G.R. No.

183460 March 12, 2013 Spouses NERIO and SOLEDAD PADOR and REY
PADOR, Petitioners, vs. Barangay Captain BERNABE ARCAYAN, Barangay Tanod CHIEF ROMEO PADOR,
Barangay Tanods ALBERTO ALIVIO, CARMELO REVALES, ROBERTO ALIMORIN, WINELO ARCAYAN,
CHRISTOPHER ALIVIO & BIENVENIDO ARCAYAN, all of Barangay Tabunan, Cebu City, Respondents. .... 1
DANIEL MASANGKAY TAPUZ, AURORA TAPUZ-MADRIAGA, LIBERTY M. ASUNCION, LADYLYN BAMOS
MADRIAGA, EVERLY TAPUZ MADRIAGA, EXCEL TAPUZ, IVAN TAPUZ AND MARIAN TIMBAS,
Petitioners, - versus HONORABLE JUDGE ELMO DEL ROSARIO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of
RTC Br. 5 Kalibo, SHERIFF NELSON DELA CRUZ, in his capacity as Sheriff of the RTC, THE PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE stationed in BoracayIsland, represented by the PNP STATION COMMANDER, THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN CEBU 18thDIVISION, SPOUSES GREGORIO SANSON &
MA. LOURDES T. SANSON, Respondents. G.R. No. 182484 Promulgated: June 17, 2008 ....................... 5
P/SUPT. FELIXBERTO CASTILLO, POLICE OFFICERS ROMEO BAGTAS, RUPERTO BORLONGAN,
EDMUNDO DIONISIO, RONNIE MORALES, ARNOLD TRIA, and GILBERTO PUNZALAN, ENGR. RICASOL P.
MILLAN, ENGR. REDENTOR S. DELA CRUZ, MR. ANASTACIO L. BORLONGAN, MR. ARTEMIO ESGUERRA,
TISOY, and JOHN DOES, .......................................................................................................................... 15
Petitioners, - versus - DR. AMANDA T. CRUZ, NIXON T. CRUZ, and FERDINAND T. CRUZ, Respondents.
G.R. No. 182165 Promulgated: November 25, 2009 .............................................................................. 15
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, ALEXANDER S. DEYTO and RUBEN A. SAPITULA, Petitioners,
versus ROSARIO GOPEZ LIM,Respondent. G.R. No. 184769 Promulgated: October 5, 2010 ................ 21
EDGARDO NAVIA,[1] RUBEN DIO,[2] and ANDREW BUISING, Petitioners, - versus - VIRGINIA
PARDICO, for and in behalf and in representation of BENHUR V. PARDICO Respondent. G.R. No.
184467 Promulgated: June 19, 2012 ...................................................................................................... 25
G.R. No. 204528 February 19, 2013 SECRETARY LEILA M. DE LIMA, DIRECTOR NONNATUS R. ROJAS
and DEPUTY DIRECTOR REYNALDO 0. ESMERALDA, Petitioners, vs. MAGTANGGOL B.
GATDULA, Respondent. .......................................................................................................................... 32
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA IN
FAVOR OF MELISSA C. ROXAS, MELISSA C. ROXAS, Petitioner, -versus- GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO,
GILBERT TEODORO, GEN. VICTOR S. IBRADO, P/DIR. GEN. JESUS AME VERZOSA, LT. GEN. DELFIN N.
BANGIT, PC/SUPT. LEON NILO A. DELA CRUZ, MAJ. GEN. RALPH VILLANUEVA, PS/SUPT. RUDY GAMIDO
LACADIN, AND CERTAIN PERSONS WHO GO BY THE NAME[S] DEX, RC AND ROSE, Respondents. G.R.
No. 189155 Promulgated: September 7, 2010 ....................................................................................... 38
RODOLFO NOEL LOZADA, JR., VIOLETA LOZADA and ARTURO LOZADA, Petitioners, - versus -
PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO, EDUARDO ERMITA, AVELINO RAZON, ANGEL ATUTUBO
and SPO4 ROGER VALEROSO, Respondents. G.R. Nos. 184379-80 Promulgated: April 24, 2012 .......... 55
REVEREND FATHER ROBERT P. REYES, Petitioner, - versus - COURT OF APPEALS, SECRETARY RAUL M.
GONZALEZ, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, AND
COMMISSIONER MARCELINO C. LIBANAN, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU
OF IMMIGRATION, Respondents. G. R. No. 182161 Promulgated: December 3, 2009.......................... 68

G.R. No. 183460 March 12, 2013 Spouses NERIO and SOLEDAD PADOR and REY
PADOR, Petitioners, vs. Barangay Captain BERNABE ARCAYAN, Barangay
Tanod CHIEF ROMEO PADOR, Barangay Tanods ALBERTO ALIVIO, CARMELO
REVALES, ROBERTO ALIMORIN, WINELO ARCAYAN, CHRISTOPHER ALIVIO &
BIENVENIDO ARCAYAN, all of Barangay Tabunan, Cebu City, Respondents.

Page 1 of 76
DECISION

SERENO, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assails the Resolution2 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 17, Cebu City, in Spec. Proc. No. 16061-CEB. The RTC Resolution denied the
Petition for a Writ of Amparo filed by petitioner-spouses Nerio and Soledad Pador and Rey
Pador against respondents - Barangay Captain Bernabe Arcayan, Barangay Tanod Chief Romeo
Pador, and Barangay Tanods Alberto Alivio, Carmela Revales, Roberto Alimorin, Winelo
Arcayan, Christopher Alivio and Bienvenido Arcayan.

On 22 March 2008, petitioners filed with the RTC a Verified Petition for the Issuance of a Writ
of Amparo.3

Petitioners alleged that in February 2008, rumors circulated that petitioner Nerio Pador was a
marijuana planter in Barangay Tabunan, Cebu City.4 On 17 March 2008, respondents Alberto
Alivio, Carmelo Revales and Roberto Alimorin raided their ampalaya farm to search for
marijuana plants, but found none.5 After the raid, petitioners Nerio and Rey Pador received
invitation letters for a conference from respondent Barangay Captain Arcayan.6They referred the
invitation letters to their counsel, who advised them not to attend and, instead, send a letter-reply
to Barangay Captain Arcayan. When the latter received the letter-reply, he allegedly read its
contents, got one copy, and refused to sign a receipt of the document.7 Petitioners then concluded
that the conduct of the raid, the sending of the invitation letters, the refusal of respondent
barangay captain to receive their letter-reply as well as the possibility of more harassment
cases, false accusations, and possible violence from respondents gravely threatened their right
to life, liberty and security and necessitated the issuance of a writ of amparo.8

After examining the contents of the petition and the affidavits attached to it, the RTC issued the
Writ and directed respondents to make a verified return.9

In compliance with the RTCs directive, respondents filed their Verified Return and/or
Comment.10 In their counter-statement of facts, they alleged that on 16 March 2008, respondent
Winelo Arcayan received a report regarding the alleged existence of a marijuana plantation in a
place called Sitio Gining in Barangay Tabunan.11He then referred the matter to Barangay Tanod
Chief Romeo Pador and Barangay Captain Arcayan, who commenced to organize a patrol.12

On the morning of 17 March 2008, while the barangay tanods were having a final briefing,
Carmelo Revales left the place to take his breakfast.13 While he was taking his breakfast, Nerio
Pador, who was riding a motorcycle, stopped and accused the former of uprooting the marijuana
plants.14 Carmelo denied any knowledge about the incident, and Nerio thereafter threatened to
have him killed. Carmelo promptly reported this threat to the other barangay tanods.15

Respondents recounted that, notwithstanding Nerios actions, they proceeded to patrol the
area.16 When they passed by the house of Nerio, he angrily uttered in Cebuano, "If I will be
informed who reported the matter to the police, I will attack the informant." Carmelo then asked
him, "Who reported to you?" Nerio replied, "I will tell you later once I will be captured by police
authorities. All of us will be dead this afternoon. I want a shoot out!"17

Respondents thereafter commenced their patrol of a place owned by a certain David Quintana,
but their rounds yielded a negative result.18

Later that evening, while respondent Alberto Alivio was passing by the house of Nerio, the latter
threatened to kill him, saying, "I want to kill now!"19 Alberto then asked him, "Who reported to
you so that the truth will come out?" Nerio then punched the door of his house and said, "I will
tell you later when I will be captured by the police authorities!" Alberto then left the place and
reported the matter to respondent Barangay Captain Arcayan.20

Page 2 of 76
In response to the reports, Barangay Captain Arcayan stated that he ordered his secretary to
prepare invitation letters for petitioners Nerio and Rey Pador, as the allegations of threats and
intimidation made by Nerio against some of the barangay tanods were serious. Barangay Captain
Arcayan explained that he no longer signed a copy of petitioners letter-reply, as he had already
been given a copy of it.21

The RTC then heard the Petition. On 3 July 2008, it issued the assailed Resolution 22 finding that
petitioners claims were based merely on hearsay, speculations, surmises and conjectures, and
that respondents had sufficiently explained the reason behind the issuance of the letters of
invitation. It thereafter proceeded to deny petitioners the privilege of the writ of amparo.23

Dissatisfied with the ruling of the RTC, petitioners filed the instant Petition for Review24 before
this Court, ascribing grave and serious error on the part of the trial court.25

The Courts Ruling

We uphold the RTCs Resolution and deny the instant Petition.

Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo26 provides for the grounds that may be relied upon
in a petition therefor, as follows:

SEC. 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose
right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.

The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.

Thus, to be entitled to the privilege of the writ, petitioners must prove by substantial
evidence27 that their rights to life, liberty and security are being violated or threatened by an
unlawful act or omission.

A closer look at the instant Petition shows that it is anchored on the following allegations: first,
that respondents conducted a raid on the property of petitioner based on information that the
latter were cultivators of marijuana; second, that respondent barangay captain sent them
invitation letters without stating the purpose of the invitation; third, that respondent barangay
captain refused to receive petitioners letter-reply; and fourth, that petitioners anticipate the
possibility of more harassment cases, false accusations, and potential violence from respondents.

All these allegations are insufficient bases for a grant of the privilege of the writ.

On the first allegation, we find that the supposed raid on petitioners ampalaya farm was
sufficiently controverted by respondents.

Respondents alleged, and the trial court found, that a roving patrol was conducted, not on the
ampalaya farm of Nerio Pador, but on an area locally called Sitio Gining, which was beside the
lot possessed by David Quintana.28

Assuming, however, that respondents had in fact entered the ampalaya farm, petitioner Rey
Pador himself admitted that they had done so with his permission, as stated in his affidavit:

5. Around 8:00 a.m., I saw Tabunan barangay tanod Roberto Alimorin. I greeted him good
morning. He told me that there are reports that marijuana plants were grown at our ampalaya
farm and that there is already a raid.

6. Being innocent and nothing to hide, I allowed Mr. Alimorin to search the ampalaya farm for
marijuana plants.29

Finally, even assuming that the entry was done without petitioners permission, we cannot grant
the privilege of the writ of amparo based upon a trespass on their ampalaya farm. Granting that

Page 3 of 76
the intrusion occurred, it was merely a violation of petitioners property rights. In Tapuz v. Del
Rosario,30 we ruled that the writ of amparo does not envisage the protection of concerns that are
purely property or commercial in nature, as follows:

The writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise in the
number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and
effective remedies to address these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address violations of
or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and independent remedy
beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules.
What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a
writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds.31 x x x. (Emphasis in the original)

We therefore rule that the alleged intrusion upon petitioners ampalaya farm is an insufficient
ground to grant the privilege of the writ of amparo.

On petitioners second and third allegations, we find that the barangay captains act of sending
invitation letters to petitioners and failure to sign the receiving copy of their letter-reply did not
violate or threaten their constitutional right to life, liberty or security. The records show that
Barangay Captain Arcayan sufficiently explained the factual basis for his actions. Moreover, the
records are bereft of any evidence that petitioners were coerced to attend the conference through
the use of force or intimidation. On the contrary, they had full freedom to refuse to attend the
conference, as they have in fact done in this case.1wphi1

The fourth allegation of petitioner that, following these events, they can anticipate more
harassment cases, false accusations and possible violence from respondents is baseless,
unfounded, and grounded merely on pure speculations and conjectures. As such, this allegation
does not warrant the consideration of this Court.

On a final note, we reiterate that the privilege of the writ of amparo is an extraordinary remedy
adopted to address the special concerns of extra-legal killings and enforced disappearances.
"Accordingly, the remedy ought to be resorted to and granted judiciously, lest the ideal sought by
the Amparo Rule be diluted and undermined by the indiscriminate filing of amparo petitions for
purposes less than the desire to secure amparo reliefs and protection and/or on the basis of
unsubstantiated allegations."32

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is DENIED. The 3 July
2008 Resolution of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Cebu City, in Spec. Proc. No. 16061-
CEB is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

EN BANC

Page 4 of 76
DANIEL MASANGKAY TAPUZ, AURORA TAPUZ-MADRIAGA, LIBERTY M.
ASUNCION, LADYLYN BAMOS MADRIAGA, EVERLY TAPUZ MADRIAGA, EXCEL
TAPUZ, IVAN TAPUZ AND MARIAN TIMBAS, Petitioners, -
versus HONORABLE JUDGE ELMO DEL ROSARIO, in his capacity as
Presiding Judge of RTC Br. 5 Kalibo, SHERIFF NELSON DELA CRUZ, in his
capacity as Sheriff of the RTC, THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE stationed
in BoracayIsland, represented by the PNP STATION COMMANDER, THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN CEBU 18thDIVISION, SPOUSES
GREGORIO SANSON & MA. LOURDES T. SANSON, Respondents. G.R. No.
182484 Promulgated: June 17, 2008

Before us for the determination of sufficiency of form and substance (pursuant to

Sections 1 and 4 of Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court; Sections 1 and 5 of the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo;[1] and Sections 1 and 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data[2]) is the petition
for certiorari and for the issuance of the writs of amparo and habeas data filed by the above-
named petitioners against the Honorable Judge Elmo del Rosario [in his capacity as presiding
judge of RTC Br. 5, Kalibo], Sheriff Nelson de la Cruz [in his capacity as Sheriff of the RTC],
the Philippine National Police stationed in Boracay Island, represented by the PNP Station
Commander, the Honorable Court of Appeals in Cebu, 18th Division, and the spouses
Gregorio Sanson and Ma. Lourdes T. Sanson, respondents.

The petition and its annexes disclose the following material antecedents:

The private respondents spouses Gregorio Sanson and Ma. Lourdes

T. Sanson (the private respondents), filed with the Fifth Municipal Circuit Trial Court
of Buruanga-Malay, Aklan (the MCTC) a complaint[3] dated 24 April 2006 for forcible
entry and damages with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
against the petitioners Daniel Masangkay Tapuz, Aurora Tapuz-Madriaga, Liberty M. Asuncion,
Ladylyn Bamos Madriaga,
Everly Tapuz Madriaga,Excel Tapuz,Ivan Tapuz andMarian Timbas (the petitioners) and other
John Does numbering about 120. The private respondents alleged in their complaint that: (1)
they are the registered owners under TCT No. 35813 of a 1.0093-hectare parcel of land located
at Sitio Pinaungon, Balabag, Boracay, Malay, Aklan (the disputed land); (2) they were the
disputed lands prior possessors when the petitioners armed with bolos and carrying suspected
firearms and together with unidentified persons numbering 120 - entered the disputed land by
force and intimidation, without the private respondents permission and against the objections of
the private respondents security men, and built thereon a nipa and bamboo structure.

In their Answer[4] dated 14 May 2006, the petitioners denied the material allegations of
the complaint. They essentially claimed that: (1) they are the actual and prior possessors of the
disputed land; (2) on the contrary, the private respondents are the intruders; and (3) the private
respondents certificate of title to the disputed property is spurious. They asked for the dismissal
of the complaint and interposed a counterclaim for damages.

Page 5 of 76
 The MCTC, after due proceedings, rendered on 2 January 2007 a decision[5] in the private
respondents favor. It found prior possession the key issue in forcible entry cases - in the private
respondents favor, thus:

The key that could unravel the answer to this question lies in the Amended
Commissioners Report and Sketch found on pages 245 to 248 of the records and
the evidence the parties have submitted. It is shown in the Amended
Commissioners Report and Sketch that the land in question is enclosed by a
concrete and cyclone wire perimeter fence in pink and green highlighter as shown
in the Sketch Plan (p. 248). Said perimeter fence was constructed by the plaintiffs
14 years ago. The foregoing findings of the Commissioner in his report and sketch
collaborated the claim of the plaintiffs that after they acquired the land in question
on May 27, 1993 through a Deed of Sale (Annex A, Affidavit of
Gregorio Sanson, p. 276, rec.), they caused the construction of the perimeter fence
sometime in 1993 (Affidavit of Gregorio Sanson, pp. 271-275, rec.).

From the foregoing established facts, it could be safely inferred that the
plaintiffs were in actual physical possession of the whole lot in question since
1993 when it was interrupted by the defendants (sic) when on January 4, 2005
claiming to (sic) the Heirs of Antonio Tapuz entered a portion of the land in
question with view of inhabiting the same and building structures therein
prompting plaintiff Gregorio Sanson to confront them before BSPU, Police Chief
Inspector Jack L. Wanky and Barangay Captain Glenn Sacapao. As a result of
their confrontation, the parties signed an Agreement (Annex D, Complaint p. 20)
wherein they agreed to vacate the disputed portion of the land in question and
agreed not to build any structures thereon.

The foregoing is the prevailing situation of the parties after the incident of
January 4, 2005 when the plaintiff posted security guards, however, sometime on
or about 6:30 A.M. of April 19, 2006, the defendants some with bolos and one
carrying a sack suspected to contain firearms with other John Does numbering
about 120 persons by force and intimidation forcibly entered the premises along
the road and built a nipa and bamboo structure (Annex E, Complaint, p. 11) inside
the lot in question which incident was promptly reported to the proper authorities
as shown by plaintiffs Certification (Annex F, Complaint, p. 12) of the entry in
the police blotter and on same date April 19, 2006, the plaintiffs filed a complaint
with the Office of the Lupong
Tagapamayapa of Barangay Balabag, Boracay Island,Malay, Aklan but no
settlement was reached as shown in their Certificate to File Action (Annex G,
Complaint, p. 13); hence the present action.

Defendants (sic) contend in their answer that prior to January 4, 2005, they
were already occupants of the property, being indigenous settlers of the same,
under claim of ownership by open continuous, adverse possession to the exclusion
of other (sic). (Paragraph 4, Answer, p. 25).

The contention is untenable. As adverted earlier, the land in question is

enclosed by a perimeter fence constructed by the plaintiffs sometime in 1993 as
noted by the Commissioner in his Report and reflected in his Sketch, thus, it is
safe to conclude that the plaintiffs where (sic) in actual physical possession of the
land in question from 1993 up to April 19, 2006 when they were
ousted therefrom by the defendants by means of force. Applying by analogy the
ruling of the Honorable Supreme Court in the case of Molina, et al. vs. De Bacud,
19 SCRA 956, if the land were in the possession of plaintiffs from 1993 to April
19, 2006, defendants claims to an older possession must be rejected as untenable

Page 6 of 76
 because possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same time in two
different personalities.

Defendants likewise contend that it was the plaintiffs who forcibly entered
the land in question on April 18, 2006 at about 3:00 oclock in the afternoon as
shown in their Certification (Annex D, Defendants Position Paper, p. 135, rec.).

The contention is untenable for being inconsistent with their allegations

made to the commissioner who constituted (sic) the land in question that they
built structures on the land in question only on April 19, 2006 (Par. D.4,
Commissioners Amended Report, pp. 246 to 247), after there (sic) entry thereto
on even date.

Likewise, said contention is contradicted by the categorical statements of

defendants witnesses,Rowena Onag, Apolsida Umambong, Ariel Gac, Darwin
Alvarez and Edgardo Pinaranda, in their Joint Affidavit (pp. 143- 144, rec.) [sic]
categorically stated that on or about April 19, 2006, a group of armed men entered
the property of our said neighbors and built plastic roofed tents. These armed men
threatened to drive our said neighbors away from their homes but they refused to
leave and resisted the intruding armed men.

From the foregoing, it could be safely inferred that no incident of forcible

entry happened on April 18, 2006 but it was only on April 19, 2006 when the
defendants overpowered by their numbers the security guards posted by the
plaintiffs prior to the controversy.

Likewise, defendants (sic) alleged burnt and other structures depicted in

their pictures attached as annexes to their position paper were not noted and
reflected in the amended report and sketch submitted by the Commissioner,
hence, it could be safely inferred that these structures are built and (sic) situated
outside the premises of the land in question, accordingly, they are irrelevant to the
instant case and cannot be considered as evidence of their actual possession of the
land in question prior to April 19, 2006[6].

The petitioners appealed the MCTC decision to the Regional Trial Court (RTC, Branch 6
of Kalibo, Aklan) then presided over by Judge Niovady M. Marin (Judge Marin).

On appeal, Judge Marin granted the private respondents motion for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction through an Order dated 26 February 2007, with the issuance
conditioned on the private respondents posting of a bond. The writ [7] authorizing the immediate
implementation of the MCTC decision was actually issued by respondent Judge Elmo
F. del Rosario (the respondent Judge) on 12 March 2007 after the private respondents had
complied with the imposed condition. The petitioners moved to reconsider the issuance of the
writ; the private respondents, on the other hand, filed a motion for demolition.

The respondent Judge subsequently denied the petitioners Motion for Reconsideration
and to Defer Enforcement of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction in an Order dated 17 May
2007[8].

Meanwhile, the petitioners opposed the motion for demolition.[9] The respondent Judge
nevertheless issued via a Special Order[10] a writ of demolition to be implemented fifteen (15)

Page 7 of 76
days after the Sheriffs written notice to the petitioners to voluntarily demolish their house/s to
allow the private respondents to effectively take actual possession of the land.

The petitioners thereafter filed on 2 August 2007 with the Court of Appeals, Cebu City, a
Petition for Review[11] (under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) of the Permanent
Mandatory Injunction and Order of Demolition of the RTC of Kalibo, Br. 6 in Civil Case No.
7990.

Meanwhile, respondent Sheriff Nelson R. dela Cruz issued the Notice to Vacate and for
Demolition on 19 March 2008.[12]

It was against this factual backdrop that the petitioners filed the present petition last 29
April 2008. The petition contains and prays for three remedies, namely: a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court; the issuance of a writ of habeas data under the Rule
on the Writ of Habeas Data; and finally, the issuance of the writ of amparo under the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo.

To support the petition and the remedies prayed for, the petitioners present factual
positions diametrically opposed to the MCTCs findings and legal reasons. Most importantly, the
petitioners maintain their claims of prior possession of the disputed land and of intrusion into
this land by the private respondents. The material factual allegations of the petition bases as well
of the petition for the issuance of the writ of Amparo read:
29. On April 29, 2006 at about 9:20 a.m. armed men sporting 12 gauge shot
guns intruded into the property of the defendants [the land in dispute]. They
were not in uniform. They fired their shotguns at the defendants. Later the
following day at 2:00 a.m. two houses of the defendants were burned to ashes.

30. These armed men [without uniforms] removed the barbed wire fence put up
by defendants to protect their property from intruders. Two of the armed men
trained their shotguns at the defendants who resisted their intrusion. One of them
who was identified as SAMUEL LONGNO y GEGANSO, 19 years old, single,
and a resident of Binun-an, Batad, Iloilo, fired twice.

