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On Pleasure: A Reflection on Happiness from the Confucian and Daoist Perspectives

Author(s): Shaoming CHEN and Huawei LIU


Source: Frontiers of Philosophy in China, Vol. 5, No. 2 (June 2010), pp. 179-195
Published by: Brill
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Front. Philos. China 2010, 5(2): 179-195
DOI 10.1007/sl 1466-010-0010-9

RESEARCH ARTICLE

CHEN Shaoming

On Pleasure: A Reflection on Happiness from the


Confucian and Daoist Perspectives

? Higher Education Press and Springer-Verlag 2010

Abstract This paper discusses the structural relationship between ideals on


pleasure and pleasure as a human psychological phenomenon in Chinese thought.
It describes the psychological phenomenon of pleasure, and compares different
approaches by pre-Qin Confucian and Daoist scholars. It also analyzes its
development in Song and Ming Confucianism. Finally, in the conclusion, the
issue is transferred to a general understanding of happiness, so as to demonstrate
the modern value of the classical ideological experience.

Keywords pleasure, worry, self-cultivation, happiness

1 Introduction
Pleasure does not need any reason. However, different attitudes towards pleasure
are not self-evident. This explains why it was a hotly debated topic in traditional
Chinese philosophy. On the basis of past discussions, this paper tries to analyze
the structural relationship between Chinese thinkers' ideals on pleasure and
pleasure as a human psychological phenomenon. It describes the psychological
phenomenon of pleasure, and compares different approaches towards it by
pre-Qin Confucian and Daoist scholars. From there, it examines the theoretical
foundation of Song and Ming Confucians' discussions of "Where does the
pleasure of Confucius and Yan Hui rest in?" and their experiences in
self-cultivation, extending to some beliefs which overlap with modern ethics or
philosophy-anthropology. Finally, it returns to a common understanding of
happiness to reveal the modern value of classical thought.

Translated by LIU Huawei from Zhexue Yanjiu (Philosophical Researches), 2008,


(9): 44^51_
CHEN Shaoming (M)
Department of Philosophy, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou 510275, China
E-mail: hsscsm@mail.sysu.edu.cn

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180 CHEN Shaoming

2 An Analysis of the Structure of Experience

What is pleasure? Besides music, ^ (pronounced as yu? when referred to music,


and l? to pleasure) usually refers to a pleased mood, which is a psychological
experience. However, the experiences referred to by pleasure can be expressed
by many other words: joy, gladness, delight, satisfaction, merriment, etc.
Sometimes these words may refer to different types of pleasure, or pleasure in
different degrees. The reason that so many different words express the same
meaning is, in addition to being for the most part interchangeable with pleasure,
more importantly, the emotional experiences expressed by these words are what
we are pleased to feel. Or conversely, they are the opposite of those feelings that
we try to avoid, for example, anger, fear, jealousy, bitterness, worry, disgust,
hatred, etc., which we are displeased to feel.
Fundamentally speaking, an emotional reaction affects both the body and mind.
As a rational being, one cannot separate the body from the mind. However, if we
take consciousness, that which makes man perceptive and savvy, as the
performance of the mind, differentiations between the two can be traced.
Through discrimination, emotional phenomena can be classified as from body to
mind, and from mind to body. Therefore, we can define pleasure as the pleasure
of the body, of the mind, and of body-mind.
Let us begin with the pleasure of the body. It's a perceptive experience that
precedes mental reflection. Many physical senses, for example, a pleasant
temperature, the feel of velvet, bright eyesight and delicious taste makes our
moods pleasant. Such a reaction comes before any thought and consideration,
that is, it has nothing to do with one's educational level and is not a deliberate
choice. It is not a result of any menial activities. That is why we call it pleasure
of the body. Such pleasure is individual because it cannot be shared physically.
You cannot eat and make other people feel full, and someone cannot put on
clothes and make you warm. On the other hand, such pleasure is based on
material conditions. As it depends on external sources, it is calculable and
consumable. That is why everyone desires physical pleasure, but not everyone
will be satisfied. It leads to never-ending conflict between humans hunting for
material resources for pleasure. Spiritual pursuit without physical pleasure,
although it may be holy, is abnormal to human beings, while the pursuit of pure
physical pleasure is of an animal nature. Physical pleasure is the basis of man's
pursuit of happiness, as well the source of most misfortune. When some religions
and traditional morals deny the pursuit of pleasure, they refer to this sort of
pleasure.
The pleasure of the mind is not directly related to one's physical desire. It is
concerned with understanding and evaluating things beyond one's body,

