Republic of the Philippines Secretary of Justice, Immigration Commissioner, Secretary of
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 88211 October 27, 1989
FERDINAND E. MARCOS, IMELDA R. MARCOS, FERDINAND R. MARCOS.
JR., IRENE M. ARANETA, IMEE M. MANOTOC, TOMAS MANOTOC,
GREGORIO ARANETA, PACIFICO E. MARCOS, NICANOR YIGUEZ and
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), represented by
its President, CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE RAUL MANGLAPUS, CATALINO MACARAIG, SEDFREY
ORDOEZ, MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, FIDEL RAMOS, RENATO DE
VILLA, in their capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Executive
Secretary, Secretary of Justice, Immigration Commissioner, Secretary of
National Defense and Chief of Staff, respectively, respondents.
G.R. No. 88211.September 15, 1989. *
FERDINAND E. MARCOS, IMELDA R. MARCOS, FERDINAND
R. MARCOS, JR., IRENE M. ARANETA, IMEE M. MANOTOC,
TOMAS MANOTOC, GREGORIO ARANETA, PACIFICO E.
MARCOS, NICANOR YIGUEZ and PHILIPPINE
CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), represented by
its President, CONRADO F. ESTRELLA,
petitioners, vs. HONORABLE RAUL MANGLAPUS, CATALINO
MACA-RAIG, SEDFREY ORDOEZ, MIRIAM DEFENSOR
SANTIAGO, FIDEL RAMOS, RENATO DE VILLA, in their
capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Executive Secretary,
National Defense and Chief of Staff, respectively, respondents.
Political Law; Bill of Rights; Liberty of Abode; Right to Travel; The
right to return to ones country is not among the rights specifically
guaranteed under the Bill of Rights, though it may well be considered
_______________
*
EN BANC.
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Marcos vs. Manglapus
as a generally accepted principle of international law which is part of
the law of the land.The right to return to ones country is not among the
rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which treats only of
the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is our wellconsidered
view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted
principle of international law and, under our Constitution, is part of the
law of the land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution]. However, it is distinct
and separate from the right to travel and enjoys a different protection
under the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, i.e.,against
being arbitrarily deprived thereof [Art. 12 (4)].
Same; Same; The constitutional guarantees invoked by petitioners are
not absolute and inflexible, they admit of limits and must be adjusted to
the requirements of equally important public interests.The resolution of
the problem is made difficult because the persons who seek to return to
the country are the deposed dictator and his family at whose door the
travails of the country are laid and from whom billions of dollars believed
to be ill-gotten wealth are sought to be recovered. The constitutional
guarantees they invoke are neither absolute nor inflexible. For the
exercise of even the preferred freedoms of speech and of expression,
although couched in absolute terms, admits of limits and must be
adjusted to the requirements of equally important public interests
[Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 79690-707, October 7, 1988].
Same; Separation of Powers; Executive Powers; The grant of execu-tive
power means a grant of all executive powers.The 1987 Constitution has
fully restored the separation of powers of the three great branches of
government. To recall the words of Justice Laurel in Angara v. Electoral
Commission [63 Phil. 139 (1936)], the Constitution has blocked out with
deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the
legislative and the judicial departments of the government. [At 157].
Thus, the 1987 constitution explicitly provides that [t]he legislative
power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines [Art. VI, Sec. 1],
[t]he executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines
[Art. VII, Sec. 1], and [t]he judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme
Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law [Art. VIII,
Sec. 1]. These provisions not only establish a separation of powers by
actual division [Angara v. Electoral Commission, supra] but also confer
plenary legislative, executive and judicial powers subject only to
limitations provided in the Constitution. For as the Supreme Court in
Ocampo v. Cabangis [15 Phil. 626, (1910)] pointed out a grant of the
legislative power means a
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Marcos vs. Manglapus
grant of all legislative power; and a grant of the judicial power means
a grant of all the judicial power which may be exercised under the
government. [At 631-632.] If this can be said of the legislative power
which is exercised by two chambers with a combined membership of more
than two hundred members and of the judicial power which is vested in a
hierarchy of courts, it can equally be said of the executive power which is
vested in one officialthe President.
Same; Same; Same; The President; The powers granted to the
President are not limited to those powers specifically enumerated in the
Constitution.It would not be accurate, however, to state that executive
power is the power to enforce the laws, for the President is head of state
as well as head of government and whatever powers inhere in such
positions pertain to the office unless the Constitution itself withholds it.
