THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ADULFO TERROBIAS, defendant-appellant.

DE CASTRO, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Catanduanes convicting the accused,
Adulfo Terrobias, of the crime of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
acknowledge the offspring of Delia Bonion as his natural child with all the rights granted her by law; and to
indemnify the victim, Delia C. Bonion, in the sum of P10,000.00 as actual, moral and exemplary damages, and
to pay the costs. 1

To the charge of rape, appellant interposed the defense of alibi. He does not, therefore, deny the truth of the
testimony of the complainant, the 17-year old Delia C. Bonion, as to her sexual experience except only to
disclaim any participation therein with his assertion of never having had sexual intercourse with her. The
testimony of the complainant on how she was sexually assaulted, and the events that intervened thereafter,
may, therefore, be quoted from the appealed decision which set forth the said testimony as follows:

... Complainant Delia C. Bonion narrated how on the night of February 17, 1977 as she was fast
asleep because of the days work, she woke up to find Adulfo Terrobias already on top of her
holding her hands and when she resisted was told not to shout under threats of harm. As Delia
continued to struggle, Adulfo covered her mouth with a wad of cotton soaked with medicine
which smell weakened her and caused her to lose consciousness. When she came to, Delia still
saw Adulfo getting his pants and went out the room. Still laboring under the fear of harm
because Adulfo warned her that nobody should know what he did, Delia continued her usual
household work, awaiting the arrival of her parents. Adulfo did not take breakfast at the table the
following morning, Delia's mother visited her February 27 and she confided to her what Adulfo
did. Florencia Terrobias was informed by Dolores C. Bonion same day within the hearing of
Delia, and after condemning Adulfo as a salvaje her Lola Insay asked the two to wait for the
arrival of Gregorio Terrobias who was in Naga City. The defense miserably failed to present
Gregorio and Florencia Terrobias to rebut the claim of Delia and Dolores about the report of the
RAPE to both of them. Neither did the defense deny that Gregorio after knowing his son's
perfidy told complainant and her mother Dolores to have the child removed or aborted thru the
help of an 'arbulario'. The proposal of abortion refused, Dolores demanded that Adulfo marry her
daughter which the Terrobias Fay scorned. Delia was thereafter taken away by her own parents.
The case went to Court. In retaliation, Dolores and her husband were summarily removed as
tenant-encargado. 2

The assault took place in the house of appellant's parents, Gregorio and Florencia Terrobias, at Bato,
Catanduanes, where complainant was a house helper, her parents being the "encargado" 3 of the properties of
the aforesaid spouses, whom Delia called "Lolo Goyong" and "Lola Insay", 4 and treated as her foster parents.
Appellant, then single and thirty-three years of age, was living with his parents in the same house. Delia's room
was between appellant's room and that of the latter's mother. 5 It is in complainant's room that the rape took
place.

From her plain and straightforward testimony, We have no doubt as to complainant's candor and sincerity. A
17-year old girl at the time, she could not have merely concocted the story she narrated in court, directed
against a thirty-three-year-old son of her masters. Only truth and a feeling of deep grievance could have
impelled her to charge appellant with the grave offense committed against her, even at a price she has to pay
in terms of her honor being exposed or even tarnished not to mention the discharge of her parents as
"encargados" of appellant's parents.
The circumstances as duly established following the sexual assault could not but strengthen belief in
complainant's honesty and truthfulness. As soon as she had the chance to report the offense done her to
someone of her fullest confidence and who could look at her plight with sympathy and understanding, she did
so. This was on February 27, 1977 on her mother's first visit to her after the incident when she told her mother
about the harrowing experience. 6 The mother, in turn, told appellant's mother what the latter's son did to her
daughter. Right after hearing the daughter's whole story, appellant's mother, instead of expressing disbelief in
what was told her, reproached her son for the act, calling him "salvage", and suggested that Delia remain until
the matter is reported to her husband who was then in Naga City. 7 When the father of appellant heard of the
incident as narrated to him by complainant's mother, he told the latter to return on April 2 to afford him time to
investigate the matter. On her return as agreed, Delia's mother told appellant's father that Delia was on the
family way. Thus informed, appellant's father suggested abortion by an "arbulario", 8to which Delia's mother
disagreed, and instead demanded that appellant marry Delia who was with her. Appellant's father answered in
Bicol: "Carabaos should be with carabaos and cows with cows." 9

On the same date, April 2, 1977, Mrs. Bonion took her daughter Delia to Virac to seek advice of her aunt who
suggested that a medical certificate be secured as to the condition of Delia. Dr. Masagca who examined Delia
found her one and one-half month pregnant, her last menstruation being on January 29, 1977.

Because of the complaint filed by Delia and her parents who forthwith reported what happened to their
daughter to the PC at Virac the Terrobias spouses discharged Delia's parents as their "encargado". 10 Delia
later gave birth to a baby girl on October 28, 1977. 11

With the complainant pointing to appellant as the person who ravished her in her room in appellant's residence
on the night of February 17, 1977 the latter's alibi of not being in his house on said time and day because he
attended the birthday part of Teodulo dela Providencia in San Andres, Catanduanes, some 25 kilometers from
Bato where he had to spend the night Teodulos house because he had drunk too much is unavailing. No
motive was given why the complainant should falsely charge appellant with so grave an offense, considering
that she had treated appellant s parents with so much affection that she called their, "Lolo" and "Lola".

Complainant might have incurred in some inconsistencies, in her testimony during the trial in relation to
statements she gave before the trial as appellant tried graphically to demonstrate in his brief (p. 11). They refer,
however, to minor details that do not detract from the truth of the central fact of rape having been committed by
appellant on the complainant. They arise from or are caused by, the natural weakness, or even fickleness, of
memory and rather strengthen credibility, as they erase suspicion of coaching or of a rehearsed testimony. On
the important and decisive details, however, she was consistent in all the statements she made, such as
appellant's being already on top of her when she woke up, how she resisted his action despite appellant's
threat, which was followed by the latter pressing a wad of cotton soaked with medicine in her mouth and nose
which rendered her unconscious, her feeling pain in, and the bleeding of, her private parts, her "bra" being torn
and her skirt, rolled up.

On the other hand, complainant's mother's testimony that on her first visit to her daughter at her masters'
residence after the incident, Delia reported to her the outrage committed on her, and appellant's mother called
her son a savage on being informed of what he did, while the father advised the removal of the fetus by an
"arbulario," were not rebutted by appellant's parents. They did not take the witness stand despite that the
aforesaid testimony against them lent full credence to complainant's story. The acts of appellant's parents as
aforestated would show that they had no reason to disbelieve said story, specially considering that the father
had all the time he asked for to investigate the matter. Indeed, a young simple barrio girl like Delia could not
have fabricated a charge of rape against a man twice her age, the son of her masters at that, for whom she
had none but affectionate respect.

Appellant claims of having been denied his constitutional right by the mere fact that the trial of the case took
only four days is entirely without basis. He had presented all his evidence which was duly submitted by his
counsel who never asked for more time to do so. His right to cross-examine the witnesses against him was
exercised to the fullest.

Neither is his claim of lack of authority of the trial judge to decide the instant case with any legal support to
stand on. While by the Resolution of the Supreme Court 12 the authority of the trial judge to try criminal cases in
Branch 11 of the Court of First Instance of Catanduanes was up to March 2, 1978, it does not preclude
submission of memoranda even after such date, as long as the trial was completed, and the order to file
memorandum given, before the expiration of his authority to try the case. Much less was the trial judge
divested of the authority to decide the case which he can do anytime after the trial of the case, under Section
51 of the Judiciary Act, the filing of memoranda not being a part of the trial, nor is the memorandum itself an
essential, much less an indispensable, pleading before a case may be submitted for decision. It is intended
primarily to aid the court in the rendition of the decision in accordance with law and the evidence, and should
not, therefore, be the cause for the loss of the authority of the judge who heard the case to decide it.

WHEREFORE, as recommended by the Solicitor General, the judgment appealed from being in accordance
with law and the evidence, is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs.

SO ORDERED.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 178778
Plaintiff-Appellee,
Present:

CARPIO MORALES, J.,

Chairperson,
- versus - BRION,
BERSAMIN,
ABAD,* and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

T/SGT. PORFERIO R. ANGUS, JR., Promulgated:

Accused-Appellant.
August 3, 2010
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

On appeal is the Decision[1] dated December 5, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
00114, which affirmed with modification the Decision [2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Misamis Oriental,
Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 18, convicting appellant T/Sgt. Porferio R. Angus, Jr. of the crime of parricide
in Criminal Case No. 2002-587.

Appellant T/Sgt. Porferio R. Angus, Jr. was charged in an Information[3] dated June 7, 2002, as follows:

That on or about the 10th day of January, 2002, at about 10:00 oclock in the morning, more or
less, at Lanis[i] Patrol Base, Lanis[i], Municipality of Claveria, Province of Misamis Oriental, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault, choked and strangled the
neck of his legitimate wife Betty Angus, thereby causing her instantaneous death.

CONTRARY TO and in violation of Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code.

Upon arraignment, appellant, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty [4] to the offense
charged.

The prosecution and the defense stipulated on the following facts at the pre-trial, to wit:

1. That the accused and the victim were legally married.

2. That the incident happened on January 10, 2002, at the Lanisi Patrol Base, Lanisi, Claveria,
Misamis Oriental.

3. That T/SGT Porferio R. Angus, Jr. is a member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, particularly
the Philippine Army, assigned at the Lanisi Patrol Base, Lanisi, Claveria, Misamis Oriental.[5]
 Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

The prosecution presented as witnesses Police Senior Inspector Reynaldo A. Padulla, Staff Sergeant
Romeo Rhea, Dr. Alex R. Uy, Dr. Luchie S. Serognas-At-at, and Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Unit
(CAFGU) members Romeo I. Malaran, Leoncio P. Jintapa and Alejo O. Carpio. Their testimonies may be
synthesized into the following narration of events:

The victim, Betty D. Angus, arrived at the Lanisi Patrol Base at around 7:00 p.m. on January 9,
2002. Appellant fetched her at the gate and they proceeded to his bunker. Later, CAFGU members Malaran
and Carpio heard the two (2) arguing about appellants relationship with another woman. Appellant was also
seen go out of his bunker around midnight to get some rice, beef and vegetables for dinner.[6]

The following day, January 10, 2002, at around 7:00 a.m., appellant had breakfast at the mess hall with
Jintapa, Malaran and Carpio. As appellant was not with his wife, Jintapa reminded appellant to call her. When
appellant returned, he told them that he would just leave some food for his wife because she was still sleeping.

After eating, Malaran and Jintapa asked for permission to fetch water near the barangay elementary
school about a kilometer away.While they were gone, Carpio went to the outpost and started cleaning his
firearm. Appellant went to the comfort room then decided to join Carpio at the outpost. On his way to the
outpost, appellant passed by his bunker and peeped through the door which was open by about 1 inches.
[7]
Carpio was able to see the door because it was facing the outpost. [8] A few minutes later, Malaran and
Jintapa returned and joined appellant and Carpio at the outpost. The four (4) shared funny stories and joked for
a while, after which Carpio went to the mess hall while Jintapa went to his bunker. Malaran and appellant
decided to continue their conversation at the mess hall.[9]

On their way to the mess hall, appellant passed by his bunker but was not able to open the door at
once because something was blocking it from the inside. When appellant pushed the door, Malaran saw the
back of the victim in a slanting position and leaning at the door.Appellant went inside and almost immediately
shouted for help. Malaran and Carpio saw appellant embracing his wife. They helped appellant carry Bettys
body to the bed. Malaran observed that her skin below the jaw was reddish and her knees were covered with
mud.[10] There was food on the table and a multi-colored tubao[11] was hanging on the purlins of the roof about a
meter away from the victim. The lower tip of the tubao was in a circular form and was hanging about four (4)
feet from the ground. They heard appellant repeatedly say, Why did you do this? How can I explain this to our
children?[12]

Carpio called Jintapa and told him that something had happened to Betty. This was around 10:00
a.m. When Jintapa entered appellants bunker, he noticed that the tubao was still hanging from the roof. He
also saw appellant embracing his wife and crying hard. Appellant exerted effort to revive his wife by pumping
her chest. Malaran tried to help by massaging Bettys hands, feet, and legs. When Carpio and Malaran left to
look for a vehicle, Jintapa took Malarans place and also massaged Bettys hands and feet which were already
cold. Appellant, who continued to cry very hard, covered Bettys neck with his tubao and draped a blanket over
her body. The tubao that was hanging on the roof was not removed until Corporal Teodoro Guibone ordered a
meat collector to remove it.[13]

At the Claveria Municipal Hospital, Dr. Luchie S. Serognas-At-at concluded that Betty was already dead
upon arrival for she no longer had a pulse. She asked appellant as to the cause of her death, and after two (2)
minutes, he replied that maybe she suffered a heart attack as she had a history of heart ailment. Dr. At-at wanted
to thoroughly examine Bettys body but she was not able to do so because appellant was crying very hard. A
commotion also took place at the hospital when a soldier, later identified as Sgt. Romeo Rhea, tried to box
appellant, saying that appellants crying was only an act. [14] Rhea and appellant were companions at Bravo
Company, while Betty was Rheas neighbor in Basilan.Appellant is also the godfather of Rheas child. According to
Rhea, he knew about appellants illicit relationship with a certain Jennifer Abao, with whom appellant had been
sweethearts for about three (3) years prior to the incident on January 10, 2002.[15]

Dr. Alex R. Uy, Medico-Legal Officer of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory of Patag,
Cagayan de Oro City, conducted the autopsy. His examination revealed the following findings:

HEAD AND NECK

1. Abrasion: Right Mandibular Region: measuring 4 x 2 cm., 4 cm. from the anterior
midline.

2. Ligature mark: extending bilaterally around the neck at the level below the hyoid
bone, measuring 42 x 1 cm., bisected by the anterior midline, directed horizontally and
posteriorward. Larynx and Trachea are markedly congested and hemorrhagic.[16]

Dr. Uy stated that Betty may have died two (2) hours after taking her last meal due to the presence of
partially digested food inside the stomach.[17] He believed that the cause of her death was asphyxia by
strangulation and not by hanging, as the victim did not sustain a fractured bone on her neck or hyoid bone and
there was no hemorrhage above the trachea and larynx. He explained that the sudden gravitational force
would usually cause a fractured bone. Dr. Uy clarified that the absence of a fractured bone would only happen
if the person hangs herself very slowly without a sudden force or if she was in a kneeling position.[18]

For its part, the defense presented as witnesses Angeles S. Ociones, Senior Police Officer 1 Victorino
Busalla, Cheryl Ann A. Siarez, Master Sergeant Benedicto Palma, Emeliano Bolonias, Bobby Padilla Lopez
and appellant. Taken together, their testimonies present the following narrative:

Cheryl Ann A. Siarez is the only daughter of Betty and appellant. In the afternoon of January 9, 2002, at
around 1:30 p.m., Betty went inside Cheryl Anns bedroom and told her to be serious in her studies. Betty also
intimated to Cheryl Ann that she wanted to go to a far place where there would be no more rumors, no
backbiting, and nobody would recognize her. At 4:00 p.m., they boarded a bus bound for Cagayan de Oro
City. Betty disembarked at Villanueva, Misamis Oriental to transfer to a passenger jeepney going to Claveria.[19]
 From Villanueva to Claveria, Betty sat beside Angeles Ociones, an old friend, in the front seat of the
jeepney. She confided to Ociones about her jealousy towards her husband. She also mentioned that she was
angry that she was not able to catch him and his mistress. Ociones advised Betty to confront her husband
regarding the rumors she had heard, as it was common to hear such rumors every time a soldier is assigned to a
place away from home. Betty revealed that she planned to commit suicide because of the many stories she had
heard about her husband. This was the third time she shared thoughts of suicide. Betty further said she wanted
to go to a far place where nobody would recognize her. At around 7:00 p.m., Betty arrived at Lanisi Patrol Base.
[20]

Appellant met his wife at the gate and went with her to his bunker. Appellant testified that they talked
about only three (3) things: his whereabouts on January 7, 2002, the conference in Mat-i, Claveria, and whether
he was able to borrow money for the renovation of their house.He later admitted, however, that Betty also
confronted him about his relationship with another woman. At around 11:00 p.m. they went to bed.He asked
Betty if she has eaten dinner but she said she did not want to eat. Nonetheless, he brought her some food then
went back to sleep. He woke up the following day at around 6:00 a.m. and heard Emiliano Bolonias knocking at
his door. Bolonias confirmed that when the door was opened, he saw Betty sleeping on the bed. Since Betty was
still asleep, appellant suggested that they proceed to the mess hall to talk about their financial dealings. He did
not lock the door to his bunker when they left. At around 8:00 a.m. appellant went back to his bunker to invite his
wife to have breakfast with them.[21]

After having breakfast, appellant, Malaran, Carpio and Jintapa went to the outpost while Bolonias left the
patrol base. Malaran and Jintapa asked permission to fetch water but later arrived and stayed at the
outpost. Appellant went to his bunker and found the same locked from inside. He knocked and called his wife,
but there was no response. He forcibly opened the door and saw his wife hanging with the use of a tubaowhich
was tied at the purlins of the roof. Her body was hanging and almost in a kneeling position. He shouted for help
as he untied the knot around Bettys neck but was not able to carry her since she was heavy. The other CAFGU
members helped appellant put Betty on the bed.Malaran massaged Bettys feet while appellant massaged her
chest and even did a mouth-to-mouth resuscitation. When the vehicle appellant had requested arrived, Betty was
brought to the hospital. The tubao that was used by the victim was left hanging at the purlins.[22]

That same day, Cheryl Ann was informed that her mother was in serious condition. She was fetched and
brought to Claveria, Misamis Oriental, where she saw her father crying. Appellant told Cheryl Ann that her mother
had committed suicide. The burial was originally scheduled on January 16, 2002 so her grandmother could
attend. Bettys relatives who attended the wake did not attend the burial because they got angry when appellant did
not allow them to bring Bettys body to Basilan. Her grandfather, SPO4 Cesar Ocay, told Cheryl Ann to bury her
mothers body in Basilan so that they will not file a case against appellant. Cheryl Ann believes her mother
committed suicide.[23]

M/Sgt. Benedicto Palma testified that on January 15, 2002, at around 2:00 p.m., he was at the funeral
parlor of Poblacion, Balingasag, Misamis Oriental, assisting Dr. Alex Uy, who was conducting the autopsy on
Bettys body. When he asked Dr. Uy regarding his findings, the doctor replied that appellant had nothing to do
with the death of his wife, and that she indeed committed suicide. [24] Aside from appellant, his brothers-in-law,
Edgardo De Vera and Mariano De Vera, Sgt. Rhea, and appellants sister-in-law, Jerry, were also present at the
funeral parlor when Dr. Uy announced his findings that Betty committed suicide.[25]

On May 20, 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, finding accused T/SGT. PORFERIO R. ANGUS, JR., GUILTY beyond

reasonable doubt [of] the crime of Parricide, punishable under Article 246 of the Revised
Penal Code, and taking into account the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, he is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, including its accessory
penalties. He is also directed to pay FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00), as indemnity, to
the heirs of the victim.

SO ORDERED. Cagayan de Oro City, May 20, 2003.[26]

Appellant interposed an appeal to this Court. Pursuant to People v. Mateo,[27] which modified Rules 122,
124 and 125 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, insofar as they provide for direct
appeals from the RTC to this Court in cases where the penalty imposed by the trial court is death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, this case was referred to the CA for intermediate review.

On December 5, 2006, the CA rendered judgment affirming with modification the decision of the
RTC. The fallo of the CA decision reads:

FOR THE REASONS STATED, the appealed Decision convicting T/SGT. PORFERIO R.
ANGUS, JR. of Parricide is hereby AFFIRMEDwith the MODIFICATION that he is additionally
ORDERED to pay the heirs of the victim P25,000 as exemplary damages and P50,000 as moral
damages on top of the decreed indemnity. Costs de officio.

