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Peter McLaughlin (2001) What Functions Explain: Functional Explanation and Self-
Reproducing Systems. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Ms., xi + 259 pp, $75.
In a previous paper in this journal (Wouters, 2005a) I observed that most recent work
on biological function seeks to articulate a notion of biological function that serves
the aims of naturalistic philosophy of mind (namely to reduce human intentionality to
biological function). Such accounts aim for a notion of function that is metaphysically
unproblematic. They tend to end up with a notion of function that is philosophically, well-
founded, but provides little insight in real biology. McLaughlins What Functions Explain
is different. His main interest is not in the philosophy of mind but in the philosophy of
science, especially of biology and social science. He neither aims to articulate a notion of
function that is metaphysically as unproblematic as possible, nor to deliver a verdict on the
legitimacy of functional explanation. Rather, he seeks to describe the actual metaphysical
presuppositions of a certain use of function attributions in biology and social science.
His central concern is the question what metaphysical assumptions one makes about a
system if one ascribes functions to its parts and behaviors in order to explain why those
function bearers are where and what they are. Of what kind of systems are function
attributions explanatory?
McLaughlin distinguishes two traditions of explicating functions: the dispositional
view (favored by Nagel, Cummins, and Bigelow & Pargetter) and the etiological view
(favored by Hempel, Ruse, Elster, Wright, Neander and Millikan). The dispositional
view is characterized by the idea that functions are contributions to some end, where the
end is defined differently in different theories. For example, the end can be defined by
the characteristic activities of the system (Nagel), the capacities one wants to explain
(Cummins), or the survival and reproduction of the organism (Bigelow & Pargetter). The
dispositional view covers, according to McLaughlin, a large part of the use of function
talk in biology and shows that this talk is metaphysically unproblematic. However, the
dispositional view cannot account for the use of function attributions to causally explain
the occurrence or the structure of the function bearer.
The etiological view is characterized by the idea that functions are supposed to explain
why the function bearer occurs. McLaughlin depicts Hempel as the originator of this
tradition. According to him, Hempels analysis has two major elements:
(1) disposition: a function bearer (X) does or enables something (Y)
(2) welfare: Y is beneficial to some system (S).
Because these two conditions do not guarantee that the function bearer occurs,
Hempel rejected functional explanation as invalid. Later accounts in Hempels tradi-
tion seek to solve this problem by adding a third condition:
(3) feedback: the occurrence of X in S is the result of a feedback mechanism involving
the exercise of Y.
Ruses and Elsters analyses contain all three elements, the other etiological views
drop the welfare condition, explicitly or implicitly. This makes them vulnerable to two
types of unintuitive function attributions: the attribution of functions to items or activities
that were once useful but have lost that utility and the attribution of functions to organisms
as a whole. The main challenge (for all etiological accounts) is, of course, to describe
a suitable feedback mechanism (Elster denies that there is such a mechanism in society
and for that reason rejects functional explanation in social science). The dominant view
(Neander, Millikan) holds that the relevant feedback mechanism is provided by natural
selection. McLaughlin sees several problems with this view. The main ones are that, on
the one hand, functions are readily ascribed to new traits as soon as they are useful to
the organism, even if they are not yet selected for (hopeful monsters and swamp mules)
(which shows that natural selection is not necessary), and, on the other hand, that we deny
that the parts of replicating crystals have functions (which shows that natural selection
is not sufficient).
McLaughlins own analysis is in line with the etiological tradition. However, unlike
the dominant account it is not a selected effects theory. Instead, it seeks the relevant
feedback mechanism at the individual level.
McLaughlin accepts all three conditions of the etiological approach (disposition,
welfare and feedback). His variant of the first condition (disposition) says that the function
is persistent or regularly produced. The only metaphysical presupposition associated with
this condition is causality, an assumption that is relatively unproblematic. The analysis
of the other conditions (welfare and feedback) reveals more problematic assumptions.
According to McLaughlin functional explanation assumes that the systems to which this
kind of explanation is applied have a good for themselves and that it is the contribution
to this good (the function) that explains the existence of the function bearer.
In regard to the feedback condition, consider the case of a new trait with a beneficial
effect (for example a somatic mutation that allows more accurate vision). When are we
inclined to see the production of this benefit as a function rather than an accident? If the
trait is persistent or regularly produced and if its being beneficial somehow explains the
presence of the trait (this all sounds very similar to Wright). Suppose that an organism is
continuously scrutinizing its parts and behaviors, keeping beneficial modifications and
eliminating harmful ones. In that case we could say that the new trait is there because of
the benefits it confers to the organism as a whole.
Something like this seems to be the case in organisms. Their organs remain what they
are because they are part of an organism that is continuously rebuilding and repairing
itself. The organs are supplied with energy, nutrients, and chemicals that influence its
operation, wastes are removed, temperatures maintained, cells replaced and so on. If
nothing happens to an organ it will degenerate and if an organ degenerates the organism
will die. This means that if an organ contributes to the well-being of the organism as
a whole it will thereby contribute to its own maintenance. However, if it has adverse
effects on the organisms well being it will contribute to its own degeneration. So, self-
maintenance seems to provide the required feedback mechanism.
Reflection on the second condition (welfare) leads to a similar conclusion.
McLaughlin evokes the distinction between relative and intrinsic purposiveness (teleol-
ogy) to makes this clear. According to the second condition, functions are contributions
to some good, but what makes a thing a good? Quite often a thing is a good because
it serves some other good. This relative purposiveness leads to a regress: something is
good because it is good for some other thing that is good because it is good for some
other thing that is good because . . . . In order to ground function attribution this regress
must be stopped. McLaughlin argues that natural selection cannot stop this regress.
Natural selection produces traits that are good for producing progeny. But natural se-
lection does not explain why producing progeny is good. For that reason, an appeal to
BOOK REVIEW 57
REFERENCES
Craver, C.F. (2001). Role functions, mechanisms, and hierarchy. Philosophy of Science 68: 5374.
Wouters, A.G. (1993). Marxs embryology of society. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 23:
149179.
Wouters, A.G. (1999). Explanation without a Cause. Utrecht University. Ph.D. thesis.
http://www.morepork.demon.nl/diss/.
Wouters, A.G. (2005a). The function debate in philosophy. Acta Biotheoretica 53: 123151.
BOOK REVIEW 59
Wouters, A.G. (2005b). The functional perspective of organismal biology. In: T.A.C. Reydon and
L. Hemerik (Eds.), Current Themes in Theoretical Biology: A Dutch Perspective. Springer,
Dordrecht. p. 3369.
Arno Wouters
Heyendaal Institute Nijmegen
The Netherlands
E-mail: arno.wouter@hin.ru.nl