Furthermore, the Constitution itself provides that the execution of the
laws is only one of the powers of the President. It also grants the
President other powers that do not involve the execu-tion of any provision
of law, e.g.,his power over the countrys foreign relations. On these
premises, we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution imposes
limitations on the exercise of specificpowers of the President, it maintains
intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of executive
power. Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be
limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In
other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so
enumerated.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Commander-In-Chief Powers: The
President can exercise Commander-In-Chief powers in order to keep the
peace and maintain public order and security even in the absence of an
emergency.More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the
Presidents powers as protector of the peace. [Rossiter, The Ameri-can
Presidency.] The power of the President to keep the peace is not limited
merely to exercising the commander-in-chief powers in times of emergency
or to leading the State against external and internal threats to its
existence. The President is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in
times of emergency, but is also tasked with attending to the day-to-day
problems of maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic
tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on the horizon. Wide
discretion, within the bounds of law, in fulfilling presidential duties in
times of peace is not in any way disminished by the relative want of an
emergency specified in the commander-in-chief provision. For in making
the President commander-in-chief the enumeration of powers that follow
cannot be said to exclude the Presi-dents exercising as Commander-in-
Chief powers short of the calling of
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Marcos vs. Manglapus
the armed forces, or suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpusor declaring martial law, in order to keep the peace, and maintain
public order and security.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The President has the power under the
Constitution to bar the Marcoses from returning to our country.That the
President has the power under the Constitution to bar the Marcoses from
returning has been recognized by members of the Legislature, and is
manifested by the Resolution proposed in the House of Representatives
and signed by 103 of its members urging the President to allow Mr.
Marcos to return to the Philippines as a genuine unselfish gesture for
true national reconciliation and as irrevocable proof of our collective
adherence to uncompromising respect for human rights under the
Constitution and our laws. [House Resolution No. 1342, Rollo, p. 321.]
The Resolution does not question the Presidents power to bar the
Marcoses from returning to the Philippines, rather, it appeals to the
Presidents sense of compassion to allow a man to come home to die in his
country. What we are saying in effect is that the request or demand of the
Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be considered
in the light solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of
abode and the right to travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of case law
which clearly never contemplated situations even remotely similar to the
present one. It must be treated as a matter that is appropriately
addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President which are
implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to
safeguard and protect general welfare. In that context, such request or
demand should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part
of the President to determine whether it must be granted or denied.
Same; Same; Same; Power of Judicial Review; Political Question
Doctrine; The present Constitution limits resort to the political question
doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial inquiry.Under the
Constitution, judicial power includes the duty to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Goverment. [Art. VIII, Sec. 1.] Given this wording, we cannot agree with
the Solicitor General that the issue constitutes a political question which
is beyond the jurisdiction of the Court to decide. The present Constitution
limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens the scope of
judicial inquiry into areas which the Court, under previous constitutions,
would have normally left to the political departments to decide. But
nonetheless there remain issues beyond the Courts jurisdiction the
determination of which is exclusively for
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Marcos vs. Manglapus
the President, for Congress or for the people themselves through a
plebiscite or referendum. We cannot, for example, question the Presidents
recognition of a foreign government, no matter how premature or
improvident such action may appear. We cannot set aside a presidential
pardon though it may appear to us that the beneficiary is totally
undeserving of the grant. Nor can we amend the Constitution under the
guise of resolving a dispute brought before us because the power is
reserved to the people.
Same; Same; Same; Same; In the exercise of the power of judicial
review, the function of the court is merely to check, not to supplant the
Executive.There is nothing in the case before us that precludes our
determination thereof on the political question doctrine. The deliberations
of the Constitutional Commission cited by petitioners show that the
framers intended to widen the scope of judicial review but they did not
intend courts of justice to settle all actual controversies before them.
When political questions are involved, the Constitution limits the
determination to whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the
official whose action is being questioned. If grave abuse is not established,
the Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the official concerned
and decide a matter which by its nature or by law is for the latter alone to
decide. In this light, it would appear clear that the second paragraph of
Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution, defining judicial power, which
specifically empowers the courts to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government, incorporates in the fundamental law
the ruling in Lansang v. Garcia [G.R. No. L-33964, December 11, 1971, 42
SCRA 448] that: Article VII of the [1935] Constitution vests in the
Executive the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
under specified conditions. Pursuant to the principle of separation of
powers underlying our system of government, the Executive is supreme
within his own sphere. However, the separation of powers, under the
Constitution, is not absolute. What is more, it goes hand in hand with the
system of checks and balances, under which the Executive is supreme, as
regards the suspension of the privilege, but only if and when he acts
within the sphere alloted to him by the Basic Law, and the authority to
determine whether or not he has so acted is vested in the Judicial
Department, which, in this respect, is, in turn, constitutionally supreme.