SO ORDERED.[28]

Hence, this appeal. In his brief,[29] appellant raises a lone assignment of error:

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF

THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS
GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

Appellant argues that nobody really saw who killed the victim or when and how she was killed. He
asserts that the prosecution witnesses merely testified to have last seen Betty alive on the night of January 9,
2002. Thereafter, they heard the couple arguing about a woman. The following morning Betty was found
dead. Although there was more than one (1) circumstance, appellant contends that the prosecution failed to
prove that the combination thereof leads to the inevitable conclusion that he killed his wife.

We find merit in appellants contentions.

 The Constitution mandates that an accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proven
beyond reasonable doubt. The burden lies on the prosecution to overcome such presumption of innocence by
presenting the quantum of evidence required. In so doing, the prosecution must rest on the strength of its own
evidence and must not rely on the weakness of the defense. [30] And if the prosecution fails to meet its burden
of proof, the defense may logically not even present evidence on its own behalf. In such cases the presumption
prevails and the accused should necessarily be acquitted.[31]

We may well emphasize that direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only basis on which a
court draws its finding of guilt. Established facts that form a chain of circumstances can lead the mind intuitively
or impel a conscious process of reasoning towards a conviction. [32] Verily, resort to circumstantial evidence is
sanctioned by Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.

While no general rule can be laid down as to the quantity of circumstantial evidence which will suffice in
a given case, all the circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis
that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with
every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt. The circumstances proved should constitute an unbroken
chain which leads to only one (1) fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of all
others, is the guilty person. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean the degree of proof excluding the
possibility of error and producing absolute certainty. Only moral certainty or that degree of proof which
produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind is required.[33]

The following are the requisites for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support conviction: (a)
there is more than one (1) circumstance, (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been proven,
and (c) the combination of all the circumstances results in a moral certainty that the accused, to the exclusion
of all others, is the one (1) who has committed the crime. Thus, to justify a conviction based on circumstantial
evidence, the combination of circumstances must be interwoven in such a way as to leave no reasonable
doubt as to the guilt of the accused.[34]

After a thorough review of the records of the case, we find sufficient basis to warrant the reversal of the
assailed judgment of conviction. The crime of parricide is defined and punished under Article 246 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended, to wit:
Art. 246. Parricide. - Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, or any of his ascendants or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide
and shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.

The elements of the crime of parricide are: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; and
(3) the deceased is the father, mother or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, of the accused or any of his
ascendants or descendants, or his spouse.[35]

The evidence in this case shows that Betty arrived at the camp at around 7:00 oclock in the evening
of January 9, 2002. Witnesses heard Betty and the appellant arguing over the latters illicit relationship with
another woman. The following day, appellant went out of his bunker at around 6:00 oclock in the morning. He
had breakfast at the mess area with his companions, but went back to his bunker at around8:00 oclock to ask
his wife to join them for breakfast. When he returned, he told his men that his wife could not join them for
breakfast because she was still asleep. At around 10:00 a.m., appellant returned to his bunker followed by
Malaran who saw the dead body of the victim.

The Court is not satisfied that the circumstantial evidence in this case constitutes an unbroken chain which
leads to the conclusion that appellant, to the exclusion of all others, is guilty of killing his wife. The trial court relied
on the testimonies of Malaran and Carpio who heard the appellant and his wife arguing about the latters illicit
relationship with another woman, which supposedly proves motive for him to commit the crime. However, granting
that appellant and Betty had an argument on the night before her death, it would be too much to presume that such
an argument would drive appellant to kill his wife. Clearly, the motive is not convincing. If at all, the testimonies of
Malaran and Carpio merely show a suspicion of appellants responsibility for the crime. Needless to state, however,
suspicion no matter how strong can not sway judgment.[36] In the absence of any other evidence reasonably linking
appellant to the crime, evidence of motive is not sufficient to convict him.[37]

Likewise, Dr. Uy explained that if a person hangs herself, most of the time there will be a fracture on the
bone of the neck because of the pressure caused by gravity that pulls the rope. However, he also testified that
if the person hangs herself slowly, there will be no fractureon her neck or hyoid bone. Thus, the fact that Betty
did not sustain a fractured bone on her neck or hyoid bone, as the doctor observed, does not automatically
lead to the conclusion that appellant strangled the victim. Given the evidence that the victim had intimated her
wish to commit suicide a day before the incident, it is not farfetched to conclude that she indeed chose to take
her life.

An acquittal based on reasonable doubt will prosper even though the accuseds innocence may be
doubted, for a criminal conviction rests on the strength of the evidence of the prosecution and not on the
weakness of the defense. And, if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two (2) or more
explanations, one (1) of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his
guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction. That
which is favorable to the accused should be considered. [38] After all, mas vale que queden sin castigar diez reos
presuntos, que se castigue uno inocente.[39] Courts should be guided by the principle that it would be better to set
free ten (10) men who might be probably guilty of the crime charged than to convict one (1) innocent man for a
crime he did not commit.[40]

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated December 5, 2006 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00114 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant T/Sgt. Porferio R. Angus,
Jr. is ACQUITTED of the crime of parricide on the ground of reasonable doubt. Unless detained for some other
lawful reasons, appellant is hereby ordered released immediately.

SO ORDERED.
 ERIBERTO S. MASANGKAY, G.R. No. 164443
Petitioner,

Present:

CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,

- versus - VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
DEL CASTILLO, and
PEREZ, JJ.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:

Respondent. June 18, 2010
x-------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Every criminal conviction must draw its strength from the prosecutions evidence. The evidence must be such that the
constitutional presumption of innocence is overthrown and guilt is established beyond reasonable doubt. The
prosecutorial burden is not met when the circumstances can yield to different inferences. Such equivocation betrays a
lack of moral certainty to support a judgment of conviction.

This Petition for Review[1] assails the March 16, 2004 Decision[2] and the July 9, 2004 Resolution[3] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 25775. The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the appealed Decision is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that Eriberto Masangkay is instead meted the penalty of imprisonment for a term of Six
(6) months and One (1) day of prision correccional minimum.

SO ORDERED.[4]

Factual Antecedents

Petitioner Eriberto Masangkay (Eriberto), his common-law wife Magdalena Ricaros (Magdalena), Cesar
Masangkay (Cesar) and his wifeElizabeth Masangkay (Elizabeth), and Eric Dullano were the incorporators and directors
of Megatel Factors, Inc. (MFI) which was incorporated in June 1990.[5]

On December 29, 1993 Eriberto filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) a Petition for the
Involuntary Dissolution[6] of MFI for violation of Section 6 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 902-A. The named
respondents were MFI, Cesar and Elizabeth.[7] The said petition was made under oath before a notary public, and
alleged among others:

3. At or around September 1, 1993, respondent Elizabeth A. Masangkay prepared or

caused to be prepared a Secretarys Certificate which states:
 That at a special meeting of the Board of Directors of the said corporation held
at its principal office on December 5, 1992, the following resolution by unanimous votes
of the directors present at said meeting and constituting a quorum was approved and
adopted:

RESOLVED, as it is hereby resolved that Lot No. 2069-A-2 situated at Bo.

Canlalay, Bian, Laguna containing an area of 3,014 square meters covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-210746 be exchanged with 3,700 shares of stock of the
corporation worth or valued atP370,000.00 by way of a Deed of Exchange with
Cancellation of Usufruct.

xxxx
4. Said secretarys certificate is absolutely fictitious and simulated because the alleged
meeting of the Board of Directors held on December 5, 1992 did not actually materialize.

xxxx

5. Using the said falsified and spurious document, x x x respondents executed

another fictitious document known as the Deed of Exchange with Cancellation of Usufruct.

The contract purporting to be a transfer of 3,700 shares of stock of MFI in return for a piece of a
land (Lot No. 2064-A-2) located at Canlalay, Bian, Laguna and owned by minor child Gilberto Ricaros
Masangkay is void.

Article 1409 of the New Civil Code states:

Art. 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and void from the beginning.

xxxx

(2) Those which are absolutely simulated or fictitious;

(3) Those whose cause or object did not exist at the time of the transaction;

xxxx

These contracts cannot be ratified. Neither can the right to set up the defense of
illegality be waived.

The aforementioned contract is indeed simulated and fictitious because they defrauded minor
child Gilberto Ricaros Masangkay and deprived him of his own property without any consideration at all.

Records of the MFI revealed that minor child Gilberto Ricaros Masangkay [or] his alleged
guardian Magdalena S. Ricaros never became a stockholder at any point in time of MFI.

x x x x[8]

The case remains pending to date.[9]

Claiming that Eriberto lied under oath when he said that there was no meeting of the Board held on December 5,
1992 and that the Deed of Exchange with Cancellation of Usufruct is a fictitious instrument, the respondent in the SEC
case, Cesar, filed a complaint for perjury[10] against Eriberto before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal.
 Eriberto raised the defense of primary jurisdiction. He argued that what is involved is primarily an intra-corporate
controversy; hence, jurisdiction lies with the SEC pursuant to Section 6 of PD 902-A, as amended by PD No. 1758. He
also insisted that there was a prejudicial question because the truth of the allegations contained in his petition for
involuntary dissolution has yet to be determined by the SEC. These defenses were sustained by the assistant provincial
prosecutor and the complaint for perjury was dismissed for lack of merit.[11]

It was however reinstated upon petition for review[12] before the Department of Justice.[13] Chief State Prosecutor
Zenon L. De Guia held that the petition for involuntary dissolution is an administrative case only and thus cannot possibly
constitute a prejudicial question to the criminal case. He also rejected the claim that the SEC has exclusive authority over
the case. The Chief State Prosecutor explained that the prosecution and enforcement department of the SEC has
jurisdiction only over criminal and civil cases involving a violation of a law, rule, or regulation that is administered and
enforced by the SEC. Perjury, penalized under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), is not within the SECs
authority.[14] Thus, he ordered the conduct of a preliminary investigation, which eventually resulted in the filing of the
following information:

That sometime in the month of December 1992, [15] in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, a
place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit acts of perjury in his Petition for Involuntary Dissolution of
Megatel Factors, Inc. based on violation of Section 6 of Presidential Decree 902-A against Megatel
Factors, Inc., Cesar Masangkay, Jr. and Elizabeth Masangkay which he made under oath before a
notary authorized to receive and administer oath and filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission, wherein he made willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood on a material matter when
he declared the following, to wit: a) the secretary certificate dated September 1, 1993, proposed by
Elizabeth Masangkay is fictitious and simulated because the alleged December 5, 1992, meeting never
took place; and, b) the Deed of Exchange with Cancellation of Usufruct is a fictitious document, whereby
the respondents defrauded the minor child Gilberto Ricaros Masangkay, by exchanging the childs 3,014
square meters lot with 3, 700 shares of stock of the corporation, when in fact no consideration for the
transfer was made as Gilberto Ricaros Masangkay or his guardian Magdalena Ricaros has never been
a stockholder of the Corporation at any point in time, when in truth and in fact the accused well knew that
the same statements he made in his petition and which he reaffirmed and made use as part of his
evidence in the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) are false.[16]

The information was docketed as Criminal Case No. 56495 and raffled to the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC)
of Mandaluyong City, Branch 59.

Eriberto filed a motion to quash,[17] insisting that it is the SEC which has primary jurisdiction over the case. He
also argued that the truth of the allegations contained in the information is still pending resolution in SEC Case No. 12-
93-4650, thereby constituting a prejudicial question to the perjury case.

The MeTC denied the motion to quash for lack of merit.[18] It held that the fact that the parties to the criminal case
are mostly stockholders of the same corporation does not automatically make the case an intra-corporate dispute that is
within the SEC jurisdiction. It likewise held that the fact that the parties are stockholders is merely incidental and that the
subject of the case is a criminal act and hence within the general jurisdiction of the MeTC. As regards the issue of
prejudicial question, the MeTC ruled that the petition before the SEC has nothing to do with the criminal case. The truth
of the statements for which he is being indicted is a matter of defense which the defendant may raise in the criminal
case.

Eriberto filed a petition for certiorari before Branch 158 of the Pasig City Regional Trial Court (RTC) to assail the
denial of his motion to quash.The denial was affirmed.[19] He then filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, which was
denied for being a wrong mode of appeal.[20]
Failing to suspend the criminal proceedings, Eriberto entered a plea of not guilty during arraignment.[21] He then
waived the conduct of a pre-trial conference.[22]

During trial, the prosecution presented the private complainant Cesar as its sole witness. [23] He testified that
on December 5, 1992, a meeting of the Board of Directors was held at 9:00 oclock in the morning at the office of MFI in
Canlalay, Bian, Laguna. He presented the minutes of the alleged meeting and reiterated the details contained therein
indicating that the Board unanimously approved Magdalenas proposal to exchange her sons (Gilberto Masangkay
[Gilberto]) property with MFI shares of stock.[24] The prosecution established that one of the signatures appearing in the
minutes belongs to Eriberto.[25] This allegedly belies Eribertos statement that the December 5, 1992 meeting did not
actually materialize, and shows that he knew his statement to be false because he had attended the meeting and signed
the minutes thereof. The prosecution also pointed out that in the proceedings before the guardianship court to obtain
approval for the exchange of properties, Eriberto had testified in support of the exchange. [26] The guardianship court
subsequently approved the proposed transaction.[27] The resulting Deed of Exchange contained Eribertos signature as
first party.[28]

As for Eribertos statement that the Deed of Exchange was simulated, the prosecution disputed this by again
using the minutes of the December 5, 1992 meeting, which states that the property of Gilberto will be exchanged for
3,700 MFI shares.

For his defense, Eriberto asserted that the December 5, 1992 meeting did not actually take place. While he
admitted signing, reading and understanding the minutes of the alleged meeting, he explained that the minutes were
only brought by Cesar and Elizabeth to his house for signing, but there was no actual meeting.[29]

To support the claim that no meeting took place in 1992, the defense presented Elizabeth, the MFI corporate
secretary, who could not remember with certainty if she had sent out any notice for the December 5, 1992 meeting and
could not produce any copy thereof.

The defense also presented a notice of meeting dated October 19, 1993, which called for the MFI
boards initial meeting since its business operations started, to be held on November 9, 1993. Emphasizing the words
initial meeting, Eriberto argued that this proves that prior to November 9, 1993, no meeting (including the December 5,
1992 meeting) had ever taken place.

As for the charge that he perjured himself when he stated that the Deed of Exchange was fictitious and
simulated for lack of consideration, Eriberto explained that MFI never issued stock certificates in favor of his son
Gilberto. Corporate secretary Elizabeth corroborated this statement and admitted that stock certificates were never
issued to Gilberto or any of the stockholders.[30]

While he admitted supporting the proposed exchange and seeking its approval by the guardianship court,
Eriberto maintained that he did so because he was convinced by private complainant Cesar that the exchange would
benefit his son Gilberto. He however reiterated that, to date, Gilberto is not a stockholder of MFI, thus has not received
any consideration for the exchange.
On rebuttal, the prosecution refuted Eribertos claim that the board had its first actual meeting only on November
9, 1993. It explained that theNovember 9, 1993 meeting was the initial meeting since business operations began,
because MFI obtained permit to conduct business only in 1993. But the November 9, 1993 meeting was not the first
meeting ever held by the board of directors. The prosecution presented the secretarys certificates of board meetings
held on April 6, 1992[31] and September 5, 1992[32] -- both before November 9, 1993 and both signed by Eriberto.[33] At
this time, business operations have not yet begun because the companys hotel building was still under construction. The
said secretarys certificates in fact show that MFI was still sourcing additional funds for the construction of its hotel.[34]

Ruling of the Metropolitan Trial Court

On October 18, 2000, the MeTC rendered a judgment [35] holding that the prosecution was able to prove that
the December 5, 1992 meeting actually took place and that petitioner attended the same as evidenced by his signature
in the minutes thereof. As for Eribertos statement that the Deed of Exchange was fictitious, the MeTC held that his
participation in the approval and execution of the document, as well as his avowals before the guardianship court
regarding the proposed exchange all militate against his previous statement. Petitioner was thus found guilty as charged
and sentenced to imprisonment of two months of arresto mayor minimum and medium, as minimum, to one year and
one day of arresto mayor maximum and prison correccional minimum, as maximum.[36]

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

Eriberto appealed[37] his conviction to the RTC of Mandaluyong City, Branch 213, which eventually affirmed the appealed
judgment.[38] The fallo of the Decision states that:

WHEREFORE, the decision of October 18, 2000 by Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch
59, Mandaluyong City, convicting the accused-appellant Eriberto S. Masangkay of the crime of perjury
under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code is hereby affirmed in toto.

SO ORDERED.[39]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA affirmed the appealed ruling of the trial courts, holding that the prosecution was able to prove that the falsehoods
in the petition for involuntary dissolution were deliberately made. It explained that Eribertos signatures on the two
allegedly fictitious documents show that he participated in the execution of the Deed of Exchange and was present in
the December 5, 1992 meeting. Having participated in these two matters, Eriberto knew that these were not simulated
and fictitious, as he claimed in his verified petition for involuntary dissolution of MFI. Thus, he deliberately lied in his
petition.[40]

The CA rejected petitioners argument that the two statements were not material. It ruled that they were material because
petitioner even cited them as principal basis for his petition for involuntary dissolution.[41]

The appellate court found no merit in the issue of prejudicial question. It held that the result of the petition for involuntary
dissolution will not be determinative of the criminal case, which can be resolved independently.[42]

The CA however, corrected the imposed penalty on the ground that the trial court was imprecise in its application of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law.The CA meted the penalty of imprisonment for a term of six months and one day of prision
correccional minimum.[43]

Petitioner moved for reconsideration[44] which was denied.[45]

Hence, this petition.[46]

Issues

Petitioner submits the following issues for review:

I
WHETHER THERE WAS DELIBERATE ASSERTION OF FALSEHOOD

II
WHETHER THE TRUTHFUL ALLEGATION IN THE PETITION FOR INVOLUNTARY DISSOLUTION
THAT THERE WAS NO MEETING IS MATERIAL TO THE PETITION

III
WHETHER PERJURY COULD PROSPER WHILE THE MAIN CASE REMAINS PENDING[47]

Since this is a case involving a conviction in a criminal case, the issues boil down to whether the prosecution was able to
prove the accuseds guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Our Ruling

We rule that the prosecution failed to prove the crime of perjury beyond reasonable doubt.

Article 183 of the RPC provides:

False testimony in other cases and perjury in solemn affirmation. The penalty of arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any person who,
knowingly making untruthful statements and not being included in the provisions of the next preceding
 articles shall testify under oath, or make an affidavit, upon any material matter before a competent
person authorized to administer an oath in cases in which the law so requires.

Any person who, in case of a solemn affirmation made in lieu of an oath, shall commit any of the
falsehoods mentioned in this and the three preceding articles of this section, shall suffer the respective
penalties provided therein.

For perjury to exist, (1) there must be a sworn statement that is required by law; (2) it must be made under oath before a
competent officer; (3) the statement contains a deliberate assertion of falsehood; and (4) the false declaration is with
regard to a material matter.[48]

The presence of the first two elements is not disputed by the petitioner and they are indeed present in the instant
case. The sworn statements which contained the alleged falsehoods in this case were submitted in support of the
petition for involuntary dissolution, as required by Sections 105 and 121 of the Corporation Code.

The petition was also verified by the petitioner before a notary public [49]an officer duly authorized by law to
administer oaths. This verification was done in compliance with Section 121 of the Corporation Code.[50]

It is the elements of deliberate falsehood and materiality of the false statements to the petition for involuntary dissolution
which are contested.

