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Front. Philos. China 2010, 5(2): 179-195
DOI 10.1007/sl 1466-010-0010-9
RESEARCH ARTICLE
CHEN Shaoming
1 Introduction
Pleasure does not need any reason. However, different attitudes towards pleasure
are not self-evident. This explains why it was a hotly debated topic in traditional
Chinese philosophy. On the basis of past discussions, this paper tries to analyze
the structural relationship between Chinese thinkers' ideals on pleasure and
pleasure as a human psychological phenomenon. It describes the psychological
phenomenon of pleasure, and compares different approaches towards it by
pre-Qin Confucian and Daoist scholars. From there, it examines the theoretical
foundation of Song and Ming Confucians' discussions of "Where does the
pleasure of Confucius and Yan Hui rest in?" and their experiences in
self-cultivation, extending to some beliefs which overlap with modern ethics or
philosophy-anthropology. Finally, it returns to a common understanding of
happiness to reveal the modern value of classical thought.
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180 CHEN Shaoming
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On Pleasure: A Reflection on Happiness from the Confucian and Daoist Perspectives 181
1 Hereinafter all the quotations from the Analects will be followed by parenthesis marks
indicating the chapter number. Texts of the Analects in this paper are from James Legge's
translation (Legge 1991a). To avoid confusion, people's names are in Pinyin.
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182 CHEN Shaoming
experience itself is an inseparable blend of the two. On the other hand, pure
physical pleasure may influence mental pleasure, and vise versa. Complete
pleasure is integrated, however, with different individual inclinations.
Theoretically, the more it depends on objective conditions, the more possible it is
to reach identical reactions. On the contrary, the more it depends on subjective
thought, the more likely it is to lead to divergence. Therefore, the pleasure of the
mind, which can be shared, does not necessarily lead to identical reactions.
Physical pleasure relies on physical necessities and does not contain conflict in
itself; conflict results from a lack of resources to satisfy the desire for it. Whereas
different faiths may lead to conflict, particularly those of different opinions about
what physical pleasure is, its necessary conditions and the rules of distribution.
When different faiths appear as abstract concepts, the problem becomes even
more complicated. The same thing can be an enjoyment to one person/group, and
at the same time a challenge of tolerance to another. In such a way, mental
pleasure may sublime, cover or torture the original aspects of physical pleasure.
The subject of pleasure is more than a problem of psychology or self-cultivation;
it also involves culture and politics.
This brief description of pleasure provides an analytical framework for further
discussions on the structural relationship of ideals on pleasure in Chinese
philosophy and to further understand the subject of happiness.
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On Pleasure: A Reflection on Happiness from the Confucian and Daoist Perspectives 183
antagonistic relationships of basic human emotions, and the latter involves one's
emotional relevance to others in the world. Both point to comprehending the
connection between morality and happiness.
Confucians have admitted and accepted the pursuit of physical pleasure ever
since the time of Confucius. He said that in a country where people are numerous,
what should be done next was "to enrich them"; and only after that there came
the necessity "to teach them" (Book 13). "To enrich them" is not possible
without the material conditions, which forms the foundation of physical pleasure.
The wish to enrich people shows that the Master accepts physical pleasure.
Mencius emphasizes the regulation of "the livelihood of the people" for the
purpose of "the old wearing silk and eating flesh, and the ordinary people
suffering neither from hunger nor cold" (Liang Hui Wang Shang2). His idea of "a
benevolent government" is also based on the fulfillment of people's elementary
needs. Confucius, who admired the li-yue ?L?ft (rites and music) civilization of
Zhou, had much more detailed requirements for body-mind pleasure. When he
said "to teach them" he meant teaching the li and yue. Confucius was good at
music. His comments on the music of Shao were interesting. On the one hand,
"When the Master was in Chi, he heard the Shao, and for three months did not
know the taste of flesh. did not think,' he said, 'that music could be as
excellent as this'" (Book 7). On the other hand, "The Master said of the Shao that
it was perfectly beautiful and also perfectly good. He said of Wu that it was
perfectly beautiful but not perfectly good" (Book 3). The former shows that the
pursuit of body-mind pleasure can be transformed into the pursuit of pure
physical pleasure. The latter shows that conceptual purity is necessary in
body-mind pleasure. As // and yue are usually inseparable, the performance of li
can acquire a similar function as yue. Confucius typically mentions body-mind
pleasure and mental pleasure as a pair. At the beginning of the Analects, the
Master said: "Is it not pleasant to learn with a constant perseverance and
application? Is it not delightful to have friends coming from distant quarters? Is
he not a man of complete virtue, who feels no discomposure though men may
take no note of him?" (Book 1) If what is learnt is // or a craft, which is achieved
through physical acts, the pleasure is of body-mind. If the object is documentary
knowledge, then it is the pleasure of knowing. The joyous feeling of welcoming
friends, and the pleasure that results from caring for others or being cared for by
others, belong to the mind. "Feeling no discomposure" means not being unhappy.
