SUBJECT: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2
HELD:
Yes. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice T. Stanley Matthews, the
Court concluded that, despite the impartial wording of the law, its biased
enforcement violated the Equal Protection Clause. According to the Court, even if
the law is impartial on its face, "if it is applied and administered by public
authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust
and illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to
their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the
Constitution." The kind of biased enforcement experienced by the plaintiffs, the
Court concluded, amounted to "a practical denial by the State of that equal
protection of the law" and therefore violated the provision of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
PLESSY VS. FERGUSON, 163 US 537 (1896)
FACTS:
The state of Louisiana enacted a law that required separate railway cars for
blacks and whites. In 1892, Homer Adolph Plessy -- who was seven-eighths
Caucasian -- took a seat in a "whites only" car of a Louisiana train. He refused to
move to the car reserved for blacks and was arrested.
ISSUE:
Is Louisiana's law mandating racial segregation on its trains an
unconstitutional infringement on both the privileges and immunities and the equal
protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment?
HELD:
No, the state law is within constitutional boundaries. The majority, in an
opinion authored by Justice Henry Billings Brown, upheld state-imposed racial
segregation. The justices based their decision on the separate-but-equal doctrine,
that separate facilities for blacks and whites satisfied the Fourteenth Amendment
so long as they were equal. (The phrase "separate but equal" was not part of the
opinion.) Justice Brown conceded that the 14th Amendment intended to establish
absolute equality for the races before the law. But Brown noted that "in the nature
of things it could not have been intended to abolish distinctions based upon color,
or to enforce social, as distinguished from political equality, or a commingling of
the two races unsatisfactory to either." In short, segregation does not in itself
constitute unlawful discrimination.
BRADWELL VS. ILLINOIS, 83 US 130 (1873)
FACTS:
Myra Bradwell asserted her right to a license to practice law in Illinois by
virtue of her status as a United States citizen. The judges of the Illinois Supreme
Court denied her application with only one judge dissenting.
ISSUE:
Is the right to obtain a license to practice law guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment to all citizens of the United States?
HELD:
No. While the Court agreed that all citizens enjoy certain privileges and
immunities which individual states cannot take away, it did not agree that the
right to practice law in a state's courts is one of them. There was no agreement,
argued Justice Millerthat this right depended on citizenship. In his concurrence,
Justice Bradley went above and beyond the constitutional explanations of the case
to describe the reasons why it was natural and proper for women to be excluded
from the legal profession. He cited the importance of maintaining the "respective
spheres of man and woman," with women performing the duties of motherhood
and wife in accordance with the "law of the Creator."
YICK WO VS. HOPKINS, 118 US 356 (1886)
FACTS:
An 1880 ordinance of the city of San Francisco required all laundries in
wooden buildings to hold a permit issued by the city's Board of Supervisors. The
board had total discretion over who would be issued a permit. Although workers of
Chinese descent operated 89 percent of the city's laundry businesses, not a single
Chinese owner was granted a permit. Yick Wo and Wo Lee each operated laundry
businesses without a permit and, after refusing to pay a $10 fine, were imprisoned
by the city's sheriff, Peter Hopkins. Each sued for writ of habeas corpus, arguing
the fine and discriminatory enforcement of the ordinance violated their rights
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Noting that, on
its face, the law is nondiscriminatory, the Supreme Court of California and the
Circuit Court of the United States for the District of California denied claims for
Yick Wo and Wo Lee, respectively.
ISSUE:
Did the unequal enforcement of the city ordinance violate Yick Wo and Wo
Lee's rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
1
 SUBJECT: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2
standards." The Court found that the Michigan legislature, in enacting the statute,
could have determined that allowing women to bartend could "give rise to moral
and social problems against which it may devise preventive measures." The Court,
Justice Frankfurter concludes, is in no position to "cross-examine either actually or
argumentatively the mind of Michigan legislators."
BROWN VS. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF TOPEKA, 347 US 483 (1954)
FACTS:
This case was the consolidation of four cases arising in separate states
relating to the segregation of public schools on the basis of race. In each of the
cases, African American minors had been denied admittance to certain public
schools based on laws allowing public education to be segregated by race. They
argued that such segregation violates the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiffs were denied relief based on the precedent
set by Plessy v. Ferguson, which established the separate but equal doctrine
that stated separate facilities for the races was constitutional as long as the
facilities were substantially equal. In the case arising from Delaware, the
Supreme Court of Delaware ruled that the African American students had to be
admitted to the white public schools because of their higher quality facilities.
ISSUE:
Does the segregation of public education based solely on race violate the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
HELD:
Yes. Chief Justice Earl Warren delivered the opinion of the unanimous Court.
The Supreme Court held that separate but equal facilities are inherently unequal
and violate the protections of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Court also held that the segregation of public education based
on race instilled a sense of inferiority that had a hugely detrimental effect on the
education and personal growth of African American children.
GEDULDIG VS. AIELLO, 417 US 484 (1974)
FACTS:
Carolyn Aiello experienced disability as a result of complications during her
pregnancy. She was ineligible for benefits from California's Disability Fund under
Section 2626 of California's Unemployment Insurance Code. Section 2626 denied
benefits to women whose disabilities resulted from pregnancy. Aiello and other
disabled women who were denied benefits under Section 2626 challenged the
statute as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
KOREMATSU VS. U.S., 323 US 214 (1944)
FACTS:
During World War II, Presidential Executive Order 9066 and congressional
statutes gave the military authority to exclude citizens of Japanese ancestry from
areas deemed critical to national defense and potentially vulnerable to espionage.
Korematsu remained in San Leandro, California and violated Civilian Exclusion
Order No. 34 of the U.S. Army.
ISSUE:
Did the President and Congress go beyond their war powers by
implementing exclusion and restricting the rights of Americans of Japanese
descent?
HELD:
The exclusion order applying to Americans of Japanese descent was lawful.
The Court sided with the government and held that the need to protect against
espionage outweighed Korematsu's rights. Justice Black argued that compulsory
exclusion, though constitutionally suspect, is justified during circumstances of
"emergency and peril."
GOESAERT VS. CLEARY, 335 US 464 (1948)
FACTS:
A Michigan statute required that all bartenders hold licenses in cities with
populations greater than 50,000, but the statute also stated that a woman could
not be issued a license unless she was "the wife or daughter of the male owner" of
a liquor establishment. Two female bartenders challenged the law, requesting an
injunction against its enforcement, on the ground that it violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A three-judge panel of the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan rejected the bartenders'
claim.
ISSUE:
Did the Michigan statute, in denying female bartenders access to licenses,
violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
HELD:
No. In a 6-3 opinion authored by Justice Felix Frankfurter, the Court
concluded that the Constitution "does not preclude the States from drawing a
sharp line between the sexes" or "to reflect sociological insight, or shifting social
standards, any more than it requires them to keep abreast of the latest scientific
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 SUBJECT: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides Bakke a cause of action;
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not prohibit the university's
race-based admissions program;
The Equal Protection Clause permits race to be one factor, among many, in
an admissions program; and
The Equal Protection Clause prohibits the university's specific race-based
admissions program, and Bakke shall be admitted.
No and yes. There was no single majority opinion. Four of the justices
contended that any racial quota system supported by government violated the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., agreed, casting the deciding
vote ordering the medical school to admit Bakke. However, in his opinion, Powell
argued that the rigid use of racial quotas as employed at the school violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The remaining four justices
held that the use of race as a criterion in admissions decisions in higher education
was constitutionally permissible. Powell joined that opinion as well, contending
that the use of race was permissible as one of several admission criteria. So, the
Court managed to minimize white opposition to the goal of equality (by finding for
Bakke) while extending gains for racial minorities through affirmative action.
PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATOR OF MASSACHUSETTS VS. FEENEY, 442 US
256 (1979)
FACTS:
A Massachusetts law gave hiring preference to honorably discharged
veterans applying for state civil service positions. Feeney, a woman who scored
high on certain competitive civil service examinations, was ranked below male
veterans who had lower scores.
