111

DR. FERNANDO P. SOLIDUM v. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 192123 March 10, 2014

TOPIC: Rule 111 Civil liability arising from the offense is deemed instituted (sec.1)

PONENTE: BERSAMIN, J.:

FACTS:
This appeal is taken by a physician-anesthesiologist who has been pronounced guilty of reckless
imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and the
Court of Appeals (CA). He had been part of the team of anesthesiologists during the surgical
pull-through operation conducted on a three-year old patient born with an imperforate anus.
Gerald Albert Gercayo (Gerald) was born on June 2, 1992 with an imperforate anus. Two days
after his birth, Gerald underwent colostomy, a surgical procedure to bring one end of the large
intestine out through the abdominal wall, enabling him to excrete through a colostomy bag
attached to the side of his body.
On May 17, 1995, Gerald, then three years old, was admitted at the Ospital ng Maynila for a
pull-through operation. The petitioner Dr. Fernando Solidum (Dr. Solidum) was the
anesthesioligist. During the operation, Gerald experienced bradycardia, and went into a coma.
He regained consciousness only after a month. He could no longer see, hear or move.
Agitated by her sons helpless and unexpected condition, Ma. Luz Gercayo (Luz) lodged a
complaint for reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries with the City
Prosecutors Office of Manila against the attending physicians.
Upon a finding of probable cause, the City Prosecutors Office filed an information solely
against Dr. Solidum.
The case was initially filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, but was transferred to the
RTC pursuant to Section 5 of Republic Act No. 8369 (The Family Courts Act of 1997).
On July 19, 2004, the RTC rendered its judgment finding Dr. Solidum guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries. On January 20, 2010, the
CA affirmed the conviction of Dr. Solidum.
ISSUE(S): whether or not Dr. Solidum was liable for criminal negligence.

HELD: No
RATIO: Dr. Solidum was criminally charged for "failing to monitor and regulate properly the
levels of anesthesia administered to said Gerald Albert Gercayo and using 100% halothane and
other anesthetic medications." However, the foregoing circumstances, taken together, did not
prove beyond reasonable doubt that Dr. Solidum had been recklessly imprudent in
administering the anesthetic agent to Gerald. Indeed, Dr. Vertidos findings did not preclude
the probability that other factors related to Geralds major operation, which could or could not
necessarily be attributed to the administration of the anesthesia, had caused the hypoxia and
had then led Gerald to experience bradycardia. Dr. Vertido revealingly concluded in his report,
instead, that "although the anesthesiologist followed the normal routine and precautionary
procedures, still hypoxia and its corresponding side effects did occur."
The existence of the probability about other factors causing the hypoxia has engendered in the
mind of the Court a reasonable doubt as to Dr. Solidums guilt, and moves us to acquit him of
the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries. "A reasonable doubt of
guilt," according to United States v. Youthsey:
x x x is a doubt growing reasonably out of evidence or the lack of it. It is not a captious doubt;
not a doubt engendered merely by sympathy for the unfortunate position of the defendant, or a
dislike to accept the responsibility of convicting a fellow man. If, having weighed the evidence
on both sides, you reach the conclusion that the defendant is guilty, to that degree of certainty
as would lead you to act on the faith of it in the most important and crucial affairs of your life,
you may properly convict him. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is not proof to a mathematical
demonstration. It is not proof beyond the possibility of mistake.
We have to clarify that the acquittal of Dr. Solidum would not immediately exempt him from
civil liability. But we cannot now find and declare him civilly liable because the circumstances
that have been established here do not present the factual and legal bases for validly doing so.
His acquittal did not derive only from reasonable doubt. There was really no firm and
competent showing how the injury to Gerard had been caused. That meant that the manner of
administration of the anesthesia by Dr. Solidum was not necessarily the cause of the hypoxia
that caused the bradycardia experienced by Gerard. Consequently, to adjudge Dr. Solidum
civilly liable would be to speculate on the cause of the hypoxia. We are not allowed to do so, for
civil liability must not rest on speculation but on competent evidence.
Liability of Ospital ng Maynila
Although the result now reached has resolved the issue of civil liability, we have to address the
unusual decree of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, of expressly holding Ospital ng Maynila
civilly liable jointly and severally with Dr. Solidum. The decree was flawed in logic and in law.
In criminal prosecutions, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability that is deemed
instituted with the criminal action refers only to that arising from the offense charged. It is
puzzling, therefore, how the RTC and the CA could have adjudged Ospital ng Maynila jointly
 GR No. 191240, July 30, 2014

CRISTINA B. CASTILLO, Petitioner,

vs.
PHILLIP R. SALVADOR, Respondent.

Facts:
Petition for review on certiorari which assails the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) with respect only
to the civil aspect of the case as respondent Phillip R. Salvador had been acquitted of the crime of Estafa.

The respondent Phillip R. Salvador was charged with Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of the
Revised Penal Code. While, petitioner Cristina B. Castillo is a businesswoman engaged in real
estate business, educational institution, boutique, and trading business. She was then enticed by Salvador
and his brother, Ramon Salvador to engage in freight and remittance business.

