Republic

of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC


A.C. No. 8197 October 2, 1946

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,
vs.
MARCELINO ADORABLE, ET AL., claimants;
MIGUEL PEARANDA, claimant-appellant;
PURIFICACION SOLINAP ET AL., claimants-appellees.

Evidente, Butalid and Pearanda for claimant-appellant.
Manuel F. Zamora for claimants-appellees.


R E S O L U T I O N



PERFECTO, J.:


At the reconstitution of the above-entitled case, claimant-
appellant presented copies of several papers, exhibits, pleadings,
motions and orders, including copy of the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Iloilo, record on appeal, and the printed brief of
said claimant-appellant who, at the time he filed his motion for
reconstitution on February 26, 1946, was under the impression
that the case, which was pending decision in the Court of Appeals
when the war broke out, remained unacted upon by said court
until the motion for reconstitution was filed.

On June 25, 1946, Attorney Manuel F. Zamora, for the claimants
and appellees, acting under the highest standards of truthfulness,
fair play and nobility as becomes a deserving member of the bar,
instead of taking advantage of claimant-appellant's ignorance of
what really happened in the Court of Appeals, informed this court
that the case had been decided in favor of said claimant and
appellant by the Court of Appeals, filing to said effect the copy of
the decision promulgated on September 9, 1942, sent to him by
said court, to save the appellant the trouble of waiting for the
reconstitution of this case and this tribunal the trouble of
deciding again a case already decided.

Upon being informed of the statements of Attorney Zamora,
claimant-appellant's attorneys filed a petition with the
commissioner for reconstitution to make a report to this Court
that the records be declared reconstituted, together with the
decision of the Court of Appeals dated September 9, 1942, and
that said records be remanded to the lower court for execution of
the decision.lwphi1.net


The court resolved to declare that the case is reconstituted and to
order that copy of the decision of the Court of Appeals,
promulgated on September 9, 1942, be sent to the lower court for
execution. This resolution is being adopted not without making of
record that the considered as an example worthy to be
remembered by all members of the bar.





 SECOND DIVISION WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment
is hereby rendered declaring the deed of sale entitled Bilihang
Patuluyan ng Bahagi ng Isang Lupang Panahanan purportedly
executed by Candida Baylo on August 25, 1971, acknowledged
[G.R. No. 114275. July 7, 1997] before Notary Public Apolinario S. Escueta and entered in his
notarial register as Doc. No. 124, Page No. 16, Book No. IV, Series
of 1971, as null and void and of no force and effect, and the
representative of the estate of the plaintiff Cirila Baylo
Carolasan and the defendants Gregorio Sevillo, Samero
IIGO F. CARLET, as Special Administrator of the Estate of Pablo Sevillo, Maltin Sevillo, Andrea Sevillo and Isidro Zamora, as
Sevillo and Antonia Palisoc, petitioner, vs. HON. the surviving spouse of Consolacion Sevillo, are hereby
COURT OF APPEALS, VIRGINIA C. ZARATE, JACOBO C. ordered to partition Lot No. 981 of the Bian Estate, situated in
ZARATE, VICTORIA C. ZARATE, HON. CONRADO Tubigan, Bian, Laguna if they are able to agree among themselves
DIZON, Acting Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of by proper instruments of conveyance, within 30 days from the
Bian, Laguna, and DEPUTY SHERIFF ROGELIO S. finality of this decision, which shall be confirmed by this Court,
MOLINA of Bian, Laguna, respondents. otherwise, commissioners will be appointed to make the
partition.
D E C I S I O N
The defendants Gregorio Sevillo and Samero Sevillo are hereby
ROMERO, J.:
jointly and severally ordered to pay plaintiffs substituted heirs of
the late Cirila Baylo Carolasan, namely, Virginia C. Zarate, of Brgy.
The Rules of Court provide litigants with options on what Real, Calamba, Laguna, Jacobo C. Zarate, Victoria C. Zarate,
course of action to take in obtaining judicial relief. Once such Nemesio C. Zarate, Dominador C. Zarate and Elvira C. Zarate, all of
option is taken and a case is filed in court, the parties are Brgy. Tubigan, Bian, Laguna, the sum of P3,000.00 for attorneys
compelled to ventilate all matters and relevant issues therein. The fees and the sum of P2,000.00 for litigation expenses aside from
losing party who files another action regarding the same costs of suit.
controversy will be needlessly squandering time, effort and
financial resources because he is barred by law from litigating the
The decision having become final and executory, a writ of
same controversy all over again. Such is the situation in the case at
execution was issued on November 10, 1982. Lot 981 was
bar: whether or not there is res judicata or bar by prior
surveyed and subdivided into six lots, one lot having an area of
judgment. The present controversy is surrounded by the following
452.04 square meters, four lots with 86.49 square meters each
facts:
and one lot with 66 square meters as footpath or concession to a
right of way.[2] By virtue of this adjudication, private respondents
Lot 981 of the Bian Estate in Laguna, with an area of 864 square Zarate procured TCT Nos. T-163388 and T-163393 over their
meters, was purchased by Jose Sevillo in 1910 on installment. In share in the property.
1917, Transfer Certificate No. 1599 was issued in his name after
payment of the full purchase price. Jose Sevillos marriage to The losing parties in that case, the Sevillos, filed a case to
Severa Bayran produced four sons, Teodoro, Mariano, Vicente annul the aforesaid decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. B-
and Pablo. Pablo married Antonia Palisoc in 1920 and they begot 1656 before the then Intermediate Appellate Court (CA-G.R. SP No.
four children, Consolacion, Alejandra (Andrea), Samero 07657) alleging lack of jurisdiction based on service of summons
(Casimiro) and Marin (Martin or Maltin) Sevillo. In 1949, Pablo on unauthorized counsel. On March 31, 1986, the appellate court
Sevillo declared Lot No. 981 for taxation purposes under Tax granted the Zarates motion to dismiss the case on the ground of res
Declaration Nos. 6125 and 2586 even if the property was still in judicata. The Supreme Court denied the petition for review filed
Jose Sevillos name. by the Sevillos for lack of merit on September 8, 1986 in G.R. No.
74505.[3]
In 1955, Pablo, by then a widower, married Candida On May 6, 1983, private respondents, the Zarates, filed Civil
Baylo. The union produced no offspring. Candidas daughter, Cirila Case No. 2375, an ejectment suit against the Sevillos before the
Baylo Carolasan, was sired by another man. Municipal Trial Court of Bian.[4] The municipal court ruled in favor
of plaintiffs and ordered defendants below, to immediately vacate
In 1965, Pablo Sevillo, with Candida Baylo, filed a petition
the subject property and remove their houses thereon and to pay
before the Court of First Instance for reconstitution of
rental in arrears, damages, attorneys fees and litigation
title. Reconstitution was allowed and TCT No. RT-926 was issued
expenses.[5]Writs of execution and demolition were issued by the
in the name of Pablo Sevillo, married to Candida Baylo. Pablo
court. Defendants filed a motion for reconsideration but before
Sevillo and his wife died in 1967 and in 1974, respectively.
said motion could be heard, they filed a petition for certiorari with
In 1980, the heirs of Cirila Baylo Carolasan,[1] all surnamed the Regional Trial Court of Laguna (Civil Case No. B-3106). The
Zarate and herein private respondents, filed a case for annulment Sevillos alleged that the inferior court did not have jurisdiction
of deed of sale over Lot 981 and for partition of property among over the case which was filed more than a year after the alleged
the surviving heirs of Pablo Sevillo. The case was docketed unlawful entry. The Regional Trial Court held that the municipal
as Civil Case No. B-1656 before the Court of First Instance of Bian, court had no jurisdiction over the complaint for ejectment. On
Laguna. The Deed of Sale sought to be annulled was allegedly appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the Regional Trial Courts
executed by Candida Baylo, grandmother to the Zarates, in favor decision on July 11, 1990 in CA-G.R. SP No. 18806. Affirming the
of Gregorio, Samero, Martin and Andrea, surnamed Sevillo and appellate courts decision, the Supreme Court denied the Sevillos
Isidro Zamora. After trial on the merits, the court rendered its petition for review in G.R. No. 94382 on April 10, 1991.[6]
Decision on June 15, 1982 with the following dispositive portion:
On July 10, 1991, petitioner Iigo F. Carlet, as special
administrator of the estate of Pablo and Antonia Sevillo, filed the
case at bar, an action for reconveyance of property, docketed
as Civil Case No. B-3582, against the heirs of Cirila namely, are conclusively settled by a judgment rendered therein, such facts
Virginia, Jacobo, Victoria and Elvira, all surnamed Zarate. Plaintiff or questions become res judicata and may not again be litigated in
therein prayed for a declaration of ownership over the entire 864- a subsequent action between the same parties or their privies
square-meter lot in the name of the estate of Jose Sevillo and/ or regardless of the form of the latter. This is the essence of res
the estate of Teodoro, Mariano, Vicente and Pablo Sevillo; that TCT judicata or bar by prior judgment.[10]
Nos. T-163393 and T-163388 be annulled and a new one be issued
in favor of said estate; and that defendants be ordered to There are four requisites to successfully invoke res judicata:
pay P20,000.00, attorneys fees in the amount of P50,000.00 and (a) finality of the former judgment; (b) the court which rendered
expenses of litigation.[7] it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (c) it
must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be between
Defendants Zarate moved to dismiss the case on the ground the first and second actions identity of parties, subject matter and
of res judicata, claiming that the facts alleged in the complaint had cause of action.[11] A judgment on the merits rendered in the first
already been pleaded and passed upon by the lower court in Civil case constitutes an absolute bar to the subsequent action when the
Case No. B-1656, the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 07657 and three identities are present.[12]
by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 74505. They also opposed the
motion for preliminary injunction saying it was meant to delay and The attendance of the first three elements for the application
that the grounds relied upon had previously been passed upon by of res judicata is not disputed by petitioner. What needs to be
the lower court in Civil Case Nos. B-1656 and 2375, the Court of determined is the existence of identity in parties, subject matter
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 18806 and the Supreme Court in G.R. No. and cause of action between Civil Case Nos. B-1656 and B-3582.
94382. Respondent court correctly concluded that there is identity
On October 8, 1991, the trial court issued an Order granting of parties between the case at bar (Civil Case No. B-3582), an
the motion to dismiss Civil Case No. B-3582, stating that the issue action for reconveyance of Lot No. 981, and Civil Case No. B-1656
of ownership had been threshed out in the cases cited and that, as for annulment of deed of sale and partition involving the same Lot
held by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 07657, plaintiff 981. Although Civil Case No. B-3582 was initiated by petitioner as
below merely tried to obtain the same relief by way of a different administrator of the estate of Pablo and Antonia Sevillo, the fact
action. The dispositive portion of said Order reads: remains that he represents the same heirs of Pablo Sevillo, namely
Martin, Alejandra, Casimiro (or Samero) and Consolacion Sevillo
who were defendants in Civil Case No. B-1656, as the latter or their
WHEREFORE, finding merit in the motion to dismiss, the same is heirs would eventually benefit should petitioner succeed in this
hereby granted and the above case is hereby ordered case. Petitioners allegation that he represents the heirs of Jose
dismissed. As a consequence, the motion for preliminary Sevillo and Severa Bayran Sevillo and, therefore, including Pablo
injunction is hereby denied. Sevillos three brothers, is belied by the very title of the instant
petition that he is the special administrator of the estate of Pablo
Pursuant to well-settled pronouncements of the Supreme Court, Sevillo and Antonia Palisoc, having been appointed as such on July
the plaintiff and her counsel are hereby ordered to explain within 10, 1991.[13]
five (5) days from receipt hereof why they should not be cited in
contempt of court for forum-shopping. Let a copy of this order be It should further be stressed that absolute identity of parties
furnished the local IBP Chapter where Atty. Modesto Jimenez is not required for the principle of res judicata to be
belongs so that he may be administratively dealt with in applicable.[14] A shared identity of interest is sufficient to invoke
accordance with law. the coverage of this principle.[15] While it is true that the heirs of
Pablo and Antonia Sevillo will still be judicially determined at the
intestate proceedings in which petitioner was named estate
SO ORDERED. special administrator, it is equally true that the defendants in Civil
Case No. B-1656, namely Consolacion, Alejandra, Samero and
Carlets appeal to respondent court (CA-G.R. CV No. 36129) Martin Sevillo, are the children and heirs of Pablo and Antonia
was dismissed on January 11, 1994, with the Court of Appeals Sevillo.
affirming the questioned Order of the trial court in toto and
ordering appellants and counsel to pay treble costs.[8] There is no dispute as regards the identity of subject matter
since the center of controversy in the instant case and in Civil Case
Hence, the instant petition for review where the issue to be No. B-1656 is Lot No. 981 of the Bian Estate.
resolved is whether or not the adjudication in Civil Case No. B-
1656 (including CA-G.R. SP No. 07657 and SC-G.R. No. 74505) As regards identity of causes of action, the test often used in
constitutes res judicata to the case at bar (Civil Case No. B-3582). determining whether causes of action are identical is to ascertain
whether the same evidence which is necessary to sustain the
Petitioner in the main contends that respondent court erred, second action would have been sufficient to authorize a recovery
because there is no identity of cause of action between the case at in the first, even if the forms or nature of the two actions be
bar (Civil Case No. B-3582) and the cases cited, particularly Civil different. If the same facts or evidence would sustain both actions,
Case No. B-1656. The former is an entirely different case which the two actions are considered the same within the rule that the
seeks the annulment of TCT No. 1599 and the derivative titles judgment in the former is a bar to the subsequent action;
issued in the name of private respondents Zarate. There is likewise otherwise, it is not.[16]
no identity of parties. According to petitioner, the plaintiff in Civil
Case No. 3582 is the Special Administrator representing the estate The instant case (Civil Case No. B-3582), which is an action
of Jose Sevillo and Severa Bayran, who does not represent any of for the reconveyance of Lot No. 981, is premised on the claim that
the private respondents herein.[9] TCT Nos. T-163388 and T-163393, belonging to private
respondents as heirs of Candida Baylo and Cirila Baylo Carolasan,
We affirm the contested decision of the Court of Appeals. are null and void.[17] To succeed entails presenting evidence that
the title acquired by the Zarates, upon which they founded their
When material facts or questions which were in issue in a complaint for partition in Civil Case No. B-1656, is in fact null and
former action and were admitted or judicially determined there void.
 In Civil Case No. B-1656, the Zarates prayer for partition of With respect to the issue of forum-shopping for which the
Lot No. 981 was anchored on the authenticity of their title trial court ordered counsel for petitioners, Atty. Modesto Jimenez,
thereto. Consequently, the case provided the defendants, heirs of to explain why he should not be cited in contempt,[24] this applies
Pablo and Antonia Sevillo, the opportunity to prove otherwise, i.e. only when the two (or more) cases are still pending.[25]
that the Zarates title was null and void. However, they failed to
contest the matter before the trial court, the Court of Appeals and Clearly, despite knowledge of final judgments in Civil Case
the Supreme Court.[18] Inasmuch as the same evidence was needed No. B-1656, CA-G.R. CV No. 07657 and SC-G.R. No. 74505, as well
in prosecuting Civil Case No. B-1656 and the case at bar, there is as in G.R. No. 94382 (the ejectment case), counsel persisted in
identity of causes of action. The additional fact alleged by filing the case at bar for reconveyance. Since this case is barred by
petitioner - that Candida Baylo was not in fact married to Pablo the judgment in Civil Case No. B-1656, there was no other pending
Sevillo and the reconstituted title in their name reflects a case to speak of when it was filed in July 1991. Thus, the non-
misrepresentation is, under the circumstances, immaterial. Said forum-shopping rule is not violated.
allegation could have been presented and heard in Civil Case No. What counsel for petitioners did, however, in filing this
B-1656.[19] The parties are bound not only as regards every matter present action to relitigate the title to and partition over Lot No.
offered and received to sustain or defeat their claims or demand 981, violates Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
but as to any other admissible matter which might have been for lawyers which states that a lawyer owes candor, fairness and
offered for that purpose and of all other matters that could have good faith to the court. Rule 10.01 of the same Canon states that
been adjudged in that case.[20] (a) lawyer shall not do any falsehood x x x nor shall he mislead or
Neither does the fact that Civil Case No. B-1656 was an action allow the court to be misled by any artifice. Counsels act of filing a
for annulment of deed of sale and partition while Civil Case No. B- new case involving essentially the same cause of action is likewise
3582 is for reconveyance of property alter the fact that both cases abusive of the courts processes and may be viewed as improper
have an identical cause of action. A change in the form of the action conduct tending to directly impede, obstruct and degrade the
or in the relief sought does not remove a proper case from the administration of justice.[26]
application of res judicata.[21] WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision
Moreover, as early as March 31, 1986 in the original action of the Court of Appeals dated January 11, 1994 is hereby
for annulment of judgment case, the then Intermediate Appellate AFFIRMED. Treble costs against petitioner.
Court immediately recognized that: SO ORDERED.