ISSUE:
Did the law discriminate against women and violate the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
HELD:
No. The Court held that the law was enacted to serve "legitimate and
worthy purposes" and not to discriminate on the basis of sex. Even though few
women benefitted from the scheme, Justice Stewart argued that "veteran status is
not uniquely male." Furthermore, the law placed many men who were not
veterans at a disadvantage as well. The distinction in the law was clearly between
veterans and nonveterans, not between men and women.
Amendment. The United States District Court for the Northern District of California
held the statute unconstitutional. The state appealed to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Did Section 2626 of California's Unemployment Insurance Code violate the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
HELD:
No. In a 6-3 decision, the Court reversed the District Court and upheld the
statute. In an opinion authored by Justice Potter Stewart, the Court accepted
California's interest in keeping the Disability Fund program solvent and
maintaining the low contribution rate from program members. Insuring disability
resulting from pregnancy complications would be "extraordinarily expensive" and
make the program "impossible to maintain." As in Dandridge v. Williams, California
was not obligated by the Equal Protection Clause to "choose between attacking
every aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem at all." Therefore,
California could constitutionally choose which disabilities to insure through the
Disability Fund in order to maintain the solvency and contribution level of the
program.
REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA VS. BAKKE, 438 US 265
(1978)
FACTS:
Allan Bakke, a thirty-five-year-old white man, had twice applied for
admission to the University of California Medical School at Davis. He was rejected
both times. The school reserved sixteen places in each entering class of one
hundred for "qualified" minorities, as part of the university's affirmative action
program, in an effort to redress longstanding, unfair minority exclusions from the
medical profession. Bakke's qualifications (college GPA and test scores) exceeded
those of any of the minority students admitted in the two years Bakke's
applications were rejected. Bakke contended, first in the California courts, then in
the Supreme Court, that he was excluded from admission solely on the basis of
race.
ISSUE:
Did the University of California violate the Fourteenth Amendment's equal
protection clause, and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, by practicing an affirmative
action policy that resulted in the repeated rejection of Bakke's application for
admission to its medical school?
HELD:
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 SUBJECT: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2
Applying intermediate scrutiny, Justice Sandra Day OConnor (J. OConnor) notes
that the State of Mississippi has not advanced an important state interest for
operating a single sex nursing school. In particular, she notes that women did not
lack opportunities to be trained as nurses in Mississippi without the presence of
MUW.
J. OConnor also argues that the means to achieving even an important
governmental objective (although she found none) are absent, as MUW allows
male auditors in the nursing classes. If men are already in the classroom, the state
is not technically operating a single-sex nursing program.
Dissent. Justice Lewis Powell (J. Powell) argues that the Respondent has not
suffered a cognizable injury, as there were state-operated nursing programs that
accepted men elsewhere in the state and there is no right to attend a state-run
university close to ones hometown.
Discussion. The majority focuses on whether Mississippi may discriminate
against men in admission to nursing programs. However, there are two powerful
arguments brought up by the dissent. The first is the lack of injury argument
without injury a case is not ripe, and the constitutional issue may not be reached.
There is also the argument that as there is no unique educational opportunity here
(there are nursing programs accepting men in the State college system), the state
is not denying opportunities to men.
Conclusion No. Considering the size, purpose, selectivity, and exclusivity of
Rotary's membership, the Court found that the relationship among the club's
members was not of the intimate or private variety which warrants First
Amendment protection. Writing for the unanimous Court, Justice Powell argued
that because many of Rotary's activities (including their meetings) are conducted
in the presence of strangers, and because women members would not prevent the
club from carrying out its purposes, there was no violation of associational rights.
Furthermore, even if there were a slight encroachment on the rights of Rotarians
to associate, that minimal infringement would be justified since it "serves the
State's compelling interest" in ending sexual discrimination.
BOD, Rotary Intl vs ROTARY CLUB OF DUARTE (1987)
When the Duarte chapter of Rotary International violated club policy by admitting
three women into its active membership its charter was revoked and it was
expelled. The California Court of Appeals, however, in reversing a lower court
decision, found that Rotary International's action violated a California civil rights
act prohibiting sexual discrimination.
MICHAEL M. VS. SUPERIOR COURT OF SONOMA COUNTY, 450 US 464 (1981)
FACTS:
Michael M., a 17 and 1/2 year-old male, was found guilty of violating
California's "statutory rape" law. The law defined unlawful sexual intercourse as
"an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a female not the wife of the
perpetrator, where the female is under the age of 18 years." The statute thus
made men alone criminally liable for such conduct. Michael M. challenged the
constitutionality of the law.
ISSUE:
Did California's statutory rape law unconstitutionally discriminate on the
basis of gender?
HELD:
No. In a plurality decision, the Court held that the law did not violate the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, noting that "young men
and young women are not similarly situated with respect to the problems and the
risks of sexual intercourse." The Court found that the state had a strong interest in
preventing "illegitimate pregnancy." The Court noted that "[i]t is hardly
unreasonable for a legislature acting to protect minor females to exclude them
from punishment. Moreover, the risk of pregnancy itself constitutes a substantial
deterrence to young females. No similar natural sanctions deter males.
MISSISSIPPI UNIV SCHOOL FOR WOMEN vs HOGAN
Brief Fact Summary. The Respondent, Hogan (Respondent), was denied
admission to Mississippi University for Womens (MUW) nursing program solely on
the basis of gender. He now alleges this is a denial of equal protection.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. A state may not preclude one gender or the other from
participating in a unique educational environment solely on the basis of gender.
Facts. MUW is the only single-sex collegiate institution maintained by the State of
Mississippi. The Respondent was otherwise qualified for admission to the schools
nursing program, but he was denied admission on the basis of being male.
Issue. Does the operation of a female only nursing school by a State violate Equal
Protection?
Held. Yes. Appeals Court ruling affirmed.
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 SUBJECT: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2
There is no doubt from the record that the oral ability to communicate effectively in English is ISSUE: Did a law which required California Rotary Clubs to admit women
reasonably related to the normal operation of the clerks office. members violate Rotary International's First Amendment rights of association?

(3) The legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason was not a mere pretext.
The hiring process involved scores on a variety of categories, and Fragante was given a 3 on a scale of
1-10 for speech.
Furthermore, the record does not show that the jobs went to persons less qualified than Fragante: to the
contrary.
In sum, the court noted, Fragante was passed over for employment because of the deleterious effect of
his Filipino accent on his ability to communicate orally, not merely because he had such an accent.
Rule: An adverse employment decision may be predicated upon individuals accent when but only
when it interferes materially with job performance.
Boy Scouts of America v Dale
Facts of the case
The Boy Scouts of America revoked former Eagle Scout and assistant scoutmaster James Dale's adult
membership when the organization discovered that Dale was a homosexual and a gay rights activist. In
1992, Dale filed suit against the Boy Scouts, alleging that the Boy Scouts had violated the New Jersey
statute prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in places of public accommodation.
The Boy Scouts, a private, not-for-profit organization, asserted that homosexual conduct was
inconsistent with the values it was attempting to instill in young people. The New Jersey Superior Court
held that New Jersey's public accommodations law was inapplicable because the Boy Scouts was not a
place of public accommodation. The court also concluded that the Boy Scouts' First Amendment
freedom of expressive association prevented the government from forcing the Boy Scouts to accept
Dale as an adult leader. The court's Appellate Division held that New Jersey's public accommodations
law applied to the Boy Scouts because of its broad-based membership solicitation and its connections
with various public entities, and that the Boy Scouts violated it by revoking Dale's membership based
on his homosexuality. The court rejected the Boy Scouts' federal constitutional claims. The New Jersey
Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that application of New Jersey's public accommodations law
did not violate the Boy Scouts' First Amendment right of expressive association because Dale's
inclusion would not significantly affect members' abilities to carry out their purpose. Furthermore, the
court concluded that reinstating Dale did not compel the Boy Scouts to express any message.