In the exercise of such authority, the function of the Court is merely to
checknot to supplantthe Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he
has gone beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to
exercise the power vested in him or to determine the
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wisdom of his act. . . . [At 479-480.]
 Same; Same; Same; Same; The President did not act arbitrarily,
capriciously and whimsically in determining that the return of the
Marcoses poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare, and in
prohibiting their return.We find that from the pleadings filed by the
parties, from their oral arguments, and the facts revealed during the
briefing in chambers by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and the National Security Adviser, wherein petitioners and
respondents were represented, there exist factual basis for the Presidents
decision. The Court cannot close its eyes to present realities and pretend
that the country is not besieged from within by a wellorganized
communist insurgency, a separatist movement in Mindanao, rightist
conspiracies to grab power, urban terrorism, the murder with impunity of
military men, police officers and civilian officials, to mention only a few.
The documented history of the efforts of the Marcoses and their followers
to destabilize the country, as earlier narrated in thisponenciabolsters the
conclusion that the return of the Marcoses at this time would only
exacerbate and intensify the violence directed against the State and
instigate more chaos. As divergent and discordant forces, the enemies of
the State may be contained. The military establishment has given
assurances that it could handle the threats posed by particular groups.
But it is the catalytic effect of the return of the Marcoses that may prove
to be the proverbial final straw that would break the camels back. With
these before her, the President cannot be said to have acted arbitrarily
and capriciously and whimsically in determining that the return of the
Marcoses poses a serious threat to the national interest and welfare and
in prohibiting their return.
RESOLUTION
EN BANC:
In its decision dated September 15,1989, the Court, by a vote of eight (8) to
seven (7), dismissed the petition, after finding that the President did not act
arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of
former President Marcos and his family at the present time and under present
circumstances pose a threat to national interest and welfare and in prohibiting
their return to the Philippines. On September 28, 1989, former President Marcos
died in Honolulu, Hawaii. In a statement, President Aquino said:
In the interest of the safety of those who will take the death of Mr.
Marcos in widely and passionately conflicting ways, and for the
tranquility of the state and order of society, the remains of
Ferdinand E. Marcos will not be allowed to be brought to our
country until such time as the government, be it under this
administration or the succeeding one, shall otherwise decide.
[Motion for Reconsideration, p. 1; Rollo, p, 443.]
On October 2, 1989, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by petitioners,
raising the following major arguments:
1. to bar former President Marcos and his family from returning to the Philippines
is to deny them not only the inherent right of citizens to return to their country of
birth but also the protection of the Constitution and all of the rights guaranteed to
Filipinos under the Constitution;
2. the President has no power to bar a Filipino from his own country; if she has,
she had exercised it arbitrarily; and
3. there is no basis for barring the return of the family of former President
Marcos. Thus, petitioners prayed that the Court reconsider its decision, order
respondents to issue the necessary travel documents to enable Mrs. Imelda R.
Marcos, Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., Irene M. Araneta, Imee M. Manotoc, Tommy
Manotoc and Gregorio Araneta to return to the Philippines, and enjoin
respondents from implementing President Aquino's decision to bar the return of
the remains of Mr. Marcos, and the other petitioners, to the Philippines.
Commenting on the motion for reconsideration, the Solicitor General argued that
the motion for reconsideration is moot and academic as to the deceased Mr.
Marcos. Moreover, he asserts that "the 'formal' rights being invoked by the
Marcoses under the label 'right to return', including the label 'return of Marcos'
remains, is in reality or substance a 'right' to destabilize the country, a 'right' to
hide the Marcoses' incessant shadowy orchestrated efforts at destabilization."
[Comment, p. 29.] Thus, he prays that the Motion for Reconsideration be denied
for lack of merit.
We deny the motion for reconsideration.
1. It must be emphasized that as in all motions for reconsideration, the burden is
upon the movants, petitioner herein, to show that there are compelling reasons to
reconsider the decision of the Court.
