Labor Cases (Set 2)

1. G.R. No. 128024. May 9, 2000

BEBIANO M. BAEZ, petitioner, vs. HON. DOWNEY C. VALDEVILLA and ORO

MARKETING, INC., respondents.

DECISION

GONZAGA_REYES, J.:

The orders of respondent judge[1] dated June 20, 1996 and October 16, 1996,
taking jurisdiction over an action for damages filed by an employer against its
dismissed employee, are assailed in this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court for having been issued in grave abuse of discretion.

Petitioner was the sales operations manager of private respondent in its branch in
Iligan City. In 1993, private respondent "indefinitely suspended" petitioner and the
latter filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the National Labor Relations
Commission ("NLRC") in Iligan City. In a decision dated July 7, 1994, Labor Arbiter
Nicodemus G. Palangan found petitioner to have been illegally dismissed and
ordered the payment of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement, and of backwages
and attorney's fees. The decision was appealed to the NLRC, which dismissed the
same for having been filed out of time.[2] Elevated by petition for certiorari before
this Court, the case was dismissed on technical grounds[3]; however, the Court also
pointed out that even if all the procedural requirements for the filing of the petition
were met, it would still be dismissed for failure to show grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the NLRC. Slxmis

On November 13, 1995, private respondent filed a complaint for damages before
the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Misamis Oriental, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-
554, which prayed for the payment of the following: Slxsc

a. P709,217.97 plus 12% interest as loss of profit and/or unearned income of three
years;

b. P119,700.00 plus 12% interest as estimated cost of supplies, facilities, properties,

space, etc. for three years;
c. P5,000.00 as initial expenses of litigation; and

d. P25,000.00 as attorney's fees.[4]

On January 30, 1996, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the above complaint. He
interposed in the court below that the action for damages, having arisen from an
employer-employee relationship, was squarely under the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the NLRC under Article 217(a), paragraph 4 of the Labor Code and is
barred by reason of the final judgment in the labor case. He accused private
respondent of splitting causes of action, stating that the latter could very well have
included the instant claim for damages in its counterclaim before the Labor Arbiter.
He also pointed out that the civil action of private respondent is an act of forum-
shopping and was merely resorted to after a failure to obtain a favorable decision
with the NLRC. Scslx

Ruling upon the motion to dismiss, respondent judge issued the herein questioned
Order, which summarized the basis for private respondent's action for damages in
this manner: Slx

Paragraph 5 of the complaint alleged that the defendant violated the plaintiffs policy
re: His business in his branch at Iligan City wherein defendant was the Sales
Operations Manager, and paragraph 7 of the same complaint briefly narrated the
modus operandi of defendant, quoted herein: Defendant canvassed customers
personally or through salesmen of plaintiff which were hired or recruited by him. If
said customer decided to buy items from plaintiff on installment basis, defendant,
without the knowledge of said customer and plaintiff, would buy the items on cash
basis at ex-factory price, a privilege not given to customers, and thereafter required
the customer to sign promissory notes and other documents using the name and
property of plaintiff, purporting that said customer purchased the items from
plaintiff on installment basis. Thereafter, defendant collected the installment
payments either personally or through Venus Lozano, a Group Sales Manager of
plaintiff but also utilized by him as secretary in his own business for collecting and
receiving of installments, purportedly for the plaintiff but in reality on his own
account or business. The collection and receipt of payments were made inside the
Iligan City branch using plaintiffs facilities, property and manpower. That
accordingly plaintiffs sales decreased and reduced to a considerable extent the
profits which it would have earned.[5]

In declaring itself as having jurisdiction over the subject matter of the instant
controversy, respondent court stated: Mesm
A perusal of the complaint which is for damages does not ask for any relief under
the Labor Code of the Philippines. It seeks to recover damages as redress for
defendant's breach of his contractual obligation to plaintiff who was damaged and
prejudiced. The Court believes such cause of action is within the realm of civil law,
and jurisdiction over the controversy belongs to the regular courts.

While seemingly the cause of action arose from employer- employee relations, the
employer's claim for damages is grounded on the nefarious activities of defendant
causing damage and prejudice to plaintiff as alleged in paragraph 7 of the
complaint. The Court believes that there was a breach of a contractual obligation,
which is intrinsically a civil dispute. The averments in the complaint removed the
controversy from the coverage of the Labor Code of the Philippines and brought it
within the purview of civil law. (Singapore Airlines, Ltd. Vs. Pao, 122 SCRA 671.)
xxx[6]

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the above Order was denied for lack of
merit on October 16, 1996. Hence, this petition. Calrky

Acting on petitioner's prayer, the Second Division of this Court issued a Temporary
Restraining Order ("TRO ") on March 5, 1997, enjoining respondents from further
proceeding with Civil Case No. 95-554 until further orders from the Court. Kycalr

By way of assignment of errors, the petition reiterates the grounds raised in the
Motion to Dismiss dated January 30, 1996, namely, lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the action, res judicata, splitting of causes of action, and forum-
shopping. The determining issue, however, is the issue of jurisdiction. Kyle

Article 217(a), paragraph 4 of the Labor Code, which was already in effect at the
time of the filing of this case, reads: Exsm

ART. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. --- (a) Except as
otherwise provided under this Code the Labor Arbiters shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within thirty (30) calendar days after the
submission of the case by the parties for decision without extension, even in the
absence of stenographic notes, the following cases involving all workers, whether
agricultural or non-agricultural:
xxx

4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from the
employer-employee relations;

xxx

The above provisions are a result of the amendment by Section 9 of Republic Act
("R.A.") No. 6715, which took effect on March 21, 1989, and which put to rest the
earlier confusion as to who between Labor Arbiters and regular courts had
jurisdiction over claims for damages as between employers and employees. Sppedjo

It will be recalled that years prior to R.A. 6715, jurisdiction over all money claims of
workers, including claims for damages, was originally lodged with the Labor Arbiters
and the NLRC by Article 217 of the Labor Code.[7] On May 1, 1979, however,
Presidential Decree ("P.D.") No. 1367 amended said Article 217 to the effect that
"Regional Directors shall not indorse and Labor Arbiters shall not entertain claims
for moral or other forms of damages."[8] This limitation in jurisdiction, however,
lasted only briefly since on May 1, 1980, P.D. No. 1691 nullified P.D. No. 1367 and
restored Article 217 of the Labor Code almost to its original form. Presently, and as
amended by R.A. 6715, the jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the NLRC in Article 217
is comprehensive enough to include claims for all forms of damages "arising from
the employer-employee relations". Miso

Whereas this Court in a number of occasions had applied the jurisdictional

provisions of Article 217 to claims for damages filed by employees,[9] we hold that
by the designating clause "arising from the employer-employee relations" Article
217 should apply with equal force to the claim of an employer for actual damages
against its dismissed employee, where the basis for the claim arises from or is
necessarily connected with the fact of termination, and should be entered as a
counterclaim in the illegal dismissal case. Nexold

Even under Republic Act No. 875 (the "Industrial Peace Act", now completely
superseded by the Labor Code), jurisprudence was settled that where the plaintiff's
cause of action for damages arose out of, or was necessarily intertwined with, an
alleged unfair labor practice committed by the union, the jurisdiction is exclusively
with the (now defunct) Court of Industrial Relations, and the assumption of
jurisdiction of regular courts over the same is a nullity.[10] To allow otherwise would
be "to sanction split jurisdiction, which is prejudicial to the orderly administration of
justice."[11] Thus, even after the enactment of the Labor Code, where the damages
separately claimed by the employer were allegedly incurred as a consequence of
strike or picketing of the union, such complaint for damages is deeply rooted from
the labor dispute between the parties, and should be dismissed by ordinary courts
for lack of jurisdiction. As held by this Court in National Federation of Labor vs.
Eisma, 127 SCRA 419: Manikx

Certainly, the present Labor Code is even more committed to the view that on
policy grounds, and equally so in the interest of greater promptness in the
disposition of labor matters, a court is spared the often onerous task of determining
what essentially is a factual matter, namely, the damages that may be incurred by
either labor or management as a result of disputes or controversies arising from
employer-employee relations.

There is no mistaking the fact that in the case before us, private respondent's claim
against petitioner for actual damages arose from a prior employer-employee
relationship. In the first place, private respondent would not have taken issue with
petitioner's "doing business of his own" had the latter not been concurrently its
employee. Thus, the damages alleged in the complaint below are: first, those
amounting to lost profits and earnings due to petitioner's abandonment or neglect
of his duties as sales manager, having been otherwise preoccupied by his
unauthorized installment sale scheme; and second, those equivalent to the value of
private respondent's property and supplies which petitioner used in conducting his
"business ". Maniks

Second, and more importantly, to allow respondent court to proceed with the
instant action for damages would be to open anew the factual issue of whether
petitioner's installment sale scheme resulted in business losses and the dissipation
of private respondent's property. This issue has been duly raised and ruled upon in
the illegal dismissal case, where private respondent brought up as a defense the
same allegations now embodied in his complaint, and presented evidence in
support thereof. The Labor Arbiter, however, found to the contrary ---that no
business losses may be attributed to petitioner as in fact, it was by reason of
petitioner's installment plan that the sales of the Iligan branch of private respondent
(where petitioner was employed) reached its highest record level to the extent that
petitioner was awarded the 1989 Field Sales Achievement Award in recognition of
his exceptional sales performance, and that the installment scheme was in fact with
the knowledge of the management of the Iligan branch of private respondent.[12] In
other words, the issue of actual damages has been settled in the labor case, which
is now final and executory. Manikan

Still on the prospect of re-opening factual issues already resolved by the labor court,
it may help to refer to that period from 1979 to 1980 when jurisdiction over
employment-predicated actions for damages vacillated from labor tribunals to
regular courts, and back to labor tribunals. In Ebon vs. de Guzman, 113 SCRA 52,
[13] this Court discussed:
The lawmakers in divesting the Labor Arbiters and the NLRC of jurisdiction to award
moral and other forms of damages in labor cases could have assumed that the
Labor Arbiters' position-paper procedure of ascertaining the facts in dispute might
not be an adequate tool for arriving at a just and accurate assessment of damages,
as distinguished from backwages and separation pay, and that the trial procedure in
the Court of First Instance would be a more effective means of determining such
damages. xxx

Evidently, the lawmaking authority had second thoughts about depriving the Labor
Arbiters and the NLRC of the jurisdiction to award damages in labor cases because
that setup would mean duplicity of suits, splitting the cause of action and possible
conflicting findings and conclusions by two tribunals on one and the same claim.

So, on May 1, 1980, Presidential Decree No. 1691 (which substantially reenacted
Article 217 in its original form) nullified Presidential Decree No. 1367 and restored to
the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC their jurisdiction to award all kinds of damages in
cases arising from employer-employee relations. xxx (Underscoring supplied)

Clearly, respondent court's taking jurisdiction over the instant case would bring
about precisely the harm that the lawmakers sought to avoid in amending the Labor
Code to restore jurisdiction over claims for damages of this nature to the NLRC.
Oldmiso

This is, of course, to distinguish from cases of actions for damages where the
employer-employee relationship is merely incidental and the cause of action
proceeds from a different source of obligation. Thus, the jurisdiction of regular
courts was upheld where the damages, claimed for were based on tort[14],
malicious prosecution[15], or breach of contract, as when the claimant seeks to
recover a debt from a former employee[16] or seeks liquidated damages in
enforcement of a prior employment contract. [17]

Neither can we uphold the reasoning of respondent court that because the
resolution of the issues presented by the complaint does not entail application of
the Labor Code or other labor laws, the dispute is intrinsically civil. Article 217(a) of
the Labor Code, as amended, clearly bestows upon the Labor Arbiter original and
exclusive jurisdiction over claims for damages arising from employer-employee
relations ---in other words, the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction to award not only the
reliefs provided by labor laws, but also damages governed by the Civil Code.[18]
Thus, it is obvious that private respondent's remedy is not in the filing of this
separate action for damages, but in properly perfecting an appeal from the Labor
Arbiter's decision. Having lost the right to appeal on grounds of untimeliness, the
decision in the labor case stands as a final judgment on the merits, and the instant
action for damages cannot take the place of such lost appeal.

Respondent court clearly having no jurisdiction over private respondent's complaint

for damages, we will no longer pass upon petitioner's other assignments of error.
Ncm

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED, and the complaint in Civil Case No. 95-554
before Branch 39 of the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental is hereby
DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs. Ncmmis

SO ORDERED.

2. G.R. No. 184397, September 09, 2015

ROSALINDA G. PAREDES, Petitioner, v. FEED THE CHILDREN PHILIPPINES, INC.

AND/OR DR. VIRGINIA LAO, HERCULES PARADIANG AND BENJAMIN ESCOBIA,
Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

For this Court's resolution is a petition for review on certiorari, dated October 23,
2008, of petitioner Rosalinda G. Paredes, seeking to reverse and set aside the
Decision1 dated March 25, 2008 and Resolution2 dated August 28, 2008 of the
Court of Appeals (CA). The assailed Decision annulled and set aside the rulings of
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) Fourth Division, Cebu City and
affirmed the rulings of the Labor Arbiter (LA), which held that petitioner voluntarily
resigned and was not constructively dismissed.

The antecedents are as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Respondent Feed the Children Philippines, Inc. (FTCP) is a nonstock, non-profit, and
non-government organization duly incorporated under the Philippine laws in 1989.
Its objective is to provide food, clothing, educational supplies and other necessities
of indigent children worldwide3 Respondents Dr. Virginia Lao, Hercules Paradiang
and Benjamin Escobia were members of the FTCP Board of Trustees (Board) and
Executive Committee (Execom) of FTCP.4

Petitioner Rosalinda Paredes was FTCP's National Director. Her functions and duties
include project management, fund accessing, income generation, financial
management, and administration of the organization. She also signed all the FTCP
checks and approved all requisitions and disbursements of FTCP funds.5 As per
FTCP's By-laws, it was also her duty to execute all resolutions and/or decisions of the
Board.6

Petitioner was first hired by FTCP in 1999 as Country Director. Her contract was
renewed several times until her last contract for the period from October 1, 2004 to
September 30, 2007. Her initial salary was US$1000.00 and then later, she was paid
P70,000.00 aside from other benefits and allowances.7

On August 12, 2005, forty-two (42) FTCP employees signed a petition letter
addressed to the Board expressing their complaints against alleged detestable
practices of petitioner, to wit: seeking exemption from policies which she herself
had approved; withholding organization funds despite approval of its release;
procuring health insurance for herself without paying her share of the premium; and
receiving additional fees contrary to the terms of her contract.8

The next day, August 13, 2005, the staff of FTCP called Lao to a meeting to submit
their petition. They included Atty. Edgar Chatto, then Chairman of the Board, in the
meeting when they realized that it was only her and Escobia who were present. The
group was edgy and demanded for outright solution. However, the three Board
members told them that they should follow a process.9

Petitioner learned from Atty. Chatto that Program Manager Primitivo Fostanes and
his co-employees prepared a petition questioning her leadership and management
of FTCP. She filed an administrative complaint against Fostanes on August 24, 2005,
but the same was not acted upon.10

When the Board convened for a meeting on August 28, 2005, petitioner was not
allowed to participate. She was only allowed to join the meeting after three hours.
As ex officio member of the Board and as head of the secretariat, she was always
present in every meeting to discuss her reports, programs and proposals.11

During the meeting, the Board discussed the animosity between the petitioner and
the staff of FTCP and how they would address the issue since they have inadequate
grievance mechanism for issues involving top management.12 According to Lao,
petitioner became combative in issuing memos and filing of administrative
charges.13 Atty. Chatto recounted that when petitioner heard about the protesting
senior management and staff, her initial reaction was to resign but then she asked
that the complaints be put in writing.14 After their discussion, they called the
representatives of the complaining staff and petitioner to air their side.

Consequently, the Board decided that: Acting Board Chair Lao will issue a back-to-
work memorandum and status quo to ensure that all the scheduled tasks be
accomplished; there will be a Supervisory Team, composing of Lao and Escobia, that
will draw a definite work plan and be compensated; the Supervisory Team will not
replace the functions of the National Director; and FTCP will hire an independent
professional management and financial auditor.15

Petitioner sent letters to the Board inquiring about the scope of audit. When the
Board did not respond, her lawyers demanded Lao to address petitioner's concerns
regarding the management and financial audit and that the manual of operations be
strictly followed.16 In another letter, her lawyers informed individual respondents
that petitioner raised the legality and propriety of the conduct of the audit, thus,
they requested that they desist from conducting the audit. The letter also indicated
that failure to do so would implead them as respondents in a preliminary injunction
case that they would file.17

While she was at an orientation for local government officials of Surigao del Norte at
the Bohol Tropics Resort on October 24, 2005, petitioner received a phone call from
her staff at FTCP that the auditors from SRD & Co. were already at their office. Lao
also called to instruct her that she should meet the auditors and accommodate
them. She refrained from obeying the order and was adamant that she should
receive her requested information first.18

On October 26, 2005, the FTCP management executive committee, headed by

petitioner, informed the Board that they were not afraid of the audit. They wanted
due process as provided by the by-laws, manual of operations, and manual of
financial policies and accounting procedures approved by the Board itself. They also
inquired about the meetings and processes of the Execom that they were not aware
of. Lastly, they asked for a dialogue to settle their differences.19
On the same date, petitioner wrote an electronic mail (e-mail) to Dr. Larry Jones, the
founder of Feed the Children International, Inc. and reported that Paradiang and two
members of the Board initiated a surprise and secret audit. She expressed that the
management was upset to the manner of conducting the audit. She also insinuated
that Paradiang was always after her despite steering the organization to
development. She intimated that she would legally protect herself should she be
illegally dismissed and that they would seek relief from the harassment by
Paradiang.20

The Board resolved to suspend petitioner because of her indifferent attitude and
unjustified refusal to submit to an audit.21 Before it could be implemented,
respondent FTCP received her resignation letter.22 In her resignation letter, she
wrote that she can only serve the organization up to December 31, 2005. She found
it no longer tenable to work with the Board since she had differences with majority
of the members regarding resolutions, policies and procedures.23

On October 29, 2005, the Board accepted her resignation with the condition that its
effectivity be moved to November 30, 2005. She was not obliged to report for work
and FTCP was willing to pay her salary for the month of November to aid her while
she looked for other employment.24

Petitioner wrote to the members of management and foreign funders informing

them that she was no longer connected with FTCP. She moved out all her belongings
and even brought FTCP's documents.25cralawred

On November 2, 2005, petitioner filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal, claiming

that she was forced to resign, thus, was constructively dismissed, and impleaded
Lao, Paradiang and Escobia in their personal capacities.26

Upon failure of the parties to settle amicably, the mandatory conference was
terminated.

In her position paper, petitioner alleged that she was not included in the
Supervisory Team which performed her functions and issued memorandum directly
to her subordinates. She also alleged that she was excluded from Execom
meetings.27

Respondents, on the other hand, claimed that petitioner was signatory to all the
bank checks of respondent FTCP and approved all requisitions and disbursements.
She received an excess of US$1,000.00 for her salary and did not return the same.
They alleged that petitioner voluntarily resigned from her position and removed all
her belongings from the FTCP.28

The LA ruled in favor of the respondents, the dispositive portion of the Decision29
reads:cralawlawlibrary

WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the case is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit
and judgment is hereby rendered ordering complainant Rosalinda G. Paredes to pay
the following:

1. One Hundred Forty-Three Thousand Six Hundred [F]orty-Six and 73/100

(P143,646.73) representing her accountabilities to respondent FTCP in Philippine
Currency;

2. One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) to respondent FTCP representing

complainant's accountability in US Currency;

3. Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) each to respondents Dr. Virginia Lao,
Benjamin Escobia and Hercules Paradiang for moral damages;

4. One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) to respondent FTCP for damages incurred;

5. One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) to respondents collectively for

exemplary damages; and

6. Attorney's Fees to 10% of the total award.

SO ORDERED.

Undaunted, petitioner appealed the decision to the NLRC. In its Decision31 dated
March 28, 2007, the NLRC reversed and set aside the decision of the LA and ruled in
her favor, the dispositive portion of which states

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Labor Arbiter dated 08

November 2006 is REVERSED and SET aside and a new one is entered, to
wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

I. Ordering respondent Feed the Children Philippines, Inc. to pay the complainant of
her salaries and allowances corresponding to the unexpired portion of her contract
in the aggregate amount of One Million Six Hundred Eighty-Five Thousand Nine
Hundred and 00/100 (PI,685,900.00), broken down as follows:cralawlawlibrary
a. Salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of the contract

- P1,610,000.00

b. Transportation allowances

- 29,900.00

c. Representation allowances

- 46,000.00

Total

P1,685,900.00;

chanrobleslaw

and

2. Ordering respondent Feed the Children Philippines, Inc. to pay complainant of

moral damages in the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00); and
exemplary damages in the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00).

Respondents Dr. Virginia Lao, Hercules Paradiang and Benjamin Escobia are
absolved from any liability for lack of legal basis.

SO ORDERED.32

In a Resolution33 dated June 14, 2007, the NLRC dismissed the motion for
reconsideration of the respondents. Thus, respondents filed before the CA a petition
for certiorari. The CA ruled for the respondents. The fallo of said decision
reads:cralawlawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated March 28, 2007 and the Resolution dated June 14,
2007, of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Fourth Division, Cebu
City, in NLRC Case No. V-000074-2007, are NULLIFIED and a new one rendered as
follows:cralawlawlibrary
1. Declaring private respondent to have voluntarily resigned from her
employment/consultancy with FTCP;

2. Directing private respondent to pay FTCP

a. Thirty-four thousand four hundred thirty-eight pesos and 37/100 (P34,438.37) for
her unpaid loans;

b. One hundred nine thousand two hundred eight pesos and 36/100 (P109.208.36)
respecting her disbursement and withdrawals from the FTCP Provident
Fund.chanrobleslaw

Costs against private respondent.

SO ORDERED

The CA did not find any valid. reason to disturb its decision, hence, it denied
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.35

In this recourse, petitioner raises the following issues for this Court's
consideration:cralawlawlibrary

I. The CA contravenes the law and jurisprudence when it granted the petition for
certiorari that raised questions factual in nature and when it sweepingly applied the
ruling in St. Martin Funeral Homes to justify its act of delving into the findings of the
NLRC which were outside the scope of extraordinary remedy of certiorari.

II. The CA grossly contradicts the law and jurisprudence on constructive dismissal
and ignored, misunderstood or misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances
which, if considered, would change the outcome of the case when it ruled that
petitioner voluntarily resigned and was not constructively dismissed.

III. The CA effectively reverses the law and jurisprudence on damages and
recognized money claims in labor cases when it condemned petitioner to pay
respondents' claims for damages that were not duly proven by the latter and that
clearly did not arise from an employer-employee relationship.
IV. The CA violates the Constitution, the law and the prevailing jurisprudence when it
resolved the lingering doubts that remain in the present case, as those arising from
evidence and from interpretation of agreements and writings, against
labor.chanrobleslaw

The present petition is partly meritorious.

It is elementary that this Court is not a trier of facts, and only errors of law are
generally reviewed in petitions for review on certiorari. Judicial review of labor cases
does not go beyond the evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence upon which its
labor officials' findings rest. As such, the findings of facts and conclusion of the
NLRC are generally accorded not only great weight and respect but even clothed
with finality and deemed binding on this Court as long as they are supported by
substantial evidence.36

However, if the factual findings of the LA and the NLRC are conflicting, as in this
case, the reviewing court may delve into the records and examine for itself the
questioned findings.37 The exception, rather than the general rule, applies in the
present case since the LA and the CA found facts supporting the conclusion that
petitioner was not constructively dismissed, while the NLRC's factual findings
contradicted the LA's findings. Under this situation, such conflicting factual findings
are not binding on us, and we retain the authority to pass on the evidence
presented and draw conclusions therefrom.

After judicious review on the records of the case, this Court deems it proper to
disregard the findings of fact of the NLRC. This Court finds that the NLRC committed
grave abuse of discretion when it ruled for the petitioner without substantial
evidence to support its findings of facts and conclusion.

Petitioner, relying in the principle of finality and conclusiveness of the decisions of

labor tribunals, faults the CA for reversing the findings of the NLRC and affirming the
factual findings of the LA that she voluntarily resigned. She averred that the CA
erred when it applied the ruling in the case of St. Martin Funeral Homes v. NLRC38
to justify its inquiring into the findings of the NLRC which was outside the scope of
extraordinary remedy of certiorari. She posited that NLRC's findings cannot be
delved into without first declaring the decision itself to have been issued with grave
abuse of discretion.39

Courts generally accord great respect and finality to factual findings of

administrative agencies, like labor tribunals, in the exercise of their quasi-judicial
function. However, this doctrine espousing comity to administrative findings of facts
are not infallible and cannot preclude the courts from reviewing and, when proper,
disregarding these findings of facts when shown that the administrative body
committed grave abuse of discretion.40

It is settled that in a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, the issues are
limited to errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. However, in labor cases
elevated to it via petition for certiorari, the CA is empowered to evaluate the
materiality and significance of the evidence alleged to have been capriciously,
whimsically, or arbitrarily disregarded by the NLRC in relation to all other evidence
on record.41

The CA can grant this prerogative writ when the factual findings complained of are
not supported by the evidence on record; when it is necessary to prevent a
substantial wrong or to do substantial justice; when the findings of the NLRC
contradict those of the LA; and when necessary to arrive at a just decision of the
case.42 To make this finding, the CA necessarily has to view the evidence if only to
determine if the NLRC ruling had basis in evidence.43

Contrary to petitioner's contention, the CA, by express legal mandate and pursuant
to its equity jurisdiction, may review factual findings and evidence of the parties to
determine whether the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in its findings.44 Since
this Court finds that the findings of the LA and NLRC contradicting and that the
findings of NLRC are not supported by the evidence on record, we rule that it is
within the CA's power to review the factual findings of the NLRC. Accordingly, this
Court does not find erroneous the course that the CA took in resolving that
petitioner was not constructively dismissed.

This Court, in turn, has the same authority to sift through the factual findings of
both the CA and the NLRC in the event of their conflict.45 This Court, therefore, is
not precluded from reviewing the factual issues when there are conflicting findings
by the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the Court of Appeals.46

Since petitioner admittedly resigned, it is incumbent upon her to prove that her
resignation was involuntary and that it was actually a case of constructive dismissal
with clear, positive and convincing evidence.47

Petitioner alleged that she was forced to resign by Lao, Paradiang and Escobia. For
her, it was the overbearing and prejudiced attitude towards her by individual
respondents that rendered her continued employment impossible, unreasonable or
unlikely. She maintained that the prevailing working environment compelled her to
disassociate with FTCP. She recounted that the individual respondents deliberately
excluded her from important meetings despite being the chief executive officer and
a fixture to all Board meetings.

Petitioner cited the August 28, 2005 Board meeting and a subsequent Execom
meeting where she was apparently banished as proof of respondents'
discrimination. She emphasized in all her pleadings that, aside from it being
provided by the by-laws, she believed that her presence at all Board meetings
cannot be dispensed with since it was through her effort that the Board of Trustees
became functional. For her, she was isolated and singled out. She claimed that
these circumstances clearly denoted that the actions of the respondents were
motivated by discrimination and made in bad faith.

Case law holds that constructive dismissal occurs when there is cessation of work
because continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely;
when there is a demotion in rank or diminution in pay or both; or when a clear
discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to the
employee.48 The test is whether a reasonable person in the employee's position
would have felt compelled to give up his position under the circumstances.49

In this case, petitioner cannot be deemed constructively dismissed. She failed to

present clear and positive evidence that respondent FTCP, through its Board of
Trustees, committed acts of discrimination, insensibility, or disdain towards her
which rendered her continued employment unbearable or forced her to terminate
her employment from the respondent. As settled, bare allegations of constructive
dismissal, when uncorroborated by the evidence on record, cannot be given
credence.50

It is highly unlikely and incredible for someone of petitioner's position and

educational attainment to so easily succumb to individual respondents' alleged
harassment without defending herself. In fact, records reveal that she wrote directly
to Jones when her contract was not to be renewed and whenever she felt
threatened. She vehemently opposed the audit and openly disobeyed the Board
when she was not informed of the scope. She, along with other management staff,
questioned the meetings of the Execom that they were not informed.51 It is also
noted that her husband is a lawyer and that she employed lawyers who sent a
series of demand letters to the Board to provide her the details of the audit and
even ordered the Board to desist from pursuing the audit.

There was no urgency for petitioner to submit her resignation letter. In fact, the day
before it was given, she and other management staff requested for a dialogue with
the Board to address the issue regarding the management and financial audit.52 It
is, therefore, improbable that her continued employment is rendered impossible or
unreasonable.

Records do not show any demotion in rank or a diminution in pay made against her.
Petitioner claimed that the fact that the Supervisory Team performed her functions
and issued memorandum directly to her subordinates, and her being barred from
subsequent Execom meetings constituted constructive dismissal. However, there
was no evidence to corroborate her claim of usurpation. She did not present
evidence of the supposed direct memorandum issued by the Supervisory Team to
the staff. Aside from the minutes of the September 29, 2005 meeting of the
Execom, there was no other proof of petitioner's exclusion from other subsequent
Execom meetings.

We find that, apart from her self-serving and uncorroborated allegations, petitioner
did not present any substantial evidence of constructive dismissal. She was not able
to present a single witness to corroborate her claims of harassment by Lao,
Paradiang and Escobia.

Petitioner supported her claim with the minutes of the August 28, 2005 meeting and
another minutes of the meeting of the Execom that she was excluded. She argued
that her sudden exclusion from board meetings despite established practice
constituted grave abuse of managerial rights of the respondent FTCP.

We are not persuaded that her exclusion to the meeting constituted discrimination
or harassment. A careful perusal of the minutes would reveal that the Board
convened to deliberate on the solution to the apparent conflict between petitioner
and the staff since they have insufficient grievance mechanism for issues involving
top management. She could not fault the Board to not include her in that particular
meeting since she was a party involved and to avoid. possible influence that she
could have exerted.

Petitioner presented documents like e-mail correspondences with Paradiang about

the non-renewal of her contract earlier in her employment, e-mail correspondences
to Jones about harassment towards her and specifically mentioning Paradiang,
demand letters from her and her lawyers, her resignation letter, and the board
resolution accepting her resignation. These do not verify that respondents
committed discrimination or disdain towards her. Hence, her allegations are sell-
serving and uncorroborated and should not be given evidentiary weight.

On the other hand, respondent FTCP presented a letter53 dated August 28, 2005
written by petitioner addressed to the Board wherein she presented her side about
the petition of the employees against her. She also praised the Board for
strengthening the organization, for putting valuable policies in the organization, and
for opening the organization to new partnerships.

In another letter54 dated September 6, 2005, she reported that on the same date
as the August 28 Board meeting, she and Fostanes met to discuss concerns and
apologized for what happened and other members of management also apologized
and accepted the reconciliation that she extended to them. She also reported that
during the September 5, 2005 General Staff meeting, the issues were discussed,
feelings and sentiments were shared, and concluded with a firm commitment from
everyone to rebuild the good name of FTCP and work together to enhance its
system and maintain its integrity.

The letters did not mention nor hinted that petitioner protested about being
excluded from the meeting which she has considered as a hearing against her. It did
not even reveal that there was undue prejudice from individual respondents.
Records are bereft of proof that she even attempted to address the Board about the
supposed discrimination or disdain by individual respondents. It is only upon filing of
the illegal dismissal case that she alleged that she felt that she was discriminated
against and treated with disdain by respondents.

Respondents presented an affidavit and a police blotter55 attesting that some

employees who signed in the August 12 letter-petition were intimidated by the
secretary of petitioner's lawyer-husband to sign a recantation. She refuted the same
by alleging that they could have not known that it was recantation when it appeared
in the blotter that they only saw the page they were made to sign. Respondents also
presented an affidavit56 attesting that petitioner intimidated an employee by telling
her that she would file suits against those who defamed her when the employee
refused to recant her signature in the petition against her.

For petitioner, the fact that the effectivity of her resignation was moved to
November showed the eagerness of Lao, Paradiang and Escobia to get rid of her.57

We held that the act of the employer moving the effectivity of the resignation is not
an act of harassment. The 30-day notice requirement for an employee's resignation
is actually for the benefit of the employer who has the discretion to waive such
period. Its purpose is to afford the employer enough time to hire another employee
if needed and to see to it that there is proper turn-over of the tasks which the
resigning employee may be handling.58
Such rule requiring an employee to stay or complete the 30-day period prior to the
effectivity of his resignation becomes discretionary on the part of management as
an employee who intends to resign may be allowed a shorter period before his
resignation becomes effective.59

Thus, the act of respondents moving the effectivity date of petitioner's resignation
to a date earlier than what she had stated cannot be deemed malicious. This cannot
be viewed as an act of harassment but merely the exercise of respondent's
management prerogative. We cannot expect employers to maintain in their employ
employees who intend to resign, just so the latter can have continuous work as they
look for a new source of income.

Petitioner alleged that the CA erred when it ruled that she should pay respondents'
claims for damages. She maintained that they were not duly proven and that they
clearly didnot arise from an employer-employee relationship.

This Court held that the "money claims of workers" referred to in Article 21760 of
the Labor Code embraces money claims which arise out of or in connection with the
employer-employee relationship, or some aspect or incident of such relationship.61

Applying the rule of noscitur a sociis in clarifying the scope of Article 217, it is
evident that paragraphs 1 to 5 refer to cases or disputes arising out of or in
connection with an employer-employee relationship. In other words, the money
claims within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of labor arbiters are those which
have some reasonable causal connection with the employer-employee
relationship.62

This claim is distinguished from cases of actions for damages where the employer-
employee relationship is merely incidental and the cause of action proceeds from a
different source of obligation. Thus, the regular courts have jurisdiction where the
damages claimed for were based on: tort, malicious prosecution, or breach of
contract, as when the claimant seeks to recover a debt from a former employee or
seeks liquidated damages in the enforcement of a prior employment contract.'"

By the designating clause "arising from the employer-employee relations," Article

217 applies with equal force to the claim of an employer for actual damages against
its dismissed employee, where the basis for the claim arises from or is necessarily
connected with the fact of termination, and should be entered as a counterclaim in
the illegal dismissal case.64
In this case, the CA erred in awarding P34,438.37 for petitioner's unpaid debt to
respondents. The claim for recovery of a debt has no reasonable causal connection
with any of the claims provided for in Article 217. The fact that the transaction
happened at the time they were employer and employee did not negate the civil
jurisdiction of trial court. Hence, it is erroneous for the LA and the CA to rule on such
claim arising from a different source of obligation and where the employer-
employee relationship was merely incidental.

Likewise, the CA erred in awarding P109,208.36 for the reimbursement of the FTCP
provident Fund allegedly withdrawn by petitioner. Although it was entered by the
respondents in its counterclaim, this claim does not arise from or is necessarily
connected with the fact of termination. It also had no reasonable causal connection
with employer-employee relationship.

Lastly, petitioner maintained that the CA erred when it resolved the lingering doubt
in the present case against labor. She alleged that the CA violated the Constitution,
the law, and jurisprudence.

We held that the law and jurisprudence guarantee security of tenure to every
employee. However, in protecting the rights of the workers, the law does not
authorize the oppression or self-destruction of the employer. Social justice does not
mean that every labor dispute shall automatically be decided in favor of labor. Thus,
the Constitution and the law equally recognize the employer's right and prerogative
to manage its operation according to reasonable standards and norms of fair play.65

It is settled that the law serves to equalize the unequal. The labor force is a special
class that is constitutionally protected because of the inequality between capital
and labor. This constitutional protection presupposes that the labor force is weak.
However, the level of protection to labor should vary from case to case; otherwise,
the state might appear to be too paternalistic in affording protection to labor.66
Petitioner could not expect to have the same level of ardent protection that the laws
bestow upon a lowly laborer be given to her, a high ranking officer of respondent
FTCP. As proven, she was considered on equal footing with her employer and even
had the occasion to demand the renewal of her contract by sending an e-mail to the
organization's founder.67

We cannot subscribe to petitioner's allegation that the CA ruled against labor when
it resolved the factual issues of the case. As discussed, it is well within the powers
and jurisdiction of the CA to evaluate the evidence alleged to have been
capriciously, whimsically, or arbitrarily disregarded by the NLRC, or as in the present
case, for considering petitioner's bare allegations without support of substantial
evidence. This Court finds that the CA did not violate the Constitution, the law and
jurisprudence. Hence, the resolution of the doubt as to whether petitioner
voluntarily resigned or was constructively dismissed based on the evidence on
record was proper and was not against labor.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari, dated October 23, 2008, of
petitioner Rosalinda G. Paredes is hereby PARTLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the ruling
of the Court of Appeals in its Decision dated March 25, 2008, that petitioner was not
constructively dismissed, is hereby AFFIRMED. However, the awards of F34,438.37
and PI09,208.36 for the unpaid debt of petitioner and reimbursement of the FTCP
provident Fund, respectively, are hereby SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

3. CENTURY PROPERTIES, INC., Petitioner, v. EDWIN J. BABIANO AND EMMA B.

CONCEPCION, Respondents.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated April 8,
2015 and the Resolution3 dated October 12, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 132953, which affirmed, with modification the Decision4 dated June
25, 2013 and the Resolution5 dated October 16, 2013 of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC LAC No. 05-001615-12, and ordered petitioner
Century Properties, Inc. (CPI) to pay respondents Edwin J. Babiano (Babiano) and
Emma B. Concepcion (Concepcion; collectively, respondents) unpaid commissions in
the amounts of P889,932.42 and P591,953.05, respectively.

The Facts

On October 2, 2002, Babiano was hired by CPI as Director of Sales, and was
eventually6 appointed as Vice President for Sales effective September 1, 2007. As
CPFs Vice President for Sales, Babiano was remunerated with, inter alia, the
following benefits: (a) monthly salary of P70,000.00; (b) allowance of P50,000.00;
and (c) 0.5% override commission for completed sales. His employment contract7
also contained a "Confidentiality of Documents and Non-Compete Clause"8 which,
among others, barred him from disclosing confidential information, and from
working in any business enterprise that is in direct competition with CPI "while [he
is] employed and for a period of one year from date of resignation or termination
from [CPI]." Should Babiano breach any of the terms thereof, his "forms of
compensation, including commissions and incentives will be
forfeited."9chanrobleslaw

During the same period, Concepcion was initially hired as Sales Agent by CPI and
was eventually10 promoted as Project Director on September 1, 2007.11 As such,
she signed an employment agreement, denominated as "Contract of Agency for
Project Director"12 which provided, among others, that she would directly report to
Babiano, and receive, a monthly subsidy of P60,000.00, 0.5% commission, and cash
incentives.13 On March 31, 2008, Concepcion executed a similar contract14 anew
with CPI in which she would receive a monthly subsidy of P50,000.00, 0.5%
commission, and cash incentives as per company policy. Notably, it was stipulated
in both contracts that no employer-employee relationship exists between
Concepcion and CPI.15chanrobleslaw

After receiving reports that Babiano provided a competitor with information

regarding CPFs marketing strategies, spread false information regarding CPI and its
projects, recruited CPI's personnel to join the competitor, and for being absent
without official leave (AWOL) for five (5) days, CPI, through its Executive Vice
President for Marketing and Development, Jose Marco R. Antonio (Antonio), sent
Babiano a Notice to Explain16 on February 23, 2009 directing him to explain why he
should not be charged with disloyalty, conflict of interest, and breach of trust and
confidence for his actuations.17chanrobleslaw

On February 25, 2009, Babiano tendered18 his resignation and revealed that he had
been accepted as Vice President of First Global BYO Development Corporation (First
Global), a competitor of CPI.19 On March 3, 2009, Babiano was served a Notice of
Termination20 for: (a) incurring AWOL; (b) violating the "Confidentiality of
Documents and Non-Compete Clause" when he joined a competitor enterprise while
still working for CPI and provided such competitor enterprise information regarding
CPFs marketing strategies; and (c) recruiting CPI personnel to join a
competitor.21chanrobleslaw

On the other hand, Concepcion resigned as CPFs Project Director through a letter22
dated February 23, 2009, effective immediately.

On August 8, 2011, respondents filed a complaint23 for non-payment of

commissions and damages against CPI and Antonio before the NLRC, docketed as
NLRC Case No. NCR-08-12029-11, claiming that their repeated demands for the
payment and release of their commissions remained unheeded.24chanrobleslaw

For its part, CPI maintained25cralawred that Babiano is merely its agent tasked with
selling its projects. Nonetheless, he was afforded due process in the termination of
his employment which was based on just causes.26 It also claimed to have validly
withheld Babiano's commissions, considering that they were deemed forfeited for
violating the "Confidentiality of Documents and Non-Compete Clause."27 On
Concepcion's money claims, CPI asserted that the NLRC had no jurisdiction to hear
the same because there was no employer-employee relations between them, and
thus, she should have litigated the same in an ordinary civil action.28chanrobleslaw

The LA Ruling

In a Decision29 dated March 19, 2012, the Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled in CPI's favor
and, accordingly, dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.30chanrobleslaw

The LA found that: (a) Babiano's acts of providing information on CPI's marketing
strategies to the competitor and spreading false information about CPI and its
projects are blatant violations of the "Confidentiality of Documents and Non-
Compete Clause" of his employment contract, thus, resulting in the forfeiture of his
unpaid commissions in accordance with the same clause;31 and (b) it had no
jurisdiction over Concepcion's money claim as she was not an employee but a mere
agent of CPI, as clearly stipulated in her engagement contract with the
latter.32chanrobleslaw

Aggrieved, respondents appealed33 to the NLRC.

The NLRC Ruling

In a Decision34 dated June 25, 2013, the NLRC reversed and set aside the LA ruling,
and entered a new one ordering CPI to pay Babiano and Concepcion the amounts of
P685,211.76 and P470,754.62, respectively, representing their commissions from
August 9, 2008 to August 8, 2011, as well as 10% attorney's fees of the total
monetary awards.35chanrobleslaw

While the NLRC initially concurred with the LA that Babiano's acts constituted just
cause which would warrant the termination of his employment from CPI, it, however,
ruled that the forfeiture of all earned commissions of Babiano under the
"Confidentiality of Documents and Non-Compete Clause" is confiscatory and
unreasonable and hence, contrary to law and public policy.36 In this light, the NLRC
held that CPI could not invoke such clause to avoid the payment of Babiano's
commissions since he had already earned those monetary benefits and, thus,
should have been released to him. However, the NLRC limited the grant of the
money claims in light of Article 291 (now Article 306)37 of the Labor Code which
provides for a prescriptive period of three (3) years. Consequently, the NLRC
awarded unpaid commissions only from August 9, 2008 to August 8, 2011 i.e.,
which was the date when the complaint was filed.38 Meanwhile, contrary to the LA's
finding, the NLRC ruled that Concepcion was CPI's employee, considering that CPI:
(a) repeatedly hired and promoted her since 2002; (b) paid her wages despite
referring to it as "subsidy"; and (c) exercised the power of dismissal and control over
her.39 Lastly, the NLRC granted respondents' claim for attorney's fees since they
were forced to litigate and incurred expenses for the protection of their rights and
interests.40chanrobleslaw

Respondents did not assail the NLRC findings. In contrast, only CPI moved for
reconsideration,41 which the NLRC denied in a Resolution42 dated October 16,
2013. Aggrieved, CPI filed a petition for certiorari43 before the CA.

The CA Ruling

In a Decision44 dated April 8, 2015, the CA affirmed the NLRC ruling with
modification increasing the award of unpaid commissions to Babiano and
Concepcion in the amounts of P889,932.42 and P591.953.05, respectively, and
imposing interest of six percent (6%) per annum on all monetary awards from the
finality of its decision until fully paid.45chanrobleslaw

The CA held that Babiano properly instituted his claim for unpaid commissions
before the labor tribunals as it is a money claim arising from an employer-employee
relationship with CPI. In this relation, the CA opined that CPI cannot withhold such
unpaid commissions on the ground of Babiano's alleged breach of the
"Confidentiality of Documents and Non-Compete Clause" integrated in the latter's
employment contract, considering that such clause referred to acts done after the
cessation of the employer-employee relationship or to the "post-employment"
relations of the parties. Thus, any such supposed breach thereof is a civil law
dispute that is best resolved by the regular courts and not by labor
tribunals.46chanrobleslaw

Similarly, the CA echoed the NLRC's finding that there exists an employer-employee
relationship between Concepcion and CPI, because the latter exercised control over
the performance of her duties as Project Director which is indicative of an employer-
employee relationship. Necessarily therefore, CPI also exercised control over
Concepcion's duties in recruiting, training, and developing directors of sales
because she was supervised by Babiano in the performance of her functions. The
CA likewise observed the presence of critical factors which were indicative of an
employer-employee relationship with CPI, such as: (a) Concepcion's receipt of a
monthly salary from CPI; and (b) that she performed tasks besides selling CPI
properties. To add, the title of her contract which was referred to as "Contract of
Agency for Project Director" was not binding and conclusive, considering that the
characterization of the juridical relationship is essentially a matter of law that is for
the courts to determine, and not the parties thereof. Moreover, the totality of
evidence sustains a finding of employer-employee relationship between CPI and
Concepcion.47chanrobleslaw

Further, the CA held that despite the NLRC's proper application of the three (3)-year
prescriptive period under Article 291 of the Labor Code, it nonetheless failed to
include all of respondents' earned commissions during that time - i.e., August 9,
2008 to August 8, 2011 - thus, necessitating the increase in award of unpaid
commissions in respondents' favor.48chanrobleslaw

Undaunted, CPI sought for reconsideration,49 which was, however, denied in a

Resolution50 dated October 12, 2015; hence, this petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA erred in denying
CPI's petition for certiorari, thereby holding it liable for the unpaid commissions of
respondents.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is partly meritorious.

I.

Article 1370 of the Civil Code provides that "[i]f the terms of a contract are clear
and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning
of its stipulations shall control."51 In Norton Resources and Development
Corporation v. All Asia Bank Corporation,52 the Court had the opportunity to
thoroughly discuss the said rule as follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The rule is that where the language of a contract is plain and unambiguous, its
meaning should be determined without reference to extrinsic facts or aids. The
intention of the parties must be gathered from that language, and from that
language alone. Stated differently, where the language of a written contract is clear
and unambiguous, the contract must be taken to mean that which, on its face, it
purports to mean, unless some good reason can be assigned to show that the words
should be understood in a different sense. Courts cannot make for the parties better
or more equitable agreements than they themselves have been satisfied to make,
or rewrite contracts because they operate harshly or inequitably as to one of the
parties, or alter them for the benefit of one party and to the detriment of the other,
or by construction, relieve one of the parties from the terms which he voluntarily
consented to, or impose on him those which he did not.53 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)

Thus, in the interpretation of contracts, the Court must first determine whether a
provision or stipulation therein is ambiguous. Absent any ambiguity, the provision
on its face will be read as it is written and treated as the binding law of the parties
to the contract.54chanrobleslaw

In the case at bar, CPI primarily invoked the "Confidentiality of Documents and Non-
Compete Clause" found in Babiano's employment contract55 to justify the forfeiture
of his commissions, viz.:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Confidentiality of Documents and Non-Compete Clause

All records and documents of the company and all information pertaining to its
business or affairs or that of its affiliated companies are confidential and no
unauthorized disclosure or reproduction or the same will be made by you any time
during or after your employment.

And in order to ensure strict compliance herewith, you shall not work for whatsoever
capacity, either as an employee, agent or consultant with any person whose
business is in direct competition with the company while you are employed and for
a period of one year from date of resignation or termination from the company.

In the event the undersigned breaches any term of this contract, the undersigned
agrees and acknowledges that damages may not be an adequate remedy and that
in addition to any other remedies available to the Company at law or in equity, the
Company is entitled to enforce its rights hereunder by way of injunction, restraining
order or other relief to enjoin any breach or default of this contract.
The undersigned agrees to pay all costs, expenses and attorney's fees incurred by
the Company in connection with the enforcement of the obligations of the
undersigned. The undersigned also agrees to .pay the Company all profits, revenues
and income or benefits derived by or accruing to the undersigned resulting from the
undersigned's breach of the obligations hereunder. This Agreement shall be binding
upon the undersigned, all employees, agents, officers, directors, shareholders,
partners and representatives of the undersigned and all heirs, successors and
assigns of the foregoing.

Finally, if undersigned breaches any terms of this contract, forms of compensation

including commissions and incentives will be forfeited.56 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)

Verily, the foregoing clause is not only clear and unambiguous in stating that
Babiano is barred to "work for whatsoever capacity x x x with any person whose
business is in direct competition with [CPI] while [he is] employed and for a period
of one year from date of [his] resignation or termination from the company," it also
expressly provided in no uncertain terms that should Babiano "[breach] any term of
[the employment contract], forms of compensation including commissions and
incentives will be forfeited." Here, the contracting parties - namely Babiano on one
side, and CPI as represented by its COO-Vertical, John Victor R. Antonio, and Director
for Planning and Controls, Jose Carlo R. Antonio, on the other -indisputably wanted
the said clause to be effective even during the existence of the employer-employee
relationship between Babiano and CPI, thereby indicating their intention to be
bound by such clause by affixing their respective signatures to the employment
contract. More significantly, as CPFs Vice President for Sales, Babiano held a highly
sensitive and confidential managerial position as he "was tasked, among others, to
guarantee the achievement of agreed sales targets for a project and to ensure that
his team has a qualified and competent manpower resources by conducting
recruitment activities, training sessions, sales rallies, motivational activities, and
evaluation programs."57 Hence, to allow Babiano to freely move to direct
competitors during and soon after his employment with CPI would make the latter's
trade secrets vulnerable to exposure, especially in a highly competitive marketing
environment. As such, it is only reasonable that CPI and Babiano agree on such
stipulation in the latter's employment contract in order to afford a fair and
reasonable protection to CPI.58 Indubitably, obligations arising from contracts,
including employment contracts, have the force of law between the contracting
parties and should be complied with in good faith.59 Corollary thereto, parties are
bound by the stipulations, clauses, terms, and conditions they have agreed to,
provided that these stipulations, clauses, terms, and conditions are not contrary to
law, morals, public order or public policy,60 as in this case.

Therefore, the CA erred in limiting the "Confidentiality of Documents and Non-

Compete Clause" only to acts done after the cessation of the employer-employee
relationship or to the "post-employment" relations of the parties. As clearly
stipulated, the parties wanted to apply said clause during the pendency of
Babiano's employment, and CPI correctly invoked the same before the labor
tribunals to resist the former's claim for unpaid commissions on account of his
breach of the said clause while the employer-employee relationship between them
still subsisted. Hence, there is now a need to determine whether or not Babiano
breached said clause while employed by CPI, which would then resolve the issue of
his entitlement to his unpaid commissions.

A judicious review of the records reveals that in his resignation letter61 dated
February 25, 2009, Babiano categorically admitted to CPI Chairman Jose Antonio
that on February 12, 2009, he sought employment from First Global, and five (5)
days later, was admitted thereto as vice president. From the foregoing, it is
evidently clear that when he sought and eventually accepted the said position with
First Global, he was still employed by CPI as he has not formally resigned at that
time. Irrefragably, this is a glaring violation of the "Confidentiality of Documents and
Non-Compete Clause" in his employment contract with CPI, thus, justifying the
forfeiture of his unpaid commissions.

II.

Anent the nature of Concepcion's engagement, based on case law, the presence of
the following elements evince the existence of an employer-employee relationship:
(a) the power to hire, i.e., the selection and engagement of the employee; (b) the
payment of wages; (c) the power of dismissal; and (d) the employer's power to
control the employee's conduct, or the so called "control test." The control test is
commonly regarded as the most important indicator of the presence or absence of
an employer-employee relationship.62 Under this test, an employer-employee
relationship exists where the person for whom the services are performed reserves
the right to control not only the end achieved, but also the manner and means to be
used in reaching that end.63chanrobleslaw

Guided by these parameters, the Court finds that Concepcion was an employee of
CPI considering that: (a) CPI continuously hired and promoted Concepcion from
October 2002 until her resignation on February 23, 2009,64 thus, showing that CPI
exercised the power of selection and engagement over her person and that she
performed functions that were necessary and desirable to the business of CPI; (b)
the monthly "subsidy" and cash incentives that Concepcion was receiving from CPI
are actually remuneration in the concept of wages as it was regularly given to her
on a monthly basis without any qualification, save for the "complete submission of
documents on what is a sale policy";65 (c) CPI had the power to discipline or even
dismiss Concepcion as her engagement contract with CPI expressly conferred upon
the latter "the right to discontinue [her] service anytime during the period of
engagement should [she] fail to meet the performance standards,"66 among
others, and that CPI actually exercised such power to dismiss when it accepted and
approved Concepcion's resignation letter; and most importantly, (d) as aptly pointed
out by the CA, CPI possessed the power of control over Concepcion because in the
performance of her duties as Project Director - particularly in the conduct of
recruitment activities, training sessions, and skills development of Sales Directors -
she did not exercise independent discretion thereon, but was still subject to the
direct supervision of CPI, acting through Babiano.67chanrobleslaw

Besides, while the employment agreement of Concepcion was denominated as a

"Contract of Agency for Project Director," it should be stressed that the existence of
employer-employee relations could not be negated by the mere expedient of
repudiating it in a contract. In the case of Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. v. NLRC,68
it was ruled that one's employment status is defined and prescribed by law, and not
by what the parties say it should be, viz.:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

It is axiomatic that the existence of an employer-employee relationship cannot be

negated by expressly repudiating it in the management contract and providing
therein that the "employee" is an independent contractor when the terms of the
agreement clearly show otherwise. For, the employment status of a person is
defined and prescribed by law and not by what the parties say it should be. In
determining the status of the management contract, the "four-fold test" on
employment earlier mentioned has to be applied.69 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

Therefore, the CA correctly ruled that since there exists an employer-employee

relationship between Concepcion and CPI, the labor tribunals correctly assumed
jurisdiction over her money claims.

III.

Finally, CPI contends that Concepcion's failure to assail the NLRC ruling awarding
her the amount of P470,754.62 representing unpaid commissions rendered the
same final and binding upon her. As such, the CA erred in increasing her monetary
award to P591,953.05.70chanrobleslaw

The contention lacks merit.

As a general rule, a party who has not appealed cannot obtain any affirmative relief
other than the one granted in the appealed decision. However, jurisprudence admits
an exception to the said rule, such as when strict adherence thereto shall result in
the impairment of the substantive rights of the parties concerned. In Global
Resource for Outsourced Workers, Inc. v. Velasco:71

Indeed, a party who has failed to appeal from a judgment is deemed to have
acquiesced to it and can no longer obtain from the appellate court any affirmative
relief other than what was already granted under said judgment. However, when
strict adherence to such technical rule will impair a substantive right, such as that
of an illegally dismissed employee to monetary compensation as provided by law,
then equity dictates that the Court set aside the rule to pave the way for a full and
just adjudication of the case.72 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In the present case, the CA aptly pointed out that the NLRC failed to account for all
the unpaid commissions due to Concepcion for the period of August 9, 2008 to
August 8, 2011.73 Indeed, Concepcion's right to her earned commissions is a
substantive right which cannot be impaired by an erroneous computation of what
she really is entitled to. Hence, following the dictates of equity and in order to arrive
at a complete and just resolution of the case, and avoid a piecemeal dispensation of
justice over the same, the CA correctly recomputed Concepcion's unpaid
commissions, notwithstanding her failure to seek a review of the NLRC's
computation of the same.

In sum, the Court thus holds that the commissions of Babiano were properly
forfeited for violating the "Confidentiality of Documents and Non-Compete Clause."
On.the other hand, CPI remains liable for the unpaid commissions of Concepcion in
the sum of P591,953.05.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated April 8, 2015 and
the Resolution dated October 12, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 132953 are hereby MODIFIED in that the commissions of respondent Edwin J.
Babiano are deemed FORFEITED. The rest of the CA Decision stands.

SO ORDERED.

4. G.R. No. 200114, August 24, 2015

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, Petitioner, v. DEBBIE UBAA, Respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assails: 1) the July 29, 2011 Decision2 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) denying the Petition for Certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 110006
and affirming the March 6, 2007 Order3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Daet,
Camarines Norte, Branch 39 in Civil Case No. 7304; and 2) the CA's January 10,
2012 Resolution4 denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the herein
assailed Decision.

Factual Antecedents

On December 26, 2002, respondent Debbie Ubana filed a civil case for damages
against the DBP Service Corporation, petitioner Social Security System (SSS), and
the SSS Retirees Association5 before the RTC of Daet, Camarines Norte. The case
was docketed as Civil Case No. 7304 and assigned to RTC Branch 39.

In her Complaint,6 respondent alleged that in July 1995, she applied for
employment with the petitioner. However, after passing the examinations and
accomplishing all the requirements for employment, she was instead referred to
DBP Service Corporation for "transitory employment." She took the pre-employment
examination given by DBP Service Corporation and passed the same. On May 20,
1996, she was told to report for training to SSS, Naga City branch, for immediate
deployment to SSS Daet branch. On May 28, 1996, she was made to sign a six-
month Service Contract Agreement7 by DBP Service Corporation, appointing her as
clerk for assignment with SSS Daet branch effective May 27, 1996, with a daily
wage of only P171.00. She was assigned as "Frontliner" of the SSS Members
Assistance Section until December 15, 1999. From December 16, 1999 to May 15,
2001, she was assigned to the Membership Section as Data Encoder. On December
16, 2001, she was transferred to the SSS Retirees Association as Processor at the
Membership Section until her resignation on August 26, 2002. As Processor, she was
paid only P229.00 daily or P5,038.00 monthly, while a regular SSS Processor
receives a monthly salary of P18,622.00 or P846.45 daily wage. Her May 28, 1996
Service Contract Agreement with DBP Service Corporation was never renewed, but
she was required to work for SSS continuously under different assignments with a
maximum daily salary of only P229.00; at the same time, she was constantly
assured of being absorbed into the SSS plantilla. Respondent claimed she was
qualified for her position as Processor, having completed required training and
passed the SSS qualifying examination for Computer Operations Course given by
the National Computer Institute, U.P. Diliman from May 16 to June 10, 2001, yet she
was not given the proper salary. Because of the oppressive and prejudicial
treatment by SSS, she was forced to resign on August 26, 2002 as she could no
longer stand being exploited, the agony of dissatisfaction, anxiety, demoralization,
and injustice. She asserted that she dedicated six years of her precious time
faithfully serving SSS, foregoing more satisfying employment elsewhere, yet she
was merely exploited and given empty and false promises; that defendants
conspired to exploit her and violate civil service laws and regulations and Civil Code
provisions on Human Relations, particularly Articles 19, 20, and 21.8 As a result, she
suffered actual losses by way of unrealized income, moral and exemplary damages,
attorney's fees and litigation expenses.
Respondent prayed for an award of P572,682.67 actual damages representing the
difference between the legal and proper salary she should have received and the
actual salary she received during her six-year stint with petitioner; P300,000.00
moral damages; exemplary damages at the discretion of the court; P20,000.00
attorney's fees and P1,000.00 appearance fees; and other just and equitable relief.

Petitioner and its co-defendants SSS Retirees Association and DBP Service
Corporation filed their respective motions to dismiss, arguing that the subject
matter of the case and respondent's claims arose out of employer-employee
relations, which are beyond the RTC's jurisdiction and properly cognizable by the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).

Respondent opposed the motions to dismiss, arguing that pursuant to civil service
rules and regulations, service contracts such as her Service Contract Agreement
with DBP Service Corporation should cover only a) lump sum work or services such
as janitorial, security or consultancy services, and b) piece work or intermittent jobs
of short duration not exceeding six months on a daily basis.9 She posited that her
service contract involved the performance of sensitive work, and not merely
janitorial, security, consultancy services, or work of intermittent or short duration. In
fact, she was made to work continuously even after the lapse of her 6-month
service contract. Citing Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 40,
respondent contended that the performance of functions outside of the nature
provided in the appointment and receiving salary way below that received by
regular SSS employees amount to an abuse of rights; and that her cause of action is
anchored on the provisions of the Civil Code on Human Relations.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On October 1, 2003, the RTC issued an Order10 dismissing respondent's complaint

for lack of jurisdiction, stating that her claim for damages "has a reasonable causal
connection with her employer-employee relations with the defendants"11 and "is
grounded on the alleged fraudulent and malevolent manner by which the
defendants conspired with each other in exploiting [her], which is a clear case of
unfair labor practice,"12 falling under the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter of the
NLRC. Thus, it decreed:cralawlawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the aforementioned Motion to Dismiss the

complaint of the herein plaintiff for lack of jurisdiction is hereby GRANTED. The
above-entitled complaint is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.13
Respondent moved for reconsideration. On March 6, 2007, the RTC issued another
Order14 granting respondent's motion for reconsideration. The trial court
held:cralawlawlibrary

Section 2(1), Art. K-B, 1987 Constitution, expressly provides that "the civil service
embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the
government, including government-owned or controlled corporation[s] with original
charters." Corporations with original charters are those which have been created by
special law[s] and not through the general corporation law. In contrast, labor law
claims against government-owned and controlled corporations without original
charters fall within the jurisdiction of the Department of Labor and Employment and
not the Civil Service Commission. (Light Rail Transit Authority vs. Perfecto Venus,
March 24, 2006.)