On the element of materiality, a material matter is the main fact which is the subject of the inquiry or any fact or
circumstance which tends to prove that fact, or any fact or circumstance which tends to corroborate or strengthen the
testimony relative to the subject of inquiry, or which legitimately affects the credit of any witness who testifies.[51]

Petitioner filed a petition for involuntary dissolution of MFI based on Section 105 of the Corporate Code, which
states:

Section 105. Withdrawal of stockholder or dissolution of corporation. In addition and without

prejudice to the other rights and remedies available to a stockholder under this Title, any stockholder of a
close corporation may, for any reason, compel the said corporation to purchase his shares at their fair
value, which shall not be less than their par or issued value, when the corporation has sufficient assets in
his books to cover its debts and liabilities exclusive of capital stock:Provided, That any stockholder of a
close corporation may, by written petition to the Securities and Exchange Commission, compel the
dissolution of such corporation whenever any of the acts of the directors, officers or those in control of
the corporation is illegal, or fraudulent, or dishonest, or oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to the
corporation or any stockholder, or whenever corporate assets are being misapplied or wasted.

He stated in his petition for involuntary dissolution that:

xxxx

4. Said secretarys certificate is absolutely fictitious and simulated, because the

alleged meeting of the Board of Directors held on December 5, 1992did not actually materialize.
 xxxx

5. Using the said falsified and spurious document, x x x respondents executed

another fictitious document known as the Deed of Exchange with Cancellation of Usufruct.

xxxx

The aforementioned contract is indeed simulated and fictitious because they defrauded minor
child Gilberto Ricaros Masangkay and deprived him of his own property without any consideration at all.

xxxx

8. The foregoing acts and deeds of the respondents, done in evident bad faith and
in conspiracy with one another, are seriously fraudulent and illegalbecause they constitute estafa
through falsification of documents, punishable under Articles 315 and 171 of the Revised Penal Code.

9. Likewise, said acts and deeds are feloniously prejudicial to the stockholders of
MFI, including petitioner, as corporate assets are being misapplied and wasted.

10. MFI should therefore be ordered dissolved after appropriate proceedings before this
Honorable Commission, in accordance with Sections 105 and 121 of the New Corporation Code x x x.[52]

The statements for which the petitioner is tried for perjury are the very grounds he relied upon in his petition for corporate
dissolution. They refer to acts of the MFI directors which are allegedly fraudulent, illegal and prejudicial, and which would
allegedly justify corporate dissolution under Section 105 of the Corporation Code. Evidently, these statements are
material to his petition for involuntary dissolution. The element of materiality is therefore present.

The prosecution, however, failed to prove the element of deliberate falsehood.

The prosecution has the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt the falsehood of petitioners statement that
the December 5, 1992 meeting didnot actually materialize. In other words, the prosecution has to establish that the said
meeting in fact took place, i.e., that the directors were actually and physically present in one place at the same time and
conferred with each other.

To discharge this burden, the prosecution relied mainly on the minutes of the alleged December 5,
1992 meeting, signed by the accused, which are inconsistent with his statement that the December 5, 1992 meeting did
not actually materialize. According to the minutes, a meeting actually took place. On the other hand, according to the
petitioners statement in the petition for dissolution, the meeting did not actually materialize or take place. The two
statements are obviously contradictory or inconsistent with each other. But the mere contradiction or inconsistency
between the two statements merely means that one of them is false. It cannot tell us which of the two statements is
actually false. The minutes could be true and the sworn statement false. But it is equally possible that the minutes are
false and the sworn statement is true, as explained by the petitioner who testified that the minutes were simply brought to
his house for signature, but no meeting actually transpired. Given the alternative possibilities, it is the prosecutions
burden to affirmatively prove beyond reasonable doubt that the first statement (the minutes) is the true one, while the
other statement (in the petition for dissolution) is the false one.
 We have held before that a conviction for perjury cannot be obtained by the prosecution by merely showing the
inconsistent or contradictory statements of the accused, even if both statements are sworn. The prosecution must
additionally prove which of the two statements is false and must show the statement to be false by
evidence other than the contradictory statement.[53] The rationale for requiring evidence other than a contradictory
statement is explained thus:

x x x Proof that accused has given contradictory testimony under oath at a different time will not
be sufficient to establish the falsity of his testimony charged as perjury, for this would leave simply one
oath of the defendant as against another, and it would not appear that the testimony charged was false
rather than the testimony contradictory thereof. The two statements will simply neutralize each other;
there must be some corroboration of the contradictory testimony. Such corroboration, however, may be
furnished by evidence aliunde tending to show perjury independently of the declarations of testimony of
the accused.[54]

In this case, however, the prosecution was unable to prove, by convincing evidence other than the minutes, that
the December 5, 1992 meeting actually took place. It merely presented, aside from the minutes, the testimony of private
complainant Cesar, who is a respondent in the corporate dissolution case filed by the petitioner and is therefore not a
neutral or disinterested witness.[55] The prosecution did not present the testimony of the other directors or participants in
the alleged meeting who could have testified that the meeting actually occurred. Neither did the prosecution offer any
explanation why such testimony was not presented. It likewise failed to present any evidence that might circumstantially
prove that on December 5, 1992, the directors were physically gathered at a single place, and there conferred with each
other and came up with certain resolutions. Notably, the prosecution failed to present the notice for the alleged
meeting. The corporate secretary, Elizabeth, who was presented by the petitioner, could not even remember whether
she had sent out a prior notice to the directors for the alleged December 5, 1992 meeting. The lack of certainty as to the
sending of a notice raises serious doubt as to whether a meeting actually took place, for how could the directors have
been gathered for a meeting if they had not been clearly notified that such a meeting would be taking place?

The insufficiency of the prosecutions evidence is particularly glaring considering that the petitioner had already explained
the presence of his signature in the minutes of the meeting. He testified that while the meeting did not actually take
place, the minutes were brought to his house for his signature. He affixed his signature thereto because he believed that
the proposed exchange of the assets, which was the subject of the minutes, would be beneficial to his child,
Gilberto. Acting on this belief, he also supported the approval of the exchange by the guardianship court.

Under these circumstances, we cannot say with moral certainty that the prosecution was able to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that the December 5, 1992 meeting actually took place and that the petitioners statement denying the
same was a deliberate falsehood.
The second statement in the petition for involuntary dissolution claimed to be perjurious reads:

5. Using the said falsified and spurious document, respondents executed another
fictitious document known as the Deed of Exchange with Cancellation of Usufruct.
 The contract purporting to be a transfer of 3,700 shares of stock of MFI in return for a piece of
land (Lot No. 2064-A-2) located at Canlalay, Bian, Laguna and owned by minor child Gilberto
Masangkay is void.

Article 1409 of the New Civil Code states:

Article 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and void from the beginning:

xxxx

(2) those which are absolutely simulated or fictitious;

(3) those whose cause or object did not exist at the time of the transaction;

xxxx

These contracts cannot be ratified. Neither can the right to set up the defense of
illegality be waived.

The aforementioned contract is indeed simulated and fictitious because they defrauded minor
child Gilberto Ricaros Masangkay and deprived him of his own property without any consideration at all.

Records of the MFI revealed that minor child Gilberto Ricaros Masangkay [or] his alleged
guardian Magdalena S. Ricaros never became a stockholder at any point in time of MFI.

In short, the petitioner is being charged with deliberate falsehood for his statement that the deed of exchange is
fictitious. To support the accusation, the prosecution proved that petitioner assented to the said Deed of Exchange by
virtue of his signatures in the minutes of the alleged December 5, 1992meeting and on the instrument itself, and his
participation in procuring the guardianship courts approval of the transaction. These allegedly show that the exchange
was not fictitious and that Eriberto knew it.

We cannot agree with this line of reasoning. Petitioners imputation of fictitiousness to the Deed of Exchange should not
be taken out of context. He explained in paragraph 5 of his petition for involuntary dissolution that the Deed of Exchange
is simulated and fictitious pursuant to Article 1409 of the Civil Code, because it deprived Gilberto Masangkay of his
property without any consideration at all. To justify his allegation that Gilberto did not receive anything for the exchange,
he stated in the same paragraph that Gilberto never became a stockholder of MFI (MFI stocks were supposed to be the
consideration for Gilbertos land). This fact was subsequently proven by the petitioner through the corporate secretary
Elizabeth, who admitted that MFI never issued stocks in favor of the stockholders. This testimony was never explained
or rebutted by the prosecution. Thus, petitioners statement that the exchange was simulated and fictitious x x x because
they x x x deprived [Gilberto] of his own property without any consideration at all cannot be considered a deliberate
falsehood. It is simply his characterization of the transaction, based on the fact that Gilberto did not receive consideration
for the exchange of his land.

As importantly, petitioners statements in paragraph 5 of the petition for involuntary dissolution about the nature of the
Deed of Exchange are conclusions of law, and not factual statements which are susceptible of truth or falsity. They are
his opinion regarding the legal character of the Deed of Exchange.He opined that the Deed of Exchange was fictitious or
simulated under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, because MFI supposedly did not perform its reciprocal obligation to issue
stocks to Gilberto in exchange for his land. His opinion or legal conclusion may have been wrong (as failure of
consideration does not make a contract simulated or fictitious),[56] but it is an opinion or legal conclusion nevertheless. An
opinion or a judgment cannot be taken as an intentional false statement of facts.[57]

We recognize that perjury strikes at the very administration of the laws; that it is the policy of the law that judicial
proceedings and judgments shall be fair and free from fraud; that litigants and parties be encouraged to tell the truth, and
that they be punished if they do not.[58] However, it is also at the heart of every criminal proceeding that every person is
presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

Given the foregoing findings, there is no more need to discuss the issue involving the propriety of proceeding with the
perjury case while the civil case for corporate dissolution is pending.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed March 16, 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
GR No. 25775 and its July 9, 2004 Resolution, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Eriberto S. Masangkay
is ACQUITTED of the charge of perjury on the ground ofREASONABLE DOUBT.

SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. NINOY MALBOG @ SATURNINO MALBOG,
AMADEO VIERNES*AND SALVADOR BAMBILLA, accused-appellants.

DECISION

PURISIMA, J.:

Appeal interposed by the appellants from the decision, dated March 23, 1992, of Branch 42 of the
Regional Trial Court in Dagupan City, finding them guilty of forcible abduction with rape and sentencing them to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the victim in the amount ofP50,000.00; and to pay the
costs.

On August 28, 1990, Estela Eng y Ulalan lodged her criminal complaint for forcible abduction with rape
against Ninoy Malbog, Amado Viernes and an unnamed suspect (John Doe).

Filed by on August 29, 1990 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Daniel Terrado, the Original Complaint alleged:

That on or about the 30th day of January, 1990, in the City of Dagupan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, NINOY MALBOG, AMADO VIERNES and JOHN DOE,
with violence and intimidation against persons, confederating together, acting jointly and helping one another,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally, forcibly abduct one ESTELA ENG y Ulalan, by dragging
her inside a car and bringing her to INAWA LODGE-INN, Calasiao, Pangasinan and once inside, with the use
of force, accused JOHN DOE have carnal knowledge of said ESTELA ENG y Ulalan, against her will and
consent to the damage and prejudice of the latter.[1]

Upon arraignment thereunder on December 28, 1990, with the assistance of counsel de parte, Atty. Santiago
Marcella, Ninoy Malbog @ Saturnino Malbog and Amado Viernes entered negative pleas.

Appellant Salvador Bambilla, who was a member of the Philippine National Police (then known as
Integrated National Police) and whose case was first referred to the office of the Judge Advocate General
(JAGO), was included in the charge in the Amended Complaint, dated January 10, 1991, alleging:

That on or about the 30th day of January, 1990, in the City of Dagupan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, NINOY MALBOG @ SATURNINO MALBOG, AMADO
VIERNES and SALVADOR BAMBILLA, with violence and intimidation against persons, confederating together,
acting jointly and helping one another, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and criminally, forcibly abduct one
ESTELA ENG y Ulalan, by dragging her inside a car and bringing her to INAWA LODGE-INN, Calasiao,
Pangasinan and once inside with the use of force, accused SALVADOR BAMBILLA have carnal knowledge of
said ESTELA ENG y Ulalan, against her will and consent, to the damage and prejudice of the latter.[2]

With Bambilla pleading not guilty upon arraignment on June 17, 1991, trial proceeded.

Evidence for the prosecution consisted of the testimonies of the victim, Estela Eng y Ulalan, and Dr. Rico
Reyes, the examining physician.

Estela Eng y Ulalan, who was 19 years old at the time of the incident and a nursing student at Lyceum
Northwestern University in Dagupan City, testified that at about six o clock in the morning of January 30, 1990,
she boarded a Balbin-Fernandez bus bound for Dagupan City to attend her classes at Northwestern University.
Appellant Salvador Bambilla also boarded the same bus and sat beside her. Upon reaching Dagupan, the bus
stopped in front of the Post Office. She was about to alight from the vehicle when Bambilla held her hand and
threatened her. Bambilla continued to hold her hand tightly even after they had alighted. While standing in front
of the Post Office, he told her that he would kill her if she shouted or made noise. Then, a blue car stopped in
front of them and Bambilla opened the door of the car, pushed her inside and also boarded. Once inside the
vehicle, she recognized appellant Ninoy Malbog as the driver. Seated beside him on the front seat was Amado
Viernes. She recognized Malbog because he was their former family driver, and she recognized Viernes only
by face until he was later identified. She shouted for help but kept quiet when Bambilla threatened her and
poked his gun at her waist.

Upon the order of Bambilla, Malbog drove the car to Calasiao and stopped in front of what she later came
to know as Inawa Lodge-Inn. Malbog drove the car into a garage, and a man immediately closed the gate after
which Viernes and Malbog went out of the car and left while Bambilla pushed her (victim) out and forced her to
go up a staircase. Upon reaching the door of a room, Bambilla pushed her inside, followed her and locked the
door. She screamed and when nobody heard her, she kneeled in front of Bambilla and pleaded to him not to do
anything to her. Bambilla pushed her to the bed, instead, went on top of her, and began kissing her cheeks,
neck and lips. Then, he pulled her white uniform up to her waist and removed her underwear, after which he
(Bambilla) took off his pants and brief. She struggled and fought against him but he was stronger. Thereafter,
he tried to insert his penis into her vagina while making an up and down movement but she closed her
legs. Later, she felt hot fluid on her thighs.According to her (victim), she did not know if Bambilla was able to
penetrate her private parts because she was too tired and lost consciousness.

When she recovered, she went to the comfort room to wash her private parts. She looked for a window
through which to escape but she found none. When she went out of the comfort room, Bambilla told her that he
was leaving to buy for her a shirt because her uniform was all wet and dirty.

When Bambilla returned, he brought a skirt and T-shirt and ordered her to change her clothes, after which
he told her that he was bringing her to Manila. When she had dressed up they left the Inawa Lodge and rode
on the same blue car driven by Malbog earlier but this time, it was Bambilla who drove the car. On the way, she
gypped Bambilla by telling him that she would go with him to Manila but he should first take her home to
Pozorrubio to get some clothes. When they reached Pozorrubio at around 12:00 noon, she alighted at
Barangay Talogtog and took a tricycle. Upon reaching their house, she told her brother Cesar what happened.
The following day, January 31, 1990, she submitted herself for medical examination by Dr. Rico Reyes, at the
Don Teofilo Memorial Hospital. Two days after the incident, or on February 1, 1990 to be precise, she reported
the incident to the Pozorrubio Police and also to the Dagupan City Police.[3]

The victim-complainant denied the theory of appellant Salvador Bambilla that he was her boyfriend and
she voluntarily went with him to Inawa Lodge-Inn on January 30, 1990.

The second prosecution witness, Dr. Rico Reyes, recounted that on January 31, 1990, the victim-
complainant, Estela Eng, went to the Don Teofilo Memorial Hospital for physical examination, which
examination revealed that there was:

erythema on left labia minora xxx; hymenal laceration, healed at 6:00 o clock and 10:00 o clock position;
vaginal introitus admits 1 finger; cervix closed; uterus was small; adnexae-free; vaginal smear was done for
detection of presence of spermatozoa and the findings was negative for spermatozoa.

Aside from the said findings, there was no other sign of physical injury. Dr. Reyes explained that erythema on
left labia minora meant that there was reddening on the left labia which might be an irritation caused by tight
underwears; and that the healed hymenal laceration at six o clock and ten o clock positions could have been
sustained more than seven days prior to examination.[4]

Evidence for the defense consisted mainly of the testimonies of all the three appellants, Ninoy Malbog @
Saturnino, Amadeo Viernes and Salvador Bambilla.
 According to appellant Bambilla, he and the complainant were sweethearts. He first met her in February
1988, when he was assigned as traffic policeman near complainants bakery in Barangay Poblacion,
Pozorrubio, Pangasinan. Since then, he began courting her and after she answered him on March 14, 1988,
they began going out and he would take her to and from the school.

On January 30, 1990, at around six oclock in the morning, as he was already off-duty, he boarded a
Balbin-Fernandez bus bound for Dagupan City, to go home to Amagbagan. The bus was already half full when
he boarded it. Upon seeing the complainant, Estela Eng, inside the bus, he sat beside her. They reached
Dagupan at around seven oclock a.m. and they alighted together in front of the Post Office. As Estela Eng was
already late for her class, he invited her for a date and she acceded on condition that she was to be brought
back to her school at 12:00 noon to attend her afternoon classes. He then told her that he was going to bring
her to Inawa Lodge in Calasiao. She was reluctant at first, asking him if there was no other place where they
could go to but later on she agreed to go with him but asked him not to touch her - (Anggapoy galawan).

They were about to board a tricycle for Calasiao when an oncoming blue car blew its horn. He recognized
the driver as Ninoy Malbog who used to drive a passenger mini-bus he usually rode on. He then approached
the car and talked to Malbog. When he found out that Malbog was going to Dagupan City to buy materials for
his employer, he requested him (Malbog) to take him and Estela to Calasiao. When Malbog agreed, he and
Estela sat in the backseat. As they were leaving, they saw Amado Viernes, waving at them and asking them
where they were going. Malbog told Viernes that he would first bring Bambilla and his companion to Calasiao,
buy spare parts for his employer and then go back to Pozorrubio. Viernes asked Malbog if he could hitch a ride
back to Pozorrubio. After asking permission from his mother, Amado also boarded the car and sat beside him
(Malbog).

While they were on their way to Calasiao, Estela Eng was worried that Malbog and Viernes might tell her
brother that she went with them to Calasiao. When they reached Inawa Lodge, he instructed Malbog to bring
the car inside the compound. A man directed them towards a garage where they parked the car. He asked
Estela to go ahead upstairs because he had to tell the two not to report to her brother. When Estela left, he
asked Malbog to leave the car so people would not see him (Bambilla) and Estela when they leave the
place. He assured Malbog that his employer, Rocky Cancino, was his good friend and he would explain to
Cancino when he brings back the car to him. With such assurance, Malbog agreed to leave the car and he and
Viernes left Inawa Lodge.

After the two left, Bambilla proceeded to pay the motel bills after which a roomboy accompanied him to
Room B, handing him a towel and pitcher of cold water. When he went inside the room, he saw Estela sitting
on the bed. When he asked her why she was quiet, she told him that she was worried that Malbog and Viernes
might report to her brother. He told her not to worry and began to kiss her until both of them were lying on the
bed.He then removed her dress, her bra and her panty and continued kissing her. Then he stood up to remove
his clothes while Estela covered her body with her clothes because she was ashamed of his seeing her naked.
When he was already undressed, he laid on top of her but Estela kept her legs closed. When he tried to open
her legs, she told him not today because we have pregnancy test next week. [5] Thus, he simply inserted his
penis in between her thighs just above her knees because she continued to clutch her dress and covered her
body from the knee up. He ejaculated on her thighs.

Afterwards, Estela got up and went to the comfort room. After a few minutes, she went out of the comfort
room, lied on the bed beside him, embraced him and told him Do not abandon me. After assuring her that he
will not because he loves her, he suggested that they leave Inawa Lodge as he was already hungry. While
Estela was putting on her clothes, she noticed that they were all crumpled and told him that she needed new
clothes.As he could not convince her to go with him, he went out alone.