As petitioner had deeply fallen in love with respondent Salvador and since she trusted him very much as
he even acted as a father to her children while her annulment was ongoing, she agreed to embark on the
remittance business. She agreed with respondent and Ramon that any profit derived from the business
would be equally divided among them and that respondent would be in charge of promotion and
marketing in Hong Kong, and Ramon would take charge of the operations of business in the Philippines
and she would be financing the business.

The business has not operated yet as petitioner was still raising the amount of US$100,000.00 as capital
for the actual operation. When petitioner already had the money, she handed the same to respondent
Salvador which was witnessed by her disabled half-brother Enrico B. Tan. However, the
proposed business never operated as respondent only stayed in Hong Kong for three days. When she
asked respondent about the money and the business, the latter told her that the money was deposited in a
bank. However, upon further query, respondent confessed that he used the money to pay for his other
obligations. Since then, the US$100,000.00 was not returned at all.

Respondents defense that he and petitioner became close friends and eventually fell in love and had an
affair. They traveled to Hong Kong and Bangkok where petitioner saw how popular he was among the
Filipino domestic helpers, which led her to suggest a remittance business. Although hesitant, he has
friends with such business. He denied that petitioner gave him US$10,000.00 when he went to Hong
Kong and Bangkok. After he came back from the United States, petitioner had asked him and his brother
Ramon for a meeting. During the meeting, petitioner brought up the money remittance business, but
Ramon told her that they should make a study of it first. He was introduced to Roy Singun, owner of a
money remittance business in Pasay City. Upon the advice of Roy, respondent and petitioner, her
husband and Ramon went to Palau. He denied receiving US$20,000.00 from petitioner but admitted that
it was petitioner who paid for the plane tickets. After their Palau trip, they went into training at Western
Union at the First World Center in Makati City. Ramon, petitioner and her mother went to Hong Kong to
register the business, while he took care of petitioners children here. He and Ramon went back to Hong
Kong but denied having received the amount of US$100,000.00 from petitioner but then admitted receipt
of the amount of P100, 000.00 which petitioner asked him to give to Charlie Chau as payment for the
pieces of diamond jewelry she got from him, which Chau had duly acknowledged. He denied Enricos
testimony that petitioner gave him the amount of US$100,000.00 in his mothers house. He claimed that
no remittance business was started in Hong Kong as they had no license, equipment, personnel and
money to operate the same. Upon his return to the Philippines, petitioner never asked him about the
business, as she never gave him such amount. He intimated that he and petitioner even went to Hong
Kong again to buy some goods for the latters boutique. He admitted that he loved petitioner and her
children very much as there was a time when petitioners finances were short; he gave her P600, 000.00
for the enrollment of her children in very expensive schools. It is also not true that he and Ramon initiated
the Hong Kong and Bangkok trips
Petitioner files the instant petition on the civil aspect of the case alleging that even if the Court Of Appeals
decided to acquit him it should have at least retained the award of damages to the petitioner.

ISSUE:
WON the award of damages or the civil aspect be retained.

RULING:
The award of damages must be removed. Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects
on the civil liability of the accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of
the actor omission complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person who has been
found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never be held liable for such act or
omission. There being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the question, and the civil action, if any,
which may be instituted must be based on grounds other than the delict complained of. This is the
situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. The second instance is an acquittal based on
reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been
satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of
evidence only. This is the situation contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil Code, where the civil action for
damages is for the same act or omission.

A reading of the CA decision would show that respondent was acquitted because the prosecution failed to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Said the CA:

The evidence for the prosecution being insufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the crime as
charged had been committed by appellant, the general presumption, that a person is innocent of the
crime or wrong, stands in his favor. The prosecution failed to prove that all the elements of Estafa are
present in this case as would overcome the presumption of innocence in favor of appellant. For in fact, the
prosecutions primary witness herself could not even establish clearly and precisely how appellant
committed the alleged fraud. She failed to convince us that she was deceived through misrepresentations
and/or insidious actions, in venturing into a remittance business. Quite the contrary, the obtaining
circumstance in this case indicate the weakness of her submissions.

Thus, since the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt, respondent is not exempt from civil liability which
may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. In Encinas v. National Bookstore, Inc., the higher
court explained the concept of preponderance of evidence as follows:

Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is
usually considered to be synonymous with the term greater weight of the evidence or greater weight of
the credible evidence. Preponderance of evidence is a phrase which, in the last analysis, means
probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that
which is offered in opposition thereto.

However, in this case, no such civil liability is proved even by preponderance of evidence.

In discrediting petitioners allegation that she gave respondent US$100,000.00 in May 2002, the CA
found that: (1) petitioner failed to show how she was able to raise the money in such a short period of time
and even gave conflicting versions on the source of the same; (2) petitioner failed to require respondent to
sign a receipt so she could have a record of the transaction and offered no plausible reason why the money
was allegedly hand-carried to Hong Kong; (3) petitioners claim of trust as reason for not requiring
respondent to sign a receipt was inconsistent with the way she conducted her previous transactions with
him; and (4) petitioners behavior after the alleged fraud perpetrated against her was inconsistent with
the actuation of someone who had been swindled.

The petition for the award of damages is denied.