Having been created under an original charter, RA No. 1161 as amended by R.A.
8282, otherwise known as the Social Security Act of 1997, the SSS is governed by
the provision[s] of the Civil Service Commission. However, since the SSS denied the
existence of an employer-employee relationship, and the case is one for Damages,
it is not the Civil Service Commission that has jurisdiction to try the case, but the
regular courts.

A perusal of the Complaint filed by the plaintiff against the defendant SSS clearly
shows that the case is one for Damages.

Paragraph 15 of her complaint states, thus:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

xxx. Likewise, they are contrary to the Civil Code provisions on human relations
which [state], among others, that Every person, must in the exercise of his rights
and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due and
observe honesty and good faith (Article 19) and that Every person who, contrary to
law, willfully or negligently [causes] damages to another, shall indemnify the latter
for the same. (Art. 20)

"Article 19 provides a rule of conduct that is consistent with an orderly and

harmonious relationship between and among men and women It codifies the
concept of what is justice and fair play so that abuse of right by a person will be
prevented. Art. 20 speaks of general sanction for all other provisions of law which
do not especially provide their own sanction. Thus, anyone, who, whether willfully or
negligently, in the exercise of his legal right or duty, causes damage to another,
shall indemnify his or her victim for injuries suffered thereby." (Persons and Family
Relations, Sta. Maria, Melencio, Jr. (2004) pp. 31-32.)
Wherefore, all premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby
GRANTED. The case against defendant Social Security System represented by its
President is hereby reinstated in the docket of active civil cases of this court.

SO ORDERED.15 [Italics in the original]

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the RTC stood its ground in its June 24,
2009 Order16cralawrednad

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In a Petition for Certiorari17 filed with the CA and docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
110006, petitioner sought a reversal of the RTC's June 24, 2009 and March 6, 2007
Orders and the reinstatement of its original October 1, 2003 Order dismissing Civil
Case No. 7304, insisting that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over
respondent's claims for "unrealized salary income" and other damages, which
constitute a labor dispute cognizable only by the labor tribunals. Moreover, it
claimed that the assailed Orders of the trial court were issued with grave abuse of
discretion. It argued that the trial court gravely erred in dismissing the case only as
against its co-defendants DBP Service Corporation and SSS Retirees Association and
maintaining the charge against it, considering that its grounds for seeking dismissal
are similar to those raised by the two. It maintained that DBP Service Corporation
and SSS Retirees Association are legitimate independent job contractors engaged
by it to provide manpower services since 2001, which thus makes respondent an
employee of these two entities and not of SSS; and that since it is not the
respondent's employer, then there is no cause of action against it.

On July 29, 2011, the CA issued the assailed Decision containing the following
pronouncement:cralawlawlibrary

Hence, petitioner seeks recourse before this Court via this Petition for Certiorari
challenging the RTC Orders. For the resolution of this Court is the sole issue
of:cralawlawlibrary

WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC HAS JURISDICTION TO HEAR AND DECIDE CIVIL CASE
NO. 7304.

The petition is devoid of merits.

The rule is that, the nature of an action and the subject matter thereof, as well as,
which court or agency of the government has jurisdiction over the same, are
determined by the material allegations of the complaint in relation to the law
involved and the character of the reliefs prayed for, whether or not the
complainant/plaintiff is entitled to any or all of such reliefs. A prayer or demand for
relief is not part of the petition of the cause of action; nor does it enlarge the cause
of action stated or change the legal effect of what is alleged. In determining which
body has jurisdiction over a case, the better policy is to consider not only the status
or relationship of the parties but also the nature of the action that is the subject of
their controversy.

A careful perusal of Ubana's Complaint in Civil Case No. 7304 unveils that Ubana's
claim is rooted on the principle of abuse of right laid in the New Civil Code. She was
claiming damages based on the alleged exploitation [perpetrated] by the
defendants depriving her of her rightful income. In asserting that she is entitled to
the damages claimed, [she] invoked not the provisions of the Labor Code or any
other labor laws but the provisions on human relations under the New Civil Code.
Evidently, the determination of the respective rights of the parties herein, and the
ascertainment whether there were abuses of such rights, do not call for the
application of the labor laws but of the New Civil Code. Apropos thereto, the
resolution of the issues raised in the instant complaint does not require the
expertise acquired by labor officials. It is the courts of general jurisdiction, which is
the RTC in this case, which has the authority to hear and decide Civil Case No. 7304.

Not every dispute between an employer and employee involves matters that only
labor arbiters and the NLRC can resolve in the exercise of their adjudicatory or
quasi-judicial powers. Where the claim to the principal relief sought is to be resolved
not by reference to the Labor Code or other labor relations statute or a collective
bargaining agreement but by the general civil law, the jurisdiction over the dispute
belongs to the regular courts of justice and not to the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. In
such situations, [resolution] of the dispute requires expertise, not in labor
management relations nor in wage structures and other terms and conditions of
employment, but rather in the application of the general civil law. Clearly, such
claims fall outside the area of competence or expertise ordinarily ascribed to Labor
Arbiters and the NLRC and the rationale for granting jurisdiction over such claims to
these agencies disappears.

It is the character of the principal relief sought that appears essential in this
connection. Where such principal relief is to be granted under labor legislation or a
collective bargaining agreement, the case should fall within the jurisdiction of the
Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, even though a claim for damages might be asserted as
an incident to such claim.

The pivotal question is whether the Labor Code has any relevance to the principal
relief sought in the complaint. As pointed out earlier, Ubana did not seek refuge
from the Labor Code in asking for the award of damages. It was the transgression of
Article[s] 19 and 20 of the New Civil Code that she was insisting in wagering this
case. The primary relief sought herein is for moral and exemplary damages for the
abuse of rights. The claims for actual damages for unrealized income are the natural
consequence for abuse of such rights.

While it is true that labor arbiters and the NLRC have jurisdiction to award not only
reliefs provided by labor laws, but also damages governed by the Civil Code, these
reliefs must still be based on an action that has a reasonable causal connection with
the Labor Code, other labor statutes, or collective bargaining agreements. Claims
for damages under paragraph 4 of Article 217 must have a reasonable causal
connection with any of the claims provided for in the article in order to be
cognizable by the labor arbiter. Only if there is such a connection with the other
claims can the claim for damages be considered as arising from employer-employee
relations. In the present case, Ubana's claim for damages is not related to any other
claim under Article 217, other labor statutes, or collective bargaining agreements.

All told, it is ineluctable that it is the regular courts that has [sic] jurisdiction to hear
and decide Civil Case No. 7304. In Tolosa v. NLRC,18 the Supreme Court held that,
"[i]t is not the NLRC but the regular courts that have jurisdiction over action for
damages, in which the employer-employee relations is merely incidental, and in
which the cause of action proceeds from a different source of obligation such as
tort. Since petitioner's claim for damages is predicated on a quasi-delict or tort that
has no reasonable causal connection with any of the claims provided for in Article
217, other labor statutes or collective bargaining agreements, jurisdiction over the
action lies with the regular courts not with the NLRC or the labor arbiters." The same
rule applies in this case.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED and the Order
dated March 6, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 39 of Daet, Camarines Norte
in Civil Case No. 7304 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.19

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,20 but the CA denied the same in its
January 10, 2012 Resolution.21 Hence, the present Petition.

Issue

Petitioner simply submits that the assailed CA dispositions are contrary to law and
jurisprudence.
Petitioner's Arguments

Praying that the assailed CA dispositions be set aside and that the RTC's October 1,
2003 Order dismissing Civil Case No. 7304 be reinstated, petitioner essentially
maintains in its Petition and Reply22 that respondent's claims arose from and are in
fact centered on her previous employment. It maintains that there is a direct causal
connection between respondent's claims and her employment, which brings the
subject matter within the jurisdiction of the NLRC. Petitioner contends that
respondent's other claims are intimately intertwined with her claim of actual
damages which are cognizable by the NLRC. Moreover, petitioner alleges that its
existing manpower services agreements with DBP Service Corporation and SSS
Retirees Association are legitimate; and that some of respondent's claims may not
be entertained since these pertain to benefits enjoyed by government employees,
not by employees contracted via legitimate manpower service providers. Finally,
petitioner avers that the nature and character of the reliefs prayed for by the
respondent are directly within the jurisdiction not of the courts, but of the labor
tribunals.

Respondent's Arguments

In her Comment,23 respondent maintains that her case is predicated not on labor
laws but on Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code for petitioner's act of exploiting her
and enriching itself at her expense by not paying her the correct salary
commensurate to the position she held within SSS. Also, since there is no employer-
employee relationship between her and petitioner, as the latter itself admits, then
her case is not cognizable by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) either; that since
the NLRC and the CSC have no jurisdiction over her case, then it is only the regular
courts which can have jurisdiction over her claims. She argues that the CA is correct
in ruling that her case is rooted in the principle of abuse of rights under the Civil
Code; and that the Petition did not properly raise issues of law.

Our Ruling

The Court denies the Petition.

In Home Development Mutual Fund v. Commission on Audit,24 it was held that while
they performed the work of regular government employees, DBP Service
Corporation personnel are not government personnel, but employees of DBP Service
Corporation acting as an independent contractor. Applying the foregoing
pronouncement to the present case, it can be said that during respondent's stint
with petitioner, she never became an SSS employee, as she remained an employee
of DBP Service Corporation and SSS Retirees Association - the two being
independent contractors with legitimate service contracts with SSS.

Indeed, "[i]n legitimate job contracting, no employer-employee relation exists

between the principal and the job contractor's employees. The principal is
responsible to the job contractor's employees only for the proper payment of
wages."25cralawredcralawrednad

In her Complaint, respondent acknowledges that she is not petitioner's employee,

but that precisely she was promised that she would be absorbed into the SSS
plantilla after all her years of service with SSS; and that as SSS Processor, she was
paid only P229.00 daily or P5,038.00 monthly, while a regular SSS Processor
receives a monthly salary of P18,622.00, or P846.45 daily wage. In its pleadings,
petitioner denied the existence of an employer-employee relationship between it
and respondent; in fact, it insists on the validity of its service agreements with DBP
Service Corporation and SSS Retirees Association - meaning that the latter, and not
SSS, are respondent's true employers. Since both parties admit that there is no
employment relation between them, then there is no dispute cognizable by the
NLRC. Thus, respondent's case is premised on the claim that in paying her only
P229.00 daily - or P5,038.00 monthly - as against a monthly salary of P18,622.00, or
P846.45 daily wage, paid to a regular SSS Processor at the time, petitioner exploited
her, treated her unfairly, and unjustly enriched itself at her expense.

For Article 217 of the Labor Code to apply, and in order for the Labor Arbiter to
acquire jurisdiction over a dispute, there must be an employer-employee relation
between the parties thereto.chanrobleslaw

x x x It is well settled in law and jurisprudence that where no employer-employee

relationship exists between the parties and no issue is involved which may be
resolved by reference to the Labor Code, other labor statutes or any collective
bargaining agreement, it is the Regional Trial Court that has jurisdiction, x x x The
action is within the realm of civil law hence jurisdiction over the case belongs to the
regular courts. While the resolution of the issue involves the application of labor
laws, reference to the labor code was only for the determination of the solidary
liability of the petitioner to the respondent where no employer-employee relation
exists. Article 217 of the Labor Code as amended vests upon the labor arbiters
exclusive original jurisdiction only over the following:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

1. Unfair labor practices;

2. Termination disputes;
3. If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers may file
involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and conditions of
employment;

4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from
employer-employee relations;

5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code, including questions
involving legality of strikes and lockouts; and

6. Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social Security, Medicare and

maternity benefits, all other claims, arising from employer- employee relations,
including those of persons in domestic or household service, involving an amount
exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) regardless of whether accompanied with
a claim for reinstatement.

In all these cases, an employer-employee relationship is an indispensable

jurisdictional requisite x x x.26

Since there is no employer-employee relationship between the parties herein, then

there is no labor dispute cognizable by the Labor Arbiters or the NLRC.

There being no employer-employee relation or any other definite or direct contract

between respondent and petitioner, the latter being responsible to the former only
for the proper payment of wages, respondent is thus justified in filing a case against
petitioner, based on Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, to recover the proper
salary due her as SSS Processor. At first glance, it is indeed unfair and unjust that
as, Processor who has worked with petitioner for six long years, she was paid only
P5,038.00 monthly, or P229.00 daily, while a regular SSS employee with the same
designation and who performs identical functions is paid a monthly salary of
P18,622.00, or P846.45 daily wage. Petitioner may not hide under its service
contracts to deprive respondent of what is justly due her. As a vital government
entity charged with ensuring social security, it should lead in setting the example by
treating everyone with justice and fairness. If it cannot guarantee the security of
those who work for it, it is doubtful that it can even discharge its directive to
promote the social security of its members in line with the fundamental mandate to
promote social justice and to insure the well-being and economic security of the
Filipino people.

In this jurisdiction, the "long honored legal truism of 'equal pay for equal work'" has
been "impregnably institutionalized;" "[p]ersons who work with substantially equal
qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid
similar salaries."27 "That public policy abhors inequality and discrimination is
beyond contention. Our Constitution and laws reflect the policy against these evils.
The Constitution in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights exhorts Congress
to 'give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the
right of all people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political
inequalities.' The very broad Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every person, 'in
the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, [to] act with justice,
give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith'."28cralawrednad

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The assailed July 29, 2011 Decision and
January 10, 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 110006 are
AFFIRMED. The case is ordered remanded with dispatch to the Regional Trial Court
of Daet, Camarines Norte, Branch 39, for continuation of proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

DISSENTING OPINION

JARDELEZA, J.:

The majority has voted to deny the petition on the ground that, there being no
employer-employee relationship between the parties, there is no labor dispute
cognizable by the Labor Arbiters or the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC). There being no labor dispute, the trial court correctly assumed jurisdiction
over respondent's suit for damages against the Social Security System (SSS), based
on Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code.

With all due respect, I dissent from the majority decision.

It is my view that respondent's suit against the SSS involves a labor dispute properly
cognizable by the Civil Service Commission (CSC).
Both parties agree that there is no employer-employee relation between them,
respondent being an employee of independent service contractors1 hired by the
SSS. This fact alone, however, does not preclude the controversy between them
from being a labor dispute.2 Article 212(1) of the Labor Code defines a labor dispute
to include "any controversy or matter concerning terms or conditions of
employment or the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing,
maintaining, changing or arranging the terms and conditions of employment
regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relations of
employer and employee."3cralawrednad

Furthermore, respondent's claims relate to the terms and conditions of her working
relationship vis-a-vis the SSS. While captioned as a suit for damages under Articles
19 and 20 of the Civil Code, respondent's action is really one to recover from the
SSS amounts she would have received had she been employed in petitioner's roster
of regular employees. This is a dispute no different from "regularization cases"
usually filed by contractual employees seeking to be absorbed as regular
employees of a company.

The SSS is a government-controlled corporation created by Republic Act (RA) No.

1161.4 Pursuant to Section 2(1), Article IX of the Constitution,5 a labor dispute
involving the SSS is cognizable by the CSC. Thus,

...that the action below is for damages under Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code
would not suffice to keep the case within the jurisdictional boundaries of regular
Courts. That claim for damages is interwoven with a labor dispute existing between
the parties and would have to be ventilated before the administrative machinery
established for the expeditious settlement of those disputes. To allow the action
filed below to prosper would bring about "split jurisdiction" which is obnoxious to the
orderly administration of justice.

I note with serious concern the statement of the majority that respondent is
"justified" in filing the case based on Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code "to recover
the proper salary" and that the SSS "may not hide under its service contracts to
deprive respondent of what is justly due her."7cralawrednad

The only issue for resolution in this case concerns the matter of jurisdiction. While
clearly obiter, the foregoing statement gives the impression that the merits of
respondent's claim have already been proved and settled. This, on the contrary, is
an issue still to be resolved on remand.

The foregoing statement would have serious repercussions on a significant question

of law, that is, whether or not a principal can legally be held liable for damages by a
person contracted through an independent contractor under a valid and legitimate
service contract.
This Court has recognized that an employer has "the proprietary right to exercise an
inherent management prerogative and its best business judgment to determine
whether it should contract out the performance of some of its work to independent
contractors."8 This right, in my view, flows from the constitutional liberty of an
employer to determine whether to perform its work itself or through independent
contractors that meet the requirements of the law.

Accordingly, I vote to GRANT the petition filed by the SSS and order the dismissal,
without prejudice, of respondent's Complaint for Damages filed before the trial
court.

5. G.R. No. 171212 August 4, 2014

INDOPHIL TEXTILE MILLS, INC., Petitioner,

vs.

ENGR. SALVADOR ADVIENTO, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court which seeks to review, reverse and set-aside the Decision1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA), dated May 30, 2005, and its Resolution2 dated January 10,
2006 in the case entitled Jndophil Textile Mills, Inc. v. Hon. Rolando R. Velasco and
Engr. Salvador Adviento, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 83099.

The facts are not disputed.

Petitioner Indophil Textile Mills, Inc. is a domestic corporation engaged in the

business of manufacturing thread for weaving.3 On August 21, 1990, petitioner
hired respondent Engr. Salvador Adviento as Civil Engineer to maintain its facilities
in Lambakin, Marilao, Bulacan.4 On August 7, 2002, respondent consulted a
physician due to recurring weakness and dizziness.5 Few days later, he was
diagnosed with Chronic Poly Sinusitis, and thereafter, with moderate, severe and
persistent Allergic Rhinitis.6 Accordingly, respondent was advised by his doctor to
totally avoid house dust mite and textile dust as it will transmute into health
problems.7

Distressed, respondent filed a complaint against petitioner with the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC), San Fernando, Pampanga, for alleged illegal dismissal
and for the payment of backwages, separation pay, actual damages and attorneys
fees. The said case, docketed as NLRC Case No. RAB-III-05-5834-03, is still pending
resolution with the NLRC at the time the instant petition was filed.8

Subsequently, respondent filed another Complaint9 with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Aparri, Cagayan, alleging that he contracted such occupational disease by
reason of the gross negligence of petitioner to provide him with a safe, healthy and
workable environment.

In his Complaint, respondent alleged that as part of his job description, he

conductsregular maintenance check on petitioners facilities including its dye house
area, which is very hot and emits foul chemical odor with no adequate safety
measures introduced by petitioner.10 According to respondent, the air washer
dampers and all roof exhaust vests are blown into open air, carrying dust thereto.11
Concerned, respondent recommended to management to place roof insulation to
minimize, if not, eradicate the health hazards attendant in the work place.12
However, said recommendation was turned down by management due to high
cost.13 Respondent further suggested to petitioners management that the
engineering office be relocated because ofits dent prone location, such that even if
the door of the office is sealed, accumulated dust creeps in outside the office.14
This was further aggravated by the installation of new filters fronting the office.15
However, no action was taken by management.16 According to respondent, these
healthhazards have been the persistent complaints of most, if not all, workers of
petitioner.17 Nevertheless, said complaints fell on deaf ears as petitioner callously
ignored the health problems of its workers and even tended to be apathetic to their
plight, including respondent.18

Respondent averred that, being the only breadwinner in the family, he made several
attempts to apply for a new job, but to his dismay and frustration, employers who
knew ofhis present health condition discriminated against him and turned down his
application.19 By reason thereof, respondent suffered intense moral suffering,
mental anguish, serious anxiety and wounded feelings, praying for the recovery of
the following: (1) Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) asmoral damages; (2) Two
Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) as exemplary damages; and (3) Seven Million Three
Thousand and Eight Pesos (P7,003,008.00) as compensatory damages.20 Claiming
to be a pauper litigant, respondent was not required to pay any filing fee.21
In reply, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss22 on the ground that: (1) the RTC has
no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint because the same falls
under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter (LA) under Article
217(a)(4) of the Labor Code; and (2) there is another action pending with the
Regional Arbitration Branch III of the NLRC in San Fernando City, Pampanga,
involving the same parties for the same cause.

On December 29, 2003, the RTC issued a Resolution23 denying the aforesaid Motion
and sustaining its jurisdiction over the instant case. It held that petitioners alleged
failure to provide its employees with a safe, healthy and workable environment is an
act of negligence, a case of quasi-delict. As such, it is not within the jurisdiction of
the LA under Article 217 of the Labor Code. On the matter of dismissal based on lis
pendencia, the RTC ruled that the complaint before the NLRC has a different cause
of action which is for illegal dismissal and prayer for backwages, actual damages,
attorneys fees and separation pay due to illegal dismissal while in the present case,
the cause of action is for quasi-delict.24 The falloof the Resolution is quoted below:

WHEREFORE, finding the motion to dismiss to be without merit, the Court deniesthe
motion to dismiss.

SO ORDERED.25

On February 9, 2004, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration thereto, which

was likewise denied in an Order issued on even date.

Expectedly, petitioner then filed a Petition for Certiorariwith the CA on the ground
that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in upholding that it has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
complaint despite the broad and clear terms of Article 217 of the Labor Code, as
amended.26

After the submission by the parties of their respective Memoranda, the CA rendered
a Decision27 dated May 30, 2005 dismissing petitioners Petition for lack of merit,
the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSEDfor

lack of merit. SO ORDERED.28
From the aforesaid Decision, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was
nevertheless denied for lack of merit in the CAs Resolution29 dated January 10,
2006. Hence, petitioner interposed the instant petition upon the solitary ground that
"THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN
A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND WITH APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE
HONORABLE SUPREME COURT."30 Simply, the issue presented before us is whether
or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter of respondents complaint
praying for moral damages,exemplary damages, compensatory damages, anchored
on petitioners alleged gross negligence in failing to provide a safe and healthy
working environment for respondent.

The delineation between the jurisdiction of regular courts and labor courts over
cases involving workers and their employers has always been a matter of
dispute.31 It is up to the Courts to lay the line after careful scrutiny of the factual
milieu of each case. Here, we find that jurisdiction rests on the regular courts.

In its attempt to overturn the assailed Decision and Resolution of the CA, petitioner
argues that respondentsclaim for damages is anchored on the alleged gross
negligence of petitioner as an employer to provide its employees, including herein
respondent, with a safe, healthy and workable environment; hence, it arose from an
employer-employee relationship.32 The fact of respondents employment
withpetitioner as a civil engineer is a necessary element of his cause ofaction
because without the same, respondent cannot claim to have a rightto a safe,
healthy and workable environment.33 Thus, exclusive jurisdiction over the same
should be vested in the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC pursuant to Article 217(a)(4) of
the Labor Code of the Philippines (Labor Code), as amended.34

We are not convinced.

The jurisdiction of the LA and the NLRC is outlined in Article 217 of the Labor Code,
as amended by Section 9 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6715, to wit:

ART. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission-- (a) Except as
otherwise provided under this Code the Labor Arbiter shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within thirty (30) calendar days after the
submission of the case by the parties for decision without extension, even in the
absence of stenographic notes, the following cases involving all workers, whether
agricultural or nonagricultural:
1. Unfair labor practice cases;

2. Termination disputes;

3. If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers may file
involvingwages, rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and conditions of
employment;

4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from
employer-employee relations;

5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code including questions
involving the legality of strikes and lockouts; and

6. Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social Security, Medicare and

maternity benefits, all other claims, arising from employer-employee relations,
including those of persons in domestic or household service,involving an amount
exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) regardless of whether accompanied with
a claim for reinstatement.

x x x.35

While we have upheld the present trend to refer worker-employer controversies to

labor courts in light of the aforequoted provision, we have also recognized that not
all claims involving employees can be resolved solely by our labor courts,
specifically when the law provides otherwise.36 For this reason, we have formulated
the "reasonable causal connection rule," wherein if there is a reasonable causal
connection between the claim asserted and the employer-employee relations, then
the case is within the jurisdiction of the labor courts; and in the absence thereof, it
is the regular courts that have jurisdiction.37 Such distinction is apt since it cannot
be presumed that money claims of workers which do not arise out of or in
connection with their employer-employee relationship, and which would therefore
fall within the general jurisdiction of the regular courts of justice, were intended by
the legislative authority to be taken away from the jurisdiction of the courts and
lodged with Labor Arbiters on an exclusive basis.38
In fact, as early as Medina vs. Hon. Castro-Bartolome,39 in negating the jurisdiction
of the LA, although the parties involved were an employer and two employees, the
Court succinctly held that:

The pivotal question to Our mind iswhether or not the Labor Code has any relevance
to the reliefs sought by the plaintiffs. For if the Labor Code has no relevance, any
discussion concerning the statutes amending it and whether or not they have
retroactive effect is unnecessary.

It is obvious from the complaint that the plaintiffs have not alleged any unfair labor
practice. Theirs is a simple action for damages for tortious acts allegedly committed
by the defendants. Such being the case, the governing statute is the Civil Code and
not the Labor Code. It results that the orders under revieware based on a wrong
premise.40

Similarly, we ruled in the recent case of Portillo v. Rudolf Lietz, Inc.41 that not all
disputes between an employer and his employees fall within the jurisdiction of the
labor tribunals suchthat when the claim for damages is grounded on the "wanton
failure and refusal" without just cause of an employee to report for duty despite
repeated notices served upon him of the disapproval of his application for leave
ofabsence, the same falls within the purview of Civil Law, to wit:

As early as Singapore Airlines Limited v. Pao, we established that not all disputes
between an employer and his employee(s) fall within the jurisdiction of the labor
tribunals. We differentiated between abandonment per seand the manner and
consequent effects of such abandonment and ruled that the first, is a labor case,
while the second, is a civil law case.

Upon the facts and issues involved, jurisdiction over the present controversy must
be held to belong to the civil Courts. While seemingly petitioner's claim for damages
arises from employer-employee relations, and the latest amendment to Article 217
of the Labor Code under PD No. 1691 and BP Blg. 130 provides that all other
claimsarising from employer-employee relationship are cognizable by Labor Arbiters
[citation omitted], in essence, petitioner's claim for damages is grounded on the
"wanton failure and refusal"without just cause of private respondent Cruz to report
for duty despite repeated notices served upon him of the disapproval of his
application for leave of absence without pay. This, coupled with the further
averment that Cruz "maliciously and with bad faith" violated the terms and
conditions of the conversion training course agreement to the damage of petitioner
removes the present controversy from the coverage of the Labor Code and brings it
within the purview of Civil Law.
Clearly, the complaint was anchored not on the abandonment per seby private
respondent Cruz of his jobas the latter was not required in the Complaint to report
back to workbut on the manner and consequent effects of such abandonmentof
work translated in terms of the damages which petitioner had to suffer. x x x.42

Indeed, jurisprudence has evolved the rule that claims for damages under Article
217(a)(4) of the Labor Code, to be cognizable by the LA, must have a reasonable
causal connection withany of the claims provided for in that article.43 Only if there
is such a connection with the other claims can a claim for damages be considered
as arising from employer-employee relations.44

In the case at bench, we find that such connection is nil.

True, the maintenance of a safe and healthy workplace is ordinarily a subject of

labor cases. More, the acts complained of appear to constitute matters involving
employee-employer relations since respondent used to be the Civil Engineer of
petitioner. However, it should be stressed that respondents claim for damages is
specifically grounded on petitioners gross negligenceto provide a safe, healthy and
workable environment for its employees a case of quasi-delict. This is easily
ascertained from a plain and cursory reading of the Complaint,45 which enumerates
the acts and/or omissions of petitioner relative to the conditions in the workplace, to
wit:

1. Petitioners textile mills have excessive flying textile dust and waste in its
operations and no effort was exerted by petitioner to minimize or totally eradicate
it;

2. Petitioner failed to provide adequate and sufficient dust suction facilities;

3. Textile machines are cleaned with air compressors aggravating the dusty work
place;

4. Petitioner has no physician specializing in respiratoryrelated illness considering it

is a textile company;

5. Petitioner has no device to detectthe presence or density of dust which is

airborne;
6. The chemical and color room are not equipped with proper safety chemical nose
mask; and

7. The power and boiler plant emit too much smoke with solid particles blown to the
air from the smoke stack of the power plant emitting a brown rust color which
engulfs the entire compound.46

In addition, respondent alleged that despite his earnest efforts to suggest to

management to place roof insulation to minimize, if not, eradicate the health
hazards attendant in the workplace, the same was not heeded.47

It is a basic tenet that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined upon the
allegations made in the complaint, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is
entitled to recover upon the claim asserted therein, which is a matter resolved only
after and as a result of a trial.48 Neither can jurisdiction of a court bemade to
depend upon the defenses made by a defendant in his answer or motion to
dismiss.49 In this case, a perusal of the complaint would reveal that the subject
matter is one of claim for damages arising from quasi-delict, which is within the
ambit of the regular court's jurisdiction.

The pertinent provision of Article 2176 of the Civil Code which governs quasi-
delictprovides that: Whoever by act or omissioncauses damageto another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damagedone. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is
called quasi-delict.50

Thus, to sustain a claim liability under quasi-delict, the following requisites must
concur: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the
defendant, or someother person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the
connection of causeand effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and
the damages incurred by the plaintiff.51

In the case at bar, respondent alleges that due to the continued and prolonged
exposure to textile dust seriously inimical to his health, he suffered work-contracted
disease which is now irreversible and incurable, and deprived him of job
opportunities.52 Clearly, injury and damages were allegedly suffered by respondent,
an element of quasi-delict. Secondly, the previous contract of employment between
petitioner and respondent cannot be used to counter the element of "no pre-
existing contractual relation" since petitioners alleged gross negligence in
maintaining a hazardous work environment cannot be considered a mere breach of
such contract of employment, but falls squarely within the elements of quasi-
delictunder Article 2176 of the Civil Code since the negligence is direct, substantive
and independent.53 Hence, we ruled in Yusen Air and Sea Services Phils., Inc. v.
Villamor54 that:

When, as here, the cause of action is based on a quasi-delictor tort, which has no
reasonable causal connection with any of the claims provided for in Article 217,
jurisdiction over the action is with the regular courts.55

It also bears stressing that respondent is not praying for any relief under the Labor
Code of the Philippines. He neither claims for reinstatement nor backwages or
separation pay resulting from an illegal termination. The cause of action herein
pertains to the consequence of petitioners omission which led to a work-related
disease suffered by respondent, causing harm or damage to his person. Such cause
of action is within the realm of Civil Law, and jurisdiction over the controversy
belongs to the regular courts.56

Our ruling in Portillo, is instructive, thus:

There is no causal connection between private respondents claim for damages and
the respondent employers claim for damages for the alleged "Goodwill Clause"
violation. Portillos claim for unpaid salaries did not have anything to do with her
alleged violation of the employment contract as, in fact, her separation from
employmentis not "rooted" in the alleged contractual violation. She resigned from
her employment. She was not dismissed. Portillos entitlementto the unpaid salaries
is not even contested. Indeed, Lietz Inc.s argument about legal compensation
necessarily admits that it owesthe money claimed by Portillo.57

Further, it cannot be gainsaid that the claim for damages occurred afterthe
employer-employee relationship of petitioner and respondent has ceased. Given
that respondent no longer demands for any relief under the Labor Code as well as
the rules and regulations pertinent thereto, Article 217(a)(4) of the Labor Code is
inapplicable to the instant case, as emphatically held in Portillo, to wit:

It is clear, therefore, that while Portillos claim for unpaid salaries is a money claim
that arises out ofor in connection with an employeremployee relationship, Lietz
Inc.s claim against Portillo for violation of the goodwill clause is a money claim
based on an act done after the cessation of the employment relationship. And, while
the jurisdiction over Portillos claim is vested in the labor arbiter, the jurisdiction
over Lietz Inc.s claim rests on the regular courts. Thus:
As it is, petitioner does not ask for any relief under the Labor Code. It merely seeks
to recover damages based on the parties' contract of employment as redress for
respondent's breach thereof. Such cause of action is within the realm of Civil Law,
and jurisdiction over the controversy belongs to the regular courts. More so must
this be in the present case, what with the reality that the stipulation refers to the
post-employment relations of the parties.58

Where the resolution of the dispute requires expertise, not in labor management
relations nor in wage structures and other terms and conditions of employment, but
rather in the application of the general civil law, such claim falls outside the area of
competence of expertise ordinarily ascribed to the LA and the NLRC.59

Guided by the aforequoted doctrines, we find no reason to reverse the findings of

the CA.1wphi1 The RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter of respondent's
complaint praying for moral damages, exemplary damages, compensatory
damages, anchored on petitioner's alleged gross negligence in failing to provide a
safe and healthy working environment for respondent. WHEREFORE, the petition is
DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated May 30, 2005, and its
Resolution dated January 10, 2006 in CA-G.R. SP No. 83099 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

6. G.R. No. 202961, February 04, 2015

EMER MILAN, RANDY MASANGKAY, WILFREDO JAVIER, RONALDO DAVID, BONIFACIO

MATUNDAN, NORA MENDOZA, ET AL., Petitioners, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, SOLID MILLS, INC., AND/OR PHILIP ANG, Respondents.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

An employer is allowed to withhold terminal pay and benefits pending the

employees return of its properties.
Petitioners are respondent Solid Mills, Inc.s (Solid Mills) employees.1 They are
represented by the National Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU), their collective
bargaining agent.2chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

As Solid Mills employees, petitioners and their families were allowed to occupy SMI
Village, a property owned by Solid Mills.3 According to Solid Mills, this was [o]ut of
liberality and for the convenience of its employees . . . [and] on the condition that
the employees . . . would vacate the premises anytime the Company deems
fit.4chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In September 2003, petitioners were informed that effective October 10, 2003, Solid
Mills would cease its operations due to serious business losses.5 NAFLU recognized
Solid Mills closure due to serious business losses in the memorandum of agreement
dated September 1, 2003.6 The memorandum of agreement provided for Solid
Mills grant of separation pay less accountabilities, accrued sick leave benefits,
vacation leave benefits, and 13th month pay to the employees.7 Pertinent portions
of the agreement provide:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREAS, the COMPANY has incurred substantial financial losses and is currently
experiencing further severe financial losses;chanrobleslaw

WHEREAS, in view of such irreversible financial losses, the COMPANY will cease its
operations on October 10, 2003;chanrobleslaw

WHEREAS, all employees of the COMPANY on account of irreversible financial losses,

will be dismissed from employment effective October 10, 2003;chanrobleslaw

In view thereof, the parties agree as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

That UNION acknowledges that the COMPANY is experiencing severe financial losses
and as a consequence of which, management is constrained to cease the
companys operations.

The UNION acknowledges that under Article 283 of the Labor Code, separation pay
is granted to employees who are dismissed due to closures or cessation of
operations NOT DUE to serious business losses.
The UNION acknowledges that in view of the serious business losses the Company
has been experiencing as seen in their audited financial statements, employees ARE
NOT granted separation benefits under the law.

The COMPANY, by way of goodwill and in the spirit of generosity agrees to grant
financial assistance less accountabilities to members of the Union based on length
of service to be computed as follows: (Italics in this paragraph supplied)

Number of days - 12.625 for every year of service

In view of the above, the members of the UNION will receive such financial
assistance on an equal monthly installments basis based on the following
schedule:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

First Check due on January 5, 2004 and every 5th of the month thereafter until
December 5, 2004.

The COMPANY commits to pay any accrued benefits the Union members are entitled
to, specifically those arising from sick and vacation leave benefits and 13th month
pay, less accountabilities based on the following
schedule:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

One Time Cash Payment to be distributed anywhere from. . . .

....

The foregoing agreement is entered into with full knowledge by the parties of their
rights under the law and they hereby bind themselves not to conduct any concerted
action of whatsoever kind, otherwise the grant of financial assistance as discussed
above will be withheld.8 (Emphasis in the original)

Solid Mills filed its Department of Labor and Employment termination report on
September 2, 2003.9chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Later, Solid Mills, through Alfredo Jingco, sent to petitioners individual notices to
vacate SMI Village.10chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Petitioners were no longer allowed to report for work by October 10, 2003.11 They
were required to sign a memorandum of agreement with release and quitclaim
before their vacation and sick leave benefits, 13th month pay, and separation pay
would be released.12 Employees who signed the memorandum of agreement were
considered to have agreed to vacate SMI Village, and to the demolition of the
constructed houses inside as condition for the release of their termination benefits
and separation pay.13 Petitioners refused to sign the documents and demanded to
be paid their benefits and separation pay.14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Hence, petitioners filed complaints before the Labor Arbiter for alleged non-
payment of separation pay, accrued sick and vacation leaves, and 13th month
pay.15 They argued that their accrued benefits and separation pay should not be
withheld because their payment is based on company policy and practice.16
Moreover, the 13th month pay is based on law, specifically, Presidential Decree No.
851.17 Their possession of Solid Mills property is not an accountability that is
subject to clearance procedures.18 They had already turned over to Solid Mills their
uniforms and equipment when Solid Mills ceased
operations.19chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On the other hand, Solid Mills argued that petitioners complaint was premature
because they had not vacated its property.20chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of petitioners.21 According to the Labor Arbiter,
Solid Mills illegally withheld petitioners benefits and separation pay.22 Petitioners
right to the payment of their benefits and separation pay was vested by law and
contract.23 The memorandum of agreement dated September 1, 2003 stated no
condition to the effect that petitioners must vacate Solid Mills property before their
benefits could be given to them.24 Petitioners possession should not be construed
as petitioners accountabilities that must be cleared first before the release of
benefits.25 Their possession is not by virtue of any employer-employee
relationship.26 It is a civil issue, which is outside the jurisdiction of the Labor
Arbiter.27chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The dispositive portion of the Labor Arbiters decision

reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is entered ORDERING respondents
SOLID MILLS, INC. and/or PHILIP ANG (President), in solido to pay the remaining 21
complainants:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

1) 19 of which, namely EMER MILAN, RAMON MASANGKAY, ALFREDO JAVIER,

RONALDO DAVID, BONIFACIO MATUNDAN, NORA MENDOZA, MYRNA IGCAS, RAUL DE
LAS ALAS, RENATO ESTOLANO, REX S. DIMAFELIX, MAURA MILAN, JESSICA
BAYBAYON, ALFREDO MENDOZA, ROBERTO IGCAS, ISMAEL MATA, CARLITO DAMIAN,
TEODORA MAHILOM, MARILOU LINGA, RENATO LINGA their separation pay of 12.625
days pay per year of service, pro-rated 13th month pay for 2003 and accrued
vacation and sick leaves, plus 12% interest p.a. from date of filing of the lead
case/judicial demand on 12/08/03 until actual payment and/or finality;chanrobleslaw

2) the remaining 2 of which, complainants CLEOPATRA ZACARIAS, as she already

received on 12/19/03 her accrued 13th month pay for 2003, accrued VL/SL total
amount of P15,435.16, likewise, complainant Jerry L. Sesma as he already received
his accrued 13th month pay for 2003, SL/VL in the total amount of P10,974.97, shall
be paid only their separation pay of 12.625 days pay per year of service but also
with 12% interest p.a. from date of filing of the lead case/judicial demand on
12/08/03 until actual payment and/or finality, which computation as of date, amount
to as shown in the attached computation sheet.

3) Nine (9) individual complaints viz., of Maria Agojo, Joey Suarez, Ronaldo Vergara,
Ronnie Vergara, Antonio R. Dulo, Sr., Bryan D. Durano, Silverio P. Durano, Sr.,
Elizabeth Duarte and Purificacion Malabanan are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE due to
amicable settlement, whereas, that of [RONIE ARANAS], [EMILITO NAVARRO],
[NONILON PASCO], [GENOVEVA PASCO], [OLIMPIO A. PASCO] are DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE, for lack of interest and/or failure to prosecute.

The Computation and Examination unit is directed to cause the computation of the
award in Pars. 2 and 3 above.28 (Emphasis in the original)

Solid Mills appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission.29 It prayed for,
among others, the dismissal of the complaints against it and the reversal of the
Labor Arbiters decision.30chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The National Labor Relations Commission affirmed paragraph 3 of the Labor

Arbiters dispositive portion, but reversed paragraphs 1 and 2.
Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the Decision of Labor Arbiter Renaldo O. Hernandez dated 10/17/05 is
AFFIRMED in so far as par. 3 thereof is concerned but modified in that paragraphs 1
and 2 thereof are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the following
complainants, namely: Emir Milan, Ramon Masangkay, Alfredo Javier, Ronaldo
David, Bonifacio Matundan, Nora Mendoza, Myrna Igcas, Raul De Las Alas, Renato
Estolano, Rex S. Dimaf[e]lix, Maura Milan, Jessica Baybayon, Alfredo Mendoza,
Roberto Igcas, Cleopatra Zacarias and Jerry L. Sesmas monetary claims in the form
of separation pay, accrued 13th month pay for 2003, accrued vacation and sick
leave pays are held in abeyance pending compliance of their accountabilities to
respondent company by turning over the subject lots they respectively occupy at
SMI Village Sucat Muntinlupa City, Metro Manila to herein respondent company.31

The National Labor Relations Commission noted that complainants Marilou Linga,
Renato Linga, Ismael Mata, and Carlito Damian were already paid their respective
separation pays and benefits.32 Meanwhile, Teodora Mahilom already retired long
before Solid Mills closure.33 She was already given her retirement
benefits.34chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The National Labor Relations Commission ruled that because of petitioners failure
to vacate Solid Mills property, Solid Mills was justified in withholding their benefits
and separation pay.35 Solid Mills granted the petitioners the privilege to occupy its
property on account of petitioners employment.36 It had the prerogative to
terminate such privilege.37 The termination of Solid Mills and petitioners
employer-employee relationship made it incumbent upon petitioners to turn over
the property to Solid Mills.38chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Petitioners filed a motion for partial reconsideration on October 18, 2010,39 but this
was denied in the November 30, 2010 resolution.40chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Petitioners, thus, filed a petition for certiorari41 before the Court of Appeals to assail
the National Labor Relations Commission decision of August 31, 2010 and resolution
of November 30, 2010.42chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On January 31, 2012, the Court of Appeals issued a decision dismissing petitioners
petition,43 thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby ordered DISMISSED.44

The Court of Appeals ruled that Solid Mills act of allowing its employees to make
temporary dwellings in its property was a liberality on its part. It may be revoked
any time at its discretion.45 As a consequence of Solid Mills closure and the
resulting termination of petitioners, the employer-employee relationship between
them ceased to exist. There was no more reason for them to stay in Solid Mills
property.46 Moreover, the memorandum of agreement between Solid Mills and the
union representing petitioners provided that Solid Mills payment of employees
benefits should be less accountabilities.47chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On petitioners claim that there was no evidence that Teodora Mahilom already
received her retirement pay, the Court of Appeals ruled that her complaint filed
before the Labor Arbiter did not include a claim for retirement pay. The issue was
also raised for the first time on appeal, which is not allowed.48 In any case, she
already retired before Solid Mills ceased its operations.49chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The Court of Appeals agreed with the National Labor Relations Commissions
deletion of interest since it found that Solid Mills act of withholding payment of
benefits and separation pay was proper. Petitioners terminal benefits and pay were
withheld because of petitioners failure to vacate Solid Mills
property.50chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Finally, the Court of Appeals noted that Carlito Damian already received his
separation pay and benefits.51 Hence, he should no longer be awarded these
claims.52chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In the resolution promulgated on July 16, 2012, the Court of Appeals denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration.53chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Petitioners raise in this petition the following errors:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE

ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT PAYMENT OF THE MONETARY CLAIMS OF PETITIONERS
SHOULD BE HELD IN ABEYANCE PENDING COMPLIANCE OF THEIR ACCOUNTABILITIES
TO RESPONDENT SOLID MILLS BY TURNING OVER THE SUBJECT LOTS THEY
RESPECTIVELY OCCUPY AT SMI VILLAGE, SUCAT, MUNTINLUPA CITY.
II

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE

ERROR WHEN IT UPHELD THE RULING OF THE NLRC DELETING THE INTEREST OF
12% PER ANNUM IMPOSED BY THE HONORABLE LABOR ARBITER HERNANDEZ ON
THE AMOUNT DUE FROM THE DATE OF FILING OF THE LEAD CASE/JUDICIAL DEMAND
ON DECEMBER 8, 2003 UNTIL ACTUAL PAYMENT AND/OR FINALITY.

III

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE

ERROR WHEN IT UPHELD THE RULING OF THE NLRC DENYING THE CLAIM OF
TEODORA MAHILOM FOR PAYMENT OF RETIREMENT BENEFITS DESPITE LACK OF ANY
EVIDENCE THAT SHE RECEIVED THE SAME.

IV

WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER CARLITO DAMIAN IS ENTITLED TO HIS MONETARY

BENEFITS FROM RESPONDENT SOLID MILLS.54

Petitioners argue that respondent Solid Mills and NAFLUs memorandum of

agreement has no provision stating that benefits shall be paid only upon return of
the possession of respondent Solid Mills property.55 It only provides that the
benefits shall be less accountabilities, which should not be interpreted to include
such possession.56 The fact that majority of NAFLUs members were not occupants
of respondent Solid Mills property is evidence that possession of the property was
not contemplated in the agreement.57 Accountabilities should be interpreted to
refer only to accountabilities that were incurred by petitioners while they were
performing their duties as employees at the worksite.58 Moreover, applicable laws,
company practice, or policies do not provide that 13th month pay, and sick and
vacation leave pay benefits, may be withheld pending satisfaction of liabilities by
the employee.59chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Petitioners also point out that the National Labor Relations Commission and the
Court of Appeals have no jurisdiction to declare that petitioners act of withholding
possession of respondent Solid Mills property is illegal.60 The regular courts have
jurisdiction over this issue.61 It is independent from the issue of payment of
petitioners monetary benefits.62chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
For these reasons, and because, according to petitioners, the amount of monetary
award is no longer in question, petitioners are entitled to 12% interest per
annum.63chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Petitioners also argue that Teodora Mahilom and Carlito Damian are entitled to their
claims. They insist that Teodora Mahilom did not receive her retirement benefits
and that Carlito Damian did not receive his separation
benefits.64chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Respondents Solid Mills and Philip Ang, in their joint comment, argue that
petitioners failure to turn over respondent Solid Mills property constituted an
unsatisfied accountability for which reason petitioners benefits could rightfully be
withheld.65 The term accountability should be given its natural and ordinary
meaning.66 Thus, it should be interpreted as a state of being liable or
responsible, or obligation.67 Petitioners differentiation between accountabilities
incurred while performing jobs at the worksite and accountabilities incurred outside
the worksite is baseless because the agreement with NAFLU merely stated
accountabilities, without qualification.68chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On the removal of the award of 12% interest per annum, respondents argue that
such removal was proper since respondent Solid Mills was justified in withholding
the monetary claims.69chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Respondents argue that Teodora Mahilom had no more cause of action for
retirement benefits claim.70 She had already retired more than a decade before
Solid Mills closure. She also already received her retirement benefits in 1991.71
Teodora Mahiloms claim was also not included in the complaint filed before the
Labor Arbiter. It was improper to raise this claim for the first time on appeal. In any
case, Teodora Mahiloms claim was asserted long after the three-year prescriptive
period provided in Article 291 of the Labor Code.72chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Lastly, according to respondents, it would be unjust if Carlito Damian would be

allowed to receive monetary benefits again, which he, admittedly, already received
from Solid Mills.73chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

I
The National Labor Relations

Commission may preliminarily

determine issues related to rights

arising from an employer-employee

relationship

The National Labor Relations Commission has jurisdiction to determine,

preliminarily, the parties rights over a property, when it is necessary to determine
an issue related to rights or claims arising from an employer-employee relationship.

Article 217 provides that the Labor Arbiter, in his or her original jurisdiction, and the
National Labor Relations Commission, in its appellate jurisdiction, may determine
issues involving claims arising from employer-employee relations.
Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

ART. 217. JURISDICTION OF LABOR ARBITERS AND THE COMMISSION. (1) Except as
otherwise provided under this Code, the Labor Arbiters shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide within thirty (30) calendar days after the
submission of the case by the parties for decision without extension, even in the
absence of stenographic notes, the following cases involving workers, whether
agricultural or non-agricultural:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Unfair labor practice cases;

Termination disputes;

If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers may file
involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and conditions of
employment;

Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from the
employer-employee relations;

Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code, including questions
involving the legality of strikes and lockouts; and

Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social Security, Medicare and

maternity benefits, all other claims, arising from employer-employee relations
including those of persons in domestic or household service, involving an amount
exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00), regardless of whether accompanied
with a claim for reinstatement.
(2) The Commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases
decided by Labor Arbiters. (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioners claim that they have the right to the immediate release of their benefits
as employees separated from respondent Solid Mills is a question arising from the
employer-employee relationship between the parties.

Claims arising from an employer-employee relationship are not limited to claims by

an employee. Employers may also have claims against the employee, which arise
from the same relationship.

In Baez v. Valdevilla,74 this court ruled that Article 217 of the Labor Code also
applies to employers claim for damages, which arises from or is connected with the
labor issue. Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Whereas this Court in a number of occasions had applied the jurisdictional

provisions of Article 217 to claims for damages filed by employees, we hold that by
the designating clause arising from the employer-employee relations Article 217
should apply with equal force to the claim of an employer for actual damages
against its dismissed employee, where the basis for the claim arises from or is
necessarily connected with the fact of termination, and should be entered as a
counterclaim in the illegal dismissal case.75

Baez was cited in Domondon v. National Labor Relations Commission.76 One of

the issues in Domondon is whether the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction to decide an
issue on the transfer of ownership of a vehicle assigned to the employee. It was
argued that only regular courts have jurisdiction to decide the
issue.77chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

This court ruled that since the transfer of ownership of the vehicle to the employee
was connected to his separation from the employer and arose from the employer-
employee relationship of the parties, the employers claim fell within the Labor
Arbiters jurisdiction.78chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

As a general rule, therefore, a claim only needs to be sufficiently connected to the

labor issue raised and must arise from an employer-employee relationship for the
labor tribunals to have jurisdiction.
In this case, respondent Solid Mills claims that its properties are in petitioners
possession by virtue of their status as its employees. Respondent Solid Mills
allowed petitioners to use its property as an act of liberality. Put in other words, it
would not have allowed petitioners to use its property had they not been its
employees. The return of its properties in petitioners possession by virtue of their
status as employees is an issue that must be resolved to determine whether
benefits can be released immediately. The issue raised by the employer is,
therefore, connected to petitioners claim for benefits and is sufficiently intertwined
with the parties employer-employee relationship. Thus, it is properly within the
labor tribunals jurisdiction.

II

Institution of clearance procedures

has legal bases

Requiring clearance before the release of last payments to the employee is a

standard procedure among employers, whether public or private. Clearance
procedures are instituted to ensure that the properties, real or personal, belonging
to the employer but are in the possession of the separated employee, are returned
to the employer before the employees departure.

As a general rule, employers are prohibited from withholding wages from

employees. The Labor Code provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Art. 116. Withholding of wages and kickbacks prohibited. It shall be unlawful for any
person, directly or indirectly, to withhold any amount from the wages of a worker or
induce him to give up any part of his wages by force, stealth, intimidation, threat or
by any other means whatsoever without the workers consent.

The Labor Code also prohibits the elimination or diminution of benefits.

Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Art. 100. Prohibition against elimination or diminution of benefits. Nothing in this

Book shall be construed to eliminate or in any way diminish supplements, or other
employee benefits being enjoyed at the time of promulgation of this Code.
However, our law supports the employers institution of clearance procedures
before the release of wages. As an exception to the general rule that wages may
not be withheld and benefits may not be diminished, the Labor Code
provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Art. 113. Wage deduction. No employer, in his own behalf or in behalf of any person,
shall make any deduction from the wages of his employees,
except:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

1. In cases where the worker is insured with his consent by the employer, and the
deduction is to recompense the employer for the amount paid by him as premium
on the insurance;chanrobleslaw

2. For union dues, in cases where the right of the worker or his union to check-off
has been recognized by the employer or authorized in writing by the individual
worker concerned; and

3. In cases where the employer is authorized by law or regulations issued by the

Secretary of Labor and Employment. (Emphasis supplied)

The Civil Code provides that the employer is authorized to withhold wages for debts
due:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Article 1706. Withholding of the wages, except for a debt due, shall not be made by
the employer.cralawred

Debt in this case refers to any obligation due from the employee to the employer.
It includes any accountability that the employee may have to the employer. There
is no reason to limit its scope to uniforms and equipment, as petitioners would
argue.

More importantly, respondent Solid Mills and NAFLU, the union representing
petitioners, agreed that the release of petitioners benefits shall be less
accountabilities.
Accountability, in its ordinary sense, means obligation or debt. The ordinary
meaning of the term accountability does not limit the definition of accountability
to those incurred in the worksite. As long as the debt or obligation was incurred by
virtue of the employer-employee relationship, generally, it shall be included in the
employees accountabilities that are subject to clearance procedures.

It may be true that not all employees enjoyed the privilege of staying in respondent
Solid Mills property. However, this alone does not imply that this privilege when
enjoyed was not a result of the employer-employee relationship. Those who did
avail of the privilege were employees of respondent Solid Mills. Petitioners
possession should, therefore, be included in the term accountability.

Accountabilities of employees are personal. They need not be uniform among all
employees in order to be included in accountabilities incurred by virtue of an
employer-employee relationship.

Petitioners do not categorically deny respondent Solid Mills ownership of the

property, and they do not claim superior right to it. What can be gathered from the
findings of the Labor Arbiter, National Labor Relations Commission, and the Court of
Appeals is that respondent Solid Mills allowed the use of its property for the benefit
of petitioners as its employees. Petitioners were merely allowed to possess and use
it out of respondent Solid Mills liberality. The employer may, therefore, demand the
property at will.79chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The return of the propertys possession became an obligation or liability on the part
of the employees when the employer-employee relationship ceased. Thus,
respondent Solid Mills has the right to withhold petitioners wages and benefits
because of this existing debt or liability. In Solas v. Power and Telephone Supply
Phils., Inc., et al., this court recognized this right of the employer when it ruled that
the employee in that case was not constructively dismissed.80
Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

There was valid reason for respondents withholding of petitioners salary for the
month of February 2000. Petitioner does not deny that he is indebted to his
employer in the amount of around P95,000.00. Respondents explained that
petitioners salary for the period of February 1-15, 2000 was applied as partial
payment for his debt and for withholding taxes on his income; while for the period
of February 15-28, 2000, petitioner was already on absence without leave, hence,
was not entitled to any pay.81
The law does not sanction a situation where employees who do not even assert any
claim over the employers property are allowed to take all the benefits out of their
employment while they simultaneously withhold possession of their employers
property for no rightful reason.

Withholding of payment by the employer does not mean that the employer may
renege on its obligation to pay employees their wages, termination payments, and
due benefits. The employees benefits are also not being reduced. It is only
subjected to the condition that the employees return properties properly belonging
to the employer. This is only consistent with the equitable principle that no one
shall be unjustly enriched or benefited at the expense of
another.82chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

For these reasons, we cannot hold that petitioners are entitled to interest of their
withheld separation benefits. These benefits were properly withheld by respondent
Solid Mills because of their refusal to return its property.

III

Mahilom and Damian are not

entitled to the benefits claimed

Teodora Mahilom is not entitled to separation benefits.

Both the National Labor Relations Commission and the Court of Appeals found that
Teodora Mahilom already retired long before respondent Solid Mills closure. They
found that she already received her retirement benefits. We have no reason to
disturb this finding. This court is not a trier of facts. Findings of the National Labor
Relations Commission, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are
binding upon this court.83chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Moreover, Teodora Mahiloms claim for retirement benefits was not included in her
complaint filed before the Labor Arbiter. Hence, it may not be raised in the appeal.
Similarly, the National Labor Relations Commission and the Court of Appeals found
that Carlito Damian already received his terminal benefits. Hence, he may no
longer claim terminal benefits.

The fact that respondent Solid Mills has not yet demolished Carlito Damians house
in SMI Village is not evidence that he did not receive his benefits. Both the National
Labor Relations Commission and the Court of Appeals found that he executed an
affidavit stating that he already received the benefits.

Absent any showing that the National Labor Relations Commission and the Court of
Appeals misconstrued these facts, we will not reverse these findings.

Our laws provide for a clear preference for labor. This is in recognition of the
asymmetrical power of those with capital when they are left to negotiate with their
workers without the standards and protection of law. In cases such as these, the
collective bargaining unit of workers are able to get more benefits and in exchange,
the owners are able to continue with the program of cutting their losses or wind
down their operations due to serious business losses. The company in this case did
all that was required by law.

The preferential treatment given by our law to labor, however, is not a license for
abuse.84 It is not a signal to commit acts of unfairness that will unreasonably
infringe on the property rights of the company. Both labor and employer have social
utility, and the law is not so biased that it does not find a middle ground to give
each their due.

Clearly, in this case, it is for the workers to return their housing in exchange for the
release of their benefits. This is what they agreed upon. It is what is fair in the
premises.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals decision is AFFIRMED.

7. G.R. Nos. 174941 February 1, 2012

ANTONIO P. SALENGA and NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, Petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and CLARK DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondents.

DECISION

SERENO, J.:

The present Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 assails the Decision1 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) promulgated on 13 September 2005, dismissing the Complaint for
illegal dismissal filed by petitioner Antonio F. Salenga against respondent Clark
Development Corporation (CDC). The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision
states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the original and supplemental petitions are

GRANTED. The assailed resolutions of the National Labor Relations Commission
dated September 10, 2003 and January 21, 2004 are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The
complaint filed by Antonio B. Salenga against Clark Development is DISMISSED.
Consequently, Antonio B. Salenga is ordered to restitute to Clark Development
Corporation the amount of P3,222,400.00, which was received by him as a
consequence of the immediate execution of said resolutions, plus interest thereon
at the rate of 6% per annum from date of

such receipt until finality of this judgment, after which the interest shall be at the
rate of 12% per annum until said amount is fully restituted.

SO ORDERED.2

The undisputed facts are as follows:

On 22 September 1998, President/Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Rufo Colayco issued

an Order informing petitioner that, pursuant to the decision of the board of directors
of respondent CDC, the position of head executive assistant the position held by
petitioner was declared redundant. Petitioner received a copy of the Order on the
same day and immediately went to see Colayco. The latter informed him that the
Order had been issued as part of the reorganization scheme approved by the board
of directors. Thus, petitioners employment was to be terminated thirty (30) days
from notice of the Order.
On 17 September 1999, petitioner filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal with a claim
for reinstatement and payment of back wages, benefits, and moral and exemplary
damages against respondent CDC and Colayco. The Complaint was filed with the
National Labor Relations Commission-Regional Arbitration Branch (NLRC-RAB) III in
San Fernando, Pampanga. In defense, respondents, represented by the Office of the
Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC), alleged that the NLRC had no jurisdiction to
entertain the case on the ground that petitioner was a corporate officer and, thus,
his dismissal was an intra-corporate matter falling properly within the jurisdiction of
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).

On 29 February 2000, labor arbiter (LA) Florentino R. Darlucio issued a Decision3 in

favor of petitioner Salenga. First, the LA held that the NLRC had jurisdiction over the
Complaint, considering that petitioner was not a corporate officer but a managerial
employee. He held the position of head executive assistant, categorized as a Job
Level 12 position, not subject to election or appointment by the board of directors.

Second, the LA pointed out that respondent CDC and Colayco failed to establish a
valid cause for the termination of petitioners employment. The evidence presented
by respondent CDC failed to show that the position of petitioner was superfluous as
to be classified "redundant." The LA further pointed out that respondent corporation
had not disputed the argument of petitioner Salenga that his position was that of a
regular employee. Moreover, the LA found that petitioner had not been accorded
the right to due process. Instead, the latter was dismissed without the benefit of an
explanation of the grounds for his termination, or an opportunity to be heard and to
defend himself.

