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THE A POSTERIORI QUIA DEMONSTRATION OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

Paul Gerard Horrigan, Ph.D., 2016.

Demonstration

There are two types of demonstration1: the quia demonstration (which goes from the
effects to the causes) and the propter quid demonstration (which goes from causes to effects).2
St. Thomas explains these two types of demonstration for us in his Summa Theologiae, and then
affirms the possibility of an a posteriori demonstration of Gods existence: Demonstration can
be made in two ways. One is through the cause, and is called propter quid, and this is to argue
from what is prior absolutely. The other is through the effect, and is called a demonstration quia.
This is to argue from what is prior relatively only to us. When an effect is better known to us
than its cause, from the effect we proceed to the knowledge of the cause. And from every effect
the existence of its proper cause can be demonstrated, so long as its effects are better known to
us, because since every effect depends upon its cause, if the effect exists, the cause must pre-
exist. Hence the existence of God, in so far as it is not self-evident to us, can be demonstrated
from those of His effects which are known to us.3

The demonstration propter quid (a priori) consists in demonstrating the effects and
properties of something on the basis of the cause or nature, which is more known to us.4 In the a
priori demonstration (also called deduction), the process of demonstration starts from what is
prior in essendo and also in cognoscendo, to what is posterior by nature. The instrument of
demonstration is a cause, a definition, or a general principle. Mathematics is essentially a
1
Studies on demonstration in Aristotle: O. BENNETT, The Nature of Demonstrative Proof According to the
Principles of Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas, Catholic University Press, Washington, D.C., 1943 ; Y. R. SIMON
and K. MENGER, Aristotelian Demonstration and Postulational Method, The Modern Schoolman, 25 (1947-48),
pp. 183-192 ; E. SIMMONS, Demonstration and Self-Evidence, The Thomist, 24 (1961), pp. 139-162 ; J.
BARNES, Aristotles Theory of Demonstration, Phronesis, 14 (1969), pp. 123-152 ; B. T. WILKINS, Aristotle on
Scientific Explanation, Dialogue, 9 (1970), pp. 337-355 ; B. A. BRODY, Towards an Aristotelian Theory of
Scientific Explanation, Philosophy of Science, 39 (1972), pp. 20-31 ; J. JOPE, Subordinate Demonstrative Science
in the Sixth Book of Aristotles Physics, Classical Quarterly, 22 (1972), pp. 279-292 ; D. J. HADGOPOULOS,
Demonstration and the Second Figure in Aristotle, The New Scholasticism, 49 (1975), pp. 62-75 ; H. S.
THAYER, Aristotle on the Meaning of Science, Philosophical Inquiry, 1 (1979), pp. 87-104 ; T. V. UPTON,
Imperishable Being and the Role of Technical Hypotheses in Aristotelian Demonstration, Nature and System, 2
(1980), pp. 91-99 ; J. HINTIKKA, Aristotelian Induction, Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 34 (1980), pp.
422-439 ; J. BARNES, Proof and the Syllogism, in Aristotle on Science: The Posterior Analytics, Proceedings of
the Eighth Symposium Aristotelicum, Padua, 1981, pp. 1-59 ; M. T. FREEJOHN, Definition and the Two Stages of
Aristotelian Demonstration, Review of Metaphysics, 36 (1982), pp. 375-395 ; A. CASSINI, La funcin de la
teoria de la demonstracin scientifica en Aristoteles, Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofia, 14 (1988), pp. 165-
177.
Studies on demonstration in St. Thomas: O. BENNETT, St. Thomas Theory of the Demonstrative Proof,
Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, 16 (1941), pp. 76-88 ; J. F. ANDERSON, On
Demonstration in Thomistic Metaphysics, The New Scholasticism, 32 (1958), pp. 476-494.
2
Cf. D. MERCIER, Manual of Modern Thomistic Philosophy, volume 2, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co.,
London, 1938, p. 184.
3
Summa Theologiae, I, q. 2, a. 2, c.
4
For an in-depth study of this demonstration, see: E. CHAVARRI, Naturaleza de la demostracin propter quid en
los Analiticos Posteriores, Estudios Filosoficos, 20 (1971), pp. 39-90; 21 (1972), pp. 3-58, 283-338, 559-585.

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deductive science for its demonstrations are basically propter quid (a priori). In certain instances
what is better known to us is also more knowable by nature and in itself. Such is the case with
the science of mathematics; by reason of its abstraction from matter, it carries out its
demonstrations only on the basis of formal principles. Hence, mathematical demonstrations
begin with what is more knowable in itself.5

On the other hand, the demonstration quia (a posteriori) demonstrates the existence of a
cause by using its effects, which are more known to us, as the point of departure. Such a
demonstration begins with what is posterior in essendo and ends with what is anterior in essendo,
as what is posterior by nature comes first in cognoscendo. This effect-to-cause demonstration
is called quia because what the conclusion does is to affirm the existence of the cause because
(quia) of the existence of the effect. The quia demonstration is also called a posteriori for it
begins with what is posterior in the ontological order (the order of being or reality). In itself, a
cause is prior to its effect, but in a demonstration we must start with whatever is prior as far as
concerns us. Thus, when the effects are more evident to us than the cause, we proceed from
knowledge of the effects to knowledge of the cause. It is possible to demonstrate the existence of
a cause starting from its effects for since every effect depends upon its cause, every effect must
presuppose the existence of its cause. Therefore, the existence of God (not self-evident with
regard to ourselves), can be demonstrated through His effects which are evident to us.

The A Posteriori Demonstration of the Existence of God

Essential Points to Remember for Any A Posteriori Quia Effect to Cause Demonstration
of Gods Existence. The a posteriori effect to cause demonstrations of the existence of God are
not simple demonstrations that any ordinary person on the street can perform; rather, the five
ways require an adequate understanding of the fundamental points of realist metaphysics, such as
the transcendental structure of being, the doctrine of transcendental metaphysical participation,
intrinsic and extrinsic predicamental causality and their ultimate ontological foundation in
transcendental metaphysical causality. These quia demonstrations of Gods existence are not
mathematical deductions nor are they demonstrations from physics; they are, instead,
metaphysical demonstrations that regard created beings in as much as they are caused effects that
require an uncaused proper, immediate and necessary cause. They are demonstrations rooted in
the centrality of esse (as the actuality of all acts and the perfection of all perfections) and in
analogous transcendental metaphysical causality. The core metaphysical point of the quia
demonstrations lies in the fact that the real composite structure of beings (entia), composed of
essence (essentia) and act of being (esse), requires a reason why those beings in fact are. And
this reason cannot be found in the order of predicamental causality (which explains only the
becoming of the effect but not its act of being), but rather in the order of transcendental
metaphysical causality wherein we find that the being by essence is the immediate and necessary
proper cause of all finite beings. Such a causality is metaphysical and not physical or a causality
of phenomena.

The Constitutive Elements of the A Posteriori Demonstration of Gods Existence. There


are four constitutive elements in the a posteriori quia demonstration of the existence of God: 1.
the point of departure (or starting point); 2. the application of causality to the point of departure;
5
Cf. In I Anal. Post., lect. 14.

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3. the impossibility of proceeding to infinity in a series of per se essentially subordinated series
of causes; and 4. the conclusion of the necessity of Gods existence. This four stage structure is
summarized by Battista Mondin as follows: 1. The attention is drawn to a certain phenomenon
(change, secondary causality, possibility, the grades of perfection, finality); 2. The relative,
dependent and caused character (that is, the contingency) of the phenomenon is evidenced.
Whatever changes is moved by another; second causes are in turn, caused; the possible receives
its being from others; the grades of perfection receive perfection from the highest perfection;
finality always requires intelligence, while natural things in themselves do not have intelligence;
3. It is demonstrated that the effective and actual reality of a contingent phenomenon cannot be
explained by postulating the intervention of an infinite series of contingent causes; and 4. It is
concluded that the only valid explanation of the contingent is God. He is the unmoved mover, the
uncaused cause, necessary being, the most perfect being, and the supreme ordering
intelligence.6

1. The Starting Point of the A Posteriori Demonstration of the Existence of God. The a
posteriori quia demonstration of the existence of God is a metaphysical demonstration. We are
not doing physics, a scientific experiment, nor are we working out a mathematical problem. We
are doing metaphysics, whose subiectum, being as being (ens qua ens), is arrived at via the
resolutio. But the sensible and the physical is the obligatory passage that one must undergo to
pass on to the metaphysical level, since all our knowledge begins from that which is grasped by
the senses.7 Gilson observes that a truly Thomistic proof of the existence of God always starts
from some thing or situation empirically given in sense knowledge. Only from an actually given
existence can one legitimately infer a nonempirically given existence. For instance, change is a
fact given in sense experience8 In the sixth edition of his Thomism, Gilson writes concerning
each of the five ways, that each proof is based on the empirical observation of a fact, because no
existence could be inferred except by starting from some other existenceThere is motion, there
are reciprocal actions, beings that are born and die, things more or less perfect, and there is order
in things. It is because all this exists that we can confirm that its cause exists. The presence, then,
of a sensible existential base is a first characteristic common to the five proofs for the existence
of God.9

In the point of departure (or starting point) of the demonstration of Gods existence, we
perceive the world of real beings, of physical reality, that is immediately evident to our
observation and experience, but nevertheless must now be endowed with a metaphysical
formality. The demonstration starts from empirical or observable facts, that is, from things or
6
B. MONDIN, A History of Mediaeval Philosophy, Urbaniana University Press, Rome, 1991, p. 320.
7
Cf. V. J. BOURKE, Experience of Extra-Mental Reality as a Starting Point of St. Thomas Metaphysics,
Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, 14 (1938), pp. 134-144.
8
. GILSON, Elements of Christian Philosophy, Mentor-Omega, New York, p. 1963, p. 61.
9
. GILSON, Thomism: The Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, a translation of Le thomisme, sixth and final edition by
L. K. Shook and A. Maurer, Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto, 2002, p. 74. Towards the end of the
chapter, Gilson states that Thomas never used the composition of essentia and esse in finite beings to prove the
existence of God. Moreover, the composition of essentia and esse is not a sensible datum even in the wide meaning
of the term. We are aware of movement, contingency, grades of being, and so forth, but we are so little aware of the
distinction between esse and essentia that many refuse to admit that there is one. The required sensible evidence
would be lacking at the very beginning of such a proof. The De ente et essentia does not contain a proof of the
existence of God. It does, however, contain a profound meditation on the notion of God, beginning with the
certainty of His existence and His perfect unity(. GILSON, op. cit., p. 83).