G.R. No. 175256 August 23, 2012 LILY LIM, Petitioner, vs. KOU CO PING a.k.a. CHARLIE
CO, Respondent. G.R. No. 179160 KOU CO PING a.k.a. CHARLIE CO, Petitioner, vs. LILY
LIM, Respondent. DEL CASTILLO, J.: Petitions for Review

Facts: In February 1999, FR Cement Corporation (FRCC), owner/operator of a cement manufacturing

plant, issued several withdrawal authorities for the account of cement dealers and traders, Fil-Cement
Center and Tigerbilt. These withdrawal authorities state the number of bags that the dealer/trader paid
for and can withdraw from the plant. Each withdrawal authority contained a provision that it is valid for
six months from its date of issuance, unless revoked by FRCC Marketing Department. Fil-Cement Center
and Tigerbilt, through their administrative manager, Gail Borja (Borja), sold the withdrawal authorities
covering 50,000 bags of cement to Co for the amount of P 3.15 million or P 63.00 per bag. On February
15, 1999, Co sold these withdrawal authorities to Lim allegedly at the price of P 64.00 per bag or a total of
P 3.2 million. Using the withdrawal authorities, Lim withdrew the cement bags from FRCC on a staggered
basis. She successfully withdrew 2,800 bags of cement, and sold back some of the withdrawal authorities,
covering 10,000 bags, to Co. Sometime in April 1999, FRCC did not allow Lim to withdraw the remaining
37,200 bags covered by the withdrawal authorities. Lim clarified the matter with Co and Borja, who
explained that the plant implemented a price increase and would only release the goods once Lim pays for
the price difference or agrees to receive a lesser quantity of cement. Lim objected and maintained that the
withdrawal authorities she bought were not subject to price fluctuations. Lim sought legal recourse after
her demands for Co to resolve the problem with the plant or for the return of her money had failed. An
Information for Estafa through Misappropriation or Conversion was filed against Co before Branch 154 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City. On November 19, 2003, the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 154,
rendered its Order acquitting Co of the estafa charge for insufficiency of evidence in view of the absence of
the essential requisites of the crime of estafa. After the trial on the civil aspect of the criminal case, the
Pasig City RTC also relieved Co of civil liability to Lim in its December 1, 2004 Order. On March 14, 2005,
Lim filed her notice of appeal on the civil aspect of the criminal case. Her appeal was docketed as CA-G.R.
CV No. 85138 and raffled to the Second Division of the CA. On April 19, 2005, Lim filed a complaint for
specific performance and damages before Branch 21 of the RTC of Manila. The defendants in the civil case
were Co and all other parties to the withdrawal authorities, Tigerbilt, Fil-Cement Center, FRCC, Southeast
Asia Cement, and La Farge Corporation. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 05-112396, asserted
two causes of action: breach of contract and abuse of rights. Lim prayed for Co to honor his contractual
commitments either by delivering the 37,200 bags of cement, making arrangements with FRCC to allow
Lim to withdraw the cement, or to pay for their value. She likewise asked that the defendants be held
solidarily liable to her for the damages she incurred in her failed attempts to withdraw the cement and for
the damages they inflicted on her as a result of their abuse of their rights. In reaction to the filing of the
civil complaint for specific performance and damages, Co filed motions to dismiss the said civil case and
Lims appeal in the civil aspect of the estafa case or CA-G.R. CV No. 85138.25 He maintained that the two
actions raise the same issue, which is Cos liability to Lim for her inability to withdraw the bags of cement,
and should be dismissed on the ground of lis pendens and forum shopping. The appellate court (Second
Division) favorably resolved Cos motion and dismissed Lims appeal from the civil aspect of the estafa
case. In its Resolution dated October 20, 2005, the CA Second Division held that the parties, causes of
action, and reliefs prayed for in Lims appeal and in her civil complaint are identical. Both actions seek the
same relief, which is the payment of the value of the 37,200 bags of cement. Thus, the CA Second Division
dismissed Lims appeal for forum shopping. The CA denied Lims motion for reconsideration. Lim filed
the instant petition for review, which was docketed as G.R. No. 175256. Meanwhile, the Manila RTC
denied Cos Motion to Dismiss in an Order dated December 6, 2005. The Manila RTC held that there was
no forum shopping because the causes of action invoked in the two cases are different. It observed that the
civil complaint before it is based on an obligation arising from contract and quasi-delict, whereas the civil
liability involved in the appeal of the criminal case arose from a felony. Co filed a petition for certiorari,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 93395, before the appellate court. He prayed for the nullification of the
Manila RTCs Order in Civil Case No. 05-112396 for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.
The CA Seventeenth Division denied Cos petition and remanded the civil complaint to the trial court for
further proceedings. The CA Seventeenth Division agreed with the Manila RTC that the elements of litis
pendentia and forum shopping are not met in the two proceedings because they do not share the same
cause of action. Co filed the instant Petition for Review, which was docketed as G.R. No. 179160. Upon
Cos motion, the Court resolved to consolidate the two petitions. Kou Co Pings arguments Co maintains
that Lim is guilty of forum shopping because she is asserting only one cause of action in CA-G.R. CV No.
85138 (the appeal from the civil aspect of Criminal Case No. 116377) and in Civil Case No. 05-112396,
which is for Cos violation of her right to receive 37,200 bags of cement. Likewise, the reliefs sought in
both cases are the same, that is, for Co to deliver the 37,200 bags of cement or its value to Lim. That Lim
utilized different methods of presenting her case a criminal action for estafa and a civil complaint for
specific performance and damages should not detract from the fact that she is attempting to litigate the
same cause of action twice. Co makes light of the distinction between civil liability ex contractu and ex
delicto. According to him, granting that the two civil liabilities are independent of each other,
nevertheless, the two cases arising from them would have to be decided using the same evidence and
going over the same set of facts. Thus, any judgment rendered in one of these cases will constitute res
judicata on the other. In G.R. No. 179160, Co prays for the annulment of the CA Decision and Resolution
in CA-G.R. SP No. 93395, for a declaration that Lim is guilty of forum shopping, and for the dismissal of
Civil Case No. 05-112396. In G.R. No. 175256, Co prays for the affirmation of the CA Decision in CAG.R.
CV No. 85138 (which dismissed Lims appeal from the trial courts decision in Criminal Case No. 116377).
Lily Lims arguments Lim admits that the two proceedings involve substantially the same set of facts
because they arose from only one transaction. She is quick to add, however, that a single act or omission
does not always make a single cause of action. It can possibly give rise to two separate civil liabilities on
the part of the offender (1) ex delicto or civil liability arising from crimes, and (2) independent civil
liabilities or those arising from contracts or intentional torts. The only caveat provided in Article 2177 of
the Civil Code is that the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission.
Because the law allows her two independent causes of action, Lim contends that it is not forum shopping
to pursue them. She then explains the separate and distinct causes of action involved in the two cases. Her
cause of action in CA-G.R CV No. 85138 is based on the crime of estafa. Co violated Lims right to be
protected against swindling. He represented to Lim that she can withdraw 37,200 bags of cement using
the authorities she bought from him. This is a fraudulent representation because Co knew, at the time that
they entered into the contract, that he could not deliver what he promised. On the other hand, Lims cause
of action in Civil Case No. 05-112396 is based on contract. Co violated Lims rights as a buyer in a contract
of sale. Co received payment for the 37,200 bags of cement but did not deliver the goods that were the
subject of the sale. In G.R. No. 179160, Lim prays for the denial of Cos petition. In G.R. No. 175256, she
prays for the reversal of the CA Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 85138, for a declaration that she is not guilty
of forum shopping, and for the reinstatement of her appeal in Criminal Case No. 116377 to the CA.