Finally, considering petitioners reputation and contribution as a government

employee for 40 years, the LA awarded moral damages amounting to P2,000,000
and exemplary damages of P500,000. The dispositive portion of the LAs Decision
reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring

respondent Clark Development Corporation and Rufo Colayco guilty of illegal
dismissal and for which they are ordered, as follows:

1. To reinstate complainant to his former or equivalent position without loss of

seniority rights and privileges;

2. To pay complainant his backwages reckoned from the date of his dismissal on
September 22, 1998 until actual reinstatement or merely reinstatement in the
payroll which as of this date is in the amount of P722,400.00;
3. To pay complainant moral damages in the amount of P2,000,000.00; and,

4. To pay complainant exemplary damages in the amount of P500,000.00.

SO ORDERED.4

At the time the above Decision was rendered, respondent CDC was already under
the leadership of Sergio T. Naguiat. When he received the Decision on 10 March
2000, he subsequently instructed Atty. Monina C. Pineda, manager of the Corporate
and Legal Services Department and concurrent corporate board secretary, not to
appeal the Decision and to so inform the OGCC.5

Despite these instructions, two separate appeals were filed before LA Darlucio on 20
March 2000. One appeal6 was from the OGCC on behalf of respondent CDC and
Rufo Colayco. The OGCC reiterated its allegation that petitioner was a corporate
officer, and that the termination of his employment was an intra-corporate matter.
The Memorandum of Appeal was verified and certified by Hilana Timbol-Roman, the
executive vice president of respondent CDC. The Memorandum was accompanied
by a UCPB General Insurance Co., Inc. supersedeas bond covering the amount due
to petitioner as adjudged by LA Darlucio. Timbol-Roman and OGCC lawyer Roy
Christian Mallari also executed on 17 March 2000 a Joint Affidavit of Declaration
wherein they swore that they were the "respective authorized representative and
counsel" of respondent corporation. However, the Memorandum of Appeal and the
Joint Affidavit of Declaration were not accompanied by a board resolution from
respondents board of directors authorizing either Timbol-Roman or Atty. Mallari, or
both, to pursue the case or to file the appeal on behalf of respondent.

It is noteworthy that Naguiat, who was president/CEO of respondent CDC from 3

February 2000 to 5 July 2000, executed an Affidavit on 20 March 2002,7 wherein he
stated that without his knowledge, consent or approval, Timbol-Roman and Atty.
Mallari filed the above-mentioned appeal. He further alleged that their statements
were false.

The second appeal, meanwhile, was filed by former CDC President/CEO Rufo
Colayco. Colayco alleged that petitioner was dismissed not on 22 September 1998,
but twice on 9 March 1999 and 23 March 1999. The dismissal was allegedly
approved by respondents CDC board of directors pursuant to a new organizational
structure. Colayco likewise stated that he had posted a supersedeas bond the
same bond taken out by Timbol-Roman issued by the UCPB General Insurance Co.
dated 17 March 2000 in order to secure the monetary award, exclusive of moral and
exemplary damages.

Petitioner thereafter opposed the two appeals on the grounds that both appellants,
respondent CDC as allegedly represented by Timbol-Roman and Atty. Mallari and
Rufo Colayco had failed to observe Rule VI, Sections 4 to 6 of the NLRC Rules of
Procedure; and that appellants had not been authorized by respondents board of
directors to represent the corporation and, thus, they were not the "employer"
whom the Rules referred to. Petitioner also alleged that appellants failed to refute
the findings of LA Darlucio in the previous Decision.

In the meantime, while the appeal was pending, on 19 October 2000, respondents
board chairperson and concurrent President/CEO Rogelio L. Singson ordered the
reinstatement of petitioner to the latters former position as head executive
assistant, effective 24 October 2000.8

On 28 May 2001, respondent CDCs new President/CEO Emmanuel Y. Angeles issued

a Memorandum, which offered all managers of respondent corporation an early
separation/redundancy program. Those who wished to avail themselves of the
program were to be given the equivalent of their 1.25-month basic salary for every
year of service and leave credits computed on the basis of the same 1.25-month
equivalent of their basic salary.9

In August 2001, respondent CDC offered another retirement plan granting higher
benefits to the managerial employees. Thus, on 12 September 2001, petitioner filed
an application for the early retirement program, which Angeles approved on 3
December 2001.

Meanwhile, in the proceedings of the NLRC, petitioner received on 12 September

2001 its 30 July 2001 Decision10 on the appeal filed by Timbol-Roman and Colayco.
It is worthy to note that the said Decision referred to the reports of reviewer arbiters
Cristeta D. Tamayo and Thelma M. Concepcion, who in turn found that petitioner
Salenga was a corporate officer of CDC. Nevertheless, the First Division of the NLRC
upheld LA Darlucios ruling that petitioner Salenga was indeed a regular employee.
It also found that redundancy, as an authorized cause for dismissal, has not been
sufficiently proven, rendering the dismissal illegal. However, the NLRC held that the
award of exemplary and moral damages were unsubstantiated. Moreover, it also
dropped Colayco as a respondent to the case, since LA Darlucio had failed to
provide any ground on which to anchor the formers solidary liability.
Petitioner Salenga thereafter moved for a partial reconsideration of the above-
mentioned Decision. He sought the reinstatement of the award of exemplary and
moral damages. He likewise insisted that the NLRC should not have entertained the
appeal on the following grounds: (1) respondent CDC did not file an appeal and did
not post the required cash or surety bond; (2) both Timbol-Roman and Colayco were
admittedly not real parties-in-interest; (3) they were not the employer or the
employers authorized representative and, thus, had no right to appeal; and (4) both
appeals had not been perfected for failure to post the required cash or surety bond.
In other words, petitioners theory revolved on the fact that neither Timbol-Roman
nor Colayco was authorized to represent the corporation, so the corporation itself
did not appeal LA Darlucios Decision. As a result, that Decision should be
considered as final and executory.

For its part, the OGCC also filed a Motion for Reconsideration11 of the NLRCs 30
July 2001 Decision insofar as the finding of illegal dismissal was concerned. It no
longer questioned the commissions finding that petitioner was a regular employee,
but instead insisted that he had been dismissed as a consequence of his redundant
position. The motion, however, was not verified by the duly authorized
representative of respondent CDC.

On 5 December 2002, the NLRC denied petitioner Salengas Motion for Partial
Reconsideration and dismissed the Complaint. The dispositive portion of the
Resolution12 reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, complainants partial motion for reconsideration is denied. As

recommended by Reviewer Arbiters Cristeta D. Tamayo in her August 2, 2000 report
and Thelma M. Concepcion in her November 25, 2002 report, the decision of Labor
Arbiter Florentino R. Darlucio dated 29 February 2000 is set aside.

The complaint below is dismissed for being without merit.

SO ORDERED.13

Meanwhile, pending the Motions for Reconsideration of the NLRCs 30 July 2001
Decision, another issue arose with regard to the computation of the retirement
benefits of petitioner. Respondent CDC did not immediately give his requested
retirement benefits, pending clarification of the computation of these benefits. He
claimed that the computation of his retirement benefits should also include the forty
(40) years he had been in government service in accordance with Republic Act No.
(R.A.) 8291, or the GSIS Act, and should not be limited to the length of his
employment with respondent corporation only, as the latter insisted.
In a letter dated 14 March 2003, petitioner Salengas counsel wrote to the board of
directors of respondent to follow up the payment of the retirement benefits
allegedly due to petitioner.14

Pursuant to the NLRCs dismissal of the Complaint of petitioner Salenga, Angeles

subsequently denied the formers request for his retirement benefits, to wit:15

Please be informed that we cannot favorably grant your clients claim for retirement
benefits considering that Clark Development Corporation's dismissal of Mr. Antonio
B. Salenga had been upheld by the National Labor Relations Commission through a
Resolution dated December 5, 2002...

xxx xxx xxx

As it is, the said Resolution dismissed the Complaint filed by Mr. Salenga for being
without merit. Consequently, he is not entitled to receive any retirement pay from
the corporation.

Meanwhile, petitioner Salenga filed a second Motion for Reconsideration of the 5

December 2002 Resolution of the NLRC, reiterating his claim that it should not have
entertained the imperfect appeal, absent a proper verification and certification
against forum-shopping from the duly authorized representative of respondent CDC.
Without that authority, neither could the OGCC act on behalf of the corporation.

The OGCC, meanwhile, resurrected its old defense that the NLRC had no jurisdiction
over the case, because petitioner Salenga was a corporate officer.

The parties underwent several hearings before the NLRC First Division. During these
times, petitioner Salenga demanded from the OGCC to present a board resolution
authorizing it or any other person to represent the corporation in the proceedings.
This, the OGCC failed to do.

After giving due course to the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner
Salenga, the NLRC issued a Resolution16 on 10 September 2003, partially granting
the motion. This time, the First Division of the NLRC held that, absent a board
resolution authorizing Timbol-Roman to file the appeal on behalf of respondent CDC,
the appeal was not perfected and was thus a mere scrap of paper. In other words,
the NLRC had no jurisdiction over the appeal filed before it.

The NLRC further held that respondent CDC had failed to show that petitioner
Salengas dismissal was pursuant to a valid corporate reorganization or board
resolution. It also deemed respondent estopped from claiming that there was indeed
a redundancy, considering that petitioner Salenga had been reinstated to his
position as head executive assistant. While it granted the award of moral damages,
it nevertheless denied exemplary damages. Thus, the dispositive portion of its
Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the complainants Motion for Reconsideration is

GRANTED and We set aside our Resolution of December 5, 2002. The Decision of the
Labor Arbiter dated February 29, 2000 is REINSTATED with the MODIFICATION that:

1.) Being a nominal party, respondent Rufo Colayco is declared to be not jointly and
severally liable with respondent Clark Development Corporation;

2.) Respondent Clark Development Corporation is ordered to pay the complainant

his full backwages and other monetary claims to which he is entitled under the
decision of the Labor Arbiter;

3.) Respondent CDC is likewise ordered to pay the complainant moral and
exemplary damages as provided under the Labor Arbiters Decision; and

4.) All other money claims are DENIED for lack of merit.

In the meantime, respondent CDC is ordered to pay the complainant his retirement
benefits without further delay.

SO ORDERED.17

On 3 October 2003, the OGCC filed a Motion for Reconsideration18 despite the
absence of a verification and the certification against forum shopping.
On 21 January 2004, the motion was denied by the NLRC for lack of merit.19

On 5 February 2004, the executive clerk of the NLRC First Division entered the
judgment on the foregoing case. Thereafter, on 9 February 2004, the NLRC
forwarded the entire records of the case to the NLRC-RAB III Office in San Fernando,
Pampanga for appropriate action.

On 4 March 2004, petitioner Salenga filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution
before the NLRC-RAB III, Office of LA Henry D. Isorena. The OGCC opposed the
motion on the ground that it had filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari seeking
the reversal of the NLRC Decision dated 30 July 2001 and the Resolutions dated 10
September 2003 and 21 January 2004, respectively. It is noteworthy that, again,
there was no board resolution attached to the Petition authorizing its filing.

Despite the pending Petition with the CA, LA Isorena issued a Writ of Execution
enforcing the 10 September 2003 Resolution of the NLRC. On 1 April 2004, the LA
issued an Order20 to the manager of the Philippine National Bank, Clark Branch,
Angeles City, Pampanga, to immediately release in the name of NLRC-RAB III the
amount of P3,222,400 representing partial satisfaction of the judgment award,
including the execution fee of P31,720.

Respondent CDC filed with the CA in February 2004 a Petition for Certiorari with a
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary
injunction. However, the Petition still lacked a board resolution from the board of
directors of respondent corporation authorizing its then President Angeles to verify
and certify the Petition on behalf of the board. It was only on 16 March 2004 that
counsel for respondent filed a Manifestation/Motion21 with an attached Secretarys
Certificate containing the boards Resolution No. 86, Series of 2001. The Resolution
authorized Angeles to represent respondent corporation in prosecuting, maintaining,
or compromising any lawsuit in connection with its business.

Meanwhile, in the proceedings before LA Isorena, both respondent CDCs legal

department and the OGCC on 6 April 2004 filed their respective Motions to Quash
Writ of Execution.22 They both cited the failure to afford to respondent due process
in the issuance of the writ. They claimed that the pre-conference hearing on the
execution of the judgment had not pushed through. They also reiterated that the
Petition for Certiorari dated 11 February 2004 was still pending with the CA.

Both motions were denied by LA Isorena for lack of factual and legal bases.
On 6 May 2004, respondent filed with LA Isorena another Motion to Quash Writ of
Execution, again reiterating the pending Petition with the CA.

This active exchange of pleadings and motions and the delay in the payment of his
money claims eventually led petitioner Salenga to file an Omnibus Motion23 before
LA Isorena. In his motion, he recomputed the amount due him representing back
wages, other benefits or allowances, legal interests and attorneys fees. He also
prayed for the computation of his retirement benefits plus interests in accordance
with R.A. 829124 and R.A. 1616.25 He insisted that since respondent CDC was a
government-owned and -controlled corporation (GOCC), his previous government
service totalling 40 years must also be credited in the computation of his retirement
pay. Thus, he demanded the payment of the total amount of P23,920,772.30,
broken down as follows:

From the illegal dismissal suit: (In Philippine peso)

Recomputed award 3,758,786

Legal interest 5,089,342.58

Attorneys fees 1,196,052.80

Litigation expenses 250,000

Retirement pay

Retirement gratuity 6,987,944

Unused vacation and sick leave 1,440,328

Legal interest 4,050,544.96

Attorneys fees 1,147,781.90

On 11 May 2004, the CA issued a Resolution26 ordering petitioner Salenga to

comment on the Petition and holding in abeyance the issuance of a temporary
restraining order.

The parties thereafter filed their respective pleadings.

On 19 July 2004, the CA temporarily restrained the NLRC from enforcing the
Decision dated 29 February 2000 for a period of 60 days.27 After the lapse of the 60
days, LA Isorena issued a Notice of Hearing/Conference scheduled for 1 October
2004 on petitioners Omnibus Motion dated 7 May 2004.
Meanwhile, on 24 September 2004, the CA issued another Resolution,28 this time
denying the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, after
finding that the requisites for the issuance of the writ had not been met.

Respondent CDC subsequently filed a Supplemental Petition29 with the CA,

challenging the computation petitioner Salenga made in his Omnibus Motion filed
with the NLRC. Respondent alleged that the examiner had erred in including the
other years of government service in the computation of retirement benefits. It
claimed that, since respondent corporation was created under the Corporation
Code, petitioner Salenga was not covered by civil service laws. Hence, his
retirement benefits should only be limited to the number of years he had been
employed by respondent.

Subsequently, respondent CDC filed an Omnibus Motion30 to admit the

Supplemental Petition and to reconsider the CAs Resolution denying the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction. In the motion, respondent alleged that petitioner
Salenga had been more than sufficiently paid the amounts allegedly due him,
including the award made by LA Darlucio. On 12 March 2002, respondent CDC had
issued a check amounting to P852,916.29, representing petitioners retirement pay
and terminal pay. Meanwhile, on 2 April 2004, P3,254,120 representing the initial
award was debited from the account of respondent CDC.

On 7 February 2005, respondent CDC filed a Motion31 once again asking the CA to
issue a writ of preliminary injunction in the light of a scheduled 14 February 2005
conference called by LA Mariano Bactin, who had taken over the case from LA
Isorena.

At the 14 February 2005 hearing, the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement
and were thus required to submit their relevant pleadings and documents in support
of their respective cases.

On 16 February 2005, the CA issued a Resolution32 admitting the Supplemental

Petition filed by respondent, but denying the prayer for the issuance of an injunctive
writ.

Thereafter, on 8 March 2005, LA Bactin issued an Order33 resolving the Omnibus

Motion filed by petitioner Salenga for the recomputation of the monetary claims due
him. In the Order, LA Bactin denied petitioners Motion for the recomputation of the
award of back wages, benefits, allowances and privileges based on the 29 February
2000 Decision of LA Darlucio. LA Bactin held that since the Decision had become
final and executory, he no longer had jurisdiction to amend or to alter the judgment.
Anent the second issue of the computation of retirement benefits, LA Bactin also
denied the claim of petitioner Salenga, considering that the latters retirement
benefits had already been paid. The LA, however, did not rule on whether petitioner
was entitled to retirement benefits, either under the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS) or under the Social Security System (SSS), and held that this issue
was beyond the expertise and jurisdiction of a LA.

Petitioner Salenga thereafter appealed to the NLRC, which granted the appeal in a
Resolution34 dated 22 July 2005. First, it was asked to resolve the issue of the
propriety of having the Laguesma Law Office represent respondent CDC in the
proceedings before the LA. The said law firm entered its appearance as counsel for
respondent during the pre-execution conference/hearing on 1 October 2004. On this
issue, the NLRC held that respondent corporations legal department, which had
previously been representing the corporation, was not validly substituted by the
Laguesma Law Office. In addition, the NLRC held that respondent had failed to
comply with Memorandum Circular No. 9, Series of 1998, which strictly prohibits the
hiring of lawyers of private law firms by GOCCs without the prior written conformity
and acquiescence of the Office of Solicitor General, as the case may be, and the
prior written concurrence of the Commission on Audit (COA). Thus, the NLRC held
that all actions and submissions undertaken by the Laguesma Law Office on behalf
of respondent were null and void.

The second issue raised before the NLRC was whether LA Bactin acted without
jurisdiction in annulling and setting aside the formers final and executory judgment
contained in its 10 September 2003 Resolution, wherein it held that the appeal had
not been perfected, absent the necessary board resolution allowing or authorizing
Timbol-Roman and Atty. Mallari to file the appeal. On this issue, the NLRC stated:

The final and executory judgment in this case is clearly indicated in the dispositive
portion of Our Resolution promulgated on September 10, 2003 GRANTING
complainants motion for reconsideration, SETTING ASIDE Our Resolution of
December 5, 2002, and REINSTATING the Decision of the Labor Arbiter dated
February 29, 2000 with the following modification[s]: (1) declaring respondent Rufo
Colayco not jointly and severally liable with respondent Clark Development
Corporation; (2) ordering respondent CDC to pay the complainant his full backwages
and other monetary claims to which he is entitled under the decision of the Labor
Arbiter; (3) ordering respondent CDC to pay complainant moral and exemplary
damages as provided under the Labor Arbiters Decision; and (4) ordering
respondent CDC to pay the complainant his retirement benefits without further
delay. This was entered in the Book of Entry of Judgment as final and executory
effective as of February 2, 2004.
Implementing this final and executory judgment, Arbiter Isorena issued an Order
dated May 24, 2004, DENYING respondents Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution
dated March 22, 2004, correctly stating thusly:

"Let it be stressed that once a decision has become final and executory, it becomes
the ministerial duty of this Office to issue the corresponding writ of execution. The
rationale behind it is based on the fact that the winning party has suffered enough
and it is the time for him to enjoy the fruits of his labor with dispatch. The very
purpose of the pre-execution conference is to explore the possibility for the parties
to arrive at an amicable settlement to satisfy the judgment award speedily, not to
delay or prolong its implementation."

Thus, when Arbiter Bactin, who took over from Arbiter Isorena upon the latters filing
for leave of absence due to poor health in January 2005, issued the appealed Order
nullifying, instead of implementing, the final and executory judgment of this
Commission, the labor arbiter a quo acted WITHOUT JURISDICTION.35

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal of herein complainant is hereby

GRANTED, and We declare NULL AND VOID the appealed Order of March 8, 2005
and SET ASIDE said Order; We direct the immediate issuance of the corresponding
Alias Writ of Execution to enforce the final and executory judgment of this
Commission as contained in Our September 10, 2003 Resolution.

SO ORDERED.36

Unwilling to accept the above Resolution of the NLRC, the Laguesma Law Office filed
a Motion for Reconsideration dated 29 August 2005 with the NLRC. Again, the
motion lacked proper verification and certification against non-forum shopping.

In the meantime, the OGCC also filed with the CA a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ
of Preliminary Injunction dated 30 August 200537 against the NLRCs 22 July 2005
Resolution. The OGCC alleged that the issues in the Resolution addressed monetary
claims that were raised by petitioner Salenga only in his Omnibus Motion dated 7
May 2004 or after the issuance of the 10 September 2003 Decision of LA Darlucio.
Thus, the OGCC insisted that the NLRC had no jurisdiction over the issue, for the
matter was still pending with the CA.
The OGCC likewise filed another Motion for Reconsideration38 dated 31 August
2005 with the NLRC. The OGCC maintained that it was only acting in a collaborative
manner with the legal department of respondent CDC, for which the former
remained the lead counsel. The OGCC reiterated that, as the statutory counsel of
GOCCs, it did not need authorization from them to maintain a case, and thus, LA
Bactin had jurisdiction over that case. Finally, it insisted that petitioner Salenga was
not covered by civil service laws on retirement, the CDC having been created under
the Corporation Code.

On 13 September 2005, the CA promulgated the assailed Decision. Relying heavily

on the reports of Reviewer Arbiters Cristeta D. Tamayo and Thelma M. Concepcion,
it held that petitioner Salenga was a corporate officer. Thus, the issue before the
NLRC was an intra-corporate dispute, which should have been lodged with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), which had jurisdiction over the case at
the time the issue arose. The CA likewise held that the NLRC committed grave
abuse of discretion when it allowed and granted petitioner Salengas second Motion
for Reconsideration, which was a prohibited pleading.

Petitioner subsequently filed a Motion for Reconsideration on 7 October 2005,

alleging that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in reconsidering the
findings of fact, which had already been found to be conclusive against respondent;
and in taking cognizance of the latters Petition which had not been properly
verified.

The CA, finding no merit in petitioners allegations, denied the motion in its 17
August 2006 Resolution.

On 4 September 2006, petitioner Salenga filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File
a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, praying for an extension of fifteen
(15) days within which to file the Petition. The motion was granted through this
Courts Resolution dated 13 September 2006. The case was docketed as G.R. No.
174159.

On 25 September 2006, however, petitioner filed a Manifestation39 withdrawing the

motion. He manifested before us that he would instead file a Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65, which was eventually docketed as G.R. No. 174941. On 7 July 2008,
this Court, through a Resolution, considered the Petition for Review in G.R. No.
174159 closed and terminated.
Petitioner raises the following issues for our resolution:

I.

The Court of Appeals acted without jurisdiction in reviving and re-litigating the
factual issues and matters of petitioners illegal dismissal and retirement benefits.

II.

The Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to entertain the original Petition as a

remedy for an appeal that had actually not been filed, absent a board resolution
allowing the appeal.

III.

The Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion when it did the following:

a. It failed to dismiss the original and supplemental Petitions despite the lack of a
board resolution authorizing the filing thereof.

b. It failed to dismiss the Petitions despite the absence of a proper verification and
certification against non-forum shopping.

c. It failed to dismiss the Petitions despite respondents failure to inform it of the

pending proceedings before the NLRC involving the same issues.

d. It failed to dismiss the Petitions on the ground of forum shopping.

e. It did not dismiss the Petition when respondent failed to attach to it certified true
copies of the assailed NLRC 30 July 2001 Decision; 10 September 2003 Resolution;
21 January 2004 Resolution; copies of material portions of the record as are referred
to therein; and copies of pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto.
f. It did not act on respondents failure to serve on the Office of the Solicitor General
a copy of the pleadings, motions and manifestations the latter had filed before the
Court of Appeals, as well as copies of pertinent court resolutions and decisions,
despite the NLRC being a party to the present case.

g. It disregarded the findings of fact and conclusions of law arrived at by LA

Darlucio, subjecting them to a second analysis and evaluation and supplanting them
with its own findings.

h. It granted the Petition despite respondents failure to show that the NLRC
committed grave abuse of discretion in rendering the latters 30 July 2001 Decision,
10 September 2003 Resolution and 21 January 2004 Resolution.

i. It dismissed the complaint for illegal dismissal and ordered the restitution of the
P3,222,400 already awarded to petitioner, plus interest thereon.

In its defense, private respondent insists that the present Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65 is an improper remedy to question the Decision of the CA, and thus,
the case should be dismissed outright. Nevertheless, it reiterates that private
petitioner was a corporate officer whose employment was dependent on board
action. As such, private petitioners employment was an intra-corporate controversy
cognizable by the SEC, not the NLRC. Private respondent also asserts that it has
persistently sought the reversal of LA Darlucios Decision by referring to the letters
sent to the OGCC, as well as Verification and Certificate against forum-shopping.
However, these documents were signed only during Angeles time as private
respondents president/CEO, and not of the former presidents. Moreover, private
respondent contends that private petitioner is not covered by civil service laws,
thus, his years in government service are not creditable for the purpose of
determining the total amount of retirement benefits due him. In relation to this,
private respondent enumerates the amounts already paid to private petitioner.

The Courts Ruling

The Petition has merit.

This Court deigns it proper to collapse the issues in this Petition to simplify the
matters raised in what appears to be a convoluted case. First, we need to determine
whether the NLRC and the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, when they entertained respondents so-called appeal
of the 29 February 2000 Decision rendered by LA Darlucio.

Second, because of the turn of events, a second issue the computation of

retirement benefits cropped up while the first case for illegal dismissal was still
pending. Although the second issue may be considered as separate and distinct
from the illegal dismissal case, the issue of the proper computation of the
retirement benefits was nevertheless considered by the relevant administrative
bodies, adding more confusion to what should have been a simple case to begin
with.

The NLRC had no jurisdiction

to entertain the appeal filed by

Timbol-Roman and former

CDC CEO Colayco.

To recall, on 29 February 2000, LA Darlucio rendered a Decision in favor of

petitioner, stating as follows:

xxxComplainant cannot be considered as a corporate officer because at the time of

his termination, he was holding the position of Head Executive Assistant which is
categorized as a Job Level 12 position that is not subject to the election or
appointment by the Board of Directors. The approval of Board Resolution Nos. 200
and 214 by the Board of Directors in its meeting held on February 11, 1998 and
March 25, 1998 clearly refers to the New CDC Salary Structure where the pay
adjustment was based and not to complainants relief as Vice-President, Joint
Ventures and Special Projects. While it is true that his previous positions are
classified as Job Level 13 which are subject to board confirmation, the status of his
appointment was permanent in nature. In fact, he had undergone a six-month
probationary period before having acquired the permanency of his appointment.
However, due to the refusal of the board under then Chairman Victorino Basco to
confirm his appointment, he was demoted to the position of Head Executive
Assistant. Thus, complainant correctly postulated that he was not elected to his
position and his tenure is not dependent upon the whim of the boardxxx

xxx xxx xxx

Anent the second issue, this Office finds and so holds that respondents have
miserably failed to show or establish the valid cause in terminating the services of
complainant.

xxx xxx xxx

In the case at bar, respondents failed to adduce any evidence showing that the
position of Head Executive Assistant is superfluous. In fact, they never disputed the
argument advanced by complainant that the position of Head Executive Assistant
was classified as a regular position in the Position Classification Study which is an
essential component of the Organizational Study that had been approved by the
CDC board of directors in 1995 and still remains intact as of the end of 1998.
Likewise, studies made since 1994 by various management consultancy groups
have determined the need for the said position in the Office of the President/CEO in
relation to the vision, mission, plans, programs and overall corporate goals and
objectives of respondent CDC. There is no evidence on record to show that the
position of Head Executive Assistant was abolished by the Board of Directors in its
meeting held in the morning of September 22, 1998. The minutes of the meeting of
the board on said date, as well as its other three meetings held in the month of
September 1998 (Annexes "B", "C", "D" and "E", Complainants Reply), clearly
reveal that no abolition or reorganization plan was discussed by the board. Hence,
the ground of redundancy is merely a device made by respondent Colayco in order
to ease out the complainant from the respondent corporation.

Moreover, the other ground for complainants dismissal is unclear and unknown to
him as respondent did not specify nor inform the complainant of the alleged recent
developmentsxxx

This Office is also of the view that complainant was not accorded his right to due
process prior to his termination. The law requires that the employer must furnish
the worker sought to be dismissed with two (2) written notices before termination
may be validly effected: first, a notice apprising the employee of the particular acts
or omissions for which his dismissal is sought and, second, a subsequent notice
informing the employee of the decision to dismiss him. In the case at bar,
complainant was not apprised of the grounds of his termination. He was not given
the opportunity to be heard and defend himselfxxx40

The OGCC, representing respondent CDC and former CEO Colayco separately
appealed from the above Decision. Both alleged that they had filed the proper bond
to cover the award granted by LA Darlucio.
It is clear from the NLRC Rules of Procedure that appeals must be verified and
certified against forum-shopping by the parties-in-interest themselves. In the case
at bar, the parties-in-interest are petitioner Salenga, as the employee, and
respondent Clark Development Corporation as the employer.

A corporation can only exercise its powers and transact its business through its
board of directors and through its officers and agents when authorized by a board
resolution or its bylaws. The power of a corporation to sue and be sued is exercised
by the board of directors. The physical acts of the corporation, like the signing of
documents, can be performed only by natural persons duly authorized for the
purpose by corporate bylaws or by a specific act of the board. The purpose of
verification is to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true
and correct and have been filed in good faith.41

Thus, we agree with petitioner that, absent the requisite board resolution, neither
Timbol-Roman nor Atty. Mallari, who signed the Memorandum of Appeal and Joint
Affidavit of Declaration allegedly on behalf of respondent corporation, may be
considered as the "appellant" and "employer" referred to by Rule VI, Sections 4 to 6
of the NLRC Rules of Procedure, which state:

SECTION 4. REQUISITES FOR PERFECTION OF APPEAL. - (a) The Appeal shall be filed
within the reglementary period as provided in Section 1 of this Rule; shall be verified
by appellant himself in accordance with Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, with
proof of payment of the required appeal fee and the posting of a cash or surety
bond as provided in Section 6 of this Rule; shall be accompanied by memorandum
of appeal in three (3) legibly typewritten copies which shall state the grounds relied
upon and the arguments in support thereof; the relief prayed for; and a statement
of the date when the appellant received the appealed decision, resolution or order
and a certificate of non-forum shopping with proof of service on the other party of
such appeal. A mere notice of appeal without complying with the other requisites
aforestated shall not stop the running of the period for perfecting an appeal.

(b) The appellee may file with the Regional Arbitration Branch or Regional Office
where the appeal was filed, his answer or reply to appellant's memorandum of
appeal, not later than ten (10) calendar days from receipt thereof. Failure on the
part of the appellee who was properly furnished with a copy of the appeal to file his
answer or reply within the said period may be construed as a waiver on his part to
file the same.

(c) Subject to the provisions of Article 218, once the appeal is perfected in
accordance with these Rules, the Commission shall limit itself to reviewing and
deciding specific issues that were elevated on appeal.
SECTION 5. APPEAL FEE. -The appellant shall pay an appeal fee of one hundred fifty
pesos (P150.00) to the Regional Arbitration Branch or Regional Office, and the
official receipt of such payment shall be attached to the records of the case.

SECTION 6. BOND. - In case the decision of the Labor Arbiter or the Regional
Director involves a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected
only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond. The appeal bond shall either be in
cash or surety in an amount equivalent to the monetary award, exclusive of
damages and attorneys fees.

In case of surety bond, the same shall be issued by a reputable bonding company
duly accredited by the Commission or the Supreme Court, and shall be
accompanied by:

(a) a joint declaration under oath by the employer, his counsel, and the bonding
company, attesting that the bond posted is genuine, and shall be in effect until final
disposition of the case.

(b) a copy of the indemnity agreement between the employer-appellant and

bonding company; and

(c) a copy of security deposit or collateral securing the bond.

A certified true copy of the bond shall be furnished by the appellant to the appellee
who shall verify the regularity and genuineness thereof and immediately report to
the Commission any irregularity.

Upon verification by the Commission that the bond is irregular or not genuine, the
Commission shall cause the immediate dismissal of the appeal.

No motion to reduce bond shall be entertained except on meritorious grounds and

upon the posting of a bond in a reasonable amount in relation to the monetary
award.
The filing of the motion to reduce bond without compliance with the requisites in the
preceding paragraph shall not stop the running of the period to perfect an appeal.
(Emphasis supplied)

The OGCC failed to produce any valid authorization from the board of directors
despite petitioner Salengas repeated demands. It had been given more than
enough opportunity and time to produce the appropriate board resolution, and yet it
failed to do so. In fact, many of its pleadings, representations, and submissions
lacked board authorization.

We cannot agree with the OGCCs attempt to downplay this procedural flaw by
claiming that, as the statutorily assigned counsel for GOCCs, it does not need such
authorization. In Constantino-David v. Pangandaman-Gania,42 we exhaustively
explained why it was necessary for government agencies or instrumentalities to
execute the verification and the certification against forum-shopping through their
duly authorized representatives. We ruled thereon as follows:

But the rule is different where the OSG is acting as counsel of record for a
government agency. For in such a case it becomes necessary to determine whether
the petitioning government body has authorized the filing of the petition and is
espousing the same stand propounded by the OSG. Verily, it is not improbable for
government agencies to adopt a stand different from the position of the OSG since
they weigh not just legal considerations but policy repercussions as well. They have
their respective mandates for which they are to be held accountable, and the
prerogative to determine whether further resort to a higher court is desirable and
indispensable under the circumstances.

The verification of a pleading, if signed by the proper officials of the client agency
itself, would fittingly serve the purpose of attesting that the allegations in the
pleading are true and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of
speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith. Of course, the OSG may opt
to file its own petition as a "People's Tribune" but the representation would not be
for a client office but for its own perceived best interest of the State.

The case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. S.C. Johnson and Son, Inc., is not
also a precedent that may be invoked at all times to allow the OSG to sign the
certificate of non-forum shopping in place of the real party-in-interest. The ruling
therein mentions merely that the certification of non-forum shopping executed by
the OSG constitutes substantial compliance with the rule since "the OSG is the only
lawyer for the petitioner, which is a government agency mandated under Section
35, Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV, of the 1987 Administrative Code (Reiterated under
Memorandum Circular No. 152 dated May 17, 1992) to be represented only by the
Solicitor General."

By its very nature, "substantial compliance" is actually inadequate observance of

the requirements of a rule or regulation which are waived under equitable
circumstances to facilitate the administration of justice there being no damage or
injury caused by such flawed compliance. This concept is expressed in the
statement "the rigidity of a previous doctrine was thus subjected to an inroad under
the concept of substantial compliance." In every inquiry on whether to accept
"substantial compliance," the focus is always on the presence of equitable
conditions to administer justice effectively and efficiently without damage or injury
to the spirit of the legal obligation.

xxx xxx xxx

The fact that the OSG under the 1987 Administrative Code is the only lawyer for a
government agency wanting to file a petition, or complaint for that matter, does not
operate per se to vest the OSG with the authority to execute in its name the
certificate of non-forum shopping for a client office. For, in many instances, client
agencies of the OSG have legal departments which at times inadvertently take legal
matters requiring court representation into their own hands without the intervention
of the OSG. Consequently, the OSG would have no personal knowledge of the
history of a particular case so as to adequately execute the certificate of non-forum
shopping; and even if the OSG does have the relevant information, the courts on the
other hand would have no way of ascertaining the accuracy of the OSG's assertion
without precise references in the record of the case. Thus, unless equitable
circumstances which are manifest from the record of a case prevail, it becomes
necessary for the concerned government agency or its authorized representatives
to certify for non-forum shopping if only to be sure that no other similar case or
incident is pending before any other court.

We recognize the occasions when the OSG has difficulty in securing the attention
and signatures of officials in charge of government offices for the verification and
certificate of non-forum shopping of an initiatory pleading. This predicament is
especially true where the period for filing such pleading is non-extendible or can no
longer be further extended for reasons of public interest such as in applications for
the writ of habeas corpus, in election cases or where sensitive issues are involved.
This quandary is more pronounced where public officials have stations outside Metro
Manila.

But this difficult fact of life within the OSG, equitable as it may seem, does not
excuse it from wantonly executing by itself the verification and certificate of non-
forum shopping. If the OSG is compelled by circumstances to verify and certify the
pleading in behalf of a client agency, the OSG should at least endeavor to inform
the courts of its reasons for doing so, beyond instinctively citing City Warden of the
Manila City Jail v. Estrella and Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. S.C. Johnson and
Son, Inc.

Henceforth, to be able to verify and certify an initiatory pleading for non-forum

shopping when acting as counsel of record for a client agency, the OSG must (a)
allege under oath the circumstances that make signatures of the concerned officials
impossible to obtain within the period for filing the initiatory pleading; (b) append to
the petition or complaint such authentic document to prove that the party-petitioner
or complainant authorized the filing of the petition or complaint and understood and
adopted the allegations set forth therein, and an affirmation that no action or claim
involving the same issues has been filed or commenced in any court, tribunal or
quasi-judicial agency; and, (c) undertake to inform the court promptly and
reasonably of any change in the stance of the client agency.

Anent the document that may be annexed to a petition or complaint under letter (b)
hereof, the letter-endorsement of the client agency to the OSG, or other
correspondence to prove that the subject-matter of the initiatory pleading had been
previously discussed between the OSG and its client, is satisfactory evidence of the
facts under letter (b) above. In this exceptional situation where the OSG signs the
verification and certificate of non-forum shopping, the court reserves the authority
to determine the sufficiency of the OSG's action as measured by the equitable
considerations discussed herein. (Emphasis ours, italics provided)

The ruling cited above may have pertained only to the Office of the Solicitor
Generals representation of government agencies and instrumentalities, but we see
no reason why this doctrine cannot be applied to the case at bar insofar as the
OGCC is concerned.

While in previous decisions we have excused transgressions of these rules, it has

always been in the context of upholding justice and fairness under exceptional
circumstances. In this case, though, respondent failed to provide any iota of rhyme
or reason to compel us to relax these requirements. Instead, what is clear to us is
that the so-called appeal was done against the instructions of then President/CEO
Naguiat not to file an appeal. Timbol-Roman, who signed the Verification and the
Certification against forum-shopping, was not even an authorized representative of
the corporation. The OGCC was equally remiss in its duty. It ought to have advised
respondent corporation, the proper procedure for pursuing an appeal. Instead, it
maintained the appeal and failed to present any valid authorization from respondent
corporation even after petitioner had questioned OGCCs authority all throughout
the proceedings. Thus, it is evident that the appeal was made in bad faith.
The unauthorized and overzealous acts of officials of respondent CDC and the OGCC
have led to a waste of the governments time and resources. More alarmingly, they
have contributed to the injustice done to petitioner Salenga. By taking matters into
their own hands, these officials let the case drag on for years, depriving him of the
enjoyment of property rightfully his. What should have been a simple case of illegal
dismissal became an endless stream of motions and pleadings.

Time and again, we have said that the perfection of an appeal within the period
prescribed by law is jurisdictional, and the lapse of the appeal period deprives the
courts of jurisdiction to alter the final judgment.43 Thus, there is no other recourse
but to respect the findings and ruling of the labor arbiter. Clearly, therefore, the CA
committed grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the Petition filed before it after
the NLRC had dismissed the case based on lack of jurisdiction. The assailed CA
Decision did not even resolve petitioner Salengas consistent and persistent claim
that the NLRC should not have taken cognizance of the appeal in the first place,
absent a board resolution. Thus, LA Darlucios Decision with respect to the liability
of the corporation still stands.

However, we note from that Decision that Rufo Colayco was made solidarily liable
with respondent corporation. Colayco thereafter filed his separate appeal. As to him,
the NLRC correctly held in its 30 July 2001 Decision that he may not be held
solidarily responsible to petitioner. As a result, it dropped him as respondent.
Notably, in the case at bar, petitioner does not question that ruling.

Based on the foregoing, all other subsequent proceedings regarding the issue of
petitioners dismissal are null and void for having been conducted without
jurisdiction. Thus, it is no longer incumbent upon us to rule on the other errors
assigned in the matter of petitioner Salengas dismissal.

CDC is not under the civil service laws on retirement.

While the case was still persistently being pursued by the OGCC, a new issue arose
when petitioner Salenga reached retirement age: whether his retirement benefits
should be computed according to civil service laws.

To recall, the issue of how to compute the retirement benefits of petitioner was
raised in his Omnibus Motion dated 7 May 2004 filed before the NLRC after it had
reinstated LA Darlucios original Decision. The issue was not covered by petitioners
Complaint for illegal dismissal, but was a different issue altogether and should have
been properly addressed in a separate Complaint. We cannot fault petitioner,
though, for raising the issue while the case was still pending with the NLRC. If it
were not for the "appeal" undertaken by Timbol-Roman and the OGCC through Atty.
Mallari, the issue would have taken its proper course and would have been raised in
a more appropriate time and manner. Thus, we deem it proper to resolve the matter
at hand to put it to rest after a decade of litigation.

Petitioner Salenga contends that respondent CDC is covered by the GSIS Law. Thus,
he says, the computation of his retirement benefits should include all the years of
actual government service, starting from the original appointment forty (40) years
ago up to his retirement.

Respondent CDC owes its existence to Executive Order No. 80 issued by then
President Fidel V. Ramos. It was meant to be the implementing and operating arm of
the Bases Conversion and Development Authority (BCDA) tasked to manage the
Clark Special Economic Zone (CSEZ). Expressly, respondent was formed in
accordance with Philippine corporation laws and existing rules and regulations
promulgated by the SEC pursuant to Section 16 of Republic Act (R.A.) 7227.44 CDC,
a government-owned or -controlled corporation without an original charter, was
incorporated under the Corporation Code. Pursuant to Article IX-B, Sec. 2(1), the
civil service embraces only those government-owned or -controlled corporations
with original charter. As such, respondent CDC and its employees are covered by
the Labor Code and not by the Civil Service Law, consistent with our ruling in
NASECO v. NLRC,45 in which we established this distinction. Thus, in Gamogamo v.
PNOC Shipping and Transport Corp.,46 we held:

Retirement results from a voluntary agreement between the employer and the
employee whereby the latter after reaching a certain age agrees to sever his
employment with the former.

Since the retirement pay solely comes from Respondent's funds, it is but natural
that Respondent shall disregard petitioner's length of service in another company
for the computation of his retirement benefits.

Petitioner was absorbed by Respondent from LUSTEVECO on 1 August 1979.

Ordinarily, his creditable service shall be reckoned from such date. However, since
Respondent took over the shipping business of LUSTEVECO and agreed to assume
without interruption all the service credits of petitioner with LUSTEVECO, petitioner's
creditable service must start from 9 November 1977 when he started working with
LUSTEVECO until his day of retirement on 1 April 1995. Thus, petitioner's creditable
service is 17.3333 years.
We cannot uphold petitioner's contention that his fourteen years of service with the
DOH should be considered because his last two employers were government-owned
and controlled corporations, and fall under the Civil Service Law. Article IX(B),
Section 2 paragraph 1 of the 1987 Constitution states

Sec. 2. (1)The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities,

and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters.

It is not at all disputed that while Respondent and LUSTEVECO are government-
owned and controlled corporations, they have no original charters; hence they are
not under the Civil Service Law. In Philippine National Oil Company-Energy
Development Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, we ruled:

xxx "Thus under the present state of the law, the test in determining whether a
government-owned or controlled corporation is subject to the Civil Service Law are
[sic] the manner of its creation, such that government corporations created by
special charter(s) are subject to its provisions while those incorporated under the
General Corporation Law are not within its coverage." (Emphasis supplied)

Hence, petitioner Salenga is entitled to receive only his retirement benefits based
only on the number of years he was employed with the corporation under the
conditions provided under its retirement plan, as well as other benefits given to him
by existing laws.1wphi1

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition in G.R. No. 174941 is partially
GRANTED. The Decision of LA Darlucio is REINSTATED insofar as respondent
corporations liability is concerned. Considering that petitioner did not maintain the
action against Rufo Colayco, the latter is not solidarily liable with respondent Clark
Development Corporation.

The case is REMANDED to the labor arbiter for the computation of petitioners
retirement benefits in accordance with the Social Security Act of 1997 otherwise
known as Republic Act No. 8282, deducting therefrom the sums already paid by
respondent CDC. If any, the remaining amount shall be subject to the legal interest
of 6% per annum from the filing date of petitioners Omnibus Motion on 11 May
2004 up to the time this judgment becomes final and executory. Henceforth, the
rate of legal interest shall be 12% until the satisfaction of judgment.
SO ORDERED.

8. G.R. No. 168612 December 10, 2014

PHILIPPINE ELECTRIC CORPORATION (PHILEC), Petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, NATIONAL CONCILIATION AND MEDIATION BOARD (NCMB),
Department of Labor and Employment, RAMON T. JIMENEZ, in his capacity as
Voluntary Arbitrator, PHILEC WORKERS' UNION (PWU), ELEODORO V. LIPIO, and
EMERLITO C. IGNACIO, Respondents.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

An appeal to reverse or modify a Voluntary Arbitrator's award or decision must be filed

before the Court of Appeals within 10 calendar days from receipt of the award or decision.

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Court of Appeals decision dated May 25,
1 2

2004, dismissing the Philippine Electric Corporations petition for certiorari for lack of merit.
Philippine Electric Corporation (PHILEC) is a domestic corporation "engaged in the
manufacture and repairs of high voltage transformers." Among its rank-and-file employees
3

were Eleodoro V. Lipio (Lipio) and Emerlito C. Ignacio, Sr. (Ignacio, Sr.), former members of
the PHILEC Workers Union (PWU). PWU is a legitimate labor organization and the
4

exclusive bargaining representative of PHILECs rank-and-file employees. 5

From June 1, 1989 to May 31, 1997, PHILEC and its rank-and-file employees were
governed by collective bargaining agreements providing for the following step increases in
an employees basic salary in case of promotion: 6

Rank-and-File (PWU)
Pay
Grade June 1, 1989 to June 1, 1992 to June 1, 1994 to
May 31, 1992 May 31, 1994 May 31, 1997
I II 50 60 65
II III 60 70 78
III IV 70 80 95
IV V 80 110 120
V- VI 100 140 150
VI VII 120 170 195
VII VIII 170 230 255
VIII IX 220 290 340
 IX X 260 350 455

On August 18, 1997 and with the previous collective bargaining agreements already
expired, PHILEC selected Lipio for promotion from Machinist under Pay Grade VIII to7

Foreman I under Pay Grade B. PHILEC served Lipio a memorandum, instructing him to
8 9

undergo training for the position of Foreman I beginning on August 25, 1997. PHILEC
undertook to pay Lipio training allowance as provided in the memorandum:

This will confirm your selection and that you will undergo training for the position of
Foreman I (PG B) of the Tank Finishing Section, Distribution Transformer Manufacturing
and Repair effective August 25, 1997.

You will be trained as a Foreman I,and shall receive the following training allowance until
you have completed the training/observation period which shall not exceed four (4) months.

First Month ----- 350.00

Second month ----- 815.00
Third month ----- 815.00
Fourth month ----- 815.00

Please be guided accordingly. 10

Ignacio, Sr., then DT-Assembler with Pay Grade VII, was likewise selected for training for
11

the position of Foreman I. On August 21, 1997, PHILEC served Ignacio, Sr. a
12

memorandum, instructing him to undergo training with the following schedule of allowance:
13

This will confirm your selection and that you will undergo training for the position of
Foreman I (PG B) of the Assembly Section, Distribution Transformer Manufacturing and
Repair effective

August 25, 1997.

You will be trained as a Foreman I,and shall receive the following training allowance until
you have completed the training/observation period which shall not exceed four (4) months.

First Month ----- 255.00

Second month ----- 605.00
Third month ----- 1,070.00
Fourth month ----- 1,070.00

Please be guided accordingly. 14

On September 17, 1997, PHILEC and PWU entered into a new collective bargaining
agreement, effective retroactively on June 1, 1997 and expiring on May 31, 1999. Under
15

Article X, Section 4 of the June 1, 1997 collective bargaining agreement, a rank-and-file

employee promoted shall be entitled to the following step increases in his or her basic
salary:
16

Section 4. STEP INCREASES. [Philippine Electric Corporation] shall adopt the following
step increases on the basic salary in case of promotion effective June 1, 1997. Such
increases shall be based on the scale below or upon the minimum of the new pay grade to
which the employee is promoted, whichever is higher:

Pay Grade Step Increase

I - II P80.00
II - III P105.00
III - IV P136.00
IV - V P175.00
V - VI P224.00
VI - VII P285.00
VII - VIII P361.00
VIII - IX P456.00
IX - X P575.00
To be promoted, a rank-and-file employee shall undergo training or observation and shall
receive training allowance as provided in Article IX, Section 1(f) of the June 1, 1997
collective bargaining agreement: 17

Section 1. JOB POSTING AND BIDDING:

....

(f) Allowance for employees under Training or Observation shall be on a graduated basis as
follows:

For the first month of training, the allowance should be equivalent to one step increase of
the next higher grade. Every month thereafter the corresponding increase shall be
equivalent to the next higher grade until the allowance for the grade applied for is attained.

As an example, if a Grade I employee qualifies for a Grade III position, he will receive the
training allowance for Grade I to Grade II for the first month. On the second month, he will
receive the training allowance for Grade I to Grade II plus the allowance for Grade II to
Grade III. He will then continue to receive this amount until he finishes his training or
observation period. 18

Claiming that the schedule of training allowance stated in the memoranda served on Lipio
and Ignacio,Sr. did not conform to Article X, Section 4 of the June 1, 1997 collective
bargaining agreement, PWU submitted the grievance to the grievance machinery. 19
PWU and PHILEC failed to amicably settle their grievance. Thus, on December 21, 1998,
the parties filed a submission agreement with the National Conciliation and Mediation
20

Board, submitting the following issues to voluntary arbitration:

WHETHER OR NOT PHILEC VIOLATED SECTION 4 (Step Increases) ARTICLE X (Wage

and Position Standardization) OF THE EXISTING COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AGREEMENT (CBA) IN IMPLEMENTING THE STEP INCREASES RELATIVE TO THE
PROMOTION OF INDIVIDUAL COMPLAINANTS.

II

WHETHER OR NOT PHILECs MANNER OF IMPLEMENTING THE STEP INCREASES IN

CONNECTION WITH THE PROMOTION OF INDIVIDUAL COMPLAINANTS IN RELATION
TO THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 4, ARTICLE X OF THE CBA CONSTITUTES UNFAIR
LABOR PRACTICE. 21

In their submission agreement, PWU and PHILEC designated Hon. Ramon T. Jimenez as
Voluntary Arbitrator (Voluntary Arbitrator Jimenez). 22

Voluntary Arbitrator Jimenez, in the order dated January 4, 1999, directed the parties to file
23

their respective position papers.

In its position paper, PWU maintained that PHILEC failed to follow the schedule of step
24

increases under Article X, Section 4 of the June 1, 1997 collective bargaining agreement.
Machinist I, Lipios position before he underwent training for Foreman I, fell under Pay
Grade VIII, while Foreman I fell under Pay Grade X. Following the schedule under Article X,
Section 4 of the June 1, 1997 collective bargaining agreement and the formula under Article
IX, Section 1(f), Lipio should be paid training allowance equal to the step increase for pay
grade bracket VIII-IX for the first month of training. For the succeeding months, Lipio should
be paid an allowance equal to the step increase for pay grade bracket VIII-IX plus the step
increase for pay grade bracket IX-X, thus: 25

First Month ----- P456.00

Second month ----- P1,031.00
Third month ----- P1,031.00
Fourth month ----- P1,031.00.

With respect to Ignacio, Sr., he was holding the position of DTAs sembler under Pay Grade
VII when hewas selected to train for the position of Foreman I under Pay Grade X. Thus, for
his first month of training, Ignacio, Sr. should be paid training allowance equal to the step
increase under pay grade bracket VII-VIII. For the second month, he should be paid an
allowance equal to the step increase under pay grade bracket VIIVIII plus the step increase
under pay grade bracket VIII-IX. For the third and fourth months, Ignacio, Sr. should receive
an allowance equal to the amount he received for the second month plus the amount equal
to the step increase under pay grade bracket IX-X, thus: 26

First Month ----- P361.00

Second month ----- P817.00
Third month ----- P1,392.00
Fourth month ----- P1,392.00.

For PHILECs failure to apply the schedule of step increases under Article X of the June 1,
1997 collective bargaining agreement, PWU argued that PHILEC committed an unfair labor
practice under Article 248 of the Labor Code.
27 28

In its position paper, PHILEC emphasized that it promoted Lipio and Ignacio, Sr. while it
29

was still negotiating a new collective bargaining agreement with PWU. Since PHILEC and
PWU had not yet negotiated a new collective bargaining agreement when PHILEC selected
Lipio and Ignacio, Sr. for training, PHILEC applied the "Modified SGV" pay grade scale in
computing Lipios and Ignacio, Sr.s training allowance. 30

This "Modified SGV" pay grade scale, which PHILEC and PWU allegedly agreed to
implement beginning on May 9, 1997, covered both rank-and-file and supervisory
employees. According to PHILEC, its past collective bargaining agreements withthe rank-
31

and-file and supervisory unions resulted in an overlap of union membership in Pay Grade IX
of the rank-and-file employees and Pay Grade A of the supervisory employees. Worse, 32

past collective bargaining agreements resulted in rank-and-file employees under Pay

Grades IX and X enjoying higher step increases than supervisory employees under Pay
Grades A and B: 33

Pay Grade
Pay Grade Scale
Scale under the
Step Increase under the Step Increase
Rank-and-File
Supervisory CBA
CBA
VIII-IX P340.00 A P290.00
IX-X P455.00 A-B P350.00

To preserve the hierarchical wage structure within PHILECs enterprise, PHILEC and PWU
allegedly agreed to implement the uniform pay grade scale under the "Modified SGV" pay
grade system, thus: 34

Pay Grade
Step Increase
Rank-and-File Supervisory
I II P65.00
II-III P78.00
 III-IV P95.00
IV-V P120.00
V-VI P150.00
VI-VII P195.00
VII-VIII P255.00
VIII-IX A P350.00
IX-X A-B P465.00
X-XI B-C P570.00
XI-XII C-D P710.00
D-E P870.00
E-F P1,055.00

Pay grade bracket IIX covered rank-and-file employees, while pay grade bracket AF
covered supervisory employees. 35

Under the "Modified SGV" pay grade scale, the position of Foreman I fell under Pay Grade
B. PHILEC then computed Lipios and Ignacio, Sr.s training allowance accordingly. 36

PHILEC disputed PWUs claim of unfair labor practice. According to PHILEC, it did not
violate its collective bargaining agreement with PWU when it implemented the "Modified
SGV" scale. Even assuming that it violated the collective bargaining agreement, PHILEC
argued that its violation was not "gross" or a "flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply
with the economic provisions of [the collective bargaining agreement]." PHILEC, therefore,
37

was not guilty of unfair labor practice.38

Voluntary Arbitrator Jimenez held in the decision dated August 13, 1999, that PHILEC
39

violated its collective bargaining agreement with PWU. According to Voluntary Arbitrator
40

Jimenez, the June 1, 1997 collective bargaining agreement governed when PHILEC
selected Lipio and Ignacio, Sr. for promotion on August 18 and 21, 1997. The provisions of
41

the collective bargaining agreement being the law between the parties, PHILEC should
have computed Lipios and Ignacio, Sr.s training allowance based on Article X, Section 4 of
the June 1, 1997 collective bargaining agreement. 42

As to PHILECs claim that applying Article X, Section 4 would result in salary distortion
within PHILECs enterprise, Voluntary Arbitrator Jimenez ruled that this was "a concern that
PHILEC could have anticipated and could have taken corrective action" before signing the
43

collective bargaining agreement.

Voluntary Arbitrator Jimenez dismissed PWUs claim of unfair labor practice. According to
44

him, PHILECs acts "cannot be considered a gross violation of the [collective bargaining
agreement] nor . . . [a] flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply withthe economic
provisions of the [agreement]."
45
Thus, Voluntary Arbitrator Jimenez ordered PHILEC to pay Lipio and Ignacio, Sr. training
allowance based on Article X, Section 4 and Article IX, Section 1 of the June 1, 1997
collective bargaining agreement. 46

PHILEC received a copy of Voluntary Arbitrator Jimenezs decision on August 16, 1999. On 47

August 26, 1999, PHILEC filed a motion for partial reconsideration of Voluntary Arbitrator
48

Jimenezs decision.

In the resolution dated July 7, 2000, Voluntary Arbitrator Jimenez denied PHILECs motion
49

for partial reconsideration for lack of merit. PHILEC received a copy of the July 7, 2000
resolution on August 11, 2000. 50

On August 29, 2000, PHILEC filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals,
51

alleging that Voluntary Arbitrator Jimenez gravely abused his discretion in rendering his
decision. PHILEC maintained that it did not violate the June 1, 1997 collective bargaining
52

agreement. It applied the "Modified SGV" pay grade rates toavoid salary distortion within
53

its enterprise. 54

In addition, PHILEC argued that Article X, Section 4 of the collective bargaining agreement
did not apply to Lipio and Ignacio, Sr. Considering that Lipio and Ignacio, Sr. were promoted
to a supervisory position, their training allowance should be computed based on the
provisions of PHILECs collective bargaining agreement with ASSET, the exclusive
bargaining representative of PHILECs supervisory employees. 55

The Court of Appeals affirmed Voluntary Arbitrator Jimenezs decision. It agreed that
56

PHILEC was bound to apply Article X, Section 4 of its June 1, 1997 collective bargaining
agreement with PWU in computing Lipios and Ignacio, Sr.s training allowance. In its
57

decision, the Court of Appeals denied due course and dismissed PHILECs petition for
certiorari for lack of merit. 58

PHILEC filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals denied in the
resolution dated June 23, 2005.
59

On August 3, 2005, PHILEC filed its petition for review on certiorari before this
court, insisting that it did not violate its collective bargaining agreement with
60

PWU. PHILEC maintains that Lipio and Ignacio, Sr. were promoted to a position covered
61

by the pay grade scale for supervisory employees. Consequently, the provisions of
62

PHILECs collective bargaining agreement with its supervisory employees should apply, not
its collective bargaining agreement with PWU. To insist on applying the pay grade scale in
63

Article X, Section 4, PHILEC argues, would result in a salary distortion within PHILEC. 64

In the resolution dated September 21, 2005,this court ordered PWU to comment on
65

PHILECs petition for review on certiorari.

In its comment, PWU argues that Voluntary Arbitrator Jimenez did not gravely abuse his
66

discretion in rendering his decision. He correctly applied the provisions of the PWU
collective bargaining agreement, the law between PHILEC and its rank-and-file employees,
in computing Lipios and Ignacio, Sr.s training allowance. 67
On September 27, 2006, PHILEC filed its reply, reiterating its arguments in its petition for
68

review on certiorari.

The issue for our resolution is whether Voluntary Arbitrator Jimenez gravely abused his
discretion in directing PHILEC to pay Lipios and Ignacio, Sr.s training allowance based on
Article X, Section 4 of the June 1, 1997 rank-and-file collective bargaining agreement.

This petition should be denied.

The Voluntary Arbitrators decision

dated August 13, 1999 is already final and
executory

We note that PHILEC filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules ofCourt against Voluntary Arbitrator Jimenezs decision. 69

This was not the proper remedy.

Instead, the proper remedy to reverse or modify a Voluntary Arbitrators or a panel of

Voluntary Arbitrators decision or award is to appeal the award or decision before the Court
of Appeals. Rule 43, Sections 1 and 3 of the Rules of Court provide:

Section 1. Scope.

This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals
and from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of orauthorized by any quasi-judicial
agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Among these agencies are the Civil
Service Commission, Central Board of Assessment Appeals, Securities and Exchange
Commission, Office of the President, Land Registration Authority, Social Security
Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology
Transfer, National Electrification Administration, Energy Regulatory Board, National
Telecommunications Commission, Department of Agrarian Reform under Republic Act No.
6657, Government Service Insurance System, Employees Compensation Commission,
Agricultural Inventions Board, Insurance Commission, Philippine Atomic Energy
Commission, Board of Investments, Construction Industry Arbitration Commission, and
voluntary arbitrators authorized by law.

....

Sec. 3. Where to appeal.

An appeal under this Rule may be taken to the Court of Appeals within the period and in the
manner herein provided, whether the appeal involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed
questions of fact and law. (Emphasis supplied)
A Voluntary Arbitrator or a panel of Voluntary Arbitrators has the exclusive original
jurisdiction over grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of collective
bargaining agreements. Should the parties agree, a Voluntary Arbitrator or a panel of
Voluntary Arbitrators shall also resolve the parties other labor disputes, including unfair
labor practices and bargaining deadlocks. Articles 261 and 262 of the Labor Code provide:

ART. 261. JURISDICTION OF VOLUNTARY ARBITRATORS OR PANEL OF VOLUNTARY

ARBITRATORS.

The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide all unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation or
implementation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement and those arising from the
interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies referred to in the immediately
preceding article. Accordingly, violations of a Collective Bargaining Agreement, except those
which are gross in character, shall no longer be treated as unfair labor practice and shall be
resolved as grievances under the Collective Bargaining Agreement. For purposes of this
article, gross violations of Collective Bargaining Agreement shall mean flagrant and/or
malicious refusal to comply with the economic provisions of such agreement.