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On Pleasure: A Reflection on Happiness from the Confucian and Daoist Perspectives 181

including other people, culture and psychic phenomena. Therefore, mental


pleasure can be defined as the pleasure of social relationships, of learning and of
faith. The pleasure of social relationships in a broad sense includes the pleasure
of being cared for or respected, as well the pleasure of loving or helping others.
The pleasure of learning is completely individual, and results from continuous
satisfaction of the desire to understand the world. To those whose career is the
creation and transmission of knowledge, such a pleasure is an especially
important experience. The pleasure of faith is hard to describe. It concerns
matters of holiness, the value of life, and the origin of meaning, etc. If one finds
his faith and firmly makes it the meaning of his life, especially when he finds it
in a time of turbulence, it is a pleasure. As such spiritual pleasure does not
depend on material conditions, it can be shared. The more it is shared, the
stronger the feeling of pleasure.
The pleasure of body-mind, as indicated by the concept, is between physical
and mental pleasure. For instance, listening to music entertains the ears and
viewing beautiful scenes the eyes. But the entertainment of the ears and eyes are
different: One who is deaf can view scenes but cannot listen to music, while for
one who is blind, things are just the opposite. It tells us that both performance
and enjoyment require adequate physical conditions. Sensitive organs are
preconditions for one to be trained as a specialist. However, physical conditions
are not everything, and everyone does not like the same tune. Confucius loved
music; but he favored Shao whereas he "hatefd] the way in which the songs of
Chang confound the music of Ya" (Book 17).1 That is to say, the favor of music
is also influenced by mental factors, including an inclination to the style and
comprehension of the cultural implication. Therefore, music is neither of body
nor mind; it is of body-mind. It is also true with painting, calligraphy, and other
performance arts involving the body, including sports, martial arts, dancing, and
Chinese opera. The only difference is the ratio between physical and mental
factors, or, the relationship structure. Physical pleasure does not require learning
and training, while the pleasure of the body-mind does, for conceptual elements
are involved. The most common manifestation of the body-mind pleasure is love.
While pure conceptual love is abnormal, love without any spiritual consolation is
no more than an animal instinct. Ideal love is a perfect combination of the body
and the mind. If the pleasure of the body represents materiality and the mind that
of divinity, the pleasure of body-mind represents humanity.
Pleasure is an experience of both the body and the mind. The discrimination
between physical and mental pleasure indicates the sources of pleasure. The

1 Hereinafter all the quotations from the Analects will be followed by parenthesis marks
indicating the chapter number. Texts of the Analects in this paper are from James Legge's
translation (Legge 1991a). To avoid confusion, people's names are in Pinyin.

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182 CHEN Shaoming

experience itself is an inseparable blend of the two. On the other hand, pure
physical pleasure may influence mental pleasure, and vise versa. Complete
pleasure is integrated, however, with different individual inclinations.
Theoretically, the more it depends on objective conditions, the more possible it is
to reach identical reactions. On the contrary, the more it depends on subjective
thought, the more likely it is to lead to divergence. Therefore, the pleasure of the
mind, which can be shared, does not necessarily lead to identical reactions.
Physical pleasure relies on physical necessities and does not contain conflict in
itself; conflict results from a lack of resources to satisfy the desire for it. Whereas
different faiths may lead to conflict, particularly those of different opinions about
what physical pleasure is, its necessary conditions and the rules of distribution.
When different faiths appear as abstract concepts, the problem becomes even
more complicated. The same thing can be an enjoyment to one person/group, and
at the same time a challenge of tolerance to another. In such a way, mental
pleasure may sublime, cover or torture the original aspects of physical pleasure.
The subject of pleasure is more than a problem of psychology or self-cultivation;
it also involves culture and politics.
This brief description of pleasure provides an analytical framework for further
discussions on the structural relationship of ideals on pleasure in Chinese
philosophy and to further understand the subject of happiness.

3 Pleasure and Worry


The idea of pleasure has a long history in China. It was a topic which ignited the
passion of Confucians and Daoists. Confucians spoke first. Confucius appraised
Yan Hui for "he did not allow his joy to be affected" (Book 6) while others were
worrying about his living conditions that were so poor that they "could not have
endured the distress" (Book 7). The Master also gave such a portrait: "He is
simply a man, who in his eager pursuit (of knowledge) forgets his food, who in
the joy of its attainment forgets his sorrows, and who does not perceive that old
age is coming on." Mencius carefully discriminated "to enjoy alone" and "to
enjoy together." On the part of Daoists, Zhuangzi took over the story of
Confucius' praise of Yan Hui and extended it to the extreme, which gave rise to
the chapter "Zhi Le" ("The Ultimate Pleasure") by his successors. Debates
on the differences and similarities of the two views of pleasure have not ceased,
of which, understandably, most were self-defending. Being an outsider and
taking the experience structure of pleasure as a frame of reference may be helpful
in seeing a new clue. Putting aside the small branches, the main disagreements
are over two points: One is the issue of pleasure and worry, the other is the
relationship of "to enjoy alone" and "to enjoy together." The former involves the