Question Does the application of New Jersey's public accommodations law violate the Boy Scouts'
First Amendment right of expressive association to bar homosexuals from serving as troop leaders?
HELD: No. Considering the size, purpose, selectivity, and exclusivity of Rotary's
membership, the Court found that the relationship among the club's members was
not of the intimate or private variety which warrants First Amendment protection.
Writing for the unanimous Court, Justice Powell argued that because many of
Rotary's activities (including their meetings) are conducted in the presence of
strangers, and because women members would not prevent the club from carrying
out its purposes, there was no violation of associational rights. Furthermore, even
if there were a slight encroachment on the rights of Rotarians to associate, that
minimal infringement would be justified since it "serves the State's compelling
interest" in ending sexual discrimination.
Fragante vs City and County of Honolulu
Facts: Fragante applied for a clerks job with the City and County of Honolulu. Although he placed
high enough on a civil service eligible list to be chosen for the position, he was not selected because of
a perceived deficiency in relevant oral communication skills caused by his heavy Filipino accent.
Fragante brought a Title VII suit, alleging disparate treatment on the basis of national origin.
History:
The district court dismissed Fragantes complaint. The oral ability to communicate effectively and
clearly was a legitimate occupational qualification for the job in question. There were no proof of a
discriminatory intent or motive by the defendant.
Issue:
Was this a case of discrimination on the basis of national origin?
Holding:
No. Affirmed.
Reasoning:
Using the McDonnell Douglas Framework:
(1) P established a prima facie case.The court assumed this was satisfied.

Conclusion (2) D articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Ps nonselection.

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 SUBJECT: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2
Yes. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Court held that
the OUAs policies were not sufficiently narrowly tailored to meet the strict scrutiny standard. Because
the policy did not provide individual consideration, but rather resulted in the admission of nearly every Scouts' First Amendment right of expressive association." In effect, the ruling gives the Boy Scouts of
applicant of underrepresented minority status, it was not narrowly tailored in the manner required by
previous jurisprudence on the issue.
In her concurring opinion, Justice Sandra Day OConnor wrote that the record showed that the only
individualized consideration in the admissions process came through the Admissions Review
Committee. Because the Committee played only a small part in the overall admissions process, it was
not sufficient to satisfy the strict scrutiny standard. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a separate
concurring opinion in which he argued that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits any racial
discrimination for the purposes of higher education admission. The admission policy in question failed
because it did not allow for sufficient consideration of non-racial factors in determining the
admissibility of a candidate from an underrepresented minority group. In his separate opinion
concurring in the judgment, Justice Stephen Breyer wrote that, in cases dealing with the Equal
Protection Clause, the Court should distinguish between policies of inclusion and policies of exclusion
because the former are much more likely to prove consistent with the intent of the Clause.
Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that, because neither of the
petitioners could receive any benefit from the relief being requested, precedent required that the case be
dismissed. While they are entitled to relief for past wrongs, they cannot seek injunctive relief to prevent
future harms to other parties. Justice David Souter joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice
Souter wrote that, by making race only one of a number of factors to be considered, the admissions
policy meets the requirements established by previous Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence. Because
the point system and the Admissions Review Committee operate in conjunction with each other, there
cannot be the holding of seats phenomenon that the majority opinion fears. Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg joined in the dissent. Justice Ginsburg also wrote a separate dissenting opinion in which she
argued that, because there is no evidence that the OUA policies attempt to limit or decrease enrollment
by any particular racial or ethnic group and there is no evidence of saving seats, the policies do not
violate the Equal Protection Clause. Racial information about an applicant can be useful in admission
considerations because it often serves to show what a student has accomplished and why the student is
worthy of admission. Justice Souter joined in the dissent.
PEOPLE VS. CAYAT, 68 Phil. 12 (1939)
FACTS:
Accused Cayat, a native of Baguio, Benguet, Mountain Province, and a
member of the non-Christian tribes, was found guilty of violating sections 2 and 3
of Act No. 1639 for having acquired and possessed one bottle of A-1-1 gin, an
intoxicating liquor, which is not a native wine. The law made it unlawful for any
Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that "applying
New Jersey's public accommodations law to require the Boy Scouts to admit Dale violates the Boy
America a constitutional right to bar homosexuals from serving as troop leaders. Chief Justice
Rehnquist wrote for the Court that, "[t]he Boy Scouts asserts that homosexual conduct is inconsistent
with the values it seeks to instill," and that a gay troop leader's presence "would, at the very least, force
the organization to send a message, both to the young members and the world, that the Boy Scouts
accepts homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior."
Gratz vs Bollinger
Facts of the case
The University of Michigans Office of Undergraduate Admissions (OUA) considers a number of
factors in its evaluative process, such as high school grades, standardized test scores, curriculum
strength, alumni relationships, geography, and leadership. The OUA also considers race and admits
virtually every qualified applicant from certain groups determined to be underrepresented minorities.
Beginning in 1998, the OUA used a point system in which students were awarded an additional 20
points for being a member of an underrepresented minority, and beginning in 1999, the University
established an Admissions Review Committee to provide an additional level of consideration.
In 1995, Jennifer Gratz and Patrick Hamacher both applied for admission to the University of
Michigan College of Literature, Science, and the Arts (LSA) as residents of the state of Michigan. Both
are of Caucasian descent. Both were denied admission and told that, although they were qualified, they
were not competitive enough applicants to be admitted on first review. In October 1997, Gratz and
Bollinger filed a class action suit against the University, the LSA, Lee Bollinger, and James Duderstadt.
They argued that the admission procedure discriminated against certain racial and ethnic groups in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. The district court held that the respondents had shown that a racially and ethnically diverse
student body produced significant academic benefits but that the admission policies of 1995-1998 were
problematic because they amounted to holding seats for certain minority groups. Therefore, the court
granted summary judgment for the petitioners with respect to the admissions policies for 1995-1998
and for the respondents with respect to the policy that began in 1999. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit heard this case the same day as Grutter v. Bollinger, a similar case, and upheld the
Universitys admission policies in that case. The petitioners in this case then asked the Court to grant
certiorari, despite the lack of opinion from the lower court, to resolve the issue.
Question Did the University of Michigans use of racial preferences in undergraduate admissions
violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964?
Conclusion
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 SUBJECT: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2
Upon the filing of a complaint or information sufficient in form and
substance against a member of the PNP for grave felonies where the
penalty imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1) day or more, the
court shall immediately suspend the accused from office until the case
is terminated. Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall to prior to the passage of the law. Cayat challenges the constitutionality of Act
be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the
accused.
Himagan assailed the suspension averring that Section 42 of P.D. 807 of
the Civil Service Decree provides that his suspension should be limited to ninety
(90) days only. He claims that an imposition of preventive suspension of over 90
days is contrary to the Civil Service Law and would be a violation of his
constitutional right to equal protection of laws .
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sec 47, RA 6975 violates equal protection guaranteed by
the Constitution.
HELD:
No. The language of the first sentence of Sec 47 of RA 6975 is clear, plain
and free from ambiguity. It gives no other meaning than that the suspension from
office of the member of the PNP charged with grave offense where the penalty is
six years and one day or more shall last until the termination of the case. The
suspension cannot be lifted before the termination of the case. The second
sentence of the same Section providing that the trial must be terminated within
ninety (90) days from arraignment does not qualify or limit the first sentence. The
two can stand independently of each other. The first refers to the period of
suspension. The second deals with the time from within which the trial should be
finished.
The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other
classes of persons charged criminally or administratively insofar as the application
of the rule on preventive suspension is concerned is that policemen carry weapons
and the badge of the law which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses
against them, as succinctly brought out in the legislative discussions.