One should avoid their good mood being affected by other people's ignorance or
misunderstanding.
2 Hereinafter all the quotations from the Mencius will be followed by parenthesis marks
indicating the chapter title. Texts of Mencius are based on James Legge's translation (Legge
1991b). To avoid confusion, pinyin is used for chapter titles and people's names.
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184 CHEN Shaoming
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On Pleasure: A Reflection on Happiness from the Confucian and Daoist Perspectives 185
Zhuangzi was special in his view on body-mind pleasure. The cook was simply
doing an artistic performance when he was working: "A cook was cutting up an
ox for Lord Wenhui. Whenever his hand touched, his shoulder leaned, his foot
stepped, his knee nudged, the flesh would fall away with a swishing sound. Each
slice of the cleaver was right in tune, zip zap! He danced in rhythm to 'The
Mulberry Grove', moved in concert with the strains of 'The Managing Chief"
("Yang Sheng Zhu" Ibid., p. 25). Besides this, there was also the
ferryman handling the boat ("Da Sheng" Ibid., p. 177), the Wheelwright
making the wheel ("Tian Dao" 3 , Ibid., p. 128), whose superb and incredible
mastery of their crafts made them able to enjoy themselves. Behind such pleasure
there is a comprehension of the Dao. "The Way which goes beyond mere skill"
("Yang Sheng Zhu," Ibid., p. 26) implies the involvement of mental or spiritual
factors. In his pursuit of pleasure, Zhuangzi showed a strong inclination to
transform or even replace the body with the mind. Zhuangzi created many
strange looking men, known as Dao-holders. Having physical disabilities means
an inability to experience common physiological pleasure. However, this is not
important as the Dao relies on mind rather than the body. The pleasure of the
mind is the focus of Zhuangzi. If we distinguish three kinds of pleasure?the
pleasure of social relationships, of acquiring knowledge and of faith, we can see
that Zhuangzi is quite different from Confucius with regard to the first one. The
relationships of the monarch and his subjects, like that between family members,
are obligatory; only ordinary friends can "look at each other with smiles and feel
no discord in their hearts." And friends in such relationship do not need each
other's help?"they would rather forget each other in rivers and lakes than to
water each other with foam (in a drying pond)." Making friends is a form of
spiritual communication. When Huizi died, Zhuangzi was sad and felt lonely
because he could no longer find an opponent in debate?he lost the pleasure of
mental competition. In fact, this is more the pleasure of acquiring knowledge
than the pleasure of interpersonal contact. The debate on "the pleasure of the
fishes" between Zhuangzi and Hui Shi (i.e., Huizi) in the chapter "Qiushui" was
sophistical paronomasia which took advantage of polys?mie words like you and
me, to be and not to be, to know or not to know, etc. Discussions on "the pleasure
of the fishes" reflected the speakers' mental pleasure. If the pursuit of such a
lifestyle can be understood as the practice of the Dao, pleasure must be
established on some spiritual faith. Hermits in that time tended to despise
material desires and escaped mundane social relationships; they received
pleasure from cultivating the mind.