Issue: Whether or not the civil cases can proceed independently of each other. YES
Ruling: A single act or omission that causes damage to an offended party may give rise to two separate
civil liabilities on the part of the offender - civil liability ex delicto, that is, civil liability arising from the
criminal offense under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and (2) independent civil liability, that is,
civil liability that may be pursued independently of the criminal proceedings. The independent civil
liability may be based on "an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony," as
provided in Article 31 of the Civil Code (such as for breach of contract or for tort). It may also be based on
an act or omission that may constitute felony but, nevertheless, treated independently from the criminal
action by specific provision of Article 33 of the Civil Code ("in cases of defamation, fraud and physical
injuries"). The civil liability arising from the offense or ex delicto is based on the acts or omissions that
constitute the criminal offense; hence, its trial is inherently intertwined with the criminal action. For this
reason, the civil liability ex delicto is impliedly instituted with the criminal offense. If the action for the
civil liability ex delicto is instituted prior to or subsequent to the filing of the criminal action, its
proceedings are suspended until the final outcome of the criminal action. The civil liability based on delict
is extinguished when the court hearing the criminal action declares that "the act or omission from which
the civil liability may arise did not exist." On the other hand, the independent civil liabilities are separate
from the criminal action and may be pursued independently, as provided in Articles 31 and 33 of the Civil
Code, which state that: ART. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or
omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal
proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter. (Emphasis supplied.) ART. 33. In cases of
defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the
criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. Because of the distinct and
independent nature of the two kinds of civil liabilities, jurisprudence holds that the offended party may
pursue the two types of civil liabilities simultaneously or cumulatively, without offending the rules on
forum shopping, litis pendentia, or res judicata. Since civil liabilities arising from felonies and those
arising from other sources of obligations are authorized by law to proceed independently of each other,
the resolution of the present issue hinges on whether the two cases herein involve different kinds of civil
obligations such that they can proceed independently of each other. The answer is in the affirmative. The
first action is clearly a civil action ex delicto, it having been instituted together with the criminal action.
On the other hand, the second action, judging by the allegations contained in the complaint, is a civil
action arising from a contractual obligation and for tortious conduct (abuse of rights). In her civil
complaint, Lim basically alleges that she entered into a sale contract with Co under the following terms:
that she bought 37,200 bags of cement at the rate of P 64.00 per bag from Co; that, after full payment, Co
delivered to her the withdrawal authorities issued by FRCC corresponding to these bags of cement; that
these withdrawal authorities will be honored by FRCC for six months from the dates written thereon. Lim
then maintains that the defendants breached their contractual obligations to her under the sale contract
and under the withdrawal authorities; that Co and his co-defendants wanted her to pay more for each bag
of cement, contrary to their agreement to fix the price at P 64.00 per bag and to the wording of the
withdrawal authorities; that FRCC did not honor the terms of the withdrawal authorities it issued; and
that Co did not comply with his obligation under the sale contract to deliver the 37,200 bags of cement to
Lim. From the foregoing allegations, it is evident that Lim seeks to enforce the defendants contractual
obligations, given that she has already performed her obligations. She prays that the defendants either
honor their part of the contract or pay for the damages that their breach has caused her. Lim also includes
allegations that the actions of the defendants were committed in such manner as to cause damage to Lim
without regard for morals, good customs and public policy. These allegations, if proven, would constitute
tortious conduct (abuse of rights under the Human Relations provisions of the Civil Code). Thus, Civil
Case No. 05-112396 involves only the obligations arising from contract and from tort, whereas the appeal
in the estafa case involves only the civil obligations of Co arising from the offense charged. They present
different causes of action, which under the law, are considered "separate, distinct, and independent" from
each other. Both cases can proceed to their final adjudication, subject to the prohibition on double
recovery under Article 2177 of the Civil Code. WHEREFORE, premises considered, Lily Lims Petition in
G.R. No. 175256 is GRANTED. The assailed October 20, 2005 Resolution of the Second Division of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 85138 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Lily Lims appeal in CA-G.R.
CV No. 85138 is ordered REINSTATED and the Court of Appeals is DIRECTED to RESOLVE the same
with DELIBERATE DISPATCH. Charlie Cos Petition G.R. No. 179160 is DENIED. The assailed April 10,
2007 Decision of the Seventeenth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 93395 is
AFFIRMED in toto.