Clearly, the relief sought in this action for annulment of judgment

beyond nullity of the decision in Civil Case No. B-1656, is an
adjudication that herein defendants are not entitled to Lot 981 of
the Bian Estate or any part thereof, on the stated grounds that
said property in the name of Pablo Sevillo and Candida Baylo
under T.C.T. No. RT-926 was in fact owned by Pablo Sevillo and
Antonia Palisoc, and that in any event, Candida Baylo had ceded
her interest therein to plaintiffs and/or their predecessors in
interest on March 31, 1969.


The self-same issue of ownership of Lot 981 was squarely raised
in Civil Case No. B-1656, herein defendants interest in said
property having therein been traversed by invoking instead an
alleged sale of Lot 981 to Gregorio Sevillo on August 25, 1971.

This amounts to employment of different forms of action to
obtain identical relief, in violation of the principle that one and
the same cause of action shall not twice be litigated (Yusingco v.
Ong Hian, 42 SCRA 589).[22]

It is to the interest of the public that there should be an end
to litigation by the parties over a subject fully and fairly
adjudicated - republicae ut sit finis litium. And an individual
should not be vexed twice for the same cause - nemo debet bis
vexari pro eadem causa. As this Court has had occasion to rule:


The foundation principle upon which the doctrine of res
judicata rests is that parties ought not to be permitted to litigate
the same issue more than once; that, when a right or fact has
been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent
jurisdiction, or an opportunity for such trial has been given, the
judgment of the court, so long as it remains unreversed, should
be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in
law or estate.[23]


 Republic of the Philippines xxx xxx xxx
SUPREME COURT
Manila Thirty-three (33) of those employees
enumerated in paragraph 6 of the complaint
EN BANC and one (Emiliano Tabasondra) who allegedly
abandoned his job by absenting himself for
G.R. No. L-49267 January 31, 1986 two weeks were absolutely refused
readmission. They are the following-
THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY, LTD. and FGU
INSURANCE GROUP, petitioners, 1. Emiliano Tabasondra 18. Isabelo Julaga-ay
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, THE INSULAR 2. Sixto Tongos 19. Jose M. Victorio
LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY, LTD. EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-
NATU, FGU INSURANCE GROUP WORKERS & EMPLOYEES 3. Alfredo Cesar 20. Domingo Nicolas
ASSOCIATION-NATU and INSULAR LIFE BUILDING
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU, respondents.
4. Domingo Boco 21. Pelagio Tayso
R E S O L U T I O N
5. Bias Ventura 22. Amado Manansala

6. Jose Castillon 23. Calixto Fernandez
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
7. Ricardo Villaruel 24. Mariano Subong
The controversy in this case is in regards to the meaning and
extent of the judgment rendered by this Court on January 30, 8. Amelio Lumibao 25. Paulino Bugay, Jr.
1971 in L-25291 (The Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., Employees
Association, et al. vs. The Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., 37 SCRA 9. Silvestre Banigued 26. Pacifico Ner
244), as subsequently explained in the Resolutions in the same
case of March 10, 1977 (76 SCRA 50) and of May 5, 1977 (77 10. Eusequio Villaruel 27. Jose Garcia
SCRA 3). The background facts may be briefly restated as follows:
11. Alfonso Fajardo 28. Florencio lbarra
1. "On May 20, 1958, the (respondent) Unions went on strike and
picketed the offices of the Insular Life Building at Plaza Moraga"
(37 SCRA 253). 12. Rodolfo Gutierrez 29. Isagani Timbol

2. Thereafter. "the striking employees decided to call off their 13. Ponciano Abesamis 30. Jose Pilapil
strike and to report back to work on June 2, 1958" (37 SCRA
255). 14. Esmeraldo Ballada 31. Hermenigildo
Ramirez
3. "It is not denied that when the strikers reported for work on
June 2, 1958, 63 members of the Union were refused readmission 15. Felipe Ramirez 32. Narciso Dano
because they had pending criminal charges" (37 SCRA 264).
16. Marciano Sunga 33. Pascual Esquillo
4. "On July 29, 1958, the CIR prosecutor filed a complaint for
unfair labor practice against the companies" (37 SCRA 256), 17. Domingo Castillon 34. Vicente Alsol (Rollo,
naming in paragraph 6 thereof the 63 strikers not readmitted on pp. 45-46)
June 2, 1958 (Rollo, pp. 32-33).
6. In L-25291, this Court had said:
5. It appears that, by August, 1958, 29 strikers had been
readmitted, with only 34 strikers not re-admitted. Said the CIR:
... . Subsequently, when practically all the
strikers had secured clearances from the
Upon the termination of the investigations fiscal's office, the Companies readmitted only
conducted by the respondents on those some but adamantly refused re-admission to
included in Exhibit '15', at various dates in the 34 officials and members of the Unions who
months of June, July and August, 1958, twenty were most active in the strike, on the ground
seven (27) of the employees mentioned in that they committed 'acts inimical to the
paragraph 6 of the complaint and three (3) interest of the respondent's, without however
employees who were not included as stating the specific acts allegedly committed.
complainants in this case (Francisco Baltazar, ...(37 SCRA p. 255)
Castor Reyes and Alfredo Velmonte) were
readmitted upon showing to the satisfaction of
respondents that they did not commit 7. The unfair practice was dismissed by CIR on August 17, 1965.
unlawful acts during the strike (Exh. '16'). On certiorari in L-25291, this Court, on January 30, 1971,
rendered judgment as follows:
 ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of
Industrial Relations dated August 17, 1965 is
reversed and set aside, and another is entered,
ordering the respondents to reinstate the
dismissed members of the petitioning Unions
to their former or comparatively similar
positions, with backwages from June 2, 1958
up to the dates of their actual reinstatements.
Costs against the respondents. (37 SCRA 280)

8. In its Resolution of March 10, 1977, this court said, in respect
of back wages from June 2, 1958, that the "Court considers the
fixing and limitation of the backwages award to their total
equivalent of three years without qualification and deduction as
applicable to and fully justified in the case at bar." (76 SCRA 64).


9. In proceedings for the implementation of the judgment of this
Court, a Labor Arbiter, in an Order dated May 23, 1977,
confirmed by respondent National Labor Relations Commission
in a Resolution dated August 1, 1978, upheld the claim of
respondent Unions that the 29 strikers who were not readmitted
on June 2, 1958, but only during June, July and August, 1958,
should also be entitled to the three years back pay together with
the 34 strikers who were never readmitted.

10. On November 14, 1978, these certiorari proceedings were
instituted by petitioner companies questioning the propriety of
NLRC's interpretation of this Court's judgment in L-25291.

In L-25291, it was already conceded that of the 63 Union
members not readmitted on June 2, 1958, 29 were subsequently
readmitted during June, July and August, 1958. Petitioner
companies had only "adamantly refused readmission to 34".
Hence, the judgment of January 30, 1971 "ordering the
respondents to reinstate the dismissed members of the petitioning
Union" could only refer to the 34 strikers refuse readmission,
excluding the 29 who had already been readmitted during the
mentioned period of June, July and August, 1958. This Court
could not have intended to order the reinstatement of, and
payment of three years back wages, to dismissed members of the
Union who had admittedly been reinstated long before the date
of the judgment.


The Union submission that all strikers refused readmission on
June 2, 1958 are entitled to backwages despite their
reinstatement in June, July and August, 1958, would be
tantamount to unjust enrichment at the expense of the
employers. As commented for the public respondent by Ruben M.
Alberto, the NLRC Chief, Research and Legal Services, "The fact of
payment of wages after reinstatement naturally precludes the
assessment of backwages for the same period. This is elementary,
otherwise that would be double pay." (Rono, p. 117)

ACCORDINGLY, the Writ of certiorari is granted. The Order of the
Labor Arbiter dated May 23, 1977, and the Resolution of the
NLRC dated August 1, 1978, are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. No costs.

SO ORDERED.







 Republic of the Philippines The Provincial Sheriff of Nueva Ecija
SUPREME COURT (reg.-spl.-del.)
Manila Cabanatuan City
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-25503 December 17, 1966 stating:
LEON DEL ROSARIO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. BIENVENIDO CHINGCUANGCO, Associate Judge of the NOW, THEREFORE, until further orders from this Court,
Court of Agrarian Relations, PROVINCIAL SHERIFF of NUEVA You, your agents, your representatives and/or any
ECIJA and TOMAS IMPERIO, respondents. person or persons acting in your behalf are hereby
Manuel A. Cordero for petitioner. restrained from implementing the Writ of Execution
Angel C. Imperio for respondents. dated December 16, 1965, in CAR Cases Nos. 2652-NE-
BENGZON, J.P., J.: 61 and 2902-NE-62 of the Court of Agrarian Relations of
Cabanatuan City entitled "Leon del Rosario, plaintiff,
versus Tomas Imperio, defendant."
This is a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction
principally assailing an order of the Court of Agrarian Relations
denying a motion to stay execution of its judgment dispossessing On January 20, 1966, respondents filed their answer. Further
the tenant until he is indemnified for alleged expenses and developments came by way of two petitions for contempt: First, a
improvements. petition filed by respondent Imperio dated February 5, 1966, to
declare petitioner's counsel in direct contempt, on the alleged
ground that in his petition herein said lawyer cited a fictitious
As leasehold tenant, petitioner, Leon del Rosario, occupied a authority. Second, a petition filed by Del Rosario, dated June 20,
parcel of land owned by respondent Tomas Imperio, situated in 1966, to cite for contempt respondent Imperio, and three non-
Cabocbocan Rizal, Nueva Ecija. Said land became the subject parties, the Chief of Police of the Municipality of Rizal, Nueva
matter of litigation between said parties before the Court of Ecija (Eduardo Dumlao), and policemen Remigio Baldonado and
Agrarian Relations, Fourth regional district, in CAR Cases Nos. Romeo Miguel, for having allegedly sought to eject Del Rosario
2652-NE '61 and 2902-NE '62. And on July 12, 1963, a decision from the land in question notwithstanding, this Court's
was rendered therein, the dispositive portion running as follows: preliminary injunction. To this a supplementary petition for
contempt was filed, dated July 25, 1966, alleging further that with
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered: (1) the full backing of said policemen, Imperio caused the plowing
ordering the ejectment of Leon del Rosario from the and harrowing of the landholding and prevented Del Rosario
landholding in question subject to Section 43 and from reaping the crops therein.
Section 50, paragraph (a), R.A. No. 1199, as amended by
R.A. No. 2263; and(2) ordering Tomas Imperio to pay After the respective parties had filed their comments to the
Leon del Rosario the value of the excess rentals received petitions for contempt, We deferred their resolution until
by him for the agricultural years 1961-62 and 1962-63. consideration of this case upon the merits.

Said judgment was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals on At issue on the merits of this petition for certiorari is the proper
March 26, 1965. interpretation or application of Section 43 of Republic Act 1199
(Agricultural Tenancy Act) which provides:
Subsequently, on October 26, 1965, Imperio filed with the Court
of Agrarian Relations a motion for execution of the aforestated SEC. 43. Rights and Obligations of Tenant-Lessee.With
judgment. Del Rosario however opposed it, on the ground that he the creation of the tenancy relationship arising out of
has a right of retention over the land until he is indemnified for the contract between the landholder-lessor and tenant-
expenses and improvements, alleging that in the present case he lessee, the latter shall have the right to enter the
is entitled thereto. Acting thereon, the Court of Agrarian premises of the land, and to the adequate and peaceful
Relations, on November 18, 1965, issued an order for the enjoyment thereof. He shall have the right to work the
issuance of a writ of execution, stating that the judgment had land according to his best judgment, provided the
become final and executory, and that Del Rosario's claim for manner and method of cultivation and harvest are in
indemnity, if any, should be filed with said court for accordance with proven farm practices. Upon
determination, but cannot stop execution of said judgment. Del termination of the relationship, he shall be entitled to
Rosario filed a motion for reconsideration but this was denied by one-half of the value of the improvements made by him,
the same court on December 14, 1965. And on December 16, provided they are reasonable and adequate to the
1965, the corresponding writ of execution was issued. purposes of the lease. (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner Del Rosario then filed, on December 27, 1965, the in relation to Section 1 of Rule 15 of the Rules of the Court of
present special civil action herein. Agrarian Relations, stating:

Respondents, on January 4, 1966, were required by Us to answer Rule 15.Writ of Execution.