If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious offense is
reinstated to his post while his case is pending, his victim and the witnesses
against him are obviously exposed to constant threat and thus easily cowed to
silence by the mere fact that the accused is in uniform and armed. the imposition
of preventive suspension for over 90 days under Sec 47 of RA 6975 does not
native of the Philippines who is a member of a non-Christian tribe within the
meaning of Act 1397 to buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink any ardent
spirits, ale, beer, wine or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the so-called
native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed
1639 on the grounds that it is discriminatory and denies the equal protection of
the laws, violates due process clause, and is an improper exercise of police power.
HELD:
It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the
equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable
classification. (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the
purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4)
must apply equally to all members of the same class.
Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real
or substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical distinctions. It is not based upon
accident of birth or parentage, as counsel for the appellant asserts, but upon the
degree of civilization and culture. The term non-Christian tribes refers, not to
religious belief but in a way, to the geographical area and more directly, to natives
of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization, usually living in tribal
relationship apart from settled communities. (Rubi vs. Provincial Board of
Mindora, supra.) This distinction is unquestionably reasonable, for the Act was
intended to meet the peculiar conditions existing in the non-Christian tribes.
The prohibition enshrined in Act 1397 is designed to insure peace and
order in and among non-Christian tribes. It applies equally to all members of the
class evident from perusal thereof. That it may be unfair in its operation against a
certain number of non-Christians by reason of their degree of culture, is not an
argument against the equality of its application.
HIMAGAN VS. PEOPLE, 237 SCRA 538 (1994)
FACTS:
Ishmael Himagan was a policeman assigned in Davao City. He was charged
for the murder of Benjamin Machitar, Jr. and for the attempted murder of
Benjamins younger brother, Barnabe. Pursuant to Section 47 of Republic Act No.
6975, Himagan was placed into suspension pending the murder case. The law
provides that:
7
 SUBJECT: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2
HELD:
Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the Labor
Code. Article 135, for example, prohibits and penalizes the payment of lesser
compensation to female employees as against a male employee for work of equal
value. Art. 248 declares it an unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate
in regard to wages in order to encourage or discourage membership in a labor
organization.
Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and
responsibility, under similar conditions, should paid similar salaries. If an employer
accords employees the same position and rank, the presumption is that these
employees perform equal work. This presumption is borne by logic and human
experience. If the employer has discriminated against an employee, it is for the
employer to explain why the employee is treated unfairly.
The employer in this case had failed to do so. There is no evidence here
that foreign-hires perform 25% more efficiently or effectively than local-hires. Both
groups have similar functions and responsibilities, which they perform under
similar working conditions.
GARCIA VS. DRILON, 699 SCRA 352 (2013)
FACTS:
Petitioner Jesus Garcia (husband) appears to have inflicted violence against
private respondent (wife and daughter). Petitioner admitted having an affair with a
bank manager. He callously boasted about their sexual relations to the household
help. His infidelity emotionally wounded private respondent. Their quarrels left her
with bruises and hematoma. Petitioner also unconscionably beat up their
daughter, Jo-ann, whom he blamed for squealing on him.
All these drove respondent Rosalie Garcia (wife) to despair causing her to
attempt suicide on December 17, 2005 by slitting her wrist. Instead of taking her
to the hospital, petitioner left the house. He never visited her when she was
confined for seven (7) days. He even told his mother-in-law that respondent should
just accept his extramarital affair since he is not cohabiting with his paramour and
has not sired a child with her.
The private respondent was determined to separate from petitioner. But
she was afraid he would take away their children and deprive her of financial
support. He warned her that if she pursued legal battle, she would not get a single
centavo from him. After she confronted him of his affair, he forbade her to hold
office. This deprived her of access to full information about their businesses.
violate the suspended policemans constitutional right to equal protection of the
laws.
Suppose the trial is not terminated within ninety days from arraignment, should
the suspension of accused be lifted?
The answer is certainly no. While the law uses the mandatory word shall
before the phrase be terminated within ninety (90) days, there is nothing in RA
6975 that suggests that the preventive suspension of the accused will be lifted if
the trial is not terminated within that period. Nonetheless, the Judge who fails to
decide the case within the period without justifiable reason may be subject to
administrative sanctions and, in appropriate cases where the facts so warrant, to
criminal or civil liability. If the trial is unreasonably delayed without fault of the
accused such that he is deprived of his right to a speedy trial, he is not without a
remedy. He may ask for the dismissal of the case. Should the court refuse to
dismiss the case, the accused can compel its dismissal by certiorari, prohibition or
mandamus, or secure his liberty by habeas corpus.
INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS VS. QUISUMBING, 33
SCRA 14 (2000)
FACTS:
The private respondent, International School, Inc. pursuant to Presidential
Decree 732, is a domestic educational institution established primarily for
dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents.
The school grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded to local hires.
These include housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes, and home leave
travel allowance. Foreign hires are also paid a salary rate twenty-five percent
(25%) more than local hires. The School justifies the difference on two significant
economic disadvantages foreign-hires have to endure, namely (a) the
dislocation factor and (b) limited tenure.
The compensation scheme is simply the Schools adaptive measure to
remain competitive on an international level in terms of attracting competent
professionals in the field of international education.
Local hires filed a petition claiming that point-of-hire classification
employed by the School is discriminatory to Filipinos and that the grant of higher
salaries to foreign-hires constitutes racial discrimination.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the schools system of compensation is violative of the
principle of equal pay for equal work
8
 SUBJECT: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2
extensive discrimination against women, and emphasized that such is a violation
of the principles of equality of rights and respect for human dignity.
2. Philippines obligation as state-party to CEDAW
The Philippines is under legal obligation to ensure their development and
advancement for the improvement of their position from one of de jure as well as
de facto equality with men. The CEDAW, going beyond the concept of
discrimination used in many legal standards and norms, focuses on discrimination
against women, with the emphasis that women have suffered and are continuing
to suffer from various forms of discrimination on account of their biological sex.
The governmental objectives of protecting human rights and fundamental
freedoms, which includes promoting gender equality and empowering women, as
mandated not only by our Constitution, but also by commitments we have made
in the international sphere, are undeniably important and essential.
RA 9262 provides the widest range of reliefs for women and children who
are victims of violence, which are often reported to have been committed not by
strangers, but by a father or a husband or a person with whom the victim has or
had a sexual or dating relationship.
3. The gender-based classification in RA 9262 is substantially related to the achievement of
governmental objectives
4. Different treatment of women and men based on biological, social, and cultural differences
The persistent and existing biological, social, and cultural differences
between women and men prescribe that they be treated differently under
particular conditions in order to achieve substantive equality for women. Thus, the
disadvantaged position of a woman as compared to a man requires the special
protection of the law, as gleaned from the following recommendations of the
CEDAW Committee:
The Convention requires that women be given an equal start and that they
be empowered by an enabling environment to achieve equality of results. It is not
enough to guarantee women treatment that is identical to that of men. Rather,
biological as well as socially and culturally constructed differences between
women and men must be taken into account. Under certain circumstances, non-
identical treatment of women and men will be required in order to address such
differences. Pursuit of the goal of substantive equality also calls for an effective
strategy aimed at overcoming under representation of women and a redistribution
of resources and power between men and women.
Thus, the RTC found reasonable ground to believe there was imminent
danger of violence against respondent and her children and issued a series of
Temporary Protection Orders (TPO) ordering petitioner, among other things, to
surrender all his firearms including a .9MM caliber firearm and a Walther PPK.
Petitioner challenges the constitutionality of RA 9262 for:
1. Making a gender-based classification, thus, providing remedies only to wives/women and not
to husbands/men.
2. He claims that even the title of the law, "An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their
Children" is already sex-discriminatory because it means violence by men against women.
3. The law also does not include violence committed by women against children and other
women.
4. He adds that gender alone is not enough basis to deprive the husband/father of the remedies
under it because its avowed purpose is to curb and punish spousal violence. The said remedies
are discriminatory against the husband/male gender.
5. There being no reasonable difference between an abused husband and an abused wife, the
equal protection guarantee is violated.