31. The armed men torched two houses of the defendants reducing them to
ashes. [...]

32. These acts of TERRORISM and (heinous crime) of ARSON were

reported by one of the HEIRS OF ANTONIO TAPUZ [...]. The terrorists
trained their shotguns and fired at minors namely IVAN GAJISAN and
MICHAEL MAGBANUA, who resisted their intrusion. Their act is a blatant
violation of the law penalizing Acts of Violence against women and children,
which is aggravated by the use of high-powered weapons.

[]

34. That the threats to the life and security of the poor indigent and
unlettered petitioners continue because the private respondents Sansons have
under their employ armed men and they are influential with the police authorities
owing to their financial and political clout.

Page 8 of 76
 35. The actual prior occupancy, as well as the ownership of the lot in
dispute by defendants and the atrocities of the terrorists [introduced into the
property in dispute by the plaintiffs] are attested by witnesses who are persons not
related to the defendants are therefore disinterested witnesses in the case namely:
Rowena Onag, Apolsida Umambong, Ariel Gac, Darwin Alvarez
and Edgardo Penarada. Likewise, the affidavit of Nemia T. Carmen is submitted
to prove that the plaintiffs resorted to atrocious acts through hired men in their bid
to unjustly evict the defendants.[13]
The petitioners posit as well that the MCTC has no jurisdiction over the complaint for forcible
entry that the private respondents filed below. Citing Section 33 of The Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1980, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691,[14] they maintain that the forcible entry case
in fact involves issues of title to or possession of real property or an interest therein, with the
assessed value of the property involved exceeding P20,000.00; thus, the case should be originally
cognizable by the RTC. Accordingly, the petitioners reason out that the RTC - to where the
MCTC decision was appealed equally has no jurisdiction to rule on the case on appeal and could
not have validly issued the assailed orders.

OUR RULING
We find the petitions for certiorari and issuance of a writ of habeas data fatally defective,
both in substance and in form. The petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo, on the
other hand, is fatally defective with respect to content and substance.

The Petition for Certiorari

We conclude, based on the outlined material antecedents that led to the petition, that the petition
for certiorari to nullify the assailed RTC orders has been filed out of time. It is not lost on us that
the petitioners have a pending petition with the Court of Appeals (the CA petition) for the review
of the same RTC orders now assailed in the present petition, although the petitioners never
disclosed in the body of the present petition the exact status of their pending CA petition. The
CA petition, however, was filed with the Court of Appeals on 2 August 2007, which indicates to
us that the assailed orders (or at the very least, the latest of the interrelated assailed orders) were
received on 1 August 2007 at the latest. The present petition, on the other hand, was filed
on April 29, 2008 or more than eight months from the time the CA petition was filed. Thus, the
present petition is separated in point of time from the assumed receipt of the assailed RTC orders
by at least eight (8) months, i.e., beyond the reglementary period of sixty (60) days[15] from
receipt of the assailed order or orders or from notice of the denial of a seasonably filed motion
for reconsideration.

We note in this regard that the petitioners counsel stated in his attached Certificate of
Compliance with Circular #1-88 of the Supreme Court[16] (Certificate of Compliance) that in the
meantime the RTC and the Sheriff issued a NOTICE TO VACATE AND FOR DEMOLITION not
served to counsel but to the petitioners who sent photo copy of the same NOTICE to their
counsel on April 18, 2008 by LBC. To guard against any insidious argument that the present
petition is timely filed because of this Notice to Vacate, we feel it best to declare now that the
counting of the 60-day reglementary period under Rule 65 cannot start from the April 18,
2008 date cited by the petitioners counsel. The Notice to Vacate and for Demolition is not an
order that exists independently from the RTC orders assailed in this petition and in the
previously filed CA petition. It is merely a notice, made in compliance with one of the assailed
orders, and is thus an administrative enforcement medium that has no life of its own separately
from the assailed order on which it is based. It cannot therefore be the appropriate subject of an
independent petition for certiorari under Rule 65 in the context of this case. The April 18,
2008 date cannot likewise be the material date for Rule 65 purposes as the above-mentioned
Notice to Vacate is not even directly assailed in this petition, as the petitions Prayer patently
shows.[17]

Page 9 of 76
 Based on the same material antecedents, we find too that the petitioners have been guilty
of willful and deliberate misrepresentation before this Court and, at the very least, of forum
shopping.

By the petitioners own admissions, they filed a petition with the Court of Appeals (docketed as
CA G.R. SP No. 02859) for the review of the orders now also assailed in this petition, but
brought the present recourse to us, allegedly because the CA did not act on the petition up to this
date and for the petitioner (sic) to seek relief in the CA would be a waste of time and would
render the case moot and academic since the CA refused to
resolve pending urgent motions and the Sheriff is determined to enforce a writ of demolition
despite the defect of LACK OF JURISDICTION.[18]

Interestingly, the petitioners counsel - while making this claim in the body of the petition - at the
same time represented in his Certificate of Compliance[19] that:
xxx

(e) the petitioners went up to the Court of Appeals to question the WRIT OF
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION copy of the petition is attached (sic);

(f) the CA initially issued a resolution denying the PETITION because it held
that the ORDER TO VACATE AND FOR DEMOLITION OF THE
HOMES OF PETITIONERS is not capable of being the subject of a
PETITION FOR RELIEF, copy of the resolution of the CA is attached
hereto; (underscoring supplied)

(g) Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on August 7, 2007 but up to this
date the same had not been resolved copy of the MR is attached (sic).

xxx

The difference between the above representations on what transpired at the appellate court level
is replete with significance regarding the petitioners intentions. We discern -- from the
petitioners act of misrepresenting in the body of their petition that the CA did not act on the
petition up to this date while stating the real Court of Appeals action in the Certification of
Compliance -- the intent to hide the real state of the remedies the petitioners sought below in
order to mislead us into action on the RTC orders without frontally considering the action that
the Court of Appeals had already undertaken.

At the very least, the petitioners are obviously seeking to obtain from us, via the present petition,
the same relief that it could not wait for from the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
02859. The petitioners act of seeking against the same parties the nullification of the same RTC
orders before the appellate court and before us at the same time, although made through different
mediums that are both improperly used, constitutes willful and deliberate forum shopping that
can sufficiently serve as basis for the summary dismissal of the petition under the combined
application of the fourth and penultimate paragraphs of Section 3, Rule 46; Section 5, Rule 7;
Section 1, Rule 65; and Rule 56, all of the Revised Rules of Court. That a wrong remedy may
have been used with the Court of Appeals and possibly with us will not save the petitioner from a
forum-shopping violation where there is identity of parties, involving the same assailed
interlocutory orders, with the recourses existing side by side at the same time.

To restate the prevailing rules, forum shopping is the institution of two or more actions or
proceedings involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or

Page 10 of 76
successively, on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable
disposition. Forum shopping may be resorted to by any party against whom an adverse judgment
or order has been issued in one forum, in an attempt to seek a favorable opinion in another, other
than by appeal or a special civil action for certiorari. Forum shopping trifles with the courts,
abuses their processes, degrades the administration of justice and congest court dockets. Willful
and deliberate violation of the rule against it is a ground for summary dismissal of the case; it
may also constitute direct contempt.[20]

Additionally, the required verification and certification of non-forum shopping is defective as

one (1) of the seven (7) petitioners - Ivan Tapuz - did not sign, in violation of Sections 4 and 5 of
Rule 7; Section 3, Rule 46; Section 1, Rule 65; all in relation with Rule 56 of the Revised Rules
of Court. Of those who signed, only five (5) exhibited their postal identification cards with the
Notary Public.

In any event, we find the present petition for certiorari, on its face and on the basis of the
supporting attachments, to be devoid of merit. The MCTC correctly assumed jurisdiction over
the private respondents complaint, which specifically alleged a cause for forcible entry and not
as petitioners may have misread or misappreciated a case involving title to or possession of
realty or an interest therein. Under Section 33, par. 2 of The Judiciary Reorganization Act, as
amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691, exclusive jurisdiction over forcible entry and
unlawful detainer cases lies with the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. These first-level courts have had jurisdiction over these cases
called accion interdictal even before the R.A. 7691 amendment, based on the issue of
pure physical possession (as opposed to the right of possession). This jurisdiction is regardless of
the assessed value of the property involved; the law established no distinctions based on the
assessed value of the property forced into or unlawfully detained. Separately
from accion interdictal are accion publiciana for the recovery of the right of possession as a
plenary action, and accion reivindicacion for the recovery of ownership.[21] Apparently, these
latter actions are the ones the petitioners refer to when they cite Section 33, par. 3, in relation
with Section 19, par. 2 of The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by Republic
Act No. 7691, in which jurisdiction may either be with the first-level courts or the regional trial
courts, dependingon the assessed value of the realty subject of the litigation. As the complaint at
the MCTC was patently for forcible entry, that court committed no jurisdictional error correctible
by certiorari under the present petition.

In sum, the petition for certiorari should be dismissed for the cited formal deficiencies, for
violation of the non-forum shopping rule, for having been filed out of time, and for
substantive deficiencies.

The Writ of Amparo

To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to
the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the
perceived lack of available and effective remedies to address these extraordinary concerns. It is
intended to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an
extraordinary and independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a
remedy supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are
purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and
uncertain grounds. Consequently, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo in line with the
extraordinary character of the writ and the reasonable certainty that its issuance demands

Page 11 of 76
requires that every petition for the issuance of the Pwrit must be supported by justifying
allegations of fact, to wit:

(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner;

(b) The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible

for the threat, act or omission, or, if the name is unknown or uncertain, the
respondent may be described by an assumed appellation;

(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated
or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent,
and how such threat or violation is committed with the attendant circumstances
detailed in supporting affidavits;

(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal

circumstances, and addresses of the investigating authority or individuals, as
well as the manner and conduct of the investigation, together with any report;

(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate
or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible
for the threat, act or omission; and

(f) The relief prayed for.

The petition may include a general prayer for other just and
equitable reliefs.[22]

The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima facie existence of the
ultimate facts determinable from the supporting affidavits that detail the circumstances of how
and to what extent a threat to or violation of the rights to life, liberty and security of the
aggrieved party was or is being committed.
The issuance of the writ of amparo in the present case is anchored on the factual allegations
heretofore quoted,[23] that are essentially repeated in paragraph 54 of the petition.These
allegations are supported by the following documents:
(a) Joint Affidavit dated 23 May 2006 of Rowena B. Onag, Apolsida Umambong,
Ariel Gac, Darwin Alvarez and Edgardo Pinaranda, supporting the factual
positions of the petitioners, id., petitioners prior possession, private respondents
intrusion and the illegal acts committed by the private respondents and their
security guards on 19 April 2006;
(b) Unsubscribed Affidavit of Nemia Carmen y Tapuz, alleging the illegal acts
(firing of guns, etc.) committed by a security guard against minors descendants of
Antonio Tapuz;

(c) Unsubscribed Affidavit of Melanie Tapuz y Samindao, essentially

corroborating Nemias affidavit;

(d) Certification dated 23 April 2006 issued by Police Officer

Jackson Jauod regarding the incident of petitioners intrusion into the disputed
land;

(e) Certification dated 27 April 2006 issued by Police Officer Allan R. Otis,
narrating the altercation between the Tapuz family and the security guards of the
private respondents, including the gun-poking and shooting incident involving
one of the security guards;

Page 12 of 76
(f) Certification issued by Police Officer Christopher R. Mendoza, narrating that a house
owned by Josiel Tapuz, Jr., rented by a certain Jorge Buenavente,
was accidentally burned by a fire.

On the whole, what is clear from these statements - both sworn and unsworn - is the overriding
involvement of property issues as the petition traces its roots to questions of physical possession
of the property disputed by the private parties. If at all, issues relating to the right to life or to
liberty can hardly be discerned except to the extent that the occurrence of past violence has been
alleged. The right to security, on the other hand, is alleged only to the extent of the threats and
harassments implied from the presence of armed men bare to the waist and the alleged pointing
and firing of weapons. Notably, none of the supporting affidavits compellingly show that the
threat to the rights to life, liberty and security of the petitioners is imminent or is
continuing.

A closer look at the statements shows that at least two of them the statements
of Nemia Carreon y Tapuz and Melanie Tapuz are practically identical and unsworn. The
Certification by Police Officer Jackson Jauod, on the other hand, simply narrates what had been
reported by one Danny Tapuz y Masangkay, and even mentions that the burning of two
residential houses was accidental.

As against these allegations are the cited MCTC factual findings in its decision in the forcible
entry case which rejected all the petitioners factual claims. These findings are significantly
complete and detailed, as they were made under a full-blown judicial process, i.e., after
examination and evaluation of the contending parties positions, evidence and arguments and
based on the report of a court-appointed commissioner.

We preliminarily examine these conflicting factual positions under the backdrop of a dispute
(with incidents giving rise to allegations of violence or threat thereof) that was brought to
and ruled upon by the MCTC; subsequently brought to the RTC on an appeal that is still
pending; still much later brought to the appellate court without conclusive results; and then
brought to us on interlocutory incidents involving a plea for the issuance of the writ
of amparo that, if decided as the petitioners advocate, may render the pending RTC appeal moot.

Under these legal and factual situations, we are far from satisfied with the prima facie existence
of the ultimate facts that would justify the issuance of a writ of amparo. Rather than acts of
terrorism that pose a continuing threat to the persons of the petitioners, the violent incidents
alleged appear to us to be purely property-related and focused on the disputed land. Thus, if the
petitioners wish to seek redress and hold the alleged perpetrators criminally accountable, the
remedy may lie more in the realm of ordinary criminal prosecution rather than on the use of the
extraordinary remedy of the writ of amparo.

Nor do we believe it appropriate at this time to disturb the MCTC findings, as our action may
carry the unintended effect, not only of reversing the MCTC ruling independently of the appeal
to the RTC that is now in place, but also of nullifying the ongoing appeal process. Such effect,
though unintended, will obviously wreak havoc on the orderly administration of justice, an
overriding goal that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo does not intend to weaken or negate.
Separately from these considerations, we cannot fail but consider too at this point the indicators,
clear and patent to us, that the petitioners present recourse via the remedy of the writ
of amparo is a mere subterfuge to negate the assailed orders that the petitioners sought and failed
to nullify before the appellate court because of the use of an improper remedial measure. We
discern this from the petitioners misrepresentations pointed out above; from their obvious act of
forum shopping; and from the recourse itself to the extraordinary remedies of the writs of
certiorari and amparo based on grounds that are far from forthright and sufficiently
Page 13 of 76
compelling. To be sure, when recourses in the ordinary course of law fail because of deficient
legal representation or the use of improper remedial measures, neither the writ of certiorari nor
that of amparo - extraordinary though they may be - will suffice to serve as a curative
substitute. The writ of amparo, particularly, should not issue when applied for as a substitute for
the appeal or certiorari process, or when it will inordinately interfere with these processes the
situation obtaining in the present case.

While we say all these, we note too that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides for rules on the
institution of separate actions,[24] for the effect of earlier-filed criminal actions,[25] and for the
consolidation of petitions for the issuance of a writ of amparo with a subsequently filed criminal
and civil action.[26] These rules were adopted to promote an orderly procedure for dealing with
petitions for the issuance of the writ of amparo when the parties resort to other parallel recourses.
Where, as in this case, there is an ongoing civil process dealing directly with
the possessory dispute and the reported acts of violence and harassment, we see no point in
separately and directly intervening through a writ of amparo in the absence of any clear prima
facie showing that the right to life, liberty or security the personal concern that the writ is
intended to protect - is immediately in danger or threatened, or that the danger or threat is
continuing. We see no legal bar, however, to an application for the issuance of the writ, in a
proper case, by motion in a pending case on appeal or on certiorari, applying by analogy the
provisions on the co-existence of the writ with a separately filed criminal case.

The Writ of Habeas Data

Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data requires the following material
allegations of ultimate facts in a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data:

(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the respondent;

(b) The manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects
the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party;

(c) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to secure the data or
information;

(d) The location of the files, registers or databases, the government office, and
the person in charge, in possession or in control of the data or information, if
known;

(e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the updating, rectification,
suppression or destruction of the database or information or files kept by the
respondent.

In case of threats, the relief may include a prayer for an order enjoining the act
complained of; and

(f) Such other relevant reliefs as are just and equitable.

Support for the habeas data aspect of the present petition only alleges that:

1. [ ] Similarly, a petition for a WRIT OF HABEAS DATA is prayed for

so that the PNP may release the report on the burning of the homes of the
petitioners and the acts of violence employed against them by the private
respondents, furnishing the Court and the petitioners with copy of the same;

Page 14 of 76
 []

66. Petitioners apply for a WRIT OF HABEAS DATA commanding the

Philippine National Police [PNP] to produce the police report pertaining to the
burning of the houses of the petitioners in the land in dispute and likewise the
investigation report if an investigation was conducted by the PNP.

These allegations obviously lack what the Rule on Writ of Habeas Data requires as a
minimum, thus rendering the petition fatally deficient. Specifically, we see no concrete
allegations of unjustified or unlawful violation of the right to privacy related to the right to life,
liberty or security. The petition likewise has not alleged, much less demonstrated, any need for
information under the control of police authorities other than those it has already set forth as
integral annexes. The necessity or justification for the issuance of the writ, based on the
insufficiency of previous efforts made to secure information, has not also been shown. In sum,
the prayer for the issuance of a writ of habeas data is nothing more than the fishing
expedition that this Court - in the course of drafting the Rule on habeas data - had in mind in
defining what the purpose of a writ of habeas data is not. In these lights, the outright denial of
the petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas data is fully in order.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DISMISS the present

petition OUTRIGHT for deficiencies of form and substance patent from its body and
attachments.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

P/SUPT. FELIXBERTO CASTILLO, POLICE OFFICERS ROMEO BAGTAS,

RUPERTO BORLONGAN, EDMUNDO DIONISIO, RONNIE MORALES, ARNOLD
TRIA, and GILBERTO PUNZALAN, ENGR. RICASOL P. MILLAN, ENGR.
REDENTOR S. DELA CRUZ, MR. ANASTACIO L. BORLONGAN, MR. ARTEMIO
ESGUERRA, TISOY, and JOHN DOES,
Petitioners, - versus - DR. AMANDA T. CRUZ, NIXON T. CRUZ, and
FERDINAND T. CRUZ, Respondents. G.R. No. 182165 Promulgated:
November 25, 2009

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.

Petitioners[1], employees and members of the local police force of the City Government of
Malolos, challenge the March 28, 2008 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos,
Branch 10 in a petition for issuance of writs of amparo and habeas data instituted by
respondents.

The factual antecedents.

Page 15 of 76
 Respondent Amanda Cruz (Amanda) who, along with her husband Francisco G. Cruz (Spouses
Cruz), leased a parcel of land situated at Barrio Guinhawa, Malolos (the property), refused to
vacate the property, despite demands by the lessor Provincial Government of Bulacan (the
Province) which intended to utilize it for local projects.

The Province thus filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against the Spouses Cruz before the
then Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Bulacan, Bulacan.

By Decision of September 5, 1997, the MTC rendered judgment against the Spouses Cruz,
which judgment, following its affirmance by the RTC, became final and executory.

The finality of the decision in the ejectment case notwithstanding, the spouses Cruz refused to
vacate the property. They thereupon filed cases against the Province[2] and the judges who
presided over the case.[3] Those cases were dismissed except their petition for annulment of
judgment lodged before Branch 18 of the RTC of Malolos, and a civil case for injunction 833-M-
2004 lodged before Branch 10 of the same RTC Malolos.

The Spouses Cruz sought in the case for injunction the issuance of a permanent writ of injunction
to prevent the execution of the final and executory judgment against them.

By Order of July 19, 2005, the RTC, finding merit in the Spouses Cruzes allegation that
subsequent events changed the situation of the parties to justify a suspension of the execution of
the final and executory judgment, issued a permanent writ of injunction, the dispositive portion
of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated August
10, 2004 is hereby GRANTED. Order dated August 10, 2004 is
hereby RECONSIDEREDand SET ASIDE. Further, the verified petition dated November 05,
2002 are hereby REINSTATED and MADE PERMANENT until the MTC-Bulacan, Bulacan
finally resolves the pending motions of petitioners with the same determines the metes and
bounds of 400 sq. meters leased premises subject matter of this case with immediate dispatch.
Accordingly, REMAND the determination of the issues raised by the petitioners on the issued
writ of demolition to the MTC of Bulacan, Bulacan.

SO ORDERED.[4] (Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)

Finding that the fallo of the RTC July 19, 2005 Order treats, as a suspensive condition for the
lifting of the permanent injunction, the determination of the boundaries of the property, the
Province returned the issue for the consideration of the MTC. In a Geodetic Engineers Report
submitted to the MTC on August 31, 2007, the metes and bounds of the property were indicated.

The MTC, by Order of January 2, 2008, approved the Report and ruled that the permanent
injunction which the RTC issued is ineffective. On motion of the Province, the MTC, by Order
of January 21, 2008, thus issued a Second Alias Writ of Demolition.

On receiving notice of the January 2, 2008 MTC Order, the Spouses Cruz filed a motion before
Branch 10 of the RTC for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) which it set for
hearing on January 25, 2008 on which date, however, the demolition had, earlier in the day, been
implemented. Such notwithstanding, the RTC issued a TRO.[5] The Spouses Cruz, along with
their sons-respondents Nixon and Ferdinand, thereupon entered the property, placed several
container vans and purportedly represented themselves as owners of the property which was for
lease.

On February 21, 2008, petitioners Police Superintendent Felixberto Castillo et al., who were
deployed by the City Mayor in compliance with a memorandum issued by Governor Joselito R.
Mendoza instructing him to protect, secure and maintain the possession of the property, entered
the property.

Page 16 of 76
 Amanda and her co-respondents refused to turn over the property, however. Insisting that the
RTC July 19, 2005 Order of Permanent Injunction enjoined the Province from repossessing it,
they shoved petitioners, forcing the latter to arrest them and cause their indictment for direct
assault, trespassing and other forms of light threats.

Respondents later filed on March 3, 2008 a Respectful Motion-Petition for Writ of Amparo and
Habeas Data, docketed as Special Civil Action No. 53-M-2008, which was coincidentally raffled
to Branch 10 of the RTC Malolos.

Respondents averred that despite the Permanent Injunction, petitioners unlawfully entered the
property with the use of heavy equipment, tore down the barbed wire fences and tents,[6] and
arrested them when they resisted petitioners entry; and that as early as in the evening of February
20, 2008, members of the Philippine National Police had already camped in front of the property.