Xu Fuguan pointed out: "Confucians think highly of pleasure. Their pleasure
is for themselves. For the all-under-heaven or the nation, they have worry. That's
why Mencius said 'Therefore a superior man worries everyday throughout the
year, as well is he glad everyday throughout a year.' For a Confucian, his
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186 CHEN Shaoming
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On Pleasure: A Reflection on Happiness from the Confucian and Daoist Perspectives 187
young men who have assumed the cap, and six or seven boys, I would wash in
the river, enjoy the breeze among the rain altars, and return home singing" (Book
11). This, too, is not personal pleasure. Such an attitude, in Mencius, was
expressed as enjoying together or alone and given a political meaning. Neither
did Mencius persuade the Liang Hui Wang not to enjoy the pleasure, nor did he
suggest an elevation of pleasure to the level of spiritual joy. Mundane pleasure
was of no problem; the problem is whether it was to be enjoyed with other
people. Following Mencius' guidance, the King admitted that enjoying pleasure
alone was less joyous than enjoying it with others; and to enjoy pleasure with a
small number of people should be less joyous than with a large number.
According to Mencius, ancient pleasure and present pleasure, the King's pleasure
and people's pleasure should be unified. This view was based on psychological
experience; the intensity of pleasure increased along the three cases?to enjoy
pleasure alone, with a small number and with a large number. And from a
political point of view, the King's pleasure ought to be unified with that of the
people. Otherwise, the King would lose his pleasure, or even his throne. The
argument for enjoying together is based on the fact that all men share the same
feeling to the same sensation: "Men's mouths agree in having the same relishes;
their ears agree in enjoying the same sounds; their eyes agree in recognizing the
same beauty" ("Gao Zi"). According to his theory on human nature, Mencius
concluded that enjoying pleasure with other people is proof of a benevolent
government.
Let us further analyze sharing pleasure. Firstly, its roots in physiology and
human nature claim that different people share the same capacity to sense
pleasure in the same condition. This implies that all men have the same right to
pursue pleasure equally. Secondly, according to the psychological experience, the
pleasure of one person for one reason is weaker than the pleasure of many people
sharing the same reason. This means that the more people that share a value, the
stronger its impact. Thirdly, there is a hidden but special pleasure?the pleasure
caused by others' joy. None of the three levels belongs to individual pleasure.
However, in the first level, common pleasure co-exists with individual pleasure.
You can enjoy the same symphony in an opera house or in your bedroom. The
second level shows that creating or providing opportunities to share pleasure
with people is a meaningful social activity. It is a basic process that a political
figure should master and be responsible for. The third level is about the pleasure
of moral significance. It concerns neither one's personal interest nor desire, nor
the causes that leads to others' pleasure, but the fact that they are happy. If the
pleasure of others is mental pleasure, it can be shared. If it is physical, it is not
exclusive. In the latter case, if reducing your own physical pleasure is needed to
realize other people's pleasure, the spirit of altruism is necessary. The state of
Confucian benevolence contains such a spirit. Such pleasure of benevolence
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188 CHEN Shaoming
Gnaw Gap inquired of Princely Scion, "Do you know wherein all things
agree?"
"How could I know that?"
"Do you know what you don't know?"
"How could I know that?"
"Well, then, is it possible to know anything at all?"
"How could I know that? Nonetheless, I'll try to say something about it.
How can we know that what I call knowledge is not really ignorance? How
can we know that what I call ignorance is not really knowledge?" ("Qi Wu
Lun," tr.Mair 1994, p. 20)
After a series of "how could I know," Zhuangzi, through the mouth of Princely
Scion, through comparing different subjects' responses and attitudes towards
dwelling, food and beauty, pointed out that common standards do not exist for
different subjects regarding the proper place to dwell, proper food to eat and
correct standard for beauty. He went on to retort:
As I see it, the principle of humaneness and righteousness, the paths of right
and wrong, are inextricably confused. How would I be able to distinguish
among them? (Ibid., p. 21)
For Zhuangzi, dwelling, food and beauty are parts of knowledge. As they
cannot understand each other, neither can they share pleasure. Here, different
species?human beings, monkeys, birds, fishes, etc.?represent people of
different identities or in different situations. People do not know each other,
hence cannot share their pleasure. Giving up the pursuit of common pleasure
means not only giving up useless work, but also not destroying most people's
pleasure in its pursuit. Therefore, the successors of Zhuangzi said: "I observe that
what the common lot considers enjoyment is to rush headlong toward their goals
in a flock as though they'd never stop. But I'm not sure whether what they all
call enjoyment is enjoyable or not? I consider non-action to be true enjoyment,
but the common lot finds it greatly distasteful" ("Zhi Le," Ibid., p. 168). People's
pleasure is not replaceable. Uniformity of the standard only causes disaster to
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On Pleasure: A Reflection on Happiness from the Confucian and Daoist Perspectives 189
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190 CHEN Shaoming
back to Confucius and Yan Hui. For the authors of Zhuangzi, Confucius' praise to
Yan Hui?"while others could not have endured the distress, he did not allow his
joy to be affected by it." ?implies that he agreed with Yan Hui for he dared to
enjoy pleasure alone. Yan Hui's pleasure was significantly enriched in Zhuangzi.