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events in the world that we can directly experience. The primary condition for a valid proof of
Gods existence is a basis in data evident to human sensible-intellectual experience. It should,
however, be made clear that though our starting point is something known empirically, such a
fact of experience must be considered metaphysically. It must not be considered in as much as it
is initially presented in an empirically experiential way, but rather according to a metaphysical
perspective (which goes beyond the sensible experience of the visible world). Our attention is
given to determinate contingent phenomena: change, secondary or instrumental causality,
possibility, grades of perfection and order. From the knowledge of things that move we have the
experience of movement. From the knowledge of the actions of creatures we have the experience
of efficient causality. From the knowledge that things are not necessary of themselves we have
the experience of the diverse grades of non-necessity. From the sensible-intellectual knowledge
of things that are more or less perfect we have the experience of grades of perfection. And from
the knowledge that non-thinking beings are finalized we have the experience of the order of the
universe. J. Garcia Lpez explains that sebbene il punto di partenza debba essere sempre un
fatto di esperienza, ci non significa che la dimostrazione sia sperimentale o fisica. Il punto di
partenza deve venir posto nellesperienza, ma non deve essere sperimentale, bens metafisico. In
altre parole, il punto di partenza deve essere colto nellesperienza (poich soltanto in essa ci
data lesistenza di qualcosa), ma non deve essere considerato in quanto dato nellesperienza, ma
secondo una prospettiva metafisica, la quale prescinde dallesperienza. Ad esempio, un ente che
si muove un punto di partenza per poter dimostrare lesistenza di Dio: lesistenza di tale ente
percepito dai sensi, ma esso non va considerato in quanto dato qui e ora nellesperienza, ma in
quanto un essere ed un essere mobile, e in quanto ente, causato. In tal modo le dimostrazioni
dellesistenza di Dio, anche se hanno il proprio punto di partenza nellesperienza, non sono
sperimentali o fisiche, ma rigorosamente metafisiche.10

2. The Application of Causality to the Point of Departure. A cause is defined as that


which really and positively influences something, making that something depend upon it in some
way. A cause is a positive principle from which something really proceeds according to a
dependence in being.11 Causality12 is the aspect of a thing insofar as it influences the being of

10
J. GARCIA LPEZ, Nuestra sabidura racional de Dios, Madrid, 1950, p. 84.
11
K. DOUGHERTY, Metaphysics, Graymoor Press, Peekskill, New York, 1965, p. 137.
12
Studies on causality: G. BALLERINI, Il principio di causalit e lesistenza di Dio, Libreria Editrice Fiorentina,
Florence, 1904 ; T. DE REGNON, La mtaphysique des causes selon Saint Thomas et Albert le Grand, Victor
Retaux, Paris, 1906 ; A. BERSANI, Principium causalitatis et existentia Dei, Divus Thomas, 2 (1925), pp. 14-35;
P. E. NOLAN, Causality and the Existence of God, The Modern Schoolman, 14 (1936), pp. 16-18 ; C. FABRO,
La difesa critica del principio di causa, Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica, 27 (1936), pp. 102-141; D.
HAWKINGS, Causality and Implication, Sheed and Ward, London, 1937 ; F. X. MEEHAN, Efficient Causality in
Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas, Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C., 1940 ; E. R. KILZER,
Efficient Causality in the Philosophy of Nature, Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association,
17 (1941), pp. 142-150 ; G. KLUBERTANZ, Causality in the Philosophy of Nature, The Modern Schoolman, 19
(1942), pp. 29-31 ; J. F. ANDERSON, The Cause of Being, B. Herder, St. Louis, 1952 ; J. S. ALBERTSON,
Instrumental Causality in St. Thomas, The New Scholasticism, 28 (1954), pp. 409-435 ; A. MICHOTTE, La
perception de la causalit, University of Louvain Publications, Louvain, 1954 ; C. GIACON, La causalit nel
razionalismo moderno, Bocca, Milan, 1954 ; J. OWENS, The Causal Proposition: Principle or Conclusion?, The
Modern Schoolman, 32 (1955), pp. 159-171, 257-270, 323-339 ; L. DE RAEYMAEKER, Le problme
mtaphysique de la causalit, Giornale di Metafisica, 2 (1957), pp. 161-179 ; P. GARIN, Le problme de la
causalit et Saint Thomas dAquin, Beauchesne, Paris, 1958 ; F. GIARDINI, Gradi di causalit e di similitudine,
Angelicum, 36 (1959), pp. 26-50 ; C. FABRO, Partecipazione e causalit, S.E.I., Turin, 1961 ; W. H. KANE,
Existence and Causality, The Thomist, 28 (1964), pp. 76-92 ; E. SELVAGGI, Causalit e indeterminismo,

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something else. A cause is generically defined as a principle having some direct influx on the
to be of another (principium per se influens esse in aliud). St. Thomas remarks that a cause
brings some influence on the to be of the thing caused.1314 It is that which exercises a
positive influence upon the to be of something else.15 Causality is truly the dynamic aspect of
being which, through the act of being (esse), is capable of communicating its various perfections
as well as to produce new things.

We experience causality in our everyday lives. For example, we know that the cause of
Jimmys black eye was Victor who gave him a punch in the schoolyard after class the other day.
Or the fact that the cause of The Messiah was George Frideric Handel who composed it. Or,
going to St. Peters basilica in Rome, we know that the cause of the Piet was Michelangelo who
sculpted it. We also have the internal experience that we are the cause of our own actions, such
as the moving of our arms, of our walking to the supermarket, etc. We also have a concurrent
internal and external experience of causality, that is, we are conscious of our causal actions on
the extra-mental, extra-subjective beings around us, as well as the influence that these particular
beings have on us. The existence of causality in our world is an evident truth which requires no
demonstration. What is necessary, though, is an inquiry into its basis. Such a basis is provided by
being (ens), which can exercise causality because of its esse.

The most characteristic observations that are affirmable after a basic consideration of the
notions of cause and effect are: 1. That the effects very dependence on its cause with regard to
esse is the counterpart of the real influence of the said cause on the effect. A cause is said to be a
cause precisely to the extent that the effect cannot come to be or exist without it. For example,
Michelangelos Mausoleum of Julius II in the church of San Pietro in Vincoli (Saint Peter in
Chains) in Rome, which contains the famous sculpture of Moses, would not exist without the
materials of which it is made and without the proper arrangement of these elements. Neither
would this sculpture work exist without the genius of Michelangelo, even though his master hand
more directly influenced the coming into being of the sculpture series than its actual being. This
two-fold way of influencing the effect enables us to define a cause as anything by which
something depends with regard to its being or to its coming into being ; 2. That there is a real
distinction between the cause and the effect since the real dependence of one thing upon another
would necessarily demand that they be really distinct from one another ; 3. Lastly, the cause is

Gregorian University, Rome, 1964 ; J. OWENS, The Causal Proposition Revisited, The Modern Schoolman, 44
(1967), pp. 143-151 ; C. GIACON, La causalit del Motore Immobile, Editrice Antenore, Padua, 1969 ; R.
LAVERDIRE, Le principe de causalit, Vrin, Paris, 1969 ; W. E. MAY, Knowledge of Causality in Hume and
Aquinas, The Thomist, 34 (1970), pp. 254-288 ; J. PETERSON, Aristotles Incomplete Causal Theory, The
Thomist, 36 (1972), pp. 420-432 ; C. GIACON, Il binomio causa-effetto secondo il tomismo, Rivista di Filosofia
Neoscolastica, 66 (1974), pp. 541-551 ; G. BLANDINO, Discussione sulla causalit I, Aquinas, 23 (1980), pp.
93-113; T. M. OLSHEWSKY, Thomas Conception of Causation, Nature and System, 2 (1980), pp. 101-122 ; G.
BLANDINO, Discussione sulla causalit II, Aquinas, 25 (1982), pp. 515-552 ; G. E. PONFERRADA, Las causas
en Aristteles y Santo Toms, Sapientia, 38 (1983), pp. 9-36 ; L. DEWAN, St. Thomas and the Principle of
Causality, in Jacques Maritain: A Philosopher in the World, edited by J. L. Allard, University of Ottawa Press,
Ottawa, 1985, pp. 53-71 ; M. PANGALLO, Il principio di causalit nella metafisica di san Tommaso: saggio di
ontologia tomista alla luce dellinterpretazione di Cornelio Fabro, Libreria Editrice Vaticana, Vatican City, 1991 ;
S. L. BROCK, Causality and Necessity in Thomas Aquinas, Quaestio, 2 (2002), pp. 217-240.
13
Importat influxum quedam ad esse causati(In V Metaphys., lect. 1, no. 751).
14
H. RENARD, The Philosophy of Being, Bruce, Milwaukee, 1950, p. 165.
15
Cf. H. J. KOREN, Introduction to the Science of Metaphysics, B. Herder, St. Louis, 1965, pp. 228-232.