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On Pleasure: A Reflection on Happiness from the Confucian and Daoist Perspectives 183

antagonistic relationships of basic human emotions, and the latter involves one's
emotional relevance to others in the world. Both point to comprehending the
connection between morality and happiness.
Confucians have admitted and accepted the pursuit of physical pleasure ever
since the time of Confucius. He said that in a country where people are numerous,
what should be done next was "to enrich them"; and only after that there came
the necessity "to teach them" (Book 13). "To enrich them" is not possible
without the material conditions, which forms the foundation of physical pleasure.
The wish to enrich people shows that the Master accepts physical pleasure.
Mencius emphasizes the regulation of "the livelihood of the people" for the
purpose of "the old wearing silk and eating flesh, and the ordinary people
suffering neither from hunger nor cold" (Liang Hui Wang Shang2). His idea of "a
benevolent government" is also based on the fulfillment of people's elementary
needs. Confucius, who admired the li-yue ?L?ft (rites and music) civilization of
Zhou, had much more detailed requirements for body-mind pleasure. When he
said "to teach them" he meant teaching the li and yue. Confucius was good at
music. His comments on the music of Shao were interesting. On the one hand,
"When the Master was in Chi, he heard the Shao, and for three months did not
know the taste of flesh. did not think,' he said, 'that music could be as
excellent as this'" (Book 7). On the other hand, "The Master said of the Shao that
it was perfectly beautiful and also perfectly good. He said of Wu that it was
perfectly beautiful but not perfectly good" (Book 3). The former shows that the
pursuit of body-mind pleasure can be transformed into the pursuit of pure
physical pleasure. The latter shows that conceptual purity is necessary in
body-mind pleasure. As // and yue are usually inseparable, the performance of li
can acquire a similar function as yue. Confucius typically mentions body-mind
pleasure and mental pleasure as a pair. At the beginning of the Analects, the
Master said: "Is it not pleasant to learn with a constant perseverance and
application? Is it not delightful to have friends coming from distant quarters? Is
he not a man of complete virtue, who feels no discomposure though men may
take no note of him?" (Book 1) If what is learnt is // or a craft, which is achieved
through physical acts, the pleasure is of body-mind. If the object is documentary
knowledge, then it is the pleasure of knowing. The joyous feeling of welcoming
friends, and the pleasure that results from caring for others or being cared for by
others, belong to the mind. "Feeling no discomposure" means not being unhappy.
One should avoid their good mood being affected by other people's ignorance or
misunderstanding.

2 Hereinafter all the quotations from the Mencius will be followed by parenthesis marks
indicating the chapter title. Texts of Mencius are based on James Legge's translation (Legge
1991b). To avoid confusion, pinyin is used for chapter titles and people's names.

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184 CHEN Shaoming

Pleasure and displeasure always accompany one another. The opposite of


pleasure covers feelings of grief, anger, hatred, fear, jealousy, worry, etc.
Confucius preferred to match worry with pleasure. He praised Yan Hui for "while
others could not have endured the distress, he did not allow his joy to be affected
by it" (Book 6). He also proudly described himself as one "who in the joy of its
attainment forgets his sorrows, and who does not perceive that old age is coming
on" (Book 7). And more than once he emphasized, "the virtuous is free from
worries." What is worry? It is anxiety pointing to the future. It has an object of
concern (someone or something) which is in motion. In the worrier's eyes, the
motion is going towards a disadvantageous end. The worried object can be the
worrier himself, or another individual or the community. When worrying for
others, if the disadvantageous process has started, the worrier was not bearing
difficulties with the worried object, for he was worrying about his bearing
capacity. Therefore, worries for others may outweigh that which the object can
bear.
Through Confucius' words and actions, we know that being "free from worry"
does not mean not having distress (or grief), nor hatred; not to say indifference to
other people's suffering. Upon hearing of Yan Hui's untimely death and Zilu's
unnatural death, Confucius deeply lamented and bitterly wept. When Ji Shi
broke the li, Confucius said it was unbearable. In fact, even Confucius was not
completely free of worry. When he said "the superior man is anxious lest he
should not get truth; he is not anxious lest poverty should come upon him" (Book
15), he meant concern for the future career that surpassed personal interest.
Otherwise it can only be explained as being ruthless or unhopeful. That is why
Fan Zhongyan's famous saying?"To worry ahead of all under heaven; and to
rnjoy after all under heaven"?represents the Confucian spirit. Evidently, to be
' free from worries" means to not care about one's personal fortune and to play
down efforts for physical pleasure and satisfaction. Compared with negative
moods, such as grief, anger, hatred, worrying is most likely to become a common
state that impedes understanding the meaning of life. Therefore, in their joy
Confucians managed to forget worries. This developed early in the three ancient
epochs (Pang 2005, pp. 217-218).
However, the intense anxiety Confucians had over the Dao cannot be covered
by the appearance of worrying. That is why Zhuangzi, who sought joy with all
his time, satirized them: "why would those humane men be so full of grief!"
(Pian Mu MW, tr. Mair 1994, p. 76) A comparison between Zhuangzi and
Confucius is necessary to clarify the issue.
We cannot say that Zhuangzi disregarded physical pleasure completely.
Zhuangzi spoke of many laborers who worked hard to meet their minimum living
requirements. But he was not interested in the way of the Confucians?to benefit
people in material life through moral governance (or benevolent government).