On the basis of respondents allegations in their petition and the supporting affidavits, the RTC,
by Order of March 4, 2008, issued writs of amparo and habeas data.[7]

The RTC, crediting respondents version in this wise:

Petitioners have shown by preponderant evidence that the facts and circumstances of the alleged
offenses examined into on Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data that there have been an on-going
hearings on the verified Petition for Contempt, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 306-M-
2006, before this Court for alleged violation by the respondents of the Preliminary Injunction
Order dated July 16, 2005 [sic] in Sp. Civil Action No. 833-M-2002, hearings were held on
January 25, 2008, February 12 and 19, 2008, where the respondents prayed for an April 22, 2008
continuance, however, in the pitch darkness of February 20, 2008, police officers, some
personnel from the Engineering department, and some civilians proceeded purposely to the
Pinoy Compound, converged therein and with continuing threats of bodily harm and danger and
stone-throwing of the roofs of the homes thereat from voices around its premises, on a pretext of
an ordinary police operation when enterviewed [sic] by the media then present, but at 8:00 a.m.
to late in the afternoon of February 21, 2008, zoomed in on the petitioners, subjecting them to
bodily harm, mental torture, degradation, and the debasement of a human being, reminiscent of
the martial law police brutality, sending chill in any ordinary citizen,[8]

rendered judgment, by Decision of March 28, 2008, in favor of respondents, disposing as

follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commitment Orders and waivers in Crim. Cases Nos.
08-77 for Direct assault; Crim. Case No. 08-77 for Other Forms of Trespass; and Crim. Case No.
08-78 for Light Threats are hereby DECLARED illegal, null and void, as petitioners were
deprived of their substantial rights, induced by duress or a well-founded fear of personal
violence. Accordingly, the commitment orders and waivers are hereby SET ASIDE. The
temporary release of the petitioners is declared ABSOLUTE.

Without any pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.[9] (Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)

Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari, pursuant to Section 19 [10] of The Rule on the
Writ of Amparo (A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC),[11] which is essentially reproduced in the Rule on the
Writ of Habeas Data (A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC).[12]

In the main, petitioners fault the RTC for

giving due course and issuing writs of amparo and habeas data when from the allegations of the
petition, the same ought not to have been issued as (1) the petition in [sic] insufficient in
substance as the same involves property rights; and (2) criminal cases had already been filed and

Page 17 of 76
pending with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 1, City of Malolos. (Underscoring
supplied)

The petition is impressed with merit.

The Court is, under the Constitution, empowered to promulgate rules for the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights.[13] In view of the heightening prevalence of extrajudicial
killings and enforced disappearances, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo was issued and took effect
on October 24, 2007 which coincided with the celebration of United Nations Day and affirmed
the Courts commitment towards internationalization of human rights. More than three months
later or on February 2, 2008, the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data was promulgated.

Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides:

Section 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose
right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ shall
cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:

Section 1. Habeas Data. The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right
to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a
public official or employee or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering,
collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and
correspondence of the aggrieved party. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

From the above-quoted provisions, the coverage of the writs is limited to the protection of rights
to life, liberty and security. And the writs cover not only actual but also threats of unlawful acts
or omissions.

Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo[14] teaches:

As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances, its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to
threats thereof. Extralegal killings are killings committed without due process of law, i.e.,
without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings. On the other hand, enforced disappearances are
attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a
government official or organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect
acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of
the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such
persons outside the protection of law.[15] (Underscoring supplied, citations omitted)

To thus be covered by the privilege of the writs, respondents must meet the threshold
requirement that their right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with an unlawful
act or omission. Evidently, the present controversy arose out of a property dispute between the
Provincial Government and respondents. Absent any considerable nexus between the acts
complained of and its effect on respondents right to life, liberty and security, the Court will not
delve on the propriety of petitioners entry into the property.

Apropos is the Courts ruling in Tapuz v. Del Rosario:[16]

To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the
extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived
lack of available and effective remedies to address these extraordinary concerns. It is intended
to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and

Page 18 of 76
independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy
supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property
or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain
grounds. Consequently, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo in line with the extraordinary character
of the writ and the reasonable certainty that its issuance demands requires that every petition for
the issuance of the writ must be supported by justifying allegations of fact, to wit:

xxxx

The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima facie existence of the
ultimate facts determinable from the supporting affidavits that detail the circumstances of how
and to what extent a threat to or violation of the rights to life, liberty and security of the
aggrieved party was or is being committed.[17] (Emphasis and italics in the original, citation
omitted)

Tapuz also arose out of a property dispute, albeit between private individuals, with the
petitioners therein branding as acts of terrorism the therein respondents alleged entry into the
disputed land with armed men in tow. The Court therein held:

On the whole, what is clear from these statements both sworn and unsworn is the overriding
involvement of property issues as the petition traces its roots to questions of physical possession
of the property disputed by the private parties. If at all, issues relating to the right to life or to
liberty can hardly be discerned except to the extent that the occurrence of past violence has been
alleged. The right to security, on the other hand, is alleged only to the extent of the treats and
harassments implied from the presence of armed men bare to the waist and the alleged pointing
and firing of weapons. Notably, none of the supporting affidavits compellingly show that the
threat to the rights to life, liberty and security of the petitioners is imminent or
continuing.[18] (Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)

It bears emphasis that respondents petition did not show any actual violation, imminent or
continuing threat to their life, liberty and security. Bare allegations that petitioners in unison,
conspiracy and in contempt of court, there and then willfully, forcibly and feloniously with the
use of force and intimidation entered and forcibly, physically manhandled the petitioners
(respondents) and arrested the herein petitioners (respondents)[19] will not suffice to prove
entitlement to the remedy of the writ of amparo. No undue confinement or detention was
present. In fact, respondents were even able to post bail for the offenses a day after their
arrest.[20]

Although respondents release from confinement does not necessarily hinder supplication for the
writ of amparo, absent any evidence or even an allegation in the petition that there is undue and
continuing restraint on their liberty, and/or that there exists threat or intimidation that destroys
the efficacy of their right to be secure in their persons, the issuance of the writ cannot be
justified.

That respondents are merely seeking the protection of their property rights is gathered from their
Joint Affidavit, viz:

xxxx

11. Kami ay humarang at humiga sa harap ng mga heavy equipment na hawak hawak ang
nasabing kautusan ng RTC Branch 10 (PERMANENT INJUNCTION at RTC ORDERS
DATED February 12, 17 at 19 2008) upang ipaglaban ang dignidad ng kautusan ng korte,
ipaglaban ang prinsipyo ng SELF-HELP at batas ukol sa PROPERTY RIGHTS, Wala kaming
nagawa ipagtanggol ang aming karapatan sa lupa na 45 years naming IN
POSSESSION. (Underscoring supplied)

Page 19 of 76
Oddly, respondents also seek the issuance of a writ of habeas data when it is not even alleged
that petitioners are gathering, collecting or storing data or information regarding their person,
family, home and correspondence.

As for respondents assertion of past incidents[21] wherein the Province allegedly violated the
Permanent Injunction order, these incidents were already raised in the injunction proceedings on
account of which respondents filed a case for criminal contempt against petitioners.[22]

Before the filing of the petition for writs of amparo and habeas data, or on February 22, 2008,
petitioners even instituted a petition for habeas corpus which was considered moot and academic
by Branch 14 of the Malolos RTC and was accordingly denied by Order of April 8, 2008.

More. Respondent Amanda and one of her sons, Francisco Jr., likewise filed a petition for writs
of amparo and habeas data before the Sandiganbayan, they alleging the commission of
continuing threats by petitioners after the issuance of the writs by the RTC, which petition
was dismissed for insufficiency and forum shopping.

It thus appears that respondents are not without recourse and have in fact taken full advantage of
the legal system with the filing of civil, criminal and administrative charges.[23]

It need not be underlined that respondents petitions for writs of amparo and habeas data are
extraordinary remedies which cannot be used as tools to stall the execution of a final and
executory decision in a property dispute.

AT ALL EVENTS, respondents filing of the petitions for writs of amparo and habeas
data should have been barred, for criminal proceedings against them had commenced after they
were arrested in flagrante delicto and proceeded against in accordance with Section 6, Rule
112[24] of the Rules of Court. Validity of the arrest or the proceedings conducted thereafter is a
defense that may be set up by respondents during trial and not before a petition for writs
of amparo and habeas data. The reliefs afforded by the writs may, however, be made available
to the aggrieved party by motion in the criminal proceedings.[25]

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged March 4, 2008 Order of Branch 10
of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos is DECLARED NULL AND VOID, and its March 28,
2008 Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Special Civil Action No. 53-M-2008 is
DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

Page 20 of 76
 EN BANC

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, ALEXANDER S. DEYTO and RUBEN A.

SAPITULA, Petitioners, versus ROSARIO GOPEZ LIM,Respondent. G.R. No.
184769 Promulgated: October 5, 2010

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

The Court is once again confronted with an opportunity to define the evolving metes and
bounds of the writ of habeas data. May an employee invoke the remedies available under such
writ where an employer decides to transfer her workplace on the basis of copies of an
anonymous letter posted therein imputing to her disloyalty to the company and calling for her
to leave, which imputation it investigated but fails to inform her of the details thereof?

Rosario G. Lim (respondent), also known as Cherry Lim, is an administrative clerk at the
Manila Electric Company (MERALCO).

On June 4, 2008, an anonymous letter was posted at the door of the Metering Office of the
Administration building of MERALCO Plaridel, Bulacan Sector, at which respondent is
assigned, denouncing respondent. The letter reads:

Cherry Lim:

MATAPOS MONG LAMUNIN LAHAT NG BIYAYA NG

MERALCO, NGAYON NAMAN AY GUSTO MONG PALAMON
ANG BUONG KUMPANYA SA MGA BUWAYA NG GOBYERNO.
KAPAL NG MUKHA MO, LUMAYAS KA RITO, WALANG
UTANG NA LOOB.[1]

Copies of the letter were also inserted in the lockers of MERALCO linesmen. Informed about it,
respondent reported the matter on June 5, 2008 to the Plaridel Station of the Philippine National
Police.[2]

By Memorandum[3] dated July 4, 2008, petitioner Alexander Deyto, Head of

MERALCOs Human Resource Staffing, directed the transfer of respondent to MERALCOs
Alabang Sector in Muntinlupa as A/F OTMS Clerk, effective July 18, 2008 in light of the receipt
of reports that there were accusations and threats directed against [her] from unknown
individuals and which could possibly compromise [her] safety and security.

Respondent, by letter of July 10, 2008 addressed to petitioner Ruben A. Sapitula, Vice-
President and Head of MERALCOs Human Resource Administration, appealed her transfer and
requested for a dialogue so she could voice her concerns and misgivings on the matter, claiming
that the punitive nature of the transfer amounted to a denial of due process. Citing the grueling
travel from her residence in Pampanga to Alabang and back entails, and violation of the

Page 21 of 76
provisions on job security of their Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), respondent
expressed her thoughts on the alleged threats to her security in this wise:

xxxx
I feel that it would have been better . . . if you could have intimated to
me the nature of the alleged accusations and threats so that at least I could have
found out if these are credible or even serious. But as you stated, these came
from unknown individuals and the way they were handled, it appears that the
veracity of these accusations and threats to be [sic]
highly suspicious, doubtful or are just mere jokes if they existed at all.

Assuming for the sake of argument only, that the alleged threats exist
as the management apparently believe, then my transfer to an unfamiliar place
and environment which will make me a sitting duck so to speak, seems
to betray the real intent of management which is contrary to its expressed
concern on my security and safety . . . Thus, it made me think twice on the
rationale for managements initiated transfer. Reflecting further, it appears to
me that instead of the management supposedly extending favor to me, the net
result and effect of management action would be a punitive one.[4] (emphasis
and underscoring supplied)

Respondent thus requested for the deferment of the implementation of her transfer
pending resolution of the issues she raised.

No response to her request having been received, respondent filed a petition[5] for the
issuance of a writ of habeas data against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Bulacan, docketed as SP. Proc. No. 213-M-2008.

By respondents allegation, petitioners unlawful act and omission consisting of their

continued failure and refusal to provide her with details or information about the alleged report
which MERALCO purportedly received concerning threats to her safety and security amount to
a violation of her right to privacy in life, liberty and security, correctible by habeas
data. Respondent thus prayed for the issuance of a writ commanding petitioners to file a written
return containing the following:

a) a full disclosure of the data or information about respondent in relation to the

report purportedly received by petitioners on the alleged threat to her
safety and security; the nature of such data and the purpose for its
collection;

b) the measures taken by petitioners to ensure the confidentiality of such data or

information; and

c) the currency and accuracy of such data or information obtained.

Additionally, respondent prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order

(TRO) enjoining petitioners from effecting her transfer to the MERALCO Alabang Sector.

Page 22 of 76
By Order[6] of August 29, 2008, Branch 7 of the Bulacan RTC directed petitioners to file their
verified written return. And by Order of September 5, 2008, the trial court granted respondents
application for a TRO.

Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the petition and recall of the TRO on the grounds
that, inter alia, resort to a petition for writ of habeas data was not in order; and the RTC lacked
jurisdiction over the case which properly belongs to the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC).[7]

By Decision[8] of September 22, 2008, the trial court granted the prayers of respondent
including the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction directing petitioners to desist from
implementing respondents transfer until such time that petitioners comply with the disclosures
required.

The trial court justified its ruling by declaring that, inter alia, recourse to a writ of habeas
data should extend not only to victims of extra-legal killings and political activists but also to
ordinary citizens, like respondent whose rights to life and security are jeopardized by petitioners
refusal to provide her with information or data on the reported threats to her person.

Hence, the present petition for review under Rule 45 of 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
and the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data[9] contending that 1) the RTC lacked jurisdiction over
the case and cannot restrain MERALCOs prerogative as employer to transfer the place of work
of its employees, and 2) the issuance of the writ is outside the parameters expressly set forth in
the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data.[10]

Maintaining that the RTC has no jurisdiction over what they contend is clearly a labor
dispute, petitioners argue that although ingeniously crafted as a petition for habeas data,
respondent is essentially questioning the

transfer of her place of work by her employer[11] and the terms and conditions of her
employment which arise from an employer-employee relationship over which the NLRC and the
Labor Arbiters under Article 217 of the Labor Code have jurisdiction.

Petitioners thus maintain that the RTC had no authority to restrain the implementation of
the Memorandum transferring respondents place of work which is purely a management
prerogative, and that OCA-Circular No. 79-2003[12] expressly prohibits the issuance of TROs or
injunctive writs in labor-related cases.

Petitioners go on to point out that the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data directs the
issuance of the writ only against public officials or employees, or private individuals or
entities engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding an
aggrieved partys person, family or home; and that MERALCO (or its officers) is clearly not
engaged in such activities.

Page 23 of 76
The petition is impressed with merit.

Respondents plea that she be spared from complying with MERALCOs Memorandum
directing her reassignment to the Alabang Sector, under the guise of a quest for information or
data allegedly in possession of petitioners, does not fall within the province of a writ of habeas
data.

Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:

Section 1. Habeas Data. The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to

any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or
threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee or
of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing
of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence
of the aggrieved party. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The habeas data rule, in general, is designed to protect by means of judicial complaint
the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual. It is meant
to provide a forum to enforce ones right to the truth and to informational privacy, thus
safeguarding the constitutional guarantees of a persons right to life, liberty and security against
abuse in this age of information technology.

It bears reiteration that like the writ of amparo, habeas data was conceived as a response,
given the lack of effective and available remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the number
of killings and enforced disappearances. Its intent is to address violations of or threats to the
rights to life, liberty or security as a remedy independently from those provided under prevailing
Rules.[13]

Castillo v. Cruz[14] underscores the emphasis laid down in Tapuz v. del Rosario[15] that the
writs of amparo and habeas data will NOT issue to protect purely property or commercial
concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague or
doubtful.[16] Employment constitutes a property right under the context of the due process clause
of the Constitution.[17] It is evident that respondents reservations on the real reasons for her
transfer - a legitimate concern respecting the terms and conditions of ones employment - are
what prompted her to adopt the extraordinary remedy of habeas data. Jurisdiction over such
concerns is inarguably lodged by law with the NLRC and the Labor Arbiters.

In another vein, there is no showing from the facts presented that petitioners committed
any unjustifiable or unlawful violation of respondents right to privacy vis-a-vis the right to life,
liberty or security. To argue that petitioners refusal to disclose the contents of reports allegedly
received on the threats to respondents safety amounts to a violation of her right to privacy is at
best speculative. Respondent in fact trivializes these threats and accusations from unknown
individuals in her earlier-quoted portion of her July 10, 2008 letter as highly suspicious, doubtful
or are just mere jokes if they existed at all.[18] And she even suspects that her transfer to another

Page 24 of 76
place of work betray[s] the real intent of management] and could be a punitive move. Her
posture unwittingly concedes that the issue is labor-related.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed September 22, 2008 Decision
of the Bulacan RTC, Branch 7 in SP. Proc. No. 213-M-2008 is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. SP. Proc. No. 213-M-2008 is, accordingly, DISMISSED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

EN BANC

EDGARDO NAVIA,[1] RUBEN DIO,[2] and ANDREW BUISING, Petitioners, -

versus - VIRGINIA PARDICO, for and in behalf and in representation of
BENHUR V. PARDICO Respondent. G.R. No. 184467 Promulgated: June 19,
2012

DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

For the protective writ of amparo to issue in enforced disappearance cases, allegation and proof that the
persons subject thereof are missing are not enough. It must also be shown by the required quantum of
proof that their disappearance was carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of,
[the government] or a political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge [the same or] give
information on the fate or whereabouts of [said missing] persons.[3]
This petition for review on certiorari[4] filed in relation to Section 19 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-
SC[5] challenges the July 24, 2008 Decision[6] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 20, Malolos
City which granted the Petition for Writ of Amparo[7] filed by herein respondent against the petitioners.
Factual Antecedents

On March 31, 2008, at around 8:30 p.m., a vehicle of Asian Land Strategies Corporation[8] (Asian Land)
arrived at the house of Lolita M. Lapore (Lolita) located at 7A Lot 9, Block 54, Grand Royale
Subdivision, Barangay Lugam, Malolos City. The arrival of the vehicle awakened Lolitas son, Enrique
Lapore (Bong), and Benhur Pardico (Ben), who were then both staying in her house. When Lolita went
out to investigate, she saw two uniformed guards disembarking from the vehicle. One of them
immediately asked Lolita where they could find her son Bong.Before Lolita could answer, the guard saw
Bong and told him that he and Ben should go with them to the security office of Asian Land because a
complaint was lodged against them for theft of electric wires and lamps in the subdivision.[9]

Page 25 of 76
Shortly thereafter, Bong, Lolita and Ben were in the office of the security department of Asian Land also
located in Grand Royale Subdivision.[10] The supervisor of the security guards, petitioner Edgardo Navia
(Navia), also arrived thereat.

As to what transpired next, the parties respective versions diverge.

Version of the Petitioners

Petitioners alleged that they invited Bong and Ben to their office because they received a report from a
certain Mrs. Emphasis, a resident of Grand Royale Subdivision, that she saw Bong and Ben removing a
lamp from a post in said subdivision.[11] The reported unauthorized taking of the lamp was relayed thru
radio to petitioners Ruben Dio (Dio) and Andrew Buising (Buising), who both work as security guards at
the Asian Land security department. Following their departments standard operating procedure, Dio and
Buising entered the report in their logbook and proceeded to the house of Mrs. Emphasis. It was there
where Dio and Buising were able to confirm who the suspects were. They thus repaired to the house of
Lolita where Bong and Ben were staying to invite the two suspects to their office. Bong and Ben
voluntarily went with them.

At the security office, Dio and Buising interviewed Bong and Ben. The suspects admitted that they took
the lamp but clarified that they were only transferring it to a post nearer to the house of Lolita.[12] Soon,
Navia arrived and Buising informed him that the complainant was not keen in participating in the
investigation. Since there was no complainant, Navia ordered the release of Bong and Ben. Bong then
signed a statement to the effect that the guards released him without inflicting any harm or injury to
him.[13] His mother Lolita also signed the logbook below an entry which states that she will never again
harbor or entertain Ben in her house. Thereafter, Lolita and Bong left the security office.

Ben was left behind as Navia was still talking to him about those who might be involved in the
reported loss of electric wires and lamps within the subdivision. After a brief discussion though, Navia
allowed Ben to leave. Ben also affixed his signature on the logbook to affirm the statements entered by
the guards that he was released unharmed and without any injury.[14]
Upon Navias instructions, Dio and Buising went back to the house of Lolita to make her sign the
logbook as witness that they indeed released Ben from their custody. Lolita asked Buising to read aloud
that entry in the logbook where she was being asked to sign, to which Buising obliged. Not contented,
Lolita put on her reading glasses and read the entry in the logbook herself before affixing her signature
therein. After which, the guards left.

Subsequently, petitioners received an invitation[15] from the Malolos City Police Station requesting them
to appear thereat on April 17, 2008 relative to the complaint of Virginia Pardico (Virginia) about her
missing husband Ben. In compliance with the invitation, all three petitioners appeared at the Malolos City
Police Station. However, since Virginia was not present despite having received the same invitation, the
meeting was reset to April 22, 2008.[16]

On April 22, 2008, Virginia attended the investigation. Petitioners informed her that they released Ben
and that they have no information as to his present whereabouts.[17] They assured Virginia though that
they will cooperate and help in the investigation of her missing husband.[18]

Version of the Respondent

Page 26 of 76
 According to respondent, Bong and Ben were not merely invited. They were unlawfully arrested,
shoved into the Asian Land vehicle and brought to the security office for investigation.Upon seeing Ben
at the security office, Navia lividly grumbled Ikaw na naman?[19] and slapped him while he was still
seated. Ben begged for mercy, but his pleas were met with a flurry of punches coming from Navia hitting
him on different parts of his body.[20] Navia then took hold of his gun, looked at Bong, and said, Wala
kang nakita at wala kang narinig, papatayin ko na si Ben.[21]

Bong admitted that he and Ben attempted to take the lamp. He explained that the area where their
house is located is very dark and his father had long been asking the administrator of Grand Royale
Subdivision to install a lamp to illumine their area. But since nothing happened, he took it upon himself to
take a lamp from one of the posts in the subdivision and transfer it to a post near their house. However,
the lamp Bong got was no longer working. Thus, he reinstalled it on the post from which he took it and
no longer pursued his plan. [22]

Later on, Lolita was instructed to sign an entry in the guards logbook where she undertook not to
allow Ben to stay in her house anymore.[23] Thereafter, Navia again asked Lolita to sign the
logbook. Upon Lolitas inquiry as to why she had to sign again, Navia explained that they needed proof
that they released her son Bong unharmed but that Ben had to stay as the latters case will be forwarded to
the barangay. Since she has poor eyesight, Lolita obligingly signed the logbook without reading it and
then left with Bong.[24] At that juncture, Ben grabbed Bong and pleaded not to be left alone. However,
since they were afraid of Navia, Lolita and Bong left the security office at once leaving Ben behind.[25]

Moments after Lolita and Bong reached their house, Buising arrived and asked Lolita to sign the
logbook again. Lolita asked Buising why she had to sign again when she already twice signed the
logbook at the headquarters. Buising assured her that what she was about to sign only pertains to Bongs
release. Since it was dark and she has poor eyesight, Lolita took Buisings word and signed the logbook
without, again, reading what was written in it. [26]
The following morning, Virginia went to the Asian Land security office to visit her husband Ben,
but only to be told that petitioners had already released him together with Bong the night before. She then
looked for Ben, asked around, and went to the barangay. Since she could not still find her
husband, Virginia reported the matter to the police.