Using the same car driven by Malbog, he went to Ang Ka Tong Store in Dagupan City and bought a shirt
and a blouse. He went back to Inawa Lodge after about 45 minutes. The door to Room B was locked when he
arrived so he knocked and called out to Estela. When Estela opened the door, he gave her the shirt and blouse
he bought and asked her to change. However, she did not immediately put on the clothes; instead, she sat on
the bed and told him, If you truly love me, do not abandon me. I will go with you. It was at that point that they
agreed to elope and go to Manila. After Estela was dressed, they checked out of Inawa Lodge riding in the
same car that he (Bambilla) borrowed from Malbog. They agreed to go home first to Pozorrubio so they could
get some clothes and money. They arrived in Pozorrubio around noontime and upon reaching Barangay
Talogtog, Estela suggested that it would be better if she would get off there and take a tricycle home so nobody
would see them together. They agreed to meet at one o clock in the afternoon of the same day at the
Pantranco bus terminal near the Pozorrubio town plaza.

While Estela took a tricycle and proceeded to her house, he also went home to Amagbagan to get money
and some clothes. He was two minutes late when he arrived at their meeting place and he did not find Estela
there. He waited for her for forty-five (45) minutes but she did not arrive. Thinking that she probably changed
her mind, he went to her school, Northwestern University, in Dagupan City. He waited for her until 4:30 but he
did not find her. He then went back to Pozorrubio and returned his clothes in his house, after which he drove to
the house of Rocky Cancino to return the car.

He (Bambilla) reached the house of Cancino at around six thirty. While he was in the house of Cancino,
two policemen, Patrolmen Mina and Perez, arrived and informed Bambilla that he was to go immediately to the
police station because the family of Estela was there. They also instructed Ninoy Malbog and Rocky Cancino
to go with him. Thus, he, together with Malbog and Cancino, went to the police station in Pozorrubio. Upon
arrival at the station, he saw Estela Eng, her two brothers, her sister and their family maid inside the station.
Outside the municipal hall, the Chief of Police P/Capt. Conrado Rosete asked him what happened and why he
tried to elope with Eng (angipatik) and he told him that nothing happened between him and Estela. Bambilla
also claimed that he tried to talk to Estela after the incident to ask her about the problem but to no avail. Later,
he learned that Estela filed a criminal complaint against him.[6]

Appellant Amado Viernes, a fish vendor, testified that in the morning of January 30, 1990, his mother Maria
Viernes asked him to accompany her to get the fish she left with a fellow fish vendor in Dagupan City. They
boarded the Balbin-Fernandez mini bus in front of their house in Barangay Talogtog, Pozorrubio. Inside the
bus, he saw Salvador Bambilla, whom he knew to be a policeman, and Estela Eng, his townmate, seated
together and talking to each other. He and his mother alighted in front of the Meles Restaurant in Dagupan
City. They found out, however, that the fish they left was already sent to Pozorrubio so they immediately
walked back towards the bus stop to get a ride home. After waiting for some time and no bus arrived, they
walked towards the Post Office. Upon reaching the said spot, he saw Bambilla and Eng talking. As he knew
Bambilla to be a policeman, he greeted the latter by saying Sir. Bambilla replied by asking him, Where are you
going? and he told him that they were going back to Pozorrubio.Fifteen more minutes passed but no bus
arrived. When Eng and Bambilla were about to board a tricycle, a car arrived and Bambilla waved at the car,
approached the same and talked to the driver whom he recognized as Ninoy Malbog. Thereafter, he saw
Bambilla and Eng board the car. He (Viernes) also approached the car to ask Malbog where he was
going. When he found out that he would be going back to Pozorrubio, he asked Malbog if he could hitch a ride
back and when the latter agreed, he went back to his mother to inform her that he would be hitching a ride
back to Pozorrubio with Malbog. When she agreed, he immediately boarded the car, on the front seat beside
Malbog.

He learned that Malbog would first take Bambilla and Eng to Calasiao, buy spare parts for Rocky
Cancinos truck, and then go back to Pozorrubio.When they reached Calasiao, they took the left route towards
the place called Inawa Lodge Inn. Upon reaching the said place, Bambilla instructed him to leave and asked
Malbog to leave the car, promising that he would be responsible for explaining what they did to
Cancino. Afterwards, he and Malbog left Inawa Lodge together and took a ride back to Dagupan. Malbog told
him that had he known that Bambilla would be asking him to leave the car, he would not have brought the two
to Calasiao. When they reached Dagupan, Malbog walked towards Perez Boulevard to buy spare parts while
he alighted in front of Carried Lumber to get a ride back to Pozorrubio.[7]
 Amado Viernes allegations were corroborated by his mother, Maria Viernes, who attested to the fact that
she was with him on January 30, 1990; that her son went to Dagupan because she asked him to accompany
her to get the fish they were supposed to sell which she left with a fellow fish vendor in Dagupan City; that
while waiting for the bus to take them back to Pozorrubio, Malbog arrived in a blue car; that his son
approached the car and talked to Malbog; that after a few minutes his son told her that he would be hitching a
ride back to Pozorrubio with Malbog.[8]

Appellant Ninoy Malbog narrated his version of the incident as follows:

In the early morning of January 30, 1990, at around six oclock in the morning, he was sent by his
employer, Rocky Cancino, to buy spare parts for their delivery truck in Dagupan City. When he reached
Dagupan City, he saw Bambilla with Estela Eng about to board a tricycle. Since he knew Bambilla, he honked
the horn to get the latters attention and Bambilla approached and asked him if he could take him and Estela to
Calasiao. As it was early and the shop where he was supposed to buy the spare parts was still closed, he
agreed. They met Amado Viernes on the way and the latter also hitched a ride. When they reached the Inawa
Lodge, Bambilla asked him to leave the car because he did not want anybody to see him and Estela checking
out of the motel. He was reluctant at first but when Bambilla assured him that he was a good friend of Cancino
and he (Bambilla) would explain to Cancino when he returns the car later in the day, he (Malbog) agreed. He
and Viernes then went back to Dagupan City and parted ways at the junction of Perez Boulevard and del Pilar
Street. He proceeded towards Sampaguita Auto Supply to buy the spare parts while Viernes went to the
Carried Lumber. After buying the spare parts, he took a ride back to Pozorrubio.[9]

Rocky Cancino, employer of Malbog confirmed that in the early morning of January 30, 1990, he sent the
latter to Dagupan City to buy spare parts of a delivery truck and allowed him to use his blue car because he
wanted the delivery truck repaired immediately. When Malbog went back around ten a.m., he was told that he
(Malbog) lent his car to Bambilla so that he got angry; that around six o clock in the evening of the same day,
Bambilla arrived and explained to him what happened; that while he and Bambilla were still talking, two
policemen came looking for Bambilla and the policemen told Bambilla to go with them to the police station such
that he and Malbog went with Bambilla to the police station.

Cancino further testified that he was of the belief that Bambilla and complainant Eng were sweethearts
because on several occasions since the year 1988, he had seen the two together on dates.[10]

Willy Napacena, roomboy of Inawa Lodge Inn, testified that he was on duty in the morning of January 30,
1990; that about seven thirty a.m., Bambilla, with three companions, two males and one female, arrived in a
blue car and he was the one who let them enter the garage; that upon getting out of the car, the two male
companions of Bambilla left while the latter and his female companion went up to Room B; that after 30
minutes, Bambilla went out of the room alone and boarded the same blue car; that during the time Bambilla
was out, he did not hear any call or buzzer from Room B, and neither did he hear any noise coming therefrom;
that Bambilla returned at around nine a.m.; and about an hour after Bambilla was back, he and the lady
checked out of the lodge.[11]

On March 23, 1992, the trial court found all the three appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of forcible abduction with rape and sentenced them accordingly. In finding for the prosecution, it
ratiocinated:

xxx xxx xxx

2. It is very unnatural for two lovers to have a date early in the morning, especially in the case of Estela who
had to attend her classes.

3. It is also unnatural that Estela would voluntarily go with him for a date in the company of the other two (2)
accused, Ninoy Malbog and Amado Viernes.
4. There were no pictures, cards and letters allegedly given to him by Estela which he allegedly surrendered to
her on January 31, 1990, because he was not foolish enough to return them to her considering that he was
invited to the police station, together with Ninoy Malbog and Rocky Bell Cancino, to shed light on what
happened between him and Estela in the early morning of January 30, 1990, and that on the same night he
saw Estela, together with her brothers and sister and their maid, being interrogated by Pat. Credo, and
considering that he appeared to be smart as borne out by the way he concocted his defense and the manner
he answered questions; and considering further that the pictures, cards and letters were very important pieces
of evidence.

5. Estela Eng immediately reported what the accused, Pat. Salvador Bambilla, and his companions did to her.
For it is hard to believe that she would sacrifice her honor, being a good looking girl, to tell a story of
defloration, allow the examination of her private parts and thereafter present herself to be the subject of a
public trial.

xxx xxx xxx

And the circumstances which negated his claim that Estela voluntarily went with him and made the Court to
rule that there is evidence of forcible abduction, are:

1. The testimony of Estela Eng is clear and convincing, the complainant declaring that she and the accused
Bambilla were never sweethearts; that when the mini-bus which she rode from Pozorrubio to Dagupan City
stopped in front of the Post Office and she was about to alight, Bambilla held her hand and threatened her with
bodily harm; that upon alighting from the mini-bus Bambilla again held her right hand with his left hand tightly
and told her that he will kill her if she will shout or will make some struggle or noise; that just as the mini-bus
moved forward, a car suddenly stopped in front of them and Bambilla pushed Estela inside; that she asked for
help by shouting, but Bambilla immediately poked his gun to her waist and because of fear, she stopped and
just cried. On the way to Calasiao she even awked (sic) help from Ninoy Malbog, but the latter ignored her.

2. And the fact that Bambilla at that time was armed with a hand gun.

xxx xxx xxx

The Court believes that the following circumstances have sufficiently established the commission of the crime
of Rape:

a] The threat, which is continuing, by Salvador Bambilla, who is a policeman and at that time armed with a
hand gun, against the life of Estela Eng from the time the latter was abducted in front of the Post Office up to
the time said Salvador Bambilla satisfied his desire in having sex with Estela Eng, which threat put her to
crouch in fear, keep silent and obey his orders.

b] There is resistance or struggle put up by Estela Eng against the intention of Bambilla to lie and have sex
with her. This resistance or struggle is evidenced by the fact that once they entered the garage of the Inawa
Lodge Inn, in Calasiao, Pangasinan, and after accused Ninoy Malbog and Amado Viernes have left upon
instruction of Bambilla, the latter pushed Estela out of the car and into the room of the hotel and, thereupon,
pursued his intention. Such resistance or struggle by private complainant is also evidenced by the fact that her
white nursing uniform dress was, as testified by accused Bambilla, crumpled , got wet and dirtied. If really
Estela Eng did not put up a resistance or struggle when Bambilla went on to satisfy his carnal designs, why
was her dress crumpled, wet and dirtied? The Court believes that the foregoing circumstances are indications
of the criminal intent of Pat. Bambilla to lie and have sex with Estela Eng, without the latters consent and
against her will.

c] There is consummated crime of Rape. This conclusion is evidenced by the findings of Dr. Rico Reyes who
was the one who attended to and examined Estela Eng.[12]
 The lower court disposed thus:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Salvador Bambilla, Ninoy Malbog, alias Saturnino Malbog, and
Amado Viernes guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Forcible Abduction With Rape and are hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to jointly and severally indemnify the offended party
Estela Eng the sum of P50,000.00, and to pay proportionate costs.

SO ORDERED.[13]

Hence, this appeal.

In criminal cases, the guilt of the accused must be proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt on
the strength of its evidence.[14]Conviction of the accused must rest not on the weakness of the defense but on
the strength of the prosecutions evidence;[15] otherwise, the accused is entitled to an acquittal.

Under the criminal justice system in this country, the overriding consideration is not whether the court
doubts the innocence of the accused but whether it entertains a reasonable doubt as to his guilt.
[16]
Speculation, conjectures and probabilities cannot take the place of proof required to establish the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt and suspicion, no matter how strong, cannot sway judgment.[17]

In reviewing rape cases, this Court is guided by the following principles: (a) an accusation of rape can be
made with facility and while the accusation is difficult to prove, it is even more difficult for the person accused,
though innocent, to disprove the charge; (b) considering that, in the nature of things, only two (2) persons are
usually involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with great caution;
and (c) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit, and cannot be allowed to draw
strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.[18]

The lone testimony of the victim of rape, if it meets the test of credibility, may be made the basis of
conviction.[19] It is therefore incumbent upon the trial court to be very scrupulous in ascertaining the credibility of
the testimony of the victim and to carefully sift through her allegations because such testimony, standing alone,
if it passes the test of credibility, may lead to a finding of guilt.

As a general rule, the factual findings by the trial court deserve a high degree of respect and will not be
disturbed on appeal in the absence of any clear showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some
facts or circumstances of weight and substance which could alter the result of the case.[20]

A judicious review of the case under scrutiny, however, shows that the trial court did overlook some facts
and circumstances of weight and substance which cast doubt on the truth and credibility of complainants
accusations.

The complainant alleged that while they (she and Bambilla) were still on the bus, the latter poked his gun
at her and threatened to kill her if she shouts. She further claimed that she did, in fact, shout but the other
passengers were probably frightened.[21]

Such allegation by the complainant cannot be given credence by the Court. It is belied by her very own
testimony with respect to the time and place where the alleged forcible abduction took place. She herself
admitted that the bus was already full when they left Pozorrubio. [22] Most of the passengers were her
townmates from Pozorrubio and schoolmates from Lyceum Northwestern University. Moreover, the alleged
threat happened in broad daylight. Given all these circumstances, the Court finds the testimony of the
complainant incredible. If indeed Bambilla threatened her by poking his gun, it was impossible that nobody
noticed if she put up a struggle against him. Then too, if she tried to shout as she claimed, somebody could
have heard her and responded to her shouts. At the very least, if she shouted, as she theorized, a commotion
inside the bus would inevitably occurred. If Bambilla carried a gun that day, it was sufficiently explained by his
being a policeman, and at the time of the incident, he just got off from his duty and was on his way home.

Complainant likewise averred that Bambilla continued to poke his gun at her and to threaten her when
they alighted from the bus in front of the Post Office. Again, such allegation is unworthy of belief. Complainant
herself admitted that the bus regularly stops in front of the Post Office, [23] where she and Bambilla alighted
because students of Lyceum usually get off thereat. The said testimony of complainant makes her allegations
of threat unlikely because it would be impossible for anyone not to notice Bambilla poking a gun at her and
threatening her. Not only that, a few meters across the Post Office was the Dagupan City Police Station. If
there was truth to the allegation that she was forcibly abducted by Bambilla, her normal reaction would have
been to resist and struggle against her abductor. And considering the circumstances of time and place where
complainant was supposedly abducted, there was every opportunity for her to seek help by the simple
expedient of shouting. As earlier mentioned, the road in front of the Post Office is a major bus stop and a lot of
people alighted thereat, as it was already seven oclock in the morning. [24] The police station was only a few
meters from the Post Office and there were passenger jeepneys parked right in front of the Post Office. [25] All
the aforesaid circumstances taken together negate the plausibility of the forcible abduction complained of.

Another significant circumstance overlooked below was the fact that Bambilla went out of the motel, left
the complainant alone and was out for more than thirty (30) minutes. This fact was testified to by Bambilla,
[26]
corroborated by the testimony of Willy Napacena, the roomboy of the motel, [27]and admitted by the
complainant herself.[28] What is more, Napacena attested to the fact that the doors to the rooms of Inawa Lodge
did not have outside locks and could only be locked from inside. [29] Complainant cannot therefore claim that
Bambilla locked her up. Said roomboy also testified that inside each room was a buzzer which could be used
by customers calling for room service.[30] Napacena, declared under oath that he did not hear any call from the
buzzer nor any shout for help coming from Room B where the complainant was left alone for at least half an
hour.[31]

It is thus decisively evident that Estela Eng had ample opportunity to escape or, at least, to shout for help if
she was really brought to the motel against her will and raped, as complained of. But she never tried to escape
nor asked for help, something unnatural for a woman who had been forcibly abducted and raped. It would have
been different if the complainant was physically unable to get up and escape, because she was beaten up and
rendered unconscious. Then, it would have been understandable why she could not escape even if there was
an opportunity to do so. In the case under scrutiny, there were no signs that complainant Eng was too
weakened to even get up and walk. Unacceptable is complainants explanation why she did not try to go out of
the room and escape, to wit:

Q You also mentioned in your previous testimony that the accused Salvador Bambilla went out for about 30
minutes?

A Yes, sir.

Q When he was out, do you mean to say that he left you from the room?

A Yes, sir.

Q And for that 30 minutes what did you do in order to escape?

A I was trying to open the door by turning the knob but I could not and how could I also escape since my
clothes were wet and dirty and the jalousies because there are also jalousies, there is still a screen
covering the said window, so how could I go out , sir.[32]
 It is simply unlikely for a woman who has just been robbed of her honor and chastity to still think of wet
and dirty clothes instead of seizing upon every opportunity to escape from her malefactor. In the case under
consideration, the complainant admitted that she waited for Bambilla to return:

Q Do you mean to say that you waited for Salvador Bambilla to return?

A It is like this, before he left he told me to stay because according to him he will buy me a skirt and a t-shirt,
sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q In other words, you want to tell the Honorable Court that it was Salvador Bambilla who suggested to buy
you skirt and t-shirt?

A Yes, sir.

Q And you trusted him to still come back and give you the skirt and t-shirt, am I correct?

A Yes, sir.[33]

As to the accusation of rape, the trial court did not consider the fact that complainant herself did not know
if Bambilla was able to insert his penis into her vagina:

Q Did he ever make any movement while on your top and his penis reached your vagina?

A He tried to insert his erect penis into my vagina but I dont know if it was inserted because I lost
consciousness, sir.[34]

Q You also stated that he ejaculated on your thigh?

A Yes, sir.

Q Do you mean to say that his penis was not able to penetrate your vagina?

A Thats what I dont know anymore because I was already tired and had lost my consciousness, sir.[35]

Then too, the findings of the medico-legal officer who examined the complainant indicated the probability
that no rape was committed. The medical certificate stated that there was no sign of external physical injuries
on the whole body of the complainant, no spermatozoa was found but there were erythema and healed
lacerations.[36] When asked to explain, the medico-legal officer opined that the erythema or reddening on the
left labia could have been caused by tight underwears and the hymenal lacerations could have been sustained
more than seven days prior to examination or several days before the alleged rape happened.[37]

In light of the foregoing circumstances coupled with complainants admission that her legs were closed all
the time she was inside the motel, [38]the fact that she did not try to escape although a second assault was very
likely, did not try to shout for help and instead, waited for Bambilla to return, effectively contradict the
protestation of complainant that she was raped. If there was sexual intercourse, evidence is utterly wanting to
show that the same was against her will.

Equally unaffirmable is the lower courts finding that all the three appellants conspired together to forcibly
abduct complainant Eng against her will and to bring her to Inawa Lodge so that Bambilla could have carnal
knowledge with her. As sufficiently shown in the testimonies of the appellants, the fact that they were together
on January 31, 1990 was a mere coincidence. Malbogs presence in Dagupan City that morning was duly
explained by Rocky Cancino, his employer, who attested under oath that he sent Malbog to Dagupan City on
that day to buy spare parts for his delivery truck. The presence of Viernes in the same place was likewise
adequately explained by his mother, Maria Viernes, who recounted that her said son accompanied her to
Dagupan City upon her request.

