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Abstract
In twenty years of ANT practice, objects have been turned into net-
works and thereby radically re-defined. An analogous project is now
starting to take shape: the study of 'subject-networks'. This is not a
critique of the 'construction' of the subject. Rather, it is an attempt
O The Editorial Board of The Sociological Review 1999. Published by Blackwell Publishers,
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A sociology of attachment
sibly as old as sociology itself, for this is a discipline that has largely
constituted itself by criticising the free subject postulated by philo
sophers. Both the European critical tradition and Anglo-American
positivist empiricism took sociology to be a way of removing action
from the person and returning it to the determinations of a struc
ture or the invisible hand of a system. Action is either the unprob-
lematic basic unity of a complex game of construction, with all its
perverse effects and paradoxical systems results,2 or the enemy, the
illusion of power which the human actor entertains when in fact (or
so it is suggested) he or she is the plaything of forces that s/he can
not see.3
Here, then, action is not treated as a problem in its ownright.It
is a by-product of theoretical orientations, often associated with
political engagements. As a result, sociological debates have long
been informed by dualist oppositions: holism w. methodological
individualism, agency vs. structure, critical vi. liberal orientations
. . . However, it is striking that the different positions in the debate
do not offer different conceptions of action. All concur that the
action of a free subject needs to be replaced, only differing about
what form this replacement might be (social class, blind functional-
ism, an invisible hand, an effect of structure). And all assume that
the action of the subject needs to be covered into something else.
One significant benefit of the 'networkization' of the 'actor' was
that philosophers, psychologists and cognitive scientists interested
in action were now joined by a number of sociologists. For instance,
Callon and Law [1997] suggest that each element of the network
'relays' and 'prolongs' the action of the collective without ever being
a (or the) source of action in itself. They conclude that (for instance)
the capacity to be strategic cannot be assigned to a human actor
within a network but should be described as the effect of the associ
ation of a heterogeneous network (corporate manager+fax+secre-
tary+...). In this way, sociologists started to be able to speak again
about the action of the collective without reducing it to the effect of
a system or structure.4
2) Both action theory and ANT also seek to describe the actions of
humans and non-humans symmetrically. Lucy Suchman's early
work serves to make this point. In her seminal book on plans and
situated action, Suchman explores instances of breakdown in com
munication between humans and machines. Her analysis makes it
possible to think of non-humans as partners in interaction.
However, objects are inferior partners: the poverty of the resources
3) Action theory and ANT also strip the subject of its cognitive,
cultural, common sense capacities and return these to its surround
ings. However, our attempt to explore how an effect may be
achieved does not completely mirror that of the action theory. For
instance, interactionists describe 'passages' in which what occurs at
a local level explains and reifies the global.5 ANT tells a different
story in which local and global, agent and 'dispositif', mutually
incite each other into existence. This is closer to workespecially in
cognitive psychologywhich argues that action is the performance
of a specific collective, rather than of an individual agent or member
of the collective [Norman, 1988; Hirschauer, 1991; Hutchins, 1995].
Hutchins for example undoes the myth of the captain who 'master
minds' the trajectory of his ship. The properties of the collective
(humans and ship) are unlike those of any single individual member
or of the sum of the individuals. Competencies are shaped by the
social and material organization of work, the lay-out of the instru
ments, the means of communication . . . Such accounts of situated
action shift analysis from the individual to the collective actor.
ANT similarly describes actors as associations of a myriad of little
elements, human and non-human.
However, it also seems to us that ANT seeks to do something dif
ferent. Exactly what this is has been blurred and overlooked as a
result of ANT's proximity to theories of action. One key idea of
ANTits analyses of networks, mediations and translationshas
nothing to do with criticising the subject of action or demonstrating
its distribution. It is not a gory explosion of the subject nor an
attempt to spread it ever wider and thinner across the landscape
into more and more heterogeneous networks. ANT cuts a thread
that is crucial to the theory of action: the link between action and
an (albeit distributed) actor. For ANT this means that the 'radical-
ization' of situated action is not radical enough. This is because it
continues to askin an appropriately deferential voice to be sure
'who acts?'. But this assumes that 'action' is there to be distributed,
while the definition and limits of action itself are not questioned.