The Commission, its Regional Offices and the Regional Directors of the Department of
Labor and Employment shall not entertain disputes, grievances, or matters under the
exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Voluntary Arbitrator orpanel of Voluntary Arbitrators
and shall immediately dispose and refer the same to the Grievance Machinery or Voluntary
Arbitration provided in the Collective Bargaining Agreement.

ART. 262. JURISDICTION OVER OTHER LABOR DISPUTES.

The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, upon agreement of the parties,
shall also hear and decide all other labor disputes including unfair labor practices and
bargaining deadlocks.

In Luzon Development Bank v. Association of Luzon Development Bank Employees, this 70

court ruled that the proper remedy against the award or decision of the Voluntary Arbitratoris
an appeal before the Court of Appeals. This court first characterized the office ofa Voluntary
Arbitrator or a panel of Voluntary Arbitrators as a quasi-judicial agency, citing Volkschel
Labor Union, et al. v. NLRC and Oceanic Bic Division (FFW) v. Romero:
71 72

In Volkschel Labor Union, et al. v. NLRC, et al.,on the settled premise that the judgments of
courts and awards of quasi-judicial agencies must become final at some definite time, this
Court ruled that the awards of voluntary arbitrators determine the rights of parties; hence,
their decisions have the same legal effect as judgments of a court. In Oceanic Bic Division
(FFW), et al. v. Romero, et al., this Court ruled that "a voluntary arbitrator by the nature of
her functions acts in a quasi-judicial capacity." Under these rulings, it follows that the
voluntary arbitrator, whether acting solely or in a panel, enjoys in law the status of a
quasijudicial agency but independent of, and apart from, the NLRC since his decisions are
not appealable to the latter. (Citations omitted)
73
This court then stated that the office of a Voluntary Arbitrator or a panel of Voluntary
Arbitrators, even assuming that the office is not strictly a quasi-judicial agency, may be
considered an instrumentality, thus:

Assuming arguendo that the voluntaryarbitrator or the panel of voluntary arbitrators may not
strictly be considered as a quasi-judicial agency, board or commission, still both he and the
panel are comprehended within the concept of a "quasi-judicial instrumentality." It may even
be stated that it was to meet the very situation presented by the quasi-judicial functions of
the voluntary arbitrators here, as well as the subsequent arbitrator/arbitral tribunal operating
under the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission, that the broader term
"instrumentalities" was purposely included in the above-quoted provision.

An "instrumentality" is anything used as a means or agency. Thus, the terms governmental

"agency" or "instrumentality" are synonymous in the sense that either of them is a means by
which a government acts, or by which a certain government act or function is performed.
The word "instrumentality," with respect to a state, contemplates an authority to which the
state delegates governmental power for the performance of a state function. An individual
person, like an administrator or executor, is a judicial instrumentality in the settling of an
estate, in the same manner that a sub-agent appointed by a bankruptcy court is an
instrumentality of the court, and a trustee in bankruptcy of a defunct corporation is an
instrumentality of the state.

The voluntary arbitrator no less performs a state function pursuant to a governmental power
delegated to him under the provisions therefor in the Labor Code and he falls, therefore,
within the contemplation of the term "instrumentality" in the aforequoted Sec. 9 of B.P.
129. (Citations omitted)
74

Since the office of a Voluntary Arbitrator or a panel of Voluntary Arbitrators is considered a

quasi-judicial agency, this court concluded that a decision or award rendered by a Voluntary
Arbitrator is appealable before the Court of Appeals. Under Section 9 of the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, the Court of Appeals has the exclusive original jurisdiction over
decisions or awards of quasi-judicial agencies and instrumentalities:

Section 9. Jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals shall exercise:

....

3. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgements, resolutions, orders or awardsof
Regional Trial Courts and quasijudicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commission,
including the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Social Security Commission, the
Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission, except those
falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the
Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as
amended, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and
subparagraph 4 of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
(Emphasis supplied)
Luzon Development Bankwas decided in 1995 but remains "good law." In the 2002 case of
75

Alcantara, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, this court rejected petitioner Santiago Alcantara, Jr.s
76

argument that the Rules of Court, specifically Rule 43, Section 2, superseded the Luzon
Development Bank ruling:

Petitioner argues, however, that Luzon Development Bank is no longer good law because of
Section 2, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, a new provision introduced by the 1997 revision.
The provision reads:

SEC. 2. Cases not covered. -This Rule shall not apply to judgments or final orders issued
under the Labor Code of the Philippines.

The provisions may be new to the Rules of Court but it is far from being a new law. Section
2, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as presently worded, is nothing more but a
reiteration of the exception to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, as
provided for in Section 9, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No.
7

7902: 8

(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or
awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or
commissions, including the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Employees
Compensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission, except those falling within
the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the
Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the
provisions of this Act and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4)
of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.

The Court took into account this exception in Luzon Development Bank but, nevertheless,
held that the decisions of voluntary arbitrators issued pursuant to the Labor Codedo not
come within its ambit:

x x x. The fact that [the voluntary arbitrators] functions and powers are provided for in the
Labor Code does not place him within the exceptions to said Sec. 9 since he is a quasi-
judicial instrumentality as contemplated therein. It will be noted that, although the
Employees Compensation Commission is also provided for in the Labor Code, Circular No.
1-91, which is the forerunner of the present Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, laid
down the procedure for the appealability of its decisions to the Court of Appeals under the
foregoing rationalization, and this was later adopted by Republic Act No. 7902 in amending
Sec. 9 of B.P. 129.

A fortiori, the decision or award of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators should
likewise be appealable to the Court of Appeals, in line with the procedure outlined in
Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, just like those of the quasi-judicial agencies,
boards and commissions enumerated therein. (Emphases in the original)
77

This court has since reiterated the Luzon Development Bankruling in its decisions. 78
Article 262-A of the Labor Code provides that the award or decision of the Voluntary
Arbitrator "shall befinal and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the copy
of the award or decision by the parties":

Art. 262-A. PROCEDURES. The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators shall
have the power to hold hearings, receive evidences and take whatever action isnecessary
to resolve the issue or issues subject of the dispute, including efforts to effect a voluntary
settlement between parties.

All parties to the dispute shall beentitled to attend the arbitration proceedings. The
attendance of any third party or the exclusion of any witness from the proceedings shall be
determined by the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators. Hearing may be
adjourned for cause or upon agreement by the parties.

Unless the parties agree otherwise, it shall be mandatory for the Voluntary Arbitrator or
panel of Voluntary Arbitrators to render an award or decision within twenty (20) calendar
days from the date of submission of the dispute to voluntary arbitration.

The award or decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators shall
contain the facts and the law on which it is based. It shall be final and executory after ten
(10) calendar days from receipt of the copy of the award or decision by the parties.

Upon motion of any interested party, the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary
Arbitrators or the Labor Arbiter in the region where the movant resides, in case of the
absence or incapacity of the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, for any
reason, may issue a writ of execution requiring either the sheriff of the Commission or
regular courts or any public official whomthe parties may designate in the submission
agreement to execute the final decision, order or award. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, in Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. Sales Force UnionPTGWO-BALAIS v. Coca

Cola-Bottlers Philippines, Inc., this court declared that the decision of the Voluntary
79

Arbitrator had become final and executory because it was appealed beyond the 10-day
reglementary period under Article 262-A of the Labor Code.

It is true that Rule 43, Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides for a 15-day reglementary
period for filing an appeal:

Section 4. Period of appeal. The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the award, judgment, final order or resolution, or from the date of its last
publication, if publication is required by law for its effectivity, or of the denial of petitioner's
motion for new trial or reconsideration duly filed in accordance with the governing law of the
court or agency a quo. Only one (1) motion for reconsideration shall be allowed. Upon
proper motion and the payment of the full amount of the docket fee before the expiration of
the reglementary period, the Court of Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen (15)
days only within which to file the petition for review. No further extension shall be granted
except for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days.
(Emphasis supplied)
The 15-day reglementary period has been upheld by this court in a long line of cases. In 80

AMA Computer College-Santiago City, Inc. v. Nacino, Nippon Paint Employees Union-
81

OLALIA v. Court of Appeals, Manila Midtown Hotel v. Borromeo, and Sevilla Trading
82 83

Company v. Semana, this court denied petitioners petitions for review on certiorari since
84

petitioners failed to appeal the Voluntary Arbitrators decision within the 15-day
reglementary period under Rule43. In these cases, the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction
to entertain the appeal assailing the Voluntary Arbitrators decision.

Despite Rule 43 providing for a 15-day period to appeal, we rule that the Voluntary
Arbitrators decision mustbe appealed before the Court of Appeals within 10 calendar days
from receipt of the decision as provided in the Labor Code.

Appeal is a "statutory privilege," which may be exercised "only in the manner and in
85

accordance withthe provisions of the law." "Perfection of an appeal within the reglementary
86

period is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional so that failure to doso rendered the
decision final and executory, and deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction to alter the final
judgment much less to entertain the appeal." 87

We ruled that Article 262-A of the Labor Code allows the appeal of decisions rendered by
Voluntary Arbitrators. Statute provides that the Voluntary Arbitrators decision "shall befinal
88

and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the copy of the award or decision
by the parties." Being provided in the statute,this 10-day period must be complied with;
otherwise, no appellate court willhave jurisdiction over the appeal. This absurd situation
occurs whenthe decision is appealed on the 11th to 15th day from receipt as allowed under
the Rules, but which decision, under the law, has already become final and executory.

Furthermore, under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution, this court "shall not
diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights" in promulgating rules of procedure in
courts. The 10-day period to appeal under the Labor Code being a substantive right, this
89

period cannot be

diminished, increased, or modified through the Rules of Court. 90

In Shioji v. Harvey, this court held that the "rules of court, promulgated by authority of law,
91

have the force and effect of law, if not in conflict with positive law." Rules of Court are
92

"subordinate to the statute." In case of conflict between the law and the Rules of Court,
93

"the statute will prevail." 94

The rule, therefore, is that a Voluntary Arbitrators award or decision shall be appealed
before the Court of Appeals within 10 days from receipt of the award or decision. Should the
aggrieved party choose to file a motion for reconsideration with the Voluntary Arbitrator, the 95

motion must be filed within the same 10-day period since a motion for reconsideration is
filed "within the period for taking an appeal." 96

A petition for certiorari is a special civil action "adopted to correct errors of jurisdiction
committed by the lower court or quasi-judicial agency, or when there is grave abuse of
discretion on the part of such court or agency amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction." An extraordinary remedy, a petition for certiorari may be filed only if appeal is
97 98
not available. If appeal is available, an appeal must be taken even if the ground relied upon
99

is grave abuse of discretion. 100

As an exception to the rule, this court has allowed petitions for certiorari to be filed in lieu of
an appeal "(a) when the public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictate; (b)
when the broader interests of justice so require; (c) when the writs issued are null; and (d)
when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority." 101

In Unicraft Industries International Corporation, et al. v. The Hon. Court of

Appeals, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari against the Voluntary Arbitrators decision.
102

Finding that the Voluntary Arbitrator rendered an award without giving petitioners an
opportunity to present evidence, this court allowed petitioners petition for certiorari despite
being the wrong remedy. The Voluntary Arbitrators award, thiscourt said, was null and void
for violation of petitioners right to due process. This court decided the case on the merits.

In Leyte IV Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. LEYECO IV Employees Union-ALU, petitioner

103

likewise filed a petition for certiorari against the Voluntary Arbitrators decision, alleging that
the decision lacked basis in fact and in law. Ruling that the petition for certiorari was filed
within the reglementary period for filing an appeal, this court allowed petitioners petition for
certiorari in "the broader interests of justice." 104

In Mora v. Avesco Marketing Corporation, this court held that petitioner Noel E. Mora erred
105

in filing a petition for certiorari against the Voluntary Arbitrators decision. Nevertheless, this
court decided the case on the merits "in the interest of substantial justice to arrive at the
proper conclusion that is conformable to the evidentiary facts." 106

None of the circumstances similar to Unicraft, Leyte IV Electric Cooperative, and Moraare
present in this case. PHILEC received Voluntary Arbitrator Jimenezs resolution denying its
motion for partial reconsideration on August 11, 2000. PHILEC filed its petition for certiorari
107

before the Court ofAppeals on August 29, 2000, which was 18 days after its receipt of
108

Voluntary Arbitrator Jimenezs resolution. The petition for certiorari was filed beyond the 10-
day reglementary period for filing an appeal. We cannot consider PHILECs petition for
certiorari as an appeal.

There being no appeal seasonably filed in this case, Voluntary Arbitrator Jimenezs decision
became final and executory after 10 calendar days from PHILECs receipt of the resolution
denying its motion for partial reconsideration. Voluntary Arbitrator Jimenezs decision is
109

already "beyond the purview of this Court to act upon." 110

II

PHILEC must pay training allowance

based on the step increases provided in
the June 1, 1997 collective bargaining
agreement

The insurmountable procedural issue notwithstanding, the case will also fail on its merits.
Voluntary Arbitrator Jimenez correctly awarded both Lipio and Ignacio, Sr. training
allowances based on the amounts and formula provided in the June 1, 1997 collective
bargaining agreement.

A collective bargaining agreement is "a contract executed upon the request of either the
employer or the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees incorporating the
agreement reached after negotiations with respect to wages, hours of work and all other
terms and conditions of employment, including proposals for adjusting any grievances or
questions arising under such agreement." A collective bargaining agreement being a
111

contract, its provisions "constitute the law between the parties" and must be complied with
112

in good faith.
113

PHILEC, as employer, and PWU, as the exclusive bargaining representative of PHILECs

rank-and-file employees, entered into a collective bargaining agreement, which the parties
agreed to make effective from June 1, 1997 to May 31, 1999. Being the law between the
parties, the June 1, 1997 collective bargaining agreement must govern PHILEC and its
rank-and-file employees within the agreed period.

Lipio and Ignacio, Sr. were rank-and-file employees when PHILEC selected them for
training for the position of Foreman I beginning August 25, 1997. Lipio and Ignacio, Sr. were
selected for training during the effectivity of the June 1, 1997 rank-and-file collective
bargaining agreement. Therefore, Lipios and Ignacio, Sr.s training allowance must be
computed based on Article X, Section 4 and ArticleIX, Section 1(f) of the June 1, 1997
collective bargaining agreement.

Contrary to PHILECs claim, Lipio and Ignacio, Sr. were not transferred out of the bargaining
unit when they were selected for training. Lipio and Ignacio, Sr. remained rank-and-file
employees while they trained for the position of Foreman I. Under Article IX, Section 1(e) of
the June 1, 1997 collective bargaining agreement, a trainee who is "unable to demonstrate
114

his ability to perform the work . . . shall be reverted to his previous

assignment. . . ." According to the same provision, the trainee "shall hold that job on a trial
115

or observation basis and . . . subject to prior approval of the authorized management

official, be appointed to the position in a regular capacity."
116

Thus, training is a condition precedent for promotion. Selection for training does not mean
automatic transfer out of the bargaining unit of rankand-file employees.

Moreover, the June 1, 1997 collective bargaining agreement states that the training
allowance of a rank-and-file employee "whose application for a posted job is accepted shall
[be computed] in accordance with Section (f) of [Article IX]." Since Lipio and Ignacio, Sr.
117

were rank-and-file employees when they applied for training for the position of Foreman I,
Lipios and Ignacio, Sr.s training allowance must be computed based on Article IX, Section
1(f) of the June 1, 1997 rank-and-file collective bargaining agreement.

PHILEC allegedly applied the "Modified SGV" pay grade scale to prevent any salary
distortion within PHILECs enterprise. This, however, does not justify PHILECs non-
compliance with the June 1, 1997 collective bargaining agreement. This pay grade scale is
not provided in the collective bargaining agreement. In Samahang Manggagawa sa Top
Form Manufacturing United Workers of the Philippines (SMTFM-UWP) v. NLRC, this court
118
ruled that "only provisions embodied in the [collective bargaining agreement] should be so
interpreted and complied with. Where a proposal raised by a contracting party does not find
print in the [collective bargaining agreement], it is not part thereof and the proponent has no
claim whatsoever to its implementation." 119

Had PHILEC wanted the "Modified SGV" pay grade scale applied within its enterprise, "it
could have requested or demanded that [the Modified SGV scale] be incorporated in the
[collective bargaining agreement]." PHILEC had "the means under the law to compel
120

[PWU] to incorporate this specific economic proposal in the [collective bargaining

agreement]." It "could have invoked Article 252 of the Labor Code" to incorporate the
121 122

"Modified SGV" pay grade scale in its collective bargaining agreement with PWU. But it did
not. Since this "Modified SGV" pay grade scale does not appear in PHILECs collective
bargaining agreement with PWU, PHILEC cannot insist on the "Modified SGV" pay grade
scales application. We reiterate Voluntary Arbitrator Jimenezs decision dated August 13,
1999 where he said that:

. . . since the signing of the current CBA took place on September 27, 1997, PHILEC, by
oversight, may have overlooked the possibility of a wage distortion occurring among
ASSET-occupied positions. It is surmised that this matter could have been negotiated and
settled with PWU before the actual signing of the CBA on September 27. Instead, PHILEC,
again, allowed the provisions of Art. X, Sec. 4 of the CBA to remain the way it is and is now
suffering the consequences of its laches. (Emphasis in the original)
123

We note that PHILEC did not dispute PWUs contention that it selected several rank-and-file
employees for training and paid them training allowance based on the schedule provided in
the collective bargaining agreement effective at the time of the trainees selection. PHILEC
124

cannot choose when and to whom to apply the provisions of its collective bargaining
agreement. The provisions of a collective bargaining agreement must be applied uniformly
and complied with in good faith.

Given the foregoing, Lipios and Ignacio, Sr.s training allowance should be computed based
on Article X, Section 4 in relation to Article IX, Section 1(f) of the June 1, 1997 rank-and-file
collective bargaining agreement. Lipio, who held the position of Machinist before selection
for training as Foreman I, should receive training allowance based on the following
schedule:

First Month ----- P456.00

Second month ----- P1,031.00
Third month ----- P1,031.00
Fourth month ----- P1,031.00

Ignacio, Sr., who held the position of DT-Assembler before selection for training as Foreman
I, should receive training allowance based on the following schedule:

First Month ----- P361.00

Second month ----- P817.00
Third month ----- P1,392.00
Fourth month ----- P1,392.00

Considering that Voluntary Arbitrator Jimenezs decision awarded sums of money, Lipio and
Ignacio, Sr. are entitled to legal interest on their training allowances. Voluntary Arbitrator
Jimenezs decision having become final and executory on August 22, 2000, PHILEC is
liable for legal interest equal to 12% per annum from finality of the decision until full
payment as this court ruled in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals: 125

When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the
rate of legal interest. . . shall be 12% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this
interim period being deemed to be by then as equivalent to a forbearance of credit. 126

The 6% legal interest under CircularNo. 799, Series of 2013, of the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas Monetary Board shall not apply, Voluntary Arbitrator Jimenezs decision having
become final and executory prior to the effectivity of the circular on July 1, 2013. In Nacar
1avvphi1

v. Gallery Frames, we held that:

127

. . . with regard to those judgments that have become final and executory prior to July 1,
2013, said judgments shall not be disturbed and shall continue to be implemented applying
the rate of interest fixed therein.
128

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Court of Appeals'
decision dated May 25, 2004 is AFFIRMED.

Petitioner Philippine Electric Corporation is ORDERED to PAY respondent Eleodoro V. Lipio

a total of P3,549.00 for a four (4)-month training for the position of Foreman I with legal
interest of 12% per annum from August 22, 2000 until the amount's full satisfaction.

For respondent Emerlito C. Ignacio, Sr., Philippine Electric Corporation is ORDERED to

PAY a total of P3,962.00 for a four (4)-month training for the position of Foreman I with legal
interest of 12% per annum from August 22, 2000 until the amount's full satisfaction.

SO ORDERED.

9. UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS FACULTY UNION, Petitioner,

vs.

UNIVERSITY OF STO. TOMAS, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

G.R. No. 203957 is a petition for review1 assailing the Decision2 promulgated on 13 July
2012 as well as the Resolution3 promulgated on 19 October 2012 by the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 120970. The CA set aside the 8 June 2011 Decision4 and 29 July
2011 Resolution5 of the Fourth Division of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) in NLRC LAC No. 10-003370-08, as well as the 24 September 2010 Decision6 of
the Labor Arbiter (LA) in NLRC-NCR Case No. 09-09745-07.

In its 24 September 2010 decision, the LA ordered the University of Santo Tomas (UST) to
remit P18,000,000.00 to the hospitalization and medical benefits fund (fund) pursuant to the
mandate of the 1996-2001 Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA).The LA also ordered
UST to pay 10% of the total monetary award as attorneys fees. The other claims were
dismissed for lack of merit. In its 8 June 2011 decision, the NLRC ordered UST to remit to
the University of Santo Tomas Faculty Union (USTFU) the amounts of P80,000,000.00 for
the fund pursuant to the CBA and P8,000,000.00 as attorneys fees equivalent to 10% of the
monetary award. The NLRC denied USTs motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.

In its 13 July 2012 decision, the CA found grave abuse of discretion on the part of NLRC
and granted USTs petition. The CA set aside the decisions of the NLRC and the LA, without
prejudice to the refiling of USTFUs complaint in the proper forum. The CA denied USTFUs
motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.

The Facts

The CA recited the facts as follows:

In a letter dated February 6, 2007, [USTFU] demanded from [UST], through its Rector, Fr.
Ernesto M. Arceo, O.P. ("Fr. Arceo"), remittance of the total amount of P65,000,000.00 plus
legal interest thereon, representing deficiency in its contribution to the medical and
hospitalization fund ("fund") of [USTs] faculty members. [USTFU] also sent [UST] a letter
dated February 26, 2007, accompanied by a summary of its claims pursuant to their 1996-
2001 CBA.

On March 2, 2007, Fr. Arceo informed [USTFU] that the aforesaid benefits were not meant
to be given annually but rather as a one-time allocation or contribution to the fund.[USTFU]
then sent [UST] another demand letter dated June 24, 2007 reiterating its position that
[UST] is obliged to remit to the fund, its contributions not only for the years 1996-1997 but
also for the subsequent years, but to no avail.

Thus, on September 5, 2007 [USTFU] filed against [UST], a complaint for unfair labor
practice, as well as for moral and exemplary damages plus attorneys fees before the
arbitration branch of the NLRC.

[UST] sought the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It
contended that the case falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitratoror
panel of voluntary arbitrators because it involves the interpretation and implementation of
the provisions of the CBA; and the conflict between the herein parties must be resolved as
grievance under the CBA and not as unfair labor practice.

[USTs] motion to dismiss was denied by the LA in its August 8, 2008 order. [UST] appealed
the Order to the NLRC. The NLRC Seventh Division, however, dismissed the appeal on
May 12, 2009 and remanded the case to the LA for further proceedings.

The NLRC, in its assailed decision, correctly summarized the issues and submissions of the
hereinparties in their respective position papers, as follows:

According to [UST], the parties had, in the past, concluded several Collective Bargaining
Agreements for the mutual benefit of the union members and [UST], and one of these
agreements was the 1996-2001 CBA. It is undisputed that one of the economic benefits
granted by [UST] under the said CBA was the "Hospitalization Fund," provided under
Section 1-A(4) of the Article XIII thereof, the pertinent provisions of which state:
ARTICLE XIII

ECONOMIC BENEFITS

Section 1. ECONOMIC BENEFITUpon ratification and approval and for the term of this
Agreement, the economic benefits to be granted by the UNIVERSITY and the schedule of
such releases are as follows:

A. School Year 1996-97 (June 1, 1996 to May 31, 1997):

xxx

4. Hospitalization Fund: Upon ratification and approval hereof, the UNIVERSITY shall
establish a perpetual hospitalization and medical benefits fund in the sum of TWO MILLION
PESOS (P2,000,000) to be managed conjointly by a hospitalization and medical benefits
committee where both management and union are equally represented.

xxx

B. School Year 1997-98 (June 1, 1997-May 31, 1998);

xxx

2. Hospitalization Fund: The UNIVERSITY shall contribute the sum of ONE MILLION
PESOS (P1,000,000) to augment the Hospitalization and Medical Benefits fund. The
saidsum shall be addedto the remaining balance of theaforementioned fund;
xxx

C. School Year 1998-99 (June 1, 1998-May 31, 1999);

xxx

2. Hospitalization Fund: The UNIVERSITY shall contribute the sum of ONE MILLION
PESOS (P1,000,000) to augment the Hospitalization and Medical Benefits Fund. The said
sum shall be added to the remaining balance of the aforementioned fund;

D. Miscellaneous Provisions:

xxx

2. All the economic benefits herein given and those elsewhere provided under this
agreement, other than retirement benefits and one-half of the signing bonus, are chargeable
to the tuition fee share, if any, of the faculty members;

xxx xxx xxx

[USTFU] added that the amount offour (4) million pesos was agreed to be paid by the
Universityto the Hospitalization Fund annually for the fourth and fifth year of their CBA,
pursuant to the parties Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) which embodied the
renegotiated economic provisions of the said CBAfor the years 1999-2000 and 2000-2001.

According to [USTFU], Section D(2) of the 1996-2001 CBA provides that:

All the economic benefitsherein given and those elsewhere provided under thisagreement,
other than retirement benefits and one-half of the signing bonus, are chargeable to the
tuition fee share, if any, of the faculty members.

[USTFU] explained that the rationale for the above-quoted provision is that the economic
benefits under the said CBA like the Hospitalization and Medical BenefitsFund, are sourced
from the tuition fee increases and pursuant thereto, [UST] is obligated to remit the amount
of P2,000,000.00 not only in the first year of the CBA (1996-1997) but also in the
subsequent years because the said amount became an integral part of the current or
existing tuition fee. Furthermore, [UST] is likewise obligated to slide in the amounts
allocated for the Hospitalization and Medical Benefits Fund for the succeeding years to the
next CBA year and so on and so forth. [USTFU] claimed that the tuition fee increase once
integrated to the old amount of tuition fee becomes and remains an integral part of the
existing tuition fee.

[USTFU] averred that while [UST] remitted the amount of P2,000,000.00 during the first
year of the 1996-2001 CBA, [UST] did not slide-in or remit the said amount in the
succeeding year (1997-1998). [UST] only remitted the amount of P1,000.000,000.00 [sic]
for the CBA year 1998-1999. Moreover, [UST] remitted only the amount of P1,000,000.00
on the third year of the CBA instead of P4,000,000.00 (2 Million + 1 Million + 1 Million). And
though [UST] remitted the amount of P4,000,000 during the fourth year (2) [sic] of the 1996-
2001 CBA, it did not remit any amount at all during the fifth year of the said Agreement.

[USTFU] claimed that during the period of the 1996-2001 CBA, [UST] should have remitted
the total amount of P25,000,000.00 instead of P8,000,000.00 only. Thus, a deficiency of
P17,000,000.00. [USTFUs] assertion is based on the following illustration:

Year 1

1996-97

Year 2

1997-98 Year 3

1998-99 Year 4

1999-00 Year 5

2000-01 Actual
amount

remitted Total

amount to

[be]

remitted

2M

remitted 2M did not

slide 2M did not

slide 2M did not

slide 2M did not

slide 2M 10M

1M

remitted 1M did not

slide 1M did not

slide 1M did not

slide 1M 4M

1M

remitted 1M did not

slide 1M did not

slide 1M 3M

4M

remitted 4M did not

slide 4M 8M

Total 8M 25M
[USTFU] added that after the fifth year of the CBA, i.e. 2001 onwards, [UST] ought to remit
the amount of P8,000,000.00 ([2]M+1M+1M+4M) annually to the Hospitalization and
Medical Benefits Fund. Hence, for the school year2001-2002 up to the school year 2005-
2006, an additional amount of P24,000,000.00 (8M x 3) should have been remitted by [UST]
to the aforesaid fund.All in all, the total amount yet to be remitted had ballooned to
P81,000,000.00.

Furthermore, [USTFU] averred that [UST] likewise failed and refused to render a proper
accounting ofthe monies it paid or released to the covered faculty as well as the money it
received as tuition fee increase starting from school year 1997-1998 onwards thereby
violating Section D (1), Article XIII of the 1996-2001 CBA which provides that:

At the end of this agreement, and within three (3) months therefrom, the UNIVERSITY shall
render an accounting of the monies it paid or released to the covered faculty in
consequence hereof.

On the other hand, [UST] claimed that it religiously complied with the economic provisions
of the 1996-2001CBA particularly its obligation to remit to the Hospitalization and Medical
Benefits Fund as the renegotiated economic provisions under the MOA by remitting the total
amount of P8,000,000.00. [UST] claimed that it was never the intention of the parties to the
CBA that the amounts deposited to the Hospitalization fund for each year shall be carried
over to the succeeding years. UST added that the MOA likewise madeno mention that the
amount of P4,000,000.00 corresponding to the school year 1999-2000 should be carried
over to the next school year. Thus, it was safe to conclude that the clear intention of the
parties was that the amounts indicated on the CBA should only be remitted once on the
scheduled school year. Accordingly, [UST] averred that it was not guilty of unfair labor
practice.

[UST] further argued that the claim of [USTFU] had already been barred by prescription
since under Article 290 of the Labor Code all unfair labor practice [cases] should be filed
within one (1) year from the accrual thereof otherwise they shall forever be barred. And
assuming that the instance [sic] case may be considered as a money claim, the same
already prescribed after three (3) years fromthe time the cause of action accrued.

Finally, [UST] maintained that the present dispute should not be treated as unfair labor
practice but should be resolved as a grievance under the CBA and referred to a Voluntary
Arbitrator.
The parties thereafter submitted their respective Replies and Rejoinders amplifying their
arguments while refuting those made by the other.7

The Labor Arbiters Ruling

The LA ruled in favor of USTFU.The LA classified USTFUs complaint as one for "unfair
labor practice, claims for sliding in of funds to hospitalization and medical benefits under the
CBA, damages and attorneys fee with prayer for slide-in and restoration of medical benefits
under the CBA."8 The LA ruled that UST was not able to comply with Article XIII, Section
1A-(4) of the 1996-2001 CBA. However, despite USTs alleged non-compliance, the LA
ruled that UST did not commit unfair labor practice.

The LA interpreted the pertinent CBA provisions to mean that UST bound itself to contribute
to the fund P2,000,000.00 every school year, regardless of the appropriated augmentation
amount. The LA computed USTs liability in this manner:

Considering that the pertinent provision of the [1996-2001] CBA Article XIII, Section 1A(4)
stated that"The University shall establish a perpetual hospitalization and medical benefits
fund in the sum of two million pesos (P2,000,000.00) x x x x" it follows that the amount of
P2M every school year must beslided in regardless of the augmentation amount as may be
appropriated. The wordshall is mandatory and the word perpetual [is] continuous thus,
[UST] is obligated to remit the actual amount to wit:

SY 1996-1997 P2M = P2M

SY 1997-1998 P2M + P1M = P3M

SY 1998-1999 P2M + P1M = P3M

SY 1999-2000 P4M (Renegotiated) = P4M

SY 2000-2001 P4M = P4M

TOTAL REMITTANCE = P16M

Thus, [UST] therefore has an unremitted fund of Eight Million (P8,000,000.00) pesos.
Corollarily, the CBA covering the period SY 2001-2006 [UST] is under obligation to remit two
(2) million (P2,000,000.00) [sic] pesos every year or a total of ten million (P10,000,000.00)
pesos in addition to whatever augmented amount stipulated in the CBA.

In fine, the total unremitted amountto the [hospitalization and medical benefits] fund is
eighteen million (P18,000,000.00) pesos. P8M for SY 1996-2001 and P10M for SY 2001-
2006.9

The LA did not find USTs non-compliance with the 1996-2001 CBA as acts that
constituteunfair labor practice.

The failure of [UST] to slide in yearly the P2M hospitalization fund is not violation of the CBA
but an error in the interpretation of the provision of the CBA. It could not be said eitherthat
[UST] acted with malice and bad faith in view of the compliance with the other economic
provision[s] of the CBA. An error in the interpretation of a provision in the CBA, absent any
malice or bad faith could not be considered as unfair laborpractice as held in the case of
Singapore Airlines Local Employees Association vs. NLRC, et al., 130 SCRA 472.10

The dispositive portion of the LAs Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premised on the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered

ordering [UST] to remit the amount of eighteen million (P18,000,000.00) pesos to [the]
hospitalization and medical benefits fund pursuant tothe mandate of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement on economic benefits.

[UST is] likewise directed to pay attorneys fee[s] equivalent to ten (10) percent of the total
monetary award in this case.

Other claims dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.11

USTFU filed a Memorandum of Partial Appeal12 from the LAs Decision. USTFU claimed
that the LA erred in holding that UST is liable to USTFU in the amount of P18 million only,
and in not holding that the amounts claimed by USTFU should beremitted by UST to
USTFU. USTFU claimed that, as of 2011, USTs total liability to the fund is P97 million: P17
million for CBA years 1996 to 2001, P40 million for CBA years 2001 to 2006, and P40
million for CBA years 2006 to 2011. USTFU also claimed that the amount should be
remitted byUST to USTFU for proper turnover to the fund.

UST, on the other hand, filed an Appeal Memorandum.13 UST claimed that the LA
committed grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance over the case because the issue
is within the jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator. UST further claimed that the LA
committed grave abuse of discretion in finding that UST erred in its interpretation of the CBA
and in not finding that USTFUs claims are already barred by prescription.

The NLRCs Ruling

The NLRC granted USTFUs appeal and denied USTs appeal for lack of merit. The NLRC
ordered UST to pay USTFU P80,000,000.00 and attorneys fees equivalent to ten percent of
the monetary award.

The NLRC pointed out that USTs refusal to comply, despite repeated demands, with the
CBAs economic provisions is tantamount to a gross and flagrant violation. Thus, the
present case properly falls under the LAs original jurisdiction as well as the NLRCs
appellate jurisdiction. The issue of prescription also cannot be heldagainst USTFU because
the cause of action accrued only when UST refused to comply with USTFUs 6 February
2007 demand letter. The demand letter was sent only after the conduct of proceedings in
the Permanent Union-University Committee (PUUC).

The NLRC noted that the subsequent CBAs between UST and USTFU show that the
parties intendedthat the amount appropriated each year to augment the fund shall be
carried over to the succeeding years and is chargeable to the tuition fee increment. The
NLRC ruled that the amounts appropriated for each year during the effectivity of the 1996-
2001 CBA should still be appropriated to the succeeding years. From school year 1997-
1998 and onwards, the basis for suchcarry over is that the amounts were sourced from
tuition increases corresponding to a given school year. Since any increase in tuition is
integrated into the subsequent tuition, the amount allocated to the fund because of the
tuition increaseshould be remitted to the fund. The 2001-2006 and 2006-2011 CBAs have
express provisions on the carry over. The NLRC computed USTs deficiency14 as follows:

For the 1996-2001 CBA:

Year 1

1996-97 Year 2

1997-98

Year 3

1998-99 Year 4

1999-00 Year 5

2000-01 Total amount

that should

be submitted

2M 2M 2M 2M 2M

1M 1M 1M 1M

1M 1M 1M

4M 4M

2M + 3M + 4M + 8M + 8M = 25M

Since it is undisputed that [UST] remitted the amount of PhP8,000,000.00 only, there is stilla
deficiency of PhP17,000,000.00 corresponding to the 1996-2001 CBA.

xxxx
For the 2001-2006 CBA:

Year 1

2001-02 Year 2

2002-03 Year 3

2003-04 Year 4

2005-06 Total amount

that should be

submitted

2M 2M 2M 2M

3M 3M 3M

3M 3M

2M + 5M + 8M + 8M = 23M

For the 2006-2011 CBA:

Year 1

2006-07 Year 2

2007-08 Year 3

2008-09 Year 4

2009-10 Year 5

2010-11 Total amount

that should

be submitted

8M + 8M + 8M + 8M + 8M = 40M
The NLRC computed USTs total liability for school years 1996-1997 up to 2010-2011 at
P80,000,000.00. The records show that UST remitted P8,000,000.00 for 1996-2001 CBA,
and there is absence of proof that the additional contributions to the fund were made for the
2001-2006 and 2006-2011 CBAs. The NLRC also ordered UST to pay USTFU attorneys
fees at 10% of the monetary award.

UST filed a motion for reconsideration of the NLRC decision.1wphi1 UST again claimed
that the Voluntary Arbitrator, and not LA, had jurisdiction over the interpretation of the CBA;
the P80,000,000.00 award had no basis; and the fund should be remitted to the Hospital
and Medical Benefits Committee, not to USTFU, as stated in the CBA.

In a Resolution promulgated on 29 July 2011, the NLRC denied USTs motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit.

UST filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before
the CA. UST still questioned the jurisdiction of the LA, as well as the award of
P80,000,000.00. UST also claimed that USTFUs money claims are barred byprescription,
and that the proper recipient of the award should bethe Hospital and Medical Benefits
Committee. Finally, UST also questioned the award for attorneys fees.15

On 8 November 2011, USTFU filed a comment before the CA. USTFU claimed that the
NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in finding that USTFU is entitled to its
claims for payment of the unremitted benefits. USTFU also claimed that certiorari is not a
proper remedy for UST because the NLRC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion.16

The Court of Appeals Ruling

The CA, in its decision promulgated on 13 July 2012, disposed of the present case by
agreeing with USTs argument that the LA and the NLRC did not have jurisdiction to hear
and decide the present case. The CA stated that since USTFUs ultimateobjective is to
clarify the relevant items in the CBA, then USTFUs complaint should have been filed with
the voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators.

The dispositive portion of the CAs decision reads:

WHEREFORE, finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of public respondent NLRC,
the petition isGRANTED. Without prejudice to the re-filing of private respondents complaint
with the proper forum, the assailed NLRC decision dated June 8,2011 and resolution dated
July 29, 2011 in NLRC LAC No. 10-003370-08, as well as the decision dated September 24,
2010 of the Labor Arbiter in NLRC-NCR Case No. 09-09745-07 are hereby SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.17

USTFU filed its motion for reconsideration18 before the CA. USTFU maintained that the LA
and the NLRC had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint.

In a resolution19 promulgated on 19 October 2012, the CA denied USTFUs motion for

reconsideration for lack of merit.

USTFU filed the present petition for review20 before this Court on 7 December 2012.

The Issues

USTFU enumerated the following grounds warranting allowance of its petition:

1. The Honorable Court of Appeals departed from the usual course of judicial proceedings
in holding that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC have no jurisdiction over the complaint for
unfair labor practice (ULP) filed by USTFU.

2. The Court of Appeals acted in a way not in accord with the applicable decisions of the
Supreme Court in holding that the voluntary arbitrator has jurisdiction over the instant case
despite the fact that Article XIII ("Grievance Machinery") of the CBA is not applicable.
3. The Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts in
not finding that under Art. XXII of the CBA, the Permanent University-Union Committee
(PUUC) is the proper forum to resolve the dispute betweenUST and USTFU. However, Art.
XXII does not provide for a "voluntary arbitration" clause and therefore, USTFU validly filed
the complaint for ULP before the Labor Arbiter.

4. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in its appreciation
of evidence in not finding that the parties agreed to have the dispute resolved by the labor
tribunals and UST had actively participated in the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter and
the NLRC which is tantamount to a recognitionof the jurisdiction of the said bodies.

5. The Court of Appeals departed from the usual course of proceedings in referring back the
case to voluntary arbitration despite the fact that the parties already fully and exhaustively
litigated the case before the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC which both correctly found in favor
of USTFU. Moreover, referral to voluntary arbitration would result in waste of precious time
in relitigating the case all over again.21

UST, for its part, enumerated the following grounds for opposing USTFUs petition:

1. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that it is the Voluntary Arbitrator which has
jurisdiction over the instant case.

2. Assuming arguendo that NLRC has jurisdiction over the instant case, it clearly erred
when it made an award not prayed for in petitioner USTFUs complaint, in effect mandating
double payment.

3. Assuming arguendo that NLRC has jurisdiction over the instant case, it erred in ruling that
respondent UST is still liable to pay the amount of P17,000,000.00 for the period 1996-2001
under the 1996-2001 CBA considering that:

a. There is no slide-in provision in the 1996-2001 CBA.

b. The amounts allocated for the Hospitalization Fund during SYs 1996-2001 were not
sourced from the 70% share of the teaching and non-teaching personnel in the tuition fee
increases.

4. The complaint for money claims ofpetitioner USTFU arising from the interpretation of the
1996-2001 CBA isalready barred by prescription.

5. Assuming arguendo that NLRC has jurisdiction over the instant case, it unjustly and
erroneously ordered respondent UST to pay the subject amount to petitioner USTFU and
notto the Hospital and Medical Benefits Committee under the CBA.22

The Courts Ruling

The petition has no merit. We shall address the issues raised by the parties one by one.

Jurisdiction over the Present Case

On the issue of jurisdiction, we affirm with modification the ruling of the CA. The Labor
Arbiter has no jurisdiction over the present case; however, despite the lack of jurisdiction,
we rule on the issues presented. We recognize that a remand to the voluntary arbitration
stage will give rise to the possibility that this case will still reach this Court through the
parties appeals. Furthermore, it does not serve the cause of justice if we allow this case to
go unresolved for aninordinate amount of time.

We quote the pertinent Articles of the Labor Code of the Philippines below:

Art. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. (a) Except as otherwise
provided underthis Code, the Labor Arbiters shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to
hear and decide, within thirty (30) calendar days after the submission of the case by the
parties for decision without extension, x x x:
1. Unfair labor practices cases;

xxxx

(b) The Commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by
Labor Arbiters.

(c) Cases arising from the interpretation or implementation of collective bargaining

agreements and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel
policies shall be disposed of by the Labor Arbiter by referring the same to the grievance
machinery and voluntary arbitration as may beprovided in said agreements.

Art. 261. Jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrators or Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators. The

Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide all unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation or
implementation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement and those arising from the
interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies referred to in the immediately
preceding article. Accordingly, violations of a Collective Bargaining Agreement, except those
which are gross in character, shall no longer be treated as unfair labor practice and shall be
resolved as grievances under the Collective Bargaining Agreement. For purposes of this
article, gross violations of Collective Bargaining Agreement shall mean flagrant
and/ormalicious refusal to comply with the economic provisions of such agreement.

The Commission, its Regional Offices and the Regional Directors of the Department of
Labor and Employment shall not entertain disputes, grievances or matters under the
exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel ofVoluntary Arbitrators
and shall immediately dispose and refer the same to the Grievance Machinery or Voluntary
Arbitration provided in the Collective Bargaining Agreement.

Art. 262. Jurisdiction over other labor disputes. The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of
Voluntary Arbitrators, upon agreement of the parties, shall also hear and decide all other
labor disputes including unfair labor practices and bargaining deadlocks.
Art. 262-A. Procedures. The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators shall
have the power to hold hearings, receive evidences and take whatever action isnecessary
to resolve the issue or issues subject to the dispute, including efforts to effect a voluntary
settlement between the parties.

All parties to the dispute shall be entitled to attend the arbitration proceedings. The
attendance of any third party to the exclusion of any witness from the proceedings shall be
determined by the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators. Hearing may be
adjourned for cause or upon agreement by the parties.

Unless the parties agree otherwise,it shall be mandatory for the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel
of Voluntary Arbitrators to render an award or decision within twenty (20) calendar days
from the date of submission of the dispute to voluntary arbitration.

The award or decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators shall
contain the facts and the law on which it is based. It shall be final and executory after ten
(10) calendar days from receipt of the copy of the award or decision by the parties.

Upon motion of any interested party, the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary
Arbitrators or the Labor Arbiter in the region where the movant resides, in case of the
absence or incapacity of the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators for any
reason, may issue a writ of execution requiring either the sheriff of the Commission or
regular courts or any public official whom the parties may designate in the submission
agreement to execute the final decision, order or award.

On the other hand, the pertinent provisions in the 1996-2001 CBA between UST and
USTFU provide:

ARTICLE X

GRIEVANCE MACHINERY

Section 1. Grievance. Any misunderstanding concerning policies and practices directly

affecting faculty members covered by this [collective bargaining] agreement ortheir working
conditions in the UNIVERSITY or any dispute arising as to the meaning, application or
violation of any provisions of thisAgreement or any complaint that a covered faculty member
may haveagainst the UNIVERSITY shall be considered a grievance.

Section 2. Exclusion. Termination of employment and preventive suspension shall be

exempted from the provisions of this Article as the same shall be governed by the
procedure in the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules.

Section 3. Procedure. A grievance shall be settled as expeditiously as possible in

accordance with the following procedure:

STEP I. Upon presentation of a grievance in writing by the aggrieved faculty member, to the
FACULTY UNION Grievance Officer, the said officer shall present the same to the Dean or
school/department head concerned who shall render his decision on the matter within five
(5) school days from the date of the presentation. If the aggrieved party is not satisfied with
the decision, or if the Dean or school/department head fails toact within the five-schoolday
period, appeal may be made to Step II within five (5) school days from receipt of the
decision or, in the absence of a decision, the expiration ofthe period for its rendition. If no
appeal is made within the period of appeal, the grievance shall be deemed settled on the
basis of Step I.

STEP II. All appeals from StepI shall be presented to and considered by an Adjudication
Committee which shall be composed of two (2) representatives chosen by the UNIVERSITY
and two (2) representatives chosen by the FACULTY UNION. The Committee shall meet
within ten (10) school days after the elevation to this step and and try to settle the grievance
to the satisfaction of all concerned. It shall render its decision within twenty (20) school days
following the presentation of the grievance to the Adjudication Committee. A quorum for any
meeting of the Committee shall consist of a majority of its entire membership. The
affirmative vote of at least three (3) members of the Committee shall be necessary to reach
a decision. If the Committee renders a decision, the grievance shall be deemed settled
accordingly. If the Committee fails to make a decision within the period of twenty (20) days
above stated, the FACULTY UNION President may, within ten (10)days thereafter elevate
the grievance to Step III.

STEP III. The grievance appealed to this step shall be handled by the FACULTY UNION
President who shall take it up with the Rector of the UNIVERSITY who, in turn, shall settle
the grievance within ten (10) days. If no settlement is arrived at within the aforementioned
period, the grievance will automatically be referred to voluntary arbitration.
STEP IV. The mechanics of arbitration shall be as follows:

(a) The UNIVERSITY and the FACULTY UNION shall select within three (3) days, by raffle
or process of elimination, an arbitrator mutually agreeable to them preferably from the list
provided by the Bureau of Labor Relations.

(b) The voluntary arbitrator shall render an award within ten (10) days after the issue in
dispute is submitted for decision and his award shall be final and binding upon all parties to
the grievance. (c) Arbitration costs shall be shared equally by the UNIVERSITY and the
FACULTY UNION.23

ARTICLE XXII

PERMANENT UNIVERSITY-UNION COMMITTEE (PUUC)

Permanent UNION-UNIVERSITY Committee (PUUC). The UNIVERSITY and the

FACULTY UNION realize that notwithstanding this CBA, there will remain problems and
irritants which will require the continuing attention of both parties. Symbolic of the mutual
good faith of the parties, they have agreed to establish a permanent committee, where the
UNIVERSITY and the FACULTY UNION are equally represented, to address these
problems as they arise.

a. Within thirty (30) days from signing of this Agreement, the Committee shall meet. The
members of the Committee are the following:

1) For the ADMINISTRATION:

a) Rector or his representative;

b) Vice Rector for Academic Affairs or his representative;

c) Vice Rector for Finance or his representative; and d) Appointee of the Rector.

2) For the FACULTY UNION:

a) President of the UNION;

b) Executive Vice President of the UNION or his representative;

c) Secretary General orhis representative; and

d) Appointee of the UNION President.

b. The regular meetings of this Committee shall be held at least bimonthly or as the need
arises. c. The decision reached in the PUUCMeetings shall be binding to all UNIVERSITY
functionaries.24

Jurisdiction is determined by the allegations of the complaint. In the present case, USTFU
alleged that UST committed unfair labor practice in its blatant violation of the economic
provisions of the 1996-2001 CBA, and subsequently, the 2001-2006 and 2006-2011 CBAs.
UST, meanwhile, has consistently questioned USTFUs act of bringing the case before the
LA, and of not submitting the present case to voluntary arbitration. The LA assumed
jurisdiction, but ruled that UST did not commit any unfair labor practice in USTs
interpretation of the economic provisions of the 1996-2001 CBA. The NLRC, on the other
hand, ruled that there was indeed unfair labor practice. The CA ruled that the LA and the
NLRC did not have jurisdiction as there was no unfair labor practice. Reading the pertinent
portions of the 1996-2001 CBA along with those of the Labor Code, we see that UST and
USTFUs misunderstanding arose solely from their differing interpretations of the CBAs
provisions on economic benefits, specifically those concerning the fund. Therefore, it was
clearly error for the LA to assume jurisdiction over the present case. The case should have
been resolved through the voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators.
Article 217(c) of the Labor Code provides that the Labor Arbiter shall refer to the grievance
machinery and voluntary arbitration as provided in the CBA those cases that involve the
interpretation of said agreements. Article 261 of the Labor Code further provides that all
unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of the CBA,
including violations of said agreement, are under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of
the voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators. Excluded from this original and
exclusive jurisdiction is gross violation of the CBA, which is defined in Article 261 as
"flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with the economic provisions" of the CBA. San
Jose v. NLRC25 provides guidelines for understanding Articles 217, 261, and 262:

1. The jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of Voluntary
Arbitrators over the cases enumerated in Articles 217, 261, and 262 can possibly include
money claims in one form or another.

2. The cases where the Labor Arbiters have original and exclusive jurisdiction are
enumerated in Article 217, and that of the Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of Voluntary
Arbitrators in Article 261.

3. The original and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters is qualified by an exception as

indicated in the introductory sentence of Article 217 (a), to wit:

"Art. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters ... (a) Except as otherwise provided under this Code
the Labor Arbiter shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide ... the
following cases involving all workers..."

The phrase "Except as otherwise provided under this Code" refers to the following
exceptions:

A. Art. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters...

xxx
(c) Cases arising from the interpretation or implementation of collective bargaining
agreement and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company
procedure/policies shall be disposed of by the Labor Arbiter by referring the same to the
grievance machinery and voluntary arbitrator as may be provided in said agreement.

B. Art. 262. Jurisdiction over other labor disputes. The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of
Voluntary Arbitrators, upon agreement of the parties, shall also hear and decide all other
labor disputes including unfair labor practices and bargaining deadlocks.

Parenthetically, the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter under Article 217
(c), for money claims is limited only to those arising from statutes or contracts other than a
Collective Bargaining Agreement. The Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators
will have original and exclusive jurisdiction over money claims "arising from the
interpretation or implementation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement and, those arising
fromthe interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies," under Article 261.

4. The jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators is provided for in

Arts. 261 and 262 of the Labor Code as indicated above.

1. A close reading of Article 261 indicates that the original and exclusive jurisdiction of
Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators is limited only to:

"... unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company
personnel policies... Accordingly, violations of a collective bargaining agreement, except
those which are gross in character, shall no longer be treated as unfair labor practice and
shall be resolved asgrievances under the Collective Bargaining Agreement. x x x."

2. Voluntary Arbitrators or Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, however, can exercise jurisdiction

over any and all disputes between an employer and a union and/or individual worker as
provided for in Article 262.
"Art. 262. Jurisdiction over other labor disputes. - The voluntary arbitrator or panel of
voluntary arbitrators, upon agreement of the parties, shall also hear and decide all other
labor disputes including unfair labor practices and bargaining deadlocks."

It must be emphasized that the jurisdiction of the Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of Voluntary
Arbitrators under Article 262 must be voluntarily conferred upon by bothlabor and
management. The labor disputes referred to in the same Article 262 can include all those
disputes mentioned in Article 217 over which the Labor Arbiter has original and exclusive
jurisdiction.

As shown in the above contextual and wholistic analysis of Articles 217, 261, and 262 of the
Labor Code, the National Labor Relations Commission correctly ruled that the Labor Arbiter
had no jurisdiction to hear and decide petitioners money-claim underpayment of retirement
benefits, as the controversy between the parties involved an issue "arising from the
interpretationor implementation" of a provision of the collective bargaining agreement. The
Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators has original and exclusive jurisdiction
over the controversy under Article 261 of the Labor Code, and not the Labor Arbiter.

Despite the allegation that UST refused to comply with the economic provisions of the 1996-
2001 CBA, we cannot characterize USTs refusal as "flagrant and/or malicious." Indeed,
USTs literal interpretation of the CBA was, in fact, what led USTFU to fileits complaint. To
our mind, USTFU actually went beyond the text of the 1996-2001 CBA when it claimed that
the integrated tuition fee increase as described in Section 1D(2) is the basis for USTs
alleged deficiency.

We cannot subscribe to USTFUs view that the 1996-2001 CBAs Article X: Grievance
Machinery is not applicable to the present case. When the issue is about the grievance
procedure, USTFU insists on a literal interpretation of the 1996-2001 CBA. Indeed, the
present case falls under Section 1s definition of grievance:"[a]ny misunderstanding
concerning policies and practices directly affecting faculty members covered by this
[collective bargaining] agreement ortheir working conditions in the UNIVERSITY or any
dispute arising as to the meaning, application or violation of any provisions of this
Agreement or any complaint that a covered faculty member may have against the
UNIVERSITY." Section 2 excludes only termination and preventive suspension from the
grievance procedure.

USTFUs focus is on the 1996-2001 CBAs provisions about the grievance process rather
than the provision about the subject matters covered by the grievance process. Despite
USTs alleged violation of the economic provisions of the CBA by its insufficient remittances
to the fund, a dispute arising as to the meaning, application or violation of the CBA, USTFU
used Step I in Section 3, and ignored Steps III and IV, to rule out any referral to voluntary
arbitration. USTFU concludes that the 1996-2001 CBAs provisions on grievance machinery
only refer to a grievance of a faculty member against UST, and that said provisions do not
contemplate a situation where USTFU itself has a grievance against UST.

USTFU argues that the PUUC is the proper forum to resolve the issue, and that the filing of
a complaint beforethe LA is proper inthe absence of a voluntary arbitration clause in the
1996-2001 CBAs Article XXII: Permanent University-Union Committee. However, as
provided in the 1996-2001 CBA, PUUC is established for "continuing problems and irritants
which will require the continuing attention" of UST and USTFU. Clearly, the PUUC
addresses mattersnot covered by the CBA.

USTFUs adamant refusal to considervoluntary arbitration ignores Articles 261 to 262-A of

the Labor Code, as well as Steps III and IV of Section 3 of the 1996-2001 CBA.

Accrual of Cause of Action and

Prescription of Claims

USTFUs claims arose from USTs alleged failure to contribute the correct amounts to the
fund during the 1996-2001 CBA. However, USTFU did not complain of any violation by UST
during the lifetime of the 1996-2001 CBA. Neither did USTFU complain of any violation by
UST during the lifetime of the succeeding 2001-2006 CBA. It was only on 6 February 2007
that USTFU sent a demand letter to UST Rector Fr. Ernesto M. Arceo, O.P., for the claimed
hospitalization and medical benefits under the 1996-2001 CBA. On 2 March 2007, UST,
through its Rector, Fr. Ernesto M. Arceo, O.P., informed USTFU, through its President, Dr.
Gil Gamilla, that "the hospitalization and medical benefits contained in [the 1996-2001 CBA]
were a one-time give, and therefore not meant to slide." USTFU notified UST on 24 June
2007 about its intent to file the necessary complaint. On 6 September 2007, USTFU filed a
complaint against UST before the LA.

The 1996-2001 CBA, as well as the applicable laws, is silent as to when USTs alleged
violation becomes actionable. Thus, we apply Article 1150 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines: "The time for prescription for all kinds of actions, when there is no special
provision which ordains otherwise, shall be counted from the day they may be brought."26
Prescription of an action is counted from the time the action may be brought.27
It is error to state that USTFUs cause of action accrued only upon USTs categorical denial
of its claims on 2 March 2007. USTFUs cause of action accrued when UST allegedly failed
to comply with the economic provisions of the 1996-2001 CBA. Upon such failure by UST,
USTFU could have brought an action against UST.

Article 290 of the Labor Code provides that unfair labor practices prescribe within one year
"from accrual of such unfair labor practice; otherwise, they shall be forever barred." Article
291 of the same Code provides that money claims arising from employer-employee
relations prescribe "within three (3) years from the time the cause of action accrued;
otherwise they shall be forever barred." USTFUs claims under the 1996-2001 CBA,
whether characterized as one for unfair labor practice or for money claims from employer-
employee relations, have already prescribed when USTFU filed a complaint before the LA.

USTFU filed its complaint under the theory of unfairlabor practice. Thus, USTFU had one
year from USTs alleged failure to contribute, or "slide in," the correct amount to the fund to
file its complaint. USTFU had one year for every alleged breach by UST: school year (SY)
1997-1998, SY 1998-1999, SY 1999-2000, SY 2000-2001, SY 2001-2002, and SY 2002-
2003. USTFU did not file any complaint within the respective one-year prescriptive periods.
USTFU decided to file its complaint only in 2007, several years after the accrual of its
several possible causes of action. Even if USTFU filed its complaint under the theory of
money claims from employer-employee relations, its cause of action still has prescribed.

Determination of the Benefits Due

We consolidate USTFUs claims, USTs remittances, and USTs alleged balances in the
table below:

USTFUs claims28 USTs remittances29 USTs alleged

Balances

1996 to 2001 CBA

SY 1996-1997 P2,000,000.00 P2,000,000.00 0

SY 1997-1998 P3,000,000.00 P1,000,000.00 P2,000,000.00

SY 1998-199 P4,000,000.00 P1,000,000.00 P3,000,000.00

1999 Memorandum

of Agreement

SY 1999-2000 P8,000,000.00 P4,000,000.00 P4,000,000.00

SY 2000-2001 P8,000,000.00 - P8,000,000.00

2001 to 2006 CBA

SY 2001-2002 P8,000,000.00 P2,000,000.00 P6,000,000.00

SY 2002-2003 P8,000,000.00 P5,000,000.00 P3,000,000.00

SY 2003-2004 P8,000,000.00 P8,000,000.00 0

SY 2004-2005 P8,000,000.00 P8,000,000.00 0

SY 2005-2006 P8,000,000.00 P8,000,000.00 0

2006-2011 CBA

SY 2006-2007 P8,000,000.00 P8,000,000.00 0

SY 2007-2008 P8,000,000.00 P8,000,000.00 0

SY 2008-2009 P8,000,000.00 P8,000,000.00 0

SY 2009-2010 P8,000,000.00 P8,000,000.00 0

SY 2010-2011 P8,000,000.00 P8,000,000.00 0

Total P105,000,000.00 P79,000,000.00 P26,000,000.00

We restate the following provisions inthe pertinent CBAs to establish what USTFU claims as
its bases for additional funds:

1996-2001 CBA

ARTICLE XIII
ECONOMIC BENEFITS

Section 1. ECONOMIC BENEFIT- Upon ratification and approval and for the term of this
Agreement. the economic benefitsto be granted by the UNIVERSITY and the schedule
ofsuch releases are as follows:

A. School Year 1996-97 (June 1, 1996 to May 31, 1997):

xxxx

4. Hospitalization Fund: Upon ratification and approval hereof, the UNIVERSITY shall
establish a perpetual hospitalization and medical benefits fund in the sum of TWO MILLION
PESOS (P2,000,000) to be managed conjointly by a hospitalization and medical benefits
committee where both management and union are equally represented.

The joint committee shall promulgate its internal rules and regulations, and on the second
year of this agreement, i.e., SY 1997-98, may allocate such amount as required, but not to
exceed ten per cent (10%) of the gross income of the fund,for administrative expenses. For
the duration of the first year of operation of the fund, the UNIVERSITY and the FACULTY
UNION shall equally subsidize the operations of the fund.

The hospitalization costs and medical benefits of the members of the faculty as provided in
Article XVIof this agreement shall be taken from this fund.

This fund is independently managed by the aforementioned joint committee, subject to

independent audit. The yearly state of finances of the fund shall be reported, appended to
the FACULTY UNIONs own annual report, to all members of the university faculty.