While the Court has, time and again, stressed that if a woman states that she was raped, she in effect
says all there is to show that she was indeed raped, experience has also shown that it is not at all impossible
that unfounded charges of rape may be proffered by women who are actuated by some sinister, ulterior or
undisclosed motive.[39]

And as held by this Court in the case of People vs. Alvario,[40] judges must free themselves of the natural
tendency to be overprotective of every woman decrying her having been sexually abused, and demanding
punishment for the abuser. While they ought to be cognizant of the anguish and humiliation the rape victim
goes through as she demands justice, judges should equally bear in mind that their responsibility is to render
justice according to law.[41]

Where the inculpatory facts and circumstances are susceptible of two or more interpretations, one of
which is consistent with the innocence of the accused while the others may be compatible with the finding of
guilt, the court must acquit the accused because the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty
required for conviction.[42]

In the case under review, the prosecution has not proven beyond reasonable doubt that appellants
Salvador Bambilla, Amado Viernes and Ninoy Malbog forcibly abducted complainant Estela Eng y Ulalan,
brought her to the Inawa Lodge and had carnal knowledge with her. With the inability of the prosecution to
discharge its burden of proof, the presumption of innocence in favor of appellants prevails and therefore,
pursuant to law all the three appellants are entitled to acquittal.

Once again, the Court has occasion to quote what Alfonso El Sabio was reputed to have said a long time
ago [m]as vale que queden sin castigar diez reos presuntos, que se castigue uno inocente.[44]
[43]

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of conviction is REVERSED, and on the ground of reasonable
doubt, appellants Saturnino Malbog, Amado Viernes* and Salvador Bambilla are hereby ACQUITTED of the
crime charged.

The Director of Prisons, National Bureau of Prison, Muntinlupa City, is ordered to cause the immediate
release of appellants unless there be any other legal ground for their continued detention, and to report to this
Court within ten (10) days the action taken under the premises. With costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
JENNY TUMAMBING y TAMAYO, Appellant.

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

This case is about how the credibility of the rape victims identification of her attacker often depends on her
spontaneous actions and behavior following the rape.

The Facts and the Case

The city prosecutor charged the accused Jenny Tumambing (Tumambing) with rape in Criminal Case 04-
227897 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila.

DK,1 the complainant, testified that at around 2:00 a.m. on June 26, 2004 she went to sleep, leaving the lights
on, at her cousins rented room. She was startled when somebody entered the room after she had turned off
the lights. The intruder, a man, poked a knife at DK and threatened to kill her if she made any noise. He
removed DKs clothes and undressed himself. He then succeeded in ravishing her. When the man was about
to leave, DK turned the light on and she saw his face. DK recognized him as the same person who passed by
her cousins room several times in the afternoon of the previous day, June 25, 2004. Later, she identified the
accused Jenny Tumambing as her rapist.

On June 27, 2004 the doctor who examined DK found no bruises, hematoma, or any sign of resistance on her
body but found several fresh lacerations on her genitals.

Tumambing denied committing the crime. He claimed that on June 26, 2004 he slept at the house of his
employer, Nestor Ledesma. He went to bed at about 9:00 p.m. and woke up at 6:00 a.m. Tumambing swore
that he never left his employers house that night. Ledesma corroborated his story. Barangay officials
summoned Tumambing and he went, thinking that it had something to do with a bloodletting campaign. He was
shocked, however, when he learned that he had been suspected of having committed rape.

On June 27, 2006 the RTC found Tumambing guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The RTC also ordered him to indemnify DK
ofP50,000.00 and pay her P50,000.00 as moral damages.

On November 12, 2009 the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed in CA-G.R. CR-HC 02433 the decision of the RTC
in its entirety, prompting Tumambing to appeal to this Court.

The Issue Presented

The sole issue presented in this case is whether or not the CA and the trial court erred in finding that accused
Tumambing raped DK under the circumstances she mentioned.

The Ruling of the Court

A successful prosecution of a criminal action largely depends on proof of two things: the identification of the
author of the crime and his actual commission of the same. An ample proof that a crime has been committed
has no use if the prosecution is unable to convincingly prove the offenders identity. The constitutional
presumption of innocence that an accused enjoys is not demolished by an identification that is full of
uncertainties.2
Here, both the RTC and the CA gave credence to DKs testimony. They maintained that DK categorically and
positively identified her rapist. The CA invoked People v. Reyes3 where the Court ruled that it would be easy for
a person who has once gained familiarity with the appearance of another to identify the latter even from a
considerable distance.4 Ordinarily, the Court would respect the trial court and the CAs findings regarding the
credibility of the witnesses.5 But the courts mentioned appear to have overlooked or misinterpreted certain
critical evidence in the case. This compels the Court to take a look at the same.6

DKs identification of accused Tumambing as her rapist is far from categorical. The Courts reading of her
testimony shows that she was quite reluctant at the beginning but eventually pointed to him when it was
suggested that it might be him after all. Several witnesses attested to DKs uncertainties regarding the rapists
identity when the barangay chairman arranged for her to meet Tumambing. PO2 Crispulo Frondozo, one of the
apprehending officers, testified as follows:

Q: Now in the barangay, do you have any occasion to see whether the complainant pinpointed accused as the
person who abused her person?

A: No, Sir.

Q: What about in any precinct or agency, do you have any occasion to see complainant positively identified the
accused?

A: No, Sir.7

Pedrito Yacub, Sr., the Barangay Chairman to whom DK initially reported the incident testified:

Q: When the accused enter the barangay hall upon invitation, what happened next?

A: Correction Sir. Not at the barangay hall. In my residence.

Q: Then what happened?

A: He was surprised and [I] told him that he is a suspect of rape and his reply was "akala ko pakukunan niyo
ako ng dugo."

Q: What was the reaction of the accused?

A: As we sat down in a table, a confrontation ensued. I assured the complainant. Don't be afraid. Tell me. I will
protect you.

I called her two cousins. Then she stare upon the suspect. I ordered the suspect to turn left, right and
backways.

Q: After you told the suspect to pose left, right and backways, what happened next?

A: The suspect told the complainant "huwag kang magtuturo. Ninenerbyus na ako." So she could not pinpoint
the suspect.

I said, "Iha, [i]to ba?" But she cannot point to.8 (Underscoring supplied)

DKs above behavior during her initial confrontation with accused Tumambing gives the Court no confidence
that, as she claimed in her testimony, she was familiar with the looks of her rapist because she saw him on the
previous day as he passed by her cousins rented room many times. If this were the case, her natural reaction
on seeing Tumambing would have been one of outright fury or some revealing emotion, not reluctance in
pointing to him despite the barangay chairmans assurance that he would protect her if she identified him. In
assessing the testimony of a wronged woman, evidence of her conduct immediately after the alleged assault is
of critical value.9

The barangay chairman continued:

Q: As barangay captain who has the duty to enforce law and city ordinances, you came to know that there
were other suspect, what did you do?

A: I invited the suspect.

Q: Do you remember the person whom you invited known as the second suspect?

A: His name is Alvin Quiatcho. For confrontation with the complainant. And confrontation ensued between her
and the suspect. I asked her is this the suspect?

Q: What was her answer?

A: She said, she could not recall. Chairman pa doctor kaya natin siya. It mean[s] "makunan ng cells."

The complainant told me chairman padoktor natin [sic] na lang natin siya.

Q: Presumably to get some sperm?

A: Yes, Sir.

Q: What did you do if any with the suggestion of [DK]?

A: I told the complainant, it would be difficult to do.

Q: After that what happened?

A: So since she could not pinpoint also the other suspect, I released the other suspect. She could not
pinpoint.10(Underscoring supplied)

That DK wanted the sperm of Alvin Quiatcho (Quiatcho), the second suspect, tested and presumably
compared with that found in her clearly indicates that she entertained the possibility that it was Quiatcho, rather
than accused Tumambing, who raped her. The Court cannot thus accept DKs testimony that she had been
familiar with the looks of the man who violated her and that she could not possibly be mistaken in identifying
him as Tumambing.

Crispin Dizon, the executive officer of the same barangay, corroborated the barangay chairmans testimony:

Q: So what was the question?

A: The question was that, "Is this the person you saw and who rape you?"

Court: Referring to?

Interpreter: Referring to Jenny Tumambing.

Q: What was the reply of the victim, if any?

A: She did not answer, Sir.

Q: What happen next when [DK] did not answer?

A: And [DK] was again asked by the Chairman and told her not to fear and tell who raped her and point
to him.

Q: What was the reply of [DK] if any?

A: She did not reply, Sir.

Q: Now if you remember how many times did the Chairman asked [DK]?

A: Four times, Sir.11

The RTC and the CA thought that DK was quite sure it was Tumambing who sexually attacked her. They
pointed out her insistence at the police precinct that it was Tumambing who really raped her and that she
positively identified him in open court. But this came about much later. The fact is that she did not refute the
testimonies given by neutral witnesses that she could not point to accused Tumambing as her rapist during
their initial confrontation at the barangay chairmans residence. These witnesses had no motive or reason to
fabricate a story for the defense.

By the nature of rape, the court has to, quite often, rely on the sole testimony of the victim.lawphi1 For this
reason, the court is always reminded to subject her testimony to a most rigid and careful scrutiny. It cannot
afford to overlook details that are essential to an understanding of the truth.12 Here, as shown above, DKs
testimony is anything but believable and consistent.

Although she categorically said on cross-examination that she saw her attacker enter the room,13 she did not
shout or raise an alarming call. Nor did she try to escape.14 She just lay in bed.15 In fact, she maintained that
position in bed even when her attacker was standing before her and removing his clothes.16 She did not shout
nor struggle when he penetrated her.17

There is one thing that DK appeared sure of. Her rapist wore a yellow shirt.18 But this is inconsistent with her
testimony that after the stranger in her room was done raping her, "bigla na lang po siyang lumabas x x
xsinundan ko siya ng tingin."19 Since DK did not say that the man put his clothes back on, it seems a certainty
that he collected his clothes and carried this out when he left the room. Since DK then turned on the light for
the first time, she had a chance to see him clearly. But, if this were so and he walked out naked, why was she
so certain that he wore a yellow shirt?

With such serious doubts regarding the true identity of DKs rapist, the Court cannot affirm the conviction of
accused Tumambing.

WHEREFORE, the Court SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 12, 2009 in CA-
G.R. CR-HC 02433 as well as the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 27, in Criminal Case
04-227897, and ACQUITS the accused-appellant Jenny Tumambing y Tamayo of the crime charged on the
ground of reasonable doubt. The Court orders his immediate RELEASE from custody unless he is being held
for some other lawful cause.
The Court further ORDERS the Director of the Bureau of Corrections to implement this Decision forthwith and
to inform this Court, within five days from receipt hereof, of the date appellant was actually released from
confinement. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO PAILANO, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Raul T. Montesino for accused-appellant.

CRUZ, J.:

At the time the rape was allegedly committed by the accused-appellant, he was already sixty-nine years
old. 1 The prosecution will have to contend not only with the presumption of innocence but also of impotence.

The crime was allegedly perpetrated in October of 1971 in Barrio Sampinit, Baybay in the City of Bago. 2 It was
reported to the authorities on December 24, 1971, 3 and the corresponding criminal complaint was filed on July
10, 1972. 4Judgment was rendered on January 30, 1976, sentencing the accused-appellant to reclusion
perpetua plus civil indemnity of P2,000 and the costs. 5 He now wants this decision reversed.

The complainant is Anita Ibaez, who was fifteen years old at the time of the alleged offense. She says that on
the day in question, she was dragged by the accused-appellant to a bushy place on the seashore where she
was waiting for her mother. She could not resist because he was threatening her with a scythe he was
carrying. In the bushes, be pointed the scythe at her neck and then forcibly took her. She could not cry out
because she was afraid. She did not report the matter to her mother because the accused-appellant bad
warned her he would kill her if she did. 6

The accused-appellant has a different version. He does not deny he had sexual intercourse with Anita, but he
insists it was voluntary. As a matter of fact, he says, it was the complainant who enticed him into the bushes,
where she wantonly opened herself to him. He was unable at first to have an erection because of his age. But
Anita herself rubbed his organ in hers until, thus stimulated, he succeeded in penetrating her. Afterwards,
noticing some people nearby who might have seen them, the girl put back her panty on and left. He followed a
few minutes later. 7

As the medical examination of the complainant was made more than two months afterwards, there naturally
could not be any finding of the bruises, cuts and scratches that usually attend forcible rape. But there was the
tell-tale hymeneal laceration in the complainant that even the accused-appellant could not dispute. 8

Given the choice between the separate accounts of the complainant and the accused-appellant, the court
inclines in favor of the latter. It is in our view more believable. Anita never spoke of any difficulty on the part of
Pailano in violating her. She simply said he removed her panty and entered her. No effort was mentioned; it
seemed she was talking of a vigorous stud. Yet, the accused-appellant was not a teenager or even only in the
prime of his life at the time of their sexual encounter. He was all of sixty-nine years old.

Considering his age and the emotional pressures of the moment, we doubt if Pailano could have accomplished
the rape as easily as Anita narrated it. The prosecution has not offered any proof of his sexual prowess, and
under stress at that. By contrast, the accused-appellant did not hesitate to testify, at the risk of his manly pride,
that he did not easily have an erection during the tryst with Anita and that it took some fondling from her before
his organ could respond. This was a hard and humiliating fact but it had to be admitted.

We are disposed to believe the testimony of Leonardo Filomeno that he saw Pailano and Anita coupling on the
day in question, 9 but not on the other previous occasions claimed by him. His presence in all of these
meetings seems too much of a coincidence to be credible. However, Pailano is also corroborated by Natividad
Madrigal, who declared she saw Anita and Pailano caressing each other, with the girl in fact assuming the
more aggressive role. 10 There is no reason not to believe this witness.

Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code provides that rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a
woman under any of the following circumstances:

1. By using force or intimidation;

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

3. When the woman is under twelve years of age, even though neither of the circumstances mentioned in the
two next preceding paragraphs shall be present.

The criminal complaint in this case alleged the commission of the crime through the first method although the
prosecution sought to establish at the trial that the complainant was a mental retardate. Its purpose in doing so
is not clear. But whatever it was, it has not succeeded.

If the prosecution was seeking to convict the accused-appellant on the ground that he violated Anita while she
was deprived of reason or unconscious, such conviction could not have been possible under the criminal
complaint as worded. This described the offense as having been committed by "Antonio Pailano, being then
provided with a scythe, by means of violence and intimidation, (who) did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the complainant, Anita Ibaez, 15 years of age, against her will." No
mention was made of the second circumstance.

Conviction of the accused-appellant on the finding that he had raped Anita while she was unconscious or
otherwise deprived of reason and not through force and intimidation, which was the method alleged would
have violated his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. 11 This right is
safeguarded by the Constitution to every accused so he can prepare an adequate defense against the charge
against him. Convicting him of a ground not alleged while he is concentrating his defense against the ground
alleged would plainly be unfair and underhanded. This right was, of course, available to the herein accused-
appellant.

In People v. Ramirez, 12 we held that a person charged with rape could not be found guilty of qualified
seduction, which had not been alleged in the criminal complaint against him. In the case of People v.
Montes, 13 the Court did not permit the conviction for homicide of a person held responsible for the suicide of
the woman he was supposed to have raped, as the crime he was accused of and acquitted was not homicide
but rape. More to the point is Tubb v. People of the Philippines, 14where the accused was charged with the
misappropriation of funds held by him in trust with the obligation to return the same under Article 315,
paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, but was convicted of swindling by means of false pretenses, under
paragraph 2(b) of the said Article, which was not alleged in the information. The Court said such conviction
would violate the Bill of Rights.

It may be argued that although initially deficient, the criminal complaint was deemed corrected when the
prosecution introduced evidence of the complainant's mental condition and the defense did not object, thereby
waiving the procedural defect. Even so, the charge has not been adequately establish established.

In the first place, the doctor who examined Anita reported that he saw no evidence of insanity in her family
history nor was there any indication of such condition in the complainant herself. 15 He did observe that she
had the mentality of a thirteen-year old, 16 which was not that serious an impediment as her age at the time
was only fifteen.
Secondly, and more importantly, the prosecution has not proved that during that encounter in the bushes,
Anita's mental condition was so weakened that she could not resist Pailano's supposed advances.

The statutory presumption of sanity 17 and the constitutional presumption of innocence 18 have not been
overcome. There is evidence that Filomeno reported the incident in the bushes on the same day to Anita's
mother, 19 but she took no action whatsoever, for reasons not disclosed. It was only two-and-a-half months later
that she decided to complain to the authorities, but then it was already suspiciously late. The only possible
explanation for her delay is that the liaison between her daughter and Pailano had already become a scandal
by that time and she must have thought she could redeem Anita's honor by initiating the criminal complaint.
The delay, however, blunts the charge of rape.

What we see here is an aging Lothario having his last lustful fling and a young girl with a rather weak mind and
a ripe body offering him a flaccid return to his youth. We do not mean to romanticize this sordid affair. It is
wrong and is not here excused, made light of, or dismissed. It is disdained for what it is an unseemly seduction
where it is not clear who the tempter and the tempted are although neither can really claim to be blameless.
But, in our view, it is definitely not rape.

WHEREFORE, the appealed conviction is REVERSED and the accused-appellant is ACQUITTED on

reasonable doubt. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 184170
Plaintiff-Appellee,

Present:

CORONA, C.J.,
-versus- Chairperson
VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
DEL CASTILLO, and
JERWIN QUINTAL y BEO, VICENTE PEREZ, JJ.
BONGAT y TARIMAN, FELIPE QUINTAL y
ABARQUEZ and LARRY PANTI y
JIMENEZ,
Accused.
Promulgated:
x------------------------x

VICENTE BONGAT y TARIMAN, February 2, 2011

Appellant.
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

On appeal is the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated 31 January 2008 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
02610 affirming the Decision[2]of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Fifth Judicial Region, Branch 42, Virac,
Catanduanes in Criminal Case Nos. 3097, 3098, 3099 and 3100 finding appellant Vicente Bongat y Tariman
(Vicente) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.

On 2 May 2001, appellant Vicente, together with 15-year old Jerwin Quintal y Beo (Jerwin), 16-year old
Felipe Quintal y Abarquez (Felipe) and Larry Panti y Jimenez (Larry) were charged in an Information for Rape
allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about August 29, 2002, at around 9:30 oclock in the evening, in barangay [XXX],
[3]
municipality of Virac, province of Catanduanes, Philippines, jurisdiction of the Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another
for a common purpose, with force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously lie and succeeded in having carnal knowledge of [AAA],[4] a minor 16 years of age,
against her will and without her consent.

That the crime of rape was committed with an aggravating circumstance of minority, the fact that
[AAA] is a minor 16 years of age when she was raped by the herein-named four (4) accused.[5]

Appellant Vicente, Jerwin and Felipe were arrested while Larry remained at large. Upon arraignment,
the accused pleaded not guilty.Trial then proceeded.
 The alleged rape victim, AAA, her mother, BBB, [6] the medico-legal officer, Dr. Elmer Tatad (Dr.
Tatad), Barangay KagawadFernando Tajan (Fernando) and Barangay Tanod Eddie Tajan (Eddie) testified for
the prosecution.

