand their right to refuse
unsafe work, or request training/guidance for tasks that
they are not yet competent in.
Consider EMS onsite during rig up operations.
2 1
24 of 29 03/05/2017 DRAFT
1. Planning
2. Rig Up / Pressure Test / Commissioning
3. Drill Out and Hole Conditioning
4. Drilling
5. Tripping
6. Wireline
7. Suspend Well for Rig Out or Completion
8. Rig Out
9. Other Hazards and Operations
UBD
MPD
Both
3rd Party Rental
All
Coil Tubing Contractor
Compression Supplier
Directional Company
MPD Equipment Provider
MPD Service Provider
Mud Company
MWD Contractor
MWD Contractor / UBD/MPD Service Provider
NRV Supplier
Operating Company
Operating Company / MPD Service Provider
Operating Company / NRV Provider
Operating Company / UBD Service Provider
Operating Company / UBD/MPD Service Provider
Picker Operator
Picker Operator / UBD/MPD Service Provider
RCD Supplier
RCD Supplier / UBD/MPD Service Provider
Rig Contractor
Rig Contractor / UBD/MPD Service Provider
Safety Services
Snubbing Contractor
Trucking Contractor
UBD Service Provider
UBD/MPD Service Provider
Wireline Contractor
All
BOP System
Choke/Flowline
Compression
Data Acquisition
Drill String
Fishing
Flare/Vent System
Lease Requirements
Lease Management
Mud System
MWD
MPD/UBD Equipment Rental
N/A
NRV
PDM
RCD
Rig Equipment
Sample Catcher
Separation
Training
Well Control
Well Program
Wireline
Wireline Tools
Y
N