ISSUE:
Whether or not R.A. 9262 is unjust, discriminatory, and violative of the
equal protection clause.
HELD:
RA 9262 is NOT UNCONSITUTIONAL.
1. RA 9262 - compliance with the CEDAW
It has been acknowledged that "gender-based violence is a form of
discrimination that seriously inhibits women's ability to enjoy rights and freedoms
on a basis of equality with men." RA 9262 can be viewed therefore as the
Philippines compliance with the CEDAW, which is committed to condemn
discrimination against women and directs its members to undertake, without
delay, all appropriate means to eliminate discrimination against women in all
forms both in law and in practice.
CEDAW
Known as the International Bill of Rights of Women, the CEDAW is the
central and most comprehensive document for the advancement of the welfare of
women. The CEDAW, in its preamble, explicitly acknowledges the existence of
9
 SUBJECT: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2
constructed differences between women and men. By failing to take into account
these differences, a formal equality approach may in fact perpetuate
discrimination and disadvantage.
b. Protectionist model this recognizes differences between women and
men but considers womens weakness as the rationale for different treatment.
This approach reinforces the inferior status of women and does not address the
issue of discrimination of women on account of their gender.
c. Substantive equality model this assumes that women are "not
vulnerable by nature, but suffer from imposed disadvantage" and that "if these
imposed disadvantages were eliminated, there was no further need for
protection." Thus, the substantive equality model gives prime importance to
womens contexts, realities, and experiences, and the outcomes or results of acts
and measures directed, at or affecting them, with a view to eliminating the
disadvantages they experience as women.
6. The gender-based classification of RA 9262 does not violate the Equal Protection Clause actively undertake ameliorative action that would remedy existing inequalities and
(application of the substantive equality model)
The equal protection clause in our Constitution does not guarantee an
absolute prohibition against classification. The non-identical treatment of women
and men under RA 9262 is justified to put them on equal footing and to give
substance to the policy and aim of the state to ensure the equality of women and
men in light of the biological, historical, social, and culturally endowed differences
between men and women.
RA 9262, by affording special and exclusive protection to women and
children, who are vulnerable victims of domestic violence, undoubtedly serves the
important governmental objectives of protecting human rights, insuring gender
equality, and empowering women. The gender-based classification and the special
remedies prescribed by said law in favor of women and children are substantially
related, in fact essentially necessary, to achieve such objectives. Hence, said Act
survives the intermediate review or middle-tier judicial scrutiny. The gender-
based classification therein is therefore not violative of the equal
protection clause embodied in the 1987 Constitution.
DUMLAO VS. COMELEC, 96 SCRA 392 (1980)
FACTS:
Patricio Dumlao was the former governor of Nueva Vizcaya. He has already
retired from his office and he has been receiving retirement benefits therefrom.
Equality of results is the logical corollary of de facto or substantive equality.
These results may be quantitative and/or qualitative in nature; that is, women
enjoying their rights in various fields in fairly equal numbers with men, enjoying
the same income levels, equality in decision-making and political influence, and
women enjoying freedom from violence.
The governments commitment to ensure that the status of a woman in all
spheres of her life are parallel to that of a man, requires the adoption and
implementation of ameliorative measures, such as RA 9262. Unless the woman is
guaranteed that the violence that she endures in her private affairs will not be
ignored by the government, which is committed to uplift her to her rightful place
as a human being, then she can neither achieve substantive equality nor be
empowered.
5. RA 9262 is justified under the Constitution
The Constitution abundantly authorize Congress or the government to
inequities experienced by women and children brought about by years of
discrimination. The equal protection clause when juxtaposed to this provision
provides a stronger mandate for the government to combat such discrimination.
Indeed, these provisions order Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment
of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity,
reduce social, economic, and political inequalities and remove cultural inequities."
RA 9262 is THE ameliorative action
In enacting R.A. 9262, Congress has taken an ameliorative action that
would address the evil effects of the social model of patriarchy, a pattern that is
deeply embedded in the societys subconscious, on Filipino women and children
and elevate their status as human beings on the same level as the father or the
husband.
R.A. 9262 aims to put a stop to the cycle of male abuses borne of
discrimination against women. It is an ameliorative measure, not a form of
"reverse discrimination" against. Ameliorative action "is not an exception to
equality, but an expression and attainment of de facto equality, the genuine and
substantive equality which the Filipino people themselves enshrined as a goal of
the 1987 Constitution." Ameliorative measures are necessary as a redistributive
mechanism in an unequal society to achieve substantive equality.
Womens struggle for equality with men has evolved under three models:
a. Formal equality - women and men are to be regarded and treated as the
same. But this model does not take into account biological and socially
10
 SUBJECT: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2
In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require
that candidates should not be more than 65 years of age at the time they assume
office, if applicable to everyone, might or might not be a reasonable classification
although, as the Solicitor General has intimated, a good policy of the law should
be to promote the emergence of younger blood in our political elective echelons.
On the other hand, it might be that persons more than 65 years old may also be
good elective local officials.
Retirement from government service may or may not be a reasonable
disqualification for elective local officials. For one thing, there can also be retirees
from government service at ages, say below 65. It may neither be reasonable to
disqualify retirees, aged 65, for a 65-year old retiree could be a good local official
just like one, aged 65, who is not a retiree.
But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official (Dumalo), who has
retired from a provincial, city or municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him
from running for the same office from which he had retired, as provided for in the
challenged provision.
In 1980, he filed for reelection to the same office. Meanwhile, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 52 was enacted. This law provides, among others, that retirees
from public office like Dumlao are disqualified to run for office. Dumlao assailed
the law averring that it is class legislation hence unconstitutional. In general,
Dumlao invoked equal protection in the eye of the law.
His petition was joined by Atty. Romeo Igot and Alfredo Salapantan, Jr.
These two however have different issues. The suits of Igot and Salapantan are
more of a taxpayers suit assailing the other provisions of BP 52 regarding the
term of office of the elected officials, the length of the campaign, and the
provision which bars persons charged for crimes from running for public office as
well as the provision that provides that the mere filing of complaints against them
after preliminary investigation would already disqualify them from office.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Dumlao, Igot, and Salapantan have a cause of action.
HELD:

VILLEGAS vs HIU CHIONG TSAI PAO HO
Pao Ho is a Chinese national employed in the City of Manila. On 27 March 1968, then Manila mayor
Antonio Villegas signed Ordinance No. 6537. The said ordinance prohibits foreign nationals to be
employed within the City of Manila without first securing a permit from the Mayor of Manila. The
permit will cost them P50.00. Pao Ho, on 04 May 1968 filed a petition for prohibition against the said
Ordinance alleging that as a police power measure, it makes no distinction between useful and non-
useful occupations, imposing a fixed P50.00 employment permit, which is out of proportion to the cost
of registration and that it fails to prescribe any standard to guide and/or limit the action of the Mayor,
thus, violating the fundamental principle on illegal delegation of legislative powers. Judge Arca of
Manila CFI ruled in favor of Pao Ho and he declared the Ordinance as being null and void.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation to the Mayor of Manila.
HELD: The decision of Judge Arca is affirmed. Ordinance No. 6537 does not lay down any criterion or
standard to guide the Mayor in the exercise of his discretion. It has been held that where an ordinance
of a municipality fails to state any policy or to set up any standard to guide or limit the mayors action,
expresses no purpose to be attained by requiring a permit, enumerates no conditions for its grant or
refusal, and entirely lacks standard, thus conferring upon the Mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to
grant or deny the issuance of building permits, such ordinance is invalid, being an undefined and
unlimited delegation of power to allow or prevent an activity per se lawful. Ordinance No. 6537 is void
because it does not contain or suggest any standard or criterion to guide the mayor in the exercise of the
power which has been granted to him by the ordinance. The ordinance in question violates the due
process of law and equal protection rule of the Constitution.