AAA narrated that on 29 August 2002 at around 9:45 p.m., she attended a wake in Barangay YYY,
[7]
Virac, Catanduanes. Upon leaving the wake to go to her grandmothers house in Barangay XXX, she noticed
that Jerwin was following her. AAA recognized Jerwin because they go to the same school. When she was
about to enter the house of her grandmother, Jerwin and Felipe, who were with a certain Maria, approached
AAA and invited her to attend a birthday party. AAA acceded and went with the trio towards Barangay ZZZ.
[8]
They went inside a dark nipa hut near a rice field and AAA saw Vicente and Larry thereat. AAA was then
made to sit on a bench by Felipe and the four accused went to converse with each other outside
the nipa hut. When the accused came back, they covered her mouth with a handkerchief, and tied her hands
and feet to the posts with a nylon string. The accused watched in delight while each of them took turns in
raping her. Jerwin ravished her twice while the rest of the accused raped her once. After they finished with
AAA, Jerwin untied her hands and feet. Vicente and Larry went home while Jerwin and Felipe accompanied
AAA to her grandmothers house.[9]

Two days later, AAA told BBB about the incident only after the latter noticed and asked her why she
could not walk properly. They went to Fernando, who is a Barangay Kagawad and later to Eddie, a Barangay
Tanod to report the incident. Fernando summoned the accused and they were made to sign a document
containing their statement regarding the incident.[10]
Eddie testified that on 1 September 2002, Jerwins parents came to him and expressed their intention
for their son, Jerwin to marry AAA. Appellant Vicente, Jerwin, Larry, Fernando, and BBB were also present at
the meeting. Eddie saw Fernando prepare a one and a half sheet of yellow paper containing the admissions
made by the accused that they raped AAA.[11]

BBB fetched Fernando and brought him to the house of Eddie to talk about a marriage proposal by
Jerwin. BBB asked Fernando to put into writing all the conversations that transpired inside the house. He did
so while BBB was dictating to him what to write. He stated that the accused admitted the crime.[12]

AAA and BBB then proceeded to the police station to report the incident. On 2 September 2002, they
went to the medico-legal and AAA was examined by Dr. Tatad, who later issued a medico-legal certificate
stating his findings as follow:

Abrasion Labia Minora

Round the Clock.[13]

For its part, the defense presented the testimonies of Jerwin, Felipe, appellant Vicente, Maria Talan
(Maria), Ricardo Rin (Ricardo), and Federico Rey (Federico) to prove that there was no crime committed.
Jerwin, Felipe and Maria attended the wake of Federicos nephew in Barangay YYY on 29 August
2002 at around 7:00 p.m. While they were playing cards, AAA approached their table and sat beside Jerwin.
[14]
Federico saw AAA play with Jerwins group on the table.[15]They stayed at the wake until 11:00 p.m. As
Marias group was about to leave, AAA asked Jerwin if she could go with him. Jerwin then introduced AAA to
Maria as his girlfriend. While on their way home, Jerwin and AAA were trailing behind Maria and Felipe. At that
juncture, both Maria and Felipe saw Jerwin place his arm around the shoulders of AAA, while AAAs arm was
wrapped around the waist of Jerwin. Thereafter, AAA invited Maria to go to the dance with her and Jerwin in
another barangay. Maria turned down the invitation and went home. While Felipe was about to enter his house,
Jerwin called him and asked if he likes to go to the dance, but Felipe declined because he needed to drive his
pedicab on the following morning.[16]
Jerwin claimed that AAA was his girlfriend; that they had been together since 31 December 2001; and
that they had sexual intercourse for three (3) or four (4) times to date. He admitted that coming from the dance,
it was around 1 a.m. when they proceeded to a nipa hut inBarangay ZZZ where they had sexual intercourse.
Thereafter, they went to sleep. When Jerwin woke up the following morning, AAA had already left.[17]

On 30 August 2002, Jerwin saw AAA crying at the house of Maria. AAA told her that she was scolded
by her mother and grandmother when she arrived home in the morning. Jerwin suggested that he would talk to
BBB and let her know that he wants to marry AAA.[18]

Ricardo, who lives just a few meters away from the nipa hut where the alleged rape was committed,
stated that he did not notice any untoward incident that transpired in the nipa hut. He however admitted that he
went to sleep at around 10:30 p.m.[19]

Jerwin and Felipe went to the house of Eddie on 1 September 2002 when they were summoned by the
latter. Felipe saw the mother of Jerwin and AAA talking about marriage, but BBB did not consent to the
wedding. His co-accused were also present at Eddies house. Felipe denied raping AAA when he was
asked. Jerwin also denied raping AAA and replied that AAA was his girlfriend. [20] After a while, they all went
home. In 2004, Jerwin and Felipe were arrested for the crime of rape. [21] While Jerwin was detained, AAA
visited her several times.

Appellant Vicente came to know AAA when she was introduced to him by Jerwin as his girlfriend
sometime in January 2002. On 29 August 2002, appellant was harvesting rice at the back
of Catanduanes National High School from 7:00 a.m. until 4:45 p.m. He got home at4:50 p.m. and slept at 8:00
p.m. He woke up the following day at 6:30 a.m. On 30 August 2002, he was summoned to go to the house of
Eddie. Upon reaching the house, he saw the parents of Jerwin and AAA conversing about the wedding of
Jerwin and AAA. He was asked by Fernando if she raped AAA, but Vicente answered in the negative. He was
made to sign his name on a blank sheet of yellow paper by Fernando. [22] While in detention, Vicente saw AAA
visiting the jail house once.[23]

The defense also presented the entries in the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP)
logbook, certified by Jail Officer Bernardo Azansa to show that AAA visited Jerwin six (6) times in jail.[24]

On 16 November 2006, the RTC rendered judgment finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of rape. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds VICENTE T. BONGAT, JERWIN B. QUINTAL AND

FELIPE A. QUINTAL guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE in Criminal Case
Nos. 3097, 3098, 3099, 3100 and hereby sentences them as follows:
 1) Vicente T. Bongat is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua for each crime.

2) Appreciating the mitigating circumstance of minority, Jerwin B. Quintal is

sentenced to suffer the penalty of 12 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 14 years, 4 months
and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, for each crime.

3) Appreciating the mitigating circumstance of minority, Felipe A. Quintal is

sentenced to suffer the penalty of 12 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 14 years, 4 months
and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, for each crime.

Vicente T. Bongat, Jerwin B. Quintal and Felipe A. Quintal are ordered to individually pay
the private complainant [AAA] the amount ofP50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as
moral damages for each crime.

Pursuant to R.A. No. 9344, the judgment of conviction against Jerwin Quintal and Felipe
Quintal is suspended. The parents or guardians of Jerwin Quintal and Felipe Quintal; the Social
Worker of this Court, Nonita Manlangit; the Municipal Social Welfare Officer of Virac,
Catanduanes Josefina T. Ramirez, the Provincial Social Welfare Officer of Catanduanes Priscilla
T. Navar, the Director of Region V of the Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD) or his duly authorized representative; and the Head of the Social Services and
Counseling Division of DSWD or his duly authorized representative are enjoined to attend the
disposition conference on November 28, 2006 at 1:30 oclock in the afternoon.[25]

Jerwin and Felipe were both confined at the Home for Boys in Naga City for rehabilitation pursuant to
the ruling of the RTC.

The RTC found AAAs testimony as credible and rejected the sweetheart theory and alibi of the defense. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision.

Appellant filed a notice of appeal. On 29 September 2008, this Court required the parties to simultaneously
submit their respective supplemental briefs. Appellant manifested that he would merely adopt their appellant's
brief before the Court of Appeals.[26] The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Manifestation stating that
it would no longer file any supplemental briefs and instead adopt its appellee's brief filed on 31 August 2007.[27]

On 27 November 2009, the RTC ordered the dismissal of the cases against Jerwin and Felipe. The dispositive
portion reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing and upon the recommendation of the DSWD, the
cases against JICL Jerwin B. Quintal and JICL Felipe A. Quintal, whose sentence have been
suspended, are hereby DISMISSED.

Finding that the objective of the disposition measures has been fulfilled, the Court orders the
final discharge of the said JICL. Let a copy of this Order be furnished the Regional Office of the
Department of Social Welfare and Development, Baraguis, Legaspi City and Office of the
Regional Director of the Department of Social Welfare and Development, Home for Boys, Naga
City, for them to cause the discharge of JICL Jerwin B. Quintal and JICL Felipe A. Quintal and
their return to their respective families.

The Municipal Social Welfare Officer of Virac, Catanduanes is ordered to submit a periodic
report on both JICL within one (1) year after their discharge.[28]
In the main, appellant assails the credibility of AAAs testimony. He insists that it was impossible for AAA to
have clearly and positively identified him as one of the perpetrators considering that AAA claimed that it was
very dark inside the nipa hut where she was supposedly raped. Appellant assails the testimony of AAA that she
went with Jerwin to a place unknown to her, despite not personally knowing him.Appellant claims this
incredibility in her testimony created serious doubt as to the reliability of her allegations. Appellant argues that
contrary to AAAs allegations, there was no clear intent on her part to resist the alleged sexual acts. AAA failed
to shout for help. Neither did she present any proof of body injuries to clearly prove that she resisted the
alleged rape. Moreover, AAA told her mother about the incident only because the latter noticed her to have
been walking in an unusual manner. Appellant asserts that he should have been convicted only of simple
seduction as conspiracy was not proven among the accused.[29]
The OSG maintains that AAA positively identified appellant as one of the four rapists. It counters that the
visibility inside the nipa hut was not that poor as to render AAA incapable of seeing her rapists faces. AAA had
a good view of appellants face because the moonlight illuminated the surroundings. It contends that there is
nothing unusual when AAA voluntarily went with Jerwin and Felipe before she was raped. According to the
OSG, AAA had a false sense of security because the two accused were minors like her and were even
accompanied by another girl. The OSG avers that force and intimidation were employed against AAA because
her hands and feet were tied to the nipa huts posts during her ordeal. There is likewise no basis for the claim
that AAA did not immediately report the incident. When AAA saw her mother, she informed her at the earliest
possible opportunity. Finally, the OSG asserts that there is conspiracy among the accused in committing rape
considering their actions before, during and after raping AAA.

The gravamen of the offense of rape is sexual intercourse with a woman against her will or without her
consent.[30] Hence, the elements necessary to sustain a conviction in the crime of rape are: (1) that the
accused had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2) that said act was accomplished (a) through the use of
force or intimidation, or (b) when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or (c) when the
victim is under 12 years of age or is demented.[31]

The prosecution, with whom the burden of proof rests, seeks to establish these elements through the
testimonies of its witnesses, particularly that of the victims.

There is a plethora of cases which tend to disfavor the accused in a rape case by holding that when a
woman declares that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has been
committed and where her testimony passes the test of credibility the accused can be convicted on the basis
thereof.[32] A dangerous precedent as it may seem, there is however a guideline provided also by jurisprudence
in scrutinizing the testimony of the victim, namely: (a) while an accusation for rape can be made with facility, it
is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; (b) in view
of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the
complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (c) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or
fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence of the
defense.[33]
 Guided by these principles and upon a careful scrutiny of the records of this case, this Court is not
convinced beyond reasonable doubt that appellant, as well as the other accused, committed the crime of rape
against AAA.

The credibility of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, as well as the inconclusive medical
finding, tends to create doubt if AAA was indeed raped. The RTC and the Court of Appeals relied largely on the
testimony of AAA that she was raped. This Court is well aware of the rule that findings of trial court relative to
the credibility of the rape victim are normally respected and not disturbed on appeal, more so, if they are
affirmed by the appellate court. It is only in exceptional circumstances that this rule is brushed aside, such as
when the courts evaluation was reached arbitrarily, or when the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or
misapplied certain facts or circumstances of weight and substance which could affect the result of the case.
[34]
And one of these exceptions obtains in this case.

This Court cannot disregard this nagging doubt with respect to the credibility of AAAs testimony, the
inconsistencies in the testimonies of the barangay tanod and barangay kagawad, the purported confession put
into writing and signed by all the accused; and the subsequent incidents relating to the case.

First, AAA testified that she does not personally know Jerwin and Felipe. However, when the two allegedly
invited her to go with them to a party, she readily accepted the invitation and in fact, went with them. Moreover,
AAA was seen playing cards with Jerwin and his group in the wake, as testified by Maria, Felipe, Jerwin and
Federico.

Second, AAA recounted that the nipa hut where she was brought by the accused was very dark. And
yet, AAA readily identified Vicente and Larry inside the hut, as two of those who raped her. Incidentally, it was
unclear how AAA was able to identify Vicente and Larry because she was never asked, not by the prosecution
nor the defense, on how she came to know the two accused.

Third, the medical certificate only contained one finding, that there was a round-the-clock abrasion in the labia
minora. This is not at all conclusive nor corroborative to support the charge of rape. At most, this indicates that
AAA had sexual intercourse. We find the medical finding lacking in relation to the testimony of AAA on how she
was ravished by four men. Although a medical examination is not an indispensable element in a prosecution of
rape, it could have corroborated an otherwise vague and dubious testimony of the victim. In fact, Dr. Tatad
admitted that he only examined AAAs private parts based on her statement that she was raped, thus:

Q: Do you remember Doctor, the date when the examination was conducted?

A: 9/2/02, sir.

Q: That was on September 2, 2002?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Now, when the person of [AAA] came to you, what did you do?

A: She consulted me and told me that she was raped, sir.

 Q: And after informing that she was raped, what did you do?

A: I told her to lie down as if she was to deliver a child and I examined the vagina. There was
abrasion in the labia minora round the clock, sir.

Q: How about laceration?

A: There was an abrasion, sir.

Q: What might have caused that abrasion round the clock?

A: It could be that something was inserted, sir.

Q: What kind of object might have been inserted?

A: According to the patient, penis was inserted in her vagina.

Q: Did she tell you as to the number of penis which were inserted in her vagina?

A: According to the patient the penis inserted to her was pushed and pulled, sir.[35]

Furthermore, in her sworn statement before the police, AAA related that her mouth was injured. [36] She
also testified in court that her hands and feet were tied to a post by a nylon string. [37] Naturally, AAA would have
sustained injuries in her hands and feet. But all these injuries were never examined by the medico-legal officer
nor did AAA allege the existence of those injuries.

Fourth, AAAs belated reporting of the rape incident has relevance in this case, especially when it appears that
she really had no intention at all to inform her mother, not until the latter actually asked her why she was
walking in an unusual manner. AAA stated:
Q: You said a while ago that your mother discovered your unusual movement in the morning of
the following day of August 29, 2002, is that correct?

A: It was after two days when my mother noticed my unusual movement during the birthday of
my brother, sir.

Q: Did you not go out of the house of your grandmother on August 30, 2002?

A: No, sir.

Q: When your mother noticed your movement, what did she do?

A: She asked me, sir.

Q: After she asked you, what did she do?

A: She asked me why I was walking that way and I told her that I was raped, sir.[38]

Fifth, BBB allegedly went to the Barangay Kagawad and the Tanod, who happens to be her cousin, to report
the rape incidents. However, when Fernando and Eddie testified, they claimed that they were initially informed
by BBB about a marriage proposal by Jerwins parents. It was only during the meeting that they learned about
the alleged rape.
Sixth, to fuel further suspicion as to whether a rape incident actually transpired, BBB never bothered to ask
AAA about the whole incident.[39] She accepted AAAs testimony hook, line and sinker. In the same breadth, it
can be recalled that Eddie, the Barangay Tanod, testified that BBB dictated to him what was written in the
yellow paper which contained the supposed admissions of rape by the accused. Eddie did not appear to have
asked or interrogated the accused about the incident. Likewise, Dr. Tatad merely examined AAAs private parts
on the basis of her claim that she was raped.

Seventh, in an unusual twist, records show that AAA was seen visiting Jerwin in jail for at least six (6)
times. These incidents are documented in a logbook presented in court by the defense and which was not
refuted by the prosecution.

The combination of all these circumstances are more than sufficient to create a reasonable doubt as to
whether first, rape was actually committed and second, whether the accused were the perpetrators.

It is thus unnecessary to belabor the issues raised by the defense for it must be reiterated that conviction
always rests on the strength of the prosecutions evidence and not on the weakness of the defense.

For the reasons cited above, we are constrained to entertain reasonable doubt. Hence, we acquit.

WHEREFORE, appellant Vicente Bongat y TARIMAN is ACQUITTED based on reasonable doubt. He

is ordered RELEASEDunless he is being detained for some other lawful cause.

SO ORDERED.
JUNIE MALLILLIN Y. LOPEZ, G.R. No. 172953
Petitioner,

Present:

QUISUMBING, J.,
- versus - Chairperson,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
VELASCO, JR., and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, BRION, JJ.
Respondent.
Promulgated:

April 30, 2008

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION

TINGA, J.:

The presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions cannot by its lonesome overcome the
constitutional presumption of innocence. Evidence of guilt beyond reasonable doubt and nothing else can
eclipse the hypothesis of guiltlessness. And this burden is met not by bestowing distrust on the innocence of
the accused but by obliterating all doubts as to his culpability.

In this Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, Junie Malillin y Lopez (petitioner)
assails the Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals dated 27 January 2006 as well as its Resolution [3] dated 30 May
2006 denying his motion for reconsideration. The challenged decision has affirmed the Decision[4] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Sorsogon City, Branch 52[5] which found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of illegal possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride, locally known as shabu, a prohibited drug.

The antecedent facts follow.

On the strength of a warrant [6] of search and seizure issued by the RTC of Sorsogon City, Branch 52, a team of
five police officers raided the residence of petitioner in Barangay Tugos, Sorsogon City on 4 February
2003. The team was headed by P/Insp. Catalino Bolanos (Bolanos), with PO3 Roberto Esternon (Esternon),
SPO1 Pedro Docot, SPO1 Danilo Lasala and SPO2 Romeo Gallinera (Gallinera) as members. The
searchconducted in the presence of barangay kagawad
Delfin Licup as well as petitioner himself, his wife Sheila and his mother, Normaallegedly yielded two (2) plastic
sachets of shabu and five (5) empty plastic sachets containing residual morsels of the said substance.

Accordingly, petitioner was charged with violation of Section 11, [7] Article II of Republic Act No. 9165,
otherwise known as The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, in a criminal information
whose inculpatory portion reads:

That on or about the 4th day of February 2003, at about 8:45 in the morning in
Barangay Tugos, Sorsogon City, Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control two (2) plastic
sachets of methamphetamine hydrochloride [or] shabu with an aggregate weight of 0.0743
gram, and four empty sachets containing shabu residue, without having been previously
authorized by law to possess the same.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[8]

Petitioner entered a negative plea.[9] At the ensuing trial, the prosecution presented Bolanos, Arroyo
and Esternon as witnesses.

Taking the witness stand, Bolanos, the leader of the raiding team, testified on the circumstances
surrounding the search as follows: that he and his men were allowed entry into the house by petitioner after the
latter was shown the search warrant; that upon entering the premises, he ordered Esternon
and barangay kagawad Licup, whose assistance had previously been requested in executing the warrant, to
conduct the search; that the rest of the police team positioned themselves outside the house to make sure that
nobody flees; that he was observing the conduct of the search from about a meter away; that the search
conducted inside the bedroom of petitioner yielded five empty plastic sachets with suspected shabu residue
contained in a denim bag and kept in one of the cabinets, and two plastic sachets containing shabu which fell
off from one of the pillows searched by Esternona discovery that was made in the presence of petitioner. [10] On
cross examination, Bolanosadmitted that during the search, he was explaining its progress to petitioners
mother, Norma, but that at the same time his eyes were fixed on the search being conducted by Esternon.[11]

Esternon testified that the denim bag containing the empty plastic sachets was found behind the door of
the bedroom and not inside the cabinet; that he then found the two filled sachets under a pillow on the bed and
forthwith called on Gallinera to have the items recorded and marked. [12] On cross, he admitted that it was he
alone who conducted the search because Bolanos was standing behind him in the living room portion of the
house and that petitioner handed to him the things to be searched, which included the pillow in which the two
sachets ofshabu were kept;[13] that he brought the seized items to the Balogo Police Station for a true inventory,
then to the trial court[14] and thereafter to the laboratory.[15]
 Supt. Lorlie Arroyo (Arroyo), the forensic chemist who administered the examination on the seized
items, was presented as an expert witness to identify the items submitted to the laboratory. She revealed that
the two filled sachets were positive of shabu and that of the five empty sachets, four were positive of
containing residue of the same substance.[16] She further admitted that all seven sachets were delivered to the
laboratory by Esternon in the afternoon of the same day that the warrant was executed except that it was not
she but rather a certain Mrs. Ofelia Garcia who received the items from Esternon at the laboratory.[17]

The evidence for the defense focused on the irregularity of the search and seizure conducted by the
police operatives. Petitioner testified that Esternon began the search of the bedroom with Licup and petitioner
himself inside. However, it was momentarily interrupted when one of the police officers declared
to Bolanos that petitioners wife, Sheila, was tucking something inside her underwear. Forthwith, a lady officer
arrived to conduct the search of Sheilas body inside the same bedroom. At that point, everyone except
Esternon was asked to step out of the room. So, it was in his presence that Sheila was searched by
the lady officer. Petitioner was then asked by a police officer to buy
cigarettes at a nearby store and when he returned from the errand, he was told that nothing was found on
Sheilas body.[18] Sheila was ordered to transfer to the other bedroom together with her children.[19]

Petitioner asserted that on his return from the errand, he was summoned by Esternon to the bedroom
and once inside, the officer closed the door and asked him to lift the mattress on the bed. And as he was doing
as told, Esternon stopped him and ordered him to lift the portion of the headboard. In that instant, Esternon
showed him sachet of shabu which according to him came from a pillow on the bed. [20] Petitioners account in
its entirety was corroborated in its material respects by Norma, barangay kagawad Licup and Sheila in their
testimonies. Norma and Sheila positively declared that petitioner was not in the house for the entire duration of
the search because at one point he was sent by Esternon to the store to buy cigarettes while Sheila was being
searched by the lady officer.[21] Licup for his part testified on the circumstances surrounding the discovery of the
plastic sachets. He recounted that after the five empty sachets were found, he went out of the bedroom and
into the living room and after about three minutes, Esternon, who was left inside the bedroom, exclaimed that
he had just found two filled sachets.[22]

On 20 June 2004 the trial court rendered its Decision declaring petitioner guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the offense charged.Petitioner was condemned to prison for twelve years (12) and one (1) day to
twenty (20) years and to pay a fine of P300,000.00.[23] The trial court reasoned that the fact that shabu was
found in the house of petitioner was prima facie evidence of petitioners animus possidendisufficient to convict
him of the charge inasmuch as things which a person possesses or over which he exercises acts of ownership
are presumptively owned by him. It also noted petitioners failure to ascribe ill motives to the police officers to
fabricate charges against him.[24]

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal. [25] In his Appeal Brief[26] filed with the Court of Appeals,
petitioner called the attention of the court to certain irregularities in the manner by which the search of his
house was conducted. For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) advanced that on the contrary, the
prosecution evidence sufficed for petitioners conviction and that the defense never advanced any proof to
show that the members of the raiding team was improperly motivated to hurl false charges against him and
hence the presumption that they had regularly performed their duties should prevail.[27]

On 27 January 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision affirming the judgment of the
trial court but modifying the prison sentence to an indeterminate term of twelve (12) years as minimum to
seventeen (17) years as maximum.[28] Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the same was denied by the
appellate court.[29] Hence, the instant petition which raises substantially the same issues.

