Professional Documents
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COMELEC
G.R. No. 199612, JANUARY 22, 2013
In resolving that the deadline for all substitutions must be made on or before Dec.
15, 2009 pursuant to Comelec Resolution No. 8678, COMELEC did not abuse its
discretion.
FACTS: Edna Sanchez and private respondent Maligaya were candidates for the
position of municipal mayor of Sto. Tomas, Batangas, in the May 10, 2010
Automated National and Local Elections. Maligaya was the Liberal Partys official
mayoralty candidate.
On April 27, 2010, Armando Sanchez, husband of Edna and the gubernatorial
candidate for the province of Batangas, died. On April 29, 2010, Edna withdrew her
Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of mayor. She then filed a new COC
and the corresponding Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance (CONA) for the
position of governor as substitute candidate for her deceased husband.
Subsequently, petitioner Renato M. Federico (Federico) filed his COC and CONA as
official candidate of the Nationalista Party and as substitute candidate for mayor, in
lieu of Edna.
Private Respondent sought to declare petitioner ineligible because his COC was
allegedly filed after the deadline had lapsed pursuant to Comelec Resolution No.
8678.
However, the COMELEC en banc resolved to give due course to the candidacy of
Edna and Petitioner.
However, by the time of the elections, because the ballots had already been
printed, the name of Edna was still on the ballots for the position of Mayor of Sto.
Tomas against Private Respondent. In fact, Edna garnered the most votes for that
election, beating Private Respodent for the position of mayor. Eventually the board
ofcanvassers credited the votes of Edna to Petitioner (who was the replacement of
Edna).
Petitioner filed a petitin for certiorari with the Supreme Court. He claimed that
Comelec Resolution No. 8678, which fixed a period for the filing of COCs and CONAs
cannot prevail over the Omnibus Election code, specifically Sec. 77 which provides
that a party's replacement candidate of one who withdraws, dies or is disqualified
may be filed no later than mid-day of the elections.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Comelec gravely abused its discretion when it annulled
Federicos proclamation as the winning candidate on the ground that his
substitution as mayoralty candidate was void.
HELD: No, the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion. The Comelec is
empowered by law to prescribe such rules so as to make efficacious and successful
the conduct of the first national automated election. RA 9369 which governs the
conduct of automated elections specifically allows COMELEC to set deadlines for the
filing of certificates of candidacy etc.
Under Sec. 15, the Comelec, which has the constitutional mandate to enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
In resolving that the deadline for all substitutions must be made on or before Dec.
15, 2009 pursuant to Comelec Resolution No. 8678, COMELEC did not abuse its
discretion.
Thus, the substitution of Petitioner was made out of time and was thus void.
Wherefore, Maligaya pa rin si Maligaya.
Jalosjos v. COMELEC Case Digest [G.R. No. 191970 April 24, 2012]
FACTS:
Petitioner Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City. He Migrated to Australia and
acquired Australian citizenship. On November 22, 2008, at age 35, he returned to
the Philippines and lived with his brother in Barangay Veterans Village, Ipil,
Zamboanga Sibugay. Upon his return, he took an oath of allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines and was issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine
Citizenship. He then renounced his Australian citizenship in September 2009.
He acquired residential property where he lived and applied for registration as voter
in the Municipality of Ipil. His application was opposed by the Barangay Captain of
Veterans Village, Dan Erasmo, sr. but was eventually granted by the ERB.
A petition for the exclusion of Jalosjos' name in the voter's list was then filed by
Erasmo before the MCTC. Said petition was denied. It was then appealed to the RTC
who also affirmed the lower court's decision.
COMELEC ruled that Jalosjos failed to comply with the residency requirement of a
gubernatorial candidate and failed to show ample proof of a bona fide intention to
establish his domicile in Ipil. COMELEC en banc affirmed the decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that Jalosjos failed to present ample proof of a
bona fide intention to establish his domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
RULING:
The Local Government Code requires a candidate seeking the position of provincial
governor to be a resident of the province for at least one year before the election.
For purposes of the election laws, the requirement of residence is synonymous with
domicile, meaning that a person must not only intend to reside in a particular place
but must also have personal presence in such place coupled with conduct indicative
of such intention.
The question of residence is a question of intention. Jurisprudence has laid down the
following guidelines: (a) every person has a domicile or residence somewhere; (b)
where once established, that domicile remains until he acquires a new one; and (c)
a person can have but one domicile at a time.
It is inevitable under these guidelines and the precedents applying them that
Jalosjos has met the residency requirement for provincial governor of Zamboanga
Sibugay.
Quezon City was Jalosjos domicile of origin, the place of his birth. It may be taken
for granted that he effectively changed his domicile from Quezon City to Australia
when he migrated there at the age of eight, acquired Australian citizenship, and
lived in that country for 26 years. Australia became his domicile by operation of law
and by choice.
