University of Utah Western Political Science Association

University of Utah
Western Political Science Association
In Defense of Liberalism
Author(s): J. P. Geise
Source: The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 44, No. 3 (Sep., 1991), pp. 583-604
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IN DEFENSE OF LIBERALISM
J.P. GEISE
ClarksonUniversity
The titleofthisessaymay seem ironic,perhapsevenpointless.

At a time when the values of liberal democracy are widely
espoused, when the rhetoricof "rights"and "freedom"is con-
stantlyinvoked, there appears to be little need to defend the liberal
vision of political life. Unfortunately,things are not quite so simple.
While the popular prestige of liberal rhetoricseems secure, its intel-
lectual standing is less certain. Put bluntly,liberalism remains under
philosophical assault fromthe so-called communitarians.
As it happens, liberal political theoristshave devised numerous
schemes to deflect the criticismsof their communitarian detractors.
For all theirvariety,however,these schemes characteristicallyassume
one of two forms.In the firstinstance, some liberals insist that their
criticsare misguided since liberalismhas a communitarianbent already
embedded within it. Others take a differentapproach. They employ
various non-liberal ideologies both to undermine the communitarians
and to buttresstheir own, liberal convictions. In the present essay, I
would like to suggest two things about the effortto justifyliberalism.
First, I thinkthat the expositions of liberalism profferedto date often
miss the mark: fewdevelop a conceptionof liberal politicsthat answers
the communitariansand remains true to liberal aspirations.But second,
I also suspect that a plausible, though not decisive, case can be made
in favorof liberalism. Both of these convictionsdemand explanation.
LIBERALS AS COMMUNITARIANS
The clearest example of liberal theory'seffortto absorb the com-

munitarian critique is to be found in the recent work of John Rawls.
This is not surprisingsince Rawls's initial formulationof A Theoryof
Justice(1971) is both the most influentialstatementof contemporary
liberalism and the communitarians'chieftarget. To wit, communitar-
ians are troubledby what theytake to be Rawls's deontologicalabstrac-
Received: September 26, 1989

First Revision Received: April 20, 1990
Second Revision Received: July 19, 1990
Accepted forPublication: August 6, 1990
584 The Western
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tions as well as by his failure to promote tightlyintegrated,morally

purposive communities.For instance, Sandel (1982) thinksthatRawls's
conception of the individual so lacks a recognitionof the constitutive
role of social practices and institutionsthat the Rawlsian man of the
"original position" is nothing more than an artfullyfabricated, intel-
lectual illusion. And MacIntyre (1981) implies that Rawls, like liber-
als generally, fails to embed his theorywithin a socially constructed
narrativethat could give moral importto his views and ethical suste-
nance to citizens. Hence, Rawls's proposals border on nihilism: they
mirrorthe emotivismallegedly characteristicof liberalism in general.
As it happens, these criticismsof Rawls amply reflecttwo facetsof
the communitarianassault on liberalism. The firstof these assaults is
epistemological/ontologicalin character, and focuses on the suppos-
edly too-reifiedfeaturesof liberal political theorizing.The second cri-
tique is more political and moral in tone; it attendsto the purportedly
alienating and anomic quality of life within liberal polities. Whether
these charges are either fair or compatible is an open question. Nev-
ertheless,Rawls responds to them by assertingthat he has been mis-
read. In both the Dewey Lectures and his subsequent writing,Rawls
(1980: 1985) disavows any unalloyed deontology.Put bluntly,he denies
that he has made what Mill (1861: 31) describes as that "effortof vol-
untary abstraction"required to overlook the fact that the "social state
is at once so natural, so necessary, and so habitual to man." Instead,
he announces that his work is a reflectionof the considered intuitions
of citizens living within liberal democratic regimes. It is their moral
convictionsthat situate and provide a narrativecontextfor"justice as
fairness"(Rawls 1985). As a consequence. Rawls claims thatA Theory
is not a meta-philosophyof justice predicated on a reifiedvision of
autonomous man, but a liberal and political testament.By saying this
Rawls assumes an essentially communitarian stance that in its focus
on the prevailing considered intuitionsof contemporaryliberal citi-
zens aims both to clarifyextant values and to investthese values with
sufficientcoherence so as to develop a narrativeforliberalism.
Rawls is not alone in making thismove; Michael Walzer is, if any-
thing, even more emphatic about his desire to avoid those "founda-
tional commitments"(Walzer 1983: xviii) characteristicof deontology.
Hence, Walzer begins his SpheresofJustice(1983) by delineating the
various types of goods that require social distribution.Once done,
Walzer is ready to suggest that distributivejustice is not achieved by
followinga single patternof decision-makingor adjudication. Rather,
In DefenseofLiberalism 585
justice is secured and tyrannyavoided by relyingon a multiplicityof