the petition; and on January 8, 1966, We issued a writ of
preliminary injunction addressed:
Section 1. Requisites for Issuance of Writ of Execution in
Case of Final Judgment Ejecting Tenant.In cases where
To: Hon. Bienvenido Chingcuangco (reg.-Spl.-del.) the dispossession is authorized by final judgment no
Judge, Court of Agrarian Relations writ of execution shall issue unless upon certification of
Cabanatuan City the corresponding Judge that the tenant has been fully
indemnified of his claim under Section 22 of Republic
 Act No. 1199 in case of share tenancy or under Section Section 1, Rule 15, Rules of the Courts of Agrarian
43 thereof in case of leasehold tenancy. Relations, predicated on Section 43 of Republic Act No.
1199, as amended, supra, has been upheld to be valid by
It is the position of respondents that Section 43 of Republic Act this Honorable Tribunal so that now no writ of
1199 merely grants the tenant the right to recover one-half of the execution can be issued unless it is complied with first
value of improvements he made on the land, without giving him (Paz Ongsiako, Inc. vs. Celestino Abad, et al., G.R. No. L-
any right of retention over the land until he is so reimbursed. As 121447). This ruling, in effect, created and established
to Section 1 of Rule 15 of the Rules of the Court of Agrarian or confirmed the prior substantial right of a tenant to
Relations, they contend that the same had been superseded with indemnification before he is finally ejected from his
the advent of the Agricultural Land Reform Code (R.A. 3844), holding.
effective August 8, 1963, which replaced the Rules of the Court of
Agrarian Relations with the Rules of Court (Sec. 115, R.A. 3844). Petitioner's counsel obviously had in mind this Court's decision
And, they emphasize that there can be no vested right on in Paz Ongsiako, Inc. vs. Celestino Abad, L-12147, July 30, 1957.
procedure, arguing that petitioner's right under the former Rules Although he cites as docket number L-121447 instead of L-
of the Court of Agrarian Relations cannot be anything more than 12147, the same is plainly but a slight typographical mistake not
procedural. sufficient to place him in contempt, especially because the names
of the parties were given correctly. As to said counsel's
There is no merit to the view that Section 1 of Rule 15 of the interpretation of this Court's decision in said case, or of what the
Rules of the Court of Agrarian Relations is not applicable in this ruling therein "in effect" created, established or confirmed, the
case for having been abrogated with the enactment of the same are mere arguments fully within the bounds of earnest
Agricultural Land Reform Code. Said Code, it is true, provides that debate, rather than a deception urged upon this Court. The first
the Court of Agrarian Relations shall be governed by the Rules of petition for contempt is therefore without merit.
Court. (Sec. 155, R.A. 3844). And neither the Rules of Court then
obtaining nor the present Rules of Court contain a similar The second petition for contempt is against respondent Imperio
provision requiring payment to the tenant of one-half of the value and three others, not parties herein: the Chief of Police of the
of his improvements before there can be execution of a judgment Municipality of Rizal, Nueva Ecija, Eduardo Dumlao; policeman
dispossessing him. Nonetheless, since the Rules of Court were Remigio Baldonado; and, policeman Romeo Miguel. Said petition
applied to the Court of Agrarian Relations only on August 8, 1963, as well as the supplemental petition thereto, allege that
pursuant to Republic Act 3844 as aforestated, its effectiveness to respondent Imperio, with the aid of the three law enforcement
pending cases as of that time, such as the instant case, should officers, disturbed petitioner in the possession and cultivation of
follow the norm set forth in Rule 133 therein; "These rules . . . the land, on June 13, 1966; caused its plowing and harrowing on
shall govern all cases brought after they take effect, and also all June 27, 1966; and prevented the petitioner from reaping the
further proceedings in cases then pending, except to the extent second rice crop on July 16, 1966. The foregoing acts, if true,
that in the opinion of the court their application would not be would be a ground for contempt only if at the time this Court's
feasible or would work injustice, in which event the former writ of preliminary injunction was issued, respondent court's
procedure shall apply." writ of execution had not yet been carried out. From the sheriff's
return,1 however, it would appear that respondent Imperio was
Should it turn out that indeed petitioner tenant had made placed in possession of the land by virtue of the writ of execution
improvements on the landholding, a point not for Us now to as of December 18, 1965. This Court's preliminary injunction,
decide then Section 43 of Republic Act 1199 clearly gives him restraining implementation of the writ of execution, was issued
the right to one-half of their value, thereby imposing upon the only on January 8, 1966. Respondents, therefore, may not be held
landholder dispossessing him the correlative duty of paying the in contempt. Nonetheless, the premature implementation of the
same. The rule prevailing during the pendency of this case in the writ of execution being illegal, petitioner should be restored to
Court of Agrarian Relations required that this account be settled peaceful and undisturbed possession of the landholding, until his
before any judgment of ejectment can be executed. It is therefore claim for payment of improvements (one-half of their value) is
not difficult to see that to apply the Rules of Court, which do not settled by respondent court.
contain a similar provision, would be unjust to the tenant. In this
event, the former procedure is to be followed, namely, Section 1 WHEREFORE, respondent court's orders of November 18, 1965
of Rule 15 of the Rules of the Court of Agrarian Relations. and December 14, 1965, denying petitioner's motion to stay
execution pending settlement of his claim for one-half of the
Respondent Imperio's argument that petitioner failed to show value of alleged improvements, as well as the writ of execution
that improvements were in fact made, should be addressed to the already issued, are hereby set aside; respondents are ordered to
Court of Agrarian Relations. The point is that the tenant's claim restore petitioner to the landholding, and to proceed according to
for reimbursement under Section 43 of Republic Act 1199 should Section 1 of Rule 15 of the former Rules of the Court of Agrarian
first be threshed out, determined and resolved before the tenant Relations, by first determining petitioner's claim for
can be dispossessed by writ of execution. This recourse is but in improvements under Section 43 of Republic Act 1199, before
accordance with the policy of the law to protect the rights of issuing a writ of execution for the said tenant's dispossession.
tenants upon the principle of social justice (Sec. 2, Republic Act The petitions for contempt are denied for lack of merit. No costs.
1199). So ordered.

The petition for contempt filed by respondent Imperio charges

petitioner's counsel of having cited a fictitious case and a non-
existing ruling. The record bears out that petitioner's counsel
alleged in page 5 of the petition for certiorari herein, thus:


 Republic of the Philippines misrepresentation and obfuscation of the
SUPREME COURT petitioners' counsel. (Last sentence, par. 1,
Manila Third Motion for Reconsideration dated Sept.
10, 1968).
EN BANC
e. ... Never has any civilized, democratic
tribunal ruled that such a gimmick (referring
to the "right to reject any and all bids") can be
used by vulturous executives to cover up and
G.R. No. L-27072 January 9, 1970 excuse losses to the public, a government
agency or just plain fraud ... and it is thus
SURIGAO MINERAL RESERVATION BOARD, ET difficult, in the light of our upbringing and
AL., petitioners, schooling, even under many of the incumbent
vs. justices, that the Honorable Supreme Court
HON. GAUDENCIO CLORIBEL ETC., ET AL., respondents, In Re: intends to create a decision that in effect does
Contempt Proceedings Against Attorneys Vicente L. Santiago, precisely that in a most absolute manner.
Jose Beltran Sotto, Graciano C. Regala and Associates, Erlito (Second sentence, par. 7, Third Motion for
R. Uy, Juanito M. Caling; and Morton F. Meads. Reconsideration dated Sept. 10, 1968).

R E S O L U T I O N The motion to inhibit filed on September 21, 1968 after

judgment herein was rendered and signed by Vicente L.
Santiago for himself and allegedly for Attys. Erlito R. Uy, and
Graciano Regala and Associates, asked Mr. Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion and Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro to inhibit themselves
SANCHEZ, J.: from considering, judging and resolving the case or any issue or
aspect thereof retroactive to January 11, 1967. The motion
After the July 31, 1968 decision of this Court adverse to charges "[t]hat the brother of the Honorable Associate Justice
respondent MacArthur International Minerals Co., the Solicitor Castro is a vice-president of the favored party who is the chief
General brought to our attention statements of record beneficiary of the false, erroneous and illegal decision dated
purportedly made by Vicente L. Santiago, Erlito R. Uy, Graciano January 31, 1968" and the ex parte preliminary injunction
Regala, and Jose Beltran Sotto, members of the Bar, with the rendered in the above-entitled case, the latter in effect prejudging
suggestion that disciplinary action be taken against them. On and predetermining this case even before the joining of an issue.
November 21, 1968, this Court issued a show-cause order. As to the Chief Justice, the motion states "[t]hat the son of the
Honorable Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion was given a
The following statements, so the Solicitor General avers, are set significant appointment in the Philippine Government by the
forth in the memoranda personally signed by Atty. Jose Beltran President a short time before the decision of July 31, 1968 was
Sotto: rendered in this case." The appointment referred to was as
secretary of the newly-created Board of Investments. The motion
presents a lengthy discourse on judicial ethics, and makes a
a. They (petitioners, including the Executive Secretary) number of side comments projecting what is claimed to be the
have made these false, ridiculous and wild statements in a patent wrongfulness of the July 31, 1968 decision. It enumerates
desperate attempt to prejudice the courts against "incidents" which, according to the motion, brought about
MacArthur International. Such efforts could be accurately respondent MacArthur's belief that "unjudicial prejudice" had
called "scattershot desperation" (Memorandum for been caused it and that there was "unjudicial favoritism" in favor
Respondents dated March 27, 1968, pp. 13-14, three lines of "petitioners, their appointing authority and a favored party
from the bottom of page 13 and first line page 14). directly benefited by the said decision." The "incidents" cited are
as follows:
b. Such a proposition is corrupt on its face and it lays bare
the immoral and arrogant attitude of the petitioners. (a) said decision is in violation of the law, which law has
(Respondents' Supplemental Memorandum and Reply to not been declared unconstitutional.
Petitioner's Memorandum Brief, dated April 13, 1968, p.
16, last two lines on bottom of the page).
(b) said decision ignores totally the applicable law in the
above-entitled case.
c. The herein petitioners ... opportunistically change their
claims and stories not only from case to case but from
pleading to pleading in the same case. (Respondents' (c) said decision deprives respondent of due process of
Supplemental Memorandum, Ibid., p.17, sixth, seventh and law and the right to adduce evidence as is the procedure
eighth lines from bottom of the page). in all previous cases of this nature.

MacArthur's third motion for reconsideration signed by Atty. (d) due course was given to the unfounded certiorari in
Vicente L. Santiago, on his behalf and purportedly for Attys. Erlito the first place when the appeal from a denial of a motion
R. Uy, Graciano Regala and Associates, and Jose B. Sotto, the to dismiss was and is neither new nor novel nor capable
Solicitor General points out, contain the following statements: of leading to a wholesome development of the law but
only served to delay respondent for the benefit of the
favored party.
d. ... ; and [the Supreme Court] has overlooked
the applicable law due to the
 (e) the preliminary injunction issued herein did not should be held responsible therefor. He further elaborated on his
maintain the status quo but destroyed it, and the explanations made on November 21, 1968.
conclusion cannot be avoided that it was destroyed for a
reason, not for no reason at all. On December 5, 1968, he supplemented his explanations by
saying that he already deleted paragraph 6 of the Motion to
(f) there are misstatements and misrepresentations in the Inhibit heretofore quoted from his rough draft but that it was still
said decision which the Honorable Supreme Court has included through inadvertence.
refused to correct.
On March 1, 1969, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, as counsel for
(g) the two main issues in the said decision were decided MacArthur, registered an amended motion to inhibit. While it
otherwise in previous decisions, and the main issue "right repeats the prayer that Mr. Chief Justice Concepcion and Mr.
to reject any or all bids" is being treated on a double Justice Castro inhibit themselves, it left but three paragraphs of
standard basis by the Honorable Supreme Court. the original motion to inhibit, taking out the dissertation on
judicial ethics and most of the comments attacking the decision of
(h) the fact that respondent believes that the Honorable this Court of July 31, 1968.
Supreme Court knows better and has greater
understanding than the said decision manifests. On the part of Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto, it must be stated that as
early as October 7, 1968, he insisted in withdrawing his
(i) the public losses (sic) one hundred and fifty to two appearance in this case as one of the lawyers of MacArthur. His
hundred million dollars by said decision without an ground was that he did not agree with the filing of the motion to
effort by the Honorable Supreme Court to learn all the inhibit the two justices. According to him, "[t]he present steps
facts through presentation through the trial court, which (sic) now being taken is against counsel's upbringing and judicial
is elementary. conscience."

On November 21, 1968, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, again for In Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto's return of November 29, 1968, he took
himself and Attys. Erlito R. Uy and Graciano Regala and pains to say that the questioned statements he made were also
Associates, in writing pointed out to this Court that the taken out of context and were necessary for the defense of his
statements specified by the Solicitor General were either quoted client MacArthur. He made the admission, though, that those
out of context, could be defended, or were comments legitimate statements lifted out of context would indeed be sufficient basis
and justifiable. Concern he expressed for the fullest defense of the for a finding that Section 20(f), Rule 138, had been violated.
interests of his clients. It was stressed that if MacArthur's
attorney could not plead such thoughts, his client would be On January 8, 1969, additional arguments were filed by Atty. Jose
deprived of due process of law. However, counsel sought to Beltran Sotto. He there averred that the Supreme Court had no
change the words "Chief Justice" to "Supreme Court" appearing original jurisdiction over the charge against him because it is one
on line 7, paragraph 2 of the motion to inhibit. Atty. Santiago also of civil contempt against a party and the charge is originally
voluntarily deleted paragraph 6 of the said motion, which in full cognizable by the Court of First Instance under Sections 4 and 10,
reads: Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. He also stressed that said charge
was not signed by an "offended party or witness", as required by
6. Unfortunately for our people, it seems that many of our law; and that the Solicitor General and his assistants could not
judicial authorities believe that they are the chosen stand in the stead of an "offended Party or witness."
messengers of God in all matters that come before them,
and that no matter what the circumstances are, their We now come to Atty. Graciano C. Regala. In his explanation of
judgment is truly ordained by the Almighty unto eternity. December 2, 1968, as further clarified by a supplemental motion
Some seem to be constitutionally incapable of considering of December 27, 1968, he manifested that the use of or reference
that any emanation from their mind or pen could be the to his law firm in this case was neither authorized nor consented
product of unjudicial prejudice or unjudicial sympathy or to by him or any of his associates; that on July 14, 1967, one
favoritism for a party or an issue. Witness the recent Morton F. Meads, in MacArthur's behalf, offered to retain his
absurdity of Judge Alikpala daring to proceed to judge a services, which was accepted; that Meads inquired from him
motion to hold himself in contempt of court seemingly whether he could appear in this case; that he advised Meads that
totally oblivious or uncomprehending of the violation of this case was outside his professional competence and referred
moral principle involved and also of Judge Geraldez Meads to another lawyer who later on likewise turned down the
who refuses to inhibit himself in judging a criminal case offer; that in view of the rejection, Meads and he agreed to
against an accused who is also his correspondent in two terminate their previous retainer agreement; that he had not
other cases. What is the explanation for such mentality? Is participated in any manner in the preparation or authorship of
it outright dishonesty? Lack of intelligence? Serious any pleading or any other document in connection with this case.
deficiency in moral comprehension? Or is it that many of
our government officials are just amoral? On February 4, 1969, Atty. Erlito R. Uy explained his side of the
case. In brief, he denied participation in any of the court papers
And, in addition, he attempted to explain further subparagraphs subject of our November 21, 1968 order; claimed that he was on
(f) and (h) of paragraph 7 thereof. six months' leave of absence from July 1, 1968 to December 31,
1968 as one of the attorneys for MacArthur but that he gave his
It was on December 2, 1968 that Atty. Vicente L. Santiago filed his permission to have his name included as counsel in all of
compliance with this Court's resolution of November 21, 1968. MacArthur's pleadings in this case (L-27072), even while he was
He there stated that the motion to inhibit and third motion for on leave of absence.
reconsideration were of his exclusive making and that he alone
Hearing on this contempt incident was had on March 3, 1969. and Morton Meads to file in writing their answer to the said
return [of Atty. Caling] and at the same time to show cause why
A second contempt proceeding arose when, on July 14, 1969, they, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago and Morton Meads, should not be
respondent MacArthur, through new counsel, Atty. Juanito M. dealt with for contempt of court, on or before August 16, 1969;
Caling who entered a special appearance for the purpose, lodged and ... to direct that the three, Atty. Juanita M. Caling, Atty. Vicente
a fourth motion for reconsideration without express leave of L. Santiago, and Morton Meads, personally appear Before this
court. Said motion reiterated previous grounds raised, and Court on Thursday, August 27, 1969, at 9:30 a.m., on which date
contained the following paragraphs: the contempt proceedings against all of them will be heard by
this Court."
4. The said decision is illegal because it was penned by the
Honorable Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion when in fact he On August 13, 1969, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago gave his
was outside the borders of the Republic of the Philippines at explanation. He disavowed the truth of Atty. Caling's statement
the time of the Oral Argument of the above-entitled case that he (Santiago) convinced Caling to sign the motion. The truth,
which condition is prohibited by the New Rules of Court according to Santiago, is that one day Morton Meads went to his
Section 1, Rule 51, and we quote: "Justices; who may take office and asked him if he knew of a lawyer nearby who could
part. ... . only those members present when any matter is help him file another motion for reconsideration, and he
submitted for oral argument will take part in its consideration (Santiago) mentioned Atty. Caling; he there upon accompanied
and adjudication ..." This requirement is especially significant Meads to Caling, told Caling of Meads' desire and left Meads with
in the present instance because the member who penned the Caling. Santiago insists that he never prepared the motion and
decision was the very member who was absent for that he never even read it.
approximately four months or more. This provision also
applies to the Honorable Justices Claudio Teehankee and On August 15, 1969, Morton Meads answered. Meads' version is
Antonio Barredo. as follows: On July 14, 1969, he went to Atty. Santiago's office
with the fourth motion for reconsideration which he himself
xxx xxx xxx prepared. Santiago started to read the motion and in fact began to
make some changes in Pencil in the first or second paragraph
when Meads told him that MacArthur wanted a new lawyer, not
6. That if the respondent MacArthur International Minerals Santiago, to file the same. Meads asked Santiago if he could
Company abandons its quest for justice in the Judiciary of the recommend one. They then went to Caling whose office was on
Philippine Government, it will inevitably either raise the graft the same floor. Santiago introduced Meads to Caling at the same
and corruption of Philippine Government officials in the time handing the fourth motion to Caling. While Caling was
bidding of May 12, 1965, required by the Nickel Law to reading the document, Santiago left. After reading the motion,
determine the operator of the Surigao nickel deposits, to the Caling gave his go-signal. He signed the same after his name was
World Court on grounds of deprivation of justice and typed therein. The motion was then filed. According to Meads,
confiscation of property and /or to the United States from the time he entered the office of Santiago to the time the
Government, either its executive or judicial branches or both, motion was filed, the period that elapsed was approximately one
on the grounds of confiscation of respondent's proprietary hour and a half. Santiago was with Caling for about three minutes
vested rights by the Philippine Government without either and Meads was with Caling for about fifteen minutes.
compensation or due process of law and invoking the
Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the cutting off of all aid
and benefits to the Philippine Government, including the In defending himself from the contempt charge, Meads asserts
sugar price premium, amounting to more than fifty million that the quotation from the Rules of Court set forth in the fourth
dollars annually, until restitution or compensation is made. motion for reconsideration has not been taken out of context
because said quotation is precisely accurate; that the "xs" indicate
that it is not a complete quotation and that it is a common
This elicited another resolution from this Court on July 18, 1969, practice in court pleadings to submit partial quotations. Meads
requiring Atty. Juanito M. Caling "to show cause within five (5) further contends that the announced plan to bring the case to the
days from receipt of notice hereof why he should not be dealt World Court is not a threat. In fact, his answer also included a
with for contempt of court." notice of appeal to the World Court.