In its Comment,[30] the OSG bids to establish that the raiding team had regularly performed its duties in
the conduct of the search.[31]It points to petitioners incredulous claim that he was framed up by Esternon on the
ground that the discovery of the two filled sachets was made in his and Licups presence. It likewise notes that
petitioners bare denial cannot defeat the positive assertions of the prosecution and that the same does not
suffice to overcome the prima facie existence of animus possidendi.

This argument, however, hardly holds up to what is revealed by the records.

Prefatorily, although the trial courts findings of fact are entitled to great weight and will not be disturbed
on appeal, this rule does not apply where facts of weight and substance have been overlooked,
misapprehended or misapplied in a case under appeal.[32] In the case at bar, several circumstances obtain
which, if properly appreciated, would warrant a conclusion different from that arrived at by the trial court and
the Court of Appeals.

Prosecutions for illegal possession of prohibited drugs necessitates that the elemental act of
possession of a prohibited substance be established with moral certainty, together with the fact that the same
is not authorized by law. The dangerous drug itself constitutes the verycorpus delicti of the offense and the fact
of its existence is vital to a judgment of conviction. [33] Essential therefore in these cases is that the identity of
the prohibited drug be established beyond doubt. [34] Be that as it may, the mere fact of unauthorized
possession will not suffice to create in a reasonable mind the moral certainty required to sustain a finding of
guilt. More than just the fact of possession, the fact that the substance illegally possessed in the first place is
the same substance offered in court as exhibit must also be established with the same unwavering exactitude
as that requisite to make a finding of guilt. The chain of custody requirement performs this function in that it
ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.[35]

As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an
exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent
claims it to be.[36] It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked
up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would
describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness
possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in
the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no
change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the
same.[37]

While testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it is almost always
impossible to obtain, an unbroken chain of custody becomes indispensable and essential when the item of real
evidence is not distinctive and is not readily identifiable, or when its condition at the time of testing or trial is
critical, or when a witness has failed to observe its uniqueness. [38] The same standard likewise obtains in case
the evidence is susceptible to alteration, tampering, contamination[39] and even substitution and exchange.[40] In
other words, the exhibits level of susceptibility to fungibility, alteration or tamperingwithout regard to whether
the same is advertent or otherwise notdictates the level of strictness in the application of the chain of custody
rule.
 Indeed, the likelihood of tampering, loss or mistake with respect to an exhibit is greatest when the
exhibit is small and is one that has physical characteristics fungible in nature and similar in form to substances
familiar to people in their daily lives. [41] Graham vs. State[42]positively acknowledged this danger. In that case
where a substance later analyzed as heroinwas handled by two police officers prior to examination who
however did not testify in court on the condition and whereabouts of the exhibit at the time it was in their
possessionwas excluded from the prosecution evidence, the court pointing out that the white powder seized
could have been indeed heroin or it could have been sugar or baking powder. It ruled that unless the state can
show by records or testimony, the continuous whereabouts of the exhibit at least between the time it came into
the possession of police officers until it was tested in the laboratory to determine its composition, testimony of
the state as to the laboratorys findings is inadmissible.[43]

A unique characteristic of narcotic substances is that they are not readily identifiable as in fact they are
subject to scientific analysis to determine their composition and nature. The Court cannot reluctantly close its
eyes to the likelihood, or at least the possibility, that at any of the links in the chain of custody over the same
there could have been tampering, alteration or substitution of substances from other casesby accident or
otherwisein which similar evidence was seized or in which similar evidence was submitted for laboratory
testing. Hence, in authenticating the same, a standard more stringent than that applied to cases involving
objects which are readily identifiable must be applied, a more exacting standard that entails a chain of custody
of the item with sufficient completeness if only to render it improbable that the original item has either been
exchanged with another or been contaminated or tampered with.

A mere fleeting glance at the records readily raises significant doubts as to the identity of the sachets
of shabu allegedly seized from petitioner. Of the people who came into direct contact with the seized objects,
only Esternon and Arroyo testified for the specific purpose of establishing the identity of the
evidence. Gallinera, to whom Esternon supposedly handed over the confiscated sachets for recording and
marking, as well as Garcia, the person to whom Esternon directly handed over the seized items for chemical
analysis at the crime laboratory, were not presented in court to establish the circumstances under which they
handled the subject items. Any reasonable mind might then ask the question: Are the sachets
of shabu allegedly seized from petitioner the very same objects laboratory tested and offered in court as
evidence?

The prosecutions evidence is incomplete to provide an affirmative answer. Considering that it

was Gallinera who recorded and marked the seized items, his testimony in court is crucial to affirm whether the
exhibits were the same items handed over to him by Esternon at the place of seizure and acknowledge the
initials marked thereon as his own. The same is true of Garcia who could have, but nevertheless failed, to
testify on the circumstances under which she received the items from Esternon, what she did with them during
the time they were in her possession until before she delivered the same to Arroyo for analysis.
 The prosecution was thus unsuccessful in discharging its burden of establishing the identity of the
seized items because it failed to offer not only the testimony of Gallinera and Garcia but also any sufficient
explanation for such failure. In effect, there is no reasonable guaranty as to the integrity of the exhibits
inasmuch as it failed to rule out the possibility of substitution of the exhibits, which cannot but inure to its own
detriment. This holds true not only with respect to the two filled sachets but also to the five sachets allegedly
containing morsels of shabu.

Also, contrary to what has been consistently claimed by the prosecution that the search and seizure
was conducted in a regular manner and must be presumed to be so, the records disclose a series of
irregularities committed by the police officers from the commencement of the search of petitioners house until
the submission of the seized items to the laboratory for analysis. The Court takes note of
the unrebuttedtestimony of petitioner, corroborated by that of his wife, that prior to the discovery of the two
filled sachets petitioner was sent out of his house to buy cigarettes at a nearby store. Equally telling is the
testimony of Bolanos that he posted some of the members of the raiding team at the door of petitioners house
in order to forestall the likelihood of petitioner fleeing the scene. By no stretch of logic can it be conclusively
explained why petitioner was sent out of his house on an errand when in the first place the police officers were
in fact apprehensive that he would flee to evade arrest. This fact assumes prime importance because the two
filled sachets were allegedly discovered by Esternon immediately after petitioner returned to his house from the
errand, such that he was not able to witness the conduct of the search during the brief but crucial interlude that
he was away.

It is also strange that, as claimed by Esternon, it was petitioner himself who handed to him the items to
be searched including the pillow from which the two filled sachets allegedly fell. Indeed, it is contrary to
ordinary human behavior that petitioner would hand over the said pillow to Esternon knowing fully well that
illegal drugs are concealed therein. In the same breath, the manner by which the search of Sheilas body was
brought up by a member of the raiding team also raises serious doubts as to the necessity thereof. The
declaration of one of the police officers that he saw Sheila tuck something in her underwear certainly diverted
the attention of the members of petitioners household away from the search being conducted by Esternon prior
to the discovery of the two filled sachets. Lest it be omitted, the Court likewise takes note
of Esternons suspicious presence in the bedroom while Sheila was being searched by a lady officer. The
confluence of these circumstances by any objective standard of behavior contradicts the prosecutions claim of
regularity in the exercise of duty.

Moreover, Section 21[44] of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 9165 clearly outlines
the post-seizure procedure in taking custody of seized drugs. In a language too plain to require a different
construction, it mandates that the officer acquiring initial custody of drugs under a search warrant must conduct
the photographing and the physical inventory of the item at the place where the warrant has been
served. Esternon deviated from this procedure. It was elicited from him that at the close of the search of
petitioners house, he brought the seized items immediately to the police station for the alleged purpose of
making a true inventory thereof, but there appears to be no reason why a true inventory could not be made in
petitioners house when in fact the apprehending team was able to record and mark the seized items and there
and then prepare a seizure receipt therefor. Lest it be forgotten, the raiding team has had enough opportunity
to cause the issuance of the warrant which means that it has had as much time to prepare for its
implementation. While the final proviso in Section 21 of the rules would appear to excuse non-compliance
therewith, the same cannot benefit the prosecution as it failed to offer any acceptable justification
forEsternons course of action.

Likewise, Esternons failure to deliver the seized items to the court demonstrates a departure from the
directive in the search warrant that the items seized be immediately delivered to the trial court with a true and
verified inventory of the same,[45] as required by Rule 126, Section 12 [46] of the Rules of Court. People
v. Go[47] characterized this requirement as mandatory in order to preclude the substitution of or tampering with
said items by interested parties.[48] Thus, as a reasonable safeguard, People vs. Del Castillo[49] declared that
the approval by the court which issued the search warrant is necessary before police officers can retain the
property seized and without it, they would have no authority to retain possession thereof and more so to deliver
the same to another agency.[50] Mere tolerance by the trial court of a contrary practice does not make the
practice right because it is violative of the mandatory requirements of the law and it thereby defeats the very
purpose for the enactment.[51]

Given the foregoing deviations of police officer Esternon from the standard and normal procedure in the
implementation of the warrant and in taking post-seizure custody of the evidence, the blind reliance by the trial
court and the Court of Appeals on the presumption of regularity in the conduct of police duty is manifestly
misplaced. The presumption of regularity is merely just thata mere presumption disputable by contrary proof
and which when challenged by the evidence cannot be regarded as binding truth. [52] Suffice it to say that this
presumption cannot preponderate over the presumption of innocence that prevails if not overthrown by proof
beyond reasonable doubt.[53] In the present case the lack of conclusive identification of the illegal drugs
allegedly seized from petitioner, coupled with the irregularity in the manner by which the same were placed
under police custody before offered in court, strongly militates a finding of guilt.

In our constitutional system, basic and elementary is the presupposition that the burden of proving the
guilt of an accused lies on the prosecution which must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the
weakness of the defense. The rule is invariable whatever may
be the reputation of the accused, for the law presumes his innocence unless and until the contrary is shown.
[54]
In dubio pro reo. When moral certainty as to culpability hangs in the balance, acquittal on reasonable doubt
inevitably becomes a matter of right.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 27 January 2006 affirming with
modification the judgment of conviction of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon City, Branch 52, and its
Resolution dated 30 May 2006 denying reconsideration thereof, are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Petitioner Junie Malillin y Lopez is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt and is accordingly ordered
immediately released from custody unless he is being lawfully held for another offense.

The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to implement this Decision and to report to this
Court the action taken hereon within five (5) days from receipt.

SO ORDERED.
PATRICIO DUMLAO, ROMEO B. IGOT, and ALFREDO SALAPANTAN, JR., petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

Raul M. Gonzales for petitioners

Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J:

This is a Petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order filed by petitioners, in their
own behalf and all others allegedly similarly situated, seeking to enjoin respondent Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) from implementing certain provisions of Batas Pambansa Big. 51, 52, and 53 for being
unconstitutional.

The Petition alleges that petitioner, Patricio Dumlao, is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, who has filed his
certificate of candidacy for said position of Governor in the forthcoming elections of January 30, 1980.
Petitioner, Romeo B. Igot, is a taxpayer, a qualified voter and a member of the Bar who, as such, has taken his
oath to support the Constitution and obey the laws of the land. Petitioner, Alfredo Salapantan, Jr., is also a
taxpayer, a qualified voter, and a resident of San Miguel, Iloilo.

Petitioner Dumlao specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as
discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution. Said
Section 4 provides:

Sec. 4. Special Disqualification in addition to violation of section 10 of Art. XI I-C of the

Constitution and disqualification mentioned in existing laws, which are hereby declared as
disqualification for any of the elective officials enumerated in section 1 hereof.

Any retired elective provincial city or municipal official who has received payment of the
retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law, and who shall have been 6,5 years of
age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected shall not be
qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner Dumlao alleges that the aforecited provision is directed insidiously against him, and that the
classification provided therein is based on "purely arbitrary grounds and, therefore, class legislation."

For their part, petitioners igot and Salapantan, Jr. assail the validity of the following statutory provisions:

Sec 7. Terms of Office Unless sooner removed for cause, all local elective officials
hereinabove mentioned shall hold office for a term of six (6) years, which shall commence on
the first Monday of March 1980.

.... (Batas Pambansa Blg. 51) Sec. 4.

Sec. 4. ...

Any person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the State, including acts amounting to
subversion, insurrection, rebellion or other similar crimes, shall not be qualified to be a
 candidate for any of the offices covered by this Act, or to participate in any partisan political
activity therein:

provided that a judgment of conviction for any of the aforementioned crimes shall be conclusive
evidence of such fact and

the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal
after preliminary investigation shall be prima fascie evidence of such fact.

... (Batas Pambansa Big. 52) (Paragraphing and Emphasis supplied).

Section 1. Election of certain Local Officials ... The election shall be held on January 30,
1980. (Batas Pambansa, Blg. 52)

Section 6. Election and Campaign Period The election period shall be fixed by the
Commission on Elections in accordance with Section 6, Art. XII-C of the Constitution. The period
of campaign shall commence on December 29, 1979 and terminate on January 28, 1980. (ibid.)

In addition to the above-cited provisions, petitioners Igot and Salapantan, Jr. also question the accreditation of
some political parties by respondent COMELEC, as authorized by Batas Pambansa Blg. 53, on the ground that
it is contrary to section 9(1)Art. XIIC of the Constitution, which provides that a "bona fide candidate for any
public office shall be it. from any form of harassment and discrimination. "The question of accreditation will not
be taken up in this case but in that of Bacalso, et als. vs. COMELEC et als. No. L-52232) where the issue has
been squarely raised,

Petitioners then pray that the statutory provisions they have challenged be declared null and void for being
violative of the Constitution.

I . The procedural Aspect

At the outset, it should be stated that this Petition suffers from basic procedural infirmities, hence, traditionally
unacceptable for judicial resolution. For one, there is a misjoinder of parties and actions. Petitioner Dumlao's
interest is alien to that of petitioners Igot and Salapantan Petitioner Dumlao does not join petitioners Igot and
Salapantan in the burden of their complaint, nor do the latter join Dumlao in his. The respectively contest
completely different statutory provisions. Petitioner Dumlao has joined this suit in his individual capacity as a
candidate. The action of petitioners Igot and Salapantan is more in the nature of a taxpayer's suit. Although
petitioners plead nine constraints as the reason of their joint Petition, it would have required only a modicum
more of effort tor petitioner Dumlao, on one hand said petitioners lgot and Salapantan, on the other, to have
filed separate suits, in the interest of orderly procedure.

For another, there are standards that have to be followed inthe exercise of the function of judicial review,
namely (1) the existence of an appropriate case:, (2) an interest personal and substantial by the party raising
the constitutional question: (3) the plea that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity and (4) the
necessity that the constiutional question be passed upon in order to decide the case (People vs. Vera 65 Phil.
56 [1937]).

It may be conceded that the third requisite has been complied with, which is, that the parties have raised the
issue of constitutionality early enough in their pleadings.

This Petition, however, has fallen far short of the other three criteria.

A. Actual case and controversy.

It is basic that the power of judicial review is limited to the determination of actual cases and controversies.

Petitioner Dumlao assails the constitutionality of the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52,
quoted earlier, as being contrary to the equal protection clause guaranteed by the Constitution, and seeks to
prohibit respondent COMELEC from implementing said provision. Yet, Dumlao has not been adversely affected
by the application of that provision. No petition seeking Dumlao's disqualification has been filed before the
COMELEC. There is no ruling of that constitutional body on the matter, which this Court is being asked to
review on Certiorari. His is a question posed in the abstract, a hypothetical issue, and in effect, a petition for an
advisory opinion from this Court to be rendered without the benefit of a detailed factual record Petitioner
Dumlao's case is clearly within the primary jurisdiction (see concurring Opinion of now Chief Justice Fernando
in Peralta vs. Comelec, 82 SCRA 30, 96 [1978]) of respondent COMELEC as provided for in section 2, Art. XII-
C, for the Constitution the pertinent portion of which reads:

"Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall have the following power and functions:

1) xxx

2) Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all
members of the National Assembly and elective provincial and city officials. (Emphasis supplied)

The aforequoted provision must also be related to section 11 of Art. XII-C, which provides:

Section 11. Any decision, order, or ruling of the Commission may be brought to the Supreme
Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from his receipt of a copy thereof.

B. Proper party.

The long-standing rule has been that "the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal
and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement" (People vs. Vera, supra).

In the case of petitioners Igot and Salapantan, it was only during the hearing, not in their Petition, that Igot is
said to be a candidate for Councilor. Even then, it cannot be denied that neither one has been convicted nor
charged with acts of disloyalty to the State, nor disqualified from being candidates for local elective positions.
Neither one of them has been calle ed to have been adversely affected by the operation of the statutory
provisions they assail as unconstitutional Theirs is a generated grievance. They have no personal nor
substantial interest at stake. In the absence of any litigate interest, they can claim no locus standi in seeking
judicial redress.

It is true that petitioners Igot and Salapantan have instituted this case as a taxpayer's suit, and that the rule
enunciated in People vs. Vera, above stated, has been relaxed in Pascual vs. The Secretary of Public Works
(110 Phil. 331 [1960], thus:

... it is well settled that the validity of a statute may be contested only by one who will sustain a
direct injury in consequence of its enforcement. Yet, there are many decisions nullifying at the
instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of public funds, upon the theory that
"the expenditure of public funds, by an officer of the State for the purpose of administering an
unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds," which may be enjoined at the
request of a taxpayer.

In the same vein, it has been held:

 In the determination of the degree of interest essential to give the requisite standing to attack
the constitutionality of a statute, the general rule is that not only persons individually affected,
but also taxpayers have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of moneys raised
by taxation and they may, therefore, question the constitutionality of statutes requiring
expenditure of public moneys. (Philippine Constitution Association, Inc., et als., vs. Gimenez, et
als., 15 SCRA 479 [1965]).