B. School Year 1997-98 (June 1, 1997-May 31, 1998):

xxxx

2. Hospitalization Fund: The UNIVERSITY shall contribute the sum of ONE MILLION
PESOS (P1,000,000) to augment the Hospitalization and Medical Benefits fund.The said
sum shall be added to the remaining balance of the aforementioned fund;

xxxx

C. School Year 1998-99 (June 1, 1998-May 31, 1999):

xxxx

2. Hospitalization Fund: The UNIVERSITY shall contribute the sum of ONE MILLION
PESOS (P1,000,000) to augment the Hospitalization and Medical Benefits fund.The said
sum shall be added to the remaining balance of the aforementioned fund;

D. Miscellaneous Provisions:

1. At the end of this agreement, and within three months therefrom, the UNIVERSITY shall
render an accounting of the monies it paid or released to the covered faculty in
consequence thereof;

2. All the economic benefits herein given and those elsewhere provided under this
agreement, other than retirement benefits and one-half of the signing bonus, are chargeable
to the tuition fee share, if any, of the faculty members;

3. In the event that the tuition fee benefits of the faculty for any of the three years covered
by this part of this agreement i.e., the University decides to raise tuition fees in the coming
two school years, exceed those provided herein, the same may be allocated for salaries
and other benefits as determined by the FACULTY UNION and the matter duly
communicated to the UNIVERSITY; and,

4. None of the benefits provided herein, both distributable immediately after ratification and
those to be given during the term hereof, other than the amounts checked-off and the
Hospitalization and Medical Benefits are to be directly distributed to the faculty members by
the University.30 1999 Memorandum of Agreement

1.0 The University hereby agrees to grant increase in salary and fringe benefits as provided
for by the tuition fee increase of school year 1999-2000 according to the following scheme:

xxxx

6.0 If there is any tuition fee increase for school year 2000-2001, there will be an additional
increase in salary/fringe benefitsto be agreed upon by both parties.

7.0An additional amount of four million pesos will be deposited in the hospitalization fund of
the faculty.31

2001-2006 CBA

Article XX

HOSPITALIZATION AND MEDICAL BENEFITS

Section 1. Hospitalization and Medical Benefits Fund. The UNION and the UNIVERSITY
shall buildup and maintain the perpetual Hospitalization and Medical Benefits Fund. For this
purpose, the UNIVERSITY agrees to appropriate for AY 2001-2002 two million pesos
(PhP2,000,000.00); for AY 2002-2003 three million pesos (PhP3,000,000.00); and for AY
2003-2004 another three million pesos (PhP3,000,000.00). It is understood that the amount
appropriated for each year is carried over to the succeeding years and is chargeable to the
tuition fee increment. x x x32 2006-2011 CBA
Article XX

HOSPITALIZATION AND MEDICAL BENEFITS

Section 5. Miscellaneous Provisions. a. The UNIVERSITY will continue to slide in the

amounts set aside in the 2001-2006 CBA to augment the fund. Fifty percent of the amount
due shall be remitted within a month from the start of the first semester and the other fifty
percent within a month from the start of the second semester of the academic year. These
sums of money shall be remitted without necessity of demand on the part of the union and
may not be garnished or held by the university on account of disputesin hospital billings
between the University and the Union.

x x x x33

USTFU claims that USTs contributions should have been cumulative, with the amount
appropriated for each year carried over to the succeeding years and is chargeable to the
tuitionfee increment. However, USTFUs claims are not supported by the economic
provisions of the 1996-2001 CBA and the 1999 Memorandum of Agreement reproduced
above.

We wholly agree with USTs interpretation of the economic provisions of the 1996-2001
CBA, the 1999 Memorandumof Agreement, and the 2001-2006 and 2006-2011 CBAs, as
well as its remittances to the fund for the covered periods. UST faithfully followed the clear
provisions of these agreements.

The 1996-2001 CBA established the fund, with an initial remittance of P2, 000, 000. 00 for
school year 1996-1997. UST bound itself to augment the fund by contributing
P1,000,000.00 per year for school years 1997-1998 and 1998-1999. The 1999
Memorandum of Agreement merely stated that UST will deposit P4,000,000.00 to the fund.
Express mention of the carryover is found onlv in Section 1, Article XX of the 2001-2006
CBA: "It is understood that the amount appropriated for each year is carried over to the
succeeding years xx x." The 1996-2001 CBA does not have this carry-over provision.
During the lifetime of the 1996-2001 CBA, the 1999 Memorandum of Agreement, and the
2001-2006 CBA, USTFU never questioned the non-compliance by UST with an alleged
carry-over agreement applicable to the 1996-2001 CBA. This Court is well aware of Article
1702 of the Civil Code, which provides that "[i]n case of doubt, all labor legislation and all
labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent living for the laborer."
This Court is also well aware that when the provisions of the CBA are clear and
unambiguous, the literal meaning of the stipulations shall govern.34 In the present case, the
CBA provisions pertaining to the fund are clear and should be interpreted according to their
literal meaning.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We DECLARE that the claims of the University of
Santo Tomas Faculty Union have prescribed and that there is no carry-over provision for the
Hospitalization and Medical Benefits Fund in the 1996-2001 Collective Bargaining
Agreement and in the 1999 Memorandum of Agreement. The carry-over provision for the
Hospitalization and Medical Benefits Fund is found only in the 2001-2006 and 2006-2011
Collective Bargaining Agreements.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

10. ACE NAVIGATION CO., INC., VELA INTERNATIONAL MARINE LTD., and/or
RODOLFO PAMINTUAN,Petitioners,
vs.
TEODORICO FERNANDEZ, assisted by GLENITA FERNANDEZ, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

For resolution is the petition for review on certiorari1 which seeks to nullify the
decision2 dated September 22, 2010 and the resolution3 dated May 26,2011 ofthe Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 112081.

The Antecedents

On October 9, 2008, seaman Teodorico Fernandez (Fernandez), assisted by his wife,

Glenita Fernandez, filed with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a complaint
for disability benefits, with prayer for moral and exemplary damages, plus attorneys fees,
against Ace Navigation Co., Inc., Vela International Marine Ltd., and/or Rodolfo Pamintuan
(petitioners).

The petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint, 4 contending that the labor arbiter had no
jurisdiction over the dispute. They argued that exclusive original jurisdiction is with the
voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators, pursuant to Section 29 of the POEA
Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC), since the parties are covered by the
AMOSUP-TCC or AMOSUP-VELA (as later cited by the petitioners) collective bargaining
agreement (CBA). Under Section 14 of the CBA, a dispute between a seafarer and the
company shall be settled through the grievance machinery and mandatory voluntary
arbitration.

Fernandez opposed the motion.5 He argued that inasmuch as his complaint involves a
money claim, original and exclusive jurisdiction over the case is vested with the labor
arbiter.

The Compulsory Arbitration Rulings

On December 9, 2008, Labor Arbiter Romelita N. Rioflorido denied the motion to dismiss,
holding that under Section 10 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042, the Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, the labor arbiter has original and exclusive jurisdiction over
money claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or
contract, notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary.6

The petitioners appealed to the NLRC, but the labor agency denied the appeal. It agreed
with the labor arbiter that the case involves a money claim and is within the jurisdiction of
the labor arbiter, in accordance with Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042. Additionally, it declared
that the denial of the motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order which is not appealable.
Accordingly, it remanded the case to the labor arbiter for further proceedings. The
petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the NLRC denied the motion, prompting the
petitioners to elevate the case to the CA through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court.

The CA Decision

Through its decision of September 22, 2010,7 the CA denied the petition on procedural and
substantive grounds.

Procedurally, it found the petitioners to have availed of the wrong remedy when they
challenged the labor arbiters denial of their motion to dismiss by way of an appeal to the
NLRC. It stressed that pursuant to the NLRC rules, 8an order denying a motion to dismiss is
interlocutory and is not subject to appeal.

On the merits of the case, the CA believed that the petition cannot also prosper. It rejected
the petitioners submission that the grievance and voluntary arbitration procedure of the
parties CBA has jurisdiction over the case, to the exclusion of the labor arbiter and the
NLRC. As the labor arbiter and the NLRC did, it opined that under Section 10 of R.A. No.
8042, the labor arbiter has the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear Fernandezs money
claims.

Further, the CA clarified that while the law9 allows parties to submit to voluntary arbitration
other labor disputes, including matters falling within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of
the labor arbiters under Article 217 of the Labor Code as this Court recognized in Vivero v.
Court of Appeals,10 the parties submission agreement must be expressed in unequivocal
language. It found no such unequivocal language in the AMOSUP/TCC CBA that the parties
agreed to submit money claims or, more specifically, claims for disability benefits to
voluntary arbitration.

The CA also took note of the POEA-SEC11 which provides in its Section 29 that in cases of
claims and disputes arising from a Filipino seafarers employment, the parties covered by a
CBA shall submit the claim or dispute to the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the
voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators. The CA explained that the relevant
POEA-SEC provisions should likewise be qualified by the ruling in the Vivero case, the
Labor Code, and other applicable laws and jurisprudence.

In sum, the CA stressed that the jurisdiction of voluntary arbitrators is limited to the
seafarers claims which do not fall within the labor arbiters original and exclusive jurisdiction
or even in cases where the labor arbiter has jurisdiction, the parties have agreed in
unmistakable terms (through their CBA) to submit the case to voluntary arbitration.

The petitioners moved for reconsideration of the CA decision, but the appellate court denied
the motion, reiterating its earlier pronouncement that on the ground alone of the petitioners
wrong choice of remedy, the petition must fail.

The Petition

The petitioners are now before this Court praying for a reversal of the CA judgment on the
following grounds:

1. The CA committed a reversible error in disregarding the Omnibus Implementing Rules

and Regulations (IRR) of the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, 12 as
amended by R.A. No. 10022,13 mandating that "For OFWs with collective bargaining
agreements, the caseshall be submitted for voluntary arbitration in accordance with Articles
261 and 262 of the Labor Code."14

The petitioners bewail the CAs rejection of the above argument for the reason that the
remedy they pursued was inconsistent with the 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the
NLRC. Citing Municipality of Sta. Fe v. Municipality of Aritao,15 they argue that the "dismissal
of a case for lack of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings."

In any event, they posit that the IRR of R.A. No. 10022 is in the nature of an adjective or
procedural law which must be given retroactive effect and which should have been applied
by the CA in resolving the present case.

2. The CA committed a reversible error in ruling that the AMOSUP-VELA CBA does not
contain unequivocal wordings for the mandatory referral of Fernandezs claim to voluntary
arbitration.

The petitioners assail the CAs failure to explain the basis "for ruling that no explicit or
unequivocal wordings appeared on said CBA for the mandatory referral of the disability
claim to arbitration."16They surmise that the CA construed the phrase "either party may refer
the case to a MANDATORY ARBITRATION COMMITTEE" under Section 14.7(a) of the
CBA as merely permissive and not mandatory because of the use of the word "may." They
contend that notwithstanding the use of the word "may," the parties unequivocally and
unmistakably agreed to refer the present disability claim to mandatory arbitration.

3. The CA committed a reversible error in disregarding the NLRC memorandum prescribing

the appropriate action for complaints and/or proceedings which were initially processed in
the grievance machinery of existing CBAs. In their motion for reconsideration with the CA,
the petitioners manifested that the appellate courts assailed decision had been modified by
the following directive of the NLRC:

As one of the measures being adopted by our agency in response to the Platform and
Policy Pronouncements on Labor Employment, you are hereby directed to immediately
dismiss the complaint and/or terminate proceedings which were initially processed in the
grievance machinery as provided in the existing Collective Bargaining Agreements (CBAs)
between parties, through the issuance of an Order of Dismissal and referral of the disputes
to the National Conciliation Mediation Board (NCMB) for voluntary arbitration.

FOR STRICT COMPLIANCE.17

4. On July 31, 2012,18 the petitioners manifested before the Court that on June 13, 2012, the
Courts Second Division issued a ruling in G.R. No. 172642, entitled Estate of Nelson R.
Dulay, represented by his wife Merridy Jane P. Dulay v. Aboitiz Jebsen Maritime,
Inc., and General Charterers, Inc., upholding the jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator or
panel of voluntary arbitrators over a seafarers money claim. They implore the Court that
since the factual backdrop and the issues involved in the case are similar to the present
dispute, the Dulay ruling should be applied to this case and which should accordingly be
referred to the National Conciliation and Mediation Board for voluntary arbitration.

The Case for Fernandez

In compliance with the Courts directive, 19 Fernandez filed on October 7, 2011 his
Comment20 (on the Petition) with the plea that the petition be dismissed for lack of merit.
Fernandez presents the following arguments:

1. The IRR of the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 (R.A. No.
8042), as amended by R.A. No. 10022,21 did not divest the labor arbiters of their
original and exclusive jurisdiction over money claims arising from employment, for
nowhere in said IRR is there such a divestment.

2. The voluntary arbitrators do not have jurisdiction over the present controversy as
can be deduced from Articles 261 and 262 of the Labor Code. Fernandez explains
that his complaint does not involve any "unresolved grievances arising from the
interpretation or implementation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement [nor] from
the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies[.]" 22 As he never
referred his claim to the grievance machinery, there is no "unresolved grievance" to
speak of. His complaint involves a claim for compensation and damages which is
outside the voluntary arbitrators jurisdiction under Article 261. Further, only disputes
 involving the union and the company shall be referred to the grievance machinery
and to voluntary arbitration, as the Court held in Sanyo Philippines Workers Union-
PSSLU v. Caizares23 and Silva v. CA.24

3. The CA correctly ruled that no unequivocal wordings appear in the CBA for the
mandatory referral of Fernandezs disability claim to a voluntary arbitrator.

The Courts Ruling

We first rule on the procedural question arising from the labor arbiters denial of the
petitioners motion to dismiss the complaint. On this point, Section 6, Rule V of The 2005
Revised Rules of Procedure of the NLRC provides:

On or before the date set for the mandatory conciliation and mediation conference, the
respondent may file a motion to dismiss. Any motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, improper venue, or that the cause of action is barred by prior judgment,
prescription, or forum shopping, shall be immediately resolved by the Labor Arbiter through
a written order. An order denying the motion to dismiss, or suspending its resolution until the
final determination of the case, is not appealable. [underscoring ours]

Corollarily, Section 10, Rule VI of the same Rules states:

Frivolous or Dilatory Appeals. No appeal from an interlocutory order shall be entertained.

To discourage frivolous or dilatory appeals, including those taken from interlocutory orders,
the Commission may censure or cite in contempt the erring parties and their counsels, or
subject them to reasonable fine or penalty.

In Indiana Aerospace University v. Comm. on Higher Educ.,25 the Court declared that "[a]n
order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory"; the proper remedy in this situation is to
appeal after a decision has been rendered. Clearly, the denial of the petitioners motion to
dismiss in the present case was an interlocutory order and, therefore, not subject to appeal
as the CA aptly noted.

The petitions procedural lapse notwithstanding, the CA proceeded to review the merits of
the case and adjudged the petition unmeritorious. We find the CAs action in order. The
Labor Code itself declares that "it is the spirit and intention of this Code that the
Commission and its members and the Labor Arbiters shall use every and all reasonable
means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively and without regard to
technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of due process." 26

We now address the focal question of who has the original and exclusive jurisdiction over
Fernandezs disability claim the labor arbiter under Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042, as
amended, or the voluntary arbitration mechanism as prescribed in the parties CBA and the
POEA-SEC?

The answer lies in the States labor relations policy laid down in the Constitution and fleshed
out in the enabling statute, the Labor Code. Section 3, Article XIII (on Social Justice and
Human Rights) of the Constitution declares:
xxxx

The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers and
employers and the preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes, including
conciliation, and shall enforce their mutual compliance therewith to foster industrial peace.

Article 260 of the Labor Code (Grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration) states:

The parties to a Collective Bargaining Agreement shall include therein provisions that will
ensure the mutual observance of its terms and conditions. They shall establish a machinery
for the adjustment and resolution of grievances arising from the interpretation or
implementation of their Collective Bargaining Agreement and those arising from the
interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies.

Article 261 of the Labor Code (Jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrators or panel of Voluntary
Arbitrators), on the other hand, reads in part:

The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide all unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation or
implementation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement and those arising from the
interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies[.]

Article 262 of the Labor Code (Jurisdiction over other labor disputes) declares:

The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, upon agreement of the parties,
shall also hear and decide all other labor disputes including unfair labor practices and
bargaining deadlocks.

Further, the POEA-SEC, which governs the employment of Filipino seafarers, provides in its
Section 29 on Dispute Settlement Procedures:

In cases of claims and disputes arising from this employment, the parties covered by
a collective bargaining agreement shall submit the claim or dispute to the original
and exclusive jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators.
If the parties are not covered by a collective bargaining agreement, the parties may at their
option submit the claim or dispute to either the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 8042
otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 or to the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators.
If there is no provision as to the voluntary arbitrators to be appointed by the parties, the
same shall be appointed from the accredited voluntary arbitrators of the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board of the Department of Labor and Employment. [emphasis
ours]

We find merit in the petition.

Under the above-quoted constitutional and legal provisions, the voluntary arbitrator or panel
of voluntary arbitrators has original and exclusive jurisdiction over Fernandezs disability
claim. There is no dispute that the claim arose out of Fernandezs employment with the
petitioners and that their relationship is covered by a CBA the AMOSUP/TCC or the
AMOSUP-VELA CBA. The CBA provides for a grievance procedure for the resolution of
grievances or disputes which occur during the employment relationship and, like the
grievance machinery created under Article 261 of the Labor Code, it is a two-tiered
mechanism, with voluntary arbitration as the last step.1wphi1

Contrary to the CAs reading of the CBAs Article 14, there is unequivocal or unmistakable
language in the agreement which mandatorily requires the parties to submit to the
grievance procedure any dispute or cause of action they may have against each other. The
relevant provisions of the CBA state:

14.6 Any Dispute, grievance, or misunderstanding concerning any ruling, practice,

wages or working conditions in the COMPANY or any breach of the Contract of
Employment, or any dispute arising from the meaning or application of the
provisions of this Agreement or a claim of violation thereof or any complaint or cause
of action that any such Seaman may have against the COMPANY, as well as
complaints which the COMPANY may have against such Seaman shall be brought to
the attention of the GRIEVANCE RESOLUTION COMMITTEE before either party takes
any action, legal or otherwise. Bringing such a dispute to the Grievance Resolution
Committee shall be unwaivable prerequisite or condition precedent for bringing any
action, legal or otherwise, in any forum and the failure to so refer the dispute shall
bar any and all legal or other actions.

14.7a) If by reason of the nature of the Dispute, the parties are unable to amicably
settle the dispute, either party may refer the case to a MANDATORY ARBITRATION
COMMITTEE. The MANDATORY ARBITRATION COMMITTEE shall consist of one
representative to be designated by the UNION, and one representative to be designated by
the COMPANY and a third member who shall act as Chairman and shall be nominated by
mutual choice of the parties. xxx

h) Referral of all unresolved disputes from the Grievance Resolution Committee to

the Mandatory Arbitration Committee shall be unwaivable prerequisite or condition
precedent for bringing any action, claim, or cause of action, legal or otherwise,
before any court, tribunal, or panel in any jurisdiction. The failure by a party or
seaman to so refer and avail oneself to the dispute resolution mechanism contained
in this action shall bar any legal or other action. All parties expressly agree that the
orderly resolution of all claims in the prescribed manner served the interests of
reaching settlements or claims in an orderly and uniform manner, as well as
preserving peaceful and harmonious labor relations between seaman, the Union, and
the Company.27 (emphases ours)

What might have caused the CA to miss the clear intent of the parties in prescribing a
grievance procedure in their CBA is, as the petitioners have intimated, the use of the
auxiliary verb "may" in Article 14.7(a) of the CBA which, to reiterate, provides that "if by
reason of the nature of the Dispute, the parties are unable to amicably settle the
dispute, either party may refer the case to a MANDATORY ARBITRATION
COMMITTEE."28
While the CA did not qualify its reading of the subject provision of the CBA, it is reasonable
to conclude that it viewed as optional the referral of a dispute to the mandatory arbitration
committee when the parties are unable to amicably settle the dispute.

We find this a strained interpretation of the CBA provision. The CA read the provision
separately, or in isolation of the other sections of Article 14, especially 14.7(h), which, in
clear, explicit language, states that the "referral of all unresolved disputes from the
Grievance Resolution Committee to the Mandatory Arbitration Committee shall be
unwaivable prerequisite or condition precedent for bringing any action, claim, or
cause of action, legal or otherwise, before any court, tribunal, or panel in any
jurisdiction"29 and that the failure by a party or seaman to so refer the dispute to the
prescribed dispute resolution mechanism shall bar any legal or other action.

Read in its entirety, the CBAs Article 14 (Grievance Procedure) unmistakably reflects the
parties agreement to submit any unresolved dispute at the grievance resolution stage to
mandatory voluntary arbitration under Article 14.7(h) of the CBA. And, it should be added
that, in compliance with Section 29 of the POEA-SEC which requires that in cases of claims
and disputes arising from a seafarers employment, the parties covered by a CBA shall
submit the claim or dispute to the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the voluntary
arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators.

Since the parties used unequivocal language in their CBA for the submission of their
disputes to voluntary arbitration (a condition laid down in Vivero for the recognition of the
submission to voluntary arbitration of matters within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of
labor arbiters), we find that the CA committed a reversible error in its ruling; it disregarded
the clear mandate of the CBA between the parties and the POEA-SEC for submission of the
present dispute to voluntary arbitration.

Consistent with this finding, Fernandezs contention that his complaint for disability
benefits is a money claim that falls within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the labor
arbiter under Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 is untenable. We likewise reject his argument
that he never referred his claim to the grievance machinery (so that no unresolved
grievance exists as required under Article 261 of the Labor Code), and that the parties to
the case are not the union and the employer.30 Needless to state, no such distinction exists
in the parties CBA and the POEA-SEC.

It bears stressing at this point that we are upholding the jurisdiction of the voluntary
arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators over the present dispute, not only because of the
clear language of the parties CBA on the matter; more importantly, we so uphold the
voluntary arbitrators jurisdiction, in recognition of the States express preference for
voluntary modes of dispute settlement, such as conciliation and voluntary arbitration as
expressed in the Constitution, the law and the rules.

In this light, we see no need to further consider the petitioners submission regarding the
IRR of the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, as amended by R.A. No.
10022, except to note that the IRR lends further support to our ruling.
In closing, we quote with approval a most recent Court pronouncement on the same issue,
thus

It is settled that when the parties have validly agreed on a procedure for resolving
grievances and to submit a dispute to voluntary arbitration then that procedure
should be strictly observed.31 (emphasis ours)

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals are SET ASIDE. Teodorico Fernandez's disability claim
is REFERRED to the Grievance Resolution Committee of the parties' collective bargaining
agreement and/or the Mandatory Arbitration Committee, if warranted.

SO ORDERED.

11. Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 201298 February 5, 2014

RAUL C. COSARE, Petitioner,

vs.

BROADCOM ASIA, INC. and DANTE AREVALO, Respondents.

DECISION

REYES, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
which assails the Decision2 dated November 24, 2011 and Resolution3 dated March 26,
2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP. No. 117356, wherein the CA ruled that the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), and not the Labor Arbiter (LA), had the jurisdiction over
petitioner Raul C. Cosare's (Cosare) complaint for illegal dismissal against Broadcom Asia,
Inc. (Broadcom) and Dante Arevalo (Arevalo), the President of Broadcom (respondents).

The Antecedents

The case stems from a complaint4 for constructive dismissal, illegal suspension and
monetary claims filed with the National Capital Region Arbitration Branch of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) by Cosare against the respondents.

Cosare claimed that sometime in April 1993, he was employed as a salesman by Arevalo,
who was then in the business of selling broadcast equipment needed by television networks
and production houses. In December 2000, Arevalo set up the company Broadcom, still to
continue the business of trading communication and broadcast equipment. Cosare was
named an incorporator of Broadcom, having been assigned 100 shares of stock with par
value of P1.00 per share.5 In October 2001, Cosare was promoted to the position of
Assistant Vice President for Sales (AVP for Sales) and Head of the Technical Coordination,
having a monthly basic net salary and average commissions of P18,000.00 and
P37,000.00, respectively.6

Sometime in 2003, Alex F. Abiog (Abiog) was appointed as Broadcoms Vice President for
Sales and thus, became Cosares immediate superior. On March 23, 2009, Cosare sent a
confidential memo7 to Arevalo to inform him of the following anomalies which were
allegedly being committed by Abiog against the company: (a) he failed to report to work on
time, and would immediately leave the office on the pretext of client visits; (b) he advised
the clients of Broadcom to purchase camera units from its competitors, and received
commissions therefor; (c) he shared in the "under the-table dealings" or "confidential
commissions" which Broadcom extended to its clients personnel and engineers; and (d) he
expressed his complaints and disgust over Broadcoms uncompetitive salaries and wages
and delay in the payment of other benefits, even in the presence of office staff. Cosare
ended his memo by clarifying that he was not interested in Abiogs position, but only wanted
Arevalo to know of the irregularities for the corporations sake.

Apparently, Arevalo failed to act on Cosares accusations. Cosare claimed that he was
instead called for a meeting by Arevalo on March 25, 2009, wherein he was asked to tender
his resignation in exchange for "financial assistance" in the amount of P300,000.00.8
Cosare refused to comply with the directive, as signified in a letter9 dated March 26, 2009
which he sent to Arevalo.

On March 30, 2009, Cosare received from Roselyn Villareal (Villareal), Broadcoms
Manager for Finance and Administration, a memo10 signed by Arevalo, charging him of
serious misconduct and willful breach of trust, and providing in part:

1. A confidential memo was received from the VP for Sales informing me that you had
directed, or at the very least tried to persuade, a customer to purchase a camera from
another supplier. Clearly, this action is a gross and willful violation of the trust and
confidence this company has given to you being its AVP for Sales and is an attempt to
deprive the company of income from which you, along with the other employees of this
company, derive your salaries and other benefits. x x x.

2. A company vehicle assigned to you with plate no. UNV 402 was found abandoned in
another place outside of the office without proper turnover from you to this office which had
assigned said vehicle to you. The vehicle was found to be inoperable and in very bad
condition, which required that the vehicle be towed to a nearby auto repair shop for
extensive repairs.

3. You have repeatedly failed to submit regular sales reports informing the company of your
activities within and outside of company premises despite repeated reminders. However, it
has been observed that you have been both frequently absent and/or tardy without proper
information to this office or your direct supervisor, the VP for Sales Mr. Alex Abiog, of your
whereabouts.

4. You have been remiss in the performance of your duties as a Sales officer as evidenced
by the fact that you have not recorded any sales for the past immediate twelve (12) months.
This was inspite of the fact that my office decided to relieve you of your duties as technical
coordinator between Engineering and Sales since June last year so that you could focus
and concentrate [on] your activities in sales.11

Cosare was given forty-eight (48) hours from the date of the memo within which to present
his explanation on the charges. He was also "suspended from having access to any and all
company files/records and use of company assets effective immediately."12 Thus, Cosare
claimed that he was precluded from reporting for work on March 31, 2009, and was instead
instructed to wait at the offices receiving section. Upon the specific instructions of Arevalo,
he was also prevented by Villareal from retrieving even his personal belongings from the
office.

On April 1, 2009, Cosare was totally barred from entering the company premises, and was
told to merely wait outside the office building for further instructions. When no such
instructions were given by 8:00 p.m., Cosare was impelled to seek the assistance of the
officials of Barangay San Antonio, Pasig City, and had the incident reported in the barangay
blotter.13

On April 2, 2009, Cosare attempted to furnish the company with a Memo14 by which he
addressed and denied the accusations cited in Arevalos memo dated March 30, 2009. The
respondents refused to receive the memo on the ground of late filing, prompting Cosare to
serve a copy thereof by registered mail. The following day, April 3, 2009, Cosare filed the
subject labor complaint, claiming that he was constructively dismissed from employment by
the respondents. He further argued that he was illegally suspended, as he placed no
serious and imminent threat to the life or property of his employer and co-employees.15

In refuting Cosares complaint, the respondents argued that Cosare was neither illegally
suspended nor dismissed from employment. They also contended that Cosare committed
the following acts inimical to the interests of Broadcom: (a) he failed to sell any broadcast
equipment since the year 2007; (b) he attempted to sell a Panasonic HMC 150 Camera
which was to be sourced from a competitor; and (c) he made an unauthorized request in
Broadcoms name for its principal, Panasonic USA, to issue an invitation for Cosares friend,
one Alex Paredes, to attend the National Association of Broadcasters Conference in Las
Vegas, USA.16 Furthermore, they contended that Cosare abandoned his job17 by
continually failing to report for work beginning April 1, 2009, prompting them to issue on
April 14, 2009 a memorandum18 accusing Cosare of absence without leave beginning April
1, 2009.

The Ruling of the LA

On January 6, 2010, LA Napoleon M. Menese (LA Menese) rendered his Decision19

dismissing the complaint on the ground of Cosares failure to establish that he was
dismissed, constructively or otherwise, from his employment. For the LA, what transpired on
March 30, 2009 was merely the respondents issuance to Cosare of a show-cause memo,
giving him a chance to present his side on the charges against him. He explained:
It is obvious that [Cosare] DID NOT wait for respondents action regarding the charges
leveled against him in the show-cause memo. What he did was to pre-empt that action by
filing this complaint just a day after he submitted his written explanation. Moreover, by
specifically seeking payment of "Separation Pay" instead of reinstatement, [Cosares]
motive for filing this case becomes more evident.20

It was also held that Cosare failed to substantiate by documentary evidence his allegations
of illegal suspension and non-payment of allowances and commissions.

Unyielding, Cosare appealed the LA decision to the NLRC.

The Ruling of the NLRC

On August 24, 2010, the NLRC rendered its Decision21 reversing the Decision of LA
Menese. The dispositive portion of the NLRC Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the DECISION is REVERSED and the Respondents

are found guilty of Illegal Constructive Dismissal. Respondents BROADCOM ASIA, INC.
and Dante Arevalo are ordered to pay [Cosares] backwages, and separation pay, as well as
damages, in the total amount of P1,915,458.33, per attached Computation.

SO ORDERED.22

In ruling in favor of Cosare, the NLRC explained that "due weight and credence is accorded
to [Cosares] contention that he was constructively dismissed by Respondent Arevalo when
he was asked to resign from his employment."23 The fact that Cosare was suspended from
using the assets of Broadcom was also inconsistent with the respondents claim that Cosare
opted to abandon his employment.
Exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00 was awarded, given the NLRCs finding
that the termination of Cosares employment was effected by the respondents in bad faith
and in a wanton, oppressive and malevolent manner. The claim for unpaid commissions
was denied on the ground of the failure to include it in the prayer of pleadings filed with the
LA and in the appeal.

The respondents motion for reconsideration was denied.24 Dissatisfied, they filed a petition
for certiorari with the CA founded on the following arguments: (1) the respondents did not
have to prove just cause for terminating the employment of Cosare because the latters
complaint was based on an alleged constructive dismissal; (2) Cosare resigned and was
thus not dismissed from employment; (3) the respondents should not be declared liable for
the payment of Cosares monetary claims; and (4) Arevalo should not be held solidarily
liable for the judgment award.

In a manifestation filed by the respondents during the pendency of the CA appeal, they
raised a new argument, i.e., the case involved an intra-corporate controversy which was
within the jurisdiction of the RTC, instead of the LA.25 They argued that the case involved a
complaint against a corporation filed by a stockholder, who, at the same time, was a
corporate officer.

The Ruling of the CA

On November 24, 2011, the CA rendered the assailed Decision26 granting the respondents
petition. It agreed with the respondents contention that the case involved an intra-corporate
controversy which, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 902-A, as amended, was within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC. It reasoned:

Record shows that [Cosare] was indeed a stockholder of [Broadcom], and that he was listed
as one of its directors. Moreover, he held the position of [AVP] for Sales which is listed as a
corporate office. Generally, the president, vice-president, secretary or treasurer are
commonly regarded as the principal or executive officers of a corporation, and modern
corporation statutes usually designate them as the officers of the corporation. However, it
bears mentioning that under Section 25 of the Corporation Code, the Board of Directors of
[Broadcom] is allowed to appoint such other officers as it may deem necessary. Indeed,
[Broadcoms] By-Laws provides:
Article IV

Officer

Section 1. Election / Appointment Immediately after their election, the Board of Directors
shall formally organize by electing the President, the Vice-President, the Treasurer, and the
Secretary at said meeting.

The Board, may, from time to time, appoint such other officers as it may determine to be
necessary or proper. x x x

We hold that [the respondents] were able to present substantial evidence that [Cosare]
indeed held a corporate office, as evidenced by the General Information Sheet which was
submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on October 22, 2009.27
(Citations omitted and emphasis supplied)

Thus, the CA reversed the NLRC decision and resolution, and then entered a new one
dismissing the labor complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, finding it unnecessary to
resolve the main issues that were raised in the petition. Cosare filed a motion for
reconsideration, but this was denied by the CA via the Resolution28 dated March 26, 2012.
Hence, this petition.

The Present Petition

The pivotal issues for the petitions full resolution are as follows: (1) whether or not the case
instituted by Cosare was an intra-corporate dispute that was within the original jurisdiction of
the RTC, and not of the LAs; and (2) whether or not Cosare was constructively and illegally
dismissed from employment by the respondents.

The Courts Ruling

The petition is impressed with merit.

Jurisdiction over the controversy

As regards the issue of jurisdiction, the Court has determined that contrary to the ruling of
the CA, it is the LA, and not the regular courts, which has the original jurisdiction over the
subject controversy. An intra-corporate controversy, which falls within the jurisdiction of
regular courts, has been regarded in its broad sense to pertain to disputes that involve any
of the following relationships: (1) between the corporation, partnership or association and
the public; (2) between the corporation, partnership or association and the state in so far as
its franchise, permit or license to operate is concerned; (3) between the corporation,
partnership or association and its stockholders, partners, members or officers; and (4)
among the stockholders, partners or associates, themselves.29 Settled jurisprudence,
however, qualifies that when the dispute involves a charge of illegal dismissal, the action
may fall under the jurisdiction of the LAs upon whose jurisdiction, as a rule, falls termination
disputes and claims for damages arising from employer-employee relations as provided in
Article 217 of the Labor Code. Consistent with this jurisprudence, the mere fact that Cosare
was a stockholder and an officer of Broadcom at the time the subject controversy developed
failed to necessarily make the case an intra-corporate dispute.

In Matling Industrial and Commercial Corporation v. Coros,30 the Court distinguished

between a "regular employee" and a "corporate officer" for purposes of establishing the true
nature of a dispute or complaint for illegal dismissal and determining which body has
jurisdiction over it. Succinctly, it was explained that "[t]he determination of whether the
dismissed officer was a regular employee or corporate officer unravels the conundrum" of
whether a complaint for illegal dismissal is cognizable by the LA or by the RTC. "In case of
the regular employee, the LA has jurisdiction; otherwise, the RTC exercises the legal
authority to adjudicate.31

Applying the foregoing to the present case, the LA had the original jurisdiction over the
complaint for illegal dismissal because Cosare, although an officer of Broadcom for being its
AVP for Sales, was not a "corporate officer" as the term is defined by law. We emphasized
in Real v. Sangu Philippines, Inc.32 the definition of corporate officers for the purpose of
identifying an intra-corporate controversy. Citing Garcia v. Eastern Telecommunications
Philippines, Inc.,33 we held:

" Corporate officers in the context of Presidential Decree No. 902-A are those officers of
the corporation who are given that character by the Corporation Code or by the
corporations by-laws. There are three specific officers whom a corporation must have under
Section 25 of the Corporation Code. These are the president, secretary and the treasurer.
The number of officers is not limited to these three. A corporation may have such other
officers as may be provided for by its by-laws like, but not limited to, the vice-president,
cashier, auditor or general manager. The number of corporate officers is thus limited by law
and by the corporations by-laws."34 (Emphasis ours)

In Tabang v. NLRC,35 the Court also made the following pronouncement on the nature of
corporate offices:

It has been held that an "office" is created by the charter of the corporation and the officer is
elected by the directors and stockholders. On the other hand, an "employee" usually
occupies no office and generally is employed not by action of the directors or stockholders
but by the managing officer of the corporation who also determines the compensation to be
paid to such employee.36 (Citations omitted)

As may be deduced from the foregoing, there are two circumstances which must concur in
order for an individual to be considered a corporate officer, as against an ordinary employee
or officer, namely: (1) the creation of the position is under the corporations charter or by-
laws; and (2) the election of the officer is by the directors or stockholders. It is only when the
officer claiming to have been illegally dismissed is classified as such corporate officer that
the issue is deemed an intra-corporate dispute which falls within the jurisdiction of the trial
courts.

To support their argument that Cosare was a corporate officer, the respondents referred to
Section 1, Article IV of Broadcoms by-laws, which reads:

ARTICLE IV

OFFICER

Section 1. Election / Appointment Immediately after their election, the Board of Directors
shall formally organize by electing the President, the Vice-President, the Treasurer, and the
Secretary at said meeting.
The Board may, from time to time, appoint such other officers as it may determine to be
necessary or proper. Any two (2) or more compatible positions may be held concurrently by
the same person, except that no one shall act as President and Treasurer or Secretary at
the same time.37 (Emphasis ours)

This was also the CAs main basis in ruling that the matter was an intra-corporate dispute
that was within the trial courts jurisdiction.

The Court disagrees with the respondents and the CA. As may be gleaned from the
aforequoted provision, the only officers who are specifically listed, and thus with offices that
are created under Broadcoms by-laws are the following: the President, Vice-President,
Treasurer and Secretary. Although a blanket authority provides for the Boards appointment
of such other officers as it may deem necessary and proper, the respondents failed to
sufficiently establish that the position of AVP for Sales was created by virtue of an act of
Broadcoms board, and that Cosare was specifically elected or appointed to such position
by the directors. No board resolutions to establish such facts form part of the case records.
Further, it was held in Marc II Marketing, Inc. v. Joson38 that an enabling clause in a
corporations by-laws empowering its board of directors to create additional officers, even
with the subsequent passage of a board resolution to that effect, cannot make such position
a corporate office. The board of directors has no power to create other corporate offices
without first amending the corporate by-laws so as to include therein the newly created
corporate office.39 "To allow the creation of a corporate officer position by a simple inclusion
in the corporate by-laws of an enabling clause empowering the board of directors to do so
can result in the circumvention of that constitutionally well-protected right [of every
employee to security of tenure]."40

The CAs heavy reliance on the contents of the General Information Sheets41, which were
submitted by the respondents during the appeal proceedings and which plainly provided
that Cosare was an "officer" of Broadcom, was clearly misplaced. The said documents
could neither govern nor establish the nature of the office held by Cosare and his
appointment thereto. Furthermore, although Cosare could indeed be classified as an officer
as provided in the General Information Sheets, his position could only be deemed a regular
office, and not a corporate office as it is defined under the Corporation Code. Incidentally,
the Court noticed that although the Corporate Secretary of Broadcom, Atty. Efren L.
Cordero, declared under oath the truth of the matters set forth in the General Information
Sheets, the respondents failed to explain why the General Information Sheet officially filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission in 2011 and submitted to the CA by the
respondents still indicated Cosare as an AVP for Sales, when among their defenses in the
charge of illegal dismissal, they asserted that Cosare had severed his relationship with the
corporation since the year 2009.
Finally, the mere fact that Cosare was a stockholder of Broadcom at the time of the cases
filing did not necessarily make the action an intra- corporate controversy. "Not all conflicts
between the stockholders and the corporation are classified as intra-corporate. There are
other facts to consider in determining whether the dispute involves corporate matters as to
consider them as intra-corporate controversies."42 Time and again, the Court has ruled that
in determining the existence of an intra-corporate dispute, the status or relationship of the
parties and the nature of the question that is the subject of the controversy must be taken
into account.43 Considering that the pending dispute particularly relates to Cosares rights
and obligations as a regular officer of Broadcom, instead of as a stockholder of the
corporation, the controversy cannot be deemed intra-corporate. This is consistent with the
"controversy test" explained by the Court in Reyes v. Hon. RTC, Br. 142,44 to wit:

Under the nature of the controversy test, the incidents of that relationship must also be
considered for the purpose of ascertaining whether the controversy itself is intra-corporate.
The controversy must not only be rooted in the existence of an intra-corporate relationship,
but must as well pertain to the enforcement of the parties correlative rights and obligations
under the Corporation Code and the internal and intra-corporate regulatory rules of the
corporation. If the relationship and its incidents are merely incidental to the controversy or if
there will still be conflict even if the relationship does not exist, then no intra-corporate
controversy exists.45 (Citation omitted)

It bears mentioning that even the CAs finding46 that Cosare was a director of Broadcom
when the dispute commenced was unsupported by the case records, as even the General
Information Sheet of 2009 referred to in the CA decision to support such finding failed to
provide such detail.

All told, it is then evident that the CA erred in reversing the NLRCs ruling that favored
Cosare solely on the ground that the dispute was an intra-corporate controversy within the
jurisdiction of the regular courts.

The charge of constructive dismissal

Towards a full resolution of the instant case, the Court finds it appropriate to rule on the
correctness of the NLRCs ruling finding Cosare to have been illegally dismissed from
employment.
In filing his labor complaint, Cosare maintained that he was constructively dismissed, citing
among other circumstances the charges that were hurled and the suspension that was
imposed against him via Arevalos memo dated March 30, 2009. Even prior to such charge,
he claimed to have been subjected to mental torture, having been locked out of his files and
records and disallowed use of his office computer and access to personal belongings.47
While Cosare attempted to furnish the respondents with his reply to the charges, the latter
refused to accept the same on the ground that it was filed beyond the 48-hour period which
they provided in the memo.

Cosare further referred to the circumstances that allegedly transpired subsequent to the
service of the memo, particularly the continued refusal of the respondents to allow Cosares
entry into the companys premises. These incidents were cited in the CA decision as
follows:

On March 31, 2009, [Cosare] reported back to work again. He asked Villareal if he could
retrieve his personal belongings, but the latter said that x x x Arevalo directed her to deny
his request, so [Cosare] again waited at the receiving section of the office. On April 1, 2009,
[Cosare] was not allowed to enter the office premises. He was asked to just wait outside of
the Tektite (PSE) Towers, where [Broadcom] had its offices, for further instructions on how
and when he could get his personal belongings. [Cosare] waited until 8 p.m. for instructions
but none were given. Thus, [Cosare] sought the assistance of the officials of Barangay San
Antonio, Pasig who advised him to file a labor or replevin case to recover his personal
belongings. x x x.48 (Citation omitted)

It is also worth mentioning that a few days before the issuance of the memo dated March
30, 2009, Cosare was allegedly summoned to Arevalos office and was asked to tender his
immediate resignation from the company, in exchange for a financial assistance of
P300,000.00.49 The directive was said to be founded on Arevalos choice to retain Abiogs
employment with the company.50 The respondents failed to refute these claims.

Given the circumstances, the Court agrees with Cosares claim of constructive and illegal
dismissal. "[C]onstructive dismissal occurs when there is cessation of work because
continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable, or unlikely as when there is a
demotion in rank or diminution in pay or when a clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain
by an employer becomes unbearable to the employee leaving the latter with no other option
but to quit."51 In Dimagan v. Dacworks United, Incorporated,52 it was explained:
The test of constructive dismissal is whether a reasonable person in the employees
position would have felt compelled to give up his position under the circumstances. It is an
act amounting to dismissal but is made to appear as if it were not. Constructive dismissal is
therefore a dismissal in disguise. The law recognizes and resolves this situation in favor of
employees in order to protect their rights and interests from the coercive acts of the
employer.53 (Citation omitted)

It is clear from the cited circumstances that the respondents already rejected Cosares
continued involvement with the company. Even their refusal to accept the explanation which
Cosare tried to tender on April 2, 2009 further evidenced the resolve to deny Cosare of the
opportunity to be heard prior to any decision on the termination of his employment. The
respondents allegedly refused acceptance of the explanation as it was filed beyond the
mere 48-hour period which they granted to Cosare under the memo dated March 30, 2009.
However, even this limitation was a flaw in the memo or notice to explain which only further
signified the respondents discrimination, disdain and insensibility towards Cosare,
apparently resorted to by the respondents in order to deny their employee of the opportunity
to fully explain his defenses and ultimately, retain his employment. The Court emphasized in
King of Kings Transport, Inc. v. Mamac54 the standards to be observed by employers in
complying with the service of notices prior to termination:

[T]he first written notice to be served on the employees should contain the specific causes
or grounds for termination against them, and a directive that the employees are given the
opportunity to submit their written explanation within a reasonable period. "Reasonable
opportunity" under the Omnibus Rules means every kind of assistance that management
must accord to the employees to enable them to prepare adequately for their defense. This
should be construed as a period of at least five (5) calendar days from receipt of the notice
to give the employees an opportunity to study the accusation against them, consult a union
official or lawyer, gather data and evidence, and decide on the defenses they will raise
against the complaint. Moreover, in order to enable the employees to intelligently prepare
their explanation and defenses, the notice should contain a detailed narration of the facts
and circumstances that will serve as basis for the charge against the employees. A general
description of the charge will not suffice. Lastly, the notice should specifically mention which
company rules, if any, are violated and/or which among the grounds under Art. 282 is being
charged against the employees.55 (Citation omitted, underscoring ours, and emphasis
supplied)

In sum, the respondents were already resolute on a severance of their working relationship
with Cosare, notwithstanding the facts which could have been established by his
explanations and the respondents full investigation on the matter. In addition to this, the fact
that no further investigation and final disposition appeared to have been made by the
respondents on Cosares case only negated the claim that they actually intended to first
look into the matter before making a final determination as to the guilt or innocence of their
employee. This also manifested from the fact that even before Cosare was required to
present his side on the charges of serious misconduct and willful breach of trust, he was
summoned to Arevalos office and was asked to tender his immediate resignation in
exchange for financial assistance.

The clear intent of the respondents to find fault in Cosare was also manifested by their
persistent accusation that Cosare abandoned his post, allegedly signified by his failure to
report to work or file a leave of absence beginning April 1, 2009. This was even the subject
of a memo56 issued by Arevalo to Cosare on April 14, 2009, asking him to explain his
absence within 48 hours from the date of the memo. As the records clearly indicated,
however, Arevalo placed Cosare under suspension beginning March 30, 2009. The
suspension covered access to any and all company files/records and the use of the assets
of the company, with warning that his failure to comply with the memo would be dealt with
drastic management action. The charge of abandonment was inconsistent with this imposed
suspension. "Abandonment is the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to
resume his employment. To constitute abandonment of work, two elements must concur:
(1) the employee must have failed to report for work or must have been absent without
valid or justifiable reason; and (2) there must have been a clear intention on the part of the
employee to sever the employer- employee relationship manifested by some overt act."57
Cosares failure to report to work beginning April 1, 2009 was neither voluntary nor
indicative of an intention to sever his employment with Broadcom. It was illogical to be
requiring him to report for work, and imputing fault when he failed to do so after he was
specifically denied access to all of the companys assets. As correctly observed by the
NLRC:

[T]he Respondent[s] had charged [Cosare] of abandoning his employment beginning on

April 1, 2009. However[,] the show-cause letter dated March 3[0], 2009 (Annex "F", ibid)
suspended [Cosare] from using not only the equipment but the "assets" of Respondent
[Broadcom]. This insults rational thinking because the Respondents tried to mislead us and
make [it appear] that [Cosare] failed to report for work when they had in fact had [sic] placed
him on suspension. x x x.58

Following a finding of constructive dismissal, the Court finds no cogent reason to modify the
NLRC's monetary awards in Cosare's favor. In Robinsons Galleria/Robinsons Supermarket
Corporation v. Ranchez,59 the Court reiterated that an illegally or constructively dismissed
employee is entitled to: (1) either reinstatement, if viable, or separation pay, if reinstatement
is no longer viable; and (2) backwages.60 The award of exemplary damages was also
justified given the NLRC's finding that the respondents acted in bad faith and in a wanton,
oppressive and malevolent manner when they dismissed Cosare. It is also by reason of
such bad faith that Arevalo was correctly declared solidarily liable for the monetary awards.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated November 24, 2011 and
Resolution dated March 26, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 117356 are
SET ASIDE. The Decision dated August 24, 2010 of the National Labor Relations
Commission in favor of petitioner Raul C. Cosare is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

12. G.R. No. 198587, January 14, 2015

SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES (SAUDIA) AND BRENDA J. BETIA, Petitioners, v. MA. JOPETTE M.
REBESENCIO, MONTASSAH B. SACAR-ADIONG, ROUEN RUTH A. CRISTOBAL AND LORAINE S.
SCHNEIDER-CRUZ, Respondents.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

All Filipinos are entitled to the protection of the rights guaranteed in the Constitution.

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari with application for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure praying
that judgment be rendered reversing and setting aside the June 16, 2011 Decision 1 and September
13, 2011 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 113006.

Petitioner Saudi Arabian Airlines (Saudia) is a foreign corporation established and existing under the
laws of Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It has a Philippine office located at 4/F, Metro House
Building, Sen. Gil J. Puyat Avenue, Makati City.3 In its Petition filed with this court, Saudia identified
itself as follows:
chanroble svirtuallawlibrary

1. Petitioner SAUDIA is a foreign corporation established and existing under the Royal Decree No.
M/24 of 18.07.1385H (10.02.1962G) in Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia ("KSA"). Its Philippine Office
is located at 4/F Metro House Building, Sen, Gil J. Puyat Avenue, Makati City (Philippine Office). It may
be served with orders of this Honorable Court through undersigned counsel at 4 th and 6th Floors,
Citibank Center Bldg., 8741 Paseo de Roxas, Makati City.4 (Emphasis supplied)
Respondents (complainants before the Labor Arbiter) were recruited and hired by Saudia as
Temporary Flight Attendants with the accreditation and approval of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration.5 After undergoing seminars required by the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration for deployment overseas, as well as training modules offered by Saudia
(e.g., initial flight attendant/training course and transition training), and after working as Temporary
Flight Attendants, respondents became Permanent Flight Attendants. They then entered into Cabin
Attendant contracts with Saudia: Ma. Jopette M. Rebesencio (Ma. Jopette) on May 16,
1990;6Montassah B. Sacar-Adiong (Montassah) and Rouen Ruth A. Cristobal (Rouen Ruth) on May 22,
1993;7and Loraine Schneider-Cruz (Loraine) on August 27, 1995. 8

Respondents continued their employment with Saudia until they were separated from service on
various dates in 2006.9

Respondents contended that the termination of their employment was illegal. They alleged that the
termination was made solely because they were pregnant. 10
As respondents alleged, they had informed Saudia of their respective pregnancies and had gone
through the necessary procedures to process their maternity leaves. Initially, Saudia had given its
approval but later on informed respondents that its management in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia had
disapproved their maternity leaves. In addition, it required respondents to file their resignation
letters.11

Respondents were told that if they did not resign, Saudia would terminate them all the same. The
threat of termination entailed the loss of benefits, such as separation pay and ticket discount
entitlements.12

Specifically, Ma. Jopette received a call on October 16, 2006 from Saudia's Base Manager, Abdulmalik
Saddik (Abdulmalik).13 Montassah was informed personally by Abdulmalik and a certain Faisal Hussein
on October 20, 2006 after being required to report to the office one (1) month into her maternity
leave.14 Rouen Ruth was also personally informed by Abdulmalik on October 17, 2006 after being
required to report to the office by her Group Supervisor.15 Loraine received a call on October 12, 2006
from her Group Supervisor, Dakila Salvador.16

Saudia anchored its disapproval of respondents' maternity leaves and demand for their resignation on
its "Unified Employment Contract for Female Cabin Attendants" (Unified Contract). 17 Under the Unified
Contract, the employment of a Flight Attendant who becomes pregnant is rendered void. It
provides:chanroble svirtuallawlibrary

(H) Due to the essential nature of the Air Hostess functions to be physically fit on board to provide
various services required in normal or emergency cases on both domestic/international flights beside
her role in maintaining continuous safety and security of passengers, and since she will not be able to
maintain the required medical fitness while at work in case of pregnancy, accordingly, if the Air
Hostess becomes pregnant at any time during the term of this contract, this shall render
her employment contract as void and she will be terminated due to lack of medical
fitness.18 (Emphasis supplied)
In their Comment on the present Petition,19 respondents emphasized that the Unified Contract took
effect on September 23, 2006 (the first day of Ramadan), 20 well after they had filed and had their
maternity leaves approved. Ma. Jopette filed her maternity leave application on September 5,
2006.21Montassah filed her maternity leave application on August 29, 2006, and its approval was
already indicated in Saudia's computer system by August 30, 2006. 22 Rouen Ruth filed her maternity
leave application on September 13, 2006, 23 and Loraine filed her maternity leave application on August
22, 2006.24

Rather than comply and tender resignation letters, respondents filed separate appeal letters that were
all rejected.25

Despite these initial rejections, respondents each received calls on the morning of November 6, 2006
from Saudia's office secretary informing them that their maternity leaves had been approved. Saudia,
however, was quick to renege on its approval. On the evening of November 6, 2006, respondents
again received calls informing them that it had received notification from Jeddah, Saudi Arabia that
their maternity leaves had been disapproved.26

Faced with the dilemma of resigning or totally losing their benefits, respondents executed handwritten
resignation letters. In Montassah's and Rouen Ruth's cases, their resignations were executed on
Saudia's blank letterheads that Saudia had provided. These letterheads already had the word
"RESIGNATION" typed on the subject portions of their headings when these were handed to
respondents.27

On November 8, 2007, respondents filed a Complaint against Saudia and its officers for illegal
dismissal and for underpayment of salary, overtime pay, premium pay for holiday, rest day, premium,
service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay, separation pay, night shift differentials, medical expense
reimbursements, retirement benefits, illegal deduction, lay-over expense and allowances, moral and
exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.28 The case was initially assigned to Labor Arbiter Hermino V.
Suelo and docketed as NLRC NCR Case No. 00-11-12342-07.

Saudia assailed the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.29 It claimed that all the determining points of
contact referred to foreign law and insisted that the Complaint ought to be dismissed on the ground
of forum non conveniens.30 It added that respondents had no cause of action as they resigned
voluntarily.31

On December 12, 2008, Executive Labor Arbiter Fatima Jambaro-Franco rendered the
Decision32dismissing respondents' Complaint. The dispositive portion of this Decision reads: chanroble svirtuallawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises' considered, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the instant

complaint for lack of jurisdiction/merit. 33 cralawlawlibrary

On respondents' appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission's Sixth Division reversed the ruling
of Executive Labor Arbiter Jambaro-Franco. It explained that "[considering that complainants-
appellants are OFWs, the Labor Arbiters and the NLRC has [sic] jurisdiction to hear and decide their
complaint for illegal termination."34 On the matter of forum non conveniens, it noted that there were
no special circumstances that warranted its abstention from exercising jurisdiction. 35 On the issue of
whether respondents were validly dismissed, it held that there was nothing on record to support
Saudia's claim that respondents resigned voluntarily.

The dispositive portion of the November 19, 2009 National Labor Relations Commission
Decision36reads:chanroble svirtuallawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding the appeal impressed with
merit. The respondents-appellees are hereby directed to pay complainants-appellants the aggregate
amount of SR614,001.24 corresponding to their backwages and separation pay plus ten (10%)
percent thereof as attorney's fees. The decision of the Labor Arbiter dated December 12, 2008 is
hereby VACATED and SET ASIDE. Attached is the computation prepared by this Commission and made
an integral part of this Decision.37 cralawla wlibrary

In the Resolution dated February 11, 2010,38 the National Labor Relations Commission denied
petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.

In the June 16, 2011 Decision,39 the Court of Appeals denied petitioners' Rule 65 Petition and modified
the Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission with respect to the award of separation pay
and backwages.

The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals Decision reads: chanroble svirtuallawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated November 19, 2009 issued
by public respondent, Sixth Division of the National Labor Relations Commission - National Capital
Region is MODIFIED only insofar as the computation of the award of separation pay and backwages.
For greater clarity, petitioners are ordered to pay private respondents separation pay which shall be
computed from private respondents' first day of employment up to the finality of this decision, at the
rate of one month per year of service and backwages which shall be computed from the date the
private respondents were illegally terminated until finality of this decision. Consequently, the ten
percent (10%) attorney's fees shall be based on the total amount of the award. The assailed Decision
is affirmed in all other respects.

The labor arbiter is hereby DIRECTED to make a recomputation based on the foregoing. 40 cralawlawlibrary

In the Resolution dated September 13, 2011,41 the Court of Appeals denied petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration.

Hence, this Appeal was filed.

The issues for resolution are the following:

First, whether the Labor Arbiter and the National Labor Relations Commission may exercise jurisdiction
over Saudi Arabian Airlines and apply Philippine law in adjudicating the present dispute;

Second, whether respondents' voluntarily resigned or were illegally terminated; and

Lastly, whether Brenda J. Betia may be held personally liable along with Saudi Arabian Airlines. chanRoble svirtualLawlibrary

I
Summons were validly served on Saudia and jurisdiction over it validly acquired.

There is no doubt that the pleadings and summons were served on Saudia through its
counsel.42Saudia, however, claims that the Labor Arbiter and the National Labor Relations Commission
had no jurisdiction over it because summons were never served on it but on "Saudia
Manila."43 Referring to itself as "Saudia Jeddah," it claims that "Saudia Jeddah" and not "Saudia
Manila" was the employer of respondents because:

First, "Saudia Manila" was never a party to the Cabin Attendant contracts entered into by respondents;

Second, it was "Saudia Jeddah" that provided the funds to pay for respondents' salaries and benefits;
and

Lastly, it was with "Saudia Jeddah" that respondents filed their resignations. 44

Saudia posits that respondents' Complaint was brought against the wrong party because "Saudia
Manila," upon which summons was served, was never the employer of respondents. 45

Saudia is vainly splitting hairs in its effort to absolve itself of liability. Other than its bare allegation,
there is no basis for concluding that "Saudia Jeddah" is distinct from "Saudia Manila."

What is clear is Saudia's statement in its own Petition that what it has is a "Philippine Office . . .
located at 4/F Metro House Building, Sen. Gil J. Puyat Avenue, Makati City." 46 Even in the position
paper that Saudia submitted to the Labor Arbiter,47 what Saudia now refers to as "Saudia Jeddah" was
then only referred to as "Saudia Head Office at Jeddah, KSA," 48 while what Saudia now refers to as
"Saudia Manila" was then only referred to as "Saudia's office in Manila." 49

By its own admission, Saudia, while a foreign corporation, has a Philippine office.

Section 3(d) of Republic Act No.. 7042, otherwise known as the Foreign Investments Act of 1991,
provides the following: chanroble svirtuallawlibrary

The phrase "doing business" shall include . . . opening offices, whether called "liaison"
offices or branches; . . . and any other act or acts that imply a continuity of commercial dealings or
arrangements and contemplate to that extent the performance of acts or works, or the exercise of
some of the functions normally incident to, and in progressive prosecution of commercial gain or of the
purpose and object of the business organization. (Emphasis supplied)
A plain application of Section 3(d) of the Foreign Investments Act leads to no other conclusion than
that Saudia is a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines. As such, Saudia may be sued in
the Philippines and is subject to the jurisdiction of Philippine tribunals.

Moreover, since there is no real distinction between "Saudia Jeddah" and "Saudia Manila" the latter
being nothing more than Saudia's local office service of summons to Saudia's office in Manila
sufficed to vest jurisdiction over Saudia's person in Philippine tribunals. chanRoblesvirtualLa wlibrary

II

Saudia asserts that Philippine courts and/or tribunals are not in a position to make an intelligent
decision as to the law and the facts. This is because respondents' Cabin Attendant contracts require
the application of the laws of Saudi Arabia, rather than those of the Philippines. 50 It claims that the
difficulty of ascertaining foreign law calls into operation the principle of forum non conveniens, thereby
rendering improper the exercise of jurisdiction by Philippine tribunals. 51

A choice of law governing the validity of contracts or the interpretation of its provisions dees not
necessarily imply forum non conveniens. Choice of law and forum non conveniens are entirely different
matters.

Choice of law provisions are an offshoot of the fundamental principle of autonomy of contracts. Article
1306 of the Civil Code firmly ensconces this: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Article 1306. The contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as
they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order,
or public policy.
In contrast, forum non conveniens is a device akin to the rule against forum shopping. It is designed
to frustrate illicit means for securing advantages and vexing litigants that would otherwise be possible
if the venue of litigation (or dispute resolution) were left entirely to the whim of either party.

Contractual choice of law provisions factor into transnational litigation and dispute resolution in one of
or in a combination of four ways: (1) procedures for settling disputes, e.g., arbitration; (2) forum, i.e.,
venue; (3) governing law; and (4) basis for interpretation. Forum non conveniens relates to, but is not
subsumed by, the second of these.