2. After a thorough consideration of the matters raised in the motion for
reconsideration, the Court is of the view that no compelling reasons have been
established by petitioners to warrant a reconsideration of the Court's decision.
The death of Mr. Marcos, although it may be viewed as a supervening event, has
not changed the factual scenario under which the Court's decision was rendered.
The threats to the government, to which the return of the Marcoses has been
viewed to provide a catalytic effect, have not been shown to have ceased. On the
contrary, instead of erasing fears as to the destabilization that will be caused by
the return of the Marcoses, Mrs. Marcos reinforced the basis for the decision to
bar their return when she called President Aquino "illegal," claiming that it is Mr.
Marcos, not Mrs. Aquino, who is the "legal" President of the Philippines, and
declared that the matter "should be brought to all the courts of the world."
[Comment, p. 1; Philippine Star, October 4, 1989.]
3. Contrary to petitioners' view, it cannot be denied that the President, upon
whom executive power is vested, has unstated residual powers which are implied
from the grant of executive power and which are necessary for her to comply with
her duties under the Constitution. The powers of the President are not limited to
what are expressly enumerated in the article on the Executive Department and in
scattered provisions of the Constitution. This is so, notwithstanding the avowed
intent of the members of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 to limit the
powers of the President as a reaction to the abuses under the regime of Mr.
Marcos, for the result was a limitation of specific power of the President,
particularly those relating to the commander-in-chief clause, but not a diminution
of the general grant of executive power.
That the President has powers other than those expressly stated in the
Constitution is nothing new. This is recognized under the U.S. Constitution from
which we have patterned the distribution of governmental powers among three
(3) separate branches.
Article II, [section] 1, provides that "The Executive Power shall be
vested in a President of the United States of America." In
Alexander Hamilton's widely accepted view, this statement cannot
be read as mere shorthand for the specific executive
authorizations that follow it in [sections] 2 and 3. Hamilton
stressed the difference between the sweeping language of article
II, section 1, and the conditional language of article I, [section] 1:
"All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States . . ." Hamilton submitted that "[t]he
[article III enumeration [in sections 2 and 31 ought therefore to be
considered, as intended merely to specify the principal articles
implied in the definition of execution power; leaving the rest to
flow from the general grant of that power, interpreted in confomity
with other parts of the Constitution...
In Myers v. United States, the Supreme Court accepted
Hamilton's proposition, concluding that the federal executive,
unlike the Congress, could exercise power from sources not
enumerated, so long as not forbidden by the constitutional text:
 the executive power was given in general terms, strengthened by
specific terms where emphasis was regarded as appropriate, and
was limited by direct expressions where limitation was
needed. . ." The language of Chief Justice Taft in Myers makes
clear that the constitutional concept of inherent power is not a
synonym for power without limit; rather, the concept suggests
only that not all powers granted in the Constitution are
themselves exhausted by internal enumeration, so that, within a
sphere properly regarded as one of "executive' power, authority is
implied unless there or elsewhere expressly limited. [TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 158-159 (1978).]
And neither can we subscribe to the view that a recognition of the President's
implied or residual powers is tantamount to setting the stage for another
dictatorship. Despite petitioners' strained analogy, the residual powers of the
President under the Constitution should not be confused with the power of the
President under the 1973 Constitution to legislate pursuant to Amendment No. 6
which provides:
Whenever in the judgment of the President (Prime Minister), there
exists a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof, or
whenever the interim Batasang Pambansa or the regular National
Assembly fails or is unable to act adequately on any matter for
any reason that in his judgment requires immediate action, he
may, in order to meet the exigency, issue the necessary decrees,
orders, or letters of instruction, which shall form part of the law of
the land,
There is no similarity between the residual powers of the President under the
1987 Constitution and the power of the President under the 1973 Constitution
pursuant to Amendment No. 6. First of all, Amendment No. 6 refers to an express
grant of power. It is not implied. Then, Amendment No. 6 refers to a grant to the
President of the specific power of legislation.
4. Among the duties of the President under the Constitution, in compliance with
his (or her) oath of office, is to protect and promote the interest and welfare of the
people. Her decision to bar the return of the Marcoses and subsequently, the
remains of Mr. Marcos at the present time and under present circumstances is in
compliance with this bounden duty. In the absence of a clear showing that she
had acted with arbitrariness or with grave abuse of discretion in arriving at this
decision, the Court will not enjoin the implementation of this decision.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to DENY the Motion for Reconsideration for
lack of merit."