When he came to the Philippines in November 2008 to live with his brother in
Zamboanga Sibugay, it is evident that Jalosjos did so with intent to change his
domicile for good. He left Australia, gave up his Australian citizenship, and
renounced his allegiance to that country. In addition, he reacquired his old
citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines,
resulting in his being issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship
by the Bureau of Immigration. By his acts, Jalosjos forfeited his legal right to live in
Australia, clearly proving that he gave up his domicile there. And he has since lived
nowhere else except in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
To hold that Jalosjos has not establish a new domicile in Zamboanga Sibugay despite
the loss of his domicile of origin (Quezon City) and his domicile of choice and by
operation of law (Australia) would violate the settled maxim that a man must have a
domicile or residence somewhere.
The COMELEC concluded that Jalosjos has not come to settle his domicile in Ipil
since he has merely been staying at his brothers house. But this circumstance
alone cannot support such conclusion. Indeed, the Court has repeatedly held that a
candidate is not required to have a house in a community to establish his residence
or domicile in a particular place. It is sufficient that he should live there even if it be
in a rented house or in the house of a friend or relative. To insist that the candidate
own the house where he lives would make property a qualification for public office.
What matters is that Jalosjos has proved two things: actual physical presence in Ipil
and an intention of making it his domicile.
Further, it is not disputed that Jalosjos bought a residential lot in the same village
where he lived and a fish pond in San Isidro, Naga, Zamboanga Sibugay. He showed
correspondences with political leaders, including local and national party-mates,
from where he lived. Moreover, Jalosjos is a registered voter of Ipil by final judgment
of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga Sibugay.
While the Court ordinarily respects the factual findings of administrative bodies like
the COMELEC, this does not prevent it from exercising its review powers to correct
palpable misappreciation of evidence or wrong or irrelevant considerations. The
evidence Jalosjos presented is sufficient to establish Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay, as his
domicile. The COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in holding otherwise.
Jalosjos won and was proclaimed winner in the 2010 gubernatorial race for
Zamboanga Sibugay. The Court will respect the decision of the people of that
province and resolve all doubts regarding his qualification in his favor to breathe life
to their manifest will.
Court GRANTED the petition and SET ASIDE the Resolution of the COMELEC.
Case Digest: Reyes v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 207264 : OCTOBER 22, 2013
PEREZ, J.:
FACTS:
This is a Motion for Reconsideration of the En Banc Resolution of June 25, 2013
which found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Commission on
Elections and affirmed the March 27, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division.
Petitioner raised the issue in the petition which is: Whether or not Respondent
COMELEC is without jurisdiction over Petitioner who is duly proclaimed winner and
who has already taken her oath of office for the position of Member of the House of
Representatives for the lone congressional district of Marinduque. Petitioner is a
duly proclaimed winner and having taken her oath of office as member of the House
of Representatives, all questions regarding her qualifications are outside the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC and are within the HRET exclusive jurisdiction.
The averred proclamation is the critical pointer to the correctness of petitioner
submission.The crucial question is whether or not petitioner could be proclaimed on
May 18, 2013. Differently stated, was there basis for the proclamation of petitioner
on May 18 , 2013.
The June 25, 2013 resolution held that before May 18, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc
had already finally disposed of the issue of petitioner lack of Filipino citizenship and
residency via its resolution dated May 14, 2013, cancelling petitioner certificate of
candidacy. The proclamation which petitioner secured on May 18, 2013 was without
any basis. On June 10, 2013, petitioner went to the Supreme Court questioning the
COMELEC First Division ruling and the May 14, 2013 COMELEC En Banc decision,
baseless proclamation on 18 May 2013 did not by that fact of promulgation alone
become valid and legal.
Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it took
cognizance of "newly-discovered evidence" without the same having been testified
on and offered and admitted in evidence. She assails the admission of the blog
article of Eli Obligacion as hearsay and the photocopy of the Certification from the
Bureau of Immigration. She likewise contends that there was a violation of her right
to due process of law because she was not given the opportunity to question and
present controverting evidence.
It must be emphasized that the COMELEC is not bound to strictly adhere to the
technical rules of procedure in the presentation of evidence. Under Section 2 of Rule
I, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure "shall be liberally construed in order to achieve
just, expeditious and inexpensive determination and disposition of every action and
proceeding brought before the Commission." In view of the fact that the
proceedings in a petition to deny due course or to cancel certificate of candidacy
are summary in nature, then the "newly discovered evidence" was properly
admitted by respondent COMELEC.
Furthermore, there was no denial of due process in the case at bar as petitioner was
given every opportunity to argue her case before the COMELEC. From 10 October
2012 when Tan's petition was filed up to 27 March 2013 when the First Division
rendered its resolution, petitioner had a period of five (5) months to adduce
evidence. Unfortunately, she did not avail herself of the opportunity given her.
In administrative proceedings, procedural due process only requires that the party
be given the opportunity or right to be heard. As held in the case of Sahali v.
COMELEC: The petitioners should be reminded that due process does not
necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply an opportunity or right to be
heard. One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps
many times more creditably and predictable than oral argument, through pleadings.
In administrative proceedings moreover, technical rules of procedure and evidence
are not strictly applied; administrative process cannot be fully equated with due
process in its strict judicial sense. Indeed, deprivation of due process cannot be
successfully invoked where a party was given the chance to be heard on his motion
for reconsideration.