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prior to the effect. The cause comes before the effect as the perfection which the cause confers
upon or produces in the effect must first exist in the cause in some manner. The fact that the
cause is prior to the effect entails, in many instances, a precedence in time. For example, Mr. and
Mrs. Leopold Mozart preceded their son Wolfgang Amadeus, Leonardo preceded the Mona Lisa,
Michelangelo preceded the Last Judgment, and Beethoven preceded the Ninth Symphony. But as
far as the causal action is concerned, effect and its cause are simultaneous and correlative as the
cause is a cause when it causes and an effect is an effect at the very moment it is being caused. If
Michelangelo stopped painting the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel the coming into being of that
particular work of art would immediately cease. If Leo Tolstoy stopped thinking during the
writing of War and Peace, the coming into being of War and Peace would immediately stop.

A proper efficient cause is an agent that exercises its influence over the being of some
other being (which is here called the effect), by means of an activity that is properly its own, that
is, by means of an activity that flows from its own nature, its own form, an activity which is
proportioned to the very nature of the agent cause. For example, in the painting of The
Transfiguration, many causes have exercised their activity, but working together as a causal unit.
We have the intelligence of Raphael, his various motor faculties or nerves, his fingers, the moved
movement of his various paintbrushes, and so forth. And the complexity of this causal activity is
beautifully mirrored in the complexity of the effect produced: The Transfiguration, which carries
profound meaning. The various elements that constitute the unity of the effect, a profound
painted masterpiece, are proportioned to what in the agent has properly produced them. For
example, the shapes, colors, shades, and textures of the painting are properly proportioned to the
oilpaints and brushes utilized, whereas the meaning or intelligibility that these shapes, forms, and
colors carry is properly proportioned to the intelligence of the artist. Hence, the proper cause of
the meaning of the painting has not been the oilpaints, paintbrushes, and canvas, which have no
intelligence, but rather the artist who has utilized these artistic tools. Therefore, this is the first
characteristic of a proper cause, that is, it produces the effect by an activity that is proportioned
to its own nature or being. Now regarding the argument from the existence of an effect to the
existence of God, it will be proper to argue for the existence of God as the proper cause of the
very being of the effect.

One can also observe how one particular set of causes may have been needed to bring
about a certain effect into being, and another set needed to sustain the effect in being. Let us take
as an example the painting of Leonardo, the famous Mona Lisa. Once the work of art had been
painted it is no longer the effect of the painter, the paint brushes and the oil paints. Rather, it was
their effect. It was painted. But it is to be observed that the painting, the Mona Lisa, is not here
and now being caused by Leonardo and his painting instruments. And yet, the Mona Lisa
remains in existence. It exists to be enjoyed by art lovers all over the world. It keeps on keeping
the being it has received, and thus, it keeps on depending on a series of causes that preserves it in
being. The existence of the canvas conserves the existence of the oil paint and the oil paint
conserves the existence of the meaning intended by Leonardo. And all these must exist
simultaneously. This aspect of the simultaneous existence of cause and effect, as far as causal
action is concerned, is of crucial interest in the demonstration of the existence of God, for once it
is seen that God is needed as the sole possible proper cause of the act of being of any being, it
will also be seen that God must simultaneously be if anything is to be at all.

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As regards the various starting points for the existence of God mentioned above, one can
find causality manifested. From the experience of movement we find that that which is moved is
moved by another. From the experience of efficient causality we find that every subordinate
cause is caused by another, that is, it is impossible that something be the efficient cause of itself.
From the experience of the diverse grades of non-necessity we find that contingent being is
caused by a necessary being. From the experience of various grades of transcendental perfections
we find that the perfections that are given in various degrees are participated, and therefore
caused. And lastly, from the experience of the order of the universe we find that order towards an
end is caused. Our starting point, which is limited, imperfect, changeable and contingent being,
is now manifested to be an effect, and as all effects depend upon their causes, once we have
proven that such changeable, imperfect, limited, and contingent beings are in fact effects, it is
subsequently necessary that a cause pre-exist. From every proper effect it is possible to
demonstrate the existence of the proper cause of its being. There are no absolute and totally
independent effects for every effect presupposes a proper cause upon which its being depends
upon.

3. The Impossibility of Proceeding to Infinity in a Per Se Essentially Subordinated


Series of Efficient Causes. This third constitutive element of the a posteriori demonstration of
the existence of God is explicitly utilized by the quia demonstrations whose points of departure
are the experience of things that move, the experience of an order of per se essentially
subordinated efficient causes, and the experience of generation and corruption of corporeal
beings (the first, second, and third ways of St. Thomas). The a posteriori demonstration from
grades of transcendental perfections (the fourth way), as well as the quia demonstration from
finalization of non-intelligent beings (the fifth way), do not require this third element, though it
can be included without compromising the structure of the proofs. To illustrate the impossibility
of infinite regress in a per se essentially subordinated series of efficient causes, let us take the
example of the secunda via. The second way (secunda via)16 a posteriori quia demonstration of
the existence of God in Summa Theologiae, I, q. 2, a. 3 starts from our experience of an order of
per se essentially subordinated efficient causes17 among the sensible things of this world (e.g., a

16
Studies on the Second Way: R. GARRIGOU-LAGRANGE, La deuxime preuve de lexistence de Dieu propose
par Saint Thomas, Doctor Communis, 7 (1954), pp. 28-40 ; R. LAUER, The Notion of Efficient Cause in the
Secunda Via, The Thomist, 38 (1974), pp. 754-767 ; J. R. T. LAMONT, An Argument for an Uncaused Cause,
The Thomist, 59 (1995), pp. 261-277 ; R. L. CARTWRIGHT, The Second Way, Mediaeval Philosophy and
Theology, 5 (1996), pp. 189-204.
17
An efficient cause is the primary principle or origin of an action which makes something simply to be, or to be in
a certain way. Alvira, Clavell and Melendo explain that the intrinsic causes found in corporeal creatures require the
action of an external agent. Since matter and form are two distinct principles by themselves, they cannot bring about
the formation of a thing; they need an external cause that has to put them together. Besides, experience shows that a
corporeal being only acquires a new substantial or accidental form by virtue of an actual extrinsic principle whose
precise role is to make matter acquire a new form.
From this point of view, the efficient cause is by nature prior to the material and formal causes. The latter
cannot exert their causal influence on one another without the prior influence of the efficient cause. Therefore, the
study of matter and form alone is not sufficient; it should naturally lead to a consideration of the efficient cause.
In corporeal beings, the efficient cause always acts by altering some (secondary) matter so as to educe a new
form from it. Hence, it can also be called a moving cause (causa movens). The efficient cause is the cause of the
causality of matter and form, since by its motion or movement it makes the matter receive the form, and makes the
form inhere in matter(In V Metaphysicorum, lect. 3). In the case of created causes, the agent always requires a
potency upon which it exerts its activity, or, in other words, a subject on which it acts in order to obtain a new effect.

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soccer player moves his foot to hit the soccer ball which moves the ball ten meters in front of
him); the conclusion will be the affirmation of the existence of God as the Uncaused First
Efficient Cause: The second way is from the nature of efficient cause. In the world of sensible
things we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no case known (neither is it, indeed,
possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself, for so it would be prior to
itself, which is impossible. Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because
in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the
intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause whether the intermediate cause be several or one
only. Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore if there be no first cause
among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate, cause. But if in efficient
causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be
an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes, all of which is plainly false. Therefore it
is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God.18

The starting point for the secunda via is the experience that we have of an order of per se
essentially subordinated efficient causes among the sensible things that we see around us (e.g.,

God alone causes without any need for a pre-existing reality, since He produces the totality of the effect.(T.
ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, Metaphysics, Sinag-Tala, Manila, 1991, pp. 201-202.
Distinctive Characteristics of Efficient Causality. Alvira, Clavell, and Melendo give us some the features of the
efficient cause: a) Unlike the material and formal causes, the efficient cause is a principle extrinsic to the effect
b) The efficient cause imparts to the subject the perfection which makes it an effect of the agent, a perfection
which the agent must actually have. A teacher, for instance, is the efficient cause of the knowledge of the student,
because he imparts to the student a portion of his own actual knowledge.
In this respect, the efficient cause is always an exemplary cause, since no one can give another a perfection
which he does not have. Thus, only an actual being can impart actuality to an effect, and it can only do so to the
extent that it is itself actual (every agent acts insofar as it is in act).
c) The effect always pre-exists in its cause in some way. The perfection transmitted may be found in the cause
either in a more eminent manner or at least in the same degree. A man, for instance, can engender another man. To
warm another body, the warming body must have a higher temperature.
Consequently, when an agent acts, it always produces something like itself. The likeness does not refer to any
perfection whatsoever, but precisely to that perfection by virtue of which the agent acts in the given instance. Fire,
for instance, does not warm insofar as it is actually luminous, but insofar as it is actually hot. Producing an effect
means imparting to matter a form which is like that possessed by the cause. Since this form may be possessed in
either of two ways, either naturally or intellectually, the likeness of the effect may refer to either. A colt is like the
horse with respect to the form which is possessed by both in a natural way. A cathedral, however, is not like the
architect, but like the model which the architect conceived in his mind.
Furthermore, the principle by virtue of which something acts in producing an effect is its form, and not its
matter, since it is by virtue of the form that it is actual. This is true both in the case of the substance and of the
accident: 1) The specific actions of a substance stem from its substantial form and from its consequent operative
powers. If man can think and will, this is because he has a spiritual soul, which is endowed with intelligence and
will. 2) Acquired perfections in the sphere of activity stem from operative habits. Thus, only a person who has the
knowledge and skill of the architect can design houses.(T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, op. cit., pp.
202-203).
18
Summa Theologiae, I, q. 2, a. 3, c.: Secunda via est ex ratione causae efficientis. Invenimus enim in istis
sensibilibus esse ordinem causarum efficientium, nec tamen invenitur, nec est possibile, quod aliquid sit causa
efficiens sui ipsius; quia sic esset prius seipso, quod est impossibile. Non autem est possibile quod in causis
efficientibus procedatur in infinitum. Quia in omnibus causis efficientibus ordinatis, primum est causa medii, et
medium est causa ultimi, sive media sint plura sive unum tantum, remota autem causa, removetur effectus, ergo, si
non fuerit primum in causis efficientibus, non erit ultimum nec medium. Sed si procedatur in infinitum in causis
efficientibus, non erit prima causa efficiens, et sic non erit nec effectus ultimus, nec causae efficientes mediae, quod
patet esse falsum. Ergo est necesse ponere aliquam causam efficientem primam, quam omnes Deum nominant.