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On Pleasure: A Reflection on Happiness from the Confucian and Daoist Perspectives 185

Zhuangzi was special in his view on body-mind pleasure. The cook was simply
doing an artistic performance when he was working: "A cook was cutting up an
ox for Lord Wenhui. Whenever his hand touched, his shoulder leaned, his foot
stepped, his knee nudged, the flesh would fall away with a swishing sound. Each
slice of the cleaver was right in tune, zip zap! He danced in rhythm to 'The
Mulberry Grove', moved in concert with the strains of 'The Managing Chief"
("Yang Sheng Zhu" Ibid., p. 25). Besides this, there was also the
ferryman handling the boat ("Da Sheng" Ibid., p. 177), the Wheelwright
making the wheel ("Tian Dao" 3 , Ibid., p. 128), whose superb and incredible
mastery of their crafts made them able to enjoy themselves. Behind such pleasure
there is a comprehension of the Dao. "The Way which goes beyond mere skill"
("Yang Sheng Zhu," Ibid., p. 26) implies the involvement of mental or spiritual
factors. In his pursuit of pleasure, Zhuangzi showed a strong inclination to
transform or even replace the body with the mind. Zhuangzi created many
strange looking men, known as Dao-holders. Having physical disabilities means
an inability to experience common physiological pleasure. However, this is not
important as the Dao relies on mind rather than the body. The pleasure of the
mind is the focus of Zhuangzi. If we distinguish three kinds of pleasure?the
pleasure of social relationships, of acquiring knowledge and of faith, we can see
that Zhuangzi is quite different from Confucius with regard to the first one. The
relationships of the monarch and his subjects, like that between family members,
are obligatory; only ordinary friends can "look at each other with smiles and feel
no discord in their hearts." And friends in such relationship do not need each
other's help?"they would rather forget each other in rivers and lakes than to
water each other with foam (in a drying pond)." Making friends is a form of
spiritual communication. When Huizi died, Zhuangzi was sad and felt lonely
because he could no longer find an opponent in debate?he lost the pleasure of
mental competition. In fact, this is more the pleasure of acquiring knowledge
than the pleasure of interpersonal contact. The debate on "the pleasure of the
fishes" between Zhuangzi and Hui Shi (i.e., Huizi) in the chapter "Qiushui" was
sophistical paronomasia which took advantage of polys?mie words like you and
me, to be and not to be, to know or not to know, etc. Discussions on "the pleasure
of the fishes" reflected the speakers' mental pleasure. If the pursuit of such a
lifestyle can be understood as the practice of the Dao, pleasure must be
established on some spiritual faith. Hermits in that time tended to despise
material desires and escaped mundane social relationships; they received
pleasure from cultivating the mind.
Xu Fuguan pointed out: "Confucians think highly of pleasure. Their pleasure
is for themselves. For the all-under-heaven or the nation, they have worry. That's
why Mencius said 'Therefore a superior man worries everyday throughout the
year, as well is he glad everyday throughout a year.' For a Confucian, his

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186 CHEN Shaoming

pleasure comes from deep understanding of the righteousness and a mastery of


ren iz (benevolence, perfect virtue). And as ren and righteousness imply
indissoluble conscientiousness of a man, the worry and pleasure exist
simultaneously" (Xu 2001, p. 35). "Why would those humane men be so ftill of
anxieties?" Zhuangzi clearly knew that it was impossible to be "free from
worry," he then took over Confucius' words on Yan Hui and proceeded in his
own way. Both Zhuangzi and Confucius forget about gain and loss; the
difference is that Zhuangzi could forget about ethical rules. The last pass for man
is breaking the fear for death. "While you do not know life, how can you know
about death?" {Analects, Legge 1991a, p. 241) Confucius put off the question.
Trying to answer it in a reasonable way, Zhuangzi thus explained his beating a
basin upon his wife's death: Life and death are just condensing and diffusing of
the qi ("Zhi Le," tr. Mair 1994, p. 168). However, this is not a problem that could
be solved solely by a breakthrough of reason; it is necessary to also include
spiritual practice, abandoning feelings, protection from love and hatred, and
finally, "I lost myself ("Qi Wu Lun," Ibid., p. 12), or "depart from my form,
leave knowledge behind, and become identical with the Transformational
Thoroughfare" ("Da Zong Shi," Ibid., p. 64). Such pleasure will not be found in
an ordinary man. Carefree wandering is the Zhuangzi's style of pleasure. He
tended to try to rid constraints on nature or the body, which was impossible, then
he tried to liberate himself spiritually. Both pursued the pleasure of the mind.
Confucians never went beyond social order, while Zhuangzi developed a
non-social-order dimension. Therefore, the debate about whether or not one can
be "free from worry" is only one of appearances.

4 To Enjoy Together or Alone?


Another topic on pleasure disputed by Confucians and Daoists, besides worry
and pleasure, is to enjoy together or alone. As a human feeling, pleasure is first of
all a personal experience. But is it a personal experience? Are one's own pleasure
and other's pleasure the same, interconnected or indifferent, even opposite?
Different opinions reveal not only different personal experiences, but also
adoptions of different social values.
Although Confucius praised Yan Hui for "he did not allow his joy to be
affected by it," "while others could not endure the distress," Confucians did not
pursue different pleasure. On the contrary, they have shown a preference for
collective pleasure since the time of Confucius. "Is it not delightful to have
friends coming from distant quarters?" This is the pleasure of getting acquainted.
Confucius agreed with Zeng Dian's description of pleasure: "In this, the last
month of spring, with the dress of the season all complete, along with five or six