ORMOC SUGAR CENTRAL vs ORMOC CITY
No. The SC pointed out the procedural lapses of this case for this case
should have never been merged. Dumlaos issue is different from Igots. They
have separate issues. Further, this case does not meet all the requisites so that
itd be eligible for judicial review. There are standards that have to be followed in
the exercise of the function of judicial review, namely: (1) the existence of an
appropriate case; (2) an interest personal and substantial by the party raising the
constitutional question; (3) the plea that the function be exercised at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the constitutional question be passed upon
in order to decide the case.
In this case, only the 3rd requisite was met.
The SC ruled however that the provision barring persons charged for
crimes may not run for public office and that the filing of complaints against them
and after preliminary investigation would already disqualify them from office as
null and void.
The assertion that BP 52 is contrary to the safeguard of equal protection is
neither well taken. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is
subject to rational classification. If the groupings are based on reasonable and real
differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated differently from another
class. For purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age, have been
validly classified differently from younger employees. Employees attaining that
age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not so
compulsorily retirable.

11
 SUBJECT: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2
reorganize the Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity, and efficiency does not include
the power to create an entirely new office was inexistent like the Truth Commission;
The E.O illegally amended the Constitution when it made the Truth Commission and
vesting it the power duplicating and even exceeding those of the Office of the Ombudsman and the
DOJ.
It violates the equal protection clause
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT the said E.O is unconstitutional.
RULING:
Yes, E.O No. 1 should be struck down as it is violative of the equal protection clause. The Chief
Executives power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted. Having been
constitutionally granted full control of the Executive Department, to which respondents belong, the
President has the obligation to ensure that all executive officials and employees faithfully comply with
the law. With AO 298 as mandate, the legality of the investigation is sustained. Such validity is not
affected by the fact that the investigating team and the PCAGC had the same composition, or that the
former used the offices and facilities of the latter in conducting the inquiry.
QUINTO v. COMELEC, GR No. 189698, December 1, 2009
FACTS: This is a Motion for Reconsideration case. On December 1, 2009, the
Supreme Court voting 8-6 declared as unconstitutional the second provision in the
third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, Section 66 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881 and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678, for being
violative of the equal protection clause and for being overbroad. The ponente of
the decision was Justice Antonio B. Nachura. The assailed Decision thus paved the
way for public appointive officials to continue discharging the powers,
prerogatives and functions of their office notwithstanding their entry into the
political arena.
Issue: Are Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, the second proviso in the third
paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act (RA) 9369, and Section 66 of the Omnibus
Election Code violative of the equal protection clause?
HELD: No. December 1, 2009 decision is now reversed and set aside. Section 4(a)
of COMELEC Resolution 8678 is a faithful reflection of the present state of the law
and jurisprudence on the matter, viz.:
In 1964, Ormoc City passed a bill which read: There shall be paid to the City Treasurer on any and all
productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company Incorporated, in Ormoc City a
municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale to the United States of America and
other foreign countries. Though referred to as a production tax, the imposition actually amounts to a
tax on the export of centrifugal sugar produced at Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. For production of sugar
alone is not taxable; the only time the tax applies is when the sugar produced is exported. Ormoc Sugar
paid the tax (P7,087.50) in protest averring that the same is violative of Sec 2287 of the Revised
Administrative Code which provides: It shall not be in the power of the municipal council to impose a
tax in any form whatever, upon goods and merchandise carried into the municipality, or out of the same,
and any attempt to impose an import or export tax upon such goods in the guise of an unreasonable
charge for wharfage, use of bridges or otherwise, shall be void. And that the ordinance is violative to
equal protection as it singled out Ormoc Sugar As being liable for such tax impost for no other sugar
mill is found in the city.
ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a violation of equal protection.
HELD: The SC held in favor of Ormoc Sugar. The SC noted that even if Sec 2287 of the RAC had
already been repealed by a latter statute (Sec 2 RA 2264) which effectively authorized LGUs to tax
goods and merchandise carried in and out of their turf, the act of Ormoc City is still violative of equal
protection. The ordinance is discriminatory for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by
the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. At the time of the taxing ordinance s enactment,
Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is true, was the only sugar central in the city of Ormoc. Still, the
classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well. The taxing
ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar
central, of the same class as plaintiff, from the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar
company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc
Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon.
BIRAOGO vs PHIL TRUTH COMMISSION
E.O No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) of 2010 was signed by President
Aquino. The said PTC is a mere branch formed under the Office of the President tasked to investigate
reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-
principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous administration and submit their findings
and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. However, PTC is not a quasi-
judicial body, it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle or render awards in disputes between parties.
Its job is to investigate, collect and asses evidences gathered and make recommendations. It has
subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt or even arrest. It cannot determine for
such facts if probable cause exist as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law.
Petitioners contends the Constitutionality of the E.O. on the grounds that.
It violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of Congress to create a
public office and appropriate funds for its operation;
The provisions of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of
1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to structurally
12
 SUBJECT: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2
period. Political partisanship is the inevitable essence of a political office, elective
positions included.
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission provides that the
prohibition notwithstanding, civil service officers and employees are allowed to
vote, as well as express their views on political issues, or mention the names of
certain candidates for public office whom they support.
On Equal Protection Clause
In Farias, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al, the Court already held
that the legal dichotomy created by the Legislature is a reasonable classification,
as there are material and significant distinctions between the two classes of
officials (appointive and elective). Consequently, the contention that Section 14 of
the Fair Election Act, in relation to Sections 66 and 67 of the Omnibus Election
Code, infringed on the equal protection clause of the Constitution, failed
muster. The Court ruled that the equal protection of the law clause in the
Constitution is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification. If the
groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences,
one class may be treated and regulated differently from the other. The Court has
explained the nature of the equal protection guarantee in this manner:
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and
individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the
oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation
which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by
territory within which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute
equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall
be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to
privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection
clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those
persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all
persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making
a distinction between those who fall within such class and those
who do not.
Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective
officials and appointive officials. The former occupy their office by
virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an
office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon
Incumbent Appointive Official. - Under Section 13 of RA 9369, which
reiterates Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, any person holding a
public appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in government-owned
or -controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his
office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
Incumbent Elected Official. xxx it considered an elected official as
resigned only upon the start of the campaign period corresponding to the
positions for which they are running, an elected official is not deemed to
have resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy
for the same or any other elected office or position. In fine, an elected
official may run for another position without forfeiting his seat.
These laws and regulations implement Section 2(4), Article IX-B of the 1987
Constitution, which prohibits civil service officers and employees from engaging in
any electioneering or partisan political campaign.
To emphasize its importance, this constitutional ban on civil service officers
and employees is presently reflected and implemented by a number of statutes:
Section 46(b)(26), Chapter 7 and Section 55, Chapter 8 both of Subtitle A, Title I,
Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987, Section 261(i) of Batas Pambansa Blg.
881 (the Omnibus Election Code).
The intent of both Congress and the framers of our Constitution to limit the
participation of civil service officers and employees in partisan political activities is
too plain to be mistaken.
But Section 2(4), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution and the
implementing statutes apply only to civil servants holding appointive offices.
Stated differently, the constitutional ban does not cover elected officials,
notwithstanding the fact that [t]he civil service embraces all branches,
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters. This is
because elected public officials, by the very nature of their office, engage in
partisan political activities almost all year round, even outside of the campaign
13
 SUBJECT: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2
must find that there is no reasonably rational reason for the
differing treatment.
In the instant case, is there a rational justification for
excluding elected officials from the operation of the deemed
resigned provisions? I submit that there is.
An election is the embodiment of the popular will, perhaps
the purest expression of the sovereign power of the people. It
involves the choice or selection of candidates to public office by
popular vote. Considering that elected officials are put in office by
their constituents for a definite term, it may justifiably be said
that they were excluded from the ambit of the deemed resigned
provisions in utmost respect for the mandate of the sovereign will.