8
an author uses a fountain pen to write down his thoughts on a blank sheet of paper), essentially
subordinated per se efficient causes, causes being ordered per se whenever the virtue of the first
cause influences the ultimate effect produced through the intermediary causes. Here the causal
influx of the first cause reaches to the ultimate effect by means of other causes. Let us give an
example of a subordinated per se order of efficient causes: Harry is playing tennis. In this case,
Harrys expertise moves his right hand, and his right hand moves the tennis racket, and the tennis
racket moves the tennis ball to the other end of the tennis court, which is the ultimate effect. In
this series of causes the causal influx of Harrys expertise influences the ultimate effect, the
moving of the tennis ball to the other end of the tennis court, by means of other causes like his
hands and his tennis racket. The Angelic Doctor explains: two things may be considered in
every agent, namely, the thing itself that acts, and the power whereby it acts. Thus fire by its heat
makes a thing hot. Now the power of the lower agent depends upon the power of the higher
agent, in so far as the higher agent gives the lower agent the power whereby it acts, or preserves
that power, or applies it to action. Thus the craftsman applies the instrument to its proper effect,
although sometimes he does not give the instrument the form whereby it acts, nor preserves that
form, but merely puts it into motion. Consequently, the action of the lower agent must not only
proceed from the lower agent through the agents own power, but also through the power of all
the higher agents, for it acts by the power of them all. Now just as the lowest agent is found to be
immediately active, so the power of the first agent is found to be immediate in the production of
the effect; because the power of the lowest agent does not of itself produce this effect, but by the
power of the proximate higher agent, and this by the power of a yet higher agent, so that the
power of the supreme agent is found to produce its effect of itself, as though it were the
immediate cause.19

As regards the difference between the prima via ex parte motus and the secunda via ex
ratione causae efficientis, Renard observes that there are essential differences which place each
proof under a distinct formality. The first way considers the passivity of beings, their becoming
as they are moved; it considers motion. The formal aspect of the second way, on the contrary, is
activity. This proof studies a limited being in so far as it is a cause, that is, in so far as by its
action it is the efficient cause of another. This limited efficient cause of another, we find, cannot
be its own cause, because it is not its own act of being (esse); and therefore, we must rise to a
higher cause.20 Concerning the difference in starting points between the first way and the
second way, Gerard Smith writes: It is the activity, the operation, of causes which is the datum
of the second way: causes causing. The datum of the first way was beings-being-moved; the
datum of the second way is beings-moving-something else. A vast difference is here. Beings-
being-moved are patients. Beings-moving-something else are agents. Agents are acting. Patients
are acted upon. Patients are becoming something; they are in fieri. Agents are causing something
else to become something; they are in agere.21

The secunda via deals with essential or per se subordinated efficient causes, not per
accidens ordered causes where the causal influx does not reach down to the ultimate effect, but

19
Summa Contra Gentiles, III, 70.
20
H. RENARD, The Philosophy of God, Bruce, Milwaukee, 1952, p. 37.
21
G. SMITH, Natural Theology, Macmillan, New York, 1951, p. 118.

9
only to the proximate effect.22 That the proximate effect manages in turn to cause some other
effect is not due to the causal influx of the first cause in such a series. The latter effect is
obviously outside the influence of the first cause in this type of causal series (the per accidens
series). Here is an example of a per accidens series of ordered causes: A camper lights a primed
torch in the woods with his flaming torch. The fact that the torch that was lit is then used to light
another primed torch and yet another can only be outside the influx of the efficient causality of
the original flaming torch that lit the first primed torch. In this series of one torch lighting
another, the influence of the first cause extends only to the proximate effect (the first primed
torch lit) but not to the last or ultimate effect (the last primed torch lit). Since the last primed
torch lit is outside the influence of the first cause this series of causes is ordered only
accidentally, for what is beyond the virtue of a cause is by accident (per accidens).

In the per se ordered series of efficient causes, on the other hand, the influx of the first
cause extends to the production of the ultimate effect through the instrumentality of the
intermediate causes.
22
Per Se Essentially Subordinated Series of Efficient Causes and Per Accidens Accidentally Subordinated Series of
Efficient Causes. Contrasting an essential efficient causal series from an accidental efficient causal series, Aquinas
states in the second article of the forty sixth question of the Prima Pars: In efficient causes it is impossible to
proceed to infinity per se thus, there cannot be an infinite number of causes that are per se required for a certain
effect; for instance, that a stone be moved by a stick, the stick by the hand, and so on to infinity. But it is not
impossible to proceed to infinity accidentally as regards efficient causes; for instance, if all the causes thus infinitely
multiplied should have the order of only one cause, their multiplication being accidental; as an artificer acts by
means of many hammer accidentally, because one after the other may be broken. It is accidental, therefore, that one
particular hammer acts after the action of another; and likewise it is accidental to this particular man as generator to
be generated by another man; for he generates as a man, and not as the son of another man.(Summa Theologiae, I,
q. 46, a. 2, ad 7).
Commenting on the difference between a per se essentially subordinated series of efficient causes and a per
accidens accidentally subordinated series of efficient causes, Dougherty observes the following: An effect can be
related to a series of efficient causes in either an essential or accidental way. Let us consider first the meaning of an
essential, efficient causal series. An effect can be produced by a series of primary and secondary causes in what is
called an essentially (per se) subordinate series of proper causes. There are certain definite attributes of this series: 1.
The secondary causes cannot act except as members of the series notwithstanding their own natures which are the
principles of their own movement ; 2. Each member of the series influences the total effect ; 3. Each member of the
series has a true causality proper to its nature; 4. There must be a first in the series which is independent and the
others are dependent upon it.
If there were no first cause in the essential series there would be no effect. The secondary or intermediary causes
cannot by themselves produce the effect, since intermediary causes produce not only by their own nature but as
influenced or moved by the first cause. If all causes were only intermediate there would be in the series no sufficient
reason for the effect. The primary cause is the universal source of the causal series terminating in the effect of the
series.
An accidental, efficient, causal series is a series in which the causal influence of the primary and every
secondary member does not reach to the last effect but only the proximate effect. For example: a chicken lays an egg
which is hatched into another chicken, which lays an egg hatched into another chicken, and so on. Any one member
of the series can be dropped without effecting the last result so long as the members are cojoined. The following
attributes describe such a series: 1. Its causality is necessarily univocal. In other words all the members cause in the
same way. Every hen produces an egg. There is no hierarchy of causes, namely, a superior primary cause and
inferior secondary causes as in the case of the essential series ; 2. The members need only be cojoined in the series ;
3. There need not be a first in number in the accidental series. The series as accidental need not be terminated from a
primary cause since multiplication of its members is accidental. It is theoretically infinite the potential infinite or
indefinite. There is no limit to the possible number of eggs and chickens as antecedents to this last effected egg. It is
called an accidental series because the multiplication of its members is accidental.(K. DOUGHERTY, Metaphysics,
Graymoor Press, Peekskill, NY, 1965, pp. 152-154).

10
Distinguishing between a per se essentially subordinated series of efficient causes and a
per accidens accidentally subordinated series of efficient causes, Grenier writes: Essentially
subordinated efficient causes are causes which are subordinated to one another in virtue of their
causality in such manner that the causality of the inferior cause actually depends on the causality
of the superior; v.g., when a bat sets a ball in motion because it is set in motion by the hand, and
the hand by another cause.