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On Pleasure: A Reflection on Happiness from the Confucian and Daoist Perspectives 187

young men who have assumed the cap, and six or seven boys, I would wash in
the river, enjoy the breeze among the rain altars, and return home singing" (Book
11). This, too, is not personal pleasure. Such an attitude, in Mencius, was
expressed as enjoying together or alone and given a political meaning. Neither
did Mencius persuade the Liang Hui Wang not to enjoy the pleasure, nor did he
suggest an elevation of pleasure to the level of spiritual joy. Mundane pleasure
was of no problem; the problem is whether it was to be enjoyed with other
people. Following Mencius' guidance, the King admitted that enjoying pleasure
alone was less joyous than enjoying it with others; and to enjoy pleasure with a
small number of people should be less joyous than with a large number.
According to Mencius, ancient pleasure and present pleasure, the King's pleasure
and people's pleasure should be unified. This view was based on psychological
experience; the intensity of pleasure increased along the three cases?to enjoy
pleasure alone, with a small number and with a large number. And from a
political point of view, the King's pleasure ought to be unified with that of the
people. Otherwise, the King would lose his pleasure, or even his throne. The
argument for enjoying together is based on the fact that all men share the same
feeling to the same sensation: "Men's mouths agree in having the same relishes;
their ears agree in enjoying the same sounds; their eyes agree in recognizing the
same beauty" ("Gao Zi"). According to his theory on human nature, Mencius
concluded that enjoying pleasure with other people is proof of a benevolent
government.
Let us further analyze sharing pleasure. Firstly, its roots in physiology and
human nature claim that different people share the same capacity to sense
pleasure in the same condition. This implies that all men have the same right to
pursue pleasure equally. Secondly, according to the psychological experience, the
pleasure of one person for one reason is weaker than the pleasure of many people
sharing the same reason. This means that the more people that share a value, the
stronger its impact. Thirdly, there is a hidden but special pleasure?the pleasure
caused by others' joy. None of the three levels belongs to individual pleasure.
However, in the first level, common pleasure co-exists with individual pleasure.
You can enjoy the same symphony in an opera house or in your bedroom. The
second level shows that creating or providing opportunities to share pleasure
with people is a meaningful social activity. It is a basic process that a political
figure should master and be responsible for. The third level is about the pleasure
of moral significance. It concerns neither one's personal interest nor desire, nor
the causes that leads to others' pleasure, but the fact that they are happy. If the
pleasure of others is mental pleasure, it can be shared. If it is physical, it is not
exclusive. In the latter case, if reducing your own physical pleasure is needed to
realize other people's pleasure, the spirit of altruism is necessary. The state of
Confucian benevolence contains such a spirit. Such pleasure of benevolence

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188 CHEN Shaoming

transcends personal pleasure of the body or body-mind and points to a concern


for other people's pleasure. It is in a sense ethical pleasure. The spiritual
dimension of Confucian pleasure is rich in ethical connotations.
Opposed to Mencius' claim on sharing pleasure, Zhuangzi preferred individual
pleasure. He gave a completely different philosophical argument in the chapter
"Qi Wu Lun," denying the possibility of different people/things to understand
each other:

Gnaw Gap inquired of Princely Scion, "Do you know wherein all things
agree?"
"How could I know that?"
"Do you know what you don't know?"
"How could I know that?"
"Well, then, is it possible to know anything at all?"
"How could I know that? Nonetheless, I'll try to say something about it.
How can we know that what I call knowledge is not really ignorance? How
can we know that what I call ignorance is not really knowledge?" ("Qi Wu
Lun," tr.Mair 1994, p. 20)

After a series of "how could I know," Zhuangzi, through the mouth of Princely
Scion, through comparing different subjects' responses and attitudes towards
dwelling, food and beauty, pointed out that common standards do not exist for
different subjects regarding the proper place to dwell, proper food to eat and
correct standard for beauty. He went on to retort:

As I see it, the principle of humaneness and righteousness, the paths of right
and wrong, are inextricably confused. How would I be able to distinguish
among them? (Ibid., p. 21)

For Zhuangzi, dwelling, food and beauty are parts of knowledge. As they
cannot understand each other, neither can they share pleasure. Here, different
species?human beings, monkeys, birds, fishes, etc.?represent people of
different identities or in different situations. People do not know each other,
hence cannot share their pleasure. Giving up the pursuit of common pleasure
means not only giving up useless work, but also not destroying most people's
pleasure in its pursuit. Therefore, the successors of Zhuangzi said: "I observe that
what the common lot considers enjoyment is to rush headlong toward their goals
in a flock as though they'd never stop. But I'm not sure whether what they all
call enjoyment is enjoyable or not? I consider non-action to be true enjoyment,
but the common lot finds it greatly distasteful" ("Zhi Le," Ibid., p. 168). People's
pleasure is not replaceable. Uniformity of the standard only causes disaster to