Likewise, contractual choice of law is not determinative of jurisdiction. Stipulating on the laws of a
given jurisdiction as the governing law of a contract does not preclude the exercise of jurisdiction by
tribunals elsewhere. The reverse is equally true: The assumption of jurisdiction by tribunals does
not ipso facto mean that it cannot apply and rule on the basis of the parties' stipulation. In Hasegawa
v. Kitamura:52 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Analytically, jurisdiction and choice of law are two distinct concepts. Jurisdiction considers whether it is
fair to cause a defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the further question whether the
application of a substantive law V'hich will determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties. The
power to exercise jurisdiction does not automatically give a state constitutional authority to apply
forum law. While jurisdiction and the choice of the lex fori will often, coincide, the "minimum contacts"
for one do not always provide the necessary "significant contacts" for the other. The question of
whether the law of a state can be applied to a transaction is different from the question of whether the
courts of that state have jurisdiction to enter a judgment. 53 cralawla wlibrary

As various dealings, commercial or otherwise, are facilitated by the progressive ease of

communication and travel, persons from various jurisdictions find themselves transacting with each
other. Contracts involving foreign elements are, however, nothing new. Conflict of laws situations
precipitated by disputes and litigation anchored on these contracts are not totally novel.

Transnational transactions entail differing laws on the requirements Q for the validity of the formalities
and substantive provisions of contracts and their interpretation. These transactions inevitably lend
themselves to the possibility of various fora for litigation and dispute resolution. As observed by an
eminent expert on transnational law: chanroble svirtuallawlibrary

The more jurisdictions having an interest in, or merely even a point of contact with, a transaction or
relationship, the greater the number of potential fora for the resolution of disputes arising out of or
related to that transaction or relationship. In a world of increased mobility, where business and
personal transactions transcend national boundaries, the jurisdiction of a number of different fora may
easily be invoked in a single or a set of related disputes. 54 cralawlawlibrary

Philippine law is definite as to what governs the formal or extrinsic validity of contracts. The first
paragraph of Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that "[t]he forms and solemnities of contracts . . .
shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed" 55 (i.e., lex loci celebrationis).

In contrast, there is no statutorily established mode of settling conflict of laws situations on matters
pertaining to substantive content of contracts. It has been noted that three (3) modes have emerged:
(1) lex loci contractus or the law of the place of the making; (2) lex loci solutionis or the law of the
place of performance; and (3) lex loci intentionis or the law intended by the parties.56

Given Saudia's assertions, of particular relevance to resolving the present dispute is lex loci
intentionis.

An author observed that Spanish jurists and commentators "favor lex loci intentionis."57 These jurists
and commentators proceed from the Civil Code of Spain, which, like our Civil Code, is silent on what
governs the intrinsic validity of contracts, and the same civil law traditions from which we draw ours.

In this jurisdiction, this court, in Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee v. V.P. Eusebio
Construction, Inc.,58 manifested preference for allowing the parties to select the law applicable to their
contract":chanroble svirtuallawlibrary
No conflicts rule on essential validity of contracts is expressly provided for in our laws. The rule
followed by most legal systems, however, is that the intrinsic validity of a contract must be governed
by the lex contractus or "proper law of the contract." This is the law voluntarily agreed upon by the
parties (the lex loci voluntatis) or the law intended by them either expressly or implicitly (the lex loci
intentionis). The law selected may be implied from such factors as substantial connection with the
transaction, or the nationality or domicile of the parties. Philippine courts would do well to adopt the
first and most basic rule in most legal systems, namely, to allow the parties to select the law
applicable to their contract, subject to the limitation that it is not against the law, morals, or public
policy of the forum and that the chosen law must bear a substantive relationship to the
transaction.59 (Emphasis in the original)
Saudia asserts that stipulations set in the Cabin Attendant contracts require the application of the laws
of Saudi Arabia. It insists that the need to comply with these stipulations calls into operation the
doctrine of forum non conveniens and, in turn, makes it necessary for Philippine tribunals to refrain
from exercising jurisdiction.

As mentioned, contractual choice of laws factors into transnational litigation in any or a combination of
four (4) ways. Moreover, forum non conveniens relates to one of these: choosing between multiple
possible fora.

Nevertheless, the possibility of parallel litigation in multiple fora along with the host of difficulties it
poses is not unique to transnational litigation. It is a difficulty that similarly arises in disputes well
within the bounds of a singe jurisdiction.

When parallel litigation arises strictly within the context of a single jurisdiction, such rules as those on
forum shopping, litis pendentia, and res judicata come into operation. Thus, in the Philippines, the
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure provide for willful and deliberate forum shopping as a ground not only
for summary dismissal with prejudice but also for citing parties and counsels in direct contempt, as
well as for the imposition of administrative sanctions. 60 Likewise, the same rules expressly provide that
a party may seek the dismissal of a Complaint or another pleading asserting a claim on the ground
"[t]hat there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause," i.e., litis
pendentia, or "[t]hat the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment," 61 i.e., res judicata.

Forum non conveniens, like the rules of forum shopping, litis pendentia, and res judicata, is a means
of addressing the problem of parallel litigation. While the rules of forum shopping, litis pendentia,
and res judicata are designed to address the problem of parallel litigation within a single
jurisdiction, forum non conveniens is a means devised to address parallel litigation arising in multiple
jurisdictions.

Forum non conveniens literally translates to "the forum is inconvenient." 62 It is a concept in private
international law and was devised to combat the "less than honorable" reasons and excuses that
litigants use to secure procedural advantages, annoy and harass defendants, avoid overcrowded
dockets, and select a "friendlier" venue.63 Thus, the doctrine of forum non conveniens addresses the
same rationale that the rule against forum shopping does, albeit on a multijurisdictional scale.

Forum non conveniens, like res judicata,64 is a concept originating in common law.65 However, unlike
the rule on res judicata, as well as those on litis pendentia and forum shopping, forum non
conveniens finds no textual anchor, whether in statute or in procedural rules, in our civil law system.
Nevertheless, jurisprudence has applied forum non conveniens as basis for a court to decline its
exercise of jurisdiction.66

Forum non conveniens is soundly applied not only to address parallel litigation and undermine a
litigant's capacity to vex and secure undue advantages by engaging in forum shopping on an
international scale. It is also grounded on principles of comity and judicial efficiency.

Consistent with the principle of comity, a tribunal's desistance in exercising jurisdiction on account
of forum non conveniens is a deferential gesture to the tribunals of another sovereign. It is a measure
that prevents the former's having to interfere in affairs which are better and more competently
addressed by the latter. Further, forum non conveniens entails a recognition not only that tribunals
elsewhere are better suited to rule on and resolve a controversy, but also, that these tribunals
are better positioned to enforce judgments and, ultimately, to dispense justice. Forum non
conveniens prevents the embarrassment of an awkward situation where a tribunal is rendered
incompetent in the face of the greater capability both analytical and practical of a tribunal in
another jurisdiction.

The wisdom of avoiding conflicting and unenforceable judgments is as much a matter of efficiency and
economy as it is a matter of international courtesy. A court would effectively be neutering itself if it
insists on adjudicating a controversy when it knows full well that it is in no position to enforce its
judgment. Doing so is not only an exercise in futility; it is an act of frivolity. It clogs the dockets of
a.tribunal and leaves it to waste its efforts on affairs, which, given transnational exigencies, will be
reduced to mere academic, if not trivial, exercises.

Accordingly, under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, "a court, in conflicts of law
cases, may refuse impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not the most 'convenient' or available
forum and the parties are not precluded from seeking remedies elsewhere." 67 In Puyat v.
Zabarte,68 this court recognized the following situations as among those that may warrant a court's
desistance from exercising jurisdiction: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

1) The belief that the matter can be better tried and decided elsewhere,
either because the main aspects of the case transpired in a foreign
jurisdiction or the material witnesses have their residence there;

2) The belief that the non-resident plaintiff sought the forum[,] a practice
known as forum shopping[,] merely to secure procedural advantages or
to convey or harass the defendant;

3) The unwillingness to extend local judicial facilities to non residents or

aliens when the docket may already be overcrowded;

4) The inadequacy of the local judicial machinery for effectuating the right
sought to be maintained; and

5) The difficulty of ascertaining foreign law.69

In Bank of America, NT&SA, Bank of America International, Ltd. v. Court of Appeals,70 this court
underscored that a Philippine court may properly assume jurisdiction over a case if it chooses to do so
to the extent: "(1) that the Philippine Court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to; (2)
that the Philippine Court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts;
and (3) that the Philippine Court has or is likely to have power to enforce its decision." 71

The use of the word "may" (i.e., "may refuse impositions on its jurisdiction" 72) in the decisions shows
that the matter of jurisdiction rests on the sound discretion of a court. Neither the mere invocation
of forum non conveniens nor the averment of foreign elements operates to automatically divest a
court of jurisdiction. Rather, a court should renounce jurisdiction only "after 'vital facts are established,
to determine whether special circumstances' require the court's desistance." 73 As the propriety of
applying forum non conveniens is contingent on a factual determination, it is, therefore, a matter of
defense.74

The second sentence of Rule 9, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is exclusive in its recital
of the grounds for dismissal that are exempt from the omnibus motion rule: (1) lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter; (2) litis pendentia; (3) res judicata; and (4) prescription. Moreover, dismissal
on account offorum non conveniens is a fundamentally discretionary matter. It is, therefore, not a
matter for a defendant to foist upon the court at his or her own convenience; rather, it must be
pleaded at the earliest possible opportunity.

On the matter of pleading forum non conveniens, we state the rule, thus: Forum non conveniens must
not only be clearly pleaded as a ground for dismissal; it must be pleaded as such at the earliest
possible opportunity. Otherwise, it shall be deemed waived.

This court notes that in Hasegawa,76 this court stated that forum non conveniens is not a ground for a
motion to dismiss. The factual ambience of this case however does not squarely raise the viability of
this doctrine. Until the opportunity comes to review the use of motions to dismiss for parallel
litigation, Hasegawa remains existing doctrine.

Consistent with forum non conveniens as fundamentally a factual matter, it is imperative that it
proceed from & factually established basis. It would be improper to dismiss an action pursuant
to forum non conveniens based merely on a perceived, likely, or hypothetical multiplicity of fora.
Thus, a defendant must also plead and show that a prior suit has, in fact, been brought in another
jurisdiction.

The existence of a prior suit makes real the vexation engendered by duplicitous litigation, the
embarrassment of intruding into the affairs of another sovereign, and the squandering of judicial
efforts in resolving a dispute already lodged and better resolved elsewhere. As has been noted: chanroble svirtuallawlibrary

A case will not be stayed o dismissed on [forum] non conveniens grounds unless the plaintiff is shown
to have an available alternative forum elsewhere. On this, the moving party bears the burden of proof.

A number of factors affect the assessment of an alternative forum's adequacy. The statute of
limitations abroad may have run, of the foreign court may lack either subject matter or personal
jurisdiction over the defendant. . . . Occasionally, doubts will be raised as to the integrity or
impartiality of the foreign court (based, for example, on suspicions of corruption or bias in favor of
local nationals), as to the fairness of its judicial procedures, or as to is operational efficiency (due, for
example, to lack of resources, congestion and delay, or interfering circumstances such as a civil
unrest). In one noted case, [it was found] that delays of 'up to a quarter of a century' rendered the
foreign forum... inadequate for these purposes. 77 cralawlawlibrary

We deem it more appropriate and in the greater interest of prudence that a defendant not only allege
supposed dangerous tendencies in litigating in this jurisdiction; the defendant must also show that
such danger is real and present in that litigation or dispute resolution has commenced in another
jurisdiction and that a foreign tribunal has chosen to exercise jurisdiction.

III

Forum non conveniens finds no application and does not operate to divest Philippine tribunals of
jurisdiction and to require the application of foreign law.

Saudia invokes forum non conveniens to supposedly effectuate the stipulations of the Cabin Attendant
contracts that require the application of the laws of Saudi Arabia.

Forum non conveniens relates to forum, not to the choice of governing law. Thai forum non
conveniens may ultimately result in the application of foreign law is merely an incident of its
application. In this strict sense, forum non conveniens is not applicable. It is not the primarily pivotal
consideration in this case.

In any case, even a further consideration of the applicability of forum non conveniens on the incidental
matter of the law governing respondents' relation with Saudia leads to the conclusion that it is
improper for Philippine tribunals to divest themselves of jurisdiction.

Any evaluation of the propriety of contracting parties' choice of a forum and'its incidents must grapple
with two (2) considerations: first, the availability and adequacy of recourse to a foreign tribunal; and
second, the question of where, as between the forum court and a foreign court, the balance of
interests inhering in a dispute weighs more heavily.

The first is a pragmatic matter. It relates to the viability of ceding jurisdiction to a foreign tribunal and
can be resolved by juxtaposing the competencies and practical circumstances of the tribunals in
alternative fora. Exigencies, like the statute of limitations, capacity to enforce orders and judgments,
access to records, requirements for the acquisition of jurisdiction, and even questions relating to the
integrity of foreign courts, may render undesirable or even totally unfeasible recourse to a foreign
court. As mentioned, we consider it in the greater interest of prudence that a defendant show, in
pleading forum non conveniens, that litigation has commenced in another jurisdiction and that a
foieign tribunal has, in fact, chosen to exercise jurisdiction.

Two (2) factors weigh into a court's appraisal of the balance of interests inhering in a dispute: first, the
vinculum which the parties and their relation have to a given jurisdiction; and second, the public
interest that must animate a tribunal, in its capacity as an agent of the sovereign, in choosing to
assume or decline jurisdiction. The first is more concerned with the parties, their personal
circumstances, and private interests; the second concerns itself with the state and the greater social
order.

In considering the vinculum, a court must look into the preponderance of linkages which the parties
and their transaction may have to either jurisdiction. In this respect, factors, such as the parties'
respective nationalities and places of negotiation, execution, performance, engagement or
deployment, come into play.

In considering public interest, a court proceeds with a consciousness that it is an organ of the state. It
must, thus, determine if the interests of the sovereign (which acts through it) are outweighed by
those of the alternative jurisdiction. In this respect, the court delves into a consideration of public
policy. Should it find that public interest weighs more heavily in favor of its assumption of jurisdiction,
it should proceed in adjudicating the dispute, any doubt or .contrary view arising from the
preponderance of linkages notwithstanding.

Our law on contracts recognizes the validity of contractual choice of law provisions. Where such
provisions exist, Philippine tribunals, acting as the forum court, generally defer to the parties'
articulated choice.

This is consistent with the fundamental principle of autonomy of contracts. Article 1306 of the Civ:l
Code expressly provides that "[t]he contracting parties may establish 'such stipulations, clauses,
terms and conditions as they may deem convenient." 78 Nevertheless, while a Philippine tribunal (acting
as the forum court) is called upon to respect the parties' choice of governing law, such respect must
not be so permissive as to lose sight of considerations of law, morals, good customs, public order, or
public policy that underlie the contract central to the controversy.

Specifically with respect to public policy, in Pakistan International Airlines Corporation v. Ople,79 this
court explained that:chanroble svirtuallawlibrary

counter-balancing the principle of autonomy of contracting parties is the equally general rule that
provisions of applicable law, especially provisions relating to matters affected with public policy, are
deemed written inta the contract. Put a little differently, the governing principle is that parties may not
contract away applicable provisions of law especially peremptory provisions dealing with matters
heavily impressed with public interest.80 (Emphasis supplied)
Article II, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution provides that "[t]he State ... shall ensure the
fundamental equality before the law of women and men." Contrasted with Article II, Section 1 of the
1987 Constitution's statement that "[n]o person shall ... be denied the equal protection of the laws,"
Article II, Section 14 exhorts the State to "ensure." This does not only mean that the Philippines shall
not countenance nor lend legal recognition and approbation to measures that discriminate on the basis
of one's being male or female. It imposes an obligation to actively engage in securing the fundamental
equality of men and women.

The Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), signed and
ratified by the Philippines on July 15, 1980, and on August 5, 1981, respectively,81 is part of the law of
the land. In view of the widespread signing and ratification of, as well as adherence (in practice) to it
by states, it may even be said that many provisions of the CEDAW may have become customary
international law. The CEDAW gives effect to the Constitution's policy statement in Article II, Section
14. Article I of the CEDAW defines "discrimination against women" as: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of
impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital
status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the
political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field. 82
cralawla wlibrary

The constitutional exhortation to ensure fundamental equality, as illumined by its enabling law, the
CEDAW, must inform and animate all the actions of all personalities acting on behalf of the State. It is,
therefore, the bounden duty of this court, in rendering judgment on the disputes brought before it, to
ensure that no discrimination is heaped upon women on the mere basis of their being women. This is
a point so basic and central that all our discussions and pronouncements regardless of whatever
averments there may be of foreign law must proceed from this premise.

So informed and animated, we emphasize the glaringly discriminatory nature of Saudia's policy. As
argued by respondents, Saudia's policy entails the termination of employment of flight attendants who
become pregnant. At the risk of stating the obvious, pregnancy is an occurrence that pertains
specifically to women. Saudia's policy excludes from and restricts employment on the basis of no other
consideration but sex.

We do not lose sight of the reality that pregnancy does present physical limitations that may render
difficult the performance of functions associated with being a flight attendant. Nevertheless, it would
be the height of iniquity to view pregnancy as a disability so permanent and immutable that, it must
entail the termination of one's employment. It is clear to us that any individual, regardless of gender,
may be subject to exigencies that limit the performance of functions. However, we fail to appreciate
how pregnancy could be such an impairing occurrence that it leaves no other recourse but the
complete termination of the means through which a woman earns a living.

Apart from the constitutional policy on the fundamental equality before the law of men and women, it
is settled that contracts relating to labor and employment are impressed with public interest. Article
1700 of the Civil Code provides that "[t]he relation between capital and labor are not merely
contractual. They are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts must yield to the common
good."

Consistent with this, this court's pronouncements in Pakistan International Airlines Corporation83 are
clear and unmistakable: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Petitioner PIA cannot take refuge in paragraph 10 of its employment agreement which specifies, firstly,
the law of Pakistan as the applicable law of the agreement, and, secondly, lays the venue for
settlement of any dispute arising out of or in connection with the agreement "only [in] courts of
Karachi, Pakistan". The first clause of paragraph 10 cannot be invoked to prevent the application of
Philippine labor laws and'regulations to the subject matter of this case, i.e., the employer-employee
relationship between petitioner PIA and private respondents. We have already pointed out that the
relationship is much affected with public interest and that the otherwise applicable Philippine laws and
regulations cannot be rendered illusory by the parties agreeing upon some other law to govern their
relationship. . . . Under these circumstances, paragraph 10 of the employment agreement cannot be
given effect so as to oust Philippine agencies and courts of the jurisdiction vested upon them by
Philippine law.84 (Emphasis supplied)
As the present dispute relates to (what the respondents allege to be) the illegal termination of
respondents' employment, this case is immutably a matter of public interest and public policy.
Consistent with clear pronouncements in law and jurisprudence, Philippine laws properly find
application in and govern this case. 'Moreover, as this premise for Saudia's insistence on the
application forum non conveniens has been shattered, it follows that Philippine tribunals may properly
assume jurisdiction over the present controversy. Philippine jurisprudence provides ample illustrations
of when a court's renunciation of jurisdiction on account of forum non conveniens is proper or
improper.'

In Philsec Investment Corporation v. Court of Appeals,85 this court noted that the trial court failed to
consider that one of the plaintiffs was a domestic corporation, that one of the defendants was a
Filipino, and that it was the extinguishment of the latter's debt that was the object of the transaction
subject of the litigation. Thus, this court held, among others, that the trial court's refusal to assume
jurisdiction was not justified by forum non conveniens and remanded the case to the trial court.

In Raytheon International, Inc. v. Rouzie, Jr.,86 this court sustained the trial court's assumption of
jurisdiction considering that the trial court could properly enforce judgment on the petitioner which
was a foreign corporation licensed to do business in the Philippines.

In Pioneer International, Ltd. v. Guadiz, Jr.,87 this court found no reason to disturb the trial court's
assumption of jurisdiction over a case in which, as noted by the trial court, "it is more convenient to
hear and decide the case in the Philippines because Todaro [the plaintiff] resides in the Philippines and
the contract allegedly breached involve[d] employment in the Philippines." 88

In Pacific Consultants International Asia, Inc. v. Schonfeld,89 this court held that the fact that the
complainant in an illegal dismissal case was a Canadian citizen and a repatriate did not warrant the
application of forum non conveniens considering that: (1) the Labor Code does not include forum non
conveniens as a ground for the dismissal of a complaint for illegal dismissal; (2) the propriety of
dismissing a case based on forum non conveniens requires a factual determination; and (3) the
requisites for assumption of jurisdiction as laid out in Bank of America, NT&SA90 were all satisfied.

In contrast, this court ruled in The Manila Hotel Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission 91 that
the National Labor Relations Q Commission was a seriously inconvenient forum. In that case, private
respondent Marcelo G. Santos was working in the Sultanate of Oman when he received a letter from
Palace Hotel recruiting him for employment in Beijing, China. Santos accepted the offer. Subsequently,
however, he was released from employment supposedly due to business reverses arising from political
upheavals in China (i.e., the Tiananmen Square incidents of 1989). Santos later filed a Complaint for
illegal dismissal impleading Palace Hotel's General Manager, Mr. Gerhard Schmidt, the Manila Hotel
International Company Ltd. (which was, responsible for training Palace Hotel's personnel and staff),
and the Manila Hotel Corporation (which owned 50% of Manila Hotel International Company Ltd.'s
capital stock).

In ruling against the National Labor Relations Commission's exercise of jurisdiction, this court noted
that the main aspects of the case transpired in two (2) foreign jurisdictions, Oman and China, and that
the case involved purely foreign elements. Specifically, Santos was directly hired by a foreign
employer through correspondence sent to Oman. Also, the proper defendants were neither Philippine
nationals nor engaged in business in the Philippines, while the main witnesses were not residents of
the Philippines. Likewise, this court noted that the National Labor Relations Commission was in no
position to conduct the following: first, determine the law governing the employment contract, as it
was entered into in foreign soil; second, determine the facts, as Santos' employment was terminated
in Beijing; and third, enforce its judgment, since Santos' employer, Palace Hotel, was incorporated
under the laws of China and was not even served with summons.

Contrary to Manila Hotel, the case now before us does not entail a preponderance of linkages that
favor a foreign jurisdiction.

Here, the circumstances of the parties and their relation do not approximate the circumstances
enumerated in Puyat,92 which this court recognized as possibly justifying the desistance of Philippine
tribunals from exercising jurisdiction.

First, there is no basis for concluding that the case can be more conveniently tried elsewhere. As
established earlier, Saudia is doing business in the Philippines. For their part, all four (4) respondents
are Filipino citizens maintaining residence in the Philippines and, apart from their previous
employment with Saudia, have no other connection to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It would even be
to respondents' inconvenience if this case were to be tried elsewhere.

Second, the records are bereft of any indication that respondents filed their Complaint in an effort to
engage in forum shopping or to vex and inconvenience Saudia.

Third, there is no indication of "unwillingness to extend local judicial facilities to non-residents or

aliens."93 That Saudia has managed to bring the present controversy all the way to this court proves
this.

Fourth, it cannot be said that the local judicial machinery is inadequate for effectuating the right
sought to be maintained. Summons was properly served on Saudia and jurisdiction over its person
was validly acquired.
Lastly, there is not even room for considering foreign law. Philippine law properly governs the present
dispute.

As the question of applicable law has been settled, the supposed difficulty of ascertaining foreign law
(which requires the application of forum non conveniens) provides no insurmountable inconvenience or
special circumstance that will justify depriving Philippine tribunals of jurisdiction.

Even if we were to assume, for the sake of discussion, that it is the laws of Saudi Arabia which should
apply, it does not follow that Philippine tribunals should refrain from exercising jurisdiction. To. recall
our pronouncements in Puyat,94 as well as in Bank of America, NT&SA,95 it is not so much the mere
applicability of foreign law which calls into operation forum non conveniens. Rather, what justifies a
court's desistance from exercising jurisdiction is "[t]he difficulty of ascertaining foreign law"96 or the
inability of a "Philippine Court to make an intelligent decision as to the law[.]" 97

Consistent with lex loci intentionis, to the extent that it is proper and practicable (i.e., "to make an
intelligent decision"98), Philippine tribunals may apply the foreign law selected by the parties. In fact,
(albeit without meaning to make a pronouncement on the accuracy and reliability of respondents'
citation) in this case, respondents themselves have made averments as to the laws of Saudi Arabia. In
their Comment, respondents write: chanroble svirtuallawlibrary

Under the Labor Laws of Saudi Arabia and the Philippines[,] it is illegal and unlawful to terminate the
employment of any woman by virtue of pregnancy. The law in Saudi Arabia is even more harsh and
strict [sic] in that no employer can terminate the employment of a female worker or give her a
warning of the same while on Maternity Leave, the specific provision of Saudi Labor Laws on the
matter is hereto quoted as follows: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

"An employer may not terminate the employment of a female worker or give her a warning of the
same while on maternity leave." (Article 155, Labor Law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Royal Decree
No. M/51.)99cralawla wlibrary

All told, the considerations for assumption of jurisdiction by Philippine tribunals as outlined in Bank of
America, NT&SA100 have been satisfied. First, all the parties are based in the Philippines and all the
material incidents transpired in this jurisdiction. Thus, the parties may conveniently seek relief from
Philippine tribunals. Second, Philippine tribunals are in a position to make an intelligent decision as to
the law and the facts. Third, Philippine tribunals are in a position to enforce their decisions. There is no
compelling basis for ceding jurisdiction to a foreign tribunal. Quite the contrary, the immense public
policy considerations attendant to this case behoove Philippine tribunals to not shy away from their
duty to rule on the case. chanRoble svirtualLawlibrary

IV

Respondents were illegally terminated.

In Bilbao v. Saudi Arabian Airlines,101 this court defined voluntary resignation as "the voluntary act of
an employee who is in a situation where one believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in
favor of the exigency of the service, and one has no other choice but to dissociate oneself from
employment. It is a formal pronouncement or relinquishment of an office, with the intention of
relinquishing the office accompanied by the act of relinquishment." 102 Thus, essential to the act of
resignation is voluntariness. It must be the result of an employee's exercise of his or her own will.

In the same case of Bilbao, this court advanced a means for determining whether an employee
resigned voluntarily: chanroble svirtuallawlibrary

As the intent to relinquish must concur with the overt act of relinquishment, the acts of the employee
before and after the alleged resignation must be considered in determining whether he or she, in fact,
intended, to sever his or her employment.103(Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, constructive dismissal has been defined as "cessation of work because 'continued
employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, as an offer involving a demotion in rank
or a diminution in pay' and other benefits." 104

In Penaflor v. Outdoor Clothing Manufacturing Corporation,105 constructive dismissal has been

described as tantamount to "involuntarily [sic] resignation due to the harsh, hostile, and unfavorable
conditions set by the employer."106 In the same case, it was noted that "[t]he gauge for constructive
dismissal is whether a reasonable person in the employee's position would feel compelled to give up
his employment under the prevailing circumstances."107

Applying the cited standards on resignation and constructive dismissal, it is clear that respondents
were constructively dismissed. Hence, their termination was illegal.

The termination of respondents' employment happened when they were pregnant and expecting to
incur costs on account of child delivery and infant rearing. As noted by the Court of Appeals,
pregnancy is a time when they need employment to sustain their families. 108 Indeed, it goes against
normal and reasonable human behavior to abandon one's livelihood in a time of great financial need.

It is clear that respondents intended to remain employed with Saudia. All they did was avail of their
maternity leaves. Evidently, the very nature of a maternity leave means that a pregnant employee will
not report for work only temporarily and that she will resume the performance of her duties as soon
as the leave allowance expires.

It is also clear that respondents exerted all efforts to' remain employed with Saudia. Each of them
repeatedly filed appeal letters (as much as five [5] letters in the case of Rebesencio 109) asking Saudia
to reconsider the ultimatum that they resign or be terminated along with the forfeiture of their
benefits. Some of them even went to Saudia's office to personally seek reconsideration. 110

Respondents also adduced a copy of the "Unified Employment Contract for Female Cabin
Attendants."111 This contract deemed void the employment of a flight attendant who becomes
pregnant and threatened termination due to lack of medical fitness. 112 The threat of termination (and
the forfeiture of benefits that it entailed) is enough to compel a reasonable person in respondents'
position to give up his or her employment.

Saudia draws attention to how respondents' resignation letters were supposedly made in their own
handwriting. This minutia fails to surmount all the other indications negating any voluntariness on
respondents' part. If at all, these same resignation letters are proof of how any supposed resignation
did not arise from respondents' own initiative. As earlier pointed out, respondents' resignations were
executed on Saudia's blank letterheads that Saudia had provided. These letterheads already had the
word "RESIGNATION" typed on the subject portion of their respective headings when these were
handed to respondents.113 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

"In termination cases, the burden of proving just or valid cause for dismissing an employee rests on
the employer."114 In this case, Saudia makes much of how respondents supposedly completed their
exit interviews, executed quitclaims, received their separation pay, and took more than a year to file
their Complaint.115 If at all, however, these circumstances prove only the fact of their occurrence,
nothing more. The voluntariness of respondents' departure from Saudia is non sequitur.

Mere compliance with standard procedures or processes, such as the completion of their exit
interviews, neither negates compulsion nor indicates voluntariness.

As with respondent's resignation letters, their exit interview forms even support their claim of illegal
dismissal and militates against Saudia's arguments. These exit interview forms, as reproduced by
Saudia in its own Petition, confirms the unfavorable conditions as regards respondents' maternity
leaves. Ma. Jopette's and Loraine's exit interview forms are particularly telling:
chanroble svirtuallawlibrary

a. From Ma. Jopette's exit interview form:

3. In what respects has the job met or failed to meet your expectations?

THE SUDDEN TWIST OF DECISION REGARDING THE MATERNITY LEAVE. 116

b. From Loraine's exit interview form:

1. What are your main reasons for leaving Saudia? What company are you joining?
 xxx xxx xxx

Others

CHANGING POLICIES REGARDING MATERNITY LEAVE (PREGNANCY) 117

As to respondents' quitclaims, in Phil. Employ Services and Resources, Inc. v. Paramio,118 this court
noted that "[i]f (a) there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible
person; or (b) the terms of the settlement are unconscionable, and on their face invalid, such
quitclaims must be struck down as invalid or illegal."119 Respondents executed their quitclaims after
having been unfairly given an ultimatum to resign or be terminated (and forfeit their benefits). chanRoble svirtualLawlibrary

Having been illegally and unjustly dismissed, respondents are entitled to full backwages and benefits
from the time of their termination until the finality of this Decision. They are likewise entitled to
separation pay in the amount of one (1) month's salary for every year of service until the fmality of
this Decision, with a fraction of a year of at least six (6) months being counted as one (1) whole year.

Moreover, "[m]oral damages are awarded in termination cases where the employee's dismissal was
attended by bad faith, malice or fraud, or where it constitutes an act oppressive to labor, or where it
was done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy." 120 In this case, Saudia
terminated respondents' employment in a manner that is patently discriminatory and running afoul of
the public interest that underlies employer-employee relationships. As such, respondents are entitled
to moral damages.

To provide an "example or correction for the public good" 121 as against such discriminatory and callous
schemes, respondents are likewise entitled to exemplary damages.

In a long line of cases, this court awarded exemplary damages to illegally dismissed employees whose
"dismissal[s were] effected in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner." 122 This court has awarded
exemplary damages to employees who were terminated on such frivolous, arbitrary, and unjust
grounds as membership in or involvement with labor unions, 123 injuries sustained in the course of
employment,124 development of a medical condition due to the employer's own violation of the
employment contract,125 and lodging of a Complaint against the employer.126 Exemplary damages were
also awarded to employees who were deemed illegally dismissed by an employer in an attempt to
evade compliance with statutorily established employee benefits. 127 Likewise, employees dismissed for
supposedly just causes, but in violation of due process requirements, were awarded exemplary
damages.128

These examples pale in comparison to the present controversy. Stripped of all unnecessary
complexities, respondents were dismissed for no other reason than simply that they were pregnant.
This is as wanton, oppressive, and tainted with bad faith as any reason for termination of employment
can be. This is no ordinary case of illegal dismissal. This is a case of manifest gender discrimination. It
is an affront not only to our statutes and policies on employees' security of tenure, but more so, to the
Constitution's dictum of fundamental equality between men and women. 129

The award of exemplary damages is, therefore, warranted, not only to remind employers of the need
to adhere to the requirements of procedural and substantive due process in termination of
employment, but more importantly, to demonstrate that gender discrimination should in no case be
countenanced.

Having been compelled to litigate to seek reliefs for their illegal and unjust dismissal, respondents are
likewise entitled to attorney's fees in the amount of 10% of the total monetary award. 130

VI

Petitioner Brenda J. Betia may not be held liable.

A corporation has a personality separate and distinct from those of the persons composing it. Thus, as
a rule, corporate directors and officers are not liable for the illegal termination of a corporation's
employees. It is only when they acted in bad faith or with malice that they become solidarity liable
with the corporation.131

In Ever Electrical Manufacturing, Inc. (EEMI) v. Samahang Manggagawa ng Ever Electrical,132 this
court clarified that "[b]ad faith does not connote bad judgment or negligence; it imports a dishonest
purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of wrong; it means breach of a known duty
through some motive or interest or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud." 133

Respondents have not produced proof to show that Brenda J. Betia acted in bad faith or with malice as
regards their termination. Thus, she may not be held solidarity liable with Saudia. cralawred

WHEREFORE, with the MODIFICATIONS that first, petitioner Brenda J. Betia is not solidarity liable
with petitioner Saudi Arabian Airlines, and second, that petitioner Saudi Arabian Airlines is liable for
moral and exemplary damages. The June 16, 2011 Decision and the September 13, 2011 Resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 113006 are hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects.
Accordingly, petitioner Saudi Arabian Airlines is ordered to pay respondents:

(1) Full backwages and all other benefits computed from the respective
dates in which each of the respondents were illegally terminated until the
finality of this Decision;

(2) Separation pay computed from the respective dates in which each of the
respondents commenced employment until the finality of this Decision at
the rate of one (1) month's salary for every year of service, with a
fraction of a year of at least six (6) months being counted as one (1)
whole year;

(3) Moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00 per respondent;

(4) Exemplary damages in the amount of P200,000.00 per respondent; and

(5) Attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the total award.

Interest of 6% per annum shall likewise be imposed on the total judgment award from the finality of
this Decision until full satisfaction thereof.

This case is REMANDED to the Labor Arbiter to make a detailed computation of the amounts due to
respondents which petitioner Saudi Arabian Airlines should pay without delay.

SO ORDERED.

13. G.R. NOS. 178382-83

CONTINENTAL MICRONESIA, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
JOSEPH BASSO, Respondent.

DECISION

JARDELEZA, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court
assailing the Decision2 dated May 23, 2006 and Resolution3 dated June 19, 2007 of the
Court of Appeals in the consolidated cases CA-G.R. SP No. 83938 and CA-G.R. SP No.
84281. These assailed Decision and Resolution set aside the Decision4 dated November
28, 2003 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) declaring Joseph Basso's
(Basso) dismissal illegal, and ordering the payment of separation pay as alternative to
reinstatement and full backwages until the date of the Decision.

The Facts

Petitioner Continental Micronesia, Inc. (CMI) is a foreign corporation organized and e:xisting
under the laws of and domiciled in the United States of America (US). It is licensed to do
business in the Philippines.5 Basso, a US citizen, resided in the Philippines prior to his
death.6

During his visit to Manila in 1990, Mr. Keith R. Braden (Mr. Braden), Managing Director-Asia
of Continental Airlines, Inc. (Continental), offered Basso the position of General Manager of
the Philippine Branch of Continental. Basso accepted the offer.7

It was not until much later that Mr. Braden, who had since returned to the US, sent Basso
the employment contract8 dated February 1, 1991, which Mr. Braden had already signed.
Basso then signed the employment contract and returned it to Mr. Braden as instructed.

On November 7, 1992, CMI took over the Philippine operations of Continental, with Basso
retaining his position as General Manager.9
On December 20, 1995, Basso received a letter from Mr. Ralph Schulz (Mr. Schulz), who
was then CMIs Vice President of Marketing and Sales, informing Basso that he has agreed
to work in CMI as a consultant on an "as needed basis" effective February 1, 1996 to July
31, 1996. The letter also informed Basso that: (1) he will not receive any monetary
compensation but will continue being covered by the insurance provided by CMI; (2) he will
enjoy travel privileges; and (3) CMI will advance Php1,140,000.00 for the payment of
housing lease for 12 months.10

On January 11, 1996, Basso wrote a counter-proposal11 to Mr. Schulz regarding his
employment status in CMI. On March 14, 1996, Basso wrote another letter addressed to
Ms. Marty Woodward (Ms. Woodward) of CMIs Human Resources Department inquiring
about the status of his employment.12 On the same day, Ms. Woodward responded that
pursuant to the employment contract dated February 1, 1991, Basso could be terminated at
will upon a thirty-day notice. This notice was allegedly the letter Basso received from Mr.
Schulz on December 20, 1995. Ms. Woodward also reminded Basso of the telephone
conversation between him, Mr. Schulz and Ms. Woodward on December 19, 1995, where
they informed him of the companys decision to relieve him as General Manager. Basso,
instead, was offered the position of consultant to CMI. Ms. Woodward also informed Basso
that CMI rejected his counter-proposal and, thus, terminated his employment effective
January 31, 1996. CMI offered Basso a severance pay, in consideration of the
Php1,140,000.00 housing advance that CMI promised him13 Basso filed a Complaint for
Illegal Dismissal with Moral and Exemplary Damages against CMI on December 19,
1996.14 Alleging the presence of foreign elements, CMI filed a Motion to Dismiss15 dated
February 10, 1997 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of CMI and the
subject matter of the controversy. In an Order16 dated August 27, 1997, the Labor Arbiter
granted the Motion to Dismiss. Applying the doctrine of lex loci contractus, the Labor Arbiter
held that the terms and provisions of the employment contract show that the parties did not
intend to apply our Labor Code (Presidential Decree No. 442). The Labor Arbiter also held
that no employer-employee relationship existed between Basso and the branch office of
CMI in the Philippines, but between Basso and the foreign corporation itself.

On appeal, the NLRC remanded the case to the Labor Arbiter for the determination of
certain facts to settle the issue on jurisdiction. NLRC ruled that the issue on whether the
principle of lex loci contractus or lex loci celebrationis should apply has to be further
threshed out.17

Labor Arbiters Ruling

Labor Arbiter Madjayran H. Ajan in his Decision18 dated September 24, 1999 dismissed the
case for lack of merit and jurisdiction.

The Labor Arbiter agreed with CMI that the employment contract was executed in the US
"since the letter-offer was under the Texas letterhead and the acceptance of Complainant
was returned there."19 Thus, applying the doctrine of lex loci celebrationis, US laws apply.
Also, applying lex loci contractus, the Labor Arbiter ruled that the parties did not intend to
apply Philippine laws, thus:

Although the contract does not state what law shall apply, it is obvious that Philippine laws
were not written into it. More specifically, the Philippine law on taxes and the Labor Code
were not intended by the parties to apply, otherwise Par. 7 on the payment by Complainant
U.S. Federal and Home State income taxes, and Pars. 22/23 on termination by 30-day prior
notice, will not be there. The contract was prepared in contemplation of Texas or U.S. laws
where Par. 7 is required and Pars. 22/23 is allowed.20

The Labor Arbiter also ruled that Basso was terminated for a valid cause based on the
allegations of CMI that Basso committed a series of acts that constitute breach of trust and
loss of confidence.21

The Labor Arbiter, however, found CMI to have voluntarily submitted to his offices
jurisdiction. CMI participated in the proceedings, submitted evidence on the merits of the
case, and sought affirmative relief through a motion to dismiss.22

NLRCs Ruling

On appeal, the NLRC Third Division promulgated its Decision23 dated November 28, 2003,
the decretal portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the decision dated 24 September 1999 is VACATED and SET ASIDE.
Respondent CMI is ordered to pay complainant the amount of US$5,416.00 for failure to
comply with the due notice requirement. The other claims are dismissed.
SO ORDERED.24

The NLRC did not agree with the pronouncement of the Labor Arbiter that his office has no
jurisdiction over the controversy. It ruled that the Labor Arbiter acquired jurisdiction over the
case when CMI voluntarily submitted to his offices jurisdiction by presenting evidence,
advancing arguments in support of the legality of its acts, and praying for reliefs on the
merits of the case.25

On the merits, the NLRC agreed with the Labor Arbiter that Basso was dismissed for just
and valid causes on the ground of breach of trust and loss of confidence. The NLRC ruled
that under the applicable rules on loss of trust and confidence of a managerial employee,
such as Basso, mere existence of a basis for believing that such employee has breached
the trust of his employer suffices. However, the NLRC found that CMI denied Basso the
required due process notice in his dismissal.26

Both CMI and Basso filed their respective Motions for Reconsideration dated January 15,
200427 and January 8, 2004.28 Both motions were dismissed in separate Resolutions
dated March 15, 200429 and February 27, 2004,30 respectively.

Basso filed a Petition for Certiorari dated April 16, 2004 with the Court of Appeals docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 83938.31 Basso imputed grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
NLRC in ruling that he was validly dismissed. CMI filed its own Petition for Certiorari dated
May 13, 2004 docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 84281,32 alleging that the NLRC gravely
abused its discretion when it assumed jurisdiction over the person of CMI and the subject
matter of the case.

In its Resolution dated October 7, 2004, the Court of Appeals consolidated the two cases33
and ordered the parties to file their respective Memoranda.

The Court of Appeals Decision

The Court of Appeals promulgated the now assailed Decision34 dated May 23, 2006, the
relevant dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition of Continental docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 84281 is DENIED
DUE COURSE and DISMISSED.

On the other hand the petition of Basso docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 83938 is GIVEN DUE
COURSE and GRANTED, and accordingly, the assailed Decision dated November 28,
2003 and Resolution dated February 27, 2004 of the NLRC are SET ASIDE and VACATED.
Instead judgment is rendered hereby declaring the dismissal of Basso illegal and ordering
Continental to pay him separation pay equivalent to one (1) month pay for every year of
service as an alternative to reinstatement. Further, ordering Continental to pay Basso his full
backwages from the date of his said illegal dismissal until date of this decision. The claim
for moral and exemplary damages as well as attorneys fees are dismissed.35

The Court of Appeals ruled that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC had jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case and over the parties. The Court of Appeals explained that
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action is determined by the allegations of the
complaint and the law. Since the case filed by Basso is a termination dispute that is
"undoubtedly cognizable by the labor tribunals", the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC had
jurisdiction to rule on the merits of the case. On the issue of jurisdiction over the person of
the parties, who are foreigners, the Court of Appeals ruled that jurisdiction over the person
of Basso was acquired when he filed the complaint for illegal dismissal, while jurisdiction
over the person of CMI was acquired through coercive process of service of summons to its
agent in the Philippines. The Court of Appeals also agreed that the active participation of
CMI in the case rendered moot the issue on jurisdiction.

On the merits of the case, the Court of Appeals declared that CMI illegally dismissed Basso.
The Court of Appeals found that CMIs allegations of loss of trust and confidence were not
established. CMI "failed to prove its claim of the incidents which were its alleged bases for
loss of trust or confidence."36 While managerial employees can be dismissed for loss of
trust and confidence, there must be a basis for such loss, beyond mere whim or caprice.

After the parties filed their Motions for Reconsideration,37 the Court of Appeals promulgated
Resolution38 dated June 19, 2007 denying CMIs motion, while partially granting Bassos as
to the computation of backwages.

Hence, this petition, which raises the following issues:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVIEWING THE FACTUAL

FINDINGS OF THE NLRC INSTEAD OF LIMITING ITS INQUIRY INTO WHETHER OR
NOT THE NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE LABOR
ARBITER AND THE NLRC HAD JURISDICTION TO HEAR AND TRY THE ILLEGAL
DISMISSAL CASE.

III.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT BASSO WAS
NOT VALIDLY DISMISSED ON THE GROUND OF LOSS OF TRUST OR CONFIDENCE.

We begin with the second issue on the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC in the
illegal dismissal case. The first and third issues will be discussed jointly.

The labor tribunals had jurisdiction

over the parties and the subject

matter of the case.

CMI maintains that there is a conflict-of-laws issue that must be settled to determine proper
jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of the case. It also alleges that the
existence of foreign elements calls for the application of US laws and the doctrines of lex
loci celebrationis (the law of the place of the ceremony), lex loci contractus (law of the place
where a contract is executed), and lex loci intentionis (the intention of the parties as to the
law that should govern their agreement). CMI also invokes the application of the rule of
forum non conveniens to determine the propriety of the assumption of jurisdiction by the
labor tribunals.

We agree with CMI that there is a conflict-of-laws issue that needs to be resolved first.
Where the facts establish the existence of foreign elements, the case presents a conflict-of-
laws issue.39 The foreign element in a case may appear in different forms, such as in this
case, where one of the parties is an alien and the other is domiciled in another state.

In Hasegawa v. Kitamura,40 we stated that in the judicial resolution of conflict-of-laws

problems, three consecutive phases are involved: jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition
and enforcement of judgments. In resolving the conflicts problem, courts should ask the
following questions:

1. "Under the law, do I have jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties to this case?

2. "If the answer is yes, is this a convenient forum to the parties, in light of the facts?

3. "If the answer is yes, what is the conflicts rule for this particular problem?

4. "If the conflicts rule points to a foreign law, has said law been properly pleaded and
proved by the one invoking it?

5. "If so, is the application or enforcement of the foreign law in the forum one of the basic
exceptions to the application of foreign law? In short, is there any strong policy or vital
interest of the forum that is at stake in this case and which should preclude the application
of foreign law?41

Jurisdiction is defined as the power and authority of the courts to hear, try and decide
cases. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by the Constitution or by law and by
the material allegations in the complaint, regardless of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled
to recover all or some of the claims or reliefs sought therein.42 It cannot be acquired
through a waiver or enlarged by the omission of the parties or conferred by the
acquiescence of the court.43 That the employment contract of Basso was replete with
references to US laws, and that it originated from and was returned to the US, do not
automatically preclude our labor tribunals from exercising jurisdiction to hear and try this
case.

This case stemmed from an illegal dismissal complaint. The Labor Code, under Article 217,
clearly vests original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving
termination disputes to the Labor Arbiter.

Hence, the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
case.

As regards jurisdiction over the parties, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the Labor
Arbiter acquired jurisdiction over the person of Basso, notwithstanding his citizenship, when
he filed his complaint against CMI. On the other hand, jurisdiction over the person of CMI
was acquired through the coercive process of service of summons. We note that CMI never
denied that it was served with summons. CMI has, in fact, voluntarily appeared and
participated in the proceedings before the courts. Though a foreign corporation, CMI is
licensed to do business in the Philippines and has a local business address here. The
purpose of the law in requiring that foreign corporations doing business in the country be
licensed to do so, is to subject the foreign corporations to the jurisdiction of our courts.44

Considering that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC have jurisdiction over the parties and the
subject matter of this case, these tribunals may proceed to try the case even if the rules of
conflict-of-laws or the convenience of the parties point to a foreign forum, this being an
exercise of sovereign prerogative of the country where the case is filed.45

The next question is whether the local forum is the convenient forum in light of the facts of
the case. CMI contends that a Philippine court is an inconvenient forum.

We disagree.
Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a Philippine court in a conflict-of-laws case
may assume jurisdiction if it chooses to do so, provided, that the following requisites are
met: (1) that the Philippine Court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to; (2)
that the Philippine Court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the
facts; and (3) that the Philippine Court has or is likely to have power to enforce its
decision.46 All these requisites are present here.

Basso may conveniently resort to our labor tribunals as he and CMI had physical presence
in the Philippines during the duration of the trial. CMI has a Philippine branch, while Basso,
before his death, was residing here.

Thus, it could be reasonably expected that no extraordinary measures were needed for the
parties to make arrangements in advocating their respective cases.

The labor tribunals can make an intelligent decision as to the law and facts. The incident
subject of this case (i.e. dismissal of Basso) happened in the Philippines, the surrounding
circumstances of which can be ascertained without having to leave the Philippines. The acts
that allegedly led to loss of trust and confidence and Bassos eventual dismissal were
committed in the Philippines. As to the law, we hold that Philippine law is the proper law of
the forum, as we shall discuss shortly. Also, the labor tribunals have the power to enforce
their judgments because they acquired jurisdiction over the persons of both parties.

Our labor tribunals being the convenient fora, the next question is what law should apply in
resolving this case.

The choice-of-law issue in a conflict-of-laws case seeks to answer the following important
questions: (1) What legal system should control a given situation where some of the
significant facts occurred in two or more states; and (2) to what extent should the chosen
legal system regulate the situation.47 These questions are entirely different from the
question of jurisdiction that only seeks to answer whether the courts of a state where the
case is initiated have jurisdiction to enter a judgment.48 As such, the power to exercise
jurisdiction does not automatically give a state constitutional authority to apply forum law.49

CMI insists that US law is the applicable choice-of-law under the principles of lex loci
celebrationis and lex loci contractus. It argues that the contract of employment originated
from and was returned to the US after Basso signed it, and hence, was perfected there.
CMI further claims that the references to US law in the employment contract show the
parties intention to apply US law and not ours. These references are:

a. Foreign station allowance of forty percent (40%) using the "U.S. State Department Index,
the base being Washington, D.C."

b. Tax equalization that made Basso responsible for "federal and any home state income
taxes."

c. Hardship allowance of fifteen percent (15%) of base pay based upon the "U.S.
Department of State Indexes of living costs abroad."

d. The employment arrangement is "one at will, terminable by either party without any
further liability on thirty days prior written notice."50

CMI asserts that the US law on labor relations particularly, the US Railway Labor Act
sanctions termination-at-will provisions in an employment contract. Thus, CMI concludes
that if such laws were applied, there would have been no illegal dismissal to speak of
because the termination-at-will provision in Bassos employment contract would have been
perfectly valid.

We disagree.

In Saudi Arabian Airlines v. Court of Appeals,51 we emphasized that an essential element of

conflict rules is the indication of a "test" or "connecting factor" or "point of contact". Choice-
of-law rules invariably consist of a factual relationship (such as property right, contract
claim) and a connecting fact or point of contact, such as the situs of the res, the place of
celebration, the place of performance, or the place of wrongdoing. Pursuant to Saudi
Arabian Airlines, we hold that the "test factors," "points of contact" or "connecting factors" in
this case are the following:

(1) The nationality, domicile or residence of Basso;

(2) The seat of CMI;

(3) The place where the employment contract has been made, the locus actus;

(4) The place where the act is intended to come into effect, e.g., the place of performance of
contractual duties;

(5) The intention of the contracting parties as to the law that should govern their agreement,
the lex loci intentionis; and

(6) The place where judicial or administrative proceedings are instituted or done.52

Applying the foregoing in this case, we conclude that Philippine law is the applicable law.
Basso, though a US citizen, was a resident here from the time he was hired by CMI until his
death during the pendency of the case. CMI, while a foreign corporation, has a license to do
business in the Philippines and maintains a branch here, where Basso was hired to work.
The contract of employment was negotiated in the Philippines. A purely consensual
contract, it was also perfected in the Philippines when Basso accepted the terms and
conditions of his employment as offered by CMI. The place of performance relative to
Bassos contractual duties was in the Philippines. The alleged prohibited acts of Basso that
warranted his dismissal were committed in the Philippines.

Clearly, the Philippines is the state with the most significant relationship to the problem.
Thus, we hold that CMI and Basso intended Philippine law to govern, notwithstanding some
references made to US laws and the fact that this intention was not expressly stated in the
contract. We explained in Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee Corporation v. V.
P. Eusebio Construction, Inc.53 that the law selected may be implied from such factors as
substantial connection with the transaction, or the nationality or domicile of the parties.54
We cautioned, however, that while Philippine courts would do well to adopt the first and
most basic rule in most legal systems, namely, to allow the parties to select the law
applicable to their contract, the selection is subject to the limitation that it is not against the
law, morals, or public policy of the forum.55
Similarly, in Bank of America, NT & SA v. American Realty Corporation,56 we ruled that a
foreign law, judgment or contract contrary to a sound and established public policy of the
forum shall not be applied. Thus:

Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work undeniable
injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most important
function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates the
fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws.57

Termination-at-will is anathema to the public policies on labor protection espoused by our

laws and Constitution, which dictates that no worker shall be dismissed except for just and
authorized causes provided by law and after due process having been complied with.58
Hence, the US Railway Labor Act, which sanctions termination-at-will, should not be applied
in this case.

Additionally, the rule is that there is no judicial notice of any foreign law. As any other fact, it
must be alleged and proved.59 If the foreign law is not properly pleaded or proved, the
presumption of identity or similarity of the foreign law to our own laws, otherwise known as
processual presumption, applies. Here, US law may have been properly pleaded but it was
not proved in the labor tribunals.

Having disposed of the issue on jurisdiction, we now rule on the first and third issues.

The Court of Appeals may review the

factual findings of the NLRC in a

Rule 65 petition.

CMI submits that the Court of Appeals overstepped the boundaries of the limited scope of
its certiorari jurisdiction when instead of ruling on the existence of grave abuse of discretion,
it proceeded to pass upon the legality and propriety of Bassos dismissal. Moreover, CMI
asserts that it was error on the part of the Court of Appeals to re-evaluate the evidence and
circumstances surrounding the dismissal of Basso.
We disagree.

The power of the Court of Appeals to review NLRC decisions via a Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court was settled in our decision in St. Martin
Funeral Home v. NLRC.60 The general rule is that certiorari does not lie to review errors of
judgment of the trial court, as well as that of a quasi-judicial tribunal. In certiorari
proceedings, judicial review does not go as far as to examine and assess the evidence of
the parties and to weigh their probative value.61 However, this rule admits of exceptions. In
Globe Telecom, Inc. v. Florendo-Flores,62 we stated:

In the review of an NLRC decision through a special civil action for certiorari, resolution is
confined only to issues of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion on the part of the labor
tribunal. Hence, the Court refrains from reviewing factual assessments of lower courts and
agencies exercising adjudicative functions, such as the NLRC.

Occasionally, however, the Court is constrained to delve into factual matters where, as in
the instant case, the findings of the NLRC contradict those of the Labor Arbiter.

In this instance, the Court in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction may look into the records
of the case and reexamine the questioned findings. As a corollary, this Court is clothed with
ample authority to review matters, even if they are not assigned as errors in their appeal, if it
finds that their consideration is necessary to arrive at a just decision of the case. The same
principles are now necessarily adhered to and are applied by the Court of Appeals in its
expanded jurisdiction over labor cases elevated through a petition for certiorari; thus, we
see no error on its part when it made anew a factual determination of the matters and on
that basis reversed the ruling of the NLRC.63 (Citations omitted.)

Thus, the Court of Appeals may grant the petition when the factual findings complained of
are not supported by the evidence on record; when it is necessary to prevent a substantial
wrong or to do substantial justice; when the findings of the NLRC contradict those of the
Labor Arbiter; and when necessary to arrive at a just decision of the case.64 To make these
findings, the Court of Appeals necessarily has to look at the evidence and make its own
factual determination.65
Since the findings of the Labor Arbiter differ with that of the NLRC, we find that the Court of
Appeals correctly exercised its power to review the evidence and the records of the illegal
dismissal case.

Basso was illegally dismissed.

It is of no moment that Basso was a managerial employee of CMI. Managerial employees

enjoy security of tenure and the right of the management to dismiss must be balanced
against the managerial employees right to security of tenure, which is not one of the
guaranties he gives up.66

In Apo Cement Corporation v. Baptisma,67 we ruled that for an employer to validly dismiss
an employee on the ground of loss of trust and confidence under Article 282 (c) of the Labor
Code, the employer must observe the following guidelines: 1) loss of confidence should not
be simulated; 2) it should not be used as subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal
or unjustified; 3) it may not be arbitrarily asserted in the face of overwhelming evidence to
the contrary; and 4) it must be genuine, not a mere afterthought to justify earlier action
taken in bad faith. More importantly, it must be based on a willful breach of trust and
founded on clearly established facts.

We agree with the Court of Appeals that the dismissal of Basso was not founded on clearly
established facts and evidence sufficient to warrant dismissal from employment. While proof
beyond reasonable doubt is not required to establish loss of trust and confidence,
substantial evidence is required and on the employer rests the burden to establish it.68
There must be some basis for the loss of trust, or that the employer has reasonable ground
to believe that the employee is responsible for misconduct, which renders him unworthy of
the trust and confidence demanded by his position.69

CMI alleges that Basso committed the following:

(1) Basso delegated too much responsibility to the General Sales Agent and relied heavily
on its judgments.70
(2) Basso excessively issued promotional tickets to his friends who had no direct business
with CMI.71

(3) The advertising agency that CMI contracted had to deal directly with Guam because
Basso was hardly available.72 Mr. Schulz discovered that Basso exceeded the advertising
budget by $76,000.00 in 1994 and by $20,000.00 in 1995.73

(4) Basso spent more time and attention to his personal businesses and was reputed to
own nightclubs in the Philippines.74

(5) Basso used free tickets and advertising money to promote his personal business,75
such as a brochure that jointly advertised one of Bassos nightclubs with CMI.

We find that CMI failed to discharge its burden to prove the above acts. CMI merely
submitted affidavits of its officers, without any other corroborating evidence. Basso, on the
other hand, had adequately explained his side. On the advertising agency and budget
issues raised by CMI, he explained that these were blatant lies as the advertising needs of
CMI were centralized in its Guam office and the Philippine office was not authorized to deal
with CMIs advertising agency, except on minor issues.76 Basso further stated that under
CMIs existing policy, ninety percent (90%) of the advertising decisions were delegated to
the advertising firm of McCann- Ericsson in Japan and only ten percent (10%) were left to
the Philippine office.77 Basso also denied the allegations of owning nightclubs and
promoting his personal businesses and explained that it was illegal for foreigners in the
Philippines to engage in retail trade in the first place.

Apart from these accusations, CMI likewise presented the findings of the audit team headed
by Mr. Stephen D. Goepfert, showing that "for the period of 1995 and 1996, personal
passes for Continental and other airline employees were noted (sic) to be issued for which
no service charge was collected."78 The audit cited the trip pass log of a total of 10 months.
The trip log does not show, however, that Basso caused all the ticket issuances.

More, half of the trips in the log occurred from March to July of 1996,79 a period beyond the
tenure of Basso. Basso was terminated effectively on January 31, 1996 as indicated in the
letter of Ms. Woodward.80
CMI also accused Basso of making "questionable overseas phone calls". Basso, however,
adequately explained in his Reply81 that the phone calls to Italy and Portland, USA were
made for the purpose of looking for a technical maintenance personnel with US Federal
Aviation Authority qualifications, which CMI needed at that time. The calls to the US were
also made in connection with his functions as General Manager, such as inquiries on his tax
returns filed in Nevada. Basso also explained that the phone lines82 were open direct lines
that all personnel were free to use to make direct long distance calls.83

Finally, CMI alleged that Basso approved the disbursement of Php80,000.00 to cover the
transfer fee of the Manila Polo Club share from Mr. Kenneth Glover, the previous General
Manager, to him. CMI claimed that "nowhere in the said contract was it likewise indicated
that the Manila Polo Club share was part of the compensation package given by CMI to
Basso."84 CMIs claims are not credible. Basso explained that the Manila Polo Club share
was offered to him as a bonus to entice him to leave his then employer, United Airlines. A
letter from Mr. Paul J. Casey, former president of Continental, supports Basso.85 In the
letter, Mr. Casey explained:

As a signing bonus, and a perk to attract Mr. Basso to join Continental Airlines, he was
given the Manila Polo Club share and authorized to have the share re-issued in his name.
In addition to giving Mr. Basso the Manila Polo Club share, Continental agreed to pay the
dues for a period of three years and this was embodied in his contract with Continental. This
was all done with my knowledge and approval.86

Clause 14 of the employment contract also states:

Club Memberships: The Company will locally pay annual dues for membership in a club in
Manila that your immediate supervisor and I agree is of at least that value to Continental
through you in your role as our General Manager for the Philippines.87

Taken together, the above pieces of evidence suggest that the Manila Polo Club share was
part of Bassos compensation package and thus he validly used company funds to pay for
the transfer fees. If doubts exist between the evidence presented by the employer and the
employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the latter.88
Finally, CMI violated procedural due process in terminating Basso. In King of Kings
Transport, Inc. v. Mamac89 we detailed the procedural due process steps in termination of
employment:

To clarify, the following should be considered in terminating the services of employees:

(1) The first written notice to be served on the employees should contain the specific causes
or grounds for termination against them, and a directive that the employees are given the
opportunity to submit their written explanation within a reasonable period. "Reasonable
opportunity" under the Omnibus Rules means every kind of assistance that management
must accord to the employees to enable them to prepare adequately for their defense. This
should be construed as a period of at least five (5) calendar days from receipt of the notice
to give the employees an opportunity to study the accusation against them, consult a union
official or lawyer, gather data and evidence, and decide on the defenses they will raise
against the complaint. Moreover, in order to enable the employees to intelligently prepare
their explanation and defenses, the notice should contain a detailed narration of the facts
and circumstances that will serve as basis for the charge against the employees. A general
description of the charge will not suffice. Lastly, the notice should specifically mention which
company rules, if any, are violated and/or which among the grounds under Art. 282 is being
charged against the employees.