CASUPANAN VS LAROYA CASE DIGEST G.R. No. 145391 August 26, 2002

Topic: Criminal Procedure: Rule 111, Rules of Court

FACTS: As a result of a vehicular accident between two vehicles, one driven by Mario Llavore Laroya and
the other owned by Roberto Capitulo and driven by Avelino Casupanan, two cases were filed before the
MCTC of Capas, Tarlac. Laroya filed a criminal case against Casupanan for reckless imprudence resulting
in damage to property. This case was on its preliminary investigation stage when Casupanan
and Capitulo filed a civil case against Laroya for quasi-delict. However, upon motion of Laroya on the
ground of forum-shopping, the MCTC dismissed the civil case. On Motion for Reconsideration,
Casupanan and Capitulo insisted that the civil case is a separate civil action which
can proceedindependently of the criminal case. Casupanan and Capitulo then filed a petition for certiorari
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Capas, Tarlac. But the RTC ruled that the order of dismissal
issued by the MCTC is a final order which disposes of the case and therefore, the proper remedy should
have been an appeal. Hence, Casupanan and Capitulo filed this petition.

Casupanan and Capitulos contention: that if the accused in a criminal case has a counterclaim against the
private complainant, he may file the counterclaim in a separate civil action at the proper time. They
contend that an action on quasi-delict is different from an action resulting from the crime of reckless
imprudence, and an accused in a criminal case can be an aggrieved party in a civil case arising from the
same incident. They maintain that under Articles 31 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the civil case
can proceed independently of the criminal action. Finally, they point out that Casupanan was not the only
one who filed the independent civil action based on quasi-delict but also Capitulo, the owner-operator of
the vehicle, who was not a party in the criminal case.

Laroyas contention: that the petition is fatally defective as it does not state the real antecedents. Laroya
further alleges that Casupanan and Capitulo forfeited their right to question the order of dismissal when
they failed to avail of the proper remedy of appeal. Laroya argues that there is no question of law to be
resolved as the order of dismissal is already final and a petition for certiorari is not a substitute for a
lapsed appeal.

ISSUE/HELD: WON an accused in a pending criminal case for reckless imprudence can validly file,
simultaneously and independently, a separate civil action for quasi-delict against the private complainant
in the criminal case. AFFIRMATIVE

RATIO DICIDENDI:
The Court held that the MCTC dismissed the civil action for quasi-delict on the ground of forum-shopping
under Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94. The MCTC did not state in its order of dismissal
that the dismissal was with prejudice. Under the Administrative Circular, the order of dismissal is without
prejudice to refiling the complaint, unless the order of dismissal expressly states that it is with prejudice.
Thus, the MCTC's dismissal, being silent on the matter, is a dismissal without prejudice. Section 1 of Rule
41 provides that an order dismissing an action without prejudice is not appealable. The remedy of the
aggrieved party is to file a special civil action under Rule 65. Clearly, the Capas RTC's order dismissing the
petition for certiorari on the ground that the proper remedy is an ordinary appeal, is erroneous.

Laroya filed the criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property based on the
Revised Penal Code while Casupanan and Capitulo filed the civil action for damages based on Article 2176
of the Civil Code. Althoughthese two actions arose from the same act or omission, they have different
causes of action. The criminal case is based on culpa criminal punishable under the Revised Penal Code
while the civil case is based on culpa aquiliana actionable under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code.
And par 6, sec 1 of Rule 111.

Since the present Rules require the accused in a criminal action to file his counterclaim in a separate civil
action, there can be no forum-shopping if the accused files such separate civil action.

Under the present Rule 111, the offended party is still given the option to file a separate civil action to
recover civil liability ex-delicto by reserving such right in the criminal action before the prosecution
presents its evidence. Also, the offended party is deemed to make such reservation if he files a separate
civil action before filing the criminal action. If the civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is filed
separately but its trial has not yet commenced, the civil action may be consolidated with
the criminal action. The consolidation under this Rule does not apply to separate civil actions arising from
the same act or omission filed under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code.