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On Pleasure: A Reflection on Happiness from the Confucian and Daoist Perspectives 189

oneself, or even society. Therefore, the ultimate pleasure for Zhuangzi is


individual pleasure, not common pleasure.
While Zhuangzi's arguments might be insufficient to overturn Mencius'
opinions, they at least exposed the issue's complexities and its possible harm to
moral life, especially in political practice. Individual and collective pleasures are
not completely identical nor opposite all the time; they are transformable. Let us
go back to the experience structure of pleasure. So long as physical pleasure is
not founded on limited resources, individual pleasure does not conflict with
collective pleasure. And as for body-mind pleasure, all may not share the same
pleasure: Some like music, others sports. They may share pleasure in different
ways: to practice or compete together, or some like to watch while others
perform. Nevertheless, like and dislike do not necessarily conflict, unless there
are limited resources. There are different inclinations to the pleasure of the mind.
Because it only concerns ideas and consumes no resources, it welcomes any form
of sharing to attain common pleasure in the mind. At the same time, those with
their own ideas and goals are the last to give up and follow others. Therefore,
differences in mental pleasure may also cause conflicts in opinions. If they are
forced to be unified, it will rely on real powers.
In what conditions do men need or pursue individual pleasure? When materials
are too scarce to meet everyone's physical pleasure, someone will monopolize
resources. In this case, the realization of individual pleasure is the same price as
that of the majority's pleasure. That is why Confucians emphasize including and
enriching education in moral governance or benevolent governance?the former
increases resources and the latter restricts people's behavior. The hermits in
Zhuangzi are lowest resource consumers. They care only about mental pleasure.
They are a special kind of individual pleasure seeker. Due to an unhealthy
mentality, they refuse to share both material and spiritual things with others, and
even enjoy pleasure at the price of others' suffering. This, of course, is the
opposite of the pleasure mentioned above?to be pleased by other people's
pleasure. It is immoral. Neither of the above two conform with Zhuangzi's
thoughts. The King of Chu persuaded Zhuangzi to take office, seducing him with
money and power. And Zhuangzi took it as worse than the life of a happy pig. A
content life for him was to watch and enjoy the fish and trees, and to talk about
and debate mysteries and the Dao. Zhuangzi's individual pleasure has nothing
in common with selfish pleasure, and is not opposed to others sharing with him.
Otherwise, he would not write about the friends who "look at each other with
smile and feel no discord in their hearts." Zhuangzi's individual pleasure
contains his ideas on morals. The precondition for his abandonment of other
social liabilities is for everyone to be independent, so as to take care of his own
destiny.
What is interesting is that Zhuangzi's idea of individual pleasure can be traced

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190 CHEN Shaoming

back to Confucius and Yan Hui. For the authors of Zhuangzi, Confucius' praise to
Yan Hui?"while others could not have endured the distress, he did not allow his
joy to be affected by it." ?implies that he agreed with Yan Hui for he dared to
enjoy pleasure alone. Yan Hui's pleasure was significantly enriched in Zhuangzi.
In the chapter "Rang Wang," Yan Hui said "your doctrines which I study are
sufficient for enjoying myself ("Rang Wang," Ibid., p. 292), indicating that his
individual pleasure is mostly on a spiritual or mental level. Furthermore, in the
chapter "Da Zong Shi," Yan Hui was portrayed as higher than Confucius?he
was the one who taught Confucius how to "sit and forget." Sometimes Yan Hui
was depicted as a superman. More than once Confucius talked about his principle
of survival: "To appear when good government prevails, and to retreat when bad
government prevails." However, in a time of bad government, he himself could
not give up society and enjoy pleasure alone. He was satirized by contemporary
hermits as one "who knows the impracticable nature of the times, and yet will be
doing them" ("Xian Wen"). A real hermit is one who cherishes a different ideal
than the mundane world, and would neither expect his ideal to be realized in his
living days nor be associated with the evils of reality. He stays away from fame,
fortune and power. He works to earn his living and lead a simple life. He leads
this life because of his moral ideal. Zhuangzi's individual pleasure is an
explanation as well a justification for spiritual life. However, the question is: Can
pleasure be divided between inferior pleasure and superior pleasure? According
to Zhuangzi, mental pleasure is superior to physical pleasure. But according to
his philosophy on the equality of things, there should be not be discrimination
between superior and inferior pleasure; any pleasure is justifiable. Thus,
Zhuangzi was the first to respond to Confucius' question on pleasure.

5 From Substance to Practice

Zhuangzi's opinion on pleasure might have influenced metaphysics in the Wei


and Jin dynasties and even the Chan Sect in Buddhism. But the topic was not
deeply explored until the Confucians in the Song and Ming dynasties began to
discuss it. "Zhou Maoshu let us seek where the pleasure of Yan Hui and
Confucius rests and what they are pleased of." This is a clue repeatedly
mentioned by Confucians during the Song period. The founder of
Neo-Confucianism, when trying to pass his essentials to the Cheng Brothers,
began with a search for pleasure according to Confucius and Yan Hui. It showed
that Lixue (School of Neo-Confucianism) was looking for a proper topic of
its own. On the one hand, he was molding an idea which could balance the
conscience of bitterness in Buddhism. On the other hand, it could draw a line
between it and Daoism, adhering to its own spiritual camp although inspiration