In the chapter "Rang Wang," Yan Hui said "your doctrines which I study are
sufficient for enjoying myself ("Rang Wang," Ibid., p. 292), indicating that his
individual pleasure is mostly on a spiritual or mental level. Furthermore, in the
chapter "Da Zong Shi," Yan Hui was portrayed as higher than Confucius?he
was the one who taught Confucius how to "sit and forget." Sometimes Yan Hui
was depicted as a superman. More than once Confucius talked about his principle
of survival: "To appear when good government prevails, and to retreat when bad
government prevails." However, in a time of bad government, he himself could
not give up society and enjoy pleasure alone. He was satirized by contemporary
hermits as one "who knows the impracticable nature of the times, and yet will be
doing them" ("Xian Wen"). A real hermit is one who cherishes a different ideal
than the mundane world, and would neither expect his ideal to be realized in his
living days nor be associated with the evils of reality. He stays away from fame,
fortune and power. He works to earn his living and lead a simple life. He leads
this life because of his moral ideal. Zhuangzi's individual pleasure is an
explanation as well a justification for spiritual life. However, the question is: Can
pleasure be divided between inferior pleasure and superior pleasure? According
to Zhuangzi, mental pleasure is superior to physical pleasure. But according to
his philosophy on the equality of things, there should be not be discrimination
between superior and inferior pleasure; any pleasure is justifiable. Thus,
Zhuangzi was the first to respond to Confucius' question on pleasure.
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On Pleasure: A Reflection on Happiness from the Confucian and Daoist Perspectives 191
came from Zhuangzi. This is understandable in view of its call to reject the "two
misters" and defend the lineage of the Dao. There are abundant discussions of
Song and Ming Confucians on pleasure. We pick out a representative topic: the
substance and the practice. The former is about the nature of pleasure, and the
latter approaches toward it. Our focus is on two figures: Zhu Xi and Wang
Yangming.
The search of pleasure is not only a speculative effort, but also an actual
practice. Among the five masters of the Northern Song dynasty, besides Zhou
Dunyi (i.e., Zhou Maoshu), who pursued a delightful life, Shao Yong built a
"Cozy Nest," sang a "Song of Coziness" and even called himself "Mr. Cozy."
The only one who made great effort to examine pleasure was Zhu Xi. His
reflections were mainly recorded not in his Lunyu Jizhu, but in interlocutions
with his disciples. The discussion, of course, was initiated by a question raised by
Zhou Dunyi. The materials used in the discussion and which formed the
foundation of his thinking, however, come from the Analects. Anything related to
pleasure in the Analects was inspected by Zhu's disciples. Besides Confucius and
Yan Hui, Zeng Dian's expression of his ambition is also an object of the
discussion. However, the key points are?first, the reason for Confucius and
Yan's pleasure; second, whether reasoning can convey the real meaning of
Confucius' words on pleasure or not.
The first question comes from Chen Yi: "If Yanzi (i.e., Yan Hui) were pleased
with the Dao, he would not have deserved the name of Yanzi." Taking the Dao as
the object of pleasure was probably a careless answer by Zhou Dunyi. Being
pleased of the Dao, of course, is not bad. However, Chen Yi's discrimination,
according to Zhu's disciples' perception, expressed concern about dividing
pleasure and the Dao into two different things. This discrimination is meaningful.