Section 2, Rule 111 of the present Rules did not change the rule that the separate civil action, filed to
recover damages ex-delicto, is suspended upon the filing of the criminal action. Section 2 of the present
Rule 111 also prohibits the filing, after commencement of the criminal action, of a separate civil action to
recover damages ex-delicto.

Section 3 of the present Rule 111, like its counterpart in the amended 1985 Rules, expressly allows the
"offended party" to bring an independent civil action under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code.
As stated in Section 3 of the present Rule 111, this civil action shall proceed independently of
the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the
"offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action."

There is no question that the offended party in the criminal action can file an independent civil action for
quasi-delict against the accused. Section 3 of the present Rule 111 expressly states that the "offended
party" may bring such an action but the "offended party" may not recover damages twice for the same act
or omission charged in the criminal action. Clearly, Section 3 of Rule 111 refers to the offended party in
the criminal action, not to the accused.

Thus, the offended party can file two separate suits for the same act or omission. The first a criminal case
where the civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is deemed instituted, and the other a civil case for
quasi-delict without violating the rule on non-forum shopping. The two cases
can proceed simultaneously and independently of each other. The commencement or prosecution of
the criminal action will not suspend the civil action for quasi-delict. The only limitation is that the
offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. In most
cases, the offended party will have no reason to file a second civil action since he cannot
recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the accused. In some instances, the accused may be
insolvent, necessitating the filing of another case against his employer or guardians.

Similarly, the accused can file a civil action for quasi-delict for the same act or omission he is accused of in
the criminal case. This is expressly allowed in paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 which states
that the counterclaim of the accused "may be litigated in a separate civil action." This is only fair for two
reasons. First, the accused is prohibited from setting up any counterclaim in the civil aspect that is
deemed instituted in the criminal case. The accused is therefore forced to litigate separately his
counterclaim against the offended party. If the accused does not file a separate civil action for quasi-delict,
the prescriptive period may set in since the period continues to run until the civil action for quasi-delict is
filed.

Second, the accused, who is presumed innocent, has a right to invoke Article 2177 of the Civil Code, in the
same way that the offended party can avail of this remedy which is independent of the criminal action. To
disallow the accused from filing a separate civil action for quasi-delict, while refusing to recognize his
counterclaim in the criminal case, is to deny him due process of law, access to the courts, and equal
protection of the law.Thus, the civil action based on quasi-delict filed separately by Casupanan
and Capitulo is proper.

Magistrado v. People

G.R. No. 148072

Topic: Rule 111; Prejudicial question

FACTS:

Private respondent Elena Librojo filed a criminal complaint of against accused Francisco Magistrado
before the the Office of the Prosecutor of Quezon City. Thereafter the prosecutor recommended the filing
of the complaint against accused. An Information was filed against the accused for perjury before the
MeTC of Quezon City.

The Information alleged that the accused subscribed and swore to an Affidavit of Loss before a notary
public stating that he lost his Owners Duplicate Certificate of TCT. The same affidavit was used to by
accused to support his Petition for Issuance of New Owners Duplicate Copy of Certificate of TCT filed
with the RTC of Quezon City. A verification was again signed and sworn into by the accused before the
notary public. However, the contents of the same affidavit, already known to the accused, are false. It was
later found out that the property subject of the TCT was mortgaged to respondent Librojo as collateral for
a loan. As a result, respondent suffered damages and prejudice due to the deliberate assertion of
falsehoods by the accused.

Subsequently, petitioner-accused Magistrado filed a motion to suspend the proceedings on the ground of
a prejudicial question. Petitioner alleged that two civil cases (for recovery of sum of money and for
cancellation of mortgage) were pending before the RTC of Quezon City, and that they must be resolved
first before the present criminal case. The RTC of Quezon City denied the motion. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the two civil cases (for Recovery of Sum of Money and for Cancellation of Mortgage)
constitutes a prejudicial question that would warrant a suspension of the criminal case of perjury
RULING + RATIO:

A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved therein, and he cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. Further,
a prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court, but the jurisdiction must be
lodged in another court. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so
intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. The Court
enumerated the requisites of a prejudicial question that would suspend the criminal proceedings until
final resolution of the civil case:

1. The civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be
based;
2. The guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined in resolving the issued raised
in the civil case;
3. Jurisdiction to try the question is lodged in another tribunal.

In concluding the Court stated, it is evident that the civil cases and the criminal cases can proceed
independently of each other. Regardless of the outcome of the two civil cases, it will not establish the
innocence or guilt of the petitioner inf the criminal case of perjury. The purchase by petitioner of the land
or his execution of a real estate mortgage will have no bearing whatsoever on whether petitioner
knowingly and fraudulently executed a false affidavit of loss of the TCT.

On 25 October 2004, Maria Pimentel y Lacap (private respondent) filed an action for frustrated parricide
against Joselito Pimentel (petitioner) before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.

On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo
City for the pre-trial and trial of a civil case (Maria Pimentel v. Joselito Pimentel) for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.