On July 30, 1969, Atty. Juanita M. Caling filed his return. He there On August 27, 1969, this Court heard Attys. Vicente L. Santiago
alleged that the said fourth motion for reconsideration was and Juanito Caling and Morton Meads in oral argument with
already finalized when Atty. Vicente L. Santiago came to his office respect to the second contempt incident. We shall now discuss
and requested him to accommodate MacArthur by signing the the first and second contempt incidents seriatim.
motion; that he turned down said request twice on the ground
that he did not know anything about the case, much less the truth
of the allegations stated in the motion; that "the allegations in 1. We start with the case of Atty. Vicente L. Santiago. In his third
said motion were subsequently explained to the undersigned motion for reconsideration, we, indeed, find language that is not
counsel together with the background of the case involved by to be expected of an officer of the courts. He pictures petitioners
Atty. Vicente L. Santiago and by one Morton F. Meads"; that upon as "vulturous executives". He speaks of this Court as a "civilized,
assurance that there was nothing wrong with the motion he was democratic tribunal", but by innuendo would suggest that it is
persuaded in good faith to sign the same; that he was misled in so not.
signing and the true facts of the allegations were not revealed to
him especially the oral argument allegedly made in the case. In his motion to inhibit, his first paragraph categorizes our
decision of July 31, 1968 as "false, erroneous and illegal" in a
Because of the foregoing explanation by Atty. Caling, this Court, presumptuous manner. He there charges that the ex
on August 4, 1969, resolved "to require Atty. Vicente L. Santiago parte preliminary injunction we issued in this case prejudiced
and predetermined the case even before the joining of an issue.
He accuses in a reckless manner two justices of this Court for indirectly from any of the petitioners or any members of any
being interested in the decision of this case: Associate Justice board-petitioner or their agents or principals, including the
Fred Ruiz Castro, because his brother is the vice president of the president." The absurdity of this posture is at once apparent. For
favored party who is the chief beneficiary of the decision, and one thing, the justices of this Court are appointed by the
Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, whose son was appointed President and in that sense may be considered to have each
secretary of the newly-created Board of Investments, "a received a favor from the President. Should these justices inhibit
significant appointment in the Philippine Government by the themselves every time a case involving the Administration crops
President, a short time before the decision of July 31, 1968 was up? Such a thought may not certainly be entertained. The
rendered." In this backdrop, he proceeds to state that "it would consequence thereof would be to paralyze the machinery of this
seem that the principles thus established [the moral and ethical Court. We would in fact, be wreaking havoc on the tripartite
guidelines for inhibition of any judicial authority by the system of government operating in this country. Counsel is
Honorable Supreme Court should first apply to itself." He puts presumed to know this. But why the unfounded charge? There is
forth the claim that lesser and further removed conditions have the not-too-well concealed effort on the part of a losing litigant's
been known to create favoritism, only to conclude that there is no attorney to downgrade this Court.
reason for a belief that the conditions obtaining in the case of the
Chief Justice and Justice Castro "would be less likely to engender The mischief that stems from all of the foregoing gross disrespect
favoritism or prejudice for or against a particular cause or party." is easy to discern. Such disrespect detracts much from the dignity
Implicit in this at least is that the Chief Justice and Justice Castro of a court of justice. Decidedly not an expression of faith,
are insensible to delicadeza, which could make their actuation counsel's words are intended to create an atmosphere of distrust,
suspect. He makes it plain in the motion that the Chief Justice and of disbelief. We are thus called upon to repeat what we have said
Justice Castro not only were not free from the appearance of in Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer (1967), 20 SCRA 441, 444, as
impropriety but did arouse suspicion that their relationship did follows: "By now, a lawyer's duties to the Court have become
affect their judgment. He points out that courts must be above common place. Really, there could hardly be any valid excuse for
suspicion at all times like Caesar's wife, warns that loss of lapses in the observance thereof. Section 20(b), Rule 138 of the
confidence for the Tribunal or a member thereof should not be Rules of Court, in categorical terms, spells out one such duty: 'To
allowed to happen in our country, "although the process has observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and
already begun." judicial officers.' As explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which
pronounces that '[i]t is the duty of the lawyer to maintain
It is true that Santiago voluntarily deleted paragraph 6 which towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the
contained language that is as disrespectful. But we cannot erase temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the
the fact that it has been made. He explained that, he deleted this maintenance of its supreme importance.' That same canon, as a
paragraph in his rough draft, which paragraph was included in corollary, makes it peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers to support
the motion filed in this Court only because of mere inadvertence. the courts against 'unjust criticism and clamor.' And more. The
This explanation does not make much of a distinguishing attorney's oath solemnly binds him to a conduct that should be
difference; it erects no shield. Not only because it was belatedly 'with all good fidelity ... to the courts.' Worth remembering is that
made but also because his signature appeared on the motion to the duty of an attorney to the courts can only be maintained by
inhibit which included paragraph 6. And this paragraph 6 rendering no service involving any disrespect to the judicial office
describes with derision "many of our judicial authorities" who which he is bound to uphold.' "
"believe that they are the chosen messengers of God in all matters
that come before them, and that no matter what the A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, "like the court itself, an
circumstances are, their judgment is truly ordained by the instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice."1 His duty is
Almighty unto eternity." It depicts them as seemingly "incapable to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to which he
of considering that any emanation from their mind or pen could owes fidelity, "not to promote distrust in the administration of
be the product of unjudicial prejudice or unjudicial sympathy or justice."2 Faith in the courts a lawyer should seek to preserve. For,
favoritism for a party or an issue." After citing acts of two judges to undermine the judicial edifice "is disastrous to the continuity
of first instance, he paused to ask: "What is the explanation for of government and to the attainment of the liberties of the
such mentality? Is it outright dishonesty? Lack of intelligence? people."3 Thus has it been said of a lawyer that "[a]s an officer of
Serious deficiency in moral comprehension? Or is it that many of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not
our government officials are just amoral?" destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the
courts so essential to the proper administration of justice."4
Paragraph 7 also of the motion to inhibit repeated mention of
"unjudicial prejudice" against respondent MacArthur and spoke It ill behooves Santiago to justify his language with the statement
of "unjudicial favoritism" for petitioners, their appointing that it was necessary for the defense of his client. A client's cause
authority and a favored party directly benefited by the decision. does not permit an attorney to cross the line between liberty and
Paragraph 8 is a lecture on judicial ethics. Paragraph 9 is a license. Lawyers must always keep in perspective the thought
warning to this Court about loss of confidence, and paragraph 10 that "[s]ince lawyers are administrators of justice, oath-bound
makes a sweeping statement that "any other justices who have servants of society, their first duty is not to their clients, as many
received favors or benefits directly or indirectly from any of the suppose, but to the administration of justice; to this, their clients'
petitioners or members of any board-petitioner, or their agents success is wholly subordinate; and their conduct ought to and
or principals, including the President", should also inhibit must be scrupulously observant of law and ethics."5 As rightly
themselves. observed by Mr. Justice Malcolm in his well-known treatise, a
judge from the very nature of his position, lacks the power to
What is disconcerting is that Atty. Santiago's accusations have no defend himself and it is the attorney, and no other, who can
basis in fact and in law. The slur made is not limited to the Chief better or more appropriately support the judiciary and the
Justice and Mr. Justice Castro. It sweepingly casts aspersion on incumbent of the judicial position.6 From this, Mr. Justice
the whole court. For, inhibition is also asked of, we repeat, "any Malcolm continued to say: "It will of course be a trying ordeal for
other justices who have received favors or benefits directly or attorneys under certain conditions to maintain respectful
obedience to the court. It may happen that counsel possesses an officer of the court in the performance of his official duties;
greater knowledge of the law than the justice of the peace or and that he too has committed, under Section 3 (d) of the same
judge who presides over the court. It may also happen that since rule, improper conduct tending to degrade the administration of
no court claims infallibility, judges may grossly err in their justice. He is, therefore, guilty of contempt.
decisions. Nevertheless, discipline and self-restraint on the part of
the bar even under adverse conditions are necessary for the 3. Not much need be said of the case of Atty. Graciano C. Regala. It
orderly administration of was improper for Atty. Santiago to have included the name of the
justice."7 firm of Atty. Regala without the latter's knowledge and consent.
Correctly did Regala insist and this is confirmed by the other
The precepts, the teachings, the injunctions just recited are not lawyers of respondents that he had not participated in any
unfamiliar to lawyers. And yet, this Court finds in the language of way in the pleadings of the above-entitled case. Regala did not
Atty. Santiago a style that undermines and degrades the even know that his name was included as co-counsel in this case.
administration of justice. The stricture in Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 He is exonerated.
of the Rules against improper conduct tending to degrade the
administration of justice8 is thus transgressed. Atty. Santiago is 4. Last to be considered with respect to the first contempt
guilty of contempt of court. incident is the case of Atty. Erlito R. Uy. Borne out by the record is
the fact that Atty. Uy was not also involved in the preparation of
2. We next take the case of Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto. We analyze any of the pleadings subject of the contempt citation. He should
the statements pointed out to us by the Solicitor General be held exempt from contempt.
hereinbefore quoted. Sotto accuses petitioners of having made
"false, ridiculous and wild statements in a desperate attempt to 5. We now turn our attention to the second contempt incident.
prejudice the courts against MacArthur." He brands such efforts The fourth motion for reconsideration is, indeed, an act of
as "scattershot desperation". He describes a proposition of contumacy.
petitioners as "corrupt on its face", laying bare "the immoral and
arrogant attitude of the petitioners." He charges petitioners with
opportunistically changing their claims and stories not only from First. It was filed without express leave of court. No explanation
case to case but from pleading to pleading in the same case. Such has been made why this has been done.
language is not arguably protected; it is the surfacing of a feeling
of contempt towards a litigant; it offends the court before which Second. It lifted Section 1. Rule 51, Rules of Court, out of context.
it is made. It is no excuse to say that these statements were taken Said Section 1 was quoted as follows: "Justices; who may take
out of context. We have analyzed the lines surrounding said part. ... only those members present when any matter is
statements. They do not in any manner justify the inclusion of submitted for oral argument will take part in its consideration
offensive language in the pleadings. It has been said that "[a] and adjudication ..." However, the provision in its entire thought
lawyer's language should be dignified in keeping with the dignity should be read thus
of the legal profession."9 It is Sotto's duty as a member of the Bar
"[t]o abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact SECTION 1. Justices; who may take part. All
prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, matters submitted to the court for its
unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is consideration and adjudication will be deemed
charged." 10 to be submitted for consideration and
adjudication by any and all of the Justices who
Not far from the case of Atty. Sotto is People vs. Young, 83 Phil. are members of the division of the court at the
702, 708, where counsel for the accused convicted of murder time when such matters are taken up for
made use of the following raw language in his brief : "The accused consideration and adjudication, whether such
since birth was a poor man and a son of a poor farmer, that since Justices were or were not present at the date
his boyhood he has never owned a thousand pesos in his own of submission; however, only those members
name. Now, here comes a chance for him. A cold fifty thousand present when any matter is submitted for oral
bucks in exchange of a man's life. A simple job. Perhaps a argument will take part in its consideration
question of seconds' work and that would transform him into a and adjudication, if the parties or either of
new man. Once in a small nipa shack, now in a palatial mansion! them, express a desire to that effect in writing
This poor ignorant man blinded by the promise of wealth, filed with the clerk at the date of
protection and stability was given to do the forbidden deed." We submission. 12
there held that "[s]uch a plea is a disgrace to the bar and an
affront to the court." Atty. Caling, who was admitted to the Bar in 1966, did not
attempt to explain this point.
It will not avail Sotto any to say that the Solicitor General or his
assistants may not be considered offended parties in this case. Meads, however, for his part tried to reason out why such a
This Court may motu proprio start proceedings of this nature. distorted quotation came about the portion left out was
There should be no doubt about the power of this Court to punish anyway marked by "XS" which is a common practice among
him for contempt under the circumstances. For, inherent in lawyers. Canon 22 of the Canons of Legal Ethics reminds the
courts is the power "[t]o control, in furtherance of justice, the lawyer to characterize his conduct with candor and fairness, and
conduct of its ministerial officers, and of all other persons in any specifically states that "it is not candid nor fair for the lawyer
manner connected with a case before it, in every manner knowingly to misquote." While Morton Meads is admittedly not a
appertaining thereto." 11 lawyer, it does not take a lawyer to see the deliberate deception
that is being foisted upon this Court. There was a qualification to
We, accordingly, hold that Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto has the rule quoted and that qualification was intentionally omitted.
misbehaved, under Section 3 (a), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, as
Third. The motion contained an express threat to take the case to rather than punishment. The people should not be given cause to
the World Court and/or the United States government. It must be break faith with the belief that a judge is the epitome of honor
remembered that respondent MacArthur at that time was still amongst men. To preserve its dignity, a court of justice should
trying to overturn the decision of this Court of July 31, 1968. In not yield to the assaults of disrespect. Punctilio of honor, we
doing so, unnecessary statements were injected. More prefer to think, is a standard of behavior so desirable in a lawyer
specifically, the motion announced that MacArthur "will pleading a cause before a court of justice.
inevitably ... raise the graft and corruption of [the] Philippine
government officials in the bidding of May 12, 1965 ... to the 9. One last word. It would seem apropos to say again that, if only
World Court" and would invoke "the Hickenlooper Amendment for one reason, this Court had really no alternative but to decide
requiring the cutting off of all aid and benefits to the Philippine the main case against respondent MacArthur. As we held in our
Government, including the sugar price premium, amounting to decision of July 31, 1968, MacArthur did not even adhere to the
more than fifty million dollars annually ... ." terms and conditions of the invitation to bid. For, this invitation
to bid explicitly warned that "bids not accompanied by bid bonds
This is a clear attempt to influence or bend the mind of this Court will be rejected. And We repeat, "[a]dmittedly, the bid of the
to decide the case in its favor. A notice of appeal to the World Company [MacArthur] had been submitted without the requisite
Court has even been embodied in Meads' return. There is a gross bond." 13 It would not require the adroit mind of a lawyer to say
inconsistency between the appeal and the move to reconsider the that a bid unaccompanied by a bond., contrary to the instructions
decision. An appeal from a decision presupposes that a party has to bidders, is not entitled to any consideration.
already abandoned any move to reconsider that decision. And
yet, it would appear that the appeal to the World Court is being It should be emphasized, too, that because the decision herein
dangled as a threat to effect a change of the decision of this Court. was by a unanimous Court, even if the Chief Justice and Mr.
Such act has no aboveboard explanation. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro had not taken part in the decision on the
merits of this case, the result would have been the same:
6. Atty. Caling has not shown to the satisfaction of this Court that MacArthur's cause would just the same have failed.
he should be exempted from the contempt charge against him. He
knows that he is an officer of this Court. He admits that he has For the reasons given, this Court hereby finds:
read the fourth motion for reconsideration before he signed it.
While he has been dragged in only at the last minute, still it was
plainly his duty to have taken care that his name should not be 1. On the first contempt charge, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago and Atty.
attached to pleadings contemptuous in character. Jose Beltran Sotto guilty of contempt of court, and fines Atty.
Santiago in the sum of P1,000, and Atty. Sotto, P100; and holds
Attys. Graciano C. Regala and Associates and Atty. Erlito R. Uy not
7. As for Morton F. Meads, he had admitted having prepared the guilty of contempt of court; and
fourth motion for reconsideration. He cannot beg off from the
contempt charge against him even though he is not a lawyer. He
is guilty of contempt. 2. On the second contempt charge, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago,
Morton F. Meads and Atty. Juanita M. Caling guilty of contempt of
court, and fines Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, an additional P1,000,
8. We go back to Atty. Vicente L. Santiago. His insistence that he Morton F. Meads, P1,000, and Atty. Juanito M. Caling, P200.
had nothing to do with the fourth motion for reconsideration and
that he had not even read the same is too transparent to survive
fair appraisal. It goes against the grain of circumstances. Caling Let a copy of this resolution be forwarded to the Honorable, the
represents before us that it was Santiago who convinced him to Secretary of Justice, for whatever action he may deem proper to
sign the motion, who with Meads explained to him the allegations take in the premises against Morton F. Meads who is an alien.
thereof and the background of the case. Caling says that if not for
his friendship with Santiago, he would not have signed the Let another copy of this resolution be forwarded to the
motion. On the other hand, Meads states that Santiago began to Honorable, the Solicitor General, for such action as he may deem
read the fourth motion for reconsideration and even started to proper in relation to the disbarment or suspension of Attys.
make changes thereon in pencil. We must not forget, too, that Vicente L. Santiago, Jose Beltran Sotto and Juanito M. Caling.
according to Meads himself, he spent, on July 14, 1969, quite
some time with Santiago before they proceeded to Caling. It is The Clerk of this Court is hereby directed to append a copy of this
highly improbable that Santiago did not read the fourth motion decision to the personal records of Attorneys Vicente L. Santiago,
for reconsideration during all that time. Jose Beltran Sotto and Juanito M. Caling. So ordered.

