Operation Chromite: Lessons Learned

MIDN Matthew Hurd

Naval Science 202

Lieutenant Greenwood

19 APR 16
 Hurd 2

The outbreak of the Korean War may very well have saved the

United States Marine Corps and the Navy from being dismantled or

absorbed into other branches. Immediately following the

development and use of the atomic bomb, many military commanders

declared that conventional warfare was now obsolete, and that

tactical bombing with nuclear weapons was all that was needed.

With their future being questioned, the Navy and Marine Corps

went into the Korean War with something to prove. Their chance to

demonstrate their worth came in the form of Operation Chromite,

better known as the Inchon landing. Operation Chromite is the

ultimate example of the importance of forward naval presence and

the use of joint operations.

Following the Japanese surrender on 11 September 1945

onboard the USS Missouri, The territories that Japan had

conquered during World War II were either given independence or

turned over to their previous colonial powers to be ruled.1 In

Korea, however, the situation was more complicated. Both the

Soviet Union and the United States wanted to oversee the

restructuring of Koreas government; the United States wanted to

establish a capitalist democracy while the Soviets wanted to set

up a Communist government.2 The resulting compromise was to

divide Korea at the 38th parallel, with the North being

controlled by the Soviet Union and the South controlled by the

United States.3 This was by no means a perfect solution, and the

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tensions between the two governments steadily rose throughout the

next five years.

The North Korean Peoples Army (NKPA) crossed the 38th

parallel and invaded South Korea on the morning of 25 June 1950.4

The NKPA Army was formidable; it consisted of over 135,000 men in

ten infantry divisions, with over 150 Soviet T-34 tanks, and 130

Yak-3 and Yak-7 fighter planes.5 By the night of 28 June, the

South Korean capital of Seoul had fallen to the NKPA and the

South Korean Republic of Koreas (ROK) Army was in full retreat.6

By this time, the United Nations had condemned the invasion and

authorized its members to give military assistance to ROK

forces.7

The United States immediately ordered naval gunfire support

from Task Force 96, which consisted of one cruiser and four

destroyers, and air support from Task Force 77, which had one

Essex-class carrier and its escort ships.8 These ships were

already stationed in Japan, and by the next morning the Yellow

Sea and the Sea of Japan were under UN control. General Douglas

MacArthur, commander of UN forces in Korea, secured the use of

the 24th, 25th, and the 1st cavalry divisions, which were stationed

in Japan, to be his initial ground forces in Korea.9 These

divisions would eventually consolidate to make up the US 8th

Army.10 MacArthur also persuaded the Joint Chiefs of Staff to

deploy the 1st Marine division to Korea, as well as the 5th Marine
 Hurd 4

Regimental Combat Group.11 Despite the growing strength of

American and ROK forces, the NKPAs advance would not be stopped.

The American and ROK defensive lines would often be broken

through by concentrated NKPA tank assaults.12 On 1 August, UN

forces were ordered to withdraw and form a defensive line along

the Naktong River, which would be known as the Pusan Perimeter.13

For the next three weeks, the NKPA and UN forces were locked

in a bloody stalemate at the Pusan perimeter, with neither side

able to claim a decisive victory. It was during this time that

General MacArthur started to plan Operation Chromite, a

masterstroke that he envisioned immediately turning the tide of

the war in the UNs favor.14 MacArthur envisioned an amphibious

landing that would cut off the overextended NKPA from their

supply lines and trap them in a coordinated pincer movement.15

MacArthur chose the port of Inchon as the landing site because of

how close it was to the 38th parallel and Seoul; the two other

options were Kunsan and Pyongyang, with Kunsan being only 100

miles behind NKPA lines, and Pyongyang being beyond the 38th

parallel.16 Even though Inchon offered the best option for

MacArthurs masterstroke, the geography of the harbor would make

an amphibious assault extremely difficult. When talking about

Inchon harbor, Lieutenant Commander Arlie Capps said we drew up

a list of every natural and geographic handicap-and Inchon had

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em all.17 Nevertheless, MacArthur could not be swayed from

going through with the landing.