modes of distribution:some goods ought to be distributedequally, oth-
ers on the basis of merit, and still others by way of market transac-
tions. Consequently, what liberal polities need to ensure is that the
distinctivenessof these various modes of distributionis respected: the
task of a liberal politicsis to maintain and refinethis"art of separation"
(Walzer 1984). Framing his scheme this way, Walzer is able to embed
his conception[s] of justice within the prevailing cultural settingand,
thus, to situatehis depictionof distributivejustice in communal values.
Though less concerned with examining the character of distribu-
tive justice, other liberal theoristshave likewise sought to emphasize
the communitarian side of liberalism. Ruth Grant (1988), for exam-
ple, sees much that is communitarian in Locke's political anthropol-
ogy. The latter'srecognitionof the social characterof men even within
the state of nature testifiesto this. Consequently, Grant argues that
Locke is not, as he is so oftendescribed, the consummate exponent of
possessiveindividualism;nor is he an apt targetforthe communitarian's
ire. More to the point, if liberalism's intellectual roots reach back to
Locke, then these roots are entwinedin an ethos that esteems the con-
nectednessof humans to one another ratherthan in one that revels in
their splendid isolation.
Althoughthereis somethingintriguingabout these effortsto blend
the "ism's" of communityand liberty,thereis somethingunsatisfactory
about them as well. For one, while the argument that liberalism can
be tied to a situatedsense of human beings and theirbehaviors may be
persuasive, the task of integratingliberalism's ideals of autonomous
and equal freedomwith the notion of situated, social agents remains
to be completed (a step in this directionis taken by Walzer 1990). For
example, even if we accept Grant's (1988) view of Locke - even if lib-
eralism does receive its intellectual sustenance fromessentially com-
munitarian sources--we must still account for its enduring commit-
ment to "rights,"to "autonomy,"and to "freedom." That is, we must
still explain liberalism's attachmentto values which appear to stress
the separateness ratherthan the unity of citizens.
For another, weaving togetherliberal and communitarian values
may jeopardize crucial featuresof liberalism itself.This problem occa-
sionally afflictsthe work of Walzer. For example, by allowing his def-
erence to extantcommunityvalues to lead him to definejustice strictly
in termsof the self-understandings of a particularcommunity,Walzer's
theoryadopts a standpoint which appears to "re-endorse"the status-
586 The Western
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quo (Smith 1986: 123). As a consequence, Walzer's approach, his own

political aims notwithstanding,gives liberalism little in the way of
critical purchase. This is a vexing situationin which to finda political
"ideology" that once paraded its credentials as criticof the statusquo.
A comparable problem attends Rawls's descriptionof liberal jus-
tice. By foresakingdeontology and by [re]definingjustice so that it
conformsto the considered intuitionsof contemporarycitizens, Rawls
risks purchasing a communitarian situatedness at the expense of an
inordinateparochialism(O'Neill 1988). To wit, once "justiceas fairness"
expresses nothing more than the moral inclinations of present-day,
Anglo-American liberals, it may have littleif anythingto say to those
residing outside the jurisdiction of Anglo-American political regimes.
Thus, Rawls risks abandoning liberalism's traditionalaim to speak to
and for those beyond its present reach: he retreatsfromliberalism's
commitmentto articulatevalues of general, indeed universal,relevance.
LOOKING BEYOND LIBERALISM

Given such difficulties,it is not surprisingthat other liberals seek
to supplement whatever measure of situatedness they can secure by
buttressingliberalism itself. Their aim is to avoid sacrificingeither
liberalism'suniversalistaspirationsor its criticaland prescriptivepower.
Often this is done by turning directly to some non-liberal political
vision, say that of Aristotleor the civic-humanists,and attemptingto
append these "ideologies" to liberal ideals. Consider, forinstance, the
labors of William Sullivan (1982), Mark Tushnet (1988), and Lawr-
ence Tribe (1985). In Sullivan's case, a suspicion thatAnglo-American
liberalism leaves individuals too isolated and too morally rudderless
leads to the conclusion that liberal values need to be supplementedby
the sense of community and virtue inherent in civic-republicanism.
Hence, Sullivan calls forthe developmentof a public philosophycapa-
ble of blending the equal freedomof liberalism with the participatory
vigorand the moral rectitudeof republicanism.This is a themerepeated
in Sullivan's work with Robert Bellah on Habits of theHeart(1985), a
book that reprises de Tocqueville's anxieties about the American pol-
ity. Here, too, stress is placed on the need to alleviate the corrosive
effectsof an unvarnished liberal individualism with a strongdose of
republican virtuosity.Presumably this step will cure the anomic ail-
ments diagnosed by liberalism's communitariancritics.
In a similar vein, Tushnet's (1988) explorationof the condition of
liberal, constitutionaljurisprudence elicits the conclusion that some-
thingis amiss. Liberalism cannot,on its own terms,justifysuch practices