Furthermore, Santiago is a lawyer of record for respondent

MacArthur in this case. He has not resigned from his position as
such lawyer. He has control of the proceedings. Whatever steps
his client takes should be within his knowledge and
responsibility. Indeed, Canon 16 of the Canons of Legal Ethics
should have reminded him that "[a] lawyer should use his best
efforts to restrain and to prevent his clients from doing those
things which the lawyer himself ought not to do, particularly with
reference to their conduct towards courts, judicial officers, jurors,
witnesses and suitors. If a client persists in such wrongdoing the
lawyer should terminate their relation."

The dignity of the Court, experience teaches, can never be

protected where infraction of ethics meets with complacency
 Republic of the Philippines portion of complainant's boat where the
SUPREME COURT complainant was seated, thereby hitting him
Manila on the back and inflicting the injury that cause
his death so that, immediately after the
EN BANC collision - part of petitioner's boat was on top
of that of the complainant; (b) these
circumstances, likewise, indicate the
considerable speed at which petitioner's
motorboat was cruising, (c) petitioner's
G.R. No. L-33672 September 28, 1973 motorboat had suffered very little damage,
which would have been considerable had it
VICENTE MUOZ, petitioner, been rammed by the offended party's boat, the
vs. latter being bigger than, as well as provided
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, with an engine twice as powerful as, that of the
respondents, DELIA T. SUTTON, respondent. petitioner; and (d) although appellant's boat
carried several passengers, including children,
and was, in fact, overloaded, appellant acted as
R E S O L U T I O N pilot and, at the same time, as its machinist,
thereby rendering it difficult for him to
manuever it properly; the Court resolved to
[deny] the petition upon the ground that it is
FERNANDO, J.: mainly factual and for lack of merit.
Considering further, that the petition quotes,
on page 5 thereof a portion of the decision
We have before us a task far from pleasant. Respondent, Delia T. appealed from, summing up evidence for the
Sutton, a member of the Philippine Bar, connected with the law defense, and makes reference thereto
firm of Salonga, Ordoez, Yap, Parlade, and Associates, must be "findings" of the Court of Appeals, which is not
held accountable for failure to live up to that exacting standard true; that, on page 6 of the petition, petitioner
expected of counsel, more specifically with reference to a duty states, referring to a portion of the same
owing this Tribunal. She failed to meet the test of candor and quotation, that the same "are the established
honesty required of pleaders when, in a petition uncontroverted facts recognized by the Court
for certiorari prepared by her to review a Court of Appeals of Appeals," which is, likewise, untrue; that, on
decision, she attributed to it a finding of facts in reckless page 8 of the petition, it is averred "It being
disregard, to say the least, of what in truth was its version as to conceded that the two versions recounted
what transpired. When given an opportunity to make proper above are by themselves credible, although
amends, both in her appearance before us and thereafter in her they are conflicting the same cannot be
memorandum, there was lacking any showing of regret for a binding on, and is therefore, reviewable by the
misconduct so obvious and so inexcusable. Such an attitude of Honorable Supreme Court. Where the findings
intransigence hardly commends itself. Her liability is clear. Only of fact of the Court of Appeals [are conflicting],
her relative inexperience in the ways of the law did save her from the same [are not binding] on the Supreme
a penalty graver than severe censure. So we rule. Court. (Cesica v. Villaseca, G.R. L-9590, April
30, 1957)" although, in fact, no conflicting
The background of the incident before us was findings of fact are made in the decision
set forth in our resolution of July 12, 1971. It appealed from; and that, on page 9 of the
reads as follows: "Acting upon the petition for petition, it is alleged that the Court of Appeals
review in G.R. No. L-33672, Vicente Muoz v. had"affirmed the minimum penalty of one (1)
People of the Philippines and the Court of year and one (1) day imposed by the lower
Appeals, and considering that the main issue court," although, in fact, minimum penalty
therein is whether petitioner Muoz is guilty imposed by the trial court was "four(4)
of homicide through reckless negligence, as months of arresto mayor"; the Court resolved
charged in the information; that in the to require counsel for the petitioner to show
language of the decision of the Court of cause, within ten (10) days from notice, why
Appeals "the prosecution and the defense they should not be dealt with for contempt of
offered two conflicting versions of the incident court [or] otherwise subjected to disciplinary
that gave rise to the case"; that, upon action for making aforementioned
examination of the evidence, the Court of misrepresentations." " 1
Appeals found, as did the trial court, that the
version of the prosecution is the true one and A pleading entitled "Compliance with
that of the defense is unbelievable; that this Resolution" by the aforesaid law firm was filed
finding of the Court of Appeals is borne out by on August 14, 1971. There was no attempt at
substantial evidence, whereas the version of justification, because in law there is none, but
the defense is inconsistent with some it did offer what was hoped to be a satisfactory
established facts, for: (a) petitioner's theory, to explanation. If so, such optimism was
the effect that his boat had been rammed by misplaced. It betrayed on its face more than
that of the complainant, is refuted by the fact just a hint of lack of candor, of minimizing the
that after hitting the left frontal outrigger of effects of grave inaccuracies in the attribution
the latter's boat, the prow and front outrigger to the Court of Appeals certain alleged facts
of petitioner's motorboat hit also the left front
 not so considered as such. It was then to say The "Joint Apology" thus offered did mitigate to some extent the
that the least a far from meticulous appraisal liability of respondent Sutton. Some members of the Court feel,
of the matter in issue. Much of what was however, that it does not go far enough. While expressing regret
therein contained did not ring true. and offering apology, there was lacking that free admission that
what was done by her should not characterized merely as
Under the circumstances, we set the matter for hearing on "errors" consisting as they do of "inaccurate statements." If there
September 14 of the same year, requiring all lawyers-partners in were a greater sincerity on her part, the offense should have been
said firm to be present. At such a hearing, respondent Delia T. acknowledged as the submission of deliberate misstatements.
Sutton appeared. While her demeanor was respectful, it was There ought to be, for the apology to gain significance, no further
obvious that she was far from contrite. On the contrary, the attempt at minimizing the enormity of the misdeed. It is then as if
impression she gave the Court was that what was done by her there was hardly any retreat from the untenable stand originally
was hardly deserving of any reproach. Even when subjected to taken. The mood, even at this stage, seems to be that she could
intensive questioning by several members of the Court, she was brazen it out as long as the words indicative of an apology were
not to be budged from such an untenable position. It was as if she offered. This Court does not view matters thus. To purge herself
was serenely unconcerned, oblivious of the unfavorable reaction of the contempt, she ought to have displayed the proper spirit of
to, which her evasive answers gave rise. There certainly was lack contrition and humility. The burden cast on the judiciary would
of awareness of the serious character of her misdeed. The act of be intolerable if it could not take at face value what is asserted by
unruffled assurance under the circumstances was hard to counsel. The time that will have to be devoted just to the task of
understand. Perhaps realizing that the Court was not disposed to verification of allegations submitted could easily be imagined.
look at the matter as a minor peccadillo, Attorney Sedfrey A. Even with due recognition then that counsel is expected to
Ordoez of the law firm expressly acknowledged that what display the utmost zeal in defense of a client's cause, it must
appeared in its petition for certiorari prepared by respondent never be at the expense of deviation from the truth. As set forth
Delia T. Sutton insofar as it did misrepresent what is set forth in in the applicable Canon of Legal Ethics: "Nothing operates more
the Court of Appeals decision sought to be reviewed was certainly to create or to foster popular prejudice against lawyers
reprehensible, and did make with the proper spirit of humility as a class, and to deprive the profession of that full measure of
the necessary expression of regret. public esteem and confidence which belongs to the proper
discharge of its duties than does the false claim, often set up by
the unscrupulous in defense of questionable transactions, that it
What is more, the law firm in a pleading entitled "Joint Apology to is the duty of the lawyer to do whatever may enable him to
the Supreme Court" filed on December 1, 1971, signed jointly by succeed in winning his client's cause." 3 What is more, the
Sedfrey A. Ordoez and Delia Sutton, did seek to make amends obligation to the bench, especially to this Court, for candor and
thus: "1. That undersigned attorney, Delia T. Sutton, together honesty takes precedence. It is by virtue of such considerations
with Messrs. Sedfrey A. Ordoez, Pedro L. Yap and Custodio O. that punishment that must fit the offense has to be meted out to
Parlade, partners in the firm of Salonga, Ordoez, Yap, Parlade & respondent Delia T. Sutton.
Associates, appeared before this Honorable Court on November
22, 1971, pursuant to an order dated October 18, 1971; 2. That
with all the sincerity and candor at the command of undersigned At the same time, the attitude displayed by one of the senior
attorney, the circumstances surrounding her preparation of the partners, Attorney Sedfrey A. Ordoez, both in the appearances
pleading which gave rise to the instant citation to show cause before the Court and in the pleadings submitted, must be
why she should not be punished for contempt of court were commended. He has made manifest that his awareness of the role
explained by her, with the assistance of Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordoez; properly incumbent on counsel, especially in his relationship to
3. That the undersigned Delia T. Sutton had no intention to this Court, is deep-seated. It must be stated, however, that in the
misrepresent any question of fact before this Honorable Court for future he, as well as the other senior partners, should exercise
her personal gain or benefit, and that it was her lack of adequate greater care in the supervision of the attorneys connected with
extensive experience in preparing petitions for certiorari which their law firm, perhaps inexperienced as yet but nonetheless
may have caused the inaccurate statements in the said petition called upon to comply with the peremptory tenets of ethical
which were enumerated in the order of this Honorable Court; 4. conduct.
That undersigned Delia T. Sutton contritely realizes the errors
which she committed in the preparation of the said petition WHEREFORE, respondent Delia T. Sutton is severely censured.
for certiorari and that the same will not recur in the future as she Let a copy of this resolution be spread on her record.
will always abide by the provisions on candor and fairness in the
Canons of Professional Ethics, which reads: "22. [Candor and
Fairness]. The conduct of the lawyer before the court and with
other lawyers should be characterized by candor and fairness. It
is not candid or fair for the lawyer knowingly to misquote the
contents of a paper, the testimony of a witness, the language or
the argument of opposing counsel, or the language of a decision
or a textbook or; with knowledge of its invalidity, to cite as
authority a decision that has been overruled, or a statute that has
been repealed; or in argument to assert as fact that which has not
been proved, or in those jurisdictions where a side has the
opening and closing arguments to mislead his opponent by
concealing or withholding positions in his opening argument
upon which his side then intends to rely. ..." 5. That undersigned
Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordoez joins Atty. Delia T. Sutton in expressing
his own apologies to the Honorable Court for not having
thoroughly supervised the preparation by Atty. Delia T. Sutton of
a type of pleading with which she was not thoroughly familiar." 2
 Republic of the Philippines of his means to life; he had pursued civic, religious and
SUPREME COURT community work, especially for the poor and the underprivileged
Manila short of extending legal assistance because of his incapacity; he
had admitted "with profound regret and with utmost humility his
EN BANC commission of an unpardonable mistake and ask(ed) that he be
given another chance;" and, he was "remorseful for what he has
done and comes to this Honorable Court with a contrite heart." 6

His wife Norma M. Dacanay likewise wrote the Court on 1
G.R. No. 100643 December 12, 1995 December 1994 saying that while she did not condone what her
husband had done, it had been her fervent wish that the Court
ADEZ REALTY, INCORPORATED, petitioner, took a second look into its decision disbarring her husband as her
vs. entire family had been traumatized by his disbarment. 7
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE PRESIDING JUDGE,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Br. 79, Morong Rizal, THE On 6 March 1995 movant sent a letter addressed to the Chief
REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR QUEZON CITY, and AGUEDO Justice and the Associate Justices of the Court reiterating his Ex-
EUGENIO, respondents. Parte Motion to Lift Disbarment of 1 December 1994. Thus

R E S O L U T I O N I am truly penitent for the serious offense I

committed and admit full responsibility for it. I
realize it was dishonest and unfair to pass the
blame to my secretary who was merely
BELLOSILLO, J.: following my instructions. The intercalation
was my own act and I am justly punished for it.
On 30 October 1992 the Court found movant, Atty. Benjamin M.
Dacanay, guilty of intercalating a material fact in a decision of the Your Honors, I do not question your decision
Court of Appeals, which he appealed to this Court on certiorari, but I only beg for your mercy. I have a wife and
thereby altering the factual findings of the Court of Appeals with children to support but my only means of
the apparent purpose of misleading this Court in order to obtain livelihood has been withdrawn from me. I am
a favorable judgment. Consequently, Atty. Dacanay was disbarred destitute and desperate and can only turn to
from the practice of law. 1 you for relief . . . .

On 20 November 1992 movant filed a Motion for Reconsideration Looking back, I cannot imagine how I could
and Leave to Offer Evidence Re Charge of Unauthorized have even thought of blackening the law
Intercalation in a Judicial Record dated 18 November 1992. He profession, to which I owe so much. Please let
claimed that the inserted words were written by his client, the me redeem myself by admitting me back to its
President of Adez Realty, Inc., in the draft of the petition to be precincts, where I swear to live strictly
filed before the Supreme Court and unwittingly adopted by according to its canons . . . . 8
movant's secretary when the latter formalized the petition. He
manifested that he would not risk committing the act for which On 21 March 1995 the Court noted the letter of 6 March 1995 of
he was found guilty considering that he was a nominee of the movant Dacanay.
Judicial and Bar Council to the President for appointment as
regional trial judge. 2 But the Court on 3 December 1992 denied On 4 August 1995 movant again prayed for his reinstatement
the motion for want of a compelling reason to justify a reversal of
the questioned resolution. 3
It has been 33 long months since my
disbarment, during which time I have been
On 23 February 1994 movant Dacanay filed a Motion to struggling to make both ends meet to provide
Lift (Disbarment) stating that he was already 62 years old, has for my wife and three children. Please give me
learned his lesson from his mistake, was terribly sorry for what the chance to prove that I am a reformed
he had done, and in all candor promised that if given another offender who will henceforth do nothing
chance he would live up to the exacting demands of the legal whatsoever to dishonor the legal profession. 9
profession. He appended to his motion certifications of good
moral character from: Fr. Celso Fernando, Parochial Vicar, Parish
of St. Michael Archangel, Marilao, Bulacan; Fr. Lauro V. Larlar, On 12 September 1995 the Court noted respondent's 4 August
OAR, Rector, San Sebastian College-Recoletos; Sis. Aniceta B. 1995 letter. 10
Abion, EMM, Chairperson, Center for Housing and Ecology
Development Foundation, Inc.; Dean Rufus B. Rodriquez, College On 17 November, 1995 movant once more wrote the Court
of Law, San Sebastian College-Recoletos; Judge Pedro T. Santiago,
Executive Judge, RTC, Quezon City; Judge Teodoro P. Regino, RTC- I humbly acknowledge again that I committed
Br. 84, Quezon City; Judge Antonio P. Solano, RTC-Br. 86, Quezon a grievous offense for which I was justly
City; and Judge Gregorio D. Dayrit, MTC-Br. 35, Quezon punished at the time with the extreme
City. 4 However, on 11 August 1994 the Court denied the motion. 5 sanction of disbarment.