In the course of the investigation on Bens disappearance, it dawned upon Lolita that petitioners
took advantage of her poor eyesight and naivete. They made her sign the logbook as a witness that they
already released Ben when in truth and in fact she never witnessed his actual release. The last time she
saw Ben was when she left him in petitioners custody at the security office.[27]

Exasperated with the mysterious disappearance of her husband, Virginia filed a Petition for Writ
of Amparo[28] before the RTC of Malolos City. Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance,
the amparo court issued an Order[29] dated June 26, 2008 directing, among others, the issuance of a writ
of amparo and the production of the body of Ben before it on June 30, 2008. Thus:

WHEREFORE, conformably with Section 6 of the Supreme Court Resolution

[in] A.M. No. 07-[9]-12-SC, also known as The Rule On The Writ Of Amparo, let a writ
of amparo be issued, as follows:

Page 27 of 76
 (1) ORDERING [petitioners] Edgardo Navia, Ruben Dio and Andrew
Buising of the Asian Land Security Agency to produce before the Court the
body of aggrieved party Benhur Pardico, on Monday, June 30, 2008, at
10:30 a.m.;

(2) ORDERING the holding of a summary hearing of the petition on the

aforementioned date and time, and DIRECTING the [petitioners] to
personally appear thereat;

(3) COMMANDING [petitioners] Edgardo Navia, Ruben Dio and Andrew

Buising to file, within a non-extendible period of seventy-two (72) hours
from service of the writ, a verified written return with supporting affidavits
which shall, among other things, contain the following:

a) The lawful defenses to show that the [petitioners] did not violate or
threaten with violation the right to life, liberty and security of the
aggrieved party, through any act or omission;

b) The steps or actions taken by the [petitioners] to determine the

fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the person or persons
responsible for the threat, act or omission; and

c) All relevant information in the possession of the [petitioners]

pertaining to the threat, act or omission against the aggrieved party.

(4) GRANTING, motu proprio, a Temporary Protection Order prohibiting

the [petitioners], or any persons acting for and in their behalf, under pain of
contempt, from threatening, harassing or inflicting any harm to [respondent],
his immediate family and any [member] of his household.

The Branch Sheriff is directed to immediately serve personally on the [petitioners], at

their address indicated in the petition, copies of the writ as well as this order, together
with copies of the petition and its annexes.[30]

A Writ of Amparo[31] was accordingly issued and served on the petitioners on June 27,
2008.[32] On June 30, 2008, petitioners filed their Compliance[33] praying for the denial of the petition for
lack of merit.

A summary hearing was thereafter conducted. Petitioners presented the testimony of Buising,
while Virginia submitted the sworn statements[34] of Lolita and Enrique which the two affirmed on the
witness stand.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On July 24, 2008, the trial court issued the challenged Decision[35] granting the petition. It disposed as
follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby grants the privilege of the writ of amparo, and
deems it proper and appropriate, as follows:

(a) To hereby direct the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to

immediately conduct a deep and thorough investigation of the [petitioners] Edgardo
Navia, Ruben Dio and Andrew Buising in connection with the circumstances

Page 28 of 76
 surrounding the disappearance of [Benhur] Pardico, utilizing in the process, as part of the
investigation, the documents forming part of the records of this case;

(b) To hereby direct the NBI to extend to the family of [Benhur] Pardico and
the witnesses who testified in this case protection as it may deem necessary to secure their
safety and security; and

(c) To hereby direct the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan to

investigate the circumstances concerning the legality of the arrest of [Benhur] Pardico by
the [petitioners] in this case, utilizing in the process, as part of said investigation, the
pertinent documents and admissions forming part of the record of this case, and take
whatever course/s of action as may be warranted.

Furnish immediately copies of this decision to the NBI, through the Office of Director
Nestor Mantaring, and to the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan.

SO ORDERED.[36]

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration[37] which was denied by the trial court in an Order[38] dated
August 29, 2008.

Hence, this petition raising the following issues for our consideration:

4.1. WHETHER X X X THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY

ERRED IN RULING THAT RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO THE PRIVILEGE
OF THE WRIT OF AMPARO.

4.1.1. WHETHER X X X RESPONDENT WAS ABLE TO

ESTABLISH THAT PETITIONERS HAVE COMMITTED OR ARE
COMMITTING ACTS IN VIOLATION OF HER HUSBANDS
RIGHT TO LIFE, LIBERTY, OR SECURITY.

4.1.2. WHETHER X X X RESPONDENT SUFFICIENTLY

ESTABLISHED THE FACT OF THE DISAPPEARANCE OF
BENHUR PARDICO.

4.1.3. WHETHER X X X RESPONDENT WAS ABLE TO

ESTABLISH THAT THE ALLEGED DISAPPEARANCE OF
BENHUR PARDICO WAS AT THE INSTANCE OF HEREIN
PETITIONERS.[39]

Petitioners Arguments

Petitioners essentially assail the sufficiency of the amparo petition. They contend that the writ
of amparo is available only in cases where the factual and legal bases of the violation or threatened
violation of the aggrieved partys right to life, liberty and security are clear. Petitioners assert that in the
case at bench, Virginia miserably failed to establish all these. First, the petition is wanting on its face as it
failed to state with some degree of specificity the alleged unlawful act or omission of the petitioners
constituting a violation of or a threat to Bens right to life, liberty and security. And second, it cannot be
deduced from the evidence Virginia adduced that Ben is missing; or that petitioners had a hand in his
alleged disappearance. On the other hand, the entries in the logbook which bear the signatures of Ben and
Lolita are eloquent proof that petitioners released Ben on March 31, 2008 at around 10:30 p.m. Petitioners
thus posit that the trial court erred in issuing the writ and in holding them responsible for Bens
disappearance.

Page 29 of 76
Our Ruling

Virginias Petition for Writ of Amparo is fatally defective and must perforce be dismissed, but not for the
reasons adverted to by the petitioners.

A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC or The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was promulgated to arrest the rampant
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances in the country. Its purpose is to provide an expeditious
and effective relief to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or
entity. [40]

Here, Bens right to life, liberty and security is firmly settled as the parties do not dispute his
identity as the same person summoned and questioned at petitioners security office on the night of March
31, 2008. Such uncontroverted fact ipso facto established Bens inherent and constitutionally enshrined
right to life, liberty and security. Article 6[41] of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights[42] recognizes every human beings inherent right to life, while Article 9[43] thereof ordains that
everyone has the right to liberty and security. The right to life must be protected by law while the right to
liberty and security cannot be impaired except on grounds provided by and in accordance with law. This
overarching command against deprivation of life, liberty and security without due process of law is also
embodied in our fundamental law.[44]

The pivotal question now that confronts us is whether Bens disappearance as alleged in Virginias
petition and proved during the summary proceedings conducted before the court a quo, falls within the
ambit of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC and relevant laws.

It does not. Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC provides:

SECTION 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to

any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation
by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual
or entity.

The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats
thereof. (Emphasis ours.)

While Section 1 provides A.M. No. 07-9-12-SCs coverage, said Rules does not, however, define
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. This omission was intentional as the Committee on
Revision of the Rules of Court which drafted A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC chose to allow it to evolve through
time and jurisprudence and through substantive laws as may be promulgated by Congress.[45] Then, the
budding jurisprudence on amparo blossomed in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis[46] when this Court defined enforced
disappearances. The Court in that case applied the generally accepted principles of international law and
adopted the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances
definition of enforced disappearances, as the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation
of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support
or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by
concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a person outside the
protection of the law.[47]

Page 30 of 76
 Not long thereafter, another significant development affecting A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC came about
after Congress enacted Republic Act (RA) No. 9851[48] on December 11, 2009. Section 3(g) thereof
defines enforced or involuntary disappearances as follows:

(g) "Enforced or involuntary disappearance of persons" means the arrest,

detention, or abduction of persons by, or with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of, a State or a political organization followed by a refusal to
acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or
whereabouts of those persons, with the intention of removing from the
protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.

Then came Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroyo[49] where Justice Arturo D. Brion wrote in his
Separate Opinion that with the enactment of RA No. 9851, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo is now a
procedural law anchored, not only on the constitutional rights to the rights to life, liberty and security, but
on a concrete statutory definition as well of what an enforced or involuntary disappearance
is.[50] Therefore, A.M. No. 07-9-12-SCs reference to enforced disappearances should be construed to
mean the enforced or involuntary disappearance of persons contemplated in Section 3(g) of RA No.
9851. Meaning, in probing enforced disappearance cases, courts should read A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC in
relation to RA No. 9851.

From the statutory definition of enforced disappearance, thus, we can derive the following
elements that constitute it:

(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;

(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the
State or a political organization;

(c) that it be followed by the State or political organizations refusal to acknowledge

or give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of
the amparo petition; and,

(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection
of the law for a prolonged period of time.

As thus dissected, it is now clear that for the protective writ of amparo to issue, allegation and proof that
the persons subject thereof are missing are not enough. It must also be shown and proved by substantial
evidence that the disappearance was carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of,
the State or a political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the same or give information
on the fate or whereabouts of said missing persons, with the intention of removing them from the
protection of the law for a prolonged period of time. Simply put, the petitioner in an amparo case has the
burden of proving by substantial evidence the indispensable element of government participation.

In the present case, we do not doubt Bongs testimony that Navia had a menacing attitude towards
Ben and that he slapped and inflicted fistic blows upon him. Given the circumstances and the pugnacious
character of Navia at that time, his threatening statement, Wala kang nakita at wala kang narinig,
papatayin ko na si Ben, cannot be taken lightly. It unambiguously showed his predisposition at that
time. In addition, there is nothing on record which would support petitioners assertion that they released
Ben on the night of March 31, 2008 unscathed from their wrath. Lolita sufficiently explained how she
was prodded into affixing her signatures in the logbook without reading the entries therein. And so far, the
information petitioners volunteered are sketchy at best, like the alleged complaint of Mrs. Emphasis who
was never identified or presented in court and whose complaint was never reduced in writing.

Page 31 of 76
 But lest it be overlooked, in an amparo petition, proof of disappearance alone is not enough. It is
likewise essential to establish that such disappearance was carried out with the direct or indirect
authorization, support or acquiescence of the government. This indispensable element of State
participation is not present in this case. The petition does not contain any allegation of State complicity,
and none of the evidence presented tend to show that the government or any of its agents orchestrated
Bens disappearance. In fact, none of its agents, officials, or employees were impleaded or implicated
in Virginias amparo petition whether as responsible or accountable persons.[51] Thus, in the absence of an
allegation or proof that the government or its agents had a hand in Bens disappearance or that they failed
to exercise extraordinary diligence in investigating his case, the Court
will definitely not hold the government or its agents either as responsible
or accountable persons.

We are aware that under Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC a writ of amparo may lie against a
private individual or entity. But even if the person sought to be held accountable or responsible in
an amparo petition is a private individual or entity, still, government involvement in the disappearance
remains an indispensable element. Here, petitioners are mere security guards at Grand Royale
Subdivision in Brgy. Lugam, Malolos City and their principal, the Asian Land, is a private entity. They do
not work for the government and nothing has been presented that would link or connect them to some
covert police, military or governmental operation. As discussed above, to fall within the ambit of A.M.
No. 07-9-12-SC in relation to RA No. 9851, the disappearance must be attended by some governmental
involvement. This hallmark of State participation differentiates an enforced disappearance case from an
ordinary case of a missing person.

WHEREFORE, the July 24, 2008 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Malolos City,
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Petition for Writ of Amparo filed by Virginia Pardico is
hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 204528 February 19, 2013 SECRETARY LEILA M. DE LIMA, DIRECTOR
NONNATUS R. ROJAS and DEPUTY DIRECTOR REYNALDO 0.
ESMERALDA, Petitioners, vs. MAGTANGGOL B. GATDULA, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

LEONEN, J.:

Submitted for our resolution is a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or
writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin "the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, in Manila from
implementing its Decision x x x in Civil Case No. 12-127405 granting respondent's application
for the issuance of inspection and production orders x x x."1 This is raised through a Petition for
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 from the "Decision" rendered by the Regional Trial Court
dated 20 March 2012.

Page 32 of 76
From the records, it appears that on 27 February 2012, respondent Magtanggol B. Gatdula filed
a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo in the Regional Trial Court of Manila.2 This case
was docketed as In the Matter of the Petition for Issuance of Writ of Amparo of Atty. Magtanggol
B. Gatdula, SP No. 12-127405. It was raffled to the sala of Judge Silvino T. Pampilo, Jr. on the
same day.

The Amparo was directed against petitioners Justice Secretary Leila M. De Lima, Director
Nonnatus R. Rojas and Deputy Director Reynaldo O. Esmeralda of the National Bureau of
Investigation (DE LIMA, ET AL. for brevity). Gatdula wanted De Lima, et al. "to cease and
desist from framing up Petitioner [Gatdula] for the fake ambush incident by filing bogus charges
of Frustrated Murder against Petitioner [Gatdula] in relation to the alleged ambush incident."3

Instead of deciding on whether to issue a Writ of Amparo, the judge issued summons and
ordered De Lima, et al. to file an Answer.4 He also set the case for hearing on 1 March 2012. The
hearing was held allegedly for determining whether a temporary protection order may be issued.
During that hearing, counsel for De Lima, et al. manifested that a Return, not an Answer, is
appropriate for Amparo cases.5

In an Order dated 2 March 2012,6 Judge Pampilo insisted that "[s]ince no writ has been issued,
return is not the required pleading but answer".7 The judge noted that the Rules of Court apply
suppletorily in Amparo cases.8 He opined that the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure applied
and thus required an Answer.9

Judge Pampilo proceeded to conduct a hearing on the main case on 7 March 2012.10 Even
without a Return nor an Answer, he ordered the parties to file their respective memoranda within
five (5) working days after that hearing. Since the period to file an Answer had not yet lapsed by
then, the judge also decided that the memorandum of De Lima, et al. would be filed in lieu of
their Answer.11

On 20 March 2012, the RTC rendered a "Decision" granting the issuance of the Writ
of Amparo. The RTC also granted the interim reliefs prayed for, namely: temporary protection,
production and inspection orders. The production and inspection orders were in relation to the
evidence and reports involving an on-going investigation of the attempted assassination of
Deputy Director Esmeralda. It is not clear from the records how these pieces of evidence may be
related to the alleged threat to the life, liberty or security of the respondent Gatdula.

In an Order dated 8 October 2012, the RTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration dated 23
March 2012 filed by De Lima, et al.

Petitioners Sec. De Lima, et al. thus came to this Court assailing the RTC "Decision" dated 20
March 2012 through a Petition for Review on Certiorari (With Very Urgent Application for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction) via Rule 45, as
enunciated in Section 19 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo (A.M. No. 07-9- 12-SC, 25
September 2007), viz:

SEC. 19. Appeal. Any party may appeal from the final judgment or order to the Supreme
Court under Rule 45. The appeal may raise questions of fact or law or both. x x x (Emphasis
supplied).

It is the Courts view that the "Decision" dated 20 March 2012 granting the writ of Amparo is not
the judgment or final order contemplated under this rule. Hence, a Petition for Review under
Rule 45 may not yet be the proper remedy at this time.

The RTC and the Parties must understand the nature of the remedy of Amparo to put its
procedures in the proper context.

Page 33 of 76
The remedy of the Writ of Amparo is an equitable and extraordinary remedy to safeguard the
right of the people to life, liberty12 and security13 as enshrined in the 1987 Constitution.14 The
Rule on the Writ of Amparo was issued as an exercise of the Supreme Court's power to
promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. 15 It aims to
address concerns such as, among others, extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.16

Due to the delicate and urgent nature of these controversies, the procedure was devised to afford
swift but decisive relief.17 It is initiated through a petition18 to be filed in a Regional Trial Court,
Sandiganbayan, the Court of Appeals, or the Supreme Court.19 The judge or justice then makes
an "immediate" evaluation20 of the facts as alleged in the petition and the affidavits submitted
"with the attendant circumstances detailed".21 After evaluation, the judge has the option to issue
the Writ of Amparo22 or immediately dismiss the case. Dismissal is proper if the petition and the
supporting affidavits do not show that the petitioner's right to life, liberty or security is under
threat or the acts complained of are not unlawful. On the other hand, the issuance of the writ
itself sets in motion presumptive judicial protection for the petitioner. The court compels the
respondents to appear before a court of law to show whether the grounds for more permanent
protection and interim reliefs are necessary.

The respondents are required to file a Return23 after the issuance of the writ through the clerk of
court. The Return serves as the responsive pleading to the petition.24 Unlike an Answer, the
Return has other purposes aside from identifying the issues in the case. Respondents are also
required to detail the actions they had taken to determine the fate or whereabouts of the
aggrieved party.

If the respondents are public officials or employees, they are also required to state the actions
they had taken to: (i) verify the identity of the aggrieved party; (ii) recover and preserve evidence
related to the death or disappearance of the person identified in the petition; (iii) identify
witnesses and obtain statements concerning the death or disappearance; (iv) determine the cause,
manner, location, and time of death or disappearance as well as any pattern or practice that may
have brought about the death or disappearance; and (vi) bring the suspected offenders before a
competent court.25 Clearly these matters are important to the judge so that s/he can calibrate the
means and methods that will be required to further the protections, if any, that will be due to the
petitioner.

There will be a summary hearing26 only after the Return is filed to determine the merits of the
petition and whether interim reliefs are warranted. If the Return is not filed, the hearing will be
done ex parte.27 After the hearing, the court will render the judgment within ten (10) days from
the time the petition is submitted for decision.28

If the allegations are proven with substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the
writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate.29 The judgment should contain measures
which the judge views as essential for the continued protection of the petitioner in
the Amparo case. These measures must be detailed enough so that the judge may be able to
verify and monitor the actions taken by the respondents. It is this judgment that could be subject
to appeal to the Supreme Court via Rule 45.30 After the measures have served their purpose, the
judgment will be satisfied. In Amparo cases, this is when the threats to the petitioners life,
liberty and security cease to exist as evaluated by the court that renders the judgment.
Parenthetically, the case may also be terminated through consolidation should a subsequent case
be filed either criminal or civil.31 Until the full satisfaction of the judgment, the extraordinary
remedy of Amparo allows vigilant judicial monitoring to ensure the protection of constitutional
rights.

The "Decision" dated 20 March 2012 assailed by the petitioners could not be the judgment or
final order that is appealable under Section 19 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. This is clear
from the tenor of the dispositive portion of the "Decision", to wit:

The Branch Clerk of Court of Court [sic] is hereby DIRECTED to issue the Writ of Amparo.

Page 34 of 76
Likewise, the Branch Clerk of Court is hereby DIRECTED to effect the service of the Writ
of Amparo in an expeditious manner upon all concerned, and for this purpose may call upon the
assistance of any military or civilian agency of the government.

This "Decision" pertained to the issuance of the writ under Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo, not the judgment under Section 18. The "Decision" is thus an interlocutory order, as
suggested by the fact that temporary protection, production and inspection orders were given
together with the decision. The temporary protection, production and inspection orders
are interim reliefs that may be granted by the court upon filing of the petition but before final
judgment is rendered.32

The confusion of the parties arose due to the procedural irregularities in the RTC.

First, the insistence on filing of an Answer was inappropriate. It is the Return that serves as the
responsive pleading for petitions for the issuance of Writs of Amparo. The requirement to file an
Answer is contrary to the intention of the Court to provide a speedy remedy to those whose right
to life, liberty and security are violated or are threatened to be violated. In utter disregard of the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo, Judge Pampilo insisted on issuing summons and requiring an
Answer.

Judge Pampilos basis for requiring an Answer was mentioned in his Order dated 2 March 2012:

Under Section 25 of the same rule [on the Writ of Amparo], the Rules of Court shall apply
suppletorily insofar as it is not inconsistent with the said rule.

Considering the summary nature of the petition, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Summary
Procedure shall apply.

Section 5. Answer Within ten (10) days from service of summons, the defendant shall file his
Answer to the complaint and serve a copy thereof on the plaintiff. x x x

WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the respondents are required to file their Answer ten
(days) from receipt of this Order.33

The 1991 Revised Rules of Summary Procedure is a special rule that the Court has devised for
the following circumstances:

SECTION 1. Scope. This rule shall govern the summary procedure in the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases falling within their jurisdiction:

A. Civil Cases:

(1) All cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer, x x x.

(2) All other cases, except probate proceedings, where the total amount of the
plaintiffs claim does not exceed x x x.

B. Criminal Cases:

(1) Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;

(2) Violations of the rental law;

(3) Violations of municipal or city ordinances;

Page 35 of 76
 (4) All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the offense
charged is imprisonment not exceeding six months, or a fine not exceeding one
thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or both, x x x.

xxxx

It is clear from this rule that this type of summary procedure only applies to
MTC/MTCC/MCTCs. It is mind-boggling how this rule could possibly apply to proceedings in
an RTC. Aside from that, this Court limited the application of summary procedure to
certain civil and criminal cases. A writ of Amparo is a special proceeding. It is a remedy by
which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or particular fact.34 It is not a civil nor a criminal
action, hence, the application of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure is seriously misplaced.

The second irregularity was the holding of a hearing on the main case prior to the issuance of the
writ and the filing of a Return. Without a Return, the issues could not have been properly joined.

Worse, is the trial courts third irregularity: it required a memorandum in lieu of a responsive
pleading (Answer) of De Lima, et al.

The Return in Amparo cases allows the respondents to frame the issues subject to a hearing.
Hence, it should be done prior to the hearing, not after. A memorandum, on the other hand, is a
synthesis of the claims of the party litigants and is a final pleading usually required before the
case is submitted for decision. One cannot substitute for the other since these submissions have
different functions in facilitating the suit.

More importantly, a memorandum is a prohibited pleading under the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo.35

The fourth irregularity was in the "Decision" dated 20 March 2012 itself. In the body of its
decision, the RTC stated:

"Accordingly this court GRANTS the privilege of the writ and the interim reliefs prayed for
by the petitioner." (Emphasis supplied).

This gives the impression that the decision was the judgment since the phraseology is similar to
Section 18 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo:

"SEC. 18. Judgment. The court shall render judgment within ten (10) days from the time the
petition is submitted for decision. If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial
evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and
appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be denied." (Emphasis supplied).

The privilege of the Writ of Amparo should be distinguished from the actual order called
the Writ of Amparo. The privilege includes availment of the entire procedure outlined in A.M.
No. 07-9-12-SC, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. After examining the petition and its attached
affidavits, the Return and the evidence presented in the summary hearing, the judgment should
detail the required acts from the respondents that will mitigate, if not totally eradicate, the
violation of or the threat to the petitioner's life, liberty or security.

A judgment which simply grants "the privilege of the writ" cannot be executed.1wphi1 It is
tantamount to a failure of the judge to intervene and grant judicial succor to the petitioner.
Petitions filed to avail of the privilege of the Writ of Amparo arise out of very real and concrete
circumstances. Judicial responses cannot be as tragically symbolic or ritualistic as "granting the
privilege of the Writ of Amparo."

The procedural irregularities in the RTC affected the mode of appeal that petitioners used in
elevating the matter to this Court.

Page 36 of 76
It is the responsibility of counsels for the parties to raise issues using the proper procedure at the
right time. Procedural rules are meant to assist the parties and courts efficiently deal with the
substantive issues pertaining to a case. When it is the judge himself who disregards the rules of
procedure, delay and confusion result.

The Petition for Review is not the proper remedy to assail the interlocutory order denominated
as "Decision" dated 20 March 2012. A Petition for Certiorari, on the other hand, is
prohibited.36 Simply dismissing the present petition, however, will cause grave injustice to the
parties involved. It undermines the salutary purposes for which the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo were promulgated.