If pleasure and the Dao are two things, the objects of pleasure can be the Dao as
well as any other things. When the Dao is an alternative among many other
things, it loses its significance as a substance. Zhu Xi expressed his opinion on it:
Liu Fu asked: "Yi Chuan (another name of Cheng Yi) thought that 'if he were
pleased of the Dao, he would not have deserved the name of Yanzi'. But he
also said that 'what Yanzi was pleased was nothing but ren iz (benevolence).'
What's the between the Dao and ren?" The answer was: "It's not that he was
pleased of ren; he was pleased because he was a man of ren. As he possessed
this ren, he could avoid selfishness in his daily life, therefore he could be
pleased" (Zhu 1986, Vol. 31).
Zhu Xi knew that the division of pleasure and the Dao is the division of I and
the Dao, which made it impossible for man to enter the state of pleasure. One is
not pleased of the Dao; he is pleased when practicing the Dao. As for Confucius,
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192 CHEN Shaoming
tie talked more about ren. It is because "the virtuous are joyful," and "the
virtuous are free from worries," Yan Hui, "that for three months there would be
nothing in his mind contrary to perfect virtue" (Legge 1991a, p. 186), could
allow his joy not to be affected. Mencius said: "All things are already complete
in us. There is no greater delight than to be conscious of sincerity on
self-examination" (Legge 1991b, p. 451). That is why Zhu Xi said, "It's not that
he was pleased of ren; he was pleased because he was a man of ren" He thus
purified the pre-Chin idea of pleasure to a mental pleasure without selfishness.
"The source of one's unhappiness is his selfishness. By overcoming his
selfishness, he attains pleasure" (Zhu 1986, Vol. 31). At the same time, the idea
that no one but a man of ren possesses pleasure implies that pleasure is an
outcome of ren, rather than a psychological phenomenon that follows
constantly changing exterior things. And as ren is the intrinsic value of the
goodness of human nature, pleasure has ontological significance. Of course
Zhu Xi knew that mere literal understanding is not sufficient; a real
understanding was the intimate pleasure acquired during the practice of the Dao
and ren: "Pleasure is but an ordinary word. However, you will not really know
it until you catch the sense after a long time of practice." It means that the
substance of the mind and nature are not based on words; it is attained through
the practice of self-cultivation.
After Zhu Xi, Wang Yangming led a deeper and wider discussion on pleasure.
Within the Song-Ming Confucians, Xinxue and Lixue held opposite views on
many problems. However, many discussions of Wang can be traced back to Zhu,
and some of his proposals even originated with Zhu. This here is his central
argument?"pleasure is the substance of the mind," which was a logical
development of Zhu Xi's argument?"It's not that he was pleased of ren; he was
pleased because he was a man of ren"
Pleasure is the substance of the mind. Though different from the pleasure
caused by the seven emotions, it cannot be independent of the seven emotions.
Even though the sages and virtuous figures had their genuine pleasure
differently, it is within the possession of any ordinary man. However, ordinary
person has it but does not know it, he instead woos a lot of worries and
bitterness and falls into perplexity and self-abandonment. Even in all the grief
and perplexity, the pleasure never disappears. Once he is conscious of sincerity
on self-examination, he'll be here (Wang 1992, p. 30).
There are at least three implications in "pleasure is the substance of the mind."
The first, since pleasure is the substance of the mind, everyone from a sage to a
fool must have the experience of pleasure or capacity to enjoy it. But only to
those who practice ren and are conscious of the substance does pleasure become
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On Pleasure: A Reflection on Happiness from the Confucian and Daoist Perspectives 193
the basic form of emotion in their life. Therefore "getting to the conscience" is
the source of pleasure and self-cultivation is the practice to make it possible.
"That little bit of conscience in you is the principle of your. Wherever your mind
goes, it immediately knows right and wrong. You can never hide from it. So long
as you do not cheat it and follow its direction, do good and get rid of evil, it
brings you safety and pleasure" (Ibid., p. 92). Secondly, pleasure is a basic
human emotion. Once designated as special, its relationship with other
emotions is like that between the Dao and the things. The Dao that is pleased is
not one of the many objects leading to pleasure. Likewise, pleasure over the
Dao is not an emotion which responds to different objects or situation. Being
pleased with the Dao means the pleasure of the Dao or the Dao of pleasure; the
Dao and the pleasure are identical (see Chen 2005, p. 194). Thirdly, basic
human emotions, except pleasure, can be divided into two groups. The positive
group, including delight, love, desire, etc., reflects different levels or extents of
pleasure. The negative group, such as worry, anger, bitterness, fear, indicates
varying instances where pleasure is lost. Overcoming negative emotions is an
effort to restore a joyous mood, which is a representation of the practice of
self-cultivation.