On 1 December 1994 movant again filed an Ex-Parte Motion to I have been suffering much since my
Lift Disbarment alleging among others that he had been deprived disbarment more than 36 months ago, but it is
 my wife and children who have suffered more
for my transgression. Although innocent, they
bear with me the stigma and burden of my
punishment. 11

The disbarment of movant Benjamin M. Dacanay for three (3)
years has, quite apparently, given him sufficient time and
occasion to soul-search and reflect on his professional conduct,
redeem himself and prove once more that he is worthy to
practice law and be capable of upholding the dignity of the legal
profession. His admission of guilt and repeated pleas for
compassion and reinstatement show that he is ready once more
to meet the exacting standards the legal profession demands
from its practitioners. Accordingly, the Court lifts the disbarment
of Benjamin M. Dacanay. However he should be sternly warned
that


[T]he practice of law is a privilege burdened
with conditions. Adherence to the rigid
standards of mental fitness, maintenance of
the highest degree of morality and faithful
compliance with the rules of the legal
profession are the conditions required for
remaining a member of good standing of the
bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice
law. The Supreme Court, as guardian of the
legal profession, has ultimate disciplinary
power over attorneys. This authority to
discipline its members is not only a right, but a
bounden duty as well . . . That is why respect
and fidelity to the Court is demanded of its
members . . . 12

WHEREFORE, the disbarment of BENJAMIN M. DACANAY from
the practice of law is LIFTED and he is therefore allowed to
resume the practice of law upon payment of the required legal
fees. This resolution is effective immediately.

SO ORDERED.




























 Republic of the Philippines court, then presided by the Hon. Ricardo C. Puno gave counsel of
SUPREME COURT record up to March 22, 1965 within which to submit the name
Manila and residence of the executor, administrator, guardian or other
legal representative of the deceased Segundo Aguinaldo. The
EN BANC aforesaid counsel in turn merely manifested on March 23, 1965
that he had ceased to be such as of May 31, 1956, and that such a
pleading be considered sufficient compliance with the aforesaid
order. Considering the turn of events, plaintiffs, in order that such
a decision in their favor be not rendered nugatory by the above
G.R. No. L-30362 November 26, 1970 technicality, had no choice but to ask the court in a motion of
April 7, 1965 to have the heirs of the deceased Segundo
VICTORIA AGUINALDO and SIMEONA AGUINALDO, plaintiffs- Aguinaldo, defendants Cecilio, Anastasia, Simplicio and Domingo,
appellees, all bearing the surname of Aguinaldo being the legitimate
vs. children, and one Felicitas Bagawisan, a granddaughter,
SEGUNDO AGUINALDO (deceased), PRIMO AGUINALDO and substituted as defendants. On October 5, 1965, the lower court,
RUFINA AGUINALDO, defendants, CECILIO AGUINALDO, this time presided by Judge Andres Sta. Maria, granted the
ANASTACIA AGUINALDO, SIMPLICIO AGUINALDO, DOMINGO aforesaid motion and substituted defendants in place of the
AGUINALDO, and FELICITAS BAGAWISAN, defendants- deceased Segundo Aguinaldo.
appellants.
Hence this appeal to the Court of Appeals, which in turn by
resolution of February 17, 1969 certified the matter to this Court,
the question involved being one of law. As noted at the outset, we
find for appellees.
FERNANDO, J.:
1. It would be the height of unreason to impute error to the lower
Any effort on the litigant to delay, if not to defeat, the court precisely for embodying in the order complained of what is
enforcement of a final judgment, executory in character, by set forth in the Rules of Court. Thus: "Whenever a party to a
raising an objection that at best hardly rises to the level of a pending case dies, becomes incapacitated or incompetent, it shall
technicality is not likely to elicit the sympathy of this Court or any be the duty of his attorney to inform the court promptly of such
court for that matter. Yet, in effect, that is what the move taken by death, incapacity or incompetency, and to give the name and
the defendants in his case amounted to. The lower court as was residence of his executor, administrator, guardian or other legal
but proper did not lend its approval. Still undeterred, they would representative." 2Had the defendant, thereafter deceased, seen to
appeal. They ought to have known better. There is no reason to it that a new counsel was appointed, then upon his death there
refuse affirmance to the order of the lower court complained of, could be compliance with the above provision. To cause plaintiffs
appointing appellants as legal representatives of the deceased to suffer for such neglect of duty is to cast an underserved
defendant and substituted in his place pursuant to the Rules of reflection on the law. It is equally vital to remember that the
Court in order that the execution that ought that have taken place judgment had become final and the stage of execution reached.
long since could at long last be effected. Defendants cannot be heard to allege that it is much too late now
to apply the above rule. That would be to set at naught the
There is no dispute as to the antecedents. On January 14, 1965, principle consistently adhered to by this Court.
the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch II through its clerk
issued a writ of execution reciting that as far back as March 31, It was succinctly put in Amor v. Jugo 3in these words: "And with
1958, it rendered a decision in favor of plaintiffs, 1 now appellees, more compelling reason the respondent court cannot refuse to
requiring one of the defendants therein, Segundo Aguinaldo, to issue such writ, or quash it or order its stay, when the judgment
reconvey one-fourth () pro-indiviso of the property in litigation had been reviewed and affirmed by an appellate court, for it
to appellees, and to pay the latter the amount of P300.00 yearly cannot review or interfere with any matter decided on appeal, or
beginning with the year 1955. There was an appeal. The decision give other or further relief, or assume supervisory jurisdiction to
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on May 23, 1965. It was interpret or reverse the judgment of the higher court." 4What was
further set forth therein that on January 5, 1965, a motion for its said by us in Li Kim Tho v. Sanchez 5 is worth recalling: "Litigation
execution was granted. Hence the writ of execution. On February must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is
13 of the same year, one Cecilio Aguinaldo filed an urgent ex essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice
parte manifestation and motion to quash such writ of execution that, once a judgment has become final, the winning party be not,
based primarily on the allegation that defendant Segundo through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict.
Aguinaldo died on August 7, 1959 during the pendency of such Courts must therefore guard against any scheme calculated to
appeal. There was an opposition to such motion on February 25, bring about that result. Constituted as they are to put an end to
1965, inviting attention to Sec. 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court to controversies, courts should frown upon any attempt to prolong
the effect that in the event of the death of a party to a pending them." 6 An excerpt from Villaflor v. Reyes 7 is equally relevant:
case, it is the duty of his attorney to give the name and residence "There should be a greater awareness on the part of litigants that
of his executor, administrator, guardian, or their legal the time of the judiciary, much more so of this Court, is too
representative and alleging that there was a failure on the part of valuable to be wasted or frittered away by efforts, far from
the counsel to comply with the above provision. The prayer was commendable, to evade the operation of a decision final and
for the denial of the motion of Cecilio Aguinaldo and for an order executory, especially so, where, as shown in this case, the clear
requiring counsel for the defendants to furnish the court the and manifest absence of any right calling for vindication, is quite
names as well as the residences of the heirs or the legal obvious and indisputable." 8
representatives of the deceased in order that they could be
substituted in his stead so as not to render nugatory a decision,
final and executory in character. On March 4, 1965, the lower
2. This appeal, moreover, should fail, predicated as it is on an
insubstantial objection bereft of any persuasive force. Defendants
had to display ingenuity to conjure a technicality. From Alonso v.
Villamor, 9 a 1910 decision, we have left no doubt as to our
disapproval of such a practice. The aim of a lawsuit is to render
justice to the parties according to law. Procedural rules are
precisely designed to accomplish such a worthy objective.
Necessarily, therefore, any attempt to pervert the ends for which
they are intended deserves condemnation. We have done so
before. We do so again.

WHEREFORE, the order of October 5, 1965 is affirmed.


This decision is immediately executory. Treble costs against
defendants.




















































 Republic of the Philippines demanded by the petitioner. That notwithstanding, the petitioner
SUPREME COURT moved for execution insofar as his fees were concemed. The court
Manila granted execution, although it does not appear that the sum was
actually collected. 5
SECOND DIVISION
Sometime thereafter, the petitioner and the private respondent
G.R. No. L-77691 August 8,1988 met to discuss relief for the latter with respect to his liability to L
& R Corporation on the one hand, and his obligation to the
petitioner on the other. The petitioner contends that the private
PATERNO R. CANLAS, petitioner, respondent "earnestly implored" 6 him to redeem the said
vs. properties; the private respondent maintains that it was the
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and FRANCISCO petitioner himself who 'offered to advance the
HERRERA, respondents. money," 7 provided that he, the private respondent, executed a
"transfer of mortgage" 8 over the properties in his favor. Who
Paterno R. Canlas Law Offices for petitioner. implored whom is a bone of contention, but as we shall see
shortly, we are inclined to agree with the private respondent's
Abalos, Gatdula & Bermejo for private respondent. version, considering primarily the petitioner's moral ascendancy
over his client and the private respondent's increasing
desperation.

The records further show that the parties, pursuant to their
SARMIENTO, J.: agreement, executed a "Deed of Sale and Transfer of Rights of
Redemption and/or to Redeem," a document that enabled the
The case dramatizes the unpleasant spectacle of a lawyer tangling petitioner, first, to redeem the parcels in question, and secondly,
with his own client, more often than not, in the matter of fees. to register the same in his name. The private respondent alleges
The lawyer, the petitioner himself, would have his petition that he subsequently filed loan applications with the Family
decided on pure questions of procedure, yet, the Court cannot let Savings Bank to finance a wet market project upon the subject
pass unnoticed the murkier face of the controversy, wherein the premises to find, according to him, and to his dismay, the
law is corrupted to promote a lawyer's selfseeking ends, and the properties already registered in the name of the petitioner. He
law profession, debased into a simple business dealing. likewise contends that the "Deed of Sale and Transfer of Rights of
Accordingly, we resolve it on the basis not only of the questions Redemption and/or to Redeem" on file with the Register of Deeds
raised by the petitioner pertaining to procedure, but considering (for Quezon City) had been falsified as follows:
its serious ethical implications, on its merits as well.
WHEREFORE, for and in full settlement of the attorney's
We turn to the facts. fees of TRANSFEREE in the amount of ONE HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (Pl00,000.00) I, FRANCISCO
The private respondent was the registered owner of eight (six, HERRERA, hereby transfer, assign and convey unto
according to the petitioner) parcels of land located in Quezon TRANSFEREE, Atty. Paterno R. Canlas, any and all my
City. 1 Between 1977 and 1978, 2 he obtained various loans from rights of the real properties and/or to redeem from the
the L & R Corporation, a financing institution, in various sums Mortgagee, L & R Corporation my mortgaged properties
totalling P420,000.00 As security therefor, he executed deeds of foreclosed and sold at public auction by the Sheriff of
mortgage in favor of the corporation over the parcels aforesaid. Quezon City and subject matter of the above Compromise
On August 28,1979, and upon the maturing of said loans, the firm Agreement in Civil Case No. Q30679 ... 9
caused an extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage following his
failure to pay, as a consequence of which, the said eight (six, whereas it originally reads:
according to the petitioner) parcels of land were disposed of at
public auction, and in which L & R Corporation was itself the WHEREFORE, for and in full settlement of the attorney's
highest bidder. fees of TRANSFEREE in the amount of ONE HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00), I, FRANCISCO
Pending redemption, the private respondent filed a complaint for HERRERA, hereby transfer, assign and convey unto
injunction against L & R Corporation, to enjoin consolidation of TRANSFEREE, Atty. Paterno R. Canlas, any and all my
title in its name, in which he succeeded in obtaining preliminary rights of equity of redemption and/or to redeem from the
injunctive relief. He was represented by the petitioner. Two years Mortgagee, L & R Corporation my mortgaged properties
later, and with no imminent end to the litigation in sight, the foreclosed and sold at public auction by the Sheriff of
parties entered into a compromise agreement whereby L & R Quezon City and subject matter of the above Compromise
Corporation accorded the private respondent another year to Agreement in Civil Case No. Q30679. . . 10
redeem the foreclosed properties subject to payment of
P600,000.00, with interest thereon at one per cent per month. As a consequence, the private respondent caused the annotation
They likewise stipulated that the petitioner shall be entitled to of an adverse claim upon the respective certificates of title
attorney's fees of P100,000.00. On November 19, 1982, the embracing the properties. Upon learning of the same, the
court 3 approved the compromise. petitioner moved for the cancellation of the adverse claim and for
the issuance of a writ of possession. The court granted both
The private respondent, however, remained in dire financial motions. The private respondent countered with a motion for a
straits a fact the petitioner himself concede 4 for which temporary restraining order and later, a motion to recall the writ
reason he failed to acquire the finding to repay the loans in of possession. He likewise alleges that he commenced disbarment
question, let alone the sum of P100,000.00 in attorney's fees proceedings before this Court against the petitioner 11 as well as
various criminal complaints for estafa, falsification, and "betrayal THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSE [sic] ITS
of trust" 12 with the Department of Justice. On December 1, 1983, DISCRETION IN NOT DISMISSING AC G.R. NO. 07860 ON THE
finally, he instituted an action for reconveyance and reformation GROUND OF RES JUDICATA
of document, 13 praying that the certificates of title issued in the
name of the petitioner be cancelled and that "the Deed of Sale and III.
Transfer of Rights of Equity of Redemption and/or to Redeem
dated May 3, 1983 ... be reformed to reflect the true agreement of
Francisco Herrera and Paterno R. Canlas, of a mortgage." 14 He THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSE [sic] ITS
vehemently maintains that the petitioner's "agreement with DISCRETION IN NOT CONSIDERING AC G. R. 07860 AS MOOT
[him] was that the latter would lend the money to the former for AND ACADEMIC SINCE PETITIONER HAD DISPOSED OF THE
a year, so that [petitioner] would have time to look for a loan for SUBJECT PROPERTIES LONG BEFORE THE FILING OF THIS SUIT.
the wet market which [the petitioner] intended to put up on said
property." 15 Predictably, the petitioner moved for dismissal. IV