In other words, complete deference is accorded to the will of the
electorate that they be served by such officials until the end of the
term for which they were elected. In contrast, there is no such
expectation insofar as appointed officials are concerned.
The dichotomized treatment of appointive and
elective officials is therefore germane to the purposes of the
law. For the law was made not merely to preserve the
integrity, efficiency, and discipline of the public service; the
Legislature, whose wisdom is outside the rubric of judicial
scrutiny, also thought it wise to balance this with the
competing, yet equally compelling, interest of deferring to
the sovereign will. (emphasis in the original)
LEAGUE OF CITIES v. COMELEC, GR NO. 176951, April 12, 2011
FACTS: This is a Motion for Reconsideration case. During the 11th Congress, 57
bills seeking the conversion of municipalities into component cities were filed
before the House of Representatives. However, Congress acted only on 33 bills. It
did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities. During the
12thCongress, R.A. No. 9009 became effective revising Section 450 of the Local
Government Code. It increased the income requirement to qualify for conversion
into a city from P20 million annual income to P100 million locally-generated
income. In the 13th Congress, 16 of the 24 municipalities filed, through their
respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. Each of the cityhood bills contained
a common provision exempting the particular municipality from the 100 million
income requirement imposed by R.A. No. 9009.
The assailed decision (promulgated on February 15, 2011) declared the 16
Cityhood Laws Republic Acts Nos. 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398,
9404, 9405, 9407, 9408, 9409, 9434, 9435, 9436, and 9491 constitutional.
stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold
their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing
authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent
capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at
the pleasure of the appointing authority.
xxx
Since the classification justifying Section 14 of Rep. Act No.
9006, i.e., elected officials vis--vis appointive officials, is anchored
upon material and significant distinctions and all the persons
belonging under the same classification are similarly treated, the
equal protection clause of the Constitution is, thus, not infringed.
The case at bar is a crass attempt to resurrect a dead issue. The miracle is
that our assailed Decision gave it new life. We ought to be guided by the doctrine
of stare decisis et non quieta movere.
The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of
the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is
equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. The test
developed by jurisprudence here and yonder is that of reasonableness, which has
four requisites:
(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;
(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.
The assailed Decision readily acknowledged that these deemed-resigned
provisions satisfy the first, third and fourth requisites of reasonableness. It,
however, proffers the dubious conclusion that the differential treatment of
appointive officials vis--vis elected officials is not germane to the purpose of the
law, because whether one holds an appointive office or an elective one, the evils
sought to be prevented by the measure remain.
The assailed Decision further stated:
... [I]t is not sufficient grounds for invalidation that we may
find that the statutes distinction is unfair, underinclusive, unwise, or
not the best solution from a public-policy standpoint; rather, we
14
 SUBJECT: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2
respondents, without exception, from the coverage of RA No. 9009. Thereby, RA
9009, and, by necessity, the LCG, were amended, not by repeal but by way of the
express exemptions being embodied in the exemption clauses.
The Court held that the imposition of the income requirement of P100 million from
local sources under RA 9009 was arbitrary. While the Constitution mandates that
the creation of local government units must comply with the criteria laid down in
the LGC, it cannot be justified to insist that the Constitution must have to yield to
every amendment to the LGC despite such amendment imminently producing
effects contrary to the original thrusts of the LGC to promote autonomy,
decentralization, countryside development, and the concomitant national growth.
PICHAY vs. OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS
(ODESLA) INVESTIGATIVE AND ADJUDICATORY DIVISION, G.R. No. 196425, July 24,
2012
FACTS: On April 16, 2001, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 12
(E.O. 12) creating the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) and vesting it with the power to
investigate or hear administrative cases or complaints for possible graft and corruption, among others,
against presidential appointees and to submit its report and recommendations to the President. Pertinent
portions of E.O. 12 provide:
Section 4. Jurisdiction, Powers and Functions. x x x
(b) The Commission, acting as a collegial body, shall have the authority to investigate or hear
administrative cases or complaints against all presidential appointees in the government and
any of its agencies or instrumentalities xxx
On November 15, 2010, President Benigno Simeon Aquino III issued Executive Order No. 13 (E.O.
13), abolishing the PAGC and transferring its functions to the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary
for Legal Affairs (ODESLA), more particularly to its newly-established Investigative and Adjudicatory
Division (IAD). The assailed executive order reads:
xxx
SECTION 2. Abolition of Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC). To enable the Office
of the President (OP) to directly investigate graft and corrupt cases of Presidential appointees RA 9009 took effect on June 30, 2001, when the 12th Congress was incipient. By
in the Executive Department including heads of government-owned and controlled
corporations, the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) is hereby abolished and their
vital functions and other powers and functions inherent or incidental thereto, transferred to the adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 entitled Joint Resolution to Exempt Certain
Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (ODESLA), OP in accordance with
the provisions of this Executive Order.
Xxx
On April 6, 2011, respondent Finance Secretary Cesar V. Purisima filed before the IAD-ODESLA a
complaint affidavit for grave misconduct against petitioner Prospero A. Pichay, Jr., Chairman of the
Board of Trustees of the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), and some other officials, which
arose from the purchase by the LWUA of Four Hundred Forty-Five Thousand Three Hundred Seventy
Seven (445,377) shares of stock of Express Savings Bank, Inc. On April 14, 2011, petitioner received
an Order requiring him and his co-respondents to submit their respective written explanations under
oath.
Now, the petitioners anchor their Ad Cautelam Motion for
Reconsideration upon the primordial ground that the Court could no longer
modify, alter, or amend its judgment declaring the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional
due to such judgment having long become final and executory. They submit that
the Cityhood Laws violated Section 6 and Section 10 of Article X of the
Constitution, as well as the Equal Protection Clause.
ISSUE: Do the 16 Cityhood Laws violate of equal protection clause of the
Constitution and the right of Local Goverments to a just share in the national
taxes?
HELD: No. Petition for Motion for Reconsideration is denied with finality.
The 16 Cityhood Laws are constitutional. We should not ever lose sight of the fact
that the 16 cities covered by the Cityhood Laws not only had conversion bills
pending during the 11th Congress, but have also complied with the requirements
of the [Local Government Code] LGC prescribed prior to its amendment by RA No.
9009. Congress undeniably gave these cities all the considerations that justice
and fair play demanded. Hence, this Court should do no less by stamping
its imprimatur to the clear and unmistakable legislative intent and by duly
recognizing the certain collective wisdom of Congress, the SC said.
The Court stressed that Congress clearly intended that the local government units
covered by the Cityhood Laws be exempted from the coverage of RA 9009, which
imposes a higher income requirement of PhP100 million for the creation of cities.
The Court reiterated that while RA 9009 was being deliberated upon, the
Congress was well aware of the pendency of conversion bills of several
municipalities, including those covered by the Cityhood Laws. It pointed out that
reason of the clear legislative intent to exempt the municipalities covered by the
conversion bills pending during the 11th Congress, the House of Representatives
Municipalities Embodied in Bills Filed in Congress before June 30, 2001 from the
coverage of Republic Act No. 9009. However, the Senate failed to act on the said
Joint Resolution. Even so, the House readopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint
Resolution No. 1 during the 12th Congress, and forwarded the same for approval
to the Senate, which again failed to prove it. Eventually, the conversion bills of
respondents were individually filed in the Lower House and fellesters.blogspot.com
were all unanimously and favorably voted upon. When forwarded to the Senate,
the bills were also unanimously approved. The acts of both Chambers of Congress
show that the exemption clauses ultimately incorporated in the Cityhood Laws are
but the express articulations of the clear legislative intent to exempt the
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 SUBJECT: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2
appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and
are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority. IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL (1) FOR USURPING THE POWER OF THE LEGISLATURE TO
xxxx
An election is the embodiment of the popular will, perhaps the purest expression of the
sovereign power of the people.1wphi1 It involves the choice or selection of candidates to
public office by popular vote. Considering that elected officials are put in office by their
constituents for a definite term, x x x complete deference is accorded to the will of the
electorate that they be served by such officials until the end of the term for which they were
elected. In contrast, there is no such expectation insofar as appointed officials are concerned.