Accidentally subordinated efficient causes are causes which are subordinated to one
another not because of their causality, but because of some other nexus; v.g., if in his work an
artificer successively uses several hammers because he breaks one after the other, these hammers
are subordinated to one another not because of their causality, but in time. Similarly, a son who
engenders is an efficient cause subordinated to his father, not essentially subordinated, i.e.,
because of causality, but accidentally, in virtue of his origin.23

While all the causes involved in our per se series are efficient causes, each one of them is
of a different nature or species. In our per se essentially subordinated and simultaneous series of
causes si tratta di causalit di ordine diverse: la volont comanda il braccio in un modo diverso
da come il braccio muove il bastone e questo sposta la pietra. Questo ci permette di capire che
Dio non il primo anello di una catena, ma ci che sostiene lintera catena.24 Parlare di causalit
divina, dunque compatibile con la difesa della trascendenza di Dio, poich Egli non agisce nel
mondo come una causa fisica.25 Smith writes: Clearly the members of such a series must differ
in nature; no one is like any other in nature. If the members did not differ in nature one from the
other, the sameness of their nature would destroy the necessity of a plurality. If two members of
a per se series were alike, one of them could do what the other does, and so there would be no
need for one of them. For example, light one candle; with the lit candle light another; the first
candle, which is like the second, was unnecessary to the lighting of the second. No need of a
series there. Causes, however, which are all operating together are so related to their effect that if
you pull one of them away from the complex, the rest effect nothing. For example, sun, soil,
vine, water are so related to grapes.26

Since there are many causes in a per se series, the essential determinant of their
operation, though present in the totality of their agency, is not present in all in the same way.
This is to say that the causes in a per se series must differ in kind, else there would be no need
for there being many: of two like causes, one could do what the other does. Their individual
difference in kind, however, leaves intact their same essential determination as a total agent. A
man driving a nail with a hammer these are different causes, because they are many. Yet they
all act from the propria virtus of one, the principal agent; each ones proper power as an
instrument participates in the power proper to the principal cause.27

Now, it is impossible for a thing to be its own efficient cause, for then it would have had
to exist before it existed in order to efficiently cause itself to exist, which is absurd, a violation of

23
H. GRENIER, Thomistic Philosophy, vol. 3 (Metaphysics), St. Dunstans University, Charlottetown, 1950, p. 270.
24
Cf. J. DE FINANCE, En balbutiant lindicibile, Gregorian University Press, Rome, 1992, p. 19.
25
M. PREZ DE LABORDA, La ricerca di Dio. Trattato di teologia filosofica, EDUSC, Rome, 2011, p. 103.
26
G. SMITH, op. cit., p. 117.
27
G. SMITH, op. cit., p. 96.

11
the principle of non-contradiction. Finite beings are not the efficient causes of themselves: non
est possibile quod aliquid sit causa efficiens sui ipsius. Gilson observes that if we consider
sensible things, which are the only possible point of departure for a proof of the existence of
God, we observe in them an order of efficient causes. But we never find, nor can we find, a being
that is its own efficient cause. Since a cause is necessarily prior to its effect, a being would have
to be prior to itself in order to be its own efficient cause, which is impossible.28 Neither is the
Infinite Being causa sui. Non est possibile quod aliquid sit causa efficiens sui ipsius. God is not
Causa Sui (as the rationalists Descartes and Spinoza erroneously maintained) but is rather the
Uncaused Cause. Severing the principle of causality from experience, and considering it as an a
priori principle which applies to being (ens) as such, led some rationalist philosophers to apply
the principle of causality indiscriminately both to creatures and to the Creator. Hence they
considered God as the Cause of Himself(Causa sui), rather than as the Uncaused Cause.
Accepting the same assumptions, other philosophers (like Hegel) ended up subordinating the
First Cause to its effects (God to creatures) and claimed that God would not be God if he did not
produce the world.29 The error of Rationalism in this matter is that of identifying cause with
ratio: we must look for the cause, that is, the reason of any given reality (Spinoza, Ethica, I,
prop. 11, aliter).30 la nozione di ente in quanto ente non implica n lessere causato n il
causare. Essa significa semplicemente ci che . La nozione di ente, dunque, prioritaria
rispetto a quella di causa, e di conseguenza il principio che esprime la non contradditoriet
dellente anche prioritario rispetto a quello di causalit.

Lessere causato non proprio dellente in quanto tale, poich altrimenti tutta la realt
sarebbe causata,31 anche quella divina, e non ci sarebbe una causa incausata. Ora, ci
impossibile, poich esigerebbe un processo allinfinito una causa esigerebbe unaltra, e questa
a sua volta unaltra, ecc. il che non si pu ammettere, poich tutto sarebbe infondato. Ci deve
essere dunque qualcosa che non sia causato da un altro, ma neanche da se stesso: la prima Causa
incausata, Dio. Daltra parte, la pienezza dellessere della Causa prima si oppone in modo
radicale ad essere causata, poich leffetto per forza imperfetto e insufficiente a se stesso.

Il sistema razionalistico invece, per la sua identificazione di causa e ratio, sostiene che
Dio causa sui, causa di se stesso, e non invece lIncausato. Partendo dagli stessi presupposti,
altri autori, come ad esempio Hegel, hanno finito per subordinare in qualche modo la Causa
prima ai suoi effetti, affermando che Dio non sarebbe Dio se non producesse il mondo.
Lequivoco razionalista su questo argomento sembra dipendere dalla sua identificazione di causa
e ratio, e dalla conseguente affermazione: ad ogni realt bisogna assegnare una causa, cio una
ragione.32 In realt, si dovrebbe dire che Dio d ragione di se stesso, ma non causa di se
stesso, non causa sui.33

28
. GILSON, Thomism: The Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, a translation of Le thomisme, sixth and final edition,
by Lawrence K. Shook and Armand Maurer, Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto, 2002, p. 62.
29
T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, op. cit., pp. 183-184.
30
T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, op. cit., p. 183.
31
Cfr. Summa Contra Gentiles, II, 52.
32
B. SPINOZA, Ethica, prop. 11, aliter.
33
L. CLAVELL and M. PREZ DE LABORDA, Metafisica, EDUSC, Rome, 2006, pp. 313-314.

12
There is then a reference to the impossibility of an infinite regress in a per se essentially
subordinated series of efficient causes.34 An infinite regress would mean no first efficient cause.
But if there would be no first efficient cause then there could be no ultimate effect because there
would be no causal influx which produced the effect. In all ordered efficient causes, the first is
the cause of the intermediate cause, whether one or many, and this is the cause of the last cause.
But, when you suppress a cause, you suppress its effect. Therefore, if you suppress the first
cause, the intermediate cause cannot be a cause. Now, if there were an infinite regress among
efficient causes, no cause would be first. Therefore, all the other causes, which are intermediate,
will be suppressed. But this is manifestly false.35 Grenier writes: If there is regress into infinity
in essentially subordinated causes, there is no first cause. But there must be a first cause in a
series of essentially subordinated causes; for the first is the cause of the intermediary, and the
intermediary, whether one or many, is the cause of the last. To disallow the first cause is to
disallow intermediary causes and effects. Therefore regress into infinity in essentially
subordinated causes is impossible.36

Miguel Prez de Laborda observes the following regarding the impossibility of an infinite
regress in a per se essentially subordinated series of efficient causes: Non possibile che si dia
un processo allinfinito nel secondo tipo di serie (cause essenziali e simultanee). In questo
secondo caso, quindi, ci deve essere un inizio nella serie delle cause. Come una catena di ferro
non pu restare salda se non c un primo anello che non sia ben ancorato nel soffitto, cos una
pietra mossa non pu dipendere da infinite azioni simultanee, poich dovrebbero essere tutte
quante attualmente esistenti. Nel loro causare (sostenere o muovere), gli anelli o i motori
intermedi dipendono da un motore o un anello precedente, che a sua volta non dipende da un
altro. E, secondo san Tommaso, questa prima causa (Motore immobile, Causa incausata, Essere
necessario) Dio.

Possiamo ora comprendere che Tommaso non sta cercando un motore immobile o una
causa incausata che abbia mosso o causato nel passato, ma adesso non continui pi ad esercitare
il suo influsso causale. Il Dio di cui Tommaso alla ricerca, non agisce nel mondo come il piede
che ha dato un calcio ad una palla, ma poi non deve pi intervenire perch essa cada rotolando
per il pendio della montagna; una volta ricevuta la spinta iniziale, la palla si rende autonoma, e si
muove ormai per una causa (la forza gravitazionale) diversa dal calcio iniziale. Ci che sta
cercando Tommaso invece una causa che nel presente (simultaneamente alleffetto) sia la fonte
continua dellessere, del cambiare e della capacit di causare degli effetti. Non una causa
dellinizio dellessere, ma dellessere attualmente.37

Renard explains why an infinite series of per se essentially subordinated and


simultaneous series of causes is impossible because contradictory, writing: The proof for the
existence of God depends upon the truth of the following statement: in a series of per se
essentially subordinated efficient causes in which each member has an influx here and now upon
the to be of the next cause, and in turn, in the same manner depends on the preceding cause, an

34
Cf. P. CAROSI, La serie infinita di cause efficienti subordinate, Divus Thomas, 46 (1943), pp. 29-77, 159-175
35
Summa Contra Gentiles, I, 13, no. 33.
36
H. GRENIER, op. cit., p. 271.
37
M. PREZ DE LABORDA, op. cit., p. 102.