In many instances, the Court adopted a policy of liberally construing its rules in order to promote
a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.37 The rules can be
suspended on the following grounds: (1) matters of life, liberty, honor or property, (2) the
existence of special or compelling circumstances, (3) the merits of the case, (4) a cause not
entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules,
(5) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (6) the
other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.38

WHEREFORE, in the interest of justice, as a prophylactic to the irregularities committed by the

trial court judge, and by virtue of its powers under Article VIII, Section 5 (5) of the Constitution,
the Court RESOLVES to:

(1) NULLIFY all orders that are subject of this Resolution issued by Judge Silvino T.
Pampilo, Jr. after respondent Gatdula filed the Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of
Amparo;

(2) DIRECT Judge Pampilo to determine within forty-eight (48) hours from his receipt
of this Resolution whether the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is proper on the basis of
the petition and its attached affidavits.

The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to cause the personal service of this Resolution on Judge
Silvino T. Pampilo, Jr. of Branch 26 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila for his proper
guidance together with a WARNING that further deviation or improvisation from the procedure
set in A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC shall be meted with severe consequences.

SO ORDERED.

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN

Associate Justice

Page 37 of 76
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND THE WRIT
OF HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF MELISSA C. ROXAS, MELISSA C. ROXAS,
Petitioner, -versus- GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GILBERT TEODORO, GEN.
VICTOR S. IBRADO, P/DIR. GEN. JESUS AME VERZOSA, LT. GEN. DELFIN N.
BANGIT, PC/SUPT. LEON NILO A. DELA CRUZ, MAJ. GEN. RALPH VILLANUEVA,
PS/SUPT. RUDY GAMIDO LACADIN, AND CERTAIN PERSONS WHO GO BY THE
NAME[S] DEX, RC AND ROSE, Respondents. G.R. No. 189155 Promulgated:
September 7, 2010

PEREZ, J.:

At bench is a Petition For Review on Certiorari[1] assailing the Decision[2] dated 26 August 2009
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00036-WRA a petition that was commenced jointly
under the Rules on the Writ of Amparo (Amparo Rule) and Habeas Data (Habeas Data Rule). In
its decision, the Court of Appeals extended to the petitioner, Melissa C. Roxas, the privilege of
the writs of amparo and habeas data but denied the latters prayers for an inspection order,
production order and return of specified personal belongings. The fallo of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY MERITORIOUS. This

Court hereby grants Petitioner the privilege of the Writ of Amparo and Habeas
Data.

Accordingly, Respondents are enjoined to refrain from distributing or

causing the distribution to the public of any records in whatever form, reports,
documents or similar papers relative to Petitioners Melissa C. Roxas, and/or
Melissa Roxas; alleged ties to the CPP-NPA or pertinently related to the
complained incident. Petitioners prayers for an inspection order, production order
and for the return of the specified personal belongings are denied for lack of
merit. Although there is no evidence that Respondents are responsible for the
abduction, detention or torture of the Petitioner, said Respondents pursuant to
their legally mandated duties are, nonetheless, ordered to continue/complete the
investigation of this incident with the end in view of prosecuting those who are
responsible. Respondents are also ordered to provide protection to the Petitioner
and her family while in the Philippines against any and all forms of harassment,
intimidation and coercion as may be relevant to the grant of these reliefs.[3]

We begin with the petitioners allegations.

Petitioner is an American citizen of Filipino descent.[4] While in the United States, petitioner
enrolled in an exposure program to the Philippines with the group Bagong Alyansang
Makabayan-United States of America (BAYAN-USA) of which she is a member.[5] During the
course of her immersion, petitioner toured various provinces and towns of Central Luzon and, in
April of 2009, she volunteered to join members of BAYAN-Tarlac[6] in conducting an initial
health survey in La Paz, Tarlac for a future medical mission.[7]

In pursuit of her volunteer work, petitioner brought her passport, wallet with Fifteen Thousand
Pesos (P15,000.00) in cash, journal, digital camera with memory card, laptop computer, external
hard disk, IPOD,[8] wristwatch, sphygmomanometer, stethoscope and medicines.[9]

Page 38 of 76
After doing survey work on 19 May 2009, petitioner and her companions, Juanito Carabeo
(Carabeo) and John Edward Jandoc (Jandoc), decided to rest in the house of one Mr. Jesus Paolo
(Mr. Paolo) in Sitio Bagong Sikat, Barangay Kapanikian, La Paz, Tarlac.[10] At around 1:30 in
the afternoon, however, petitioner, her companions and Mr. Paolo were startled by the loud
sounds of someone banging at the front door and a voice demanding that they open up.[11]

Suddenly, fifteen (15) heavily armed men forcibly opened the door, barged inside and
ordered petitioner and her companions to lie on the ground face down.[12] The armed men were
all in civilian clothes and, with the exception of their leader, were also wearing bonnets to
conceal their faces.[13]
Petitioner tried to protest the intrusion, but five (5) of the armed men ganged up on her
and tied her hands.[14] At this juncture, petitioner saw the other armed men herding Carabeo and
Jandoc, already blindfolded and taped at their mouths, to a nearby blue van. Petitioner started to
shout her name.[15] Against her vigorous resistance, the armed men dragged petitioner towards
the vanbruising her arms, legs and knees.[16] Once inside the van, but before she can be
blindfolded, petitioner was able to see the face of one of the armed men sitting beside her.[17] The
van then sped away.

After about an hour of traveling, the van stopped.[18] Petitioner, Carabeo and Jandoc were
ordered to alight.[19] After she was informed that she is being detained for being a member of the
Communist Party of the Philippines-New Peoples Army (CPP-NPA), petitioner was separated
from her companions and was escorted to a room that she believed was a jail cell from the sound
of its metal doors.[20] From there, she could hear the sounds of gunfire, the noise of planes taking
off and landing and some construction bustle.[21] She inferred that she was taken to the military
camp of Fort Magsaysay in Laur, Nueva Ecija.[22]

What followed was five (5) straight days of interrogation coupled with torture.[23] The
thrust of the interrogations was to convince petitioner to abandon her communist beliefs in favor
of returning to the fold.[24] The torture, on the other hand, consisted of taunting, choking, boxing
and suffocating the petitioner.[25]

Throughout the entirety of her ordeal, petitioner was made to suffer in blindfolds even in
her sleep.[26] Petitioner was only relieved of her blindfolds when she was allowed to take a bath,
during which she became acquainted with a woman named Rose who bathed her.[27] There were
also a few times when she cheated her blindfold and was able to peek at her surroundings.[28]

Despite being deprived of sight, however, petitioner was still able to learn the names of
three of her interrogators who introduced themselves to her as Dex, James and RC. [29] RC even
told petitioner that those who tortured her came from the Special Operations Group, and that she
was abducted because her name is included in the Order of Battle.[30]

On 25 May 2009, petitioner was finally released and returned to her uncles house in
Quezon City.[31] Before being released, however, the abductors gave petitioner a cellular phone
Page 39 of 76
with a SIM[32] card, a slip of paper containing an e-mail address with password,[33] a plastic bag
containing biscuits and books,[34] the handcuffs used on her, a blouse and a pair of
shoes.[35] Petitioner was also sternly warned not to report the incident to the group Karapatan or
something untoward will happen to her and her family.[36]

Sometime after her release, petitioner continued to receive calls from RC via the cellular
phone given to her.[37] Out of apprehension that she was being monitored and also fearing for the
safety of her family, petitioner threw away the cellular phone with a SIM card.

Seeking sanctuary against the threat of future harm as well as the suppression of any
existing government files or records linking her to the communist movement, petitioner filed
a Petition for the Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data before this Court on 1 June
2009.[38] Petitioner impleaded public officials occupying the uppermost echelons of the military
and police hierarchy as respondents, on the belief that it was government agents who were
behind her abduction and torture. Petitioner likewise included in her suit Rose, Dex and RC.[39]

The Amparo and Habeas Data petition prays that: (1) respondents be enjoined from
harming or even approaching petitioner and her family; (2) an order be issued allowing the
inspection of detention areas in the 7th Infantry Division, Fort Magsaysay, Laur, Nueva Ecija; (3)
respondents be ordered to produce documents relating to any report on the case of petitioner
including, but not limited to, intelligence report and operation reports of the 7th Infantry Division,
the Special Operations Group of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and its subsidiaries
or branch/es prior to, during and subsequent to 19 May 2009; (4) respondents be ordered to
expunge from the records of the respondents any document pertinent or connected to Melissa C.
Roxas, Melissa Roxas or any name which sounds the same; and (5) respondents be ordered to
return to petitioner her journal, digital camera with memory card, laptop computer, external hard
disk, IPOD, wristwatch, sphygmomanometer, stethoscope, medicines and her P15,000.00
cash.[40]

In a Resolution dated 9 June 2009, this Court issued the desired writs and referred the
case to the Court of Appeals for hearing, reception of evidence and appropriate action.[41] The
Resolution also directed the respondents to file their verified written return.[42]

On 18 June 2009, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Return of the
[43]
Writs on behalf of the public officials impleaded as respondents.

We now turn to the defenses interposed by the public respondents.

The public respondents label petitioners alleged abduction and torture as stage
managed.[44] In support of their accusation, the public respondents principally rely on the
statement of Mr. Paolo, as contained in the Special Report[45] of the La Paz Police Station. In
the Special Report, Mr. Paolo disclosed that, prior to the purported abduction, petitioner and her
companions instructed him and his two sons to avoid leaving the house.[46] From this statement,
the public respondents drew the distinct possibility that, except for those already inside Mr.
Page 40 of 76
Paolos house, nobody else has any way of knowing where petitioner and her companions were at
the time they were supposedly abducted.[47]This can only mean, the public respondents
concluded, that if ever there was any abduction it must necessarily have been planned by, or
done with the consent of, the petitioner and her companions themselves.[48]

Public respondents also cited the Medical Certificate[49] of the petitioner, as actually
belying her claims that she was subjected to serious torture for five (5) days. The public
respondents noted that while the petitioner alleges that she was choked and boxed by her
abductorsinflictions that could have easily produced remarkable bruisesher Medical
Certificate only shows abrasions in her wrists and knee caps.[50]

For the public respondents, the above anomalies put in question the very authenticity of
petitioners alleged abduction and torture, more so any military or police involvement
therein. Hence, public respondents conclude that the claims of abduction and torture was no
more than a charade fabricated by the petitioner to put the government in bad light, and at the
same time, bring great media mileage to her and the group that she represents.[51]

Nevertheless, even assuming the abduction and torture to be genuine, the public
respondents insist on the dismissal of the Amparo and Habeas Data petition based on the
following grounds: (a) as against respondent President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in particular,
because of her immunity from suit,[52] and (b) as against all of the public respondents, in general,
in view of the absence of any specific allegation in the petition that they had participated in, or at
least authorized, the commission of such atrocities.[53]

Finally, the public respondents posit that they had not been remiss in their duty to
ascertain the truth behind the allegations of the petitioner.[54] In both the police and military arms
of the government machinery, inquiries were set-up in the following manner:

Police Action

Police authorities first learned of the purported abduction around 4:30 oclock in the afternoon of
19 May 2009, when Barangay Captain Michael M. Manuel came to the La Paz Municipal Police
Station to report the presence of heavily armed men somewhere
in Barangay Kapanikian.[55] Acting on the report, the police station launched an initial
investigation.[56]

The initial investigation revolved around the statement of Mr. Paolo, who informed the
investigators of an abduction incident involving three (3) personslater identified as petitioner
Melissa Roxas, Juanito Carabeo and John Edward Jandocwho were all staying in his
house.[57] Mr. Paolo disclosed that the abduction occurred around 1:30 oclock in the afternoon,
and was perpetrated by about eight (8) heavily armed men who forced their way inside his
house.[58] Other witnesses to the abduction also confirmed that the armed men used a dark blue
van with an unknown plate number and two (2) Honda XRM motorcycles with no plate
numbers.[59]
Page 41 of 76
At 5:00 oclock in the afternoon of 19 May 2009, the investigators sent a Flash Message to the
different police stations surrounding La Paz, Tarlac, in an effort to track and locate the van and
motorcycles of the suspects. Unfortunately, the effort yielded negative results.[60]

On 20 May 2009, the results of the initial investigation were included in a Special
Report[61] that was transmitted to the Tarlac Police Provincial Office, headed by public
respondent P/S Supt. Rudy Lacadin (Supt. Lacadin). Public respondent Supt. Lacadin, in turn,
informed the Regional Police Office of Region 3 about the abduction.[62] Follow-up
investigations were, at the same time, pursued.[63]

On 26 May 2009, public respondent PC/Supt. Leon Nilo Dela Cruz, as Director of the
Regional Police Office for Region 3, caused the creation of Special Investigation Task
GroupCAROJAN (Task Group CAROJAN) to conduct an in-depth investigation on the
abduction of the petitioner, Carabeo and Jandoc.[64]

Task Group CAROJAN started its inquiry by making a series of background

examinations on the victims of the purported abduction, in order to reveal the motive behind the
abduction and, ultimately, the identity of the perpetrators.[65] Task Group CAROJAN also
maintained liaisons with Karapatan and the Alliance for Advancement of Peoples
Rightsorganizations trusted by petitionerin the hopes of obtaining the latters participation in the
ongoing investigations.[66] Unfortunately, the letters sent by the investigators requesting for the
availability of the petitioner for inquiries were left unheeded.[67]

The progress of the investigations conducted by Task Group CAROJAN had been
detailed in the reports[68] that it submitted to public respondent General Jesus Ame Verzosa, the
Chief of the Philippine National Police. However, as of their latest report dated 29 June 2009,
Task Group CAROJAN is still unable to make a definitive finding as to the true identity and
affiliation of the abductorsa fact that task group CAROJAN attributes to the refusal of the
petitioner, or any of her fellow victims, to cooperate in their investigative efforts.[69]

Military Action

Public respondent Gilbert Teodoro, the Secretary of National Defense, first came to know about
the alleged abduction and torture of the petitioner upon receipt of the Resolution of this Court
directing him and the other respondents to file their return.[70] Immediately thereafter, he issued
a Memorandum Directive[71] addressed to the Chief of Staff of the AFP, ordering the latter,
among others, to conduct an inquiry to determine the validity of the accusation of military
involvement in the abduction.[72]

Acting pursuant to the Memorandum Directive, public respondent General Victor S. Ibrado, the
AFP Chief of Staff, sent an AFP Radio Message[73] addressed to public respondent Lieutenant
General Delfin N. Bangit (Lt. Gen. Bangit), the Commanding General of the Army, relaying the
order to cause an investigation on the abduction of the petitioner.[74]

Page 42 of 76
For his part, and taking cue from the allegations in the amparo petition, public respondent Lt.
Gen. Bangit instructed public respondent Major General Ralph A. Villanueva (Maj. Gen.
Villanueva), the Commander of the 7th Infantry Division of the Army based in Fort Magsaysay,
to set in motion an investigation regarding the possible involvement of any personnel assigned at
the camp in the purported abduction of the petitioner.[75] In turn, public respondent Maj. Gen.
Villanueva tapped the Office of the Provost Marshal (OPV) of the 7th Infantry Division, to
conduct the investigation.[76]

On 23 June 2009, the OPV of the 7th Infantry Division released an Investigation
Report[77] detailing the results of its inquiry. In substance, the report described petitioners
allegations as opinionated and thereby cleared the military from any involvement in her alleged
abduction and torture.[78]

The Decision of the Court of Appeals

In its Decision,[79] the Court of Appeals gave due weight and consideration to the petitioners
version that she was indeed abducted and then subjected to torture for five (5) straight days. The
appellate court noted the sincerity and resolve by which the petitioner affirmed the contents of
her affidavits in open court, and was thereby convinced that the latter was telling the truth.[80]

On the other hand, the Court of Appeals disregarded the argument of the public
respondents that the abduction of the petitioner was stage managed, as it is merely based on an
unfounded speculation that only the latter and her companions knew where they were staying at
the time they were forcibly taken.[81] The Court of Appeals further stressed that the Medical
Certificate of the petitioner can only affirm the existence of a true abduction, as its findings are
reflective of the very injuries the latter claims to have sustained during her harrowing ordeal,
particularly when she was handcuffed and then dragged by her abductors onto their van.[82]

The Court of Appeals also recognized the existence of an ongoing threat against the security of
the petitioner, as manifested in the attempts of RC to contact and monitor her, even after she was
released.[83] This threat, according to the Court of Appeals, is all the more compounded by the
failure of the police authorities to identify the material perpetrators who are still at
large.[84] Thus, the appellate court extended to the petitioner the privilege of the writ
of amparo by directing the public respondents to afford protection to the former, as well as
continuing, under the norm of extraordinary diligence, their existing investigations involving the
abduction.[85]

The Court of Appeals likewise observed a transgression of the right to informational privacy of
the petitioner, noting the existence of records of investigations that concerns the petitioner as a
suspected member of the CPP-NPA.[86] The appellate court derived the existence of such records
from a photograph and video file presented in a press conference by party-list representatives
Jovito Palparan (Palparan) and Pastor Alcover (Alcover), which allegedly show the petitioner
participating in rebel exercises. Representative Alcover also revealed that the photograph and
video came from a female CPP-NPA member who wanted out of the organization. According to
Page 43 of 76
the Court of Appeals, the proliferation of the photograph and video, as well as any form of
media, insinuating that petitioner is part of the CPP-NPA does not only constitute a violation of
the right to privacy of the petitioner but also puts further strain on her already volatile
security.[87] To this end, the appellate court granted the privilege of the writ of habeas
data mandating the public respondents to refrain from distributing to the public any records, in
whatever form, relative to petitioners alleged ties with the CPP-NPA or pertinently related to her
abduction and torture.[88]

The foregoing notwithstanding, however, the Court of Appeals was not convinced that
the military or any other person acting under the acquiescence of the government, were
responsible for the abduction and torture of the petitioner.[89] The appellate court stressed that,
judging by her own statements, the petitioner merely believed that the military was behind her
abduction.[90] Thus, the Court of Appeals absolved the public respondents from any complicity in
the abduction and torture of petitioner.[91] The petition was likewise dismissed as against public
respondent President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in view of her immunity from suit.[92]

Accordingly, the petitioners prayers for the return of her personal belongings were
denied.[93] Petitioners prayers for an inspection order and production order also met the same
fate.[94]

Hence, this appeal by the petitioner.

AMPARO

A.

Petitioner first contends that the Court of Appeals erred in absolving the public respondents from
any responsibility in her abduction and torture.[95] Corollary to this, petitioner also finds fault on
the part of Court of Appeals in denying her prayer for the return of her personal belongings.[96]

Petitioner insists that the manner by which her abduction and torture was carried out, as
well as the sounds of construction, gun-fire and airplanes that she heard while in detention, as
these were detailed in her two affidavits and affirmed by her in open court, are already sufficient
evidence to prove government involvement.[97]

Proceeding from such assumption, petitioner invokes the doctrine of command responsibility to
implicate the high-ranking civilian and military authorities she impleaded as respondents in
her amparo petition.[98] Thus, petitioner seeks from this Court a pronouncement holding the
respondents as complicit in her abduction and torture, as well as liable for the return of her
belongings.[99]

Command Responsibility in Amparo Proceedings

Page 44 of 76
 It must be stated at the outset that the use by the petitioner of the doctrine of command
responsibility as the justification in impleading the public respondents in her amparopetition, is
legally inaccurate, if not incorrect. The doctrine of command responsibility is a rule of
substantive law that establishes liability and, by this account, cannot be a proper legal basis to
implead a party-respondent in an amparo petition.[100]

The case of Rubrico v. Arroyo,[101] which was the first to examine command responsibility in the
context of an amparo proceeding, observed that the doctrine is used to pinpoint
liability. Rubrico notes that:[102]

The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its context in the
development of laws of war and armed combats. According to Fr. Bernas,
"command responsibility," in its simplest terms, means the "responsibility of
commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed forces
or other persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic
conflict."[103] In this sense, command responsibility is properly a form of criminal
complicity. The Hague Conventions of 1907 adopted the doctrine of command
responsibility,[104]foreshadowing the present-day precept of holding a superior
accountable for the atrocities committed by his subordinates should he be remiss
in his duty of control over them. As then formulated, command responsibility is
"an omission mode of individual criminal liability," whereby the superior is
made responsible for crimes committed by his subordinates for failing to prevent
or punish the perpetrators[105] (as opposed to crimes he ordered). (Emphasis in the
orginal, underscoring supplied)

Since the application of command responsibility presupposes an imputation of individual

liability, it is more aptly invoked in a full-blown criminal or administrative case rather than in a
summary amparo proceeding. The obvious reason lies in the nature of the writ itself:

The writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at providing judicial relief consisting of
the appropriate remedial measures and directives that may be crafted by the court, in order to
address specific violations or threats of violation of the constitutional rights to life, liberty or
security.[106] While the principal objective of its proceedings is the initial determination of
whether an enforced disappearance, extralegal killing or threats thereof had transpiredthe
writ does not, by so doing, fix liability for such disappearance, killing or threats, whether
that may be criminal, civil or administrative under the applicable substantive law.[107] The
rationale underpinning this peculiar nature of an amparo writ has been, in turn, clearly set forth
in the landmark case of The Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo:[108]

x x x The remedy provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a summary

proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate reliefs
available to the petitioner; it is not an action to determine criminal guilt
requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring
preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring
substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive
[109]
proceedings. (Emphasis supplied)

Page 45 of 76
 It must be clarified, however, that the inapplicability of the doctrine of command
responsibility in an amparo proceeding does not, by any measure, preclude impleading military
or police commanders on the ground that the complained acts in the petition were committed
with their direct or indirect acquiescence. In which case, commanders may be impleadednot
actually on the basis of command responsibilitybut rather on the ground of their responsibility,
or at least accountability. In Razon v. Tagitis,[110] the distinct, but interrelated concepts of
responsibility and accountability were given special and unique significations in relation to
an amparo proceeding, to wit:

x x x Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by

substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission,
in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft,
among them, the directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against
the responsible parties in the proper courts. Accountability, on the other hand,
refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who exhibited
involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their
complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with
knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of
disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of
extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance.

Responsibility of Public Respondents

At any rate, it is clear from the records of the case that the intent of the petitioner in
impleading the public respondents is to ascribe some form of responsibility on their part, based
on her assumption that they, in one way or the other, had condoned her abduction and torture.[111]

To establish such assumption, petitioner attempted to show that it was government agents
who were behind her ordeal. Thus, the petitioner calls attention to the circumstances surrounding
her abduction and torturei.e., the forcible taking in broad daylight; use of vehicles with no license
plates; utilization of blindfolds; conducting interrogations to elicit communist inclinations; and
the infliction of physical abusewhich, according to her, is consistent with the way enforced
disappearances are being practiced by the military or other state forces.[112]

Moreover, petitioner also claims that she was held inside the military camp Fort
Magsaysaya conclusion that she was able to infer from the travel time required to reach the place
where she was actually detained, and also from the sounds of construction, gun-fire and airplanes
she heard while thereat.[113]
We are not impressed. The totality of the evidence presented by the petitioner does not
inspire reasonable conclusion that her abductors were military or police personnel and that she
was detained at Fort Magsaysay.

First. The similarity between the circumstances attending a particular case of abduction
with those surrounding previous instances of enforced disappearances does not, necessarily,
carry sufficient weight to prove that the government orchestrated such abduction. We opine that

Page 46 of 76
insofar as the present case is concerned, the perceived similarity cannot stand as substantial
evidence of the involvement of the government.