Thus in even the most original theory of action assumes that the
events that take place are indeed 'actions'distributed, involving
more and more non-humans, yet just actions with actors as their
source. To put it bluntly, the approach does not undo the model of
human action, but allows the cognitive capacities of humans to
migrate to objects. These in turn become efficient, intelligent, co-
ordinated, or 'purposive'. Qualities which had been the privilege of
humans and guaranteed their distinctiveness from non-humans are
simply recycled to characterize the heterogeneous 'hybrid' collective
which become the new source of action.
By contrast, ANT seeks to describe the composition of heteroge-
neous elements in networks which produce emerging action from an
indeterminate source. This means that 'action' is no longer the
primitive unit of analysis, nor the only kind of event which might be
described. 'What happens' only sometimes takes the form of an
action that may be distributed to circumscribed sources. The usual
fieldwork topics, science and engineering, show this very well. This
is because scientists, like engineers, insist on 'doing something'. In
such cases 'action' theory works because what is at issue for the
actors is the fabrication and validation of objects and theories 'that
work'. Science and technology studies describe modes of action,
tentatively stabilized through specific networks, which came to
replace the unique 'action' of action theory. However, they do not
allow access to events that are not actions. We wish to shift the field
of study in order to focus on events that 'just occur'. And these are
effects which occur at moments when amateurs enter a certain dis-
positif and are transformed by their attachment to that collective.
Abandoning oneself?
Passion, emotion, being dazzled, elation, possession, trance, all of
these are instances of events in which there is no actionin either a
similarities in the practices, the gestures, the tricks, the words and
the skill of drug and music amateurs, is an effective antidote to this
moral dualism. For the same qualifications which might serve to
condemn the drug user who is risking health, autonomy, and his
bank account, apply just as much to the musical amateur who also
invests his resources and allows his relations to be organized by a
passionthis time for music.
Even so, we are not suggesting that the two forms of addiction
are identical. Chemical flashes and drumming sounds are not the
same. Neither are social reprobation and highly valued artistic con-
noisseurship. To risk jail, or to break relationships of trust with
those to whom one is close, is not the same thing as to acceding to
the many secondary benefits of belonging to a select club. Being ini-
tiated into a world to which not everybody has access does not lead
to the same consequences, even if initiation passes through similar
steps. Yet for reasons that we hope are by now apparent, here we
will insist on the common features of the two 'addictions'.
'Passings'
The amateur experiments with the efficiency of diverse 'techno-
sociologies'. With a peculiar form of reflexivity, she writes her
sociology for us. She circulates in different registers and in both
directions: from collective to individual; physical to ritual or sym-
bolic efficiency; discretionary freedom to determinism by external
causes and higher collectives. These registers are not infinite, and
they can easily be related both to theoretical debates in the sociol-
ogy of culture or on drug addiction. Here are the more recognizable
'passings' that we can find in interviews:
from the body to the 'head' (mechanical, physical, corporeal
effects and feelings/personal psychology of the user)
from the lonely user to the social and technical setting (what's on
my own/what comes from the whole thing)
from the expertise of 'making' to the abandonment of 'feeling'
(what I do/what happens to me)
from the material efficiency of objects 'themselves' to objects as
mediations (what comes from the properties of things/what hap-
pens through things)
from the technical mastery of time and organization to loss of
control (what procedures must be obeyed/what requires its own
overwhelming)...
person. As we shall see, musicians and drug users deploy and articu-
late different versions of this divide. Thus, the origin of pleasure is
located between the two, in their interplay. It is in their encounter
and the trial which co-ordinates them that the appeal of taste and
pleasure emerges. This is a composition which the amateurs test and
try out in diverse variations, not an interpretation given by sociolo-
gists from outside.