On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before the RTC
Quezon City on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question.

ISSUE: Whether the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question that
warrants the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide against petitioner.

The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 is whether petitioner is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The issue in parricide is
whether the accused killed the victim. In this case, since petitioner was charged with frustrated parricide,
the issue is whether he performed all the acts of execution which would have killed respondent as a
consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of petitioners
will. At the time of the commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and respondent were married. The
subsequent dissolution of their marriage will have no effect on the alleged crime that was committed at
the time of the subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the marriage between petitioner and
respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally liable since at the time of the commission
of the alleged crime, he was still married to respondent.
We cannot accept petitioners reliance on Tenebro v. CA that the judicial declaration of the nullity of a
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage
insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned x x x. First, the issue in Tenebro is the effect of
the judicial declaration of nullity of a second or subsequent marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity on a criminal liability for bigamy. There was no issue of prejudicial question in that case.
Second, the Court ruled in Tenebro that [t]here is x x x a recognition written into the law itself that such a
marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. In fact, the Court declared in
that case that a declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the States penal laws are concerned.

JM Dominguez vs. Liclican

The Case:

During the stockholders meeting of the JM Dominguez Agronomic Company, presided by Cecilia (one of
the respondents,) and attended by Norma and Purita (her co-respondents) and petitioners Helen, Patrick,
Kenneth and Shirley, Patrick and Kenneth were not allowed to vote as their mother and grandmother,
both deceased are the stockholders of the company and no settlement of estate was shown to transfer
their shares in the company. Tensions rose, and respondents walked out of the meeting. Since quorum
still existed, the election proceeded. As a result, Helen, Patrick, Kenneth and Shirley were elected
officers. On the other hand, after staging the walkout, the respondents executed a Board Resolution
certifying that during the meeting, the following set of officers were elected as officers: Cecilia, Norma,
Purita, Tessie, and Shirley.

The petitioners then filed a complaint against respondents before the RTC of Baguio City for nullification
of meetings, election and acts of directors and officers, injunction and other reliefs, docketed as Civil Case
No. 6623-R. It was raffled off to Branch 7 of the RTC for Judicial Dispute Resolution. The petitioners as
stockholders then represented themselves as JMDs lawful directors and officers, collected rentals and
deposited rents due the company to its bank account. They then filed a complaint for Qualified Theft
against Ceclia, Norma and Purita. They alleged that the respondents, without any authority, conspired to
withdraw the amount of P852,024.19 from the corporations savings account with Equitable PCIBank,
and issued Check No C0002489901 in the amount of P200,000.00 payable to cash, drawn against JMDs
account with Robinsons Savings Bank. In another compliant, they claimed that respondents issued
Equitable PCIBank check no. 320953 payable to one Atty. Alexander Lava for P200,000.00.

After preliminary investigation, the Office of the City Prosecutor recommended the filing of Infomations
against the respondents. The Informations were raffled off to Branch 7 RTC of Baguio City. Finding
probable cause, the latter court issued a warrant for the arrest of respondents.

Respondents then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. They averred the existence of a
prejudicial question. By filing the complaint, petitioners were already assuming that they are the
legitimate directors of JMD, which is the very issue in the intra-corporate dispute pending with the same
RTC Branch 7.
The CA granted the petition for certiorari, holding that Since there is doubt in the instant case as to the
sufficiency of the authority of a corporate officer, Judge Tiongson-Tabora should have exercised prudence
by holding the criminal cases in abeyance pending resolution of the intra-corporate dispute which private
respondents themselves instituted. The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that their
election as officers of JMD had been sustained by virtue of the judgment in Civil Case No. 6623-R date
May 6, 2011. The issue of whether or not the judge committed grave abuse of discretion was rendered
moot and academic by the judges inhibition in the criminal cases. The CA nevertheless denied the
motion. Hence, the petitioner elevated their case to the Supreme Court via petition for review on
certiorari, on whether or not a prejudicial question exists.

The Issue:

Whether or not Civil Case No. 6623-R constituted a prejudicial question warranting the suspension of the
proceedings in the criminal case for Qualified Theft.

The Ruling:

The petition lacks merit.

The challenged Orders of the trial court were issued in grave abuse of discretion
We have previously ruled that grave abuse of discretion may arise when a lower court or tribunal violates
or contravenes the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence. By grave abuse of discretion is meant,
such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of
discretion must be grave as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty
or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law. The word
capricious, usually used in tandem with the term arbitrary, conveys the notion of willful and
unreasoning action. Thus, when seeking the corrective hand of certiorari, a clear showing of caprice and
arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion is imperative.1
In the case at bar, the CA correctly ruled that Judge Tiongson-Tabora acted with grave abuse of discretion
when she ordered the arrests of respondents Isip and Liclican despite the existence of a prejudicial
question.