In amparo proceedings, the weight that may be accorded to parallel circumstances as

evidence of military involvement depends largely on the availability or non-availability of other
pieces of evidence that has the potential of directly proving the identity and affiliation of the
perpetrators. Direct evidence of identity, when obtainable, must be preferred over mere
circumstantial evidence based on patterns and similarity, because the former indubitably offers
greater certainty as to the true identity and affiliation of the perpetrators. An amparo court cannot
simply leave to remote and hazy inference what it could otherwise clearly and directly ascertain.

In the case at bench, petitioner was, in fact, able to include in her Offer of
Exhibits,[114] the cartographic sketches[115] of several of her abductors whose faces she managed
to see. To the mind of this Court, these cartographic sketches have the undeniable potential of
giving the greatest certainty as to the true identity and affiliation of petitioners
abductors. Unfortunately for the petitioner, this potential has not been realized in view of the fact
that the faces described in such sketches remain unidentified, much less have been shown to be
that of any military or police personnel. Bluntly stated, the abductors were not proven to be part
of either the military or the police chain of command.

Second. The claim of the petitioner that she was taken to Fort Magsaysay was not adequately
established by her mere estimate of the time it took to reach the place where she was detained
and by the sounds that she heard while thereat. Like the Court of Appeals, We are not inclined to
take the estimate and observations of the petitioner as accurate on its facenot only because they
were made mostly while she was in blindfolds, but also in view of the fact that she was a mere
sojourner in the Philippines, whose familiarity with Fort Magsaysay and the travel time required
to reach it is in itself doubtful.[116] With nothing else but obscure observations to support it,
petitioners claim that she was taken to Fort Magsaysay remains a mere speculation.

In sum, the petitioner was not able to establish to a concrete point that her abductors were
actually affiliated, whether formally or informally, with the military or the police
organizations. Neither does the evidence at hand prove that petitioner was indeed taken to the
military camp Fort Magsaysay to the exclusion of other places. These evidentiary gaps, in turn,
make it virtually impossible to determine whether the abduction and torture of the
petitioner was in fact committed with the acquiescence of the public respondents. On
account of this insufficiency in evidence, a pronouncement of responsibility on the part of the
public respondents, therefore, cannot be made.

Prayer for the Return of Personal Belongings

This brings Us to the prayer of the petitioner for the return of her personal belongings.

In its decision, the Court of Appeals denied the above prayer of the petitioner by reason
of the failure of the latter to prove that the public respondents were involved in her abduction and
Page 47 of 76
torture.[117] We agree with the conclusion of the Court of Appeals, but not entirely with the
reason used to support it. To the mind of this Court, the prayer of the petitioner for the return of
her belongings is doomed to fail regardless of whether there is sufficient evidence to hold public
respondents responsible for the abduction of the petitioner.

In the first place, an order directing the public respondents to return the personal
belongings of the petitioner is already equivalent to a conclusive pronouncement of liability. The
order itself is a substantial relief that can only be granted once the liability of the public
respondents has been fixed in a full and exhaustive proceeding. As already discussed above,
matters of liability are not determinable in a mere summary amparo proceeding.[118]

But perhaps the more fundamental reason in denying the prayer of the petitioner, lies
with the fact that a persons right to be restituted of his property is already subsumed under the
general rubric of property rightswhich are no longer protected by the writ of amparo.[119] Section
1 of the Amparo Rule,[120] which defines the scope and extent of the writ, clearly excludes the
protection of property rights.

B.

The next error raised by the petitioner is the denial by the Court of Appeals of her prayer
for an inspection of the detention areas of Fort Magsaysay.[121]

Considering the dearth of evidence concretely pointing to any military involvement in

petitioners ordeal, this Court finds no error on the part of the Court of Appeals in denying an
inspection of the military camp at Fort Magsaysay. We agree with the appellate court that a
contrary stance would be equivalent to sanctioning a fishing expedition, which was never
intended by the Amparo Rule in providing for the interim relief of inspection order.[122] Contrary
to the explicit position[123] espoused by the petitioner, the Amparo Rule does not allow a fishing
expedition for evidence.

An inspection order is an interim relief designed to give support or strengthen the claim
of a petitioner in an amparo petition, in order to aid the court before making a decision.[124] A
basic requirement before an amparo court may grant an inspection order is that the place to be
inspected is reasonably determinable from the allegations of the party seeking the order. While
the Amparo Rule does not require that the place to be inspected be identified with clarity and
precision, it is, nevertheless, a minimum for the issuance of an inspection order that the
supporting allegations of a party be sufficient in itself, so as to make a prima facie case. This, as
was shown above, petitioner failed to do.

Since the very estimates and observations of the petitioner are not strong enough to make
out a prima facie case that she was detained in Fort Magsaysay, an inspection of the military
camp cannot be ordered. An inspection order cannot issue on the basis of allegations that are, in
themselves, unreliable and doubtful.

Page 48 of 76
HABEAS DATA

As earlier intimated, the Court of Appeals granted to the petitioner the privilege of the writ
of habeas data, by enjoining the public respondents from distributing or causing the distribution
to the public any records in whatever form, reports, documents or similar papers relative to the
petitioners alleged ties with the CPP-NPA or pertinently related to her abduction and
torture. Though not raised as an issue in this appeal, this Court is constrained to pass upon and
review this particular ruling of the Court of Appeals in order to rectify, what appears to Us, an
error infecting the grant.

For the proper appreciation of the rationale used by the Court of Appeals in granting the
privilege of the writ of habeas data, We quote hereunder the relevant portion[125] of its decision:

Under these premises, Petitioner prayed that all the records, intelligence
reports and reports on the investigations conducted on Melissa C. Roxas or
Melissa Roxas be produced and eventually expunged from the records. Petitioner
claimed to be included in the Governments Order of Battle under Oplan Bantay
Laya which listed political opponents against whom false criminal charges were
filed based on made up and perjured information.

Pending resolution of this petition and before Petitioner could testify

before Us, Ex-army general Jovito Palaparan, Bantay party-list, and Pastor
Alcover of the Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy party-list held a
press conference where they revealed that they received an information from
a female NPA rebel who wanted out of the organization, that Petitioner was a
communist rebel. Alcover claimed that said information reached them thru a
letter with photo of Petitioner holding firearms at an NPA training camp and
a video CD of the training exercises.

Clearly, and notwithstanding Petitioners denial that she was the

person in said video, there were records of other investigations on Melissa C.
Roxas or Melissa Roxas which violate her right to privacy. Without a doubt,
reports of such nature have reasonable connections, one way or another, to
petitioners abduction where she claimed she had been subjected to cruelties and
dehumanizing acts which nearly caused her life precisely due to allegation of her
alleged membership in the CPP-NPA. And if said report or similar reports are to
be continuously made available to the public, Petitioners security and privacy will
certainly be in danger of being violated or transgressed by persons who have
strong sentiments or aversion against members of this group. The unregulated
dissemination of said unverified video CD or reports of Petitioners alleged ties
with the CPP-NPA indiscriminately made available for public consumption
without evidence of its authenticity or veracity certainly violates Petitioners right
to privacy which must be protected by this Court. We, thus, deem it necessary to
grant Petitioner the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Data. (Emphasis supplied).

The writ of habeas data was conceptualized as a judicial remedy enforcing the right to
privacy, most especially the right to informational privacy of individuals.[126] The writ operates
to protect a persons right to control information regarding himself, particularly in the instances
where such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful
ends.

Page 49 of 76
Needless to state, an indispensable requirement before the privilege of the writ may be extended
is the showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of the right to
privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim.[127] This, in the case at bench, the petitioner failed
to do.

The main problem behind the ruling of the Court of Appeals is that there is actually no
evidence on record that shows that any of the public respondents had violated or threatened the
right to privacy of the petitioner. The act ascribed by the Court of Appeals to the public
respondents that would have violated or threatened the right to privacy of the
petitioner, i.e., keeping records of investigations and other reports about the petitioners ties with
the CPP-NPA, was not adequately provenconsidering that the origin of such records were
virtually unexplained and its existence, clearly, only inferred by the appellate court from the
video and photograph released by Representatives Palparan and Alcover in their press
conference. No evidence on record even shows that any of the public respondents had access to
such video or photograph.

In view of the above considerations, the directive by the Court of Appeals enjoining the public
respondents from distributing or causing the distribution to the public any records in whatever
form, reports, documents or similar papers relative to the petitioners alleged ties with the CPP-
NPA, appears to be devoid of any legal basis. The public respondents cannot be ordered to
refrain from distributing something that, in the first place, it was not proven to have.

Verily, until such time that any of the public respondents were found to be actually
responsible for the abduction and torture of the petitioner, any inference regarding the existence
of reports being kept in violation of the petitioners right to privacy becomes farfetched, and
premature.
For these reasons, this Court must, at least in the meantime, strike down the grant of the
privilege of the writ of habeas data.

DISPOSITION OF THE CASE

Our review of the evidence of the petitioner, while telling of its innate insufficiency to impute
any form of responsibility on the part of the public respondents, revealed two important things
that can guide Us to a proper disposition of this case. One, that further investigation with the use
of extraordinary diligence must be made in order to identify the perpetrators behind the
abduction and torture of the petitioner; and two, that the Commission on Human Rights (CHR),
pursuant to its Constitutional mandate to investigate all forms of human rights violations
involving civil and political rights and to provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of
human rights,[128] must be tapped in order to fill certain investigative and remedial voids.

Further Investigation Must Be Undertaken

Ironic as it seems, but part and parcel of the reason why the petitioner was not able to
adduce substantial evidence proving her allegations of government complicity in her abduction
Page 50 of 76
and torture, may be attributed to the incomplete and one-sided investigations conducted by the
government itself. This awkward situation, wherein the very persons alleged to be involved in an
enforced disappearance or extralegal killing are, at the same time, the very ones tasked by law to
investigate the matter, is a unique characteristic of these proceedings and is the main source of
the evidentiary difficulties faced by any petitioner in any amparo case.[129]

Cognizant of this situation, however, the Amparo Rule placed a potent safeguardrequiring
the respondent who is a public official or employee to prove that no less than extraordinary
diligence as required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance
of duty.[130] Thus, unless and until any of the public respondents is able to show to the
satisfaction of the amparo court that extraordinary diligence has been observed in their
investigations, they cannot shed the allegations of responsibility despite the prevailing scarcity of
evidence to that effect.

With this in mind, We note that extraordinary diligence, as required by the Amparo Rule,
was not fully observed in the conduct of the police and military investigations in the case at bar.

A perusal of the investigation reports submitted by Task Group CAROJAN shows

modest effort on the part of the police investigators to identify the perpetrators of the
abduction. To be sure, said reports are replete with background checks on the victims of the
abduction, but are, at the same time, comparatively silent as to other concrete steps the
investigators have been taking to ascertain the authors of the crime. Although conducting a
background investigation on the victims is a logical first step in exposing the motive behind the
abductionits necessity is clearly outweighed by the need to identify the perpetrators, especially in
light of the fact that the petitioner, who was no longer in captivity, already came up with
allegations about the motive of her captors.

Instead, Task Group CAROJAN placed the fate of their investigations solely on the
cooperation or non-cooperation of the petitionerwho, they claim, was less than enthusiastic in
participating in their investigative efforts.[131] While it may be conceded that the participation of
the petitioner would have facilitated the progress of Task Group CAROJANs investigation, this
Court believes that the formers reticence to cooperate is hardly an excuse for Task Group
CAROJAN not to explore other means or avenues from which they could obtain relevant
leads.[132] Indeed, while the allegations of government complicity by the petitioner cannot, by
themselves, hold up as adequate evidence before a court of lawthey are, nonetheless, a vital
source of valuable investigative leads that must be pursued and verified, if only to comply with
the high standard of diligence required by the Amparo Rule in the conduct of investigations.

Assuming the non-cooperation of the petitioner, Task Group CAROJANs reports still
failed to explain why it never considered seeking the assistance of Mr. Jesus Paolowho, along
with the victims, is a central witness to the abduction. The reports of Task Group CAROJAN is
silent in any attempt to obtain from Mr. Paolo, a cartographic sketch of the abductors or, at the
very least, of the one who, by petitioners account, was not wearing any mask.

Page 51 of 76
 The recollection of Mr. Paolo could have served as a comparative material to the sketches
included in petitioners offer of exhibits that, it may be pointed out, were prepared under the
direction of, and first submitted to, the CHR pursuant to the latters independent investigation on
the abduction and torture of the petitioner.[133] But as mentioned earlier, the CHR sketches
remain to be unidentified as of this date.

In light of these considerations, We agree with the Court of Appeals that further
investigation under the norm of extraordinary diligence should be undertaken. This Court simply
cannot write finis to this case, on the basis of an incomplete investigation conducted by the
police and the military. In a very real sense, the right to security of the petitioner is continuously
put in jeopardy because of the deficient investigation that directly contributes to the delay in
bringing the real perpetrators before the bar of justice.

To add teeth to the appellate courts directive, however, We find it fitting, nay, necessary
to shift the primary task of conducting further investigations on the abduction and torture of the
petitioner upon the CHR.[134] We note that the CHR, unlike the police or the military, seems to
enjoy the trust and confidence of the petitioneras evidenced by her attendance and participation
in the hearings already conducted by the commission.[135] Certainly, it would be reasonable to
assume from such cooperation that the investigations of the CHR have advanced, or at the very
least, bears the most promise of advancing farther, in terms of locating the perpetrators of the
abduction, and is thus, vital for a final resolution of this petition. From this perspective, We also
deem it just and appropriate to relegate the task of affording interim protection to the petitioner,
also to the CHR.
Hence, We modify the directive of the Court of the Appeals for further investigation, as
follows

1.) Appointing the CHR as the lead agency tasked with conducting further investigation
regarding the abduction and torture of the petitioner. Accordingly, the CHR shall, under
the norm of extraordinary diligence, take or continue to take the necessary steps: (a) to
identify the persons described in the cartographic sketches submitted by the petitioner, as
well as their whereabouts; and (b) to pursue any other leads relevant to petitioners
abduction and torture.

2.) Directing the incumbent Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP), or his
successor, and the incumbent Chief of Staff of the AFP, or his successor, to extend
assistance to the ongoing investigation of the CHR, including but not limited to
furnishing the latter a copy of its personnel records circa the time of the petitioners
abduction and torture, subject to reasonable regulations consistent with the Constitution
and existing laws.

3.) Further directing the incumbent Chief of the PNP, or his successor, to furnish to this
Court, the Court of Appeals, and the petitioner or her representative, a copy of the reports
of its investigations and their recommendations, other than those that are already part of
the records of this case, within ninety (90) days from receipt of this decision.
Page 52 of 76
4.) Further directing the CHR to (a) furnish to the Court of Appeals within ninety (90)
days from receipt of this decision, a copy of the reports on its investigation and its
corresponding recommendations; and to (b) provide or continue to provide protection to
the petitioner during her stay or visit to the Philippines, until such time as may hereinafter
be determined by this Court.

Accordingly, this case must be referred back to the Court of Appeals, for the purposes of
monitoring compliance with the above directives and determining whether, in light of any recent
reports or recommendations, there would already be sufficient evidence to hold any of the public
respondents responsible or, at least, accountable. After making such determination, the Court of
Appeals shall submit its own report with recommendation to this Court for final action. The
Court of Appeals will continue to have jurisdiction over this case in order to accomplish its tasks
under this decision.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY MERITORIOUS. We hereby

render a decision:

1.) AFFIRMING the denial of the petitioners prayer for the return of her personal
belongings;

2.) AFFIRMING the denial of the petitioners prayer for an inspection of the detention
areas of Fort Magsaysay.

3.) REVERSING the grant of the privilege of habeas data, without prejudice, however,
to any modification that this Court may make on the basis of the investigation reports and
recommendations submitted to it under this decision.

4.) MODIFYING the directive that further investigation must be undertaken, as follows

a. APPOINTING the Commission on Human Rights as the lead agency tasked

with conducting further investigation regarding the abduction and torture of the
petitioner. Accordingly, the Commission on Human Rights shall, under the norm
of extraordinary diligence, take or continue to take the necessary steps: (a) to
identify the persons described in the cartographic sketches submitted by the
petitioner, as well as their whereabouts; and (b) to pursue any other leads relevant
to petitioners abduction and torture.

b. DIRECTING the incumbent Chief of the Philippine National Police, or his

successor, and the incumbent Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, or his successor, to extend assistance to the ongoing investigation of
the Commission on Human Rights, including but not limited to furnishing the
latter a copy of its personnel records circa the time of the petitioners abduction

Page 53 of 76
 and torture, subject to reasonable regulations consistent with the Constitution and
existing laws.

c. Further DIRECTING the incumbent Chief of the Philippine National Police, or

his successor, to furnish to this Court, the Court of Appeals, and the petitioner or
her representative, a copy of the reports of its investigations and their
recommendations, other than those that are already part of the records of this case,
within ninety (90) days from receipt of this decision.

d. Further DIRECTING the Commission on Human Rights (a) to furnish to the

Court of Appeals within ninety (90) days from receipt of this decision, a copy of
the reports on its investigation and its corresponding recommendations; and (b) to
provide or continue to provide protection to the petitioner during her stay or visit
to the Philippines, until such time as may hereinafter be determined by this Court.

5.) REFERRING BACK the instant case to the Court of Appeals for the following
purposes:

a. To MONITOR the investigations and actions taken by the PNP, AFP, and the
CHR;

b. To DETERMINE whether, in light of the reports and recommendations of the

CHR, the abduction and torture of the petitioner was committed by persons acting
under any of the public respondents; and on the basis of this determination

c. To SUBMIT to this Court within ten (10) days from receipt of the report and
recommendation of the Commission on Human Rightsits own report, which shall
include a recommendation either for the DISMISSAL of the petition as against
the public respondents who were found not responsible and/or accountable, or for
the APPROPRIATE REMEDIAL MEASURES, AS MAY BE ALLOWED
BY THE AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA RULES, TO BE
UNDERTAKEN as against those found responsible and/or accountable.

Accordingly, the public respondents shall remain personally impleaded in this petition to
answer for any responsibilities and/or accountabilities they may have incurred during their
incumbencies.

Other findings of the Court of Appeals in its Decision dated 26 August 2009 in CA-G.R.
SP No. 00036-WRA that are not contrary to this decision are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Page 54 of 76
RODOLFO NOEL LOZADA, JR., VIOLETA LOZADA and ARTURO LOZADA,
Petitioners, - versus - PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO,
EDUARDO ERMITA, AVELINO RAZON, ANGEL ATUTUBO and SPO4 ROGER
VALEROSO,* Respondents. G.R. Nos. 184379-80 Promulgated: April 24,
2012

DECISION

SERENO, J.:

What the Court decides today has nothing to do with the substance or merits surrounding
the aborted deal of the Philippine government with the National Broadband Network and ZTE
Corporation, or any allegation of petitioner Rodolfo Noel June Lozada, Jr., (Lozada) regarding
the same. There is only one issue that we decide today whether circumstances are adequately
alleged and proven by petitioner Lozada to entitle him to the protection of the writ of amparo.
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision dated 12 September 2008 of the
Court of Appeals (CA), dismissing the Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo.[1]

Petitioner Lozada was the former President and Chief Executive Officer of the Philippine
Forest Corporation (PFC), a government-owned- and -controlled corporation under the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).[2] Petitioner Violeta Lozada
(Violeta) is his wife, while petitioner Arturo Lozada (Arturo) is his brother.

At the time the Petition for the Writ of Amparo was filed, respondent former President
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (former President Arroyo) was the incumbent President of the
Philippines. Meanwhile, Eduardo Ermita (ES Ermita) was then the Executive Secretary; Avelino
Razon (Razon), the Director General of the Philippine National Police (PNP); Angel Atutubo
(Atutubo), the Assistant General Manager for Security and Emergency Services of the Manila
International Airport Authority; and Rodolfo Valeroso (Valeroso), an agent of the Aviation
Security Group (ASG) of the PNP.

Antecedent Facts

The instant Petition stems from the alleged corruption scandal precipitated by a
transaction between the Philippine government, represented by the National Broadband Network
(NBN), and ZTE Corporation (ZTE), a Chinese manufacturer of telecommunications
equipment.[3] Former National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) Secretary Romulo
Neri (Sec. Neri) sought the services of Lozada as an unofficial consultant in the ZTE-NBN
deal.[4] The latter avers that during the course of his engagement, he discovered several
anomalies in the said transaction involving certain public officials.[5] These events impelled the
Senate of the Philippines Blue Ribbon Committee (Blue Ribbon Committee) to conduct an
investigation thereon,[6] for which it issued a subpoena directing Lozada to appear and testify on
30 January 2008.[7]

Page 55 of 76
 On that date, instead of appearing before the Blue Ribbon Committee, Lozada left the
country for a purported official trip to London, as announced by then DENR Secretary Lito
Atienza (Sec. Atienza).[8] In the Petition, Lozada alleged that his failure to appear at the
scheduled hearing was upon the instructions of then Executive Assistant Undersecretary Manuel
Gaite (Usec. Gaite).[9] Consequently, the Senate issued an Order dated 30 January 2008: (a)
citing Lozada for contempt; (b) ordering his arrest and detention; and (c) directing the Senate
Sergeant-at-Arms to implement the Order and make a return thereon.[10]

While overseas, Lozada asked Sec. Atienza whether the former could be allowed to go
back to the Philippines.[11] Upon the approval of Sec. Atienza, Lozada informed his family that
he was returning from Hong Kong on 5 February 2008 on board Cathay Pacific Flight No. 919,
bound to arrive in Manila at 4:40 p.m. on the same day.[12]

In the Petition, Lozada claims that, upon disembarking from the aircraft, several men held
his arms and took his bag. Although he allegedly insisted on meeting with his family, he later
realized that it was wiser to just follow them, especially when he overheard from their handheld
radio: [H]wag kayong dumaan diyan sir nandyan ang mga taga senado.[13]

Lozada asked if he could go to the comfort room, an opportunity he used to call up his
brother, petitioner Arturo, and inform him of his situation.[14] The men thereafter led him through
the departure area of the airport and into a car waiting for them.[15] They made him sit alone at
the back of the vehicle, while a man, whom he later discovered to be respondent Valeroso, took
the passenger seat and was always in contact with other individuals.[16] Lozada observed that
other cars tailed their vehicle.[17]

Sec. Atienza then phoned Lozada, assuring the latter that he was with people from the
government, and that the former was going to confer with ES and Ma[a]m. Lozada surmised that
these individuals referred to ES Ermita and former President Arroyo, respectively.[18] Sec.
Atienza also purportedly instructed Lozada to pacify his wife, petitioner Violeta, who was
making public statements asking for her husbands return.[19]

The vehicle traversed the South Luzon Expressway and drove towards the direction of
Laguna.[20] Along the way, the men asked Lozada to draft an antedated letter requesting police
protection.[21]

Lozada requested that he be brought home to Pasig, but the men were allegedly
compelled to deny his request on account of unidentified security risks.[22] Eventually, however,
the vehicle turned around and drove to Libis, Quezon City. The group stopped at The Outback
restaurant to meet with certain individuals, who turned out to be Atty. Antonio Bautista (Atty.
Bautista) and Colonel Paul Mascarinas (Col. Mascarinas) of the Police Special Protection Office
(PSPO). At the restaurant, Lozada claimed that he was made to fill in the blanks of a prepared
affidavit.[23]

Page 56 of 76
 After the meeting, the men informed Lozada that they were going to billet him in a hotel
for a night, but he suggested that they take him to La Salle Green Hills instead. The men
acquiesced.[24]