(2) After serving the first notice, the employers should schedule and conduct a hearing or
conference wherein the employees will be given the opportunity to: (1) explain and clarify
their defenses to the charge against them; (2) present evidence in support of their defenses;
and (3) rebut the evidence presented against them by the management.

During the hearing or conference, the employees are given the chance to defend
themselves personally, with the assistance of a representative or counsel of their choice.
Moreover, this conference or hearing could be used by the parties as an opportunity to
come to an amicable settlement.

(3) After determining that termination of employment is justified, the employers shall serve
the employees a written notice of termination indicating that: (1) all circumstances involving
the charge against the employees have been considered; and (2) grounds have been
established to justify the severance of their employment. (Emphasis in original.)
Here, Mr. Schulzs and Ms. Woodwards letters dated December 19, 1995 and March 14,
1996, respectively, are not one of the valid twin notices. Neither identified the alleged acts
that CMI now claims as bases for Bassos termination. Ms. Woodwards letter even stressed
that the original plan was to remove Basso as General Manager but with an offer to make
him consultant. It was inconsistent of CMI to declare Basso as unworthy of its trust and
confidence and, in the same breath, offer him the position of consultant. As the Court of
Appeals pointed out:

But mark well that Basso was clearly notified that the sole ground for his dismissal was the
exercise of the termination at will clause in the employment contract. The alleged loss of
trust and confidence claimed by Continental appears to be a mere afterthought belatedly
trotted out to save the day.90

Basso is entitled to separation pay and full backwages.

Under Article 279 of the Labor Code, an employee who is unjustly dismissed from work
shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges, and to
his full backwages, inclusive of allowances and to his other benefits or their monetary
equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld up to the time of actual
reinstatement.

Where reinstatement is no longer viable as an option, separation pay equivalent to one (1)
month salary for every year of service should be awarded as an alternative.1wphi1 The
payment of separation pay is in addition to payment of backwages.91 In the case of Basso,
reinstatement is no longer possible since he has already passed away. Thus, Bassos
separation pay with full backwages shall be paid to his heirs.

As to the computation of backwages, we agree with CMI that Basso was entitled to
backwages only up to the time he reached 65 years old, the compulsory retirement age
under the law.92 This is our consistent ruling.93

When Basso was illegally dismissed on January 31, 1996, he was already 58 years old.94
He turned 65 years old on October 2, 2002. Since backwages are granted on grounds of
equity for earnings lost by an employee due to his illegal dismissal,95 Basso was entitled to
backwages only for the period he could have worked had he not been illegally dismissed,
i.e. from January 31, 1996 to October 2, 2002.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 23,
2006 and Resolution dated June 19, 2007 in the consolidated cases CA-G.R. SP No. 83938
and CA-G.R. SP No. 84281 are

AFFIRMED, with MODIFICATION as to the award of backwages. Petitioner Continental

Micronesia, Inc. is hereby ordered to pay Respondent Joseph Bassos heirs: 1) separation
pay equivalent to one (1) month pay for every year of service, and 2) full backwages from
January 31, 1996, the date of his illegal dismissal, to October 2, 2002, the date of his
compulsory retirement age.

SO ORDERED.

14. G.R. No. 205703, March 07, 2016

INDUSTRIAL PERSONNEL & MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC. (IPAMS), SNC LAVALIN

ENGINEERS & CONTRACTORS, INC. AND ANGELITO C. HERNANDEZ, Petitioners, v.
JOSE G. DE VERA AND ALBERTO B. ARRIOLA, Respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

When can a foreign law govern an overseas employment contract? This is the fervent
question that the Court shall resolve, once and for all.

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the January 24, 2013
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 118869, which modified the
November 30, 2010 Decision2 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and its
February 2, 2011 Resolution,3 in NLRC LAC Case No. 08-000572-10/NLRC Case No. NCR
09-13563-09, a case for illegal termination of an Overseas Filipino Worker (OFW).
The Facts

Petitioner Industrial Personnel & Management Services, Inc. (IPAMS) is a local placement
agency duly organized and existing under Philippine laws, with petitioner Angelito C.
Hernandez as its president and managing director. Petitioner SNC Lavalin Engineers &
Contractors, Inc. (SNC-Lavalin) is the principal of IPAMS, a Canadian company with
business interests in several countries. On the other hand, respondent Alberto Arriola
(Arriola) is a licensed general surgeon in the Philippines.4

Employee's Position

Arriola was offered by SNC-Lavalin, through its letter,5 dated May 1, 2008, the position of
Safety Officer in its Ambatovy Project site in Madagascar. The position offered had a rate of
CA$32.00 per hour for forty (40) hours a week with overtime pay in excess of forty (40)
hours. It was for a period of nineteen (19) months starting from June 9, 2008 to December
31, 2009.

Arriola was then hired by SNC-Lavalin, through its local manning agency, IPAMS, and his
overseas employment contract was processed with the Philippine Overseas Employment
Agency (POEA)6 In a letter of understanding,7 dated June 5, 2008, SNC-Lavalin confirmed
Arriola's assignment in the Ambatovy Project. According to Arriola, he signed the contract of
employment in the Philippines.8 On June 9, 2008, Arriola started working in Madagascar.

After three months, Arriola received a notice of pre-termination of employment,9 dated

September 9, 2009, from SNC-Lavalin. It stated that his employment would be pre-
terminated effective September 11, 2009 due to diminishing workload in the area of his
expertise and the unavailability of alternative assignments. Consequently, on September 15,
2009, Arriola was repatriated. SNC-Lavalin deposited in Arriola's bank account his pay
amounting to Two Thousand Six Hundred Thirty Six Dollars and Eight Centavos
(CA$2,636.80), based on Canadian labor law.

Aggrieved, Arriola filed a complaint against the petitioners for illegal dismissal and non-
payment of overtime pay, vacation leave and sick leave pay before the Labor Arbiter (LA).
He claimed that SNC-Lavalin still owed him unpaid salaries equivalent to the three-month
unexpired portion of his contract, amounting to, more or less, One Million Sixty-Two
Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Six Pesos (P1,062,936.00). He asserted that SNC-Lavalin
never offered any valid reason for his early termination and that he was not given sufficient
notice regarding the same. Arriola also insisted that the petitioners must prove the
applicability of Canadian law before the same could be applied to his employment contract.

Employer's Position

The petitioners denied the charge of illegal dismissal against them. They claimed that SNC-
Lavalin was greatly affected by the global financial crises during the latter part of 2008. The
economy of Madagascar, where SNC-Lavalin had business sites, also slowed down. As
proof of its looming financial standing, SNC-Lavalin presented a copy of a news item in the
Financial Post,10 dated March 5, 2009, showing the decline of the value of its stocks. Thus,
it had no choice but to minimize its expenditures and operational expenses. It re-organized
its Health and Safety Department at the Ambatovy Project site and Arriola was one of those
affected.11

The petitioners also invoked EDI-Staffbuilders International, Inc. v. NLRC12 (EDI-

Staffbuilders), pointing out that particular labor laws of a foreign country incorporated in a
contract freely entered into between an OFW and a foreign employer through the latter's
agent was valid. In the present case, as all of Arriola's employment documents were
processed in Canada, not to mention that SNC-Lavalin's office was in Ontario, the principle
of lex loci celebrationis was applicable. Thus, the petitioners insisted that Canadian laws
governed the contract.

The petitioners continued that the pre-termination of Arriola's contract was valid for being
consistent with the provisions of both the Expatriate Policy and laws of Canada. The said
foreign law did not require any ground for early termination of employment, and the only
requirement was the written notice of termination. Even assuming that Philippine laws
should apply, Arriola would still be validly dismissed because domestic law recognized
retrenchment and redundancy as legal grounds for termination.

In their Rejoinder,13 the petitioners presented a copy of the Employment Standards Act
(ESA) of Ontario, which was duly authenticated by the Canadian authorities and certified by
the Philippine Embassy.
The LA Ruling

In a Decision,14 dated May 31, 2010, the LA dismissed Arriola's complaint for lack of merit.
The LA ruled that the rights and obligations among and between the OFW, the local
recruiter/agent, and the foreign employer/principal were governed by the employment
contract pursuant to the EDI-Staffbuilders case. Thus, the provisions on termination of
employment found in the ESA, a foreign law which governed Arriola's employment contract,
were applied. Given that SNC-Lavalin was able to produce the duly authenticated ESA, the
LA opined that there was no other conclusion but to uphold the validity of Arriola's dismissal
based on Canadian law. The fallo of the LA decision reads:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises being considered, judgment is hereby rendered
dismissing the complaint for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.15ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Aggrieved, Arriola elevated the LA decision before the NLRC.

The NLRC Ruling

In its decision, dated November 30, 2010, the NLRC reversed the LA decision and ruled
that Arriola was illegally dismissed by the petitioners. Citing PNB v. Cabansag,16 the NLRC
stated that whether employed locally or overseas, all Filipino workers enjoyed the protective
mantle of Philippine labor and social legislation, contract stipulations to the contrary
notwithstanding. Thus, the Labor Code of the Philippines and Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042,
or the Migrant Workers Act, as amended, should be applied. Moreover, the NLRC added
that the overseas employment contract of Arriola was processed in the POEA.

Applying the Philippine laws, the NLRC found that there was no substantial evidence
presented by the petitioners to show any just or authorized cause to terminate Arriola. The
ground of financial losses by SNC-Lavalin was not supported by sufficient and credible
evidence. The NLRC concluded that, for being illegally dismissed, Arriola should be
awarded CA$81,920.00 representing sixteen (16) months of Arriola's purported unpaid
salary, pursuant to the Serrano v. Gallant17 doctrine. The decretal portion of the NLRC
decision states:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding complainant-

appellant to have been illegally dismissed. Respondents-appellees are hereby ordered to
pay complainant-appellant the amount of CA$81,920.00, or its Philippine Peso equivalent
prevailing at the time of payment. Accordingly, the decision of the Labor Arbiter dated May
31, 2010 is hereby VACATED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.18ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The petitioners moved for reconsideration, but their motion was denied by the NLRC in its
resolution, dated February 2, 2011.

Undaunted, the petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the CA arguing that it should
be the ESA, or the Ontario labor law, that should be applied in Arriola's employment
contract. No temporary restraining order, however, was issued by the CA.

The Execution Proceedings

In the meantime, execution proceedings were commenced before the LA by Arriola. The LA
granted the motion for execution in the Order,19 dated August 8, 2011.

The petitioners appealed the execution order to the NLRC. In its Decision,20 dated May 31,
2012, the NLRC corrected the decretal portion of its November 30, 2010 decision. It
decreased the award of backpay in the amount of CA$26,880.00 or equivalent only to three
(3) months and three (3) weeks pay based on 70-hours per week workload. The NLRC
found that when Arriola was dismissed on September 9, 2009, he only had three (3) months
and three (3) weeks or until December 31, 2009 remaining under his employment contract.

Still not satisfied with the decreased award, IPAMS filed a separate petition for certiorari
before the CA. In its decision, dated July 25, 2013, the CA affirmed the decrease in Arriola's
backpay because the unpaid period in his contract was just three (3) months and three (3)
weeks.
Unperturbed, IPAMS appealed before the Court and the case was docketed as G.R. No.
212031. The appeal, however, was dismissed outright by the Court in its resolution, dated
August 8, 2014, because it was belatedly filed and it did not comply with Sections 4 and 5 of
Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. Hence, it was settled in the execution proceedings that the
award of backpay to Arriola should only amount to three (3) months and three (3) weeks of
his pay.

The CA Ruling

Returning to the principal case of illegal dismissal, in its assailed January 24, 2013 decision,
the CA affirmed that Arriola was illegally dismissed by the petitioners. The CA explained that
even though an authenticated copy of the ESA was submitted, it did not mean that the said
foreign law automatically applied in this case. Although parties were free to establish
stipulations in their contracts, the same must remain consistent with law, morals, good
custom, public order or public policy. The appellate court wrote that the ESA allowed an
employer to disregard the required notice of termination by simply giving the employee a
severance pay. The ESA could not be made to apply in this case for being contrary to our
Constitution, specifically on the right of due process. Thus, the CA opined that our labor
laws should find application.

As the petitioners neither complied with the twin notice-rule nor offered any just or
authorized cause for his termination under the Labor Code, the CA held that Arriola's
dismissal was illegal. Accordingly, it pronounced that Arriola was entitled to his salary for the
unexpired portion of his contract which is three (3) months and three (3) weeks salary. It,
however, decreased the award of backpay to Arriola because the NLRC made a wrong
calculation. Based on his employment contract, the backpay of Arriola should only be
computed on a 40-hour per week workload, or in the amount of CA$19,200.00. The CA
disposed the case in this wise:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED.

The assailed Order of the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC LAC No. 08-
000572-10/NLRC Case No. NCR 09-13563-09 is MODIFIED in that private respondent is
only entitled to a monetary judgment equivalent to his unpaid salaries in the amount of
CA$19,200.00 or its Philippine Peso equivalent.

SO ORDERED.21ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Hence, this petition, anchored on the following

ISSUES

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT ARRIOLA WAS VALIDLY DISMISSED PURSUANT

TO THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT.

II

GRANTING THAT THERE WAS ILLEGAL DISMISSAL IN THE CASE AT BAR, WHETHER
OR NOT THE SIX-WEEK ON, TWO-WEEK OFF SCHEDULE SHOULD BE USED IN THE
COMPUTATION OF ANY MONETARY AWARD.

III

GRANTING THAT THERE WAS ILLEGAL DISMISSAL, WHETHER OR NOT THE AMOUNT
BEING CLAIMED BY RESPONDENTS HAD ALREADY BEEN SATISFIED, OR AT THE
VERY LEAST, WHETHER OR NOT THE AMOUNT OF CA$2,636.80 SHOULD BE
DEDUCTED FROM THE MONETARY AWARD.22ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The petitioners argue that the rights and obligations of the OFW, the local recruiter, and the
foreign employer are governed by the employment contract, citing EDI-Staffbuilders; that
the terms and conditions of Arriola's employment are embodied in the Expatriate Policy,
Ambatovy Project - Site, Long Term, hence, the laws of Canada must be applied; that the
ESA, or the Ontario labor law, does not require any ground for the early termination of
employment and it permits the termination without any notice provided that a severance pay
is given; that the ESA was duly authenticated by the Canadian authorities and certified by
the Philippine Embassy; that the NLRC Sixth Division exhibited bias and bad faith when it
made a wrong computation on the award of backpay; and that, assuming there was illegal
dismissal, the CA$2,636.80, earlier paid to Arriola, and his home leaves should be deducted
from the award of backpay.
In his Comment,23 Arriola countered that foreign laws could not apply to employment
contracts if they were contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy,
invoking Pakistan International Airlines Corporation v. Ople (Pakistan International);24 that
the ESA was not applicable because it was contrary to his constitutional right to due
process; that the petitioners failed to substantiate an authorized cause to justify his
dismissal under Philippine labor law; and that the petitioners could not anymore claim a
deduction of CA$2,636.80 from the award of backpay because it was raised for the first time
on appeal.

In their Reply,25 the petitioners asserted that R.A. No. 8042 recognized the applicability of
foreign laws on labor contracts; that the Pakistan International case was superseded by
EDI-Staffbuilders and other subsequent cases; and that SNC-Lavalin suffering financial
losses was an authorized cause to terminate Arriola's employment.

In his Memorandum,26 Arriola asserted that his employment contract was executed in the
Philippines and that the alleged authorized cause of financial losses by the petitioners was
not substantiated by evidence.

In their Consolidated Memorandum,27 the petitioners reiterated that the ESA was
applicable in the present case and that recent jurisprudence recognized that the parties
could agree on the applicability of foreign laws in their labor contracts.

The Court's Ruling

The petition lacks merit.

Application of foreign laws with labor contracts

At present, Filipino laborers, whether skilled or professional, are enticed to depart from the
motherland in search of greener pastures. There is a distressing reality that the offers of
employment abroad are more lucrative than those found in our own soils. To reap the
promises of the foreign dream, our unsung heroes must endure homesickness, solitude,
discrimination, mental and emotional struggle, at times, physical turmoil, and, worse, death.
On the other side of the table is the growing number of foreign employers attracted in hiring
Filipino workers because of their reasonable compensations and globally-competitive skills
and qualifications. Between the dominant foreign employers and the vulnerable and
desperate OFWs, however, there is an inescapable truth that the latter are in need of
greater safeguard and protection.

In order to afford the full protection of labor to our OFWs, the State has vigorously enacted
laws, adopted regulations and policies, and established agencies to ensure that their needs
are satisfied and that they continue to work in a humane living environment outside of the
country. Despite these efforts, there are still issues left unsolved in the realm of overseas
employment. One existing question is posed before the Court -when should an overseas
labor contract be governed by a foreign law? To answer this burning query, a review of the
relevant laws and jurisprudence is warranted.

R.A. No. 8042, or the Migrant Workers Act, was enacted to institute the policies on overseas
employment and to establish a higher standard of protection and promotion of the welfare of
migrant workers.28 It emphasized that while recognizing the significant contribution of
Filipino migrant workers to the national economy through their foreign exchange
remittances, the State does not promote overseas employment as a means to sustain
economic growth and achieve national development.29 Although it acknowledged claims
arising out of law or contract involving Filipino workers,30 it does not categorically provide
that foreign laws are absolutely and automatically applicable in overseas employment
contracts.

The issue of applying foreign laws to labor contracts was initially raised before the Court in
Pakistan International. It was stated in the labor contract therein (1) that it would be
governed by the laws of Pakistan, (2) that the employer have the right to terminate the
employee at any time, and (3) that the one-month advance notice in terminating the
employment could be dispensed with by paying the employee an equivalent one-month
salary. Therein, the Court elaborated on the parties' right to stipulate in labor contracts, to
wit:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

A contract freely entered into should, of course, be respected, as PIA argues, since a
contract is the law between the parties. The principle of party autonomy in contracts is not,
however, an absolute principle. The rule in Article 1306, of our Civil Code is that the
contracting parties may establish such stipulations as they may deem convenient, "provided
they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy." Thus,
counterbalancing the principle of autonomy of contracting parties is the equally general rule
that provisions of applicable law, especially provisions relating to matters affected with
public policy, are deemed written into the contract. Put a little differently, the governing
principle is that parties may not contract away applicable provisions of law especially
peremptory provisions dealing with matters heavily impressed with public interest. The law
relating to labor and employment is clearly such an area and parties are not at liberty to
insulate themselves and their relationships from the impact of labor laws and regulations by
simply contracting with each other. x x x31

[Emphases Supplied]

In that case, the Court held that the labor relationship between OFW and the foreign
employer is "much affected with public interest and that the otherwise applicable Philippine
laws and regulations cannot be rendered illusory by the parties agreeing upon some other
law to govern their relationship."32 Thus, the Court applied the Philippine laws, instead of
the Pakistan laws. It was also held that the provision in the employment contract, where the
employer could terminate the employee at any time for any ground and it could even
disregard the notice of termination, violates the employee's right to security of tenure under
Articles 280 and 281 of the Labor Code.

In EDI-Staffbuilders, the case heavily relied on by the petitioners, it was reiterated that, "[i]n
formulating the contract, the parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and
conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order, or public policy."33 In that case, the overseas contract
specifically stated that Saudi Labor Laws would govern matters not provided for in the
contract. The employer, however, failed to prove the said foreign law, hence, the doctrine of
processual presumption came into play and the Philippine labor laws were applied.
Consequently, the Court did not discuss any longer whether the Saudi labor laws were
contrary to Philippine labor laws.

The case of Becmen Service Exporter and Promotion, Inc. v. Spouses Cuaresma,34 though
not an illegal termination case, elucidated on the effect of foreign laws on employment. It
involved a complaint for insurance benefits and damages arising from the death of a Filipina
nurse from Saudi Arabia. It was initially found therein that there was no law in Saudi Arabia
that provided for insurance arising from labor accidents. Nevertheless, the Court concluded
that the employer and the recruiter in that case abandoned their legal, moral and social
obligation to assist the victim's family in obtaining justice for her death, and so her family
was awarded P5,000,000.00 for moral and exemplary damages.

In ATCI Overseas Corporation v. Echin35 (ATCI Overseas), the private recruitment agency
invoked the defense that the foreign employer was immune from suit and that it did not sign
any document agreeing to be held jointly and solidarily liable. Such defense, however, was
rejected because R.A. No. 8042 precisely afforded the OFWs with a recourse against the
local agency and the foreign employer to assure them of an immediate and sufficient
payment of what was due. Similar to EDI-Staffbuilders, the local agency therein failed to
prove the Kuwaiti law specified in the labor contract, pursuant to Sections 24 and 25 of Rule
132 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Also, in the recent case of Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc. v. Cabiles36 (Sameer
Overseas), it was declared that the security of tenure for labor was guaranteed by our
Constitution and employees were not stripped of the same when they moved to work in
other jurisdictions. Citing PCL Shipping Phils., Inc. v. NLRC37 (PCL Shipping), the Court
held that the principle of lex loci contractus (the law of the place where the contract is made)
governed in this jurisdiction. As it was established therein that the overseas labor contract
was executed in the Philippines, the Labor Code and the fundamental procedural rights
were observed. It must be noted that no foreign law was specified in the employment
contracts in both cases.

Lastly, in Saudi Arabian Airlines (Saudia) v. Rebesencio38, the employer therein asserted
the doctrine of forum non conveniens because the overseas employment contracts required
the application of the laws of Saudi Arabia, and so, the Philippine courts were not in a
position to hear the case. In striking down such argument, the Court held that while a
Philippine tribunal was called upon to respect the parties' choice of governing law, such
respect must not be so permissive as to lose sight of considerations of law, morals, good
customs, public order, or public policy that underlie the contract central to the controversy.
As the dispute in that case related to the illegal termination of the employees due to their
pregnancy, then it involved a matter of public interest and public policy. Thus, it was ruled
that Philippine laws properly found application and that Philippine tribunals could assume
jurisdiction.

Based on the foregoing, the general rule is that Philippine laws apply even to overseas
employment contracts. This rule is rooted in the constitutional provision of Section 3, Article
XIII that the State shall afford full protection to labor, whether local or overseas. Hence,
even if the OFW has his employment abroad, it does not strip him of his rights to security of
tenure, humane conditions of work and a living wage under our Constitution.39

As an exception, the parties may agree that a foreign law shall govern the employment
contract. A synthesis of the existing laws and jurisprudence reveals that this exception is
subject to the following requisites:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

That it is expressly stipulated in the overseas employment contract that a specific foreign
law shall govern;
That the foreign law invoked must be proven before the courts pursuant to the Philippine
rules on evidence;

That the foreign law stipulated in the overseas employment contract must not be contrary to
law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy of the Philippines; and

That the overseas employment contract must be processed through the POEA.

The Court is of the view that these four (4) requisites must be complied with before the
employer could invoke the applicability of a foreign law to an overseas employment
contract. With these requisites, the State would be able to abide by its constitutional
obligation to ensure that the rights and well-being of our OFWs are fully protected. These
conditions would also invigorate the policy under R.A. No. 8042 that the State shall, at all
times, uphold the dignity of its citizens whether in country or overseas, in general, and the
Filipino migrant workers, in particular.40 Further, these strict terms are pursuant to the
jurisprudential doctrine that "parties may not contract away applicable provisions of law
especially peremptory provisions dealing with matters heavily impressed with public
interest,"41 such as laws relating to labor. At the same time, foreign employers are not at all
helpless to apply their own laws to overseas employment contracts provided that they
faithfully comply with these requisites.

If the first requisite is absent, or that no foreign law was expressly stipulated in the
employment contract which was executed in the Philippines, then the domestic labor laws
shall apply in accordance with the principle of lex loci contractus. This is based on the cases
of Sameer Overseas and PCL Shipping.

If the second requisite is lacking, or that the foreign law was not proven pursuant to
Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court, then the international law
doctrine of processual presumption operates. The said doctrine declares that "[w]here a
foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is that foreign
law is the same as ours."42 This was observed in the cases of EDI-Staffbuilders and ATCI
Overseas.

If the third requisite is not met, or that the foreign law stipulated is contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order or public policy, then Philippine laws govern. This finds legal
bases in the Civil Code, specifically: (1) Article 17, which provides that laws which have, for
their object, public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective
by laws of a foreign country; and (2) Article 1306, which states that the stipulations, clauses,
terms and conditions in a contract must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
order, or public policy. The said doctrine was applied in the case of Pakistan International.

Finally, if the fourth requisite is missing, or that the overseas employment contract was not
processed through the POEA, then Article 18 of the Labor Code is violated. Article 18
provides that no employer may hire a Filipino worker for overseas employment except
through the boards and entities authorized by the Secretary of Labor. In relation thereto,
Section 4 of R.A. No. 8042, as amended, declares that the State shall only allow the
deployment of overseas Filipino workers in countries where the rights of Filipino migrant
workers are protected. Thus, the POEA, through the assistance of the Department of
Foreign Affairs, reviews and checks whether the countries have existing labor and social
laws protecting the rights of workers, including migrant workers.43 Unless processed
through the POEA, the State has no effective means of assessing the suitability of the
foreign laws to our migrant workers. Thus, an overseas employment contract that was not
scrutinized by the POEA definitely cannot be invoked as it is an unexamined foreign law.

In other words, lacking any one of the four requisites would invalidate the application of the
foreign law, and the Philippine law shall govern the overseas employment contract.

As the requisites of the applicability of foreign laws in overseas labor contract have been
settled, the Court can now discuss the merits of the case at bench.

A judicious scrutiny of the records of the case demonstrates that the petitioners were able to
observe the second requisite, or that the foreign law must be proven before the court
pursuant to the Philippine rules on evidence. The petitioners were able to present the ESA,
duly authenticated by the Canadian authorities and certified by the Philippine Embassy,
before the LA. The fourth requisite was also followed because Arriola's employment contract
was processed through the POEA.44

Unfortunately for the petitioners, those were the only requisites that they complied with. As
correctly held by the CA, even though an authenticated copy of the ESA was submitted, it
did not mean that said foreign law could be automatically applied to this case. The
petitioners miserably failed to adhere to the two other requisites, which shall be discussed in
seratim.
The foreign law was not expressly specified in the employment contract

The petitioners failed to comply with the first requisite because no foreign law was expressly
stipulated in the overseas employment contract with Arriola. In its pleadings, the petitioners
did not directly cite any specific provision or stipulation in the said labor contract which
indicated the applicability of the Canadian labor laws or the ESA. They failed to show on the
face of the contract that a foreign law was agreed upon by the parties. Rather, they simply
asserted that the terms and conditions of Arriola's employment were embodied in the
Expatriate Policy, Ambatovy Project - Site, Long Term.45 Then, they emphasized provision
8.20 therein, regarding interpretation of the contract, which provides that said policy would
be governed and construed with the laws of the country where the applicable SNC-Lavalin,
Inc. office was located.46 Because of this provision, the petitioners insisted that the laws of
Canada, not of Madagascar or the Philippines, should apply. Then, they finally referred to
the ESA.

It is apparent that the petitioners were simply attempting to stretch the overseas
employment contract of Arriola, by implication, in order that the alleged foreign law would
apply. To sustain such argument would allow any foreign employer to improperly invoke a
foreign law even if it is not anymore reasonably contemplated by the parties to control the
overseas employment. The OFW, who is susceptible by his desire and desperation to work
abroad, would blindly sign the labor contract even though it is not clearly established on its
face which state law shall apply. Thus, a better rule would be to obligate the foreign
employer to expressly declare at the onset of the labor contract that a foreign law shall
govern it. In that manner, the OFW would be informed of the applicable law before signing
the contract.

Further, it was shown that the overseas labor contract was executed by Arriola at his
residence in Batangas and it was processed at the POEA on May 26, 2008.47 Considering
that no foreign law was specified in the contract and the same was executed in the
Philippines, the doctrine of lex loci celebrationis applies and the Philippine laws shall govern
the overseas employment of Arriola.

The foreign law invoked is contrary to the Constitution and the Labor Code

Granting arguendo that the labor contract expressly stipulated the applicability of Canadian
law, still, Arriola's employment cannot be governed by such foreign law because the third
requisite is not satisfied. A perusal of the ESA will show that some of its provisions are
contrary to the Constitution and the labor laws of the Philippines.
First, the ESA does not require any ground for the early termination of employment.48
Article 54 thereof only provides that no employer should terminate the employment of an
employee unless a written notice had been given in advance.49 Necessarily, the employer
can dismiss any employee for any ground it so desired. At its own pleasure, the foreign
employer is endowed with the absolute power to end the employment of an employee even
on the most whimsical grounds.

Second, the ESA allows the employer to dispense with the prior notice of termination to an
employee. Article 65(4) thereof indicated that the employer could terminate the employment
without notice by simply paying the employee a severance pay computed on the basis of
the period within which the notice should have been given.50 The employee under the ESA
could be immediately dismissed without giving him the opportunity to explain and defend
himself.

The provisions of the ESA are patently inconsistent with the right to security of tenure. Both
the Constitution51 and the Labor Code52 provide that this right is available to any
employee. In a host of cases, the Court has upheld the employee's right to security of
tenure in the face of oppressive management behavior and management prerogative.
Security of tenure is a right which cannot be denied on mere speculation of any unclear and
nebulous basis.53

Not only do these provisions collide with the right to security of tenure, but they also deprive
the employee of his constitutional right to due process by denying him of any notice of
termination and the opportunity to be heard.54 Glaringly, these disadvantageous provisions
under the ESA produce the same evils which the Court vigorously sought to prevent in the
cases of Pakistan International and Sameer Overseas. Thus, the Court concurs with the CA
that the ESA is not applicable in this case as it is against our fundamental and statutory
laws.

In fine, as the petitioners failed to meet all the four (4) requisites on the applicability of a
foreign law, then the Philippine labor laws must govern the overseas employment contract
of Arriola.

No authorized cause for dismissal was proven

Article 279 of our Labor Code has construed security of tenure to mean that the employer
shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized
by law.55 Concomitant to the employer's right to freely select and engage an employee is
the employer's right to discharge the employee for just and/or authorized causes. To validly
effect terminations of employment, the discharge must be for a valid cause in the manner
required by law. The purpose of these two-pronged qualifications is to protect the working
class from the employer's arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of its right to dismiss.56

Some of the authorized causes to terminate employment under the Labor Code would be
installation of labor-saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses and the
closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking.57 Each authorized
cause has specific requisites that must be proven by the employer with substantial evidence
before a dismissal may be considered valid.

Here, the petitioners assert that the economy of Madagascar weakened due to the global
financial crisis. Consequently, SNC-Lavalin's business also slowed down. To prove its
sagging financial standing, SNC-Lavalin presented a copy of a news item in the Financial
Post, dated March 5, 2009. They insist that SNC-Lavalin had no choice but to minimize its
expenditures and operational expenses.58 In addition, the petitioners argued that the
government of Madagascar prioritized the employment of its citizens, and not foreigners.
Thus, Arriola was terminated because there was no more job available for him.59

The Court finds that Arriola was not validly dismissed. The petitioners simply argued that
they were suffering from financial losses and Arriola had to be dismissed. It was not even
clear what specific authorized cause, whether retrenchment or redundancy, was used to
justify Arriola's dismissal. Worse, the petitioners did not even present a single credible
evidence to support their claim of financial loss. They simply offered an unreliable news
article which deserves scant consideration as it is undoubtedly hearsay. Time and again the
Court has ruled that in illegal dismissal cases like the present one, the onus of proving that
the employee was dismissed and that the dismissal was not illegal rests on the employer,
and failure to discharge the same would mean that the dismissal is not justified and,
therefore, illegal.60

As to the amount of backpay awarded, the Court finds that the computation of the CA was
valid and proper based on the employment contract of Arriola. Also, the issue of whether the
petitioners had made partial payments on the backpay is a matter best addressed during
the execution process.chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The January 24, 2013 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 118869 is AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

15. G.R. No. 217575, June 15, 2016

SOUTH COTABATO COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION AND GAUVAIN J. BENZONAN,

Petitioners, v. HON. PATRICIA STO. TOMAS, SECRETARY OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT, ROLANDO FABRIGAR, MERLYN VELARDE, VINCE LAMBOC, FELIPE
GALINDO, LEONARDO MIGUEL, JULIUS RUBIN, EDEL RODEROS, MERLYN COLIAO,
AND EDGAR JOPSON, Respondents.

DECISION

VELASCO JR., J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to
reverse and set aside the Decision1 dated November 28, 2014 and Resolution dated March
5, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 00179-MIN, affirming the Orders
dated November 8, 2004 and February 24, 2005 issued by the Secretary of Labor and
Employment.

Factual Antecedents

On January 19, 2004, the Department of Labor and Employment Region-XII (DOLE)
conducted a Complaint Inspection2 at the premises of DXCP Radio Station, which is owned
by petitioner South Cotabato Communications Corporation. The inspection yielded a finding
of violation of labor standards provisions of the Labor Code involving the nine (9) private
respondents, such as:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Underpayment of Wages

Underpayment of 13th Month Pay

Non-payment of the five (5) days Service Incentive Leave Pay

Non-payment of Rest Day Premium Pay

Non-payment of the Holiday Premium Pay

Non-remittance of SSS Contributions

Some employees are paid on commission basis aside from their allowance[s]3

Consequently, the DOLE issued a Notice of Inspection Result directing petitioner

corporation and/or its president, petitioner Gauvain J. Benzonan (Benzonan), to effect
restitution and/or correction of the alleged violations within five (5) days from notice. Due to
petitioners' failure to comply with its directive, the DOLE scheduled on March 3, 2004 a
Summary Investigation at its Regional Office No. XII, Provincial Extension Office, in General
Santos City. However, petitioners failed to appear despite due notice. Another hearing was
scheduled on April 1, 2004 wherein petitioners' counsel, Atty. Thomas Jacobo (Atty.
Jacobo), failed to attend due to an alleged conflict in schedule. Instead, his secretary, Nona
Gido, appeared on his behalf to request a resetting, which the DOLE Hearing Officer
denied.4 Thus, in an Order dated May 20, 2004, the DOLE Region-XII OIC Regional
Director (DOLE Regional Director) directed petitioners to pay private respondents the total
amount of P759,752, representing private respondents' claim for wage differentials, 13th
month pay differentials, service incentive leave pay, holiday premium pay, and rest day
premium Pay-Therefrom, petitioners appealed to the Secretary of Labor, raising two
grounds: (1) denial of due process; and (2) lack of factual and legal basis of the assailed
Order.

The denial of due process was predicated on the refusal of the Hearing Officer to reset the
hearing set on April 1, 2004, which thus allegedly deprived petitioners the opportunity to
present their evidence. Likewise, petitioners asserted that the Order of the Regional
Director does not state that an employer-employee relationship exists between petitioners
and private respondents, which is necessary to confer jurisdiction to the DOLE over the
alleged violations.

In an Order5 dated November 8, 2004, the Secretary of Labor affirmed the findings of the
DOLE Regional Director on the postulate that petitioners failed to question, despite notice of
hearing, the noted violations or to submit any proof of compliance therewith. And in view of
petitioners' failure to present their evidence before the Regional Director, the Secretary of
Labor adopted the findings of the Labor Inspector and considered the interviews conducted
as substantial evidence. The Secretary of Labor likewise sustained what is considered as
the straight computation method adopted by the Regional Office as regards the monetary
claims of private respondents,6 thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, presmises considered, the appeal by DXCP Radio Station and Engr.
Gauvain Benzonan is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Order dated May [20], 2004
of the Regional Director, directing appellants to pay the nine (9) appellees the aggregate
amount of Seven Hundred Fifty Nine Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty Two Pesos
(Php759,752.00), representing their claims for wage differentials, 13th month pay
differentials, service incentive leave pay, holiday pay premium and rest day premium, is
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.cralawred

Petitioners moved for, but was denied, reconsideration of the Secretary of Labor's Order.

Petitioners elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA) via a Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. By a Resolution7 dated July 20, 2005, the CA dismissed the
petition owing to procedural infirmities because petitioners failed to attach a Secretary's
Certificate evidencing the authority of petitioner Benzonan, as President, to sign the petition.
On appeal,8 this Court remanded the case back to the CA for determination on the
merits.9ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its Decision dated November 28, 2014 in CA-G.R. SP No. 00179-MIN, the CA upheld the
Secretary of Labor, holding that petitioners cannot claim denial of due process, their failure
to present evidence being attributed to their negligence.

Petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the Decision, grounded on similar arguments
raised before the Secretary of Labor, citing in addition, the pronouncement of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in the related case of NLRC No. MAC-01-010053-
2008 entitled Rolando Fabrigar, et. al. v. DXCP Radio Station, et. al. There, the NLRC held
that no employer-employee relationship exists between petitioners and private respondents
Rolando Fabrigar (Fabrigar), Edgar Jopson (Jopson), and Merlyn Velarde (Velarde). For
clarity, two separate actions were instituted by private respondents Fabrigar, Jopson, and
Velarde against petitioners: the first, for violation of labor standards provisions with the
DOLE; and the second, for illegal dismissal filed with the NLRC. The latter case arose from
the three respondents' claim of constructive dismissal effected by petitioners following the
inspection by the DOLE. In ruling for petitioners, the NLRC, in its Resolution10 dated April
30, 2008, declared that there is no employer-employee relationship between the parties,
thus negating the notion of constructive dismissal.

The CA denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration in its Resolution dated March 5, 2014.
Hence, this petition.

Petitioners presently seek the reversal of the CA's Decision and Resolution and ascribe the
following errors to the court a quo:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The [CA] did not completely and properly dispose of the case pending before it as it never
resolved all justiciable issues raised x x x, particularly, that the determination of presence or
absence of employer-employee relationship is indispensable in the resolution of this case
as jurisdiction is dependent upon it.

There is [no] single basis, either factual or legal, for the issuance of the May 20, 2004 Order
of the Regional Director x x x against the petitioners as it was issued relying merely on pure
allegations and without any substantial proof on the part of the claimants, contrary to law
and jurisprudence.

The [CA] gravely erred in ruling that the Secretary of Labor x x x did not act in a whimsical
and capricious manner or with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in affirming the Order of the [Regional Director] despite the glaring fact that no
evidence were submitted by private respondents as to the basis of [their] claim and nature
of their employment.

The [CA] erred in ruling that the Secretary of Labor x x x did not deny [petitioners their] right
to due process in affirming the x x x Order of [the] Regional Director x x x notwithstanding
[the evidence] submitted before her [that there] exist no employer- employee relation [ship]
among the parties and that the [DOLE] has no jurisdiction over the case.11

In the matter of denial of due process, petitioners maintain that they were prevented from
presenting evidence to prove that private respondents are not their employees when the
Regional Director submitted the case for resolution without affording them an opportunity to
ventilate their case or rebut the findings of the inspection. In addition, petitioners assail the
Order of the Regional Director for want of factual and legal basis, particularly the lack of
categorical finding on the existence of an employer-employee relationship between the
partiesan element which petitioners insist is a prerequisite for the exercise of the DOLE'S
jurisdiction,12 following People's Broadcasting (Bombo Radyo, Phils., Inc.) v. The Secretary
of Labor and Employment, et al.13 Petitioners likewise note that the November 8, 2004
Order of the DOLE Secretary denying petitioner's appeal, as well as the Decision of the CA,
is silent on the employer-employee relationship issue, which further suggests that no real
and proper determination of the existence of such relationship was ever made by these
tribunals.

In its Comment, the DOLE counters that the results of the interviews conducted in the
premises of DXCP in the course of its inspection constitute substantial evidence that served
as basis for the monetary awards to private respondents.14ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

From the foregoing, the issue for the resolution can be reduced into the question of whether
the CA erred in upholding the November 8, 2004 Order of the Secretary of Labor, which in
turn affirmed the May 20, 2004 Order of the Regional Director. Inextricably linked to the
resolution of the said issue is a determination of whether an employer-employee
relationship had sufficiently been established between the parties as to warrant the
assumption of jurisdiction by the DOLE and issuance of the said May 20, 2004 and
November 8, 2004 Orders.

The Court's Ruling

Petitioners were not denied due process

Petitioners' claim of denial of due process deserves scant consideration. The essence of
due process, jurisprudence teaches, is simply an opportunity to be heard, or, as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.15 As long as the parties are, in fine,
given the opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered, the demands of due process
are sufficiently met.16ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

That petitioners were given ample opportunity to present their evidence before the Regional
Director is indisputable. They were notified of the summary investigations conducted on
March 3, 2004 and April 1, 2004, both of which they failed to attend. To justify their non-
appearance, petitioners claim they requested a resetting of the April 1, 2004 hearing due to
the unavailability of their counsel.17 However, no such explanation was proffered as to why
they failed to attend the first hearing. At any rate, it behooved the petitioners to ensure that
they, as well as their counsel, would be available on the dates set for the summary
investigation as this would enable them to prove their claim of non-existence of an
employer-employee relationship. Clearly, their own negligence did them in. Their lament that
they have been deprived of due process is specious.

This thus brings to the fore the issues of whether the Orders of the Regional Director and
Secretary of Labor are supported by factual and legal basis, and, concomitantly, whether an
employer-employee relationship was sufficiently established between petitioners and private
respondents as to warrant the exercise by the DOLE of jurisdiction.

At the outset, the determination as to whether such employer-employee relationship was,

indeed, established requires an examination of facts. It is a well-settled rule that findings of
fact of quasi-judicial agencies are accorded great respect, even finality, by this Court. This
proceeds from the general rule that this Court is not a trier of facts, as questions of fact are
contextually for the labor tribunals to resolve, and only errors of law are generally reviewed
in petitions for review on certiorari criticizing the decisions of the
CA.18ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The findings of fact should, however, be supported by substantial evidence from which the
said tribunals can make their own independent evaluation of the facts. In labor cases, as in
other administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary is
substantial evidence, or such amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.19 Although no particular form of evidence is
required to prove the existence of an employer-employee relationship, and any competent
and relevant evidence to prove the relationship may be admitted,20 a finding that the
relationship exists must nonetheless rest on substantial
evidence.21ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

In addition, the findings of fact tainted with grave abuse of discretion will not be upheld. This
Court will not hesitate to set aside the labor tribunal's findings of fact when it is clearly
shown that they were arrived at arbitrarily or in disregard of the evidence on record or when
there is showing of fraud or error of law.22ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

This case clearly falls under the exception. After a careful review of this case, the Court
finds that the DOLE failed to establish its jurisdiction over the case.
The assailed May 20, 2004 Order of the Regional Director and November 8, 2004 Order of
the Secretary of Labor were issued pursuant to Article 128 of the Labor Code, to
wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

ART. 128. Visitorial and enforcement power. - (a) The Secretary of Labor and Employment
or his duly authorized representatives, including labor regulation officers, shall have access
to employer's records and premises at any time of the day or night whenever work is being
undertaken therein, and the right to copy therefrom, to question any employee and
investigate any fact, condition or matter which may be necessary to determine violations or
which may aid in the enforcement of this Code and of any labor law, wage order or rules
and regulations issued pursuant thereto.

(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of Articles 129 and 217 of this Code to the contrary, and
in cases where the relationship of employer-employee still exists, the Secretary of Labor
and Employment or his duly authorized representatives shall have the power to issue
compliance orders to give effect to the labor standards provisions of this Code and other
labor legislation based on the findings of labor employment and enforcement officers or
industrial safety engineers made in the course of inspection. The Secretary or his duly
authorized representatives shall issue writs of execution to the appropriate authority for the
enforcement of their orders, except in cases where the employer contests the findings of the
labor employment and enforcement officer and raises issues supported by documentary
proofs which were not considered in the course of inspection. (As amended by Republic Act
No. 7730, June 2, 1994). x x xcralawred

Under the aforequoted provision, the Secretary of Labor, or any of his or her authorized
representatives, is granted visitorial and enforcement powers for the purpose of determining
violations of, and enforcing, the Labor Code and any labor law, wage order, or rules and
regulations issued pursuant thereto. Indispensable to the DOLE'S exercise of such power is
the existence of an actual employer-employee relationship between the parties.

The power of the DOLE to determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship

between petitioners and private respondents in order to carry out its mandate under Article
128 has been established beyond cavil in Bombo Radyo,23
thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

It can be assumed that the DOLE in the exercise of its visitorial and enforcement power
somehow has to make a determination of the existence of an employer-employee
relationship. Such prerogatival determination, however, cannot be coextensive with the
visitorial and enforcement power itself. Indeed, such determination is merely preliminary,
incidental and collateral to the DOLE'S primary function of enforcing labor standards
provisions. The determination of the existence of employer-employee relationship is still
primarily lodged with the NLRC. This is the meaning of the clause "in cases where the
relationship of employer-employee still exists" in Art. 128 (b).
Thus, before the DOLE may exercise its powers under Article 128, two important questions
must be resolved: (1) Does the employer-employee relationship still exist, or alternatively,
was there ever an employer-employee relationship to speak of; and (2) Are there violations
of the Labor Code or of any labor law?

The existence of an employer-employee relationship is a statutory prerequisite to and a

limitation on the power of the Secretary of Labor, one which the legislative branch is entitled
to impose. The rationale underlying this limitation is to eliminate the prospect of competing
conclusions of the Secretary of Labor and the NLR.C, on a matter fraught with questions of
fact and law, which is best resolved by the quasi-judicial body, which is the NRLC, rather
than an administrative official of the executive branch of the government. If the Secretary of
Labor proceeds to exercise his visitorial and enforcement powers absent the first requisite,
as the dissent proposes, his office confers jurisdiction on itself which it cannot otherwise
acquire. (emphasis ours)cralawred

The foregoing ruling was further reiterated and clarified in the resolution of the
reconsideration of the same case, wherein the jurisdiction of the DOLE was delineated vis-
a-vis the NLRC where the employer-employee relationship between the parties is at
issue:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

No limitation in the law was placed upon the power of the DOLE to determine the existence
of an employer-employee relationship. No procedure was laid down where the DOLE would
only make a preliminary finding, that the power was primarily held by the NLRC. The law did
not say that the DOLE would first seek the NLRC's determination of the existence of an
employer-employee relationship, or that should the existence of the employer-employee
relationship be disputed, the DOLE would refer the matter to the NLRC. The DOLE must
have the power to determine whether or not an employer-employee relationship exists, and
from there to decide whether or not to issue compliance orders in accordance with Art.
128(b) of the Labor Code, as amended by RA 7730.

The DOLE, in determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship, has a ready

set of guidelines to follow, the same guide the courts themselves use. The elements to
determine the existence of an employment relationship are: (1) the selection and
engagement of the employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; (4) the
employer's power to control the employee's conduct. The use of this test is not solely limited
to the NLRC. The DOLE Secretary, or his or her representatives, can utilize the same test,
even in the course of inspection, making use of the same evidence that would have been
presented before the NLRC. (emphasis ours)cralawred

Like the NLRC, the DOLE has the authority to rule on the existence of an employer-
employee relationship between the parties, considering that the existence of an employer-
employee relationship is a condition sine qua non for the exercise of its visitorial power.
Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that without an employer-employee relationship, or if
one has already been terminated, the Secretary of Labor is without jurisdiction to determine
if violations of labor standards provision had in fact been committed,24 and to direct
employers to comply with their alleged violations of labor standards.

The Orders of the Regional Director and the Secretary of Labor do not contain clear and
distinct factual basis necessary to establish the jurisdiction of the DOLE and to justify the
monetary awards to private respondents

For expediency, the May 20, 2004 Order of the Regional Director is pertinently reproduced
hereunder:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

ORDER

This refers to the Complaint Inspection conducted at DXCP Radio Station and/or Engr.
Gauvain Benzonan, President, located at NH Lagao Road, General Santos City on January
19, 2004 pursuant to Inspection Authority No. R1201-0401-CI-052 which resulted to the
discovery of the Labor Standards violations, namely:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

1. Underpayment of Wages

2. Underpayment of 13th Month Pay

3. Non-payment of the five (5) days Service Incentive Leave Pay

4. Non-payment of Rest Day Premium Pay

5. Non-payment of the Holiday Premium Pay

6. Non-remittance of SSS Contributions

7. Some employees are paid on commission basis aside from their allowance[s]cralawred

Proceeding from the conduct of such inspection was the issuance of the Notice of
Inspection Result requiring the respondent DXCP Radio Station and/or Engr. Gauvain
Benzonan, President, to effect restitution and/or correction of the noted violations at the
plant/company level within five (5) calendar days from notice thereof. But, Engr. Gauvain
Benzonan failed to do so.
On March 3, 2004, a summary investigation was conducted at the [DOLE], Regional Office
No. XII, Provincial Extension Office, General Santos City. In that scheduled Summary
Investigation, only complainants appeared, assisted by Mr. Fred Huervana, National
President of the Philippine Organization of Labor Unions, x x x while respondent failed to
appear despite due notice.

On April 1, 2004, another Summary Investigation was conducted x x x [There] complainants

appeared, x x x while respondent was represented by Ms. Nona Gido, Secretary of Atty.
Thomas Jacobo, counsel for the respondent. During the deliberation, Ms. Nona Gido
manifested that her presence in that scheduled summary investigation was to request for
the re-scheduling of such hearing, however, such request was denied. Mr. Fred Huervana
declared that as he gleaned from the Notice of Inspection Result issued by the labor
inspector, the Non-payment of the Provisional Emergency Relief Allowance (PERA) was not
included from among the discovered violations, hence he requested that it should be
included in the computation. Such request was denied x x x. Further, Mr. Fred Huervana,
declared that this case be submitted for decision based on the merit of the case.

Failure of the parties to reach a final settlement prompted this Office to compute the
entitlements of the seven (7) affected workers for their salary differential, underpayment of
13th month pay, non-payment of the five (5) days service incentive leave pay, non-payment
of holiday premium pay and non-payment of rest day premium pay in the total amount of
SEVEN HUNDRED FIFTY NINE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED FIFTY TWO PESOS
(P759,752.00) x x x.25cralawred

In determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship, Bombo Radyo specifies

the guidelines or indicators used by courts, i.e. (1) the selection and engagement of the
employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the employer's
power to control the employee's conduct. The DOLE Secretary, or his or her
representatives, can utilize the same test, even in the course of inspection, making use of
the same evidence that would have been presented before the
NLRC.26ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

As can be gleaned from the above-quoted Order, the Regional Director merely noted the
discovery of violations of labor standards provisions in the course of inspection of the DXCP
premises. No such categorical determination was made on the existence of an employer-
employee relationship utilizing any of the guidelines set forth. In a word, the Regional
Director had presumed, not demonstrated, the existence of the relationship. Of particular
note is the DOLE'S failure to show that petitioners, thus, exercised control over private
respondents' conduct in the workplace. The power of the employee to control the work of
the employee, or the control test, is considered the most significant determinant of the
existence of an employer-employee relationship.27ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Neither did the Orders of the Regional Director and Secretary of Labor state nor make
reference to any concrete evidence to support a finding of an employer-employee
relationship and justify the monetary awards to private respondents. Substantial evidence,
such as proofs of employment, clear exercise of control, and the power to dismiss that
prove such relationship and that petitioners committed the labor laws violations they were
adjudged to have committed, are grossly absent in this case. Furthermore, the Orders dated
May 20, 2004 and November 8, 2004 do not even allude to the substance of the interviews
during the inspection that became the basis of the finding of an employer-employee
relationship.

The Secretary of Labor adverts to private respondents' allegation in their Reply28 to justify
their status as employees of petitioners. The proffered justification falls below the quantum
of proof necessary to establish such fact as allegations can easily be concocted and
manufactured. Private respondents' allegations are inadequate to support a conclusion
absent other concrete proof that would support or corroborate the same. Mere allegation,
without more, is not evidence and is not equivalent to proof.29 Hence, private respondents'
allegations, essentially self-serving statements as they are and devoid under the premises
of any evidentiary weight, can hardly be taken as the substantial evidence contemplated for
the DOLE'S conclusion that they are employees of petitioners.

In a similar vein, the use of the straight computation method in awarding the sum of
P759,752 to private respondents, without reference to any other evidence other than the
interviews conducted during the inspection, is highly telling that the DOLE failed to consider
evidence in arriving at its award and leads this Court to conclude that such amount was
arrived at arbitrarily.

It is quite implausible for the nine (9) private respondents to be entitled to uniform amounts
of Service Incentive Leave (SIL) pay, holiday pay premium, and rest day premium pay for
three (3) years, without any disparity in the amounts due them since entitlement to said
benefits would largely depend on the actual rest days and holidays worked and amount of
remaining leave credits in a year. Whoever claims entitlement to the benefits provided by
law should establish his or her right thereto.30 The burden of proving entitlement to
overtime pay and premium pay for holidays and rest days lies with the employee because
these are not incurred in the normal course of business.31 In the case at bar, evidence
pointing not only to the existence of an employer-employee relationship between the
petitioners and private respondents but also to the latter's entitlement to these benefits are
miserably lacking.
It may be that petitioners have failed to refute the allegation that private respondents were
employees of DXCP. Nevertheless, it was incumbent upon private respondents to prove
their allegation that they were, indeed, under petitioners' employ and that the latter violated
their labor rights. A person who alleges a fact has the onus of proving it and the proof
should be clear, positive and convincing.32 Regrettably, private respondents failed to
discharge this burden. The pronouncement in Bombyo Radyo that the determination by the
DOLE of the existence of an employer-employee relationship must be respected should not
be construed so as to dispense with the evidentiary requirement when called for.

It cannot be stressed enough that the existence of an employer-employee relationship

between the parties is essential to confer jurisdiction of the case to the DOLE. Without such
express finding, the DOLE cannot assume to have jurisdiction to resolve the complaints of
private respondents as jurisdiction in that instance lies with the
NLRC.33ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The Orders of the Regional Director and Secretary of Labor do not comply with Article VIII,
Section 16 of the Constitution

As a necessary corollary to the foregoing considerations, another well-grounded reason

exists to set aside the May 20, 2004 Order of the Regional Director and November 8, 2004
Order of the Secretary of Labor. The said Orders contravene Article VIII, Section 14 of the
Constitution, which requires courts to express clearly and distinctly the facts and law on
which decisions are based, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Section 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly
and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.

No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be
refused due course or denied without stating the legal basis therefor.cralawred

As stressed by this Court in San Jose v. NLRC,34 faithful compliance by the courts and
quasi-judicial bodies, such as the DOLE, with Art. VIII, Sec. 14 is a vital element of due
process as it enables the parties to know how decisions are arrived at as well as the legal
reasoning behind them. Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

This Court has previously held that judges and arbiters should draw up their decisions and
resolutions with due care, and make certain that they truly and accurately reflect their
conclusions and their final dispositions. A decision should faithfully comply with Section 14,
Article VIII of the Constitution which provides that no decision shall be rendered by any
court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts of the case and the law on
which it is based. If such decision had to be completely overturned or set aside, upon the
modified decision, such resolution or decision should likewise state the factual and legal
foundation relied upon. The reason for this is obvious: aside from being required by the
Constitution, the court should be able to justify such a sudden change of course; it must be
able to convincingly explain the taking back of its solemn conclusions and pronouncements
in the earl indecision. The same thing goes for the findings of fact made by the NLRC, as it
is a settled rule that such findings are entitled to great respect and even finality when
supported by substantial evidence; otherwise, they shall be struck down for being whimsical
and capricious and arrived at with grave abuse of discretion. It is a requirement of due
process and fair play that the parties to a litigation be informed of how it was decided, with
an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court. A
decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based
leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is especially prejudicial to the
losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a higher
tribunal. x x xcralawred

To this end, University of the Philippines v. Hon. Dizon35 instructs that the Constitution and
the Rules of Court require not only that a decision should state the ultimate facts but also
that it should specify the supporting evidentiary facts, for they are what are called the
findings of fact. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on
which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is especially
prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court (or
quasi-judicial body) for review by a higher tribunal.36ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Accordingly, this Court will not hesitate to strike down decisions rendered not hewing to the
Constitutional directive, as it did to a Decision rendered by the NLRC in Anino, et al. v.
Hinatuan Mining Corporation37 for non-observance of the said
requirement:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

In the present case, the NLRC was definitely wanting in the observance of the aforesaid
constitutional requirement. Its assailed five-page Decision consisted of about three pages of
quotation from the labor arbiter's decision, including the dispositive portion, and barely a
page (two short paragraphs of two sentences each) of its own discussion of its reasons for
reversing the arbiter's findings. It merely raised a doubt on the motive of the complaining
employees and took "judicial notice that in one area of Mindanao, the mining industry
suffered economic difficulties." In affirming peremptorily the validity of private respondents'
retrenchment program, it surmised that "[i]f small mining cooperatives experienced the
same fate, what more with those highly mechanized establishments."cralawred

The Court is not unmindful of the State's policy to zealously safeguard the rights of our
workers, as no less than the Constitution itself mandates the State to afford full protection to
labor. Nevertheless, it is equally true that the law, in protecting the rights of the laborer,
authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of the employer.38 The constitutional
policy to provide full protection to labor is not meant to be a sword to oppress employers.39
Certainly, an employer cannot be made to answer for claims that have neither been
sufficiently proved nor substantiated.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated November 28, 2014 and
Resolution dated March 5, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00179-MIN are
accordingly REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order of the then Secretary of Labor and
Employment dated November 8, 2004 denying petitioners' appeal and the Order of the
Regional Director, DOLE Regional Office No. XII, dated May 20, 2004, are ANNULLED,
without prejudice to whatever right or cause of action private respondents may have against
petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

16. G.R. No. 208986, January 13, 2016

HIJO RESOURCES CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. EPIFANIO P. MEJARES, REMEGIO C.

BALURAN, JR., DANTE SAYCON, AND CECILIO CUCHARO, REPRESENTED BY
NAMABDJERA-HRC, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This petition for review1 assails the 29 August 2012 Decision2 and the 13 August 2013
Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 04058-MIN. The Court of Appeals
reversed and set aside the Resolutions dated 29 June 2009 and 16 December 2009 of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC No. MIC-03-000229-08 (RAB XI-09-
00774-2007), and remanded the case to the Regional Arbitration Branch, Region XI, Davao
City for further proceedings.
The Facts

Respondents Epifanio P. Mejares, Remegio C. Baluran, Jr., Dante Saycon, and Cecilio
Cucharo (respondents) were among the complainants, represented by their labor union
named "Nagkahiusang Mamumuo ng Bit, Djevon, at Raquilla Farms sa Hijo Resources
Corporation" (NAMABDJERA-HRC), who filed with the NLRC an illegal dismissal case
against petitioner Hijo Resources Corporation (HRC).

Complainants (which include the respondents herein) alleged that petitioner HRC, formerly
known as Hijo Plantation Incorporated (HPI), is the owner of agricultural lands in Madum,
Tagum, Davao del Norte, which were planted primarily with Cavendish bananas. In 2000,
HPI was renamed as HRC. In December 2003, HRC's application for the conversion of its
agricultural lands into agri-industrial use was approved. The machineries and equipment
formerly used by HPI continued to be utilized by HRC.

Complainants claimed that they were employed by HPI as farm workers in HPI's plantations
occupying various positions as area harvesters, packing house workers, loaders, or
labelers. In 2001, complainants were absorbed by HRC, but they were working under the
contractor-growers: Buenaventura Tano (Bit Farm); Djerame Pausa (Djevon Farm); and
Ramon Q. Laurente (Raquilla Farm). Complainants asserted that these contractor-growers
received compensation from HRC and were under the control of HRC. They further alleged
that the contractor-growers did not have their own capitalization, farm machineries, and
equipment.

On 1 July 2007, complainants formed their union NAMABDJERA-HRC, which was later
registered with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). On 24 August 2007,
NAMABDJERA-HRC filed a petition for certification election before the DOLE.