13
infinite number of causes is impossible because contradictory. We must conclude, therefore, to
the existence of a first uncaused cause.

in a series of per se essentially subordinated and simultaneous series of causes, the


influx of the first cause looks to the to be (that is to say, it has an influx on the to be) of all the
intermediate members, reaching even to the last effect. The reason is that the intermediate causes
are actuated here and now by the first cause. If, then, there were no first cause, these
intermediary causes would not be able to act. Now in an infinite series there is no first cause and,
therefore, no sufficient reason for the actuation of the intermediate cause, no causing of the last
effect, and therefore no effect. This is contradictory, since the effect is there: it exists. Therefore,
the series cannot be infinite.38

Luigi Bogliolo states the following concerning the impossibility of an infinite regress in a
per se essentially subordinated series of efficient causes in the secunda via: To go to infinity in
the search for conditioned causes would not resolve the problem at allThe action of sculpting
of the sculptor does not find its reason for being if we do not go beyond all the agents and
causers that are conditioned and dependent, so as to reach an absolutely independent and
unconditioned Cause that leads to no others. Non autem est possibile quod in causis efficientibus
ordinatis procedatur in infinitum (it is not possible to proceed to the infinite in subordinate
causes). Since this dependent cause exists, then there must exist an Independent Cause having
within itself all that is necessary to cause, because it is the absolute fullness of perfection and
thus the principle of every perfection communicated to any existent. It is a cause whose causing
and action coincide with His essence itself. It is not a communicated and participated causality,
but completely autonomous, which coincides with the nature itself of the CauseThis absolutely
independent Cause we call God.39 Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange also states that apart from and
transcending the series of mundane and efficient causes, there is a first cause that is not caused,
or an unconditioned cause that is absolutely independent of the others. But the unconditioned
cause must be its own action, and even its own being, because operation follows being, and the
mode of operation the mode of being. In fact, this cause is the self-subsisting Being40

ngel Luis Gonzlez writes the following concerning the impossibility of an infinite
regress in a per se essentially subordinated series of efficient causes: Una serie infinita di cause
essenzialmente subordinate nella loro causalit non spiegherebbe la realt delleffetto. Infatti, se
ci che in questione la realt della causalit, necessaria una prima causa, dato che, per il
punto di partenza, le cause causano in atto in quanto dipendono, ovvero sono causate da altre
cause. Se si elimina la prima, si eliminano tutte le altre; cos come se si eliminano quelle
intermedie o lultima si rende inesplicabile leffetto; senza prima causa, non vi saranno n le
cause intermedie, n leffetto, n nulla, in quanto le cause essenzialmente subordinate non
causano se non ricevono la forza per causare. necessario, allora, arrivare ad una prima causa
incausata.41 Una serie infinita de causas esencialmente subordinadas en su causalidad no
explicara la realidad del efecto. Efectivamente, si lo que est en cuestin es la efectividad de la
causalidad, se requiere una primera causa, ya que por el punto de partida las causas estn

38
H. RENARD, The Philosophy of God, Bruce, Milwaukee, 1952, pp. 22-23.
39
L. BOGLIOLO, Rational Theology, Urbaniana University Press, Rome, 1987, p. 39.
40
R. GARRIGOU-LAGRANGE, The One God, B. Herder, St. Louis, 1943, p. 144.
41
. L. GONZLEZ, Filosofia di Dio, Le Monnier, Florence, 1988, pp. 101-102.

14
causando en tanto que dependientes o causadas por otra. Si se elimina la primera, se eliminan
todas; al igual que si se eliminan algunas intermedias o la ltima se hace inexplicable el efecto; si
no hay una primera causa, tampoco habr ni causas intermedias ni efecto, ni nada, puesto que las
causas esencialmente subordinadas no causan a no ser que reciban el influjo para causar. Es
necesario, pues, llegar a una primera causa incausada.42

The conclusion of second way is the affirmation that an Uncaused First Efficient Cause
(God) exists.43 The ultimate application of efficient causality in the secunda via, which leads to

42
. L. GONZLEZ, Teologa natural, EUNSA, Pamplona, 2008, pp. 106-107.
43
The Causality of the First Efficient Cause (God) and the Causality of Secondary Efficient Causes (Creatures):
Explaining the limits of created causality and how, in the final analysis, secondary causes (creatures) have need
of a First Cause, God, Who is the cause of the act of being (esse), Alvira, Clavell and Melendo write:
Becoming and Forms Constitute the Proper Object of the Efficient Causality of Creatures. The action of a
created agent is the cause of the coming into being (fieri) of the effect; however, it does not produce the being of
the effect as such. It effectively brings about the production of a new reality, (in the case of generation and
corruption) or the acquisition of a new mode of being by an already existing being (in accidental changes).
However, once the action of the natural agent ceases, the effect remains in its being, which reveals the effects
actual independence with respect to the cause which produced it. When an architect builds a house, for instance, he
imparts a new accidental form to already existing materials, making them suitable for dwelling. In this way, he
effectively brings about the construction of the building or its coming into being (becoming). Once the construction
activity is finished, however, the house preserves its being by virtue of certain principles which no longer depend on
the builder in any way. The same thing happens in the case of a new animal begoten by its progenitors.
The proper terminus of created causality, in the processes of generation and corruption, is the form, which is the
primary act of a corporeal substance. In the case of accidental changes, the terminus is a new accident of the
substance. The proper effect of the causality of creatures is always the eduction of a form. We can see this clearly if
we recall that a substance is a cause to the extent that it really influences its effect, or, in other words, to the extent
that the latter cannot exist if the former is suppressed. It is obvious, however, that what disappears when a created
efficient cause is removed is the process of in-forming some matter or the production of a new form, which is
where the influence of the agent of itself ends. The very reality of the effect, which continues in its own being, is not
eliminated.
Consequently, the created agent is not the sole or the absolute cause of its effect; rather, it is the cause of the
production of the effect. Generation, which is the most profound type of causality in material things, has to be
considered as a via in esse or as the way by which an effect comes to be, namely, by receiving a new substantial
form. Consequently, when the action of the agent in generation is removed, the transition from potency to act,
which is the coming into being (fieri) of the begotten, ceases, but the form itself, through which the begotten has the
act of being, does not cease. Hence, when the action of the agent in generation ceases, the being of the things
produced persists, but not their becoming (De Potentia Dei, q. 5, a. 1, c.).
Creatures are Particular Causes of Their Effects. The finitude of created causes becomes even more manifest as
we take into account the way in which they act:
a) Natural agents always act by transforming something. Both in the case of accidental changes and the
production of a new being, creatures act by merely altering an already existing reality.
b) Hence, in their activity, created causes presuppose a preexisting object. If they are bringing about an
accidental change, they need an actually existing subject that will be affected by this modification. If they are
generating a new substance, they also need prime matter from which they can educe the new substantial form, while
divesting it of the form it previously had. Fire engenders fire in another material substance; plants grow from seeds,
with the help of some other elements provided to them by their material surroundings. Animals beget their offspring
by means of their own bodies.
c) The efficient causality of finite beings is limited by their own active capacity and by the conditions of the
subject on which they act. It is evident that one cannot produce more perfection than what he himself possesses (no
one can transmit knowledge which he does not have or generate a substantial form different from his own). Besides,
the efficient power of a cause is restricted by the potentiality of the matter which it transforms or influences. No
matter how intelligent a scientist may be, he can never transmit more knowledge than what his students are able to
grasp. Similarly, the skill of a sculptor is hampered by the poor quality of the marble be carves.

15
d) Consequently, the act of being of their effects is not the immediate and proper effect of the causality of
creatures. The causality of a creature cannot account for the effect in its totality; it can do so only for some of its
perfections, which the efficient cause is able to impart, and the subject, because of its conditions, is able to receive.
Consequently, no created cause produces the total being of its effect. Even in the case of generation, it does not
produce being from absolute non-being (from nothingness); rather, it produces this thing from something which was
not this thing. This is how a new plant grows from seed.
What the created cause immediately and directly influences is the effects manner of being, (as a substance or as
an accident), rather than its act of being. Strictly speaking, its causal influence ends in the form. A horse, for
instance, is the immediate cause, not of the colts being (its having the act of being), but of its being a colt.
This does not mean that the created cause does not influence the being of the effect (otherwise it would not
really be a cause). It truly does, but in an indirect and mediate fashion, that is, through the form, which is its proper
effect. No creature can be a cause of being as such, since its activity always presupposes something which already is
or has the act of being (esse). Created agents are not the cause of the act of being as such, but of being this of
being a man, or being white, for example. The act of being, as such, presupposes nothing, since nothing can preexist
that is outside being as such. Through the activity of creatures, this being or a manner of being of this thing is
produced; for out of a preexistent being, this new being or a new manner of being of it comes about(Summa Contra
Gentiles, II, 21).
Hence, it must be said that in relation to the act of being, created causes are always particular causes; in other
words, they attain their effect not insofar as it is being but only insofar as it is a particular kind of being. Besides,
everything acts to the extent that it is actual, and since creatures possess a limited act of being (they are not pure act
of being), they necessarily have to cause limited effects in the ontological order.
Created Causality Requires a First Cause Which is the Cause of the Act of Being. Summarizing the conclusions
of the two preceding sections, we can say that the efficient causality of creatures is not sufficient to explain the being
of an effect. We have underlined the fact that it extends only to the latters coming into being or becoming.
At the same time, we have also emphasized that the created cause is a real cause. Hence, to say a created thing
causes a new substance is perfectly valid. Even though the form is the end of the act of generation, the effect is a
new substance. But it is also evident that this new substance proceeds not only from the active power of the agent,
but also from the preexistent passive potency of matter (ex materia).
Therefore, all causality of creatures necessarily demands the act of being that is presupposed. The cause of this
act of being (esse) is God, the Subsistent Esse, the First and Universal cause, in contrast to which other beings are
merely secondary causes. Only divine causality can have esse as its proper object.
God has the act of being as the proper object of His causality, both in terms of creation and the conservation of
all things in being. Creation is the act of giving the act of being (esse) to creatures out of nothing. In God, creation is
an act co-eternal and one with Himself (ab aeterno), but from mans point of view, creation is carried out in time.
The duration in time of that divine act is known as conservation, which is not really distinct from the act of creation.
As a consequence, if God had not created, nothing would exist; seen from the angle of conservation (which is the
same as creation), everything would fall into nothingness if God would not maintain in being what He had created.
To give the act of being ex nihilo is exclusive of God, for only God is the Subsisting Act of Being, as well as the
only universal and omnipotent Cause. Let us consider this briefly:
a) He is the Subsisting Act of Being and Being by essence. Only the Absolute and Unlimited Being, the Fullness
of Being, can have the act of being of creatures as its proper effect. In contrast, a particular manner of being, with a
finite and participated esse, lacks the power to reach anything which transcends that restricted mode of being.
b) He is omnipotent. We have already seen that creatures presuppose some substratum on which they act. To the
extent that this substratum is more or less distant from the act which it is to acquire, a more or less powerful efficient
cause is required to actualize the potency. For instance, to make a piece of iron red-hot, a thermal power greater than
what suffices to set fire to a piece of wood is needed, since the latter, compared to iron, is in much more proximate
potency to ignition. Since the act of being does not presuppose anything, an infinite power is needed to cause it. It is
not simply a matter of bridging a great gap between act and potency, but of overcoming the infinite chasm between
nothingness and being. Omnipotence is an attribute of God alone, since He alone is Pure Act which is not restricted
by any essence.
c) He is the only universal cause. The act of being is the most universal effect, since it embraces all the
perfections of the universe in terms of extension and intensity. It includes the perfections of all beings (extension)
and all the degrees of perfection (intensity). Hence, no particular cause immediately affects the act of being; rather,
esse is the proper effect of the first and most universal cause, namely, God, who has all perfections in their fullness.