However, the statutory provisions questioned in this case, namely, sec. 7, BP Blg. 51, and sections 4, 1, and 6
BP Blg. 52, do not directly involve the disbursement of public funds. While, concededly, the elections to be held
involve the expenditure of public moneys, nowhere in their Petition do said petitioners allege that their tax
money is "being extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional protections against abuses of
legislative power" (Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S., 83 [1960]), or that there is a misapplication of such funds by
respondent COMELEC (see Pascual vs. Secretary of Public Works, 110 Phil. 331 [1960]), or that public money
is being deflected to any improper purpose. Neither do petitioners seek to restrain respondent from wasting
public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. (Philippine Constitution Association
vs. Mathay, 18 SCRA 300 [1966]), citing Philippine Constitution Association vs. Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479
[1965]). Besides, the institution of a taxpayer's suit, per se is no assurance of judicial review. As held by this
Court in Tan vs. Macapagal (43 SCRA 677 [1972]), speaking through our present Chief Justice, this Court is
vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's suit should be entertained.

C. Unavoidability of constitutional question.

Again upon the authority of People vs. Vera, "it is a wellsettled rule that the constitutionality of an act of the
legislature will not be determined by the courts unless that question is properly raised and presented in
appropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of the case; i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be
the very lis mota presented."

We have already stated that, by the standards set forth in People vs. Vera, the present is not an "appropriate
case" for either petitioner Dumlao or for petitioners Igot and Salapantan. They are actually without cause of
action. It follows that the necessity for resolving the issue of constitutionality is absent, and procedural
regularity would require that this suit be dismissed.

II. The substantive viewpoint.

We have resolved, however, to rule squarely on two of the challenged provisions, the Courts not being entirely
without discretion in the matter. Thus, adherence to the strict procedural standard was relaxed in Tinio vs.
Mina(26 SCRA 512 [1968]); Edu vs. Ericta (35 SCRA 481 [1970]); and in Gonzalez vs. Comelec (27 SCRA 835
[1969]), the Opinion in the Tinio and Gonzalez cases having been penned by our present Chief Justice. The
reasons which have impelled us are the paramount public interest involved and the proximity of the elections
which will be held only a few days hence.

Petitioner Dumlao's contention that section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is discriminatory against him personally is belied by
the fact that several petitions for the disqualification of other candidates for local positions based on the
challenged provision have already been filed with the COMELEC (as listed in p. 15, respondent's Comment).
This tellingly overthrows Dumlao's contention of intentional or purposeful discrimination.

The assertion that Section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is contrary to the safer guard of equal protection is neither well
taken. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. If the
groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated differently
from another class. For purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age, have been validly classified
differently from younger employees. Employees attaining that age are subject to compulsory retirement, while
those of younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable.
In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require that candidates should not be more
than 65 years of age at the time they assume office, if applicable to everyone, might or might not be a
reasonable classification although, as the Solicitor General has intimated, a good policy of the law would be to
promote the emergence of younger blood in our political elective echelons. On the other hand, it might be that
persons more than 65 years old may also be good elective local officials.

Coming now to the case of retirees. Retirement from government service may or may not be a reasonable
disqualification for elective local officials. For one thing, there can also be retirees from government service at
ages, say below 65. It may neither be reasonable to disqualify retirees, aged 65, for a 65 year old retiree could
be a good local official just like one, aged 65, who is not a retiree.

But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official, who has retired from a provincial, city or municipal office,
there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had retired, as provided for in
the challenged provision. The need for new blood assumes relevance. The tiredness of the retiree for
government work is present, and what is emphatically significant is that the retired employee has already
declared himself tired and unavailable for the same government work, but, which, by virtue of a change of
mind, he would like to assume again. It is for this very reason that inequality will neither result from the
application of the challenged provision. Just as that provision does not deny equal protection neither does it
permit of such denial (see People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1933]). Persons similarly situated are sinlilarly treated.

In fine, it bears reiteration that the equal protection clause does not forbid all legal classification. What is
proscribes is a classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable. That constitutional guarantee is not violated
by a reasonable classification based upon substantial distinctions, where the classification is germane to the
purpose of the law and applies to all Chose belonging to the same class (Peralta vs. Comelec, 82 SCRA 30
[1978] citing Felwa vs. Salas, 18 SCRA 606 [1966]; Rafael v. Embroidery and Apparel Control and Inspection
Board, 21 SCRA 336 [1967]; Inchong etc., et al. vs. Hernandez 101 Phil. 1155 [1957]). The purpose of the law
is to allow the emergence of younger blood in local governments. The classification in question being pursuant
to that purpose, it cannot be considered invalid "even it at times, it may be susceptible to the objection that it is
marred by theoretical inconsistencies" (Chief Justice Fernando, The Constitution of the Philippines, 1977 ed.,
p. 547).

There is an additional consideration. Absent herein is a showing of the clear invalidity of the questioned
provision. Well accepted is the rule that to justify the nullification of a law, there must be a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and equivocal breach. Courts are practically unanimous
in the pronouncement that laws shall not be declared invalid unless the conflict with the Constitution is clear
beyond reasonable doubt (Peralta vs. COMELEC, 82 SCRA 55 [1978], citing Cooper vs. Telfair 4 Dall 14;
Dodd, Cases on Constitutional Law, 3rd ed. 1942, 56). Lastly, it is within the compentence of the legislature to
prescribe qualifications for one who desires to become a candidate for office provided they are reasonable, as
in this case.

In so far as the petition of Igot and Salapantan are concerned, the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 52, quoted in full earlier, and which they challenge, may be divided in two parts. The first
provides:

a. judgment of conviction jor any of the aforementioned crimes shall be conclusive evidence of
such fact ...

The supremacy of the Constitution stands out as the cardinal principle. We are aware of the presumption of
validity that attaches to a challenged statute, of the well-settled principle that "all reasonable doubts should be
resolved in favor of constitutionality," and that Courts will not set aside a statute as constitutionally defective
"except in a clear case." (People vs. Vera, supra). We are constrained to hold that this is one such clear case.
Explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent
until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel (Article IV, section 19,
1973 Constitution). An accusation, according to the fundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt. The
challenged proviso contravenes the constitutional presumption of innocence, as a candidate is disqualified
from running for public office on the ground alone that charges have been filed against him before a civil or
military tribunal. It condemns before one is fully heard. In ultimate effect, except as to the degree of proof, no
distinction is made between a person convicted of acts of dislotalty and one against whom charges have been
filed for such acts, as both of them would be ineligible to run for public office. A person disqualified to run for
public office on the ground that charges have been filed against him is virtually placed in the same category as
a person already convicted of a crime with the penalty of arresto, which carries with it the accessory penalty of
suspension of the right to hold office during the term of the sentence (Art. 44, Revised Penal Code).

And although the filing of charges is considered as but prima facie evidence, and therefore, may be rebutted,
yet. there is "clear and present danger" that because of the proximity of the elections, time constraints will
prevent one charged with acts of disloyalty from offering contrary proof to overcome the prima facie evidence
against him.

Additionally, it is best that evidence pro and con of acts of disloyalty be aired before the Courts rather than
before an administrative body such as the COMELEC. A highly possible conflict of findings between two
government bodies, to the extreme detriment of a person charged, will thereby be avoided. Furthermore, a
legislative/administrative determination of guilt should not be allowed to be substituted for a judicial
determination.

Being infected with constitutional infirmity, a partial declaration of nullity of only that objectionable portion is
mandated. It is separable from the first portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Big.
52 which can stand by itself.

WHEREFORE, 1) the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby declared valid. Said
paragraph reads:

SEC. 4. Special disqualification. In addition to violation of Section 10 of Article XII(C) of the

Constitution and disqualifications mentioned in existing laws which are hereby declared as
disqualification for any of the elective officials enumerated in Section 1 hereof, any retired
elective provincial, city or municipal official, who has received payment of the retirement benefits
to which he is entitled under the law and who shall have been 65 years of age at the
commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected, shall not be qualified to
run for the same elective local office from which he has retired.

2) That portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 providing
that "... the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military
tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact", is hereby
declared null and void, for being violative of the constitutional presumption of innocence
guaranteed to an accused.

SO ORDERED.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOSAN POBLADOR, defendant-appellant.

Jose Poblador for appellant.

Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor Reynato S. Puno and Solicitor Ramon A. Barcelona
for appellee.

FERNANDO, J.:

A rather unique feature of this prosecution for rape was the fact that the accused, a young man in his early
twenties, was alleged to have assaulted a woman in her middle forties, with eleven children, some of them
young girls above the age of puberty, right at a room in her house likewise occupied by another man, with her
husband and other members of the family in the immediate vicinity. It may be recalled that it was partly on the
basis of disparity in age that in People v. Mirasol, 1 Justice Recto acquitted a youth of twenty-four prosecuted at
the instance of a widow of thirty-six, her claim being that there was an attempt to have forcible intercourse with
her. That distinguished jurist found it "inexplicable why he had to set his eyes precisely on the complainant and
not on [the daughter] who, by reason of her youth and virginity, should excel her mother in point of exciting the
lust ... . " 2 Appellant Josan Poblador's fate was different, having been convicted of the crime of rape. He could
not quite convince the lower court that he was entitled to acquital, notwithstanding the weakness of the
evidence for the prosecution, the attendant circumstances moreover militating against his culpability. He could
therefore rely on the presumption of innocence. 3 It is understandable why that constitutional mandate would
be vigorously stressed in the Brief submitted by his counsel. Thereafter, on April 19 of this month, a
Manifestation in lieu of Brief was filed by Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza4 on behalf of the People of the
Philippines recommending "the reversal of the decision appealed from and the acquittal of the appellant on the
ground that his guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt, with costs de oficio." 5 He was quite
emphatic about the matter too: "Much as it is to be desired that the author of the alleged abominable offense,
were it committed, be penalized and given the corresponding punishment he deserves, punishing appellant
herein, who may be really innocent thereof, will not serve the ends of justice but rather subvert it, which is
worse than the crime itself." 6 A careful study of the evidence of record yields the same conclusion. We accept
such recommendation. The judgment of conviction, which moreover is tainted with unorthodoxy, appellant
being ordered to pay damages for defamation in the amount of P20,000.00, as well as the further sum of
P10,000.00 for exemplary damages, must be reversed.

The established facts about which there can be no conflict were set forth in the Manifestation of the Solicitor
General thus: "On the night of August 29, 1972, defendant [Josan Poblador] and [Jason Mateus] were riding on
a jeep driven by the latter on their way to the house of the former's second cousin, Abdon Bedro to [get]
fertilizer. However, the jeep went out of order about half a kilometer from their aforesaid destination and finally
stalled near the house of the spouses Dominador Baylon and Angelina Baylon at the barrio of Aglosong,
Concepcion, Iloilo, where at the time said spouses and their five children were asleep ... . As the jeep could not
be started and it was then about 10 o'clock, Poblador and Mateus were constrained to seek shelter and pass
the night in the aforestated house, where they were allowed to sleep in a room, the door of which had no
shutter ..., Poblador and Mateus left the house at about 5 o'clock the next morning but could not proceed to
their destination until 8 o'clock when they were able to start the jeep after pushing it to a distance of around
150 meters with the help of Dominador Baylon and three others, namely, Floro, Trinidad, Junior Balida and
Eliseo Obillos ... ." 7

After which the Manifestation discussed the conflicting versions as to what transpired. First came the summary
of the evidence for the prosecution. The facts testified to were set forth in a detailed and objective manner. It
was narrated that "Poblador and Mateus, both armed with guns, called on the house of the Baylons and on
entering it, Poblador asked where the latter's daughter Nenet was because he would marry her: that Angelina
Baylon replied that Nenet was in Iloilo City and that in any event he could not marry her as he was already
"married" or had a concubine, one Trining Piosca; that on hearing this remark of Angelina, Poblador [was
engaged], ordered the spouses Baylons to put out the light in the house and said, "Now that you sent Nenet to
Iloilo City, you sleep with me till morning" and, poking a gun on her chest, told her, Angelina, to come inside the
room, where Poblador and Mateus were to sleep, which she did out of fear ... ; that once Angelina was inside
the room, Poblador, without as much as kissing her or touching her breasts or any part of her body, pushed her
to the edge of a bed therein; that he ordered her to take off her shorts and panties, which she also did; that
thereafter Poblador ordered her to lie down on the bed, which she likewise complied with; that he then raised
her duster, placed himself on top of her and ravished her without any struggle on her part to defend her honor,
much less make any outcry for help, not only to her husband but also to the neighbors whose houses
surrounded the Baylons' house, because of fear as he had a gun ...; that having felt the urge to urinate, she
stood up and urinated; that thereafter, she turned to the bed and Poblador again [had intercourse with her]; that
she stayed the whole night with [him], save the time when her eight-month old still breast-fed baby cried, and
[he] told her to attend to the child ...; that Angelina's husband, who was in the sala near the door of the room
which had no shutter, did not do anything during the time his wife was being raped, which he was witnessing,
because Mateus was pointing his gun at him ...; that when his wife came out of the room to attend to the child,
he asked her if Poblador succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her ...; that although she replied in the
affirmative, he did not as much try to avenge the outrage to his wife's honor when Poblador and Mateus finally
fell asleep, because of fear that they might be just pretending ...; that Poblador, before leaving the house,
warned the spouses Baylons not to report the incident to the authorities, otherwise he would kill all of them;
that although Dominador Baylon, did not believe said threat, he did not report on the following day, the
nefarious crime to the barrio captain of Aglosong ...; that they reported the incident to Mayor Nerio Salcedo of
Concepcion, Iloilo, but he merely advised them to relax as it would not happen again ...; that Angelina Baylon's
complaint was not filed with the Court a quo by the Provincial Fiscal until August 26, 1974, or almost two (2)
years after, the commission of the offense." 8

Solicitor General Mendoza in his manifestation recommending acquittal stated that the evidence for the
defense is substantially "a denial of the charge of rape by defendant Poblador, a 24-year old bachelor, who
testified that he could not have embarrassed himself by having sexual intercourse with Angelina Baylon, an old
woman of about 45 years of age whom he respected, much less do it in the presence of her husband,
Dominador Baylon ...; that he could not have forced her to have coition with him at the point of a gun, because
he did not own a gun; that he was taken aback by the instant charge, which he later learned from Angelina
herself that did so at the instigation and pressure made to bear on her by the CIS and one Conte Baldoza who
suspected him of having been the one who killed the latter's son, so that he, Poblador, could be jailed; that had
he desired to have sexual intercourse, he would have gone to Iloilo City for the said purpose: and that
Teodorico Piosca, the father of his common-law wife, Ofelia, likewise urged her, Angelina, to prosecute this
unfounded charged for spite, because Teodorico was mad at him as he did not approve of his cohabiting with
his daughter Ofelia Piosca. ...." 9

It is thus easily understandable why counsel for appellant in the able brief 10 he submitted was quite vehement
in his denunciation of the decision rendered by the lower court. It is a fair appraisal that the guilt of his client
was not shown beyond reasonable doubt. The constitutional presumption of innocence was thus not
overcome. The Solicitor General, after a thorough study of the record, reached the same conclusion. It could
not be otherwise. He had to recommend the acquittal of appellant. As mentioned at the outset, we are in
agreement.

1. The evidence for the prosecution, to put it at its mildest, leaves much to be desired. There was a failure to
live up to the moral certainty as to the guilt of an accused being shown to justify his conviction. As stated
in People v. Dramayo: 11 "The proof against him survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be
permitted to sway judgment." 12 It would appear that the lower court did not pay due heed to such admonition,
which is merely a reiteration of a host of decisions with a similar approach. That is as it should be. To view it
differently would result in rendering illusory the constitutional mandate that an accused is presumed innocent.
There must be proof beyond reasonable doubt. Failing that, he must be acquitted. "Accusation," to quote from
Dramayo anew, "is not, according to the fundamental law, synonymous with guilt. It is incumbent on the
prosecution to demonstrate that culpability lies." 13 The lower court, in considering the version of the
prosecution, failed to exhibit that requisite measure of objectivity and detachment. It could be that the natural
sympathy for a woman claiming to have been the victim of a man's lustful desires and the abhorrence such as
an act provokes led him astray. Not so the Solicitor General, who is in his Manifestation took pains to point out
the lack of credibility of the version for the prosecution, which he characterized as "fantastic" as well sa the
contradictions and inconsistencies that vitiated it. 14 He did not stop there. He went further. He mentioned other
circumstances, the fact that the previous relationship between the appellant and the Baylons was
characterized by respect and deference on the part of the former; that if it were a case of the former's wanting
to satisfy his carnal desire, he could have, as he testified, gone to Iloilo City, and there indulged such proclivity;
that if he had committed an outrage on the Baylons, the husband certainly would have refrained from helping
appellant push his jeep to make it start; that it was rather strange that the Baylons failed to report such
occurrence at the earliest possible opportunity, the complaint being filed with the Provincial Fiscal of Iloilo City
on August 26, 1974, or almost two years after the perpetration of the alleged offense. 15 The recommendation,
considering the above, had to be one acquittal.

2. On a specific level, to refer to our decisions where the offense charged is rape, it is not amiss to
recall People v. Delfinado, 16 the opinion being penned by Justice Recto. After a careful examination of
previous cases starting fromUnited States v. Flores, 17 promulgated as early as 1906, he stated that it could be
laid down as a general rule that a judgment of conviction for the crime of rape cannot be based on the
testimony of the offended party unless such testimony is "clear, positive and convincing, or supported by other
undisputed facts and strong circumstantial evidence disclosed by the record." 18 In support of such a holding,
he cited in addition to Flores, United States v. De la Paz; 19 United States v. Magsisi; 20 United States v. Tan
Teng; 21 and United States v. Ramos. 22 He did affirm that in the above decisions, "the accused were acquitted
because the only evidence of their guilt was the uncorroborated, contradictory, and unconvincing testimony of
the alleged victims." 23 Then came this citation from the United States v. Ramos: "The mere apparent
improbability that the alleged crime could have been committed in the manner and form described by the
witnesses for the prosecution does not necessarily justify an acquittal if the evidence submitted by the
prosecution is otherwise clear, satisfactory and convincing, unless the degree of improbability is such as to
amount to a practical impossibility but in the absence of a clear, satisfactory and convincing testimony in
support of the charge, a judgment of conviction will not be sustained in the face of the apparent improbability
that the crime could have been committed as charged." 24 There is no need to reiterate that appellant's position
is much stronger considering the strain on human credulity posed by the testimony of complainant. What is
undoubted is the absence of clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence against appellant. In recommending
acquittal, the Solicitor General's position has the clear support of authoritative doctrines. Moreover, it is
bolstered by decisions of the past three years where the constitution presumption of innocence sufficed to call
for acquittal in rape prosecutions. Mention may be made of People v. Alvarez; 25 People v. Barbo; 26 People v.
Castro; 27 People v. Reyes;28 People v. Joven; 29 People v. Ilagan; 30 People v. Ramirez; 31 People v.
Godoy;32 People v. Lopez; 33 andPeople v. Omega.34

3. The tenor of this opinion is not to be misinterpreted. It goes no further than to accept the plea of the Solicitor
General after a careful study of the record that the accused is entitled to acquittal, his guilt not having been
shown beyond reasonable doubt. He is thus entitled to the protection afforded by the constitutional
presumption of innocence. The motivation that led the Baylons to testify as they did is immaterial. It suffices to
state that what they said could not be given credence. There are indications that appellant had displeased one
or more individuals of influence. That could have led, as he asserted, to the filing of this complaint. The matter,
however, need not be pursued. It could be that there are puzzles still unresolved. That may very well be, but for
the disposition of this appeal, the inquiry is necessarily limited to the quantum of proof that must exist. That is
all that is relevant to the decision reached.

WHEREFORE, the decision of January 24, 1976 finding the accused Josan Poblador guilty of the crime of
rape is reversed and he is acquitted of such a charge. This decision is immediately executory. Costs de oficio.