One instance of this sort of passage is provided when expert users
locate the source of their pleasure between personal choice and the
mimicry of other experts. Thus, the musicians try out diverse soci-
ologies of taste based on rational choice, on cultural determinism,
and on personal influence:
M2 [m, 37, jazz]: With Paulo and Michel, we really got to
working well musically. I think it is the best ensemble in which I
ever played. Jean-Luc is good but he does not make me do things
that I would not have thought I was able to do. That's the prob-
lem with groups. The equilibrium is quite unstable, to get the
perfect thing, it's difficult, you look around, you don't find it right
away. Me, it's especially the relation with Michel that matters, as a
friendship. I mention this, though among guys we don't talk
about it much in general. At the same time, that does not mean at
all that music is in the background, or just a way to get together,
a pretext to do things together. They are two important things,
but distinct. There must be something happening on the level of
the music, if we played badly, we'd continue to see each other as
friends but we'd no longer play together. In the other direction
too, could we play together if there were no friendship or rela-
tion? . . .
world belongs to me. But no so long. The state of grace lasts two
minutes. What is left is an excitement close to that of a simple
sniff [cited in J.-R. Dard, 1998].
Here the crack high is described in a switch from active to passive
tense, from description of what he does to what happens to his
body. In other instances, the user describes the high as a moment
when he himself is surprisingly different. There, is seems, the mix
between active and passive is not just sequenced and mutually
enabling; the distinction between what is caused by the drug, what
is the person under influence, and what the person 'naturally' is are
blurred. The 'naturalness' of the transported and transformed user
who suddenly does things he would never have otherwise done,
suggests that the source of action is neither entirely the drug nor
the person (as he was before he took the drug). This user of
Rohypnol (or 'Roche', a barbiturate taken at high doses and often
mixed with alcohol) describes how she becomes a 'natural' thief
with the drug.
D [f, 25, cited in Jamoulle 12,61-24]: Roche, it changes my
personality completely. I catch a big mouth, I am afraid of
nothing, I'd do anything. I don't stop thieving. Everything that I
feel like, I take. I am not discreet but people don't pay attention
because I pretend like nothing is going on . . . I steal so naturally
when I take Roche.
the explicit parallel with drugs at the end, a classical topic, both as a
metaphor and as a common practice of musicians). For drug users,
there are also several ways to prepare for and let ecstasy arrive.
They devise cocktails, as mentioned above, that multiply pleasure in
accordance with the skill of the user. Users also remain prepared for
surprise by managing their dependence on certain drugs. One very
experienced patient on methadone describes this management dur-
ing his using years:
D [50, charismatic ex-gangster and favourite substitution patient
at the clinic]: In the summer I'd go away with my family. We'd go
South to the sea. There was no dope there. I barely felt the
craving. But as soon as we were back in the car and returning to
Paris, we'd really get jittery, sweating like mad [signs of with-
drawal]. We'd stop in Lyons to go cop some dope. That was the
best time, after a full month without using, it was really good . . .
I'd stop at other times too, three-four days just to get the feeling
back. Otherwise after a while you just don't feel it (heroin)
anymore... Sometimes guys would be glad to be going to jail so
that when they'd come out they could enjoy heroin again. But jail
can also be a way of avoiding degradation, becoming an absolute
junkie. My cousin, he never went to jail, that's why he's in such
bad shape...
Managing dependence is a way of remaining prepared for pleasure,
that is, for being seized by the drug over a long period of use.
Techniques of preparation, sophisticated vocabularies are made
possible by the drug, and in turn renders it effective. The user and
amateur are seized, attached, impassioned.
1) forces the sociologist and the amateur to use the same type of
accounts, and to share the same specialized vocabulary, in the same
tentative effort to characterize the 'event', and
2) cannot be separated from the modalities through which some
moments and conditions are prepared in order to make these 'hap
penings' possibly occur.