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God alone, then, is the agent who gives being (per modum dantis esse), and not merely one that moves the agent
or alters (per modum moventis et alternantis)(In IV Metaphysic., lect. 3).
This does not mean that God creates continuously out of nothing. It means rather that in His creative act, God
created all being whether actual or possible. This act gave rise not only to those beings God created at the
beginnning of time, but also to those that would come to be through natural and artificial changes in the course of
time(T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, op. cit., pp. 234-239).
Characteristics of the Causality of the First Cause (God):
Explaining the characteristics of the causality of the First Cause (God), Alvira, Clavell and Melendo write: The
terms First Cause (God) and secondary causes (creatures) are equivalent to others which are also often used: cause
of being (esse) and cause of becoming (fieri); universal cause and particular cause; transcendental cause and
predicamental cause.
The cause of the act of being is the first cause since it is presupposed by any other cause, just as being is
prerequisite to every other effect. It is an absolutely universal cause since it embraces each and every created
perfection, whereas particular agents only influence a certain type of effect. It is a transcendent cause for the same
reason, since its proper effect, being, transcends all the categories; in contrast, predicamental causes only produce
determinate modes of being.
In contrast to secondary causes, the First Cause can be defined by the following characteristics: a) It is the cause
of the species as such, whereas secondary causes only transmit them. A man, for instance, cannot be the cause of
human nature as such, or of all the perfections belonging to it, for he would then be the cause of every man, and,
consequently, of himself, which is impossible. But this individual man is the cause, properly speaking, of that
individual man. Now, this man exists because human nature is present in this matter. So, this man is not the cause of
man, except in the sense that he is the cause of a human form that comes to be in this matter. This means being the
principle of generation of an individual manNow, there must be some proper agent cause of the human species
itself ; This cause is God(Summa Contra Gentiles, III, ch. 65).
b) It is also the cause of matter, whereas creatures only give rise to successive changes of the form. As we have
seen, in the production of any new effect, creatures presuppose a prior subject, which in the case of generation is
matter. Matter, which is the ultimate substratum of all substantial changes, is the proper effect of the causality of the
supreme cause.
c) It is the most universal cause, in contrast to creatures, which are only particular causes. Acting, by way of
transforming, all secondary causes produce a type of particular effects, which necessarily presuppose the action of a
universal cause. Just as soldiers would achieve nothing for the final victory of the army without the overall plan
foreseen by the general and without the weapons and ammunition provided by him, no creature could exist or act,
and consequently produce its proper effects, without the influence of the First Cause, which confers the act of being
both on the cause and on the subject which is transformed.
d) It is a cause by essence, whereas creatures are only causes by participation. Something has a perfection by
essence when it possesses it in all its fullness. In contrast, the perfection is only participated if the subject possesses
it only in a partial and limited way. Since everything acts insofar as it is actual, only that which is Pure Act or
Subsisting Act of Being can act and cause by essence. Any creature, however, which necessarily has the act of being
restricted by its essence, can only cause by participation, that is, by virtue of having received the act of being and in
accordance with the degree it is possessed.
Consequently, God alone has causal power in an unlimited way, and for this reason He alone can produce
things from nothing (create them) by giving them their act of being. Creatures only possess a finite and determinate
causal capacity proportionate to their degree of participation in the act of being. Besides, for their proper effects,
they presuppose divine creative action which gives the act of being to those effects.
Creatures produce their proper effects, which are only determinations of being, insofar as they are conserved
by God. That which is some kind of thing by essence is the proper cause of what is such by participation. Thus, fire
is the cause of all things that are enkindled. Now, God alone is Being by essence, while other beings are such by
participation, since in God alone is Esse identical with His essence. Therefore, the act of being (esse) of every
existing thing is the proper effect of God. And so, everything that brings something into actual being does so
because it acts through Gods power(Summa Contra Gentiles, III, ch. 66)(T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T.
MELENDO, op. cit., pp. 239-241).
The Relationship Between the First Efficient Cause (God) and Secondary Efficient Causes (Creatures):
Illustrating the relationship between the First Efficient Cause (God) and secondary efficient causes (creatures),
Alvira, Clavell and Melendo write: The being and the causality of creatures are, as we have seen, based totally on
God who is the First Cause and the Cause by essence. This entails a relationship of total subordination, and not

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merely of parallel concurrence in which Gods power and that of creatures would combine to produce a single
effect. To illustrate the relationship between Gods efficient causality and that of creatures, we can recall the
relationship between the principal cause and an instrumental cause, instead of that between two partial causes which
are extrinsically united to attain a single result (as two horses joining forces to pull a carriage). Just as a paint brush
would be unable of itself to finish a painting, a creature would be devoid of its being and its power to act if it were to
be deprived of its dependence on God.
Nonetheless, some clarification has to be made regarding this matter: a) A created instrumental cause is truly
dependent on the agent only with respect to the action of the instrument, whereas the creature is also subject to God
with regard to its own act of being.
b) A creature possesses a substantial form and certain active powers which truly affect it in a permanent way;
these are the root of its activity, to such an extent that in natural activity, the actions of secondary causes are
proportionate to their causes. In an instrument, however, in addition to the form it has, by which it can produce its
own non-instrumental effects, there is also a new power present in a transient manner, capable of producing an
effect disproportionate to the instrumental cause. Hence, in the stricter sense, creatures are called instruments when
they are used by God to produce effects which exceed their own capacities, especially in the realm of grace. They
are called secondary causes when they act in the natural order.
Three consequences can be drawn from the total subordination of secondary causes to the First Cause: a)
Compared with the secondary cause, the First Cause has a greater influence on the reality of the effect.
Analogously, a painting is more correctly attributed to the artist than to the paint brush or palette which he used. In
the case of ordered agent causes, the subsequent causes act through the power of the first cause. Now, in the order of
agent causes, God is the first causethus, all lower agent causes act through His power. The principal cause of an
action is that by whose power the action is done, rather than that which acts; thus, the action springs more strictly
from the principal agent than from the instrument. Therefore, compared with secondary agent causes, God is a more
principal cause of every action(Summa Contra Gentiles, III, ch. 67).
b) Both the First Cause and secondary causes are total causes of the effect in their own respective order, since
the effect is entirely produced by each of them, and not partly by one and partly by another. The same effect is not
attributed to a natural cause and to divine power in such a way that it is partly done by God, and partly by the natural
agent; rather, the effect is totally produced by both, in different ways, just as the same effect is wholly attributed to
the instrument and likewise wholly attributed to the principal cause(Summa Contra Gentiles, III, ch. 70).
As we have seen, the proper and adequate effect of a secondary cause is the form (substantial or accidental), and
creatures receive a particular degree of participation in the act of being through the form. The immediate proper
effect of God, however, is the act of being of all things, and through the act of being, His own power influences all
the perfections of creatures. The all-encompassing character of divine causality arises from the special nature of esse
as the act of all acts and the perfection of all pefections of a created substance. Since any creature as well as
everything in it shares in its act of beingevery being, in its entirely, must come from the first and perfect cause(In
II Sent., d. 1, q. 1, a. 2).
Therefore, divine Providence embraces everything which exists in the universe. It includes not only the
universal species but also each individual, not only the necessary or predetermined activity of inferior beings but
also the free operations of spiritual creatures. It extends not only to the most decisive actions of free creatures (those
which alter the course of mankinds history) but also to their seemingly unimportant daily activities, since both
kinds of actions share in the actuality of the esse of the person doing them. This act of being is the immediate effect
of divine efficient causality.
c) The subordination of secondary causes to God does not diminish the causal efficacy of creatures; rather it
provides the basis for the efficacy of their activity. Gods action increases and intensifies the efficacy of subordinate
causes as they progressively get more closely linked with God, since a greater causal dependence entails a greater
participation in the source of operative power. This is somewhat like the case of a student who faithfully follows the
instructions of the professor guiding him in his studies, or that of the apprentice who conscientiously does what the
accomplished artist tells him. They experience greater efficacy in their activity.
Secondary causes have an efficacy of their own, but obviously they have their power by virtue of their
dependence on higher causes. A military officer, for instance, has authority over his subordinates because of the
power invested in him by higher officers of the army; the chisel transforms the marble because of the motion
imparted to it by the artist.
Hence, the power of a lower agent depends on the power of the superior agent, insofar as the superior agent
gives this power to the lower agent whereby it may act, or preserves it, or even applies it to the action(Summa
Contra Gentiles, III, ch. 70). Since God not only confers operative power on secondary causes but also maintains

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the affirmation of the existence of God as the Uncaused First Efficient Cause, is that of
transcendental metaphysical efficient causality, which is analogous, not univocal. Lobiettivo
della metafisica qui, non tanto descrivere come avviene luna o laltra modalit del processo
causale, ma di individuare lorigine ultima di ogni causalit. Se una causa finita rinvia ad unaltra
causa finita, lespediente di differire indefinitivamente la serie delle cause causate si rivela
infondato, in quanto le cause causate saranno, singolarmente e nel loro insieme, qualitativamente
non autosufficienti da un punto di vista ontologico, e per tanto necessiteranno di un fondamento.
Lorigine radicale dei processi causali pu risiedere soltanto in un essere incausato che sia
principio assoluto dellessere finito e della sua causalit: Dio.