The trial court, however, denied the private respondent's THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
petition. It held that the alteration complained of did not change IN NOT DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION TO DISMISS SOLELY
the meaning of the contract since it was "well within [the ON THE GROUND THAT THE ARGUMENT RAISED THEREIN ARE
petitioner's] rights" 16 "to protect and insure his interest of BUT REHASH OF THE ARGUMENTS IN HIS COMMENT TO THE
P654,000.00 which is the redemption price he has PETITION. 21
paid;" 17 secondly, that the petitioner himself had acquired an
interest in the properties subject of reconveyance based on the The petitioner argues that the petition pending with the
compromise agreement approved by Judge Castro in the respondent court "is actually a petition for
injunction case, pursuant to Section 29(b), of Rule 39, of the Rules certiorari," 22disguised as a pleading for annulment of judgment
of Court, that had, consequently, made him a judgment creditor in and that in such a case, it faces alleged legal impediments (1) It
his own right; thirdly, that the private respondent had lost all had been filed out of time, allegedly two years from the issuance
rights over the same arising from his failure to redeem them from of the assailed orders, and (2) It was not preceded by a motion
L & R Corporation within the extended period; and finally, that for reconsideration. He adds that assuming annulment of
the petitioner cannot be said to have violated the ban against judgment were proper, no judgment allegedly exists for
sales of properties in custodia legis to lawyers by their annulment, the aforesaid two orders being in the nature of
clients pendente lite, since the sale in question took place after interlocutory issuances.
judgment in the injunction case abovesaid had attained finality.
The complaint was consequently dismissed, a dismissal that
eventually attained a character of finality. On purely technical grounds, the petitioner's arguments are
impressive. Annulment of judgment, we have had occasion to
rule, rests on a single ground: extrinsic fraud. What "extrinsic
Undaunted, the private respondent, on December 6, 1985, filed a fraud" means is explained in Macabingkil v. People's Homesite and
suit for "Annulment Of Judgment 18 in the respondent Court of Housing Corporation : 23
Appeals, 19 praying that the orders of Judge Castro: (1). granting
execution over the portion of the compromise agreement obliging
the private respondent to pay the petitioner P100,000.00 as xxx xxx xxx
attorney's fees; (2) denying the private respondent's prayer for a
restraining order directed against the execution: and (3) denying It is only extrinsic or collateral fraud, as distinguished
the motion to recall writ of possession, all be set aside. from intrinsic fraud, however, that can serve as a basis for
the annulment of judgment. Fraud has been regarded as
The petitioner filed a comment on the petition, but followed it up extrinsic or collateral, within the meaning of the rule,
with a motion to dismiss. On December 8, 1986, the respondent "where it is one the effect of which prevents a party from
Court of Appeals promulgated the first of its challenged having a trial, or real contest, or from presenting all of his
resolutions, denying the motion to dismiss. On March 3, 1987, the case to the court, or where it operates upon matters
Appellate Court denied reconsideration. 20 pertaining, not to the judgment itself, but of the manner in
which it was procured so that there is not a fair
submission of the controversy." In other words, extrinsic
Hence the instant petition. fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party
in the litigation which is committed outside of the trial of
As we stated, the petitioner assails these twin resolutions on the case, whereby the defeated party has been prevented
grounds of improper procedure. Specifically, he assigns the from exhibiting fully his side of the case, by fraud or
following errors: deception practiced on him by his opponent. 24

I. A perusal of the petition of therein private respondent Herrera

pending before the respondent Court reveals no cause of action
THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSE [sic] ITS for annulment of judgment. In the first place, and as herein
DISCRETION IN NOT DISMISSING AC G.R. NO. 07860 ON THE petitioner Canlas correctly points out, the judgment itself is not
GROUND THAT IT IS IN REALITY A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI assailed, but rather, the orders merely implementing it. Secondly,
FILED OUT OF TIME AND SHOULD NOT BE GIVEN DUE COURSE. there is no showing that extrinsic fraud, as Makabingkil defines it,
indeed vitiated the proceedings presided over by Judge Castro.
On the contrary, Herrera's petition in the respondent court will
II. show that he was privy to the incidents he complains of, and in
fact, had entered timely oppositions and motions to defeat Atty.
Canlas' claims under the compromise agreement.
What he objects to is his suspected collusion between Atty. procedure were to be an impediment to such an objective, "it
Canlas and His Honor to expedite the former's collection of his deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great
fees. He alleges that his counsel had deliberately, and with hindrance and chief enemy." 32 It was almost eight decades ago
malevolent designs, postponed execution to force him (Herrera) that the Court held:
to agree to sell the properties in controversy to him (Atty. Canlas)
subject to redemption. ("...[I]t was understandable that ... A litigation is not a game of technicalities in which one,
respondent Atty. Paterno R. Canlas did not implement the writ of more deeply schooled and skilled in the subtle art of
execution, instead he contacted petitioner in order that petitioner movement and position, entraps and destroys the other. It
would sign the questioned documents. This was the clincher of is, rather, a contest in which each contending party fully
the plan of respondent Atty, Paterno R. Canlas to divest petitioner and fairly lays before the court the facts in issue and then,
of his properties. For this purpose, it is obvious that respondent brushing aside as wholly trivial and indecisive all
Atty. Paterno R. Canlas had to conspire with the respondent court imperfections of form and technicalities of procedure,
judge to achieve his plan." 25) Aside from being plain speculation, asks that justice be done upon the merits. Lawsuits, unlike
it is no argument to justify annulment. Clearly, it does not amount duels, are not to be won by the a rapier's thrust ... 33
to extrinsic fraud as the term is defined in law.
It is a ruling that almost eight decades after it was rendered,
Neither is it proper for the extraordinary remedy of holds true as ever.
certiorari. Certiorari presupposes the absence of an appeal 26and
while there is no appeal from execution of judgment, appeal lies
in case of irregular implementation of the writ. 27 In the case at By Atty. Canlas' own account, "due to lack of paying capacity of
bar, there is no irregular execution to speak of As a rule, respondent Herrera, no financing entity was willing to extend
"irregular execution" means the failure of the writ to conform to him any loan with which to pay the redemption price of his
the decree of the decision executed. 28 In the instant case, mortgaged properties and petitioner's P100,000.00 attorney's
respondent Herrera's charges, to wit, that Judge Castro had erred fees awarded in the Compromise Judgment," 34 a development
in denying his motions for temporary restraining order and to that should have tempered his demand for his fees. For obvious
recall writ of possession, or that His Honor had acted hastily (". . . reasons, he placed his interests over and above those of his client,
that respondent court/judge took only one [1) day to resolve in opposition to his oath to "conduct himself as a lawyer ... with
petitioner's motion for issuance of [a] [restraining] order. . ." 29) all good fidelity ... to [his] clients." 35 The Court finds the occasion
in denying his twofold motions, do not make out a case for fit to stress that lawyering is not a moneymaking venture and
irregular execution. The orders impugned are conformable to the lawyers are not merchants, a fundamental standard that has, as a
letter of the judgment approving the parties'compromise matter of judicial notice, eluded not a few law advocates. The
agreement. petitioner's efforts partaking of a shakedown" of his own client
are not becoming of a lawyer and certainly, do not speak well of
his fealty to his oath to "delay no man for money." 36
The lengths the private respondent, Francisco Herrera, would go
to in a last-ditch bid to hold on to his lands and constraints of
economic privation have not been lost on us. It is obvious that he It is true that lawyers are entitled to make a living, in spite of the
is uneasy about the judgment on compromise itself, as well as the fact that the practice of law is not a commercial enterprise; but
subsequent contract between him and his lawyer. In such a case, that does not furnish an excuse for plain lust for material wealth,
Article 2038 of the Civil Code applies: more so at the expense of another. Law advocacy, we reiterate, is
not capital that yields profits. The returns it births are simple
rewards for a job done or service rendered. It is a calling that,
Art. 2038. A compromise in which there is mistake, fraud, unlike mercantile pursuits which enjoy a greater deal of freedom
violence intimidation, undue influence, or falsity of from government interference, is impressed with a public
documents, is subject to the provisions of article 1330 of interest, for which it is subject to State regulation. 37 Anent
this Code ... attomey's fees, section 24, of Rule 138, of the Rules, provides in
part as follows:
in relation to Article 1330 thereof:
SEC. 24. Compensation of attorneys, agreement as to fees.
Art. 1330. A contract where consent is given through An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from
mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence, or fraud his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his
is voidable. services, with a view to the importance of the subject
matter of the controversy, the extent of the services
in relation to its provisions on avoidance of'contracts. 30 The rendered, and the professional standing of the attorney...
court notes that he had, for this purpose, gone to the Regional A written contract for services shall control the amount to
Trial Court, a vain effort as we stated, and in which the decision be paid therefor unless found by the court to be
had become final. unconscionable or unreasonable.

We, however, sustain Atty. Canlas' position-on matters of So also it is decreed by Article 2208 of the Civil Code, reproduced
procedure for the enlightenment solely of the bench and the in part, as follows:
bar. It does not mean that we find merit in his petition. As we
have intimated, we cannot overlook the unseemlier side of the Art. 2208 ...
proceeding, in which a member of the bar would exploit his
mastery of procedural law to score a "technical knockout" over In all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of litigation
his own client, of all people. Procedural rules, after all, have for must be reasonable.
their object assistance unto parties "in obtaining just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding." 31 If
We do not find the petitioner's claim of attorney's fees in the sum thereof. As we have earlier averred, the private respondent, by
of P100,000.00 reasonable. We do not believe that it satisfies the reason of bankruptcy, had become an easy quarry to his counsel's
standards set forth by the Rules. The extent of the services he had moral influence and ascendancy. We are hard put to believe that
rendered in Civil Case No. 30679, and as far as the records will it was the private respondent who "earnestly implored" 42 him to
yield, is not impressive to justify payment of such a gargantuan undertake the redemption amid the former's obstinate attempts
amount. The case itself moreover did not involve complex to keep his lands that have indeed led to the multiple suits the
questions of fact or law that would have required substantial petitioner now complains of, apart from the fact that the latter
effort as to research or leg work for the petitioner to warrant his himself had something to gain from the transaction, as alluded to
demands. The fact that the properties subject thereof above. We are of the opinion that in ceding his right of
commanded quite handsome prices in the market should not be a redemption, the private respondent had intended merely to
measure of the importance or non-importance of the case. We are forestall the total loss of the parcels to the mortgagee upon the
not likewise persuaded that the petitioner's stature warrants the understanding that his counsel shall acquire the same and keep
sum claimed. them therefore within reach, subject to redemption by his client
under easier terms and conditions. Surely, the petitioner himself
All things considered, we reduce the petitioner's fees, on would maintain that he agreed to make the redemption"in order
a quantum meruit basis, to P20,000.00. that [he] may already be paid the P100,000.00 attorney's fees
awarded him in the Compromise Agreement," 43 and if his sole
concern was his fees, there was no point in keeping the
It is futile to invoke the rule granting attorneys a lien upon the properties in their entirety.
things won in litigation similar to that vested upon
redemptioners. 38 To begin with, the rule refers to realty sold as a
result of execution in satisfaction of judgment. In this case, The Court simply cannot fag for the petitioner's pretensions that
however, redemption was decreed by agreement (on he acquired the properties as a gesture of magnanimity and
compromise) between the mortgagor and mortgagee. It did not altruism He denies, of course, having made money from it, but
give the petitioner any right to the properties themselves, much what he cannot dispute is the fact that he did resell the
less the right of redemption, although provisions for his properties. 44
compensation were purportedly provided. It did not make him a
redemptioner for the plain reason that he was not named one in But if he did not entertain intents of making any profit, why was
the amicable settlement. To this extent, we reverse Judge Pedro it necessary to reword the conveyance document executed by the
Santiago's ruling in Civil Case No. 40066, recognizing Atty. Canlas' private respondent? It shall be recalled that the deed, as
"legal right, independent of the questioned deed of sale and originally drafted, provided for conveyance of the private
transfer which was executed subsequently on May 3, 1983, to respondent's "rights of equity of redemption and/or
redeem the subject realty from the L & R Corporation pursuant to redeem" 45 the properties in his favor, whereas the instrument
Sec. 29 (b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court." 39Whatever right he registered with the Register of Deeds purported to transfer "any
had, it was, arguably with respect alone to his renumeration. It and all my rights of the real properties and/or to redeem," 46 in
did not extend to the lands. his favor. He admits having entered the intercalations in question
but argues that he did so "to facilitate the registration of the
Secondly, and assuming that such a right exists, it must be in questioned deed with the Register of Deeds" 47 and that it did not
proportion to the "just fees and disbursements" 40 due him. It is change the meaning of the paper, for which Judge Santiago
still subject to the tempering hand of this Court. acquitted him of any falsification charges. 48 To start with, the
Court is at a loss how such an alteration could "facilitate"
registration. Moreover, if it did not change the tenor of the deed,
The Court notes a hidden agenda in the petitioner's haste to why was it necessary then? And why did he not inform his client?
execute the compromise agreement and subsequently, to force At any rate, the agreement is clearly a contract of adhesion. Its
the transfer of the properties to himself. As we have observed, in provisions should be read against the party who prepared it.
spite of the issuance of the writ of execution, it does not appear
that the petitioner took pains to implement it. We find this
perplexing given his passionate and persistent pleas that he was But while we cannot hold the petitioner liable for falsification
entitled to the proceeds. There can indeed be no plausible this is not the proper occasion for it we condemn him
explanation other than to enable him to keep an "ace" against the nonetheless for infidelity to his oath "to do no falsehood" 49
private respondent that led finally, to the conveyance of the
properties in his favor. To be sure, he would have us beheve that This brings us to the final question: Whether or not the
by redeeming the same from the mortgagee and by in fact parting conveyance in favor of the petitioner is subject to the ban on
with his own money he had actually done the private respondent acquisition by attorneys of things in litigation. The pertinent
a favor, but this is to assume that he did not get anything out of provisions of the Civil Code state as follows:
the transaction. Indeed, he himself admits that "[t]itles to the
properties have been issued to the new owners long before the Art. 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by
filing of private respondents [sic] petition for annulment." 41 To purchase, even at a public or judicial action, either in
say that he did not profit therefrom is to take either this Court or person or through the mediation of another:
the petitioner for naive, a proposition this Court is not prepared
to accept under the circumstances.
(1) The guardian, the property of the person or persons
who may be under his guardianship;
We are likewise convinced that it was the petitioner who
succeeded in having the private respondent sign the "Deed of Sale
and Transfer of Rights of Equity of Redemption and/or to (2) Agents, the property whose administration or sale
Redeem," a pre-prepared document apparently, that allowed him may have been intrusted to them, unless the consent of
(the petitioner) to exercise the right of redemption over the the principal have been given;
properties and to all intents and purposes, acquire ownership
 (3) Executors and administrators, the property of the appearing, however, that the properties have been conveyed to
estate under administration; third persons whom we presume to be innocent purchasers for
value, the petitioner, Atty. Paterno Canlas, must be held liable, by
(4) Public officers and employees, the property of the way of actual damages, for such a loss of properties.
State or of any subdivision thereof, or of any government
owned or controlled corporation, or institution, the We are not, however, condoning the private respondent's own
administration of which has been instrusted to them; this shortcomings. In condemning Atty. Canlas monetarily, we cannot
provision shall apply to judges and government experts overlook the fact that the private respondent has not settled his
who, in any manner whatsoever, take part in the sale; hability for payment of the properties. To hold Atty. Canlas alone
liable for damages is to enrich said respondent at the expense of
(5) Justice judges prosecuting attorneys clerks of superior his lawyer. The parties must then set off their obligations against
and inferior courts, and other officers and employees the other. To obviate debate as the actual amounts owing by one
connected with the administration of justice, the property to the other, we hold Francisco Herrera, the private respondent,
and rights in litigation or levied upon an execution before liable to Atty. Paterno Canlas, the petitioner, in the sum of
the court within whose jurisdiction or territory they P654,000.00 representing the redemption price of the
exercise their respective functions; this prohibition includes properties, 55 in addition to the sum of P20,000. 00 as and for
the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to attomey's fees. We order Atty. Canlas, in turn, to pay the
lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may respondent Herrera the amount of P1,000,000.00, the sum he
be the object of any litigation in which they may take part earned from the resale thereof, 56 such that he shall, after proper
by virtue of their profession. adjustments, be indebted to his client in the sum of P326,000.00
as and for damages.
(6) Any others specially disqualified by law.**
Needless to say, we sustain the action of the respondent Court of
Appeals in taking cognizance of the petition below. But as we
In Rubias v. Batiller, 50 we declared such contracts to be void by have stated, we are compelled, as the final arbiter of justiciable
force of Article 1409, paragraph (7), of the Civil Code, defining cases and in the highest interests ofjustice, to write finis to the
inexistent contracts. In Director of Lands v. Ababa 51 however, we controversy that has taxed considerably the dockets of the
said that the prohibition does not apply to contingent contracts, inferior courts.
in which the conveyance takes place after judgment, so that the
property can no longer be said to be "subject of litigation."
Let the Court further say that while its business is to settle actual
controversies and as a matter of general policy, to leave alone
In the instant case, the Court observes that the "Deed of Sale and moot ones, its mission is, first and foremost, to dispense justice.
Transfer of Rights of Equity of Redemption and/or to Redeem" At the outset, we have made clear that from a technical vantage
was executed following the finality of the decision approving the point, certiorari, arguably lies, but as we have likewise stated, the
compromise agreement. It is actually a new contract not one in resolution of the case rests not only on the mandate of technical
pursuance of what had been agreed upon on compromise in rules, but if the decision is to have any real meaning, on the
which, as we said, the petitioner purportedly assumed merits too. This is not the first time we would have done so; in
redemption rights over the disputed properties (but in reality, many cases we have eschewed the rigidity of the Rules of Court if
acquired absolute ownership thereof). By virtue of such a it would establish a barrier upon the administration ofjustice. It is
subsequent agreement, the lands had ceased to be properties especially so in the case at bar, in which no end to suit and
which are "the object of any litigation." Parenthetically, the Court counter-suit appears imminent and for which it is high time that
states that a writ of possession is improper to eject another from we have the final say. We likewise cannot, as the overseer of good
possession unless sought in connection with: (1) a land conduct in both the bench and the bar, let go unpunished what
registration proceeding; (2) an extrajudicial foreclosure of convinces us as serious indiscretions on the part of a lawyer.
mortgage of real property; (3) in a judicial foreclosure of
property provided that the mortgagor has possession and no
third party has intervened; and (4) in execution sales. 52 It is WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered.
noteworthy that in this case, the petitioner moved for the
issuance of the writ pursuant to the deed of sale between him and 1. ORDERING the petitioner, Atty. Patemo Canlas, to pay to the
the private respondent and not the judgment on compromise. (He private respondent, Francisco Herrera, the sum of P326,000.00,
was, as we said, issued a writ of execution on the compromise as and for damages;
agreement but as we likewise observed, he did not have the same
enforced. The sale agreement between the parties, it should be 2. ORDERING the petitioner to SHOW CAUSE why no disciplinary
noted, superseded the compromise.) The writ does not lie in such action may be imposed on him for violation of his oath, as a
a case. His remedy is specific performance. lawyer, within ten (10) days from notice, after which the same
will be consolidated with AC No. 2625;
At any rate, the transfer, so we hold, is not subject to the
injunction of Article 1491 of the Civil Code. But like all voidable 3. DISMISSING this petition and REMANDING the case to the
contracts, it is open to annulment on the ground of mistake, respondent Court of Appeals for execution; and
fraud, or undue influence, 53 which is in turn subject to the right
of innocent purchasers for value. 54
4. ORDERING the petitioner to pay costs.
For this reason, we invalidate the transfer in question specifically
for undue influence as earlier detailed. While the respondent SO ORDERED.
Herrera has not specifically prayed for invalidation, this is the
clear tenor of his petition for annulment in the Appellate Court. It
 Republic of the Philippines or petition for review with the appellate court praying for an
SUPREME COURT extension of thirty (30) days to perfect the appeal. The docket fee,
Manila however, was paid only on October 2, 1978.