Wang Yangming's contribution to pleasure is not only his theoretical argument,
but also his direction and guidance, all of which could not be listed here. In a
word, there are two reasons for human unhappiness: the objective aspect,
including physical, natural and social conditions, and the subjective aspect, an
attitude or an inherent spiritual inclination. Feeling pleasure is an enjoyment as
well as a practice. In such a practice, an individual should, first of all, overcome
the partial pursuit of physical pleasure and avoid overindulging in his desires.
Having a sense of the ultimate virtue, to be unselfish, to be broad-minded and
impartial, is where pleasure lies. On the one hand, it reduces one's fatigue in
fighting over pleasure and the bitterness brought to others. On the other hand, it
balances the shortcomings of physical pleasure by developing mental pleasure or
physical-mental pleasure. Ethically speaking, such a self-fulfilled pleasure is
more than private; it contains respect and concern for the pleasure of others. That
is why to the displeasure of others and the human factors that lead to it,
Confucians express worry and anger. Therefore, such a pleasure is not only
substantial, but also psychological and ethical.
After Zhu Xi, Wang Yangming pushed ontological reflections on pleasure to a
peak and fully displayed it in his daily interpersonal relationships. Following his
footprints, his successors made pleasure the center of their teaching and practice.
A good example is the school of Tai Zhou . Wang Geng, wrote the Xue Le
Ge, which led to the extreme popularity of pleasure in the late Ming period.
However, this era in intellectual history ended in the Qing dynasty, when the
ascension of the Man nationality brought about great chaos. Slight echoes were
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194 CHEN Shaoming
6 Conclusion
Ancient Chinese has the characters xing (lucky, fortunate) and fu ?g
(blessing), but not the modern concept xing-fu ^1 (happiness). Xing and fu in
Chinese are similar in meaning to luck and fortune in English. The word
happiness in English contains the sense of pleasure. Aristotle discussed pleasure
and happiness in the last volume of Nicomachean Ethics. In order to study
happiness in classical Chinese philosophy, it is first most important to reflect on
the idea of pleasure. Happiness is not possible without pleasure. The difference is
that there are different levels of pleasure; it may be segmentai or transitory
experiences, sometimes even conflicting. Happiness is the coordination of
different levels of pleasure, an overall feeling or remark. The view on pleasure is
the view on happiness.
The Chinese tradition also agrees with Aristotle: "As we think happiness has
pleasure mingled with it, but the activity of wisdom is admittedly the pleasantest
of excellent activities; at all events philosophy is thought to offer pleasures
marvelous for their purity and their enduringness" (Aristotle 1991, p. 162).
Confucians take pleasure as a substance of the mind. They agree that the pursuit
of happiness is the source of the meaning of life. In the classical world, this
contrasted sharply with the doctrine of bitterness or sinfulness of some religious
traditions, and simultaneously opposed a nihilist view of life. The affirmation of
physical pleasure in Confucianism makes it different from any form of asceticism.
Only when we admit that a certain level of material life is the foundation of
human pleasure is planning for social welfare possible, hence the benevolent
government. Nevertheless, physical pleasure is not all there is to pleasure and
happiness is more than welfare. Whether in ancient times or in modern society,
body-mind pleasure and mental pleasure are also indispensable for a happy
existence. Therefore, neither Confucianism nor Daoism is connected with
utilitarianism. Their different attitudes to common pleasure and individual
pleasure, however, are complementary.
Pre-modern thinkers used to advocate the cultivation of mental pleasure,
whereas in modern times, physical pleasure has become a popular public pursuit.
From an overall view of happiness, both are biased. The influence
physical-mental pleasure has had upon human happiness still requires further
discussion. A philosophy that completely realizes happiness is not only a
penetrating life philosophy, but the foundation of a healthy society.
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On Pleasure: A Reflection on Happiness from the Confucian and Daoist Perspectives 195
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