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On Pleasure: A Reflection on Happiness from the Confucian and Daoist Perspectives 191

came from Zhuangzi. This is understandable in view of its call to reject the "two
misters" and defend the lineage of the Dao. There are abundant discussions of
Song and Ming Confucians on pleasure. We pick out a representative topic: the
substance and the practice. The former is about the nature of pleasure, and the
latter approaches toward it. Our focus is on two figures: Zhu Xi and Wang
Yangming.
The search of pleasure is not only a speculative effort, but also an actual
practice. Among the five masters of the Northern Song dynasty, besides Zhou
Dunyi (i.e., Zhou Maoshu), who pursued a delightful life, Shao Yong built a
"Cozy Nest," sang a "Song of Coziness" and even called himself "Mr. Cozy."
The only one who made great effort to examine pleasure was Zhu Xi. His
reflections were mainly recorded not in his Lunyu Jizhu, but in interlocutions
with his disciples. The discussion, of course, was initiated by a question raised by
Zhou Dunyi. The materials used in the discussion and which formed the
foundation of his thinking, however, come from the Analects. Anything related to
pleasure in the Analects was inspected by Zhu's disciples. Besides Confucius and
Yan Hui, Zeng Dian's expression of his ambition is also an object of the
discussion. However, the key points are?first, the reason for Confucius and
Yan's pleasure; second, whether reasoning can convey the real meaning of
Confucius' words on pleasure or not.
The first question comes from Chen Yi: "If Yanzi (i.e., Yan Hui) were pleased
with the Dao, he would not have deserved the name of Yanzi." Taking the Dao as
the object of pleasure was probably a careless answer by Zhou Dunyi. Being
pleased of the Dao, of course, is not bad. However, Chen Yi's discrimination,
according to Zhu's disciples' perception, expressed concern about dividing
pleasure and the Dao into two different things. This discrimination is meaningful.
If pleasure and the Dao are two things, the objects of pleasure can be the Dao as
well as any other things. When the Dao is an alternative among many other
things, it loses its significance as a substance. Zhu Xi expressed his opinion on it:

Liu Fu asked: "Yi Chuan (another name of Cheng Yi) thought that 'if he were
pleased of the Dao, he would not have deserved the name of Yanzi'. But he
also said that 'what Yanzi was pleased was nothing but ren iz (benevolence).'
What's the between the Dao and ren?" The answer was: "It's not that he was
pleased of ren; he was pleased because he was a man of ren. As he possessed
this ren, he could avoid selfishness in his daily life, therefore he could be
pleased" (Zhu 1986, Vol. 31).

Zhu Xi knew that the division of pleasure and the Dao is the division of I and
the Dao, which made it impossible for man to enter the state of pleasure. One is
not pleased of the Dao; he is pleased when practicing the Dao. As for Confucius,

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192 CHEN Shaoming

tie talked more about ren. It is because "the virtuous are joyful," and "the
virtuous are free from worries," Yan Hui, "that for three months there would be
nothing in his mind contrary to perfect virtue" (Legge 1991a, p. 186), could
allow his joy not to be affected. Mencius said: "All things are already complete
in us. There is no greater delight than to be conscious of sincerity on
self-examination" (Legge 1991b, p. 451). That is why Zhu Xi said, "It's not that
he was pleased of ren; he was pleased because he was a man of ren" He thus
purified the pre-Chin idea of pleasure to a mental pleasure without selfishness.
"The source of one's unhappiness is his selfishness. By overcoming his
selfishness, he attains pleasure" (Zhu 1986, Vol. 31). At the same time, the idea
that no one but a man of ren possesses pleasure implies that pleasure is an
outcome of ren, rather than a psychological phenomenon that follows
constantly changing exterior things. And as ren is the intrinsic value of the
goodness of human nature, pleasure has ontological significance. Of course
Zhu Xi knew that mere literal understanding is not sufficient; a real
understanding was the intimate pleasure acquired during the practice of the Dao
and ren: "Pleasure is but an ordinary word. However, you will not really know
it until you catch the sense after a long time of practice." It means that the
substance of the mind and nature are not based on words; it is attained through
the practice of self-cultivation.
After Zhu Xi, Wang Yangming led a deeper and wider discussion on pleasure.
Within the Song-Ming Confucians, Xinxue and Lixue held opposite views on
many problems. However, many discussions of Wang can be traced back to Zhu,
and some of his proposals even originated with Zhu. This here is his central
argument?"pleasure is the substance of the mind," which was a logical
development of Zhu Xi's argument?"It's not that he was pleased of ren; he was
pleased because he was a man of ren"

Pleasure is the substance of the mind. Though different from the pleasure
caused by the seven emotions, it cannot be independent of the seven emotions.
Even though the sages and virtuous figures had their genuine pleasure
differently, it is within the possession of any ordinary man. However, ordinary
person has it but does not know it, he instead woos a lot of worries and
bitterness and falls into perplexity and self-abandonment. Even in all the grief
and perplexity, the pleasure never disappears. Once he is conscious of sincerity
on self-examination, he'll be here (Wang 1992, p. 30).