THIRD DIVISION In a resolution dated October 4, 1978, the appellate court granted
the respondents' motion, subject to the conditions that the same is
G.R. No. L-50054 August 17, 1988 filed within the reglementary period and that the decision sought
to be reviewed is appealable. Thereafter, the respondents filed the
corresponding appeal.
ETERNAL GARDENS MEMORIAL PARK CORPORATION,
petitioner,
vs. On November 21, 1978, the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and RESIDENTS OF the appeal on the ground that the same was filed out of time.
BAESA, CALOOCAN CITY, respondents. According to the petitioner, since the respondents received the
NPCC's order on April 20, 1978, they had up to May 5, 1978 or 15
days within which to perfect their appeal, pursuant to section 6 of
Rule 122 of the Rules of Court. However, on May 4, 1978, the
respondents filed a motion for reconsideration. Thus, assumming
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: that the said motion interrupted the period for filing their notice
of appeal, respondents had only one (1) day left within which to
This petition for certiorari seeks to set aside the order of the appeal, which was on August 26, 1978, one day after the
Intermediate Appellate Court which denied the petitioner's respondents received the denial of their motion. Therefore, since
motion to dismiss the respondent's appeal on the ground that the the respondents filed their appeal only on October 2, 1978, the
petitioner failed to include a notice of hearing in its motion and same was filed out of time being 37 days late.
the subsequent order which denied the motion to reconsider the
earlier order. The respondents filed a motion to expunge from the records the
petitioner's motion to dismiss on the ground that the latter failed
Petitioner Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corporation (Eternal to state the time and place for hearing in violation of sections 4
Gardens) applied for a certificate of clearance from the National and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.
Pollution Control Commission (NPCC), to operate a memorial
park at the former site of the Philippine Union College in Baesa, The appellate court granted the respondents' motion on January
Caloocan City, Metro Manila. The private respondents, "Residents 10, 1979. The petitioner moved to reconsider the court's order
of Baesa" opposed the application on the ground that the project but the same was denied on February 8, 1979. Consequently, it
would cause pollution of water resources in the area. filed this instant petition for certiorari and mandamus with
preliminary injunction, alleging that the appellate court
While hearings were being conducted by the NPCC, the petitioner committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing its motion on
allowed an interment to take place in its cemetery. The private the ground that said motion did not contain any notice of hearing
respondents filed a telegram complaint with the NPCC requesting for such notice is not required in motions or pleadings filed with
the latter to investigate and look into the legality of the said the appellate court.
interment, The complaint was incorporated with the original
application for clearance filed by the petitioner. While the petition was pending before this Court, the appellate
court, on March 27,1979, issued motu proprio a resolution
Upon a finding that the objections raised by the respondents recalling its order granting the respondents' motion to expunge
were not without remedy and that the project had been approved petitioner's motion to dismiss. It considered the motion
by the Metro Manila Commission, the Regional Health Office No. 4 submitted for resolution.
and the Mayor of the City of Caloocan, the NPCC issued an order
granting the petitioner a certificate of clearance to operate a On April 5, 1979, the appellate court issued another resolution
memorial park at Baesa, Caloocan City subject to the condition granting the petitioner's motion to dismiss the respondents'
that it submit the following: (1) A design of its interment vaults appeal on the ground that it was filed out of time.
duly certified by a registered structural engineer that such vaults
will not crack from earthquakes with intensity No. 7 and above In view of the aforementioned dismissal of the appeal, the
on the Richter Scale; and (2) A certification covering each petitioner filed a manifestation and motion to withdraw the
interment vault to be used that the same has passed a rigid petition for certiorari filed before this Court on the ground that it
quality control test according to the latest concept of interment to had become moot and academic.
the effect that it is structurally sound, free from the tiniest crack,
and waterproof The said order was received by the respondents
on April 20, 1978. On September 10, 1979, this Court issued a resolution requiring
the respondents to comment on petitioner's manifestation and
motion to withdraw the petition. The Court of Appeals and the
On May 4, 1978, the respondents filed a motion for Division Clerk of said Court were also directed to explain why the
reconsideration. On August 22, 1978, the NPCC denied the appellate court issued motu proprio its resolutions dated March
motion. However, it imposed a fine of P1,000.00 on the petitioner 27 and April 5, 1979, respectively, notwithstanding the said
for causing an interment to take place without any prior permit matters were no longer within its jurisdiction by virtue of the
from the NPCC. pendency of the present petition in this Court wherein the
petitioner has raised precisely the same issues for determination,
On September 8, 1978, the respondents filed a notice of appeal and to comment on the timeliness of respondents' appeal.
and an ex-parte urgent motion for extension of time to file appeal
In their comment, the respondents averred that the petition action with regard to its resolutions respectively granting
should not be dismissed for being moot and academic because respondents' motion to expunge from the records the petitioner's
the resolutions in question were not only violative of the motion to discuss and denying the latter's motion to reconsider
respondents' right to due process of law but were also null and such, order, upon learning of the petition, the appellate court
void for having been issued without jurisdiction. should have refrained from ruling thereon because its
jurisdiction was necessarily limited upon the filing of a petition
The respondent appellate court, through its division clerk, filed a for certiorari with this Court questioning the propriety of the
compliance contending that the present petition did not divest issuance of the above-mentioned resolutions. Due respect for the
the said court of jurisdiction to correct its processes and orders Supreme Court and practical and ethical considerations should
and, therefore, the questioned resolutions were issued within its have prompted the appellate court to wait for the final
lawful jurisdiction. It stated that the petition filed with this Court determination of the petition before taking cognizance of the case
was under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and not under and trying to render moot exactly what was before this court. As
Rule 45 thereof because there is as yet no final determination and we have ruled in the case of People v. Court of Appeals, (101 SCRA
judgment of the case pending with the respondent court and 450, 463 and 466):
what was actually elevated to this Court were only interlocutory
orders. Therefore, the main case still remaining with the ... Thirdly, the statement that whatever rights
appellate court, the latter had jurisdiction to correct such orders the movants were allowed to exercise in the
unless restrained by this Court. Supreme Court could be exercised by them in
the Court of Appeals' is clearly misplaced. It
On the matter of the timeliness of respondents' appeal, the implies concurrence of jurisdiction between
appellate court contended that although the respondents filed by this Tribunal and respondent Court, which is
registered mail their ex parte motion for extension of time to file totally unacceptable. It would lead to the
an appeal or petition for review on September 8, 1978, the Court absurd situation where within the
did not consider such motion as filed until after October 2, 1978 reglementary period from finality of a Decision
when respondents paid the docketing fee. Furthermore, even or Resolution, a party can simultaneously file a
granting that the latter filed their notice of appeal on September Petition for Review before this Tribunal as
8,1978, still, the same was filed outside the reglementary period well as a Motion for Reconsideration before
to appeal because after the denial of respondents motion for respondent Court. This interpretation does
reconsideration on August 25, 1978, they had only two days left havoc to the rules on orderly procedure. A
to perfect their appeal which was on August 27, 1978. party should not be allowed to pursue
simultaneous remedies in two different
forums.
On November 16, 1979, this court issued a resolution dated
November 14, 1979, giving due course to the petition and
requiring both parties to submit their respective memoranda on xxx xxx xxx
the basic issues of (1) whether or not respondents' appeal was
timely submitted to the appellate court and should be resolved xxx xxx xxx
on the merits and (2) whether the said court had jurisdiction to
issue motu proprio its resolutions dated March 27 and April 5, We find the foregoing without merit. The Writ
1979 notwithstanding the pendency of the present petition filed of certiorari is intended to keep a tribunal
with this Court on March 5, 1979. within the limits of its jurisdiction. As
explained above, respondent court acted
With regard to the jurisdiction of the appellate court in issuing without or in excess of its jurisdiction and with
the resolutions dated March 27 and April 5, 1979 respectively, grave abuse of discretion when it passed upon
the petitioner argues that since it filed a petition for certiorari private respondents Fourth Motion for
under Rule 65 which means that such a petition is a special civil Reconsideration considering that its judgment
action, the appellate court did not lose its jurisdiction to correct of conviction had already become final. And
interlocutory orders that may have been issued erroneously. what is even more glaring, respondent Court
acted on said Fourth Motion for
On the other hand, the respondents maintain that while under Reconsideration after this Tribunal had
the Rules of Court, courts may amend, modify or revoke any already denied private respondents' petition
decision or order promulgated by them, such power of authority for Review on Certiorari, as well as the
is not absolute. They state that among the limitations thereof are reconsideration thereof. The attention of
when a judgment has become final and when an appeal has been respondent Court, as explained heretofore,
interposed on time. Accordingly, while it is true that what is was called to such development. It paid no
pending in the present case is neither a final judgment nor an heed. Although now, it is claimed that had it
appeal by certiorari, the effect thereof would be the same. known, it would have stopped action or
Therefore, out of respect and courtesy for the higher court, the desisted from taking any at any stage in which
lower court should have suspended all pending proceedings in the fourth (4th) motion for reconsideration
the elevated case as even without any restraining order, the was found.
lower court had lost jurisdiction to further act on the case.
Applying the foregoing precedent, we rule that the appellate
We agree with the respondents on this point. court acted with grave abuse of or in excess of jurisdiction when
it issued the resolutions dated March 27 and April 5, 1979
correcting its earlier erroneous orders which were already before
Although this Court did not issue any restraining order against us.
the Intermediate Appellate Court to prevent it from taking any
On the second issue of whether or not respondents perfected should be reckoned not from the filing of the notice of appeal but
their appeal on time, the petitioner argues that clearly, the from the payment of docketing fees. The respondents paid the
respondents appeal was filed out of time since by their own docket fees only on October 2, 1978. We stated in the case
admission, respondents filed their notice of appeal only on of Aranas v. Endona, (117 SCRA 753, 758):
September 8, 1978, when they had only up to August 27, 1978 to
file the same. As early as November 16, 1932 this Court
rendered a decision in Lazaro v. Endencia and
Conversely, the respondents maintain that the period should be Andres (57 Phil, 552) that full payment of
reckoned from August 25, 1978, the date when they received the docket fees within the required period is an
second order of the NPCC because said order amended or 'indispensable step' for the perfection of an
modified the order of August 18, 1978 and, therefore, since there appeal. ...
was such an amendment, the period to perfect the appeal
commenced to again start from August 25, 1978. xxx xxx xxx

We find the petitioner's contention well-taken. Payment of the full amount within the
reglementary period was declared
It should be noted that when the respondents filed a motion for jurisdictional.
reconsideration of the order issued by the NPCC dated August 18,
1978, the same was denied by the latter on August 22, 1978, The jurisdictional nature of this requirement
Notice of the denial was received by the respondents on August continues to the present ...
25, 1978. The dispositive portion of the order of denial states:
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
instant motion for reconsideration of
Complainants Oppositors is hereby denied. Inasmuch as the respondents' appeal was perfected out of time,
Applicant-Respondent, through its President the appellate court did not acquire jurisdiction over it.
or managing head, is hereby Ordered to pay to Consequently, its appealed orders before this Court and all other
the Government through this Commission a orders it issued with regard to the present case are null and void.
fine of One Thousand (Pl,000.00) Pesos
pursuant to Section 9 (b) of Presidential We have carefully examined the records for any substantial
Decree No. 984 for violation of Section 8 of the considerations of equity which might warrant different
same decree. conclusions on the basic merits of the main case. We have found
none.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 75)
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the orders of the
It is clear from the above-quoted order that as far as the appellate court dated January 10, 1979, February 8, 1979, March
respondents are concemed there was no amendment of the 27, 1979 and April 5, 1979 are annulled and set aside.
NPCC's previous orders which would justify the running anew of Considering that the respondents' appeal was perfected long
the period to appeal. The only modification found in the order did after the due date, the order of the National Pollution Control
not pertain to the respondents but to the petitioner which was Commission dated April 18, 1978 is hereby declared FINAL.
fined for allowing an illegal interment. The respondents cannot
allege that the order of August 22, 1978 was more adverse to SO ORDERED.
them since it was the petitioner which was fined. After the denial
of the respondents' motion for reconsideration, they only had one
day to perfect their appeal which was on August 26, 1978.
Therefore, their filing of an appeal on September 8, 1978 was
definitely out of time. We ruled in the case of Garcia v. Echiverri,
(132 SCRA 631, 638):

Well-rooted is the principle that perfection of

an appeal within the statutory or reglementary
period is not only mandatory but also
jurisdictional and failure to do so renders the
questioned decision final and executory that
deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction to
alter the final judgment much less to entertain
the appeal. (Acda v. Minister of Labor, 119
SCRA 309; Agricultural and Industrial
Marketing, Inc. v. CA, 118 SCRA 49; Santos v.
CA, 125 SCRA 22).

Even assuming arguendo that the fifteen (15) day period to

appeal started anew on August 25, 1978, the day when
respondents received the order of August 22, 1978, still their
appeal was perfected out of time since the perfection of the same