(Emphasis supplied)
REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC. and CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS
ASSOCIATION vs. PROFESSIONAL REGULATORY BOARD OF REAL ESTATE SERVICE
and PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION, G.R. No. 197676, February 4, 2014
FACTS: Assailed in this petition for review under Rule 45 is the Decision dated July 12, 2011 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 42 denying the petition to declare as unconstitutional
Sections 28(a), 29 and 32 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9646.
R.A. No. 9646, otherwise known as the "Real Estate Service Act of the Philippines" was signed into
law on June 29, 2009 by PGMA aiming to professionalize the real estate service sector under a
regulatory scheme of licensing, registration and supervision of real estate service practitioners (real
estate brokers, appraisers, assessors, consultants and salespersons) in the country. Prior to its enactment, The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well
real estate service practitioners were under the supervision of the DTI through the Bureau of Trade
Regulation and Consumer Protection (BTRCP), in the exercise of its consumer regulation functions.
Such authority is now transferred to the PRC through the Professional Regulatory Board of Real Estate
Service (PRBRES) created under the new law.
On December 7, 2010, herein petitioners Remman Enterprises, Inc. (REI) and the Chamber of Real
Estate and Builders Association (CREBA) instituted Civil Case No. 10-124776 in the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 42. Petitioners sought to declare as void and unconstitutional Sections 28(a),
29 and 32 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9646. Section 28 states:
SEC. 28. Exemptions from the Acts Constituting the Practice of Real Estate Service. The
provisions of this Act and its rules and regulations shall not apply to the following:
(a) Any person, natural or juridical, who shall directly perform by himself/herself the acts
mentioned in Section 3 hereof with reference to his/her or its own property, except real estate
developers;
xxx
According to petitioners, Section 28(a) of R.A. No. 9646 is constitutionally infirm because it violates
the equal protection clause as no substantial distinctions exist between real estate developers and the
exempted group mentioned since both are property owners dealing with their own property.
The trial court further ruled that Section 28(a) does not violate the equal protection clause because the
exemption of real estate developers was anchored on reasonable classification aimed at protecting the
buying public from the rampant misrepresentations often committed by unlicensed real estate
practitioners, and to prevent unscrupulous and unethical real estate practices from flourishing
considering the large number of consumers in the regular course of business compared to isolated sale
transactions made by private individuals selling their own property. Hence the current case.
Now the petitioner has resorted to the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition alleging that E.O. 13
CREATE A PUBLIC OFFICE, (2) FOR USURPING THE POWER OF THE LEGISLATURE TO
APPROPRIATE FUNDS, (3) FOR USURPING THE POWER OF CONGRESS TO DELEGATE
QUASI-JUDICIAL POWERS TO ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES, (4) FOR ENCROACHING
UPON THE POWERS OF THE OMBUDSMAN, (5) FOR VIOLATING THE GUARANTEE OF DUE
PROCESS, and (6) FOR VIOLATING THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.
ISSUE: Does E.O. 13 violate equal protection clause?
HELD: No. Executive Order No. 13 Does Not Violate Petitioner's Right to Due Process and the Equal
Protection of the Laws.
Petitioner goes on to assail E.O. 13 as violative of the equal protection clause pointing to the
arbitrariness of limiting the IAD-ODESLA's investigation only to presidential appointees occupying
upper-level positions in the government. The equal protection of the laws is a guaranty against any form
of undue favoritism or hostility from the government. It is embraced under the due process concept and
simply requires that, in the application of the law, "all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed." The equal protection clause,
however, is not absolute but subject to reasonable classification so that aggrupations bearing substantial
distinctions may be treated differently from each other. This we ruled in Farinas v. Executive
Secretary, wherein we further stated that
as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which
is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which it is to operate. It does
not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike,
under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The
equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within
a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for
making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not. (Emphasis
supplied)
Presidential appointees come under the direct disciplining authority of the President. This proceeds
from the well settled principle that, in the absence of a contrary law, the power to remove or to
discipline is lodged in the same authority on which the power to appoint is vested. Having the power to
remove and/or discipline presidential appointees, the President has the corollary authority to investigate
such public officials and look into their conduct in office. Petitioner is a presidential appointee
occupying the high-level position of Chairman of the LWUA. Necessarily, he comes under the
disciplinary jurisdiction of the President, who is well within his right to order an investigation into
matters that require his informed decision.
There are substantial distinctions that set apart presidential appointees occupying upper-level positions
in government from non-presidential appointees and those that occupy the lower positions in
government. In Salumbides v. Office of the Ombudsman, we had ruled extensively on the substantial
distinctions that exist between elective and appointive public officials, thus:
Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The
former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an
office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On
the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an
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 SUBJECT: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2
business, a business which is highly regulated by the State to ensure the health and safety of home and
lot buyers.
The foregoing shows that substantial distinctions do exist between ordinary property owners exempted
under Section 28(a) and real estate developers like petitioners, and the classification enshrined in R.A. own property, and other persons such as receivers, trustees or assignees in insolvency or bankruptcy
No. 9646 is reasonable and relevant to its legitimate purpose. The Court thus rules that R.A. No. 9646 is
valid and constitutional.
ISSUE: Does Section 28 of R.A. No. 9646 violate Equal Protection Clause?
HELD: No. Section 28 of R.A. No. 9646 does not violate Equal Protection Clause.
Section 28 of R.A. No. 9646 exempts from its coverage natural and juridical persons dealing with their
proceedings. However, real estate developers are specifically mentioned as an exception from those
enumerated therein. Petitioners argue that this provision violates the equal protection clause because it
unjustifiably treats real estate developers differently from those exempted persons who also own
properties and desire to sell them. They insist that no substantial distinctions exist between ordinary
property owners and real estate developers as the latter, in fact, are more capable of entering into real
estate transactions and do not need the services of licensed real estate brokers.1wphi1 They assail
the RTC decision in citing the reported fraudulent practices as basis for the exclusion of real estate
developers from the exempted group of persons under Section 28(a).
We sustain the trial courts ruling that R.A. No. 9646 does not violate the equal protection clause.
In Ichong v. Hernandez, the concept of equal protection was explained as follows:
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well
as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation, which
is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which it is to operate. It does
not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike,
under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The
equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within
such class, and reasonable grounds exists for making a distinction between those who fall within such
class and those who do not. (2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 824-825).
Although the equal protection clause of the Constitution does not forbid classification, it is imperative
that the classification should be based on real and substantial differences having a reasonable relation to
the subject of the particular legislation. If classification is germane to the purpose of the law, concerns
all members of the class, and applies equally to present and future conditions, the classification does not
violate the equal protection guarantee.
R.A. No. 9646 was intended to provide institutionalized government support for the development of "a
corps of highly respected, technically competent, and disciplined real estate service practitioners,
knowledgeable of internationally accepted standards and practice of the profession." Real estate
developers at present constitute a sector that hires or employs the largest number of brokers,
salespersons, appraisers and consultants due to the sheer number of products (lots, houses and
condominium units) they advertise and sell nationwide. As early as in the 70s, there has been a
proliferation of errant developers, operators or sellers who have reneged on their representation and
obligations to comply with government regulations such as the provision and maintenance of
subdivision roads, drainage, sewerage, water system and other basic requirements. To protect the
interest of home and lot buyers from fraudulent acts and manipulations perpetrated by these
unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers and operators, P.D. No. 957 was issued to strictly
regulate housing and real estate development projects. Hence, in approving R.A. No. 9646, the
legislature rightfully recognized the necessity of imposing the new licensure requirements to all real
estate service practitioners, including and more importantly, those real estate service practitioners
working for real estate developers. Unlike individuals or entities having isolated transactions over their
own property, real estate developers sell lots, houses and condominium units in the ordinary course of
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SUBJECT: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2

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