LEssere-Causa prima al quale ci riferiamo, e che la religione chiama Dio, causa in


modo ontologicamente diverso rispetto al modo di causare delle cause causate. In altri termini,
non si pu equiparare il causare di Dio con il causare del finito, cos come non si pu equiparare
il suo Essere infinito con lessere finito e causato, senza perci annullare lanalogia.

Questultima osservazione imprescindibile per comprendere correttamente in cosa


consistono le vie tomiste. Con la prima via si accede a Dio come Atto puro, origine di tutto il
reale dinamico, ma trascendente rispetto ad esso. Lattualit assoluta di Dio lo distingue
infinitamente dallessere finito e dinamico che implica potenzialit. Dio, come Causa incausata,
al quale giunge la seconda via, non un elemento il pi importante di un ingranaggio, ma un
essere trascendente rispetto a tutto il causato, sia perch il suo essere , da un punto di vista
ontologico, infinitamente distante dal causato, sia perch il suo causare frutto della sua libert,
e non conseguenza di una necessit. Le vie tomiste non parlano di un Dio che parte di un
sistema nel quale sarebbe inglobato come culmine dello stesso, ma di un essere trascendente ed
assoluto, origine ultima di tutto il finito.44

Regarding the difference between univocal cause and analogical cause, Alvira, Clavell,
and Melendo state the following: This classification of causes refers to the degree of likeness of
the effect to its cause. A univocal cause produces an effect of the same species as itself. One tree
produces another tree, etc. An analogical cause produces an effect of a different and lower
species than itself, although there is always some likeness to itself. God is an analogical cause of
creatures: the act of being which He gives them does result in a likeness to God, since it is a
participation of that act which He has by essence. However, since the creatures act of being is
restricted by an essence, the created esse is infinitely distinct from that of God. Man is an
analogical cause of the artifacts he produces (a bed, a poem, a car), since these are of a species
different from man. Artificial things are subdued likenesses of the human spirit, since their forms
(received in matter) are similar to the spiritual forms which the artisan conceives in order to do
his work.45 Clavell writes in Metafisica (2006): Causa univoca e causa analoga. Tale
distinzione considera il tipo di somiglianza degli effetti rispetto alle loro cause. Il puledro

them in their being, and applies them to their effects, their efficacy is multiplied as they become more submissive to
divine action.
The great significance of this profound reality can be seen in practical activity, especially in the sphere of
human freedom. Submission to Gods law does not in the least diminish the quality of mens actions. On the
contrary, it invigorates them and confers on them an efficacy that surpasses natural standards(T. ALVIRA, L.
CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, op. cit., pp. 241-244).
44
L. ROMERA, Luomo e il mistero di Dio, EDUSC, Rome, 2008, pp. 168-169.
45
T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, op. cit., p. 205.

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assomiglia al cavallo causa univoca per la forma posseduta naturalmente da entrambi, che le
fa avere la stessa essenza ed appartenere alla stessa specie. Una cattedrale, invece, non
assomiglia allarchitetto causa analoga , ma allidea esemplare che questi ha concepito nella
propria mente.

La causa univoca quella che produce un effetto della sua stessa specie, un albero ne
genera un altro, ecc. La causa analoga produce un effetto di specie diversa e inferiore alla causa,
anche se ad essa somigliante. Luomo causa analoga degli artefatti che costruisce un letto,
una poesia, un torchio , poich questi ultimi non sono della stessa specie umana. Tuttavia, le
cose artificiali sono similitudini sebbene degradate dello spirito delluomo, dato che sono
oggetti la cui forma materializzata assomiglia alle forme spirituali concepite dallartista per
realizzare la propria opera.

Lintera attivita naturale del mondo fisico determinata ad un tipo di effetti e alle volte
univoca, mentre lazione originata dallo spirito analoga. Questi diversi tipi di causalit, per,
possono darsi in uno stesso agente. Di fatto, luomo per natura genera sempre un altro uomo e
ne causa agente univoca; e pu al contrario produrre effetti diversissimi in quanto artista o
artefice, e in questo modo anche causa analoga.

Dio causa analoga delle creature, poich d loro un essere che, in quanto
partecipazione di quello che Lui possiede per essenza, simile a Dio ma allo stesso tempo, in
quanto contratto dallessenza, si distingue infinitamente dallessere divino.46

Regarding analogous transcendental metaphysical efficient causality, Sanguineti writes:


Esiste anche un principio di causalit metafisica, non limitato alla serie forse indefinita di
cause ed effetti sensibili, un principio che consente di porre validamente le domande causali pi
profonde: perch esiste il mondo? perch la realt contingente? perch le cose sono mutevoli?
perch esiste ci che finito? Tali domande sorgono spontaneamente quando non vediamo nel
mondo, nel finito, nel contingente e nel mutabile la spiegazione della loro esistenza. Alla
domanda causale perch esiste laqua? si potr rispondere col ricorso ai processi chimici che
portano alla formazione della struttura fisica acqua. Ma anche valida la domanda: perch esiste
il cosmo, con tutte le sue leggi? dal momento che non esiste nel cosmo alcun aspetto che renda
necessaria la sua esistenza. Se ogni evento del cosmo causato e causa, esso sempre una causa
causata. Il principio del cosmo, invece, dovrebbe essere una causa incausata causa dellessere
finito e un essere necessario in modo assoluto. Di conseguenza, non potr essere un principio
immanente al cosmo. questa la base delle argomentazioni cosmologiche che portano
allaffermazione dellesistenza di Dio come principio creatore del cosmo.

Il principio di causalit metafisica non cos ovvio nella conoscenza ordinaria, in


quanto richiede una particolare riflessione sulla contingenza, caratteristica essenziale che
riguarda tutte le dimensioni dellessere materiale circostante e anche noi stessi. Non possiamo,
tuttavia, dilungarci su questo tema. Il principio si potrebbe formulare in questi termini: Ci che
nel suo insieme mutevole, contingente, causato e finito, richiede una causa non mutevole,
necessaria, incausata e infinita.

46
L. CLAVELL and M. PREZ DE LABORDA, op. cit., pp. 291-292.

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Forse si obietter che questo principio ha ununica applicazione e ununica risposta:
Dio. Tuttavia esso sostenuto dal principio di causalit fisica. Nel mondo materiale tutto
causato ed mosso. Quindi la mente naturalmente condotta ad affermare il passaggio ad una
causalit prima e trascendentale, radice di tutta la natura nel suo dinamismo e nella sua
mutabilit.47

Regarding analogous transcendental metaphysical efficient causality in the secunda via


Gonzlez writes: Nellapprofondimento della riflessione intorno alle cause seconde (cause
soltanto del fieri, del divenire) si pu e si deve passare dalla causalit predicamentale a quella
trascendentale. Mentre le cause seconde spiegano il fieri delleffetto, la causa incausata d
ragione dellessere della causa, dellattivit causale e dello stesso effetto. Pertanto, se una causa
esiste, necessario riferirsi ad una Causa Prima che la fa essere: causa dellessere delle cose e di
ogni effetto creato. Come si vede, questo il passagio decisivo e metafisicamente pi profondo
presente in tutte le vie: esso ci porta dallente allessere e dallessere allEssere.48 En la
profundizacin sobre las causas segundas, que son causas slo del fieri, del hacerse, puede y
debe pasarse de la causalidad predicamental a la trascendental. Mientras las causas segundas
explican el fieri del efecto, la causa incausada da razn del esse de la causa, de la actividad
causal y del mismo efecto. Por tanto, si una causa existe es necesario remontarse a una Primera
Causa que le hace ser: causa del ser de las cosas y de todo efecto creado. Como se ve, es el paso
decisivo y metafsicamente ms profundo que se da en todas las vas, que nos lleva del ente al ser
y del ser al Ser.49

4. The Conclusion of the A Posteriori Demonstration: That God Exists. The five ways a
posteriori quia demonstrations of the existence of God in Summa Theologiae, I, q. 2, a. 3, c.
conclude with their respective affirmations of Gods existence as First Unmoved Mover,
Uncaused First Efficient Cause, Absolutely Necessary Being, Supremely Perfect Being by
Essence, and Supreme Ordering Intelligence.

47
J. J. SANGUINETI, Introduzione alla gnoseologia, Le Monnier, Florence, 2003, pp. 188-189.
48
. L. GONZLEZ, op. cit., p. 103.
49
. L. GONZLEZ, op. cit., p. 108.

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