As jurisprudence elucidates, a prejudicial question generally exists in a situation where a civil action and a
criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the former an issue that must be pre-emptively
resolved before the latter may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved
would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case.2 The
rationale behind the principle is to avoid two conflicting decisions,3 and its existence rests on the
concurrence of two essential elements: (i) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to
the issue raised in the criminal action; and (ii) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed.4
Here, the CA aptly observed that Civil Case No. 6623-R, the intra-corporate dispute, posed a prejudicial
question to Criminal Case Nos. 29175-R and 29176-R. To be sure, Civil Case No. 6623-R involves the same
parties herein, and is for nullification of JMDs meetings, election and acts of its directors and officers,
among others. Court intervention was sought to ascertain who between the two contesting group of
officers should rightfully be seated at the companys helm. Without Civil Case No. 6623-Rs resolution,
petitioners authority to commence and prosecute Criminal Case Nos. 29175-R and 29176-R against
respondents for qualified theft in JMDs behalf remained questionable, warranting the suspension of the
criminal proceedings.

Judge Tiongson-Tabora cannot deny knowledge of the pendency of Civil Case No. 6623-R as the judge
presiding over its JDR. As correctly held by the CA:
Judge Tiongson-Tabora is well-aware of the existence of said prejudicial question that
should have barred the filing of the criminal complaint against petitioners Liclican and Isip, for the simple
reason that a juridical person can only act through its officers, and the issue in the main case submitted
for JDR before Judge Tiongson-Tabora is one for nullification of meetings, election and act of directors
and officers, injunction and other reliefs. Thus, she knows for a fact that there is a question as to
who are the legitimate directors of JMD such that there is doubt as to whether private
respondents are in a position to act for JMD. (emphasis added)
Verily, the RTC ought to have suspended the proceedings, instead of issuing the challenged Orders issued
by the RTC.

The subsequent resolution of the prejudicial question did not cure the defect
It may be, as the petitioners pointed out in their motion for reconsideration filed before the CA, that Civil
Case No. 6623-R was eventually resolved in their favor through a Judgment5 dated May 6, 2011 rendered
by the RTC, Branch 59, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, from all the foregoing disquisitions, the Court hereby declares that
the plaintiffs [petitioners herein] are the duly elected board of directors and officers of the JM
Dominguez Agronomic Company, Inc. for the year 2008 and hold-over capacity unless
here had already been an election of new officers.
Consequently, all Corporate Acts which the defendants [herein respondents and one Gerald
Cabrera and one Oscar Aquino] have done and performed and
all documents they have executed and issued have no force and effect.
Considering that the amount of Php850,000.00 which defendants have withdrawn under the account of
JM Dominguez Agronomic Company, Inc. from the Equitable PCI Bank (now Banco de Oro) is the same
subject in CC no. 29175-R entitled Pp. vs. Cecilia Liclican and Norma D. Isip for Qualified Theft, the Court
will no longer dwell on the same.

xxxx

SO ORDERED. (emphasis and words in bracket added)

This Judgment has, on June 6, 2011,become final and executory, as per the Notice of Entry of Judgment
issued by the same trial court.6 Evidently, whatever cloud of doubt loomed over petitioners actuations
has already been dispelled. Petitioners then postulate that the question on whether or not the challenged
Orders were issued in grave abuse of discretion has already been rendered moot and academic by the
June 6, 2011 ruling and by Judge Tiongson-Taboras subsequent inhibition in the criminal proceedings.
Consequently, they argue that their motion for reconsideration should have been granted by the appellate
court.
We are not convinced.

The resolution of the prejudicial question did not, in context, cure the grave abuse of discretion already
committed. The fact remains that when the RTC, Branch 7 issued its challenged Orders on March 10,
2009, the Judgment in favor of petitioners was not yet rendered. Consequently, there was still, at that
time, a real dispute as to who the rightful set of officers were. Plainly, Judge Tiongson-Tabora should not
have issued the challenged Orders and should have, instead, suspended the proceedings until Civil Case
No. 6623-R was resolved with finality.

To grant the instant petition and rule that the procedural infirmity has subsequently been cured either by
the Judgment or by Judge Tiongson-Taboras inhibition would mean condoning the continuation of the
criminal proceedings despite, at that time, the existence of a prejudicial question. Such condonation
would create a precedent that renders inutile the doctrine on prejudicial question, such that the court
trying the criminal case will be permitted to proceed with the trial in the aberrant assumption that the
resolution of the prior instituted civil case would benefit the private complainant in the criminal
proceedings. To reiterate, there was no certainty yet on how the RTC, Branch 59 would rule; thus, no
assumption on Civil Case No. 6623-Rs resolution can be made when the challenged Orders were issued.
Indeed, had the RTC, Branch 59 not given credence to petitioners arguments,it would have led to an
awkward situation wherein much time and effort is wasted by the RTC, Branch 7 in trying criminal cases
it should not have entertained.

The foregoing notwithstanding, it should be made clear that the nullification of the March 10, 2009
Orders does not, under the premises, entail the dismissal of the instituted criminal cases, but would
merely result in the suspension of the proceedings in view of the prejudicial question. However, given the
resolution of the prejudicial question and Judge Tiongson-Taboras inhibition, Criminal Case Nos. 29175-
R and 29176-R may already proceed, and ought to be re-raffled to re-determine the existence of probable
cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest against respondents.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The Court of
Appeals August 30, 2012 Decision and January 13, 2014 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 108617 are
hereby AFFIRMED.
Criminal Case Nos. 29175-R and 29176-R are hereby REMANDED to the Executive Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Baguio City to be re-raffled to one of its branches other than Branch 7.
SO ORDERED.