Upon arriving in La Salle Green Hills, Lozada was met by Violeta and his sister, Carmen
Lozada (Carmen).[25] He observed that the perimeter was guarded by policemen, purportedly
restraining his liberty and threatening not only his security, but also that of his family and the De
La Salle brothers.[26]

On 6 February 2008, at around 10:00 a.m., Col. Mascarinas supposedly brought Lozada
to the office of Atty. Bautista to finalize and sign an affidavit.[27]

At about 1:00 p.m., Violeta filed before this Court a Petition for Habeas Corpus,
docketed as G.R. No. 181342 (the Habeas Corpus case).[28] Arturo likewise filed before this
Court a Petition for a Writ of Amparo, docketed as G.R. No. 181356 (the Amparo case), and
prayed for the issuance of (a) the writ of amparo; (b) a Temporary Protection Order (TPO); and
(c) Inspection and Production Orders as regards documents related to the authority ordering
custody over Lozada, as well as any other document that would show responsibility for his
alleged abduction.[29]

At around the same time that Arturo filed the Petition for a Writ of Amparo, Col.
Mascarinas drove Lozada back to La Salle Green Hills.[30] Lozada was then made to sign a
typewritten, antedated letter requesting police protection.[31] Thereafter, former Presidential
Spokesperson Michael Defensor (Sec. Defensor) supposedly came and requested Lozada to
refute reports that the latter was kidnapped and to deny knowledge of alleged anomalies in the
NBN-ZTE deal. Sec. Defensor then purportedly gave Lozada P50,000 for the latters expenses.[32]

On 7 February 2008, Lozada decided to hold a press conference and contact the Senate
Sergeant-at-Arms, who served the warrant of arrest on him.[33] Lozada claimed that after his
press conference and testimony in the Senate, he and his family were since then harassed, stalked
and threatened.[34]

On the same day, this Court issued a Resolution (a) consolidating the Habeas
Corpus case and the Amparo case; (b) requiring respondents in the Habeas Corpus case to
comment on the Petition; (c) issuing a Writ of Amparo; (d) ordering respondents in
the Amparo case to file their verified Return; (e) referring the consolidated Petitions to the CA;
and (f) directing the CA to set the cases for hearing on 14 February 2008.[35] Accordingly, the
court a quo set both cases for hearing on 14 February 2008.[36]

On 12 February 2008, respondents filed before the CA a Manifestation and Motion,

praying for the dismissal of the Habeas Corpus case.[37] They asserted that Lozada was never
illegally deprived of his liberty and was, at that time, no longer in their custody. They likewise
averred that, beginning 8 February 2008, Lozada had already been under the supervision of the
Senate and, from then on, had been testifying before it.[38]

Page 57 of 76
 In their verified Return, respondents claimed that Sec. Atienza had arranged for the
provision of a security team to be assigned to Lozada, who was then fearful for his safety.[39] In
effect, respondents asserted that Lozada had knowledge and control of the events that took place
on 5 February 2008, voluntarily entrusted himself to their company, and was never deprived of
his liberty. Hence, respondents prayed for the denial of the interim reliefs and the dismissal of
the Petition.[40]

During the initial hearing on 14 February 2008, Lozada and Violeta ratified the Petition
in the Amparo case[41] to comply with Section 2 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo,[42] which
imposes an order to be followed by those who can sue for the writ.[43] The CA also dismissed
the Habeas Corpus case in open court for being moot and academic, as Lozada was physically
present and was not confined or detained by any of the respondents.[44] Considering that
petitioners failed to question the dismissal of the Habeas Corpus case, the said dismissal had
lapsed into finality, leaving only the Amparo case open for disposition.

Thereafter, Lozada filed a Motion for Temporary Protection Order and Production of
Documents,[45] while Arturo filed a Motion for Production of Documents.[46]Additionally, Arturo
also filed a Motion for the Issuance of Subpoena Ad Testificandum and Presentation of Hostile
Witnesses and Adverse Parties Romulo Neri, Benjamin Abalos, [Sr.], Rodolfo Valeroso, Jaime
the Driver and Other Respondents. Respondents opposed these motions.[47] The CA denied the
Motion for the Issuance of Subpoena on the ground that the alleged acts and statements
attributed to Sec. Neri and Benjamin Abalos (Abalos) were irrelevant to the Amparo case, and
that to require them to testify would only result in a fishing expedition.[48] The CA likewise
denied Arturos subsequent Motion for Reconsideration.[49]

In its Resolution dated 5 March 2008, the CA dropped former President Arroyo as a
respondent on the ground that at the time the Petition in the Amparo case was filed, she was still
the incumbent President enjoying immunity from suit.[50] Arturo filed a Motion for
Reconsideration,[51] which the CA denied in its Resolution dated 25 March 2008.[52]

On 12 September 2008, the CA rendered its Decision denying petitioners the privilege of
the Writ of Amparo and dismissing the Petition.[53] The CA found that petitioners were unable to
prove through substantial evidence that respondents violated, or threatened with violation, the
right to life, liberty and security of Lozada.

Petitioners thus filed the instant Petition, praying for: (a) the reversal of the assailed CA
Decision; (b) the issuance of the TPO; and (c) the accreditation of the Association of Major
Religious Superiors of the Philippines and the De La Salle Brothers as the sanctuaries of Lozada
and his family.[54] In the alternative, petitioners pray that this Court remand the case to the CA
for further hearings and reverse the latters Orders: (a) denying the Motion to Issue a Subpoena
Ad Testificandum and (b) dropping former President Arroyo as a respondent. Petitioners raise the
following issues:

(1) Whether the Court a [q]uo erred in ruling to dismiss the

petition for a writ of amparo and deny Petitioners prayer for a Temporary

Page 58 of 76
 Protection Order, inter alia, because there is no substantial evidence to prove that
the right to life, liberty or security of Jun Lozada was violated or threatened with
violation. This rule is not in accord with the rule on the writ of amparo and
Supreme Court jurisprudence on substantial evidence[.]

(2) Whether the Ponencia erred and gravely abused its discretion
by prematurely ruling that the testimony of witnesses which Petitioners sought to
present and who are subject of the Motion for Issuance of Subpoena ad
testificandum were irrelevant to the Petition for a Writ of Amparo in a way not in
accord with the Rules of Court and Supreme Court decisions.

(3) Whether the Court a quo erred in using and considering the
affidavits of respondents in coming up with the questioned decision when these
were not offered as evidence and were not subjected to cross-examination. This
ruling is not in accord with the Rules of Court and jurisprudence.

(4) Whether the Court a [q]uo erred in dropping as respondent

Pres. Gloria Arroyo despite her failure to submit a verified return and personally
claim presidential immunity in a way not in accord with the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo.[55]

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) asserts that petitioners failed to adduce
substantial evidence, as the allegations they propounded in support of their Petition were largely
hearsay.[56] The OSG also maintains that it was proper for the CA to have dropped former
President Arroyo as respondent on account of her presidential immunity from suit.[57]

Respondent Atutubo also alleges, among others, that: (a) Lozada voluntarily asked for
security and protection; (b) Lozada willingly submitted himself to the company of the police
escorts; (c) Atutubo merely accompanied him to pass through the contingency route customarily
provided to VIP passengers, public figures, foreign dignitaries, and the like; and (d) Atutubo
only performed his job to ensure security and maintain order at the airport upon the arrival of
Lozada.[58]

In the face of these assertions by respondents, petitioners nevertheless insist that while
they have sufficiently established that Lozada was taken against his will and was put under
restraint, respondents have failed to discharge their own burden to prove that they exercised
extraordinary diligence as public officials.[59] Petitioners also maintain that it was erroneous for
the CA to have denied their motion for subpoena ad testificandum for being irrelevant, given that
the relevancy of evidence must be examined after it is offered, and not before.[60] Finally,
petitioners contend that the presidential immunity from suit cannot be invoked
in amparo actions.[61]

Page 59 of 76
Issues

In ruling on whether the CA committed reversible error in issuing its assailed Decision,
three issues must be discussed:

I. Whether the CA committed an error in dropping former President Arroyo as

a respondent in the Amparo case.

II. Whether the CA committed an error in denying petitioners Motion for the
Issuance of a Subpoena Ad Testificandum.

III. Whether petitioners should be granted the privilege of the writ of amparo.

Discussion

The writ of amparo is an independent and summary remedy that provides rapid judicial
relief to protect the peoples right to life, liberty and security.[62] Having been originally intended
as a response to the alarming cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances in the
country, it serves both preventive and curative roles to address the said human rights violations.
It is preventive in that it breaks the expectation of impunity in the commission of these offenses,
and it is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators by inevitably
leading to subsequent investigation and action.[63]

As it stands, the writ of amparo is confined only to cases of extrajudicial killings and
enforced disappearances, or to threats thereof.[64] Considering that this remedy is aimed at
addressing these serious violations of or threats to the right to life, liberty and security, it cannot
be issued on amorphous and uncertain grounds,[65] or in cases where the alleged threat has ceased
and is no longer imminent or continuing.[66] Instead, it must be granted judiciously so as not to
dilute the extraordinary and remedial character of the writ, thus:

The privilege of the writ of amparo is envisioned basically to protect and

guarantee the rights to life, liberty, and security of persons, free from fears and
threats that vitiate the quality of this life. It is an extraordinary writ conceptualized
and adopted in light of and in response to the prevalence of extra-legal killings
and enforced disappearances. Accordingly, the remedy ought to be resorted to
and granted judiciously, lest the ideal sought by the Amparo Rule be diluted
and undermined by the indiscriminate filing of amparo petitions for purposes
less than the desire to secure amparo reliefs and protection and/or on the
basis of unsubstantiated allegations.[67] (Emphasis supplied.)

Using this perspective as the working framework for evaluating the assailed CA decision
and the evidence adduced by the parties, this Court denies the Petition.

First issue: Presidential immunity from suit

Page 60 of 76
 It is settled in jurisprudence that the President enjoys immunity from suit during his or
her tenure of office or actual incumbency.[68] Conversely, this presidential privilege of immunity
cannot be invoked by a non-sitting president even for acts committed during his or her tenure.[69]

In the case at bar, the events that gave rise to the present action, as well as the filing of
the original Petition and the issuance of the CA Decision, occurred during the incumbency of
former President Arroyo. In that respect, it was proper for the court a quo to have dropped her as
a respondent on account of her presidential immunity from suit.

It must be underscored, however, that since her tenure of office has already ended, former
President Arroyo can no longer invoke the privilege of presidential immunity as a defense to
evade judicial determination of her responsibility or accountability for the alleged violation or
threatened violation of the right to life, liberty and security of Lozada.

Nonetheless, examining the merits of the case still results in the denial of the Petition on the
issue of former President Arroyos alleged responsibility or accountability. A thorough examination
of the allegations postulated and the evidence adduced by petitioners reveals their failure to
sufficiently establish any unlawful act or omission on her part that violated, or threatened with
violation, the right to life, liberty and security of Lozada. Except for the bare claims that: (a) Sec.
Atienza mentioned a certain Ma[a]m,[70] whom Lozada speculated to have referred to her, and (b)
Sec. Defensor told Lozada that the President was hurting from all the media frenzy,[71] there is
nothing in the records that would sufficiently establish the link of former President Arroyo to the
events that transpired on 5-6 February 2010, as well as to the subsequent threats that Lozada and
his family purportedly received.

Second issue: Denial of the issuance of a

subpoena ad testificandum

This Court, in Roco v. Contreras,[72] ruled that for a subpoena to issue, it must first appear
that the person or documents sought to be presented are prima facie relevant to the issue subject
of the controversy, to wit:

A subpoena is a process directed to a person requiring him to attend and to

testify at the hearing or trial of an action or at any investigation conducted under
the laws of the Philippines, or for the taking of his deposition.

In this jurisdiction, there are two (2) kinds of subpoena, to wit:

subpoena ad testificandum and subpoena duces tecum. The first is used to compel
a person to testify, while the second is used to compel the production of books,
records, things or documents therein specified. As characterized in H.C. Liebenow
vs. The Philippine Vegetable Oil Company:

The subpoena duces tecum is, in all respects, like the

ordinary subpoena ad testificandum with the exception that it
concludes with an injunction that the witness shall bring with him
and produce at the examination the books, documents, or things
described in the subpoena.

Page 61 of 76
 Well-settled is the rule that before a subpoena duces tecum may issue, the
court must first be satisfied that the following requisites are present: (1) the books,
documents or other things requested must appear prima facie relevant to the
issue subject of the controversy (test of relevancy); and (2) such books must be
reasonably described by the parties to be readily identified (test of
definiteness).[73] (Emphasis supplied.)

In the present case, the CA correctly denied petitioners Motion for the Issuance of
Subpoena Ad Testificandum on the ground that the testimonies of the witnesses sought to be
presented during trial were prima facie irrelevant to the issues of the case. The court a quo aptly
ruled in this manner:

The alleged acts and statements attributed by the petitioner to Neri and
Abalos are not relevant to the instant Amparo Petition where the issue involved is
whether or not Lozadas right to life, liberty and security was threatened or
continues to be threatened with violation by the unlawful act/s of the respondents.
Evidence, to be relevant, must have such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce
belief in its existence or nonexistence. Further, Neri, Abalos and a certain driver
Jaime are not respondents in this Amparo Petition and the vague allegations
averred in the Motion with respect to them do not pass the test of relevancy. To
Our mind, petitioner appears to be embarking on a fishing expedition. Petitioner
should present the aggrieved party [Lozada], who has been regularly attending the
hearings, to prove the allegations in the Amparo Petition, instead of dragging the
names of other people into the picture. We have repeatedly reminded the
parties, in the course of the proceedings, that the instant Amparo Petition
does not involve the investigation of the ZTE-[NBN] contract. Petitioner
should focus on the fact in issue and not embroil this Court into said ZTE-NBN
contract, which is now being investigated by the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
and the Office of the Ombudsman.[74] (Emphasis supplied.)

All the references of petitioners to either Sec. Neri or Abalos were solely with respect to
the ZTE-NBN deal, and not to the events that transpired on 5-6 February 2008, or to the ensuing
threats that petitioners purportedly received. Although the present action is rooted from the
involvement of Lozada in the said government transaction, the testimonies of Sec. Neri or
Abalos are nevertheless not prima facie relevant to the main issue of whether there was an
unlawful act or omission on the part of respondents that violated the right to life, liberty and
security of Lozada. Thus, the CA did not commit any reversible error in denying the Motion for
the Issuance of Subpoena Ad Testificandum.

Third issue: Grant of the privilege of the writ

of amparo

A. Alleged violation of or threat to the right to

life, liberty and security of Lozada

Page 62 of 76
 Sections 17 and 18 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires the parties to establish
their claims by substantial evidence,[75] or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.[76] The use of this evidentiary threshold reveals the
clear intent of the framers of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo to have the equivalent of an
administrative proceeding, albeit judicially conducted, in addressing amparo situations.[77]

In cases where the violation of the right to life, liberty or security has already ceased, it is
necessary for the petitioner in an amparo action to prove the existence of a continuing
threat.[78] Thus, this Court held in its Resolution in Razon v. Tagitis:[79]

Manalo is different from Tagitis in terms of their factual settings,

as enforced disappearance was no longer a problem in that case. The
enforced disappearance of the brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo
effectively ended when they escaped from captivity and surfaced, while
Tagitis is still nowhere to be found and remains missing more than two years after
his reported disappearance. An Amparo situation subsisted in Manalo,
however, because of the continuing threat to the brothers right to security;
the brothers claimed that since the persons responsible for their enforced
disappearance were still at large and had not been held accountable, the former
were still under the threat of being once again abducted, kept captive or even
killed, which threat constituted a direct violation of their right to security of
person.[80] (Emphasis supplied.)

In the present case, the totality of the evidence adduced by petitioners failed to meet the
threshold of substantial evidence. Sifting through all the evidence and allegations presented, the
crux of the case boils down to assessing the veracity and credibility of the parties diverging
claims as to what actually transpired on 5-6 February 2008. In this regard, this Court is in
agreement with the factual findings of the CA to the extent that Lozada was not illegally
deprived of his liberty from the point when he disembarked from the aircraft up to the time he
was led to the departure area of the airport,[81] as he voluntarily submitted himself to the custody
of respondents:

[Lozada] was one of the first few passengers to get off the plane because
he was instructed by Secretary Atienza, th[r]ough a phone call on the night of 04
February 2008, while he was still in Hong Kong, to proceed directly to the
Bureau of Immigration so that few people would notice him and he could be
facilitated in going out of the airport without any hassle from the people of the
Senate Sergeant-at-Arms. Again, [Lozada] stated that he wanted to get away from
the Senate people. [Lozada] even went to the mens room of the airport, after he
was allegedly grabbed, where he made a call to his brother Arturo, using his
Globe phone, and he was not prevented from making said call, and was simply
advised by the person who met him at the tube to (sic) sir, bilisan mo na. When
they proceeded out of the tube and while walking, [Lozada] heard from the radio
track down, wag kayo dyan, sir, nandyan yong mga taga Senado, so they took a
detour and went up to the departure area, did not go out of the normal arrival area,
and proceeded towards the elevator near the Duty Free Shop and then down

Page 63 of 76
 towards the tarmac. Since [Lozada] was avoiding the people from the Office of
the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms, said detour appears to explain why they did
not get out at the arrival area, where [Lozada] could have passed through
immigration so that his passport could be properly stamped.

This Court does not find any evidence on record that [Lozada]
struggled or made an outcry for help when he was allegedly grabbed or
abducted at the airport. [Lozada] even testified that nobody held him, and
they were not hostile to him nor shouted at him. With noon day clarity, this
Court finds that the reason why [Lozada] was fetched at the airport was to help
him avoid the Senate contingent, who would arrest and detain him at the Office of
the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms, until such time that he would appear and give his
testimony, pursuant to the Order of the Senate on the NBN-ZTE
Project. [Lozada] clearly knew this because at that time, it was still his
decision not to testify before the Senate. He agreed with that
plan.[82](Emphases supplied.)

The foregoing statements show that Lozada personally sought the help of Sec. Atienza to
avoid the Senate personnel, and thus knew that the men who met him at the airport were there to
aid him in such objective. Surely, the actions of Lozada evinced knowledge and voluntariness,
uncharacteristic of someone who claims to have been forcibly abducted.

However, these mens subsequent acts of directing Lozada to board the vehicle and
driving him around, without disclosing the exact purpose thereof, appear to be beyond what he
had consented to and requested from Sec. Atienza. These men neither informed him of where he
was being transported nor provided him complete liberty to contact his family members to assure
them of his safety. These acts demonstrated that he lacked absolute control over the situation, as
well as an effective capacity to challenge their instructions.

Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that if Lozada had in fact been illegally restrained,
so much so that his right to liberty and security had been violated, the acts that manifested this
restraint had already ceased and has consequently rendered the grant of the privilege of the
writ of amparo moot. Whether or not Lozada was deprived of his liberty from the point when he
was led inside the vehicle waiting for him at the airport up to the time he was taken to La Salle
Green Hills, petitioners assertions that Lozada and his family continue to suffer various threats
from respondents remain unproven. The CA correctly found as follows:

The supposed announcement of General Razon over the radio that

[Lozada] was in the custody of the PNP can neither be construed as a threat to
[Lozadas] life, liberty and security. Certainly, no person in his right mind would
make that kind of media announcement if his intent was indeed to threaten
somebodys life, liberty and security.

xxx xxx xxx

He claims that he is threatened by the alleged presence of armed men

riding in motorcycle passing outside the De La Salle premises where he and his

Page 64 of 76
 family are staying and by alleged threats of armed men around him at places
where he went to. Again, these alleged threats were not proven by any evidence
at all, as having originated from any of the respondents.

[Lozada] also considers the installation of the surveillance camera at

the De La Salle and at St. Scholastica as indirect threat to his right to life,
liberty and security. He claims that these are spy cameras. However, save for
[Lozadas] self-serving claim, he simply failed to prove that they were installed
or ordered installed by the respondents for the purpose of threatening his right
to life, liberty and security.

[Lozada] further maintains that there is an alleged trend, i.e., wherever he

goes, there is a bomb threat. There were bomb threats in the places where he
went to like in [the Polytechnic University of the Philippines], Dagupan, Cebu
and Bohol. However, [Lozada] himself testified that he did not try to ascertain
where the bomb threats emanated. Plainly, there is no evidence on record that
the bomb threats were made by the respondents or done upon their
instigation.

Moreover, [Lozada] views the pronouncement of the Secretary of Justice

that he was put on the watch list of the Bureau of Immigration as a threat to his
life, liberty and security. This alleged threat is again unsupported by evidence, as
in fact, [Lozada] testified that he did not ascertain from the Bureau of
Immigration whether his name was actually in the official watch list of the
Bureau. At any rate, the Secretary of Justice is not one of the respondents in
the amparo petition, and there is no showing in the record that it was the
respondents who ordered the same for the purpose of threatening him.

[Lozada] harps on the filing of alleged frivolous cases against him and
his family as threat to his life, liberty and security. xxx However, [Lozada]
himself testified that he does not know whether the respondents or any of the
respondents ordered the filing of these cases against him. In any event, said
purported cases are to be determined based on their own merits and are
clearly beyond the realm of the instant amparo petition filed against the
respondents.[83] (Emphasis supplied.)

Finally, petitioners insist that while they were able to sufficiently establish their case by
the required evidentiary standard, respondents failed to discharge their burden to prove their
defenses by substantial evidence and to show that respondents exercised extraordinary diligence
as required by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.[84] This Court has squarely passed upon this
contention in Yano v. Sanchez,[85] to wit:

The failure to establish that the public official observed extraordinary

diligence in the performance of duty does not result in the automatic grant of the
privilege of the amparo writ. It does not relieve the petitioner from establishing
his or her claim by substantial evidence.

Page 65 of 76
 Thus, in amparo actions, petitioners must establish their claims by substantial evidence,
and they cannot merely rely on the supposed failure of respondents to prove either their defenses
or their exercise of extraordinary diligence. In this case, the totality of the evidence presented by
petitioners fails to meet the requisite evidentiary threshold, and the privilege of the writ
of amparo has already been rendered moot and academic by the cessation of the restraint to
Lozadas liberty.

B. Propriety of the privilege of the writ

of amparo and its interim reliefs

As previously discussed, there is no basis to grant Lozada the privilege of the writ
of amparo, considering that the illegal restraint alleged in this case had already ceased and there
is no imminent or continuing restriction on his liberty. In Castillo v. Cruz,[86] this Court held as
follows:

Although respondents release from confinement does not necessarily

hinder supplication for the writ of amparo, absent any evidence or even an
allegation in the petition that there is undue and continuing restraint on their
liberty, and/or that there exists threat or intimidation that destroys the efficacy of
their right to be secure in their persons, the issuance of the writ cannot be
justified. (Emphasis supplied.)

Further, it appears that Lozada had already filed before the Department of Justice (DOJ) a
Complaint charging respondents with kidnapping and attempted murder, docketed as I.S. No.
2008-467.[87] In this regard, this Courts ruling in Rubrico v. Arroyo[88] is worth considering:

First, a criminal complaint for kidnapping and, alternatively, for

arbitrary detention rooted in the same acts and incidents leading to the filing
of the subject amparo petition has been instituted with the OMB, docketed as
OMB-P-C-O7-0602-E. The usual initial steps to determine the existence of
a prima facie case against the five (5) impleaded individuals suspected to be
actually involved in the detention of Lourdes have been set in motion. It must be
pointed out, though, that the filing of the OMB complaint came before the
effectivity of the Amparo Rule on October 24, 2007.