as judicial review. Hence, Tushnet avers, liberalism needs to employ
the resources of the civic-republicanand the participatorydemocrat to
strengthenits own case. Likewise, Lawrence Tribe (1985: 203-10)
takes the Supreme Court to task forproducing decisions that, though
framed in accord with the procedural niceties of classical liberalism,
are substantivelyskewed in favorof those possessing substantial socio-
economic resources. This decision-makingpattern can only be recti-
fiedifthe liberal values of rightsand individual freedomare tempered
by the egalitarian impulse of the participatorydemocrat. Again, it is
hoped that this adjustmentto judicial practice will fostera community
of active,equal participantsof the sortdesiredby some communitarians.
The difficultywith such arguments is that what they append to
liberalism is oftenincompatible with liberalism proper. It is hard, for
example, to square the republican's desire for participatoryzeal and
patriotismwith the liberal's quest forindividual autonomy. Consider,
forinstance, the possibilitythat I do not wish to participatepolitically.
What if I simply wish to be left alone? Such a desire may be short-
sighted--and thoroughlyinimical to Sullivan's version of republican-
ism- but is it beyond the pale forliberalism? Likewise, it is hard to
mesh a thorough-goingegalitarianismof the sortthat appeals to Tribe
with the liberal ethos. In this regard, how many rights-claimsmust I
abridge in order to promote substantive equality? Finally, the quest
forcommunityentails special problems fora society as heterogeneous
as America's. How much pluralism will need to be sacrificed, how
many people will be "forcedto be free,"in order to achieve the moral
purposivenessthat Sullivan and Bellah feel is lacking in contemporary
liberal democraticregimes? In sum, how much liberalism is to be sac-
rificedin order to save liberalism fromitself?
Rather than relyingon ad hoc supplements to liberalism that are
meant to remedy the anti-communalism of liberal political culture,
but which put at riskcore elementsof liberalism itself,William Galston
(1988) approaches things in another way. He combines a deontologi-
cal bent with a neo-Aristotelianteleology in his reconstructionof the
liberal scheme. And he is careful not to permit this effortto threaten
essential liberal values. To do all this, Galston begins by isolating the
predicatesof secular moral agency. Specifically,he contendsthatmoral
agency presumes that humans consider action to be worthwhile,that
they think there is a point to their endeavors, and that they are pre-
pared to pursue their ends within the bounds imposed by reason. In
588 The Western
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fact,Galston findsthese deontological premises implicitin the workof

Rawls. Speaking of the latter,Galston notes that "Rawls's theorypre-
supposes individuals who value their earthlyexistence, who give pos-
itive weight to the achievement of their own purposes, and who are
prepared to accept rationalityas a constraint on social action and
principle"(Galston 1988: 1285). Of course, standingalone thesedeontic
presuppositionssay ratherlittle: theycould be applied with equal ease
to well-nigh every secular moral scheme. There is nothing uniquely
liberal about them, but, then, they are not meant to be the special
possession of any particular ideology.
Consequently, Galston moves to fleshout these presuppositionsas
theyapply to an especially liberal vision of political life. To do so, he
develops what he terms the "liberal virtues." These neo-Aristotelian
creatures are of two sorts. First there are those "instrumentalliberal
virtues," norms such as law-abidingness and participation (Galston
1988: 1281), that both describe and make possible the practice of a
liberal politics. These instrumentalvirtuespurportedlyreflectfacetsof
the actual political practices found withinliberal regimes. Thus, they
help to situateGalston's vision of liberal virtuosity.Next, thereare the
"intrinsicliberal virtues"(1988: 1286). These virtues of "rational self-
direction,""autonomy,"and "mutual respect"derivefromthe predicates
of secular agency that Galston's deontological theorizing establishes
are at the core of human action. In other words, each of the intrinsic
virtues can be deduced from the presupposition that ethico-political
agents must deem theiractions to be potentiallyeffective,worthy,and
rational.
More significantstill, these "intrinsicvirtues"are required forthe
task of investingliberalism with ethical criteriathat will give it both
evaluative and prescriptivepowers. Knowing these virtues supposedly
enables us to judge which actions furtherthe appropriate aims of a
liberal polity.In short,these virtuesare to bridge the chasm Kant saw
separating our a priori "duty" as rational beings and our capacity to
discern what this "duty"actually entails in concretesituations.Hence,
Galston situates his vision of liberal politics throughhis instrumental
virtues:thesevirtuesgroundhis politicson the behaviorsand procedures
required fora well-orderedregime. Then, he imbues these behaviors
with an ethico-politicalpurpose, that is, he invests them with a telos,
by way of his intrinsicvirtues. And finally,he justifies these latter
virtues by deriving them fromthe deontological predicates of moral
agency.
Suggestive as Galston's approach may be, it is not without

problems. To see why, assume that his instrumentalvirtuesdo ground
his politics. Hence, they satisfythe communitarians' quest for in-
junctions that are both reflectiveof actual practices and conducive
to collective action. Still, these instrumentalvirtues are not enough.
Without the intrinsic virtues of rational self-direction,autonomy,
and mutual respect, the instrumentalvirtues do not give a citizen
sufficient guidance. Led only by the instrumental virtues, the
citizen does not know which laws require obedience, or how and when
to participate. She requires the intrinsic,telicvirtues if she is to act
purposefully.
But there is a problem here, for the intrinsicvirtues are rather
abstract. Of course