There are at least three implications in "pleasure is the substance of the mind."
The first, since pleasure is the substance of the mind, everyone from a sage to a
fool must have the experience of pleasure or capacity to enjoy it. But only to
those who practice ren and are conscious of the substance does pleasure become

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On Pleasure: A Reflection on Happiness from the Confucian and Daoist Perspectives 193

the basic form of emotion in their life. Therefore "getting to the conscience" is
the source of pleasure and self-cultivation is the practice to make it possible.
"That little bit of conscience in you is the principle of your. Wherever your mind
goes, it immediately knows right and wrong. You can never hide from it. So long
as you do not cheat it and follow its direction, do good and get rid of evil, it
brings you safety and pleasure" (Ibid., p. 92). Secondly, pleasure is a basic
human emotion. Once designated as special, its relationship with other
emotions is like that between the Dao and the things. The Dao that is pleased is
not one of the many objects leading to pleasure. Likewise, pleasure over the
Dao is not an emotion which responds to different objects or situation. Being
pleased with the Dao means the pleasure of the Dao or the Dao of pleasure; the
Dao and the pleasure are identical (see Chen 2005, p. 194). Thirdly, basic
human emotions, except pleasure, can be divided into two groups. The positive
group, including delight, love, desire, etc., reflects different levels or extents of
pleasure. The negative group, such as worry, anger, bitterness, fear, indicates
varying instances where pleasure is lost. Overcoming negative emotions is an
effort to restore a joyous mood, which is a representation of the practice of
self-cultivation.
Wang Yangming's contribution to pleasure is not only his theoretical argument,
but also his direction and guidance, all of which could not be listed here. In a
word, there are two reasons for human unhappiness: the objective aspect,
including physical, natural and social conditions, and the subjective aspect, an
attitude or an inherent spiritual inclination. Feeling pleasure is an enjoyment as
well as a practice. In such a practice, an individual should, first of all, overcome
the partial pursuit of physical pleasure and avoid overindulging in his desires.
Having a sense of the ultimate virtue, to be unselfish, to be broad-minded and
impartial, is where pleasure lies. On the one hand, it reduces one's fatigue in
fighting over pleasure and the bitterness brought to others. On the other hand, it
balances the shortcomings of physical pleasure by developing mental pleasure or
physical-mental pleasure. Ethically speaking, such a self-fulfilled pleasure is
more than private; it contains respect and concern for the pleasure of others. That
is why to the displeasure of others and the human factors that lead to it,
Confucians express worry and anger. Therefore, such a pleasure is not only
substantial, but also psychological and ethical.
After Zhu Xi, Wang Yangming pushed ontological reflections on pleasure to a
peak and fully displayed it in his daily interpersonal relationships. Following his
footprints, his successors made pleasure the center of their teaching and practice.
A good example is the school of Tai Zhou . Wang Geng, wrote the Xue Le
Ge, which led to the extreme popularity of pleasure in the late Ming period.
However, this era in intellectual history ended in the Qing dynasty, when the
ascension of the Man nationality brought about great chaos. Slight echoes were

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194 CHEN Shaoming

heard from Liang Shuming, one of the figures referred to as a modern


neo-Confucian, but were soon overwhelmed during calls to address the national
crisis and modernization (Liang 1999, pp. 142-144).

6 Conclusion
Ancient Chinese has the characters xing (lucky, fortunate) and fu ?g
(blessing), but not the modern concept xing-fu ^1 (happiness). Xing and fu in
Chinese are similar in meaning to luck and fortune in English. The word
happiness in English contains the sense of pleasure. Aristotle discussed pleasure
and happiness in the last volume of Nicomachean Ethics. In order to study
happiness in classical Chinese philosophy, it is first most important to reflect on
the idea of pleasure. Happiness is not possible without pleasure. The difference is
that there are different levels of pleasure; it may be segmentai or transitory
experiences, sometimes even conflicting. Happiness is the coordination of
different levels of pleasure, an overall feeling or remark. The view on pleasure is
the view on happiness.
The Chinese tradition also agrees with Aristotle: "As we think happiness has
pleasure mingled with it, but the activity of wisdom is admittedly the pleasantest
of excellent activities; at all events philosophy is thought to offer pleasures
marvelous for their purity and their enduringness" (Aristotle 1991, p. 162).
Confucians take pleasure as a substance of the mind. They agree that the pursuit
of happiness is the source of the meaning of life. In the classical world, this
contrasted sharply with the doctrine of bitterness or sinfulness of some religious
traditions, and simultaneously opposed a nihilist view of life. The affirmation of
physical pleasure in Confucianism makes it different from any form of asceticism.
Only when we admit that a certain level of material life is the foundation of
human pleasure is planning for social welfare possible, hence the benevolent
government. Nevertheless, physical pleasure is not all there is to pleasure and
happiness is more than welfare. Whether in ancient times or in modern society,
body-mind pleasure and mental pleasure are also indispensable for a happy
existence. Therefore, neither Confucianism nor Daoism is connected with
utilitarianism. Their different attitudes to common pleasure and individual
pleasure, however, are complementary.
Pre-modern thinkers used to advocate the cultivation of mental pleasure,
whereas in modern times, physical pleasure has become a popular public pursuit.
From an overall view of happiness, both are biased. The influence
physical-mental pleasure has had upon human happiness still requires further
discussion. A philosophy that completely realizes happiness is not only a
penetrating life philosophy, but the foundation of a healthy society.

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On Pleasure: A Reflection on Happiness from the Confucian and Daoist Perspectives 195

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