Second, Sec. 22 of the Amparo Rule proscribes the filing of

an amparo petition should a criminal action have, in the meanwhile, been
commenced. The succeeding Sec. 23, on the other hand, provides that when the
criminal suit is filed subsequent to a petition for amparo, the petition shall be
consolidated with the criminal action where the Amparo Rule shall nonetheless
govern the disposition of the relief under the Rule. Under the terms of said Sec.
22, the present petition ought to have been dismissed at the outset. But as things
stand, the outright dismissal of the petition by force of that section is no longer
technically feasible in light of the interplay of the following factual mix: (1) the
Court has, pursuant to Sec. 6 of the Rule, already issued ex parte the writ
of amparo; (2) the CA, after a summary hearing, has dismissed the petition, but
not on the basis of Sec. 22; and (3) the complaint in OMB-P-C-O7-0602-E named
as respondents only those believed to be the actual abductors of Lourdes, while
the instant petition impleaded, in addition, those tasked to investigate the
kidnapping and detention incidents and their superiors at the top. Yet, the acts

Page 66 of 76
 and/or omissions subject of the criminal complaint and the amparo petition are so
linked as to call for the consolidation of both proceedings to obviate the mischief
inherent in a multiplicity-of-suits situation.

Given the above perspective and to fully apply the beneficial nature of the
writ of amparo as an inexpensive and effective tool to protect certain rights
violated or threatened to be violated, the Court hereby adjusts to a degree the
literal application of Secs. 22 and 23 of the Amparo Rule to fittingly address the
situation obtaining under the premises. Towards this end, two things are at once
indicated: (1) the consolidation of the probe and fact-finding aspects of the instant
petition with the investigation of the criminal complaint before the OMB; and (2)
the incorporation in the same criminal complaint of the allegations in this petition
bearing on the threats to the right to security. Withal, the OMB should be
furnished copies of the investigation reports to aid that body in its own
investigation and eventual resolution of OMB-P-C-O7-0602-E. Then, too, the
OMB shall be given easy access to all pertinent documents and evidence, if any,
adduced before the CA. Necessarily, Lourdes, as complainant in OMB-P-C-O7-
0602-E, should be allowed, if so minded, to amend her basic criminal complaint if
the consolidation of cases is to be fully effective. (Emphasis supplied.)

Thus, if the Complaint filed before the DOJ had already progressed into a criminal case,
then the latter action can more adequately dispose of the allegations made by petitioners. After
all, one of the ultimate objectives of the writ of amparo as a curative remedy is to facilitate the
subsequent punishment of perpetrators.[89] On the other hand, if there is no actual criminal case
lodged before the courts, then the denial of the Petition is without prejudice to the filing of the
appropriate administrative, civil or criminal case, if applicable, against those individuals whom
Lozada deems to have unduly restrained his liberty.

Finally, with respect to the interim reliefs sought by petitioners, this Court, in Yano v.
Sanchez,[90] declined to grant the prayer for the issuance of a TPO, as well as Inspection and
Production Orders, upon a finding that the implicated public officials were not accountable for
the disappearance subject of that case. Analogously, it would be incongruous to grant herein
petitioners prayer for a TPO and Inspection and Production Orders and at the same time rule that
there no longer exists any imminent or continuing threat to Lozadas right to life, liberty and
security. Thus, there is no basis on which a prayer for the issuance of these interim reliefs can be
anchored.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for being moot and academic. The Court
of Appeals denial of the privilege of the writ of amparo is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Page 67 of 76
 REVEREND FATHER ROBERT P. REYES, Petitioner, - versus - COURT OF
APPEALS, SECRETARY RAUL M. GONZALEZ, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, AND COMMISSIONER
MARCELINO C. LIBANAN, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE COMMISSIONER OF THE
BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, Respondents. G. R. No. 182161 Promulgated:
December 3, 2009
x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

For resolution is the petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
February 4, 2008 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. No. 00011 which
dismissed the petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo under A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, as
amended. It also assails the CAs Resolution dated March 25, 2008, denying petitioners motion
for reconsideration of the aforesaid February 4, 2008 Decision.

The undisputed facts as found by the CA are as follows:

Petitioner was among those arrested in the Manila Peninsula Hotel siege
on November 30, 2007. In the morning of November 30, 2007, petitioner together
with fifty (50) others, were brought to Camp Crame to await inquest
proceedings. In the evening of the same day, the Department of Justice (DOJ)
Panel of Prosecutors, composed of Emmanuel Y. Velasco, Phillip L. Dela Cruz
and Aristotle M. Reyes, conducted inquest proceedings to ascertain whether or
not there was probable cause to hold petitioner and the others for trial on charges
of Rebellion and/or Inciting to Rebellion.

On December 1, 2007, upon the request of the Department of Interior and

Local Government (DILG), respondent DOJ Secretary Raul Gonzales issued Hold
Departure Order (HDO) No. 45 ordering respondent Commissioner of
Immigration to include in the Hold Departure List of the Bureau of Immigration
and Deportation (BID) the name of petitioner and 49 others relative to the
aforementioned case in the interest of national security and public safety.

On December 2, 2007, after finding probable cause against petitioner and

36 others for the crime of Rebellion under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code,
the DOJ Panel of Prosecutors filed an Information docketed as I.S. No. 2007-1045
before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 150 of Makati City.

On December 7, 2007, petitioner filed a Motion for Judicial Determination

of Probable Cause and Release of the Accused Fr. Reyes Upon Recognizance
asserting that the DOJ panel failed to produce any evidence indicating his specific
participation in the crime charged; and that under the Constitution, the
determination of probable cause must be made personally by a judge.

On December 13, 2007, the RTC issued an Order dismissing the charge
for Rebellion against petitioner and 17 others for lack of probable cause. The trial
court ratiocinated that the evidence submitted by the DOJ Panel of Investigating
Prosecutors failed to show that petitioner and the other accused-civilians
conspired and confederated with the accused-soldiers in taking arms against the
government; that petitioner and other accused-civilians were arrested because

Page 68 of 76
they ignored the call of the police despite the deadline given to them to come out
from the 2ndFloor of the Hotel and submit themselves to the police authorities;
that mere presence at the scene of the crime and expressing ones sentiments on
electoral and political reforms did not make them conspirators absent concrete
evidence that the accused-civilians knew beforehand the intent of the accused-
soldiers to commit rebellion; and that the cooperation which the law penalizes
must be one that is knowingly and intentionally rendered.

On December 18, 2007, petitioners counsel Atty. Francisco L. Chavez

wrote the DOJ Secretary requesting the lifting of HDO No. 45 in view of the
dismissal of Criminal Case No. 07-3126.

On even date, Secretary Gonzales replied to petitioners letter stating that

the DOJ could not act on petitioners request until Atty. Chavezs right to represent
petitioner is settled in view of the fact that a certain Atty. J. V. Bautista
representing himself as counsel of petitioner had also written a letter to the DOJ.

On January 3, 2008, petitioner filed the instant petition claiming that

despite the dismissal of the rebellion case against petitioner, HDO No. 45 still
subsists; that on December 19, 2007, petitioner was held by BID officials at the
NAIA as his name is included in the Hold Departure List; that had it not been for
the timely intervention of petitioners counsel, petitioner would not have been able
to take his scheduled flight to Hong Kong; that on December 26, 2007, petitioner
was able to fly back to the Philippines from Hong Kong but every time petitioner
would present himself at the NAIA for his flights abroad, he stands to be detained
and interrogated by BID officers because of the continued inclusion of his name
in the Hold Departure List; and that the Secretary of Justice has not acted on his
request for the lifting of HDO No. 45. Petitioner further maintained that
immediate recourse to the Supreme Court for the availment of the writ is exigent
as the continued restraint on petitioners right to travel is illegal.

On January 24, 2008, respondents represented by the Office of the

Solicitor General (OSG) filed the Return of the Writ raising the following
affirmative defenses: 1) that the Secretary of Justice is authorized to issue Hold
Departure Orders under the DOJ Circulars No. 17, Series of 1998[2] and No. 18
Series of 2007[3] pursuant to his mandate under the Administrative Code of 1987
as ahead of the principal law agency of the government; 2) that HDO No. 45
dated December 1, 2007 was issued by the Sec. Gonzales in the course of the
preliminary investigation of the case against herein petitioner upon the request of
the DILG; 3) that the lifting of HDO No. 45 is premature in view of public
respondents pending Motion for Reconsideration dated January 3, 2008 filed by
the respondents of the Order dated December 13, 2007 of the RTC dismissing
Criminal Case No. 07-3126 for Rebellion for lack of probable cause; 4) that
petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies by filing a motion to lift HDO
No. 45 before the DOJ; and 5) that the constitutionality of Circulars No. 17 and
18 can not be attacked collaterally in an amparo proceeding.

During the hearing on January 25, 2008 at 10:00 a.m. at the Paras Hall of
the Court of Appeals, counsels for both parties appeared. Petitioners counsel Atty.
Francisco Chavez manifested that petitioner is currently in Hong Kong; that every
time petitioner would leave and return to the country, the immigration officers at
the NAIA detain and interrogate him for several minutes because of the existing
HDO; that the power of the DOJ Secretary to issue HDO has no legal basis; and
that petitioner did not file a motion to lift the HDO before the RTC nor the DOJ
because to do so would be tantamount to recognizing the power of the DOJ
Secretary to issue HDO.

Page 69 of 76
 For respondents part, the Office of the Solicitor-General (OSG)
maintained that the Secretary of the DOJs power to issue HDO springs from its
mandate under the Administrative Code to investigate and prosecute offenders as
the principal law agency of the government; that in its ten-year existence, the
constitutionality of DOJ Circular No. 17 has not been challenged except now; and
that on January 3, 2008, the DOJ Panel of Investigating Prosecutors had filed a
Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of Dismissal of the trial court.

On February 1, 2008, petitioner filed a Manifestation attaching thereto a

copy of the Order dated January 31, 2008 of the trial court denying respondent
DOJs Motion for Reconsideration for utter lack of merit. The trial court also
observed that the said Motion should be dismissed outright for being filed out of
time. [4]

The petition for a writ of amparo is anchored on the ground that respondents violated
petitioners constitutional right to travel. Petitioner argues that the DOJ Secretary has no power to
issue a Hold Departure Order (HDO) and the subject HDO No. 45 has no legal basis since
Criminal Case No. 07-3126 has already been dismissed.

On February 4, 2008, the CA rendered the assailed Decision dismissing the petition and
denying the privilege of the writ of amparo.

Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration[5] thereon was also denied in the assailed
Resolution[6] dated March 25, 2008.

Hence, the present petition which is based on the following grounds:

I.

THE DOJ SECRETARYS ARROGATION OF POWER AND

USURPATION OF AUTHORITY TO ISSUE A HOLD DEPARTURE ORDER
CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED THROUGH A RATIONALE THAT IT HAS
SUPPOSEDLY BEEN REGULARLY EXERCISED IN THE PAST OR HAS
NEVER BEEN QUESTIONED (IN THE PAST).

II.

THE DOJ HAS CLAIMED A POWER TO ISSUE AN HDO

INDEPENDENT OF THAT OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS, HENCE,
PETITIONER CANNOT MERELY RELY ON THE RESIDUAL POWER OF
THE RTC MAKATI IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 07-3126 TO ASSAIL SUCH
CLAIMED POWER.

III.

THE UTMOST EXIGENCY OF THE PETITION IS EXEMPLIFIED BY

THE CONTINUING ACTUAL RESTRAINT ON PETITIONERS RIGHT TO
TRAVEL THROUGH THE MAINTENANCE OF HIS NAME IN THE HDO
LIST AND DOES NOT SIMPLY HINGE ON THE QUESTION OF WHETHER
OR NOT PETITIONER WAS ABLE TO TRAVEL DESPITE SUCH A
RESTRAINT.

Page 70 of 76
 IV.

DOJ CIRCULAR 17 SERIES OF 1998 PROVIDES NO STATUTORY

BASIS FOR THE DOJ SECRETARYS CLAIMED POWER TO ISSUE AN
HDO FOR IT IS NOT A STATUTE. THE CIRCULAR ITSELF APPEARS NOT
TO BE BASED ON ANY STATUTE, HENCE, IT DOES NOT HAVE THE
FORCE OF LAW AND NEED NOT BE ATTACKED IN A DIRECT
PROCEEDING.[7]

Petitioner maintains that the writ of amparo does not only exclusively apply to situations
of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances but encompasses the whole gamut of
liberties protected by the Constitution. Petitioner argues that [liberty] includes the right to exist
and the right to be free from arbitrary personal restraint or servitude and includes the right of the
citizens to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways. Part of the right to liberty guaranteed by
the Constitution is the right of a person to travel.

In their Comment,[8] both respondents Secretary Gonzalez and Commissioner Libanan

argue that: 1) HDO No. 45 was validly issued by the Secretary of Justice in accordance with
Department of Justice Circular No. 17, Series of 1998,[9] and Circular No. 18, Series of
2007,[10] which were issued pursuant to said Secretarys mandate under the Administrative Code
of 1987, as head of the principal law agency of the government, to investigate the commission of
crimes, prosecute offenders, and provide immigration regulatory services; and; 2) the issue of the
constitutionality of the DOJ Secretarys authority to issue hold departure orders under DOJ
Circulars Nos. 17 and 18 is not within the ambit of a writ of amparo.

The case hinges on the issue as to whether or not petitioners right to liberty has been
violated or threatened with violation by the issuance of the subject HDO, which would entitle
him to the privilege of the writ of amparo.

The petition must fail.

Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides:

SECTION 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy

available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or
threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private individual or entity.

The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or

threats thereof.

The Court, in Secretary of National Defense et al. v. Manalo et al.,[11] made a categorical
pronouncement that the Amparo Rule in its present form is confined to these two instances of
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, or to threats thereof, thus:

Page 71 of 76
 x x x As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, its coverage, in its present form,
is confined to these two instances or to threats thereof. Extralegal killings are
killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or
judicial proceedings. On the other hand, enforced disappearances are attended by
the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a
government official or organized groups or private individuals acting with the
direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to
disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to
acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the
protection of law.[12]

In Tapuz v. Del Rosario,[13] the Court laid down the basic principle regarding the rule on
the writ of amparo as follows:

To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived as
a response to the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced
disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and effective remedies to
address these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address violations of or
threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and
independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as
a remedy supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns
that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on
amorphous and uncertain grounds. Consequently, the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo in line with the extraordinary character of the writ and the reasonable
certainty that its issuance demands requires that every petition for the issuance of
the writ must be supported by justifying allegations of fact, to wit:

(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner;

(b) The name and personal circumstances of the respondent

responsible for the threat, act or omission, or, if the name is
unknown or uncertain, the respondent may be described by an
assumed appellation;

(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved

party violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission of the respondent, and how such threat or violation is
committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting
affidavits;

(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the

names, personal circumstances, and addresses of the investigating
authority or individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of the
investigation, together with any report;

(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to

determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the
identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission;
and

(f) The relief prayed for.

The petition may include a general prayer for other just and
equitable reliefs.[14]

Page 72 of 76
 The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima
facie existence of the ultimate facts determinable from the supporting affidavits
that detail the circumstances of how and to what extent a threat to or violation of
the rights to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party was or is being
committed. (Emphasis supplied)

Here, petitioner invokes this extraordinary remedy of the writ of amparo for the protection
of his right to travel. He insists that he is entitled to the protection covered by the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo because the HDO is a continuing actual restraint on his right to travel. The Court is
thus called upon to rule whether or not the right to travel is covered by the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo.

The rights that fall within the protective mantle of the Writ of Amparo under Section 1 of
the Rules thereon are the following: (1) right to life; (2) right to liberty; and (3) right to security.

In Secretary of National Defense et al. v. Manalo et al.,[15] the Court explained the
concept of right to life in this wise:

While the right to life under Article III, Section 1 guarantees essentially
the right to be alive- upon which the enjoyment of all other rights is
preconditioned - the right to security of person is a guarantee of the secure quality
of this life, viz: The life to which each person has a right is not a life lived in fear
that his person and property may be unreasonably violated by a powerful
ruler. Rather, it is a life lived with the assurance that the government he
established and consented to, will protect the security of his person and property.
The ideal of security in life and property pervades the whole history of man. It
touches every aspect of mans existence. In a broad sense, the right to security of
person emanates in a persons legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his
limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation. It includes the right to exist, and
the right to enjoyment of life while existing, and it is invaded not only by a
deprivation of life but also of those things which are necessary to the enjoyment
of life according to the nature, temperament, and lawful desires of the
individual.[16]

The right to liberty, on the other hand, was defined in the City of Manila, et al. v. Hon.
Laguio, Jr.,[17] in this manner:

Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm

to include the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or
servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint
of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy
the facilities with which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such
restraint as are necessary for the common welfare. x x x

Secretary of National Defense et al. v. Manalo et al.[18] thoroughly expounded on the

import of the right to security, thus:

A closer look at the right to security of person would yield various

permutations of the exercise of this right.

Page 73 of 76
First, the right to security of person is freedom from fear. In its whereas
clauses, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) enunciates that a
world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief
and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of
the common people. (emphasis supplied) Some scholars postulate that freedom
from fear is not only an aspirational principle, but essentially an individual
international human right. It is the right to security of person as the word security
itself means freedom from fear. Article 3 of the UDHR provides, viz:

Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of

person.
xxx

The Philippines is a signatory to both the UDHR and the ICCPR.

In the context of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, freedom from fear is the
right and any threat to the rights to life, liberty or security is the actionable
wrong. Fear is a state of mind, a reaction; threat is a stimulus, a cause of
action. Fear caused by the same stimulus can range from being baseless to well-
founded as people react differently. The degree of fear can vary from one person
to another with the variation of the prolificacy of their imagination, strength of
character or past experience with the stimulus. Thus, in the amparo context, it is
more correct to say that the right to security is actually the freedom from
threat. Viewed in this light, the threatened with violation Clause in the latter part
of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule is a form of violation of the right to security
mentioned in the earlier part of the provision.

Second, the right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and

psychological integrity or security. Article III, Section II of the 1987
Constitution guarantees that, as a general rule, ones body cannot be searched or
invaded without a search warrant. Physical injuries inflicted in the context of
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances constitute more than a search or
invasion of the body. It may constitute dismemberment, physical disabilities, and
painful physical intrusion. As the degree of physical injury increases, the danger
to life itself escalates.Notably, in criminal law, physical injuries constitute a crime
against persons because they are an affront to the bodily integrity or security of a
person.

xxx

Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of

ones rights by the government. In the context of the writ of amparo, this right
is built into the guarantees of the right to life and liberty under Article III,
Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and the right to security of person (as
freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity) under
Article III, Section 2. The right to security of person in this third sense is a
corollary of the policy that the State guarantees full respect for human rights
under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. As the government is the
chief guarantor of order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to
life, liberty and security of person is rendered ineffective if government does not
afford protection to these rights especially when they are under threat. Protection
includes conducting effective investigations, organization of the government
apparatus to extend protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced
disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their families, and bringing offenders to
the bar of justice. x x x (emphasis supplied)[19]

Page 74 of 76
 The right to travel refers to the right to move from one place to another.[20] As we have
stated in Marcos v. Sandiganbayan,[21] xxx a persons right to travel is subject to the usual
constraints imposed by the very necessity of safeguarding the system of justice. In such cases,
whether the accused should be permitted to leave the jurisdiction for humanitarian reasons is a
matter of the courts sound discretion. [22]

Here, the restriction on petitioners right to travel as a consequence of the pendency of the
criminal case filed against him was not unlawful. Petitioner has also failed to establish that his
right to travel was impaired in the manner and to the extent that it amounted to a serious
violation of his right to life, liberty and security, for which there exists no readily available legal
recourse or remedy.

In Canlas et al. v. Napico Homeowners Association I XIII, Inc. et al.,[23] this Court ruled
that:

This new remedy of writ of amparo which is made available by this Court
is intended for the protection of the highest possible rights of any person, which is
his or her right to life, liberty and security. The Court will not spare any time or
effort on its part in order to give priority to petitions of this nature. However, the
Court will also not waste its precious time and effort on matters not covered by
the writ.

We find the direct recourse to this Court inappropriate, considering the provision of
Section 22 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo which reads:

Section 22. Effect of Filing of a Criminal Action. When a criminal action

has been commenced, no separate petition for the writ shall be filed. The reliefs
under the writ shall be available by motion in the criminal case.

The procedure under this Rule shall govern the disposition of the reliefs
available under the writ of amparo.

Pursuant to the aforementioned Section 22, petitioner should have filed with the RTC-
Makati a motion to lift HDO No. 45 in Criminal Case No. 07-3126. Petitioner, however, did not
file in the RTC-Makati a motion to lift the DOJs HDO, as his co-accused did in the same
criminal case. Petitioner argues that it was not the RTC-Makati but the DOJ that issued the said
HDO, and that it is his intention not to limit his remedy to the lifting of the HDO but also to
question before this Court the constitutionality of the power of the DOJ Secretary to issue an
HDO.[24] We quote with approval the CAs ruling on this matter:

The said provision [Section 22] is an affirmation by the Supreme Court of

its pronouncement in Crespo v. Mogul[25] that once a complaint or information is
filed in court, any disposition of the case such as its dismissal or its continuation
rests on the sound discretion of the court. Despite the denial of respondents MR of
the dismissal of the case against petitioner, the trial court has not lost control over
Criminal Case No. 07-3126 which is still pending before it. By virtue of its
residual power, the court a quo retains the authority to entertain incidents in the
instant case to the exclusion of even this Court. The relief petitioner seeks which

Page 75 of 76
 is the lifting of the HDO was and is available by motion in the criminal case. (Sec.
22, Rule on the Writ of amparo, supra).[26]

Even in civil cases pending before the trial courts, the Court has no authority to
separately and directly intervene through the writ of amparo, as elucidated in Tapuz v. Del
Rosario,[27] thus:

Where, as in this case, there is an ongoing civil process dealing directly

with the possessory dispute and the reported acts of violence and harassment, we
see no point in separately and directly intervening through a writ of amparo in the
absence of any clear prima facie showing that the right to life, liberty or
personal
in danger or threatened, or that the danger or threat is continuing. We see no legal
bar, however, to an application for the issuance of the writ, in a proper case, by
motion in a pending case on appeal or on certiorari, applying by analogy the
provisions on the co-existence of the writ with a separately filed criminal case.

Additionally, petitioner is seeking the extraordinary writ of amparo due to his

apprehension that the DOJ may deny his motion to lift the HDO.[28] Petitioners apprehension is at
best merely speculative. Thus, he has failed to show any clear threat to his right to liberty
actionable through a petition for a writ of amparo. The absence of an actual controversy also
renders it unnecessary for us on this occasion to pass upon the constitutionality of DOJ Circular
No. 17, Series of 1998 (Prescribing Rules and Regulations Governing the Issuance of Hold
Departure Orders); and Circular No. 18, Series of 2007 (Prescribing Rules and Regulations
Governing the Issuance and Implementation of Watchlist Orders and for Other Purposes).

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision of the CA dated

February 4, 2008 in CA-G.R. No. 00011 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Page 76 of 76