Preliminary Air strikes on Inchon began on 10 September,

with strike groups from the 7th fleet targeting roads and

military strong points.18 To keep the location of their landing

point secret, bombing sorties were also flown at Kunsan.19 On 15

September, two waves of LCVP transport ships carried their

Marines onto Green Beach of Wolmi Do Island, a small island

connected to Inchon by a land bridge.20 The Marines quickly took

control of the island, followed by an assault on Inchon.21 By the

next morning, the Marine forces had secured the city and started

to move inland towards Seoul.22 In a telegraph to recounting the

assault, Macarthur said The Navy and Marine Corps have never

shone more brightly than this morning.23

The aftermath of the Inchon landing went exactly as MacArthur

planned; the assaulting Marines, supported by the 7th division of

the US Army, went on to capture Seoul, cutting off the NKPA from

their lines of communication and logistical support. With all of

their momentum lost, the NKPA scrambled back to North Korea in a

mass retreat.24 Operation Chromite is widely considered to be the

most effective use of an amphibious assault in modern warfare.

MacArthurs use of forward naval presence and joint operations at

Inchon can provide invaluable lessons in leadership to this day.

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The forward presence of the US Navy prior to and during the

Korean War made the landing at Inchon possible. The immediate

movement of the 7th fleet to the Sea of Japan and the Yellow Sea

discouraged North Koreas communist supporters from interfering

in the war, keeping all of Americas planning options available

in the region. This left MacArthur a clean slate to work with

when he was cornered at Pusan; he could plan Operation Chromite

without having to worry about Chinese, Soviet, or North Korean

navies interfering with the assault forces. Forward presence has

been a tenant of the US Navy for over 100 years, and it should

continue to be implemented in future naval planning.

MacArthurs use of joint operations in Operation Chromite is

to be commended. The Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and ROK forces

were all utilized to their maximum efficiency. While the 1st

Marine division rested and prepared for the invasion, the Army

2nd infantry division replaced them on the lines so as not to

raise NKPA suspicion.25 The Navys role in Chromite was to

provide transportation, offshore supporting gunfire, and close

air support.26 After the 1st Marines had taken Inchon and started

the pincer movement MacArthur had planned, the 2nd infantry and

the 1st Korean Marine Corps Regiment assaulted from the South,

trapping the NKPA and dissimilating their command structure.27

MacArthurs use of all available forces and the advantages they

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brought with them is the shining example of the type of thought

that should go into operations planning.

Operation Chromite has gone down as one of the best examples of

military genius in history. Even though the Korean War may not

have ended as well as the United States would have liked,

Chromite completely changed the momentum of the war. It

effectively allowed UN forces to stop the spread of communism in

South Korea, giving credibility to the Truman Doctrine. MacArthur

used the Navys forward presence and power projection to control

the Sea of Japan and the Yellow Sea, clearing the way for this

operation to take place. Once the operation was planned,

Macarthur used every available resource at his disposal to come

up with the best possible course of action. Officers in both the

Navy and Marine Corps should strive to emulate MacArthurs

example.
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Endnotes
1 Utz, Curtis A. Assault from the Sea: The Amphibious Landing at

Inchon, 2nd ed. Washington: Naval Historical Center, Dept. of the

Navy, 1994.

22 Ibid.

33Symonds, Craig L. The Naval Institute Historical Atlas of the US

Navy. Annapolis, Md: Naval Inst. Press, 1995.

44 Halberstam, David. The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War.

New York: Hyperion, 2007.

5 Utz, Assault from the Sea, 8

6 Ibid.

7 Ibid.

8 Ibid.

9 Ibid.
10 Utz, Assault from the Sea, 13

11Ibid.

12 Halberstam, The Coldest Winter, 163

13 Ibid.

14 Bradford, Jeffery A. "MacArthur, Inchon, and the Art of Battle

Command." Military Review, March/April 2001.

15 Ibid.

16 Symonds, Historical atlas of the US Navy, 196

17 Utz, Assault from the Sea, 16

18 Symonds, Historical Atlas of the US Navy, 196

19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.

21 Halberstram, The Coldest Winter, 301

22 Ibid.

23 Ibid.

24 Symonds, Historical Atlas of the US Navy, 196

25 Utz, Assault from the Sea, 18

26 Ibid., 18

27 Ibid.,19

Bibliography

Bradford, Jeffery A. "MacArthur, Inchon, and the Art of Battle

Command." Military Review, March/April 2001.

Halberstam, David. The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War.
New York: Hyperion, 2007.
Symonds, Craig L. The Naval Institute Historical Atlas of the US
Navy. Annapolis, Md: Naval Inst. Press, 1995.

Utz, Curtis A. Assault from the Sea: The Amphibious Landing at

Inchon, 2nd ed. Washington: Naval Historical Center, Dept. of
the Navy, 1994.