When HRC learned that complainants formed a union, the three contractor-growers filed
with the DOLE a notice of cessation of business operations. In September 2007,
complainants were terminated from their employment on the ground of cessation of
business operations by the contractor-growers of HRC. On 19 September 2007,
complainants, represented by NAMABDJERA-HRC, filed a case for unfair labor practices,
illegal dismissal, and illegal deductions with prayer for moral and exemplary damages and
attorney's fees before the NLRC.
On 19 November 2007, DOLE Med-Arbiter Lito A. Jasa issued an Order,4 dismissing
NAMABDJERA-HRC's petition for certification election on the ground that there was no
employer-employee relationship between complainants (members of NAMABDJERA-HRC)
and HRC. Complainants did not appeal the Order of Med-Arbiter Jasa but pursued the
illegal dismissal case they filed.

On 4 January 2008, HRC filed a motion to inhibit Labor Arbiter Maria Christina S. Sagmit
and moved to dismiss the complaint for illegal dismissal. The motion to dismiss was
anchored on the following arguments: (1) Lack of jurisdiction under the principle of res
judicata; and (2) The Order of the Med-Arbiter finding that complainants were not
employees of HRC, which complainants did not appeal, had become final and executory.

The Labor Arbiter's Ruling

On 5 February 2008, Labor Arbiter Sagmit denied the motion to inhibit. Labor Arbiter Sagmit
likewise denied the motion to dismiss in an Order dated 12 February 2008. Labor Arbiter
Sagmit held that res judicata does not apply. Citing the cases of Manila Golf & Country
Club, Inc. v. IAC5 and Sandoval Shipyards, Inc. v. Pepito,6 the Labor Arbiter ruled that the
decision of the Med-Arbiter in a certification election case, by the nature of that
proceedings, does not foreclose further dispute between the parties as to the existence or
non-existence of employer-employee relationship between them. Thus, the finding of Med-
Arbiter Jasa that no employment relationship exists between HRC and complainants does
not bar the Labor Arbiter from making his own independent finding on the same issue. The
non-litigious nature of the proceedings before the Med-Arbiter does not prevent the Labor
Arbiter from hearing and deciding the case. Thus, Labor Arbiter Sagmit denied the motion to
dismiss and ordered the parties to file their position papers.

HRC filed with the NLRC a petition for certiorari with a prayer for temporary restraining
order, seeking to nullify the 5 February 2008 and 12 February 2008 Orders of Labor Arbiter
Sagmit.

The Ruling of the NLRC

The NLRC granted the petition, holding that Labor Arbiter Sagmit gravely abused her
discretion in denying HRC's motion to dismiss. The NLRC held that the Med-Arbiter Order
dated 19 November 2007 dismissing the certification election case on the ground of lack of
employer-employee relationship between HRC and complainants (members of
NAMABDJERA-HRC) constitutes res judicata under the concept of conclusiveness of
judgment, and thus, warrants the dismissal of the case. The NLRC ruled that the Med-
Arbiter exercises quasi-judicial power and the Med-Arbiter's decisions and orders have,
upon their finality, the force and effect of a final judgment within the purview of the doctrine
of res judicata.

On the issue of inhibition, the NLRC found it moot and academic in view of Labor Arbiter
Sagmit's voluntary inhibition from the case as per Order dated 11 March 2009.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals found the ruling in the Sandoval case more applicable in this case.
The Court of Appeals noted that the Sandoval case, which also involved a petition for
certification election and an illegal dismissal case filed by the union members against the
alleged employer, is on all fours with this case. The issue in Sandoval on the effect of the
Med-Arbiter's findings as to the existence of employer-employee relationship is the very
same issue raised in this case. On the other hand, the case of Chris Garments Corp. v.
Hon. Sto. Tomas7 cited by the NLRC, which involved three petitions for certification election
filed by the same union, is of a different factual milieu.

The Court of Appeals held that the certification proceedings before the Med-Arbiter are non-
adversarial and merely investigative. On the other hand, under Article 217 of the Labor
Code, the Labor Arbiter has original and exclusive jurisdiction over illegal dismissal cases.
Although the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter are also described as non-litigious, the
Court of Appeals noted that the Labor Arbiter is given wide latitude in ascertaining the
existence of employment relationship. Thus, unlike the Med-Artbiter, the Labor Arbiter may
conduct clarificatory hearings and even avail of ocular inspection to ascertain facts speedily.

Hence, the Court of Appeals concluded that the decision in a certification election case does
not foreclose further dispute as to the existence or non-existence of an employer-employee
relationship between HRC and the complainants.

On 29 August 2012, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision, the dispositive portion
of which reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed Resolutions dated June
29, 2009 and December 16, 2009 of the National Labor Relations Commission are hereby
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Let NLRC CASE No. RAB-XI-09-00774-0707 be remanded
to the Regional Arbitration Branch, Region XI, Davao City for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.8ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

cralawlawlibrary

The Issue

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in setting aside the NLRC ruling and remanding the
case to the Labor Arbiter for further proceedings.

The Ruling of the Court

We find the petition without merit.

There is no question that the Med-Arbiter has the authority to determine the existence of an
employer-employee relationship between the parties in a petition for certification election.
As held in M. Y. San Biscuits, Inc. v. Acting Sec. Laguesma:9chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Under Article 226 of the Labor Code, as amended, the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR), of
which the med-arbiter is an officer, has the following jurisdiction -

"ART. 226. Bureau of Labor Relations. - The Bureau of Labor Relations and the Labor
Relations Divisionfs] in the regional offices of the Department of Labor shall have original
and exclusive authority to act, at their own initiative or upon request of either or both parties,
on all inter-union and intra-union conflicts, and all disputes, grievances or problems arising
from or affecting labor-management relations in all workplaces whether agricultural or non-
agricultural, except those arising from the implementation or interpretation of collective
bargaining agreements which shall be the subject of grievance procedure and/or voluntary
arbitration.

The Bureau shall have fifteen (15) working days to act on labor cases before it, subject to
extension by agreement of the parties." (Italics supplied)

From the foregoing, the BLR has the original and exclusive jurisdiction to inter alia, decide
all disputes, grievances or problems arising from or affecting labor-management relations in
all workplaces whether agricultural or non-agricultural. Necessarily, in the exercise of this
jurisdiction over labor-management relations, the med-arbiter has the authority, original and
exclusive, to determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship between the
parties.

Apropos to the present case, once there is a determination as to the existence of such a
relationship, the med-arbiter can then decide the certification election case. As the authority
to determine the employer-employee relationship is necessary and indispensable in the
exercise of jurisdiction by the med-arbiter, his finding thereon may only be reviewed and
reversed by the Secretary of Labor who exercises appellate jurisdiction under Article 259 of
the Labor Code, as amended, which provides -

"ART. 259. Appeal from certification election orders. - Any party to an election may appeal
the order or results of the election as determined by the Med-Arbiter directly to the
Secretary of Labor and Employment on the ground that the rules and regulations or parts
thereof established by the Secretary of Labor and Employment for the conduct of the
election have been violated. Such appeal shall be decided within fifteen (15) calendar
days."10

cralawlawlibrary

In this case, the Med-Arbiter issued an Order dated 19 November 2007, dismissing the
certification election case because of lack of employer-employee relationship between HRC
and the members of the respondent union. The order dismissing the petition was issued
after the members of the respondent union were terminated from their employment in
September 2007, which led to the filing of the illegal dismissal case before the NLRC on 19
September 2007. Considering their termination from work, it would have been futile for the
members of the respondent union to appeal the Med-Arbiter' s order in the certification
election case to the DOLE Secretary. Instead, they pursued the illegal dismissal case filed
before the NLRC.
The Court is tasked to resolve the issue of whether the Labor Arbiter, in the illegal dismissal
case, is bound by the ruling of the Med-Arbiter regarding the existence or non-existence of
employer-employee relationship between the parties in the certification election case.

The Court rules in the negative. As found by the Court of Appeals, the facts in this case are
very similar to those in the Sandoval case, which also involved the issue of whether the
ruling in a certification election case on the existence or non-existence of an employer-
employee relationship operates as res judicata in the illegal dismissal case filed before the
NLRC. In Sandoval, the DOLE Undersecretary reversed the finding of the Med-Arbiter in a
certification election case and ruled that there was no employer-employee relationship
between the members of the petitioner union and Sandoval Shipyards, Inc. (SSI), since the
former were employees of the subcontractors. Subsequently, several illegal dismissal cases
were filed by some members of the petitioner union against SSI. Both the Labor Arbiter and
the NLRC ruled that there was no employer-employee relationship between the parties,
citing the resolution of the DOLE Undersecretary in the certification election case. The Court
of Appeals reversed the NLRC ruling and held that the members of the petitioner union
were employees of SSI. On appeal, this Court affirmed the appellate court's decision and
ruled that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC erred in relying on the pronouncement of the
DOLE Undersecretary that there was no employer-employee relationship between the
parties. The Court cited the ruling in the Manila Golf11 case that the decision in a
certification election case, by the very nature of that proceeding, does not foreclose all
further dispute between the parties as to the existence or non-existence of an employer-
employee relationship between them.

This case is different from the Chris Garments case cited by the NLRC where the Court
held that the matter of employer-employee relationship has been resolved with finality by
the DOLE Secretary, whose factual findings were not appealed by the losing party. As
mentioned earlier, the Med-Arbiter's order in this case dismissing the petition for certification
election on the basis of non-existence of employer-employee relationship was issued after
the members of the respondent union were dismissed from their employment. The purpose
of a petition for certification election is to determine which organization will represent the
employees in their collective bargaining with the employer.12The respondent union, without
its member-employees, was thus stripped of its personality to challenge the Med-Arbiter's
decision in the certification election case. Thus, the members of the respondent union were
left with no option but to pursue their illegal dismissal case filed before the Labor Arbiter. To
dismiss the illegal dismissal case filed before the Labor Arbiter on the basis of the
pronouncement of the Med-Arbiter in the certification election case that there was no
employer-employee relationship between the parties, which the respondent union could not
even appeal to the DOLE Secretary because of the dismissal of its members, would be
tantamount to denying due process to the complainants in the illegal dismissal case. This,
we cannot allow.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 29 August 2012 Decision and the
13 August 2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 04058-MIN.

SO ORDERED

17. G.R. No. 201595

ALLAN M. MENDOZA, Petitioner,

vs.

OFFICERS OF MANILA WATER EMPLOYEES UNION (MWEU), namely, EDUARDO B.

BORELA, BUENAVENTURA QUEBRAL, ELIZABETH COMETA, ALEJANDRO TORRES,
AMORSOLO TIERRA, SOLEDAD YEBAN, LUIS RENDON, VIRGINIA APILADO,
TERESITA BOLO, ROGELIO BARBERO, JOSE CASAAS, ALFREDO MAGA, EMILIO
FERNANDEZ, ROSITA BUENA VENTURA, ALMENIO CANCINO, ADELA IMANA, MARIO
MANCENIDO, WILFREDO MANDILAG, ROLANDO MANLAP AZ, EFREN MONTEMAYOR,
NELSON PAGULAYAN, CARLOS VILLA, RIC BRIONES, and CHITO BERNARDO,
Respondents.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assails the April 24, 2012 Decision2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) which dismissed the Petition for Certiorari3 in CA-G.R. SP No. 115639.

Factual Antecedents

Petitioner was a member of the Manila Water Employees Union (MWEU), a Department of
Labor and Employment (DOLE)-registered labor organization consisting of rank-and-file
employees within Manila Water Company (MWC). The respondents herein named
Eduardo B. Borela (Borela), Buenaventura Quebral (Quebral), Elizabeth Cometa (Cometa),
Alejandro Torres (Torres), Amorsolo Tierra (Tierra), Soledad Yeban (Yeban), Luis Rendon
(Rendon), Virginia Apilado (Apilado), Teresita Bolo (Bolo), Rogelio Barbero (Barbero), Jose
Casaas (Casaas), Alfredo Maga (Maga), Emilio Fernandez (Fernandez), Rosita
Buenaventura (Buenaventura), Almenio Cancino (Cancino), Adela Imana, Mario Mancenido
(Mancenido), Wilfredo Mandilag (Mandilag), Rolando Manlapaz (Manlapaz), Efren
Montemayor (Montemayor), Nelson Pagulayan, Carlos Villa, Ric Briones, and Chito
Bernardo were MWEU officers during the period material to this Petition, with Borela as
President and Chairman of the MWEU Executive Board, Quebral as First Vice-President
and Treasurer, and Cometa as Secretary.4

In an April 11, 2007 letter,5 MWEU through Cometa informed petitioner that the union was
unable to fully deduct the increased P200.00 union dues from his salary due to lack of the
required December 2006 check-off authorization from him. Petitioner was warned that his
failure to pay the union dues would result in sanctions upon him. Quebral informed Borela,
through a May 2, 2007 letter,6 that for such failure to pay the union dues, petitioner and
several others violated Section 1(g), Article IX of the MWEUs Constitution and By-Laws.7 In
turn, Borela referred the charge to the MWEU grievance committee for investigation.

On May 21, 2007, a notice of hearing was sent to petitioner, who attended the scheduled
hearing. On June 6, 2007, the MWEU grievance committee recommended that petitioner be
suspended for 30 days.

In a June 20, 2007 letter,8 Borela informed petitioner and his corespondents of the MWEU
Executive Boards "unanimous approval"9 of the grievance committees recommendation
and imposition upon them of a penalty of 30 days suspension, effective June 25, 2007.

In a June 26, 2007 letter10 to Borela, petitioner and his co-respondents took exception to
the imposition and indicated their intention to appeal the same to the General Membership
Assembly in accordance with Section 2(g), Article V of the unions Constitution and By-
Laws,11 which grants them the right to appeal any arbitrary resolution, policy and rule
promulgated by the Executive Board to the General Membership Assembly. In a June 28,
2007 reply,12 Borela denied petitioners appeal, stating that the prescribed period for appeal
had expired.

Petitioner and his co-respondents sent another letter13 on July 4, 2007, reiterating their
arguments and demanding that the General Membership Assembly be convened in order
that their appeal could be taken up. The letter was not acted upon.
Petitioner was once more charged with non-payment of union dues, and was required to
attend an August 3, 2007 hearing.14 Thereafter, petitioner was again penalized with a 30-
day suspension through an August 21, 2007 letter15 by Borela informing petitioner of the
Executive Boards "unanimous approval"16 of the grievance committee recommendation to
suspend him effective August 24, 2007, to which he submitted a written reply,17 invoking his
right to appeal through the convening of the General Membership Assembly. However, the
respondents did not act on petitioners plea.

Meanwhile, MWEU scheduled an election of officers on September 14, 2007. Petitioner filed
his certificate of candidacy for Vice-President, but he was disqualified for not being a
member in good standing on account of his suspension.

On October 2, 2007, petitioner was charged with non-payment of union dues for the third
time. He did not attend the scheduled hearing. This time, he was meted the penalty of
expulsion from the union, per "unanimous approval"18 of the members of the Executive
Board. His pleas for an appeal to the General Membership Assembly were once more
unheeded.19

In 2008, during the freedom period and negotiations for a new collective bargaining
agreement (CBA) with MWC, petitioner joined another union, the Workers Association for
Transparency, Empowerment and Reform, All-Filipino Workers Confederation (WATER-
AFWC). He was elected union President. Other MWEU members were inclined to join
WATER-AFWC, but MWEU director Torres threatened that they would not get benefits from
the new CBA.20

The MWEU leadership submitted a proposed CBA which contained provisions to the effect
that in the event of retrenchment, non-MWEU members shall be removed first, and that
upon the signing of the CBA, only MWEU members shall receive a signing bonus.21

Ruling of the Labor Arbiter

On October 13, 2008, petitioner filed a Complaint22 against respondents for unfair labor
practices, damages, and attorneys fees before the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC), Quezon City, docketed as NLRC Case No. NCR-10-14255-08. In his Position
Paper and other written submissions,23 petitioner accused the respondents of illegal
termination from MWEU in connection with the events relative to his non-payment of union
dues; unlawful interference, coercion, and violation of the rights of MWC employees to self-
organization in connection with the proposed CBA submitted by MWEU leadership, which
petitioner claims contained provisions that discriminated against non-MWEU members.
Petitioner prayed in his Supplemental Position Paper that respondents be held guilty of
unfair labor practices and ordered to indemnify him moral damages in the amount of
P100,000.00, exemplary damages amounting to P50,000.00, and 10% attorneys fees.

In their joint Position Paper and other pleadings,24 respondents claimed that the Labor
Arbiter had no jurisdiction over the dispute, which is intra-union in nature; that the Bureau of
Labor Relations (BLR) was the proper venue, in accordance with Article 226 of the Labor
Code25 and Section 1, Rule XI of Department Order 40-03, series of 2003, of the DOLE;26
and that they were not guilty of unfair labor practices, discrimination, coercion or restraint.

On May 29, 2009, Labor Arbiter Virginia T. Luyas-Azarraga issued her Decision27 which
decreed as follows:

Indeed the filing of the instant case is still premature. Section 5, Article X-Investigation
Procedures and Appeal Process of the Union Constitution and By-Laws provides that:

Section 5. Any dismissed and/or expelled member shall have the rights to appeal to the
Executive Board within seven (7) days from the date of notice of the said dismissal and/or
expulsion, which in [turn] shall be referred to the General Membership Assembly. In case of
an appeal, a simple majority of the decision of the Executive Board is imperative. The same
shall be approved/disapproved by a majority vote of the general membership assembly in a
meeting duly called for the purpose.

On the basis of the foregoing, the parties shall exhaust first all the administrative remedies
before resorting to compulsory arbitration. Thus, instant case is referred back to the Union
for the General Assembly to act or deliberate complainants appeal on the decision of the
Executive Board.

WHEREFORE PREMISES CONSIDERED, instant case is referred back to the Union level
for the General Assembly to act on complainants appeal.
SO ORDERED.28

Ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission

Petitioner appealed before the NLRC, where the case was docketed as NLRC LAC No. 07-
001913-09. On March 15, 2010, the NLRC issued its Decision,29 declaring as follows:

Complainant30 imputes serious error to the Labor Arbiter when she decided as follows:

a. Referring back the subject case to the Union level for the General Assembly to act on his
appeal.

b. Not ruling that respondents are guilty of ULP as charged.

c. Not granting to complainant moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees.

Complainant, in support of his charges, claims that respondents restrained or coerced him
in the exercise of his right as a union member in violation of paragraph "a", Article 249 of the
Labor Code,31 particularly, in denying him the explanation as to whether there was
observance of the proper procedure in the increase of the membership dues from P100.00
to P200.00 per month. Further, complainant avers that he was denied the right to appeal his
suspension and expulsion in accordance with the provisions of the Unions Constitution and
By-Laws. In addition, complainant claims that respondents attempted to cause the
management to discriminate against the members of WATER-AFWC thru the proposed
CBA.

Pertinent to the issue then on hand, the Labor Arbiter ordered that the case be referred
back to the Union level for the General Assembly to act on complainants appeal. Hence,
these appeals.
After a careful look at all the documents submitted and a meticulous review of the facts, We
find that this Commission lacks the jurisdictional competence to act on this case.

Article 217 of the Labor Code,32 as amended, specifically enumerates the cases over
which the Labor Arbiters and the Commission have original and exclusive jurisdiction. A
perusal of the record reveals that the causes of action invoked by complainant do not fall
under any of the enumerations therein. Clearly, We have no jurisdiction over the same.

Moreover, pursuant to Section 1, Rule XI, as amended, DOLE Department Order No. 40-03
in particular, Item A, paragraphs (h) and (j) and Item B, paragraph (a)(3), respectively,
provide:

"A. Inter-Intra-Union disputes shall include:

"(h) violation of or disagreements over any provision of the Constitution and By-Laws of a
Union or workers association.

"(j) violation of the rights and conditions of membership in a Union or workers association.

"B. Other Labor Relations disputes, not otherwise covered by Article 217 of the Labor Code,
shall include

"3. a labor union and an individual who is not a member of said union."

Clearly, the above-mentioned disputes and conflict fall under the jurisdiction of the Bureau
of Labor Relations, as these are inter/intra-union disputes.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Labor Arbiter a quo dated May 29, 2009 is hereby
declared NULL and VOID for being rendered without jurisdiction and the instant complaint is
DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.33

Petitioner moved for reconsideration,34 but in a June 16, 2010 Resolution,35 the motion
was denied and the NLRC sustained its Decision.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In a Petition for Certiorari36 filed with the CA and docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 115639,
petitioner sought to reverse the NLRC Decision and be awarded his claim for damages and
attorneys fees on account of respondents unfair labor practices, arguing among others that
his charge of unfair labor practices is cognizable by the Labor Arbiter; that the fact that the
dispute is inter- or intra-union in nature cannot erase the fact that respondents were guilty of
unfair labor practices in interfering and restraining him in the exercise of his right to self-
organization as member of both MWEU and WATER-AFWC, and in discriminating against
him and other members through the provisions of the proposed 2008 CBA which they
drafted; that his failure to pay the increased union dues was proper since the approval of
said increase was arrived at without observing the prescribed voting procedure laid down in
the Labor Code; that he is entitled to an award of damages and attorneys fees as a result
of respondents illegal acts in discriminating against him; and that in ruling the way it did, the
NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion.

On April 24, 2012, the CA issued the assailed Decision containing the following
pronouncement:

The petition lacks merit.

Petitioners causes of action against MWEU are inter/intra-union disputes cognizable by the
BLR whose functions and jurisdiction are largely confined to union matters, collective
bargaining registry, and labor education. Section 1, Rule XI of Department Order (D.O.) No.
40-03, Series of 2003, of the Department of Labor and Employment enumerates instances
of inter/intra-union disputes, viz:

Section 1. Coverage. Inter/intra-union disputes shall include:

xxxx

(b) conduct of election of union and workers association officers/nullification of election of

union and workers association officers;

(c) audit/accounts examination of union or workers association funds;

xxxx

(g) validity/invalidity of impeachment/ expulsion of union and workers association officers

and members;

xxxx

(j) violations of or disagreements over any provision in a union or workers association

constitution and by-laws;

xxxx

(l) violations of the rights and conditions of union or workers association membership;
xxxx

(n) such other disputes or conflicts involving the rights to self-organization, union
membership and collective bargaining

(1) between and among legitimate labor organizations;

(2) between and among members of a union or workers association.

In brief, "Inter-Union Dispute" refers to any conflict between and among legitimate labor
unions involving representation questions for purposes of collective bargaining or to any
other conflict or dispute between legitimate labor unions. "Intra-Union Dispute" refers to any
conflict between and among union members, including grievances arising from any violation
of the rights and conditions of membership, violation of or disagreement over any provision
of the unions constitution and by-laws, or disputes arising from chartering or affiliation of
union. On the other hand, the circumstances of unfair labor practices (ULP) of a labor
organization are stated in Article 249 of the Labor Code, to wit:

Article 249. Unfair labor practices of labor organizations. It shall be unlawful for labor
organization, its officers, agents, or representatives to commit any of the following unfair
labor practices:

(a) To restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization;

Provided, That the labor organization shall have the right to prescribe its own rules with
respect to the acquisition or retention of membership;

(b) To cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee,

including discrimination against an employee with respect to whom membership in such
organization has been denied or terminated on any ground other than the usual terms and
conditions under which membership or continuation of membership is made available to
other members;
xxxx

Applying the aforementioned rules, We find that the issues arising from petitioners right to
information on the increased membership dues, right to appeal his suspension and
expulsion according to CBL provisions, and right to vote and be voted on are essentially
intra-union disputes; these involve violations of rights and conditions of union membership.
But his claim that a director of MWEU warned that non-MWEU members would not receive
CBA benefits is an inter-union dispute. It is more of an "interference" by a rival union to
ensure the loyalty of its members and to persuade non-members to join their union. This is
not an actionable wrong because interfering in the exercise of the right to organize is itself a
function of self-organizing.37 As long as it does not amount to restraint or coercion, a labor
organization may interfere in the employees right to self-organization.38 Consequently, a
determination of validity or illegality of the alleged acts necessarily touches on union
matters, not ULPs, and are outside the scope of the labor arbiters jurisdiction.

As regards petitioners other accusations, i.e., discrimination in terms of meting out the
penalty of expulsion against him alone, and attempt to cause the employer, MWC, to
discriminate against non-MWEU members in terms of retrenchment or reduction of
personnel, and signing bonus, while We may consider them as falling within the concept of
ULP under Article 249(a) and (b), still, petitioners complaint cannot prosper for lack of
substantial evidence. Other than his bare allegation, petitioner offered no proof that MWEU
did not penalize some union members who failed to pay the increased dues. On the
proposed discriminatory CBA provisions, petitioner merely attached the pages containing
the questioned provisions without bothering to reveal the MWEU representatives
responsible for the said proposal. Article 249 mandates that "x x x only the officers,
members of the governing boards, representatives or agents or members of labor
associations or organizations who have actually participated in, authorized or ratified unfair
labor practices shall be held criminally liable." Plain accusations against all MWEU officers,
without specifying their actual participation, do not suffice. Thus, the ULP charges must
necessarily fail.

In administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings, only substantial evidence is necessary to

establish the case for or against a party. Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.
Petitioner failed to discharge the burden of proving, by substantial evidence, the allegations
of ULP in his complaint. The NLRC, therefore, properly dismissed the case.

FOR THESE REASONS, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.39

Thus, the instant Petition.

Issue

In an August 28, 2013 Resolution,40 this Court resolved to give due course to the Petition,
which claims that the CA erred:

A. IN DECLARING THAT THE PRESENCE OF INTER/INTRA-UNION CONFLICTS

NEGATES THE COMPLAINT FOR UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES AGAINST A LABOR
ORGANIZATION AND ITS OFFICERS, AND IN AFFIRMING THAT THE NLRC PROPERLY
DISMISSED THE CASE FOR ALLEGED LACK OF JURISDICTION.

B. IN NOT RULING THAT RESPONDENTS ARE GUILTY OF UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES

UNDER ARTICLE 249(a) AND (b) OF THE LABOR CODE.

C. IN DECLARING THAT THE THREATS MADE BY A UNION OFFICER AGAINST

MEMBERS OF A RIVAL UNION IS (sic) MERELY AN "INTERFERENCE" AND DO NOT
AMOUNT TO "RESTRAINT" OR "COERCION".

D. IN DECLARING THAT PETITIONER FAILED TO PRESENT SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE

IN PROVING RESPONDENTS SPECIFIC ACTS OF UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES.

E. IN NOT RULING THAT RESPONDENTS ARE SOLIDARILY LIABLE TO PETITIONER

FOR MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES, AND ATTORNEYS FEES.41

Petitioners Arguments
Praying that the assailed CA dispositions be set aside and that respondents be declared
guilty of unfair labor practices under Article 249(a) and (b) and adjudged liable for damages
and attorneys fees as prayed for in his complaint, petitioner maintains in his Petition and
Reply42 that respondents are guilty of unfair labor practices which he clearly enumerated
and laid out in his pleadings below; that these unfair labor practices committed by
respondents fall within the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter; that the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC,
and the CA failed to rule on his accusation of unfair labor practices and simply dismissed his
complaint on the ground that his causes of action are intra- or inter-union in nature; that
admittedly, some of his causes of action involved intra- or inter-union disputes, but other
acts of respondents constitute unfair labor practices; that he presented substantial evidence
to prove that respondents are guilty of unfair labor practices by failing to observe the proper
procedure in the imposition of the increased monthly union dues, and in unduly imposing
the penalties of suspension and expulsion against him; that under the unions constitution
and by-laws, he is given the right to appeal his suspension and expulsion to the general
membership assembly; that in denying him his rights as a union member and expelling him,
respondents are guilty of malice and evident bad faith; that respondents are equally guilty
for violating and curtailing his rights to vote and be voted to a position within the union, and
for discriminating against non-MWEU members; and that the totality of respondents
conduct shows that they are guilty of unfair labor practices.

Respondents Arguments

In their joint Comment,43 respondents maintain that petitioner raises issues of fact which
are beyond the purview of a petition for review on certiorari; that the findings of fact of the
CA are final and conclusive; that the Labor Arbiter, NLRC, and CA are one in declaring that
there is no unfair labor practices committed against petitioner; that petitioners other
allegations fall within the jurisdiction of the BLR, as they refer to intra- or inter-union
disputes between the parties; that the issues arising from petitioners right to information on
the increased dues, right to appeal his suspension and expulsion, and right to vote and be
voted upon are essentially intra-union in nature; that his allegations regarding supposed
coercion and restraint relative to benefits in the proposed CBA do not constitute an
actionable wrong; that all of the acts questioned by petitioner are covered by Section 1,
Rule XI of Department Order 40-03, series of 2003 as intra-/inter-union disputes which do
not fall within the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter; that in not paying his union dues,
petitioner is guilty of insubordination and deserved the penalty of expulsion; that petitioner
failed to petition to convene the general assembly through the required signature of 30% of
the union membership in good standing pursuant to Article VI, Section 2(a) of MWEUs
Constitution and By-Laws or by a petition of the majority of the general membership in good
standing under Article VI, Section 3; and that for his failure to resort to said remedies,
petitioner can no longer question his suspension or expulsion and avail of his right to
appeal.
Our Ruling

The Court partly grants the Petition.

In labor cases, issues of fact are for the labor tribunals and the CA to resolve, as this Court
is not a trier of facts. However, when the conclusion arrived at by them is erroneous in
certain respects, and would result in injustice as to the parties, this Court must intervene to
correct the error. While the Labor Arbiter, NLRC, and CA are one in their conclusion in this
case, they erred in failing to resolve petitioners charge of unfair labor practices against
respondents.

It is true that some of petitioners causes of action constitute intra-union cases cognizable
by the BLR under Article 226 of the Labor Code.

An intra-union dispute refers to any conflict between and among union members, including
grievances arising from any violation of the rights and conditions of membership, violation of
or disagreement over any provision of the unions constitution and by-laws, or disputes
arising from chartering or disaffiliation of the union. Sections 1 and 2, Rule XI of Department
Order No. 40-03, Series of 2003 of the DOLE enumerate the following circumstances as
inter/intra-union disputes x x x.44

However, petitioners charge of unfair labor practices falls within the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters, pursuant to Article 217 of the Labor Code. In addition,
Article 247 of the same Code provides that "the civil aspects of all cases involving unfair
labor practices, which may include claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of
damages, attorneys fees and other affirmative relief, shall be under the jurisdiction of the
Labor Arbiters."

Unfair labor practices may be committed both by the employer under Article 248 and by
labor organizations under Article 249 of the Labor Code,45 which provides as follows:
ART. 249. Unfair labor practices of labor organizations. - It shall be unfair labor practice for
a labor organization, its officers, agents or representatives:

(a) To restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization.

However, a labor organization shall have the right to prescribe its own rules with respect to
the acquisition or retention of membership;

(b) To cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee,

including discrimination against an employee with respect to whom membership in such
organization has been denied or to terminate an employee on any ground other than the
usual terms and conditions under which membership or continuation of membership is
made available to other members;

(c) To violate the duty, or refuse to bargain collectively with the employer, provided it is the
representative of the employees;

(d) To cause or attempt to cause an employer to pay or deliver or agree to pay or deliver
any money or other things of value, in the nature of an exaction, for services which are not
performed or not to be performed, including the demand for fee for union negotiations;

(e) To ask for or accept negotiation or attorneys fees from employers as part of the
settlement of any issue in collective bargaining or any other dispute; or

(f) To violate a collective bargaining agreement.

The provisions of the preceding paragraph notwithstanding, only the officers, members of
governing boards, representatives or agents or members of labor associations or
organizations who have actually participated in, authorized or ratified unfair labor practices
shall be held criminally liable. (As amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 130, August 21,
1981).
Petitioner contends that respondents committed acts constituting unfair labor practices
which charge was particularly laid out in his pleadings, but that the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC,
and the CA ignored it and simply dismissed his complaint on the ground that his causes of
action were intra- or inter-union in nature. Specifically, petitioner claims that he was
suspended and expelled from MWEU illegally as a result of the denial of his right to appeal
his case to the general membership assembly in accordance with the unions constitution
and by-laws. On the other hand, respondents counter that such charge is intra-union in
nature, and that petitioner lost his right to appeal when he failed to petition to convene the
general assembly through the required signature of 30% of the union membership in good
standing pursuant to Article VI, Section 2(a) of MWEUs Constitution and By-Laws or by a
petition of the majority of the general membership in good standing under Article VI, Section
3.

Under Article VI, Section 2(a) of MWEUs Constitution and By-Laws, the general
membership assembly has the power to "review revise modify affirm or repeal [sic]
resolution and decision of the Executive Board and/or committees upon petition of thirty
percent (30%) of the Union in good standing,"46 and under Section 2(d), to "revise, modify,
affirm or reverse all expulsion cases."47 Under Section 3 of the same Article, "[t]he decision
of the Executive Board may be appealed to the General Membership which by a simple
majority vote reverse the decision of said body. If the general Assembly is not in session the
decision of the Executive Board may be reversed by a petition of the majority of the general
membership in good standing."48 And, in Article X, Section 5, "[a]ny dismissed and/or
expelled member shall have the right to appeal to the Executive Board within seven days
from notice of said dismissal and/or expulsion which, in [turn] shall be referred to the
General membership assembly. In case of an appeal, a simple majority of the decision of
the Executive Board is imperative. The same shall be approved/disapproved by a majority
vote of the general membership assembly in a meeting duly called for the purpose."49

In regard to suspension of a union member, MWEUs Constitution and By-Laws provides

under Article X, Section 4 thereof that "[a]ny suspended member shall have the right to
appeal within three (3) working days from the date of notice of said suspension. In case of
an appeal a simple majority of vote of the Executive Board shall be necessary to nullify the
suspension."

Thus, when an MWEU member is suspended, he is given the right to appeal such
suspension within three working days from the date of notice of said suspension, which
appeal the MWEU Executive Board is obligated to act upon by a simple majority vote. When
the penalty imposed is expulsion, the expelled member is given seven days from notice of
said dismissal and/or expulsion to appeal to the Executive Board, which is required to act by
a simple majority vote of its members. The Boards decision shall then be approved/
disapproved by a majority vote of the general membership assembly in a meeting duly
called for the purpose.1avvphi1
The documentary evidence is clear that when petitioner received Borelas August 21, 2007
letter informing him of the Executive Boards unanimous approval of the grievance
committee recommendation to suspend him for the second time effective August 24, 2007,
he immediately and timely filed a written appeal. However, the Executive Board then
consisting of respondents Borela, Tierra, Bolo, Casaas, Fernandez, Rendon, Montemayor,
Torres, Quebral, Pagulayan, Cancino, Maga, Cometa, Mancenido, and two others who are
not respondents herein did not act thereon. Then again, when petitioner was charged for
the third time and meted the penalty of expulsion from MWEU by the unanimous vote of the
Executive Board, his timely appeal was again not acted upon by said board this time
consisting of respondents Borela, Quebral, Tierra, Imana, Rendon, Yeban, Cancino, Torres,
Montemayor, Mancenido, Mandilag, Fernandez, Buenaventura, Apilado, Maga, Barbero,
Cometa, Bolo, and Manlapaz.

Thus, contrary to respondents argument that petitioner lost his right to appeal when he
failed to petition to convene the general assembly through the required signature of 30% of
the union membership in good standing pursuant to Article VI, Section 2(a) of MWEUs
Constitution and By-Laws or by a petition of the majority of the general membership in good
standing under Article VI, Section 3, this Court finds that petitioner was illegally suspended
for the second time and thereafter unlawfully expelled from MWEU due to respondents
failure to act on his written appeals. The required petition to convene the general assembly
through the required signature of 30% (under Article VI, Section 2[a]) or majority (under
Article VI, Section 3) of the union membership does not apply in petitioners case; the
Executive Board must first act on his two appeals before the matter could properly be
referred to the general membership. Because respondents did not act on his two appeals,
petitioner was unceremoniously suspended, disqualified and deprived of his right to run for
the position of MWEU Vice-President in the September 14, 2007 election of officers,
expelled from MWEU, and forced to join another union, WATER-AFWC. For these,
respondents are guilty of unfair labor practices under Article 249 (a) and (b) that is,
violation of petitioners right to self-organization, unlawful discrimination, and illegal
termination of his union membership which case falls within the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters, in accordance with Article 217 of the Labor Code.

The primary concept of unfair labor practices is stated in Article 247 of the Labor Code,
which states:

Article 247. Concept of unfair labor practice and procedure for prosecution thereof.
Unfair labor practices violate the constitutional right of workers and employees to self-
organization, are inimical to the legitimate interests of both labor and management,
including their right to bargain collectively and otherwise deal with each other in an
atmosphere of freedom and mutual respect, disrupt industrial peace and hinder the
promotion of healthy and stable labor-management relations.

"In essence, [unfair labor practice] relates to the commission of acts that transgress the
workers right to organize."50 "[A]ll the prohibited acts constituting unfair labor practice in
essence relate to the workers right to self-organization."51 "[T]he term unfair labor practice
refers to that gamut of offenses defined in the Labor Code which, at their core, violates the
constitutional right of workers and employees to self-organization."52

Guaranteed to all employees or workers is the right to self-organization and to form, join, or
assist labor organizations of their own choosing for purposes of collective bargaining. This
is made plain by no less than three provisions of the Labor Code of the Philippines. Article
243 of the Code provides as follows:

ART. 243. Coverage and employees right to self-organization. All persons employed in
commercial, industrial and agricultural enterprises and in religious, charitable, medical, or
educational institutions whether operating for profit or not, shall have the right to self-
organization and to form, join, or assist labor organizations of their own choosing for
purposes or collective bargaining. Ambulant, intermittent and itinerant workers, self-
employed people, rural workers and those without any definite employers may form labor
organizations for their mutual aid and protection.

Article 248 (a) declares it to be an unfair labor practice for an employer, among others, to
interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-
organization. Similarly, Article 249 (a) makes it an unfair labor practice for a labor
organization to restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights to self-
organization . . .

xxxx

The right of self-organization includes the right to organize or affiliate with a labor union or
determine which of two or more unions in an establishment to join, and to engage in
concerted activities with co-workers for purposes of collective bargaining through
representatives of their own choosing, or for their mutual aid and protection, i.e., the
protection, promotion, or enhancement of their rights and interests.53
As members of the governing board of MWEU, respondents are presumed to know,
observe, and apply the unions constitution and by-laws. Thus, their repeated violations
thereof and their disregard of petitioners rights as a union member their inaction on his
two appeals which resulted in his suspension, disqualification from running as MWEU
officer, and subsequent expulsion without being accorded the full benefits of due process
connote willfulness and bad faith, a gross disregard of his rights thus causing untold
suffering, oppression and, ultimately, ostracism from MWEU. "Bad faith implies breach of
faith and willful failure to respond to plain and well understood obligation."54 This warrants
an award of moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00. Moreover, the Civil Code
provides:

Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly
obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights
and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:

xxxx

(12) The right to become a member of associations or societies for purposes not contrary to
law;

In Vital-Gozon v. Court of Appeals,55 this Court declared, as follows:

Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury.
They may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendants wrongful act or
omission. The instances when moral damages may be recovered are, inter alia, acts and
actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35 of the Civil Code, which,
in turn, are found in the Chapter on Human Relations of the Preliminary Title of the Civil
Code. x x x

Under the circumstances, an award of exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00, as

prayed for, is likewise proper. "Exemplary damages are designed to permit the courts to
mould behavior that has socially deleterious consequences, and their imposition is required
by public policy to suppress the wanton acts of the offender."56 This should prevent
respondents from repeating their mistakes, which proved costly for petitioner.1wphi1

Under Article 2229 of the Civil Code, [e]xemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by
way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate,
liquidated or compensatory damages. As this court has stated in the past: Exemplary
damages are designed by our civil law to permit the courts to reshape behaviour that is
socially deleterious in its consequence by creating negative incentives or deterrents against
such behaviour.57

Finally, petitioner is also entitled to attorneys fees equivalent to 10 per cent (10%) of the
total award. The unjustified acts of respondents clearly compelled him to institute an action
primarily to vindicate his rights and protect his interest. Indeed, when an employee is forced
to litigate and incur expenses to protect his rights and interest, he is entitled to an award of
attorneys fees.58

WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed April 24, 2012 Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 115639 is hereby MODIFIED, in that all of the
respondents - except for Carlos Villa, Ric Briones, and Chito Bernardo - are declared guilty
of unfair labor practices and ORDERED TO INDEMNIFY petitioner Allan M. Mendoza the
amounts of Pl00,000.00 as and by way of moral damages, PS0,000.00 as exemplary
damages, and attorney's fees equivalent to 10 per cent (10%) of the total award.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 176085 February 8, 2012

FEDERICO S. ROBOSA, ROLANDO E. PANDY, NOEL D. ROXAS, ALEXANDER

ANGELES, VERONICA GUTIERREZ, FERNANDO EMBAT, and NANETTE H. PINTO,
Petitioners,

vs.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (First Division), CHEMO-TECHNISCHE

MANUFACTURING, INC. and its responsible officials led by FRANKLIN R. DE
LUZURIAGA, and PROCTER & GAMBLE PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondents.
DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve the petition for review on certiorari1 seeking the reversal of the resolutions of
the Court of Appeals (CA) rendered on February 24, 20062 and December 14, 20063 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 80436.

Factual Background

Federico S. Robosa, Rolando E. Pandy, Noel D. Roxas, Alexander Angeles, Veronica

Gutierrez, Fernando Embat and Nanette H. Pinto (petitioners) were rank-and-file employees
of respondent Chemo-Technische Manufacturing, Inc. (CTMI), the manufacturer and
distributor of "Wella" products. They were officers and members of the CTMI Employees
Union-DFA (union). Respondent Procter and Gamble Philippines, Inc. (P & GPI) acquired all
the interests, franchises and goodwill of CTMI during the pendency of the dispute.

Sometime in the first semester of 1991, the union filed a petition for certification election at
CTMI. On June 10, 1991, Med-Arbiter Rasidali Abdullah of the Office of the Department of
Labor and Employment in the National Capital Region (DOLE-NCR) granted the petition.
The DOLE-NCR conducted a consent election on July 5, 1991, but the union failed to
garner the votes required to be certified as the exclusive bargaining agent of the company.

On July 15, 1991, CTMI, through its President and General Manager Franklin R. de
Luzuriaga, issued a memorandum4 announcing that effective that day: (1) all sales
territories were demobilized; (2) all vehicles assigned to sales representatives should be
returned to the company and would be sold; (3) sales representatives would continue to
service their customers through public transportation and would be given transportation
allowance; (4) deliveries of customers orders would be undertaken by the warehouses; and
(5) revolving funds for ex-truck selling held by sales representatives should be surrendered
to the cashier (for Metro Manila) or to the supervisor (for Visayas and Mindanao), and truck
stocks should immediately be surrendered to the warehouse.
On the same day, CTMI issued another memorandum5 informing the companys sales
representatives and sales drivers of the new system in the Salon Business Groups selling
operations.

The union asked for the withdrawal and deferment of CTMIs directives, branding them as
union busting acts constituting unfair labor practice. CTMI ignored the request. Instead, it
issued on July 23, 1991 a notice of termination of employment to the sales drivers, due to
the abolition of the sales driver positions.6

On August 1, 1991, the union and its affected members filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
and unfair labor practice, with a claim for damages, against CTMI, De Luzuriaga and other
CTMI officers. The union also moved for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
and/or temporary restraining order (TRO).

The Compulsory Arbitration Proceedings

The labor arbiter handling the case denied the unions motion for a stay order on the ground
that the issues raised by the petitioners can best be ventilated during the trial on the merits
of the case. This prompted the union to file on August 16, 1991 with the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC), a petition for the issuance of a preliminary mandatory
injunction and/or TRO.7

On August 23, 1991, the NLRC issued a TRO.8 It directed CTMI, De Luzuriaga and other
company executives to (1) cease and desist from dismissing any member of the union and
from implementing the July 23, 1991 memorandum terminating the services of the sales
drivers, and to immediately reinstate them if the dismissals have been effected; (2) cease
and desist from implementing the July 15, 1991 memorandum grounding the sales
personnel; and (3) restore the status quo ante prior to the formation of the union and the
conduct of the consent election.

Allegedly, the respondents did not comply with the NLRCs August 23, 1991 resolution.
They instead moved to dissolve the TRO and opposed the unions petition for preliminary
injunction.
On September 12, 1991, the NLRC upgraded the TRO to a writ of preliminary injunction.9
The respondents moved for reconsideration. The union opposed the motion and urgently
moved to cite the responsible CTMI officers in contempt of court.

On August 25, 1993, the NLRC denied the respondents motion for reconsideration and
directed Labor Arbiter Cristeta Tamayo to hear the motion for contempt. In reaction, the
respondents questioned the NLRC orders before this Court through a petition for certiorari
and prohibition with preliminary injunction. The Court dismissed the petition for being
premature. It also denied the respondents motion for reconsideration, as well as a second
motion for reconsideration, with finality. This notwithstanding, the respondents allegedly
refused to obey the NLRC directives. The respondents defiance, according to the
petitioners, resulted in the loss of their employment.

Meanwhile, the NLRC heard the contempt charge. On October 31, 2000, it issued a
resolution10 dismissing the charge. It ordered the labor arbiter to proceed hearing the main
case on the merits.

The petitioners moved for, but failed to secure, a reconsideration from the NLRC on the
dismissal of the contempt charge. They then sought relief from the CA by way of a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65.

The CA Decision

The CA saw no need to dwell on the issues raised by the petitioners as the question it
deemed appropriate for resolution is whether the NLRCs dismissal of the contempt charge
against the respondents may be the proper subject of an appeal. It opined that the dismissal
is not subject to review by an appellate court. Accordingly, the CA Special Sixth Division
dismissed the petition in its resolution of February 24, 2006.11

The CA considered the prayer of P & GPI to be dropped as party-respondent moot and
academic.

The petitioners sought a reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion in its resolution of
December 14, 2006.12 Hence, the present Rule 45 petition.
The Petition

The petitioners charge the CA with grave abuse of discretion in upholding the NLRC
resolutions, despite the reversible errors the labor tribunal committed in dismissing the
contempt charge against the respondents. They contend that the respondents were guilty of
contempt for their failure (1) to observe strictly the NLRC status quo order; and (2) to
reinstate the dismissed petitioners and to pay them their lost wages, sales commissions,
per diems, allowances and other employee benefits. They also claim that the NLRC, in
effect, overturned this Courts affirmation of the TRO and of the preliminary injunction.

The petitioners assail the CAs reliance on the Courts ruling that a contempt charge
partakes of a criminal proceeding where an acquittal is not subject to appeal. They argue
that the facts obtaining in the present case are different from the facts of the cases where
the Courts ruling was made. They further argue that by the nature of this case, the Labor
Code and its implementing rules and regulations should apply, but in any event, the
appellate court is not prevented from reviewing the factual basis of the acquittal of the
respondents from the contempt charges.

The petitioners lament that the NLRC, in issuing the challenged resolutions, had
unconstitutionally applied the law. They maintain that not only did the NLRC unconscionably
delay the disposition of the case for more than twelve (12) years; it also rendered an unjust,
unkind and dubious judgment. They bewail that "[f]or some strange reason, the respondent
NLRC made a queer [somersault] from its earlier rulings which favor the petitioners."13

The Case for the Respondents

Franklin K. De Luzuriaga

De Luzuriaga filed a Comment14 on May 17, 2007 and a Memorandum on December 4,

2008,15 praying for a dismissal of the petition.
De Luzuriaga argues that the CA committed no error when it dismissed the petition for
certiorari since the dismissal of the contempt charge against the respondents amounted to
an acquittal where review by an appellate court will not lie. In any event, he submits, the
respondents were charged with indirect contempt which may be initiated only in the
appropriate regional trial court, pursuant to Section 12, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. He
posits that the NLRC has no jurisdiction over an indirect contempt charge. He thus argues
that the petitioners improperly brought the contempt charge before the NLRC.

Additionally, De Luzuriaga points out that the petition raises only questions of facts which,
procedurally, is not allowed in a petition for review on certiorari. Be this as it may, he
submits that pursuant to Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, Inc. v. Tiamson,16
factual findings of labor officials, who are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters
within their respective jurisdictions, are generally accorded not only respect but even finality.
He stresses that the CA committed no reversible error in not reviewing the NLRCs factual
findings.

Further, De Luzuriaga contends that the petitioners verification and certification against
forum shopping is defective because it was only Robosa and Pandy who executed the
document. There was no indication that they were authorized by Roxas, Angeles, Gutierrez,
Embat and Pinto to execute the required verification and certification.

Lastly, De Luzuriaga maintains that the petitioners are guilty of forum shopping as the reliefs
prayed for in the petition before the CA, as well as in the present petition, are the same
reliefs that the petitioners may be entitled to in the complaint before the labor arbiter.17

P & GPI

As it did with the CA when it was asked to comment on the petitioners motion for
reconsideration,18 P & GPI prays in its Comment19 and Memorandum20 that it be dropped
as a party-respondent, and that it be excused from further participating in the proceedings.
It argues that inasmuch as the NLRC resolved the contempt charge on the merits, an
appeal from its dismissal through a petition for certiorari is barred. Especially in its case, the
dismissal of the petition for certiorari is correct because it was never made a party to the
contempt proceedings and, thus, it was never afforded the opportunity to be heard. It adds
that it is an entity separate from CTMI. It submits that it cannot be made to assume any or
all of CTMIs liabilities, absent an agreement to that effect but even if it may be liable, the
present proceedings are not the proper venue to determine its liability, if any.
On December 16, 2008, the petitioners filed a Memorandum21 raising essentially the same
issues and arguments laid down in the petition.

The Courts Ruling

Issues

The parties submissions raise the following issues:

(1) whether the NLRC has contempt powers;

(2) whether the dismissal of a contempt charge is appealable; and

(3) whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the contempt
charge against the respondents.

On the first issue, we stress that under Article 21822 of the Labor Code, the NLRC (and the
labor arbiters) may hold any offending party in contempt, directly or indirectly, and impose
appropriate penalties in accordance with law. The penalty for direct contempt consists of
either imprisonment or fine, the degree or amount depends on whether the contempt is
against the Commission or the labor arbiter. The Labor Code, however, requires the labor
arbiter or the Commission to deal with indirect contempt in the manner prescribed under
Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.23

Rule 71 of the Rules of Court does not require the labor arbiter or the NLRC to initiate
indirect contempt proceedings before the trial court. This mode is to be observed only when
there is no law granting them contempt powers.24 As is clear under Article 218(d) of the
Labor Code, the labor arbiter or the Commission is empowered or has jurisdiction to hold
the offending party or parties in direct or indirect contempt. The petitioners, therefore, have
not improperly brought the indirect contempt charges against the respondents before the
NLRC.

The second issue pertains to the nature of contempt proceedings, especially with respect to
the remedy available to the party adjudged to have committed indirect contempt or has
been absolved of indirect contempt charges. In this regard, Section 11, Rule 71 of the Rules
of Court states that the judgment or final order of a court in a case of indirect contempt may
be appealed to the proper court as in a criminal case. This is not the point at issue,
however, in this petition. It is rather the question of whether the dismissal of a contempt
charge, as in the present case, is appealable. The CA held that the NLRCs dismissal of the
contempt charges against the respondents amounts to an acquittal in a criminal case and is
not subject to appeal.

The CA ruling is grounded on prevailing jurisprudence.

In Yasay, Jr. v. Recto,25 the Court declared:

A distinction is made between a civil and [a] criminal contempt. Civil contempt is the failure
to do something ordered by a court to be done for the benefit of a party. A criminal contempt
is any conduct directed against the authority or dignity of the court.26

The Court further explained in Remman Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals27 and People
v. Godoy28 the character of contempt proceedings, thus

The real character of the proceedings in contempt cases is to be determined by the relief
sought or by the dominant purpose. The proceedings are to be regarded as criminal when
the purpose is primarily punishment and civil when the purpose is primarily compensatory or
remedial.

Still further, the Court held in Santiago v. Anunciacion, Jr.29 that:

But whether the first or the second, contempt is still a criminal proceeding in which acquittal,
for instance, is a bar to a second prosecution. The distinction is for the purpose only of
determining the character of punishment to be administered.

In the earlier case of The Insurance Commissioner v. Globe Assurance Co., Inc.,30 the
Court dismissed the appeal from the ruling of the lower court denying a petition to punish
the respondent therein from contempt for lack of evidence. The Court said in that case:

It is not the sole reason for dismissing this appeal. In the leading case of In re Mison, Jr. v.
Subido, it was stressed by Justice J.B.L. Reyes as ponente, that the contempt proceeding
far from being a civil action is "of a criminal nature and of summary character in which the
court exercises but limited jurisdiction." It was then explicitly held: "Hence, as in criminal
proceedings, an appeal would not lie from the order of dismissal of, or an exoneration from,
a charge of contempt of court." [footnote omitted]

Is the NLRCs dismissal of the contempt charges against the respondents beyond review by
this Court? On this important question, we note that the petitioners, in assailing the CA main
decision, claim that the appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion in not ruling on
the dismissal by the NLRC of the contempt charges.31 They also charge the NLRC of
having gravely abused its discretion and having committed reversible errors in:

(1) setting aside its earlier resolutions and orders, including the writ of preliminary injunction
it issued, with its dismissal of the petition to cite the respondents in contempt of court;

(2) overturning this Courts resolutions upholding the TRO and the writ of preliminary
injunction;

(3) failing to impose administrative fines upon the respondents for violation of the TRO and
the writ of preliminary injunction; and

(4) failing to order the reinstatement of the dismissed petitioners and the payment of their
accrued wages and other benefits.
In view of the grave abuse of discretion allegation in this case, we deem it necessary to look
into the NLRCs dismissal of the contempt charges against the respondents. As the charges
were rooted into the respondents alleged non-compliance with the NLRC directives
contained in the TRO32 and the writ of preliminary injunction,33 we first inquire into what
really happened to these directives.

The assailed NLRC resolution of October 31, 200034 gave us the following account on the
matter -

On the first directive, x x x We find that there was no violation of the said order. A perusal of
the records would show that in compliance with the temporary restraining order (TRO),
respondents reinstated back to work the sales drivers who complained of illegal dismissal
(Memorandum of Respondents, page 4).

Petitioners allegation that there was only payroll reinstatement does not make the
respondents guilty of contempt of court. Even if the drivers were just in the garage doing
nothing, the same does not make respondents guilty of contempt nor does it make them
violators of the injunction order. What is important is that they were reinstated and receiving
their salaries.

As for petitioners Danilo Real, Roberto Sedano and Rolando Manalo, they have resigned
from their jobs and were paid their separation pay xxx (Exhibits "6," "6-A," "7," "7-A," "8," "8-
A," Respondents Memorandum dated August 12, 1996). The issue of whether they were
illegally dismissed should be threshed out before the Labor Arbiter in whose sala the case
of unfair labor practice and illegal dismissal were (sic) filed. Records also show that
petitioner Antonio Desquitado during the pendency of the case executed an affidavit of
desistance asking that he be dropped as party complainant in as much as he has already
accepted separation benefits totaling to P63,087.33.

With respect to the second directive ordering respondents to cease and desist from
implementing the memoranda dated July 15, 1991 designed to ground sales personnel who
are members of the union, respondents alleged that they can no longer be restrained or
enjoined and that the status quo can no longer be restored, for implementation of the
memorandum was already consummated or was a fait accompli. x x x
All sales vehicles were ordered to be turned over to management and the same were
already sold[.] xxx [I]t would be hard to undo the sales transactions, the same being valid
and binding. The memorandum of July 15, 1991 authorized still all sales representatives to
continue servicing their customers using public transportation and a transportation
allowance would be issued.

xxxx

The third directive of the Commission is to preserve the "status quo ante" between the
parties.

Records reveal that WELLA AG of Germany terminated its Licensing Agreement with
respondent company effective December 31, 1991 (Exhibit "11," Respondents
Memorandum).

On January 31, 1992, individual petitioners together with the other employees were
terminated xxx. In fact, this event resulted to the closure of the respondent company. The
manufacturing and marketing operations ceased. This is evidenced by the testimony of
Rosalito del Rosario and her affidavit (Exh. "9," memorandum of Respondents) as well as
Employers Monthly Report on Employees Termination/dismissals/suspension xxx (Exhibits
"12-A" to "12-F," ibid) as well as the report that there is a permanent shutdown/total closure
of all units of operations in the establishment (Ibid). A letter was likewise sent to the
Department of Labor and Employment (Exh. "12," Ibid) in compliance with Article 283 of the
Labor Code, serving notice that it will cease business operations effective January 31,
1992.

The petitioners strongly dispute the above account. They maintain that the NLRC failed to
consider the following:

1. CTMI violated the status quo ante order when it did not restore to their former work
assignments the dismissed sales drivers. They lament that their being "garaged" deprived
them of benefits, and they were subjected to ridicule and psychological abuse. They assail
the NLRC for considering the payroll reinstatement of the drivers as compliance with its stay
order.
They also bewail the NLRCs recognition of the resignation of Danilo Real, Roberto Sedano,
Rolando Manalo and Antonio Desquitado as they were just compelled by economic
necessity to resign from their employment. The quitclaims they executed were contrary to
public policy and should not bar them from claiming the full measure of their rights, including
their counsel who was unduly deprived of his right to collect attorneys fees.

2. It was error for the NLRC to rule that the memorandum, grounding the sales drivers,
could no longer be restrained or enjoined because all sales vehicles were already sold. No
substantial evidence was presented by the respondents to prove their allegation, but even if
there was a valid sale of the vehicles, it did not relieve the respondents of responsibility
under the stay order.

3. The alleged termination of the licensing agreement between CTMI and WELLA AG of
Germany, which allegedly resulted in the closure of CTMIs manufacturing and marketing
operations, occurred after the NLRCs issuance of the injunctive reliefs. CTMI failed to
present substantial evidence to support its contention that it folded up its operations when
the licensing agreement was terminated. Even assuming that there was a valid closure of
CTMIs business operations, they should have been paid their lost wages, allowances,
incentives, sales commissions, per diems and other employee benefits from August 23,
1991 up to the date of the alleged termination of CTMIs marketing operations.

Did the NLRC commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the contempt charges against
the respondents? An act of a court or tribunal may only be considered as committed in
grave abuse of discretion when it was performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgment which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty enjoined by law, or to act at
all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility.35

The petitioners insist that the respondents violated the NLRC directives, especially the
status quo ante order, for their failure to reinstate the dismissed petitioners and to pay them
their benefits. In light of the facts of the case as drawn above, we cannot see how the status
quo ante or the employer-employee situation before the formation of the union and the
conduct of the consent election can be maintained. As the NLRC explained, CTMI closed its
manufacturing and marketing operations after the termination of its licensing agreement
with WELLA AG of Germany. In fact, the closure resulted in the termination of CTMIs
remaining employees on January 31, 1992, aside from the sales drivers who were earlier
dismissed but reinstated in the payroll, in compliance with the NLRC injunction. The
petitioners termination of employment, as well as all of their money claims, was the subject
of the illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice complaint before the labor arbiter. The latter
was ordered by the NLRC on October 31, 2000 to proceed hearing the case.36 The NLRC
thus subsumed all other issues into the main illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice case
pending with the labor arbiter. On this point, the NLRC declared:

Note that when the injunction order was issued, WELLA AG of Germany was still under
licensing agreement with respondent company. However, the situation has changed when
WELLA AG of Germany terminated its licensing agreement with the respondent, causing the
latter to close its business.

Respondents could no longer be ordered to restore the status quo as far as the individual
petitioners are concerned as these matters regarding the termination of the employees are
now pending litigation with the Arbitration Branch of the Commission. To resolve the incident
now regarding the closure of the respondent company and the matters alleged by
petitioners such as the creations of three (3) new corporations xxx as successor-
corporations are matters best left to the Labor Arbiter hearing the merits of the unfair labor
practice and illegal dismissal cases.37

We find no grave abuse of discretion in the assailed NLRC ruling. It rightly avoided delving
into issues which would clearly be in excess of its jurisdiction for they are issues involving
the merits of the case which are by law within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the
labor arbiter.38 To be sure, whether payroll reinstatement of some of the petitioners is
proper; whether the resignation of some of them was compelled by dire economic
necessity; whether the petitioners are entitled to their money claims; and whether quitclaims
are contrary to law or public policy are issues that should be heard by the labor arbiter in the
first instance. The NLRC can inquire into them only on appeal after the merits of the case
shall have been adjudicated by the labor arbiter.

The NLRC correctly dismissed the contempt charges against the respondents.1wphi1 The
CA likewise committed no grave abuse of discretion in not disturbing the NLRC resolution.

In light of the above discussion, we find no need to dwell into the other issues the parties
raised.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition for lack of merit and
AFFIRM the assailed resolutions of the Court of Appeals.
SO ORDERED.