Drugs, like music (or love, or wine tasting . . . ) throw the user nei
ther into of social construction and 'pure' ritual nor into chemistry
or aesthetics (the mechanical effect of drugs or musical pieces
themselves). Skilled gestures and techniques of the body, appropri
ate dispositions of the mind, obsessive tidiness in installation,
organizational control of time and space, quasi-scientific expertise
of the objects involved and adeptness at managing their passion as
a collective construction of a 'connoisseur's practice' . . . these
practical and social modalities are necessary but do not work by
themselves. Our descriptions, observations and interviews con
stantly reveal a subtle interweaving between being abandoned to
an external power and the virtuosity of practices, of manual, and
of social skills. The user passes between active and passive. That is,
between am manipulated' (because I agree to it) and manipu
late' (an object which is stronger than myself). This 'passing' is at
the heart of a theory of attachment. It emphasises the force of
things as the locus of an event, of an emergence. There, in that
encounter, the user is seized at those very points of asperity (or
affordance) that are made possible and relevant by the sophistica
tion of his/her own practices and vocabularies, as well as by the
properties of the objects used.
The drug or the music is 'potentialized' as the user acquires the
skills to condition the arrival of pleasure. The subjectexpertly
seizedpasses between activity and passivity. The user strives tenta
tively to fulfil those conditions which will let him be seized and
taken over by a potentialized exogenous force. 'Passivity' then is not
a moment of inactionnot a lack of will of the user who suddenly
fails to be a full subject. Rather passivity adds to action, potential-
izes action. The greater the strength of the constraints and the more
she abandons herself to what can happen, the more strongly it can
indeed happen and the more she feels herself. This is the classical
paradox of passionmostly described in the case of love: how can
one act so intensely for something to arrive against which one can
do nothing? The more passive the more active, the more active the
more passive...
Notes
1 No English equivalent seems to exist. The term 'dispositif' is appropriate for our
purposes as it focuses on objects, conditions and means through which entities in
networks emerge.
2 This is the 'American' side of the coin; see eg a suggestive presentation of the
debate with the methodological individualism in [Hirschman, 1977].
3 This is more the 'French' side: A. Hennion has shown how the idea of 'illusio',
negative and critique in Bourdieu [eg 1980, 204], is already the unproblematic sci
entist and positive conception at work eg in the seminal theory by Durkheim
[1912] of the cultural objects, seen as representation of an invisible social reality.
For a summary of this, see [Hennion, 1993,237-267].
4 Ethnomethodology and interactionism have helped to make this oscillation
between the types of explanations less marked. However as Callon and Law
remark, though these authors assume that 'interests' and 'norms' are not stable
but arise in local situations, the gap remains because they remain concerned with
describing the interaction between agent and structure, subject and object,
human and non-human. Insufficient emphasis is put on the presence of objects
inside the collective agencies.
5 See our discussion of S. Star and J. Griesemer [1989] below.
6 This is what music shows best, with its procession of objects, instruments, scenes,
corporeal performances, all necessary and insufficient for it to emerge. When an
interpreter says he 'plays music', 'music' is this score, in front of the performer,
but it is just as much the very act of playing: unlike a cause or an effect, 'music' is
not the 'object' of an action which might be external, instrumental, to it. From a
long set of mediations (scores, instruments, gestures and bodies, stages and medi
ums), at certain moments, on top of it allsomething might happen.
7 'Among all these acting entities no hierarchy is introduced: they have the same
privileges and often play identical roles. This tolerance towards elements which
people the world is taken to its extreme by semioticians when they use the notion
of actant. [...] Actants are all the elements which accomplish or are transformed
by the actions through which the narration evolves', [our translation of Callon et
al., 1982, p. 92] With the notion of 'actants' semioticians can avoid the zero-sum
game implied in causal explanations.
8 'We do not admire the Venus of Milo because it is beautiful, but it is beautiful
because we admire it', said Charles Lalo in 1912.
9 See for example C. Hayles [1992].
10 Methadone treatment, for example, was deemed to be efficacious when the user
asked for it and when its mode of use was close to the mode of use of heroin of
the patient. Methadone is one of several opiates (moscontin, skenan, subutex . . . )
prescribed for the treatment of heroin addiction in France, within institutional
settings or with a close follow-up from the generalist. The drug prescribed then is
caught in a web of social and technical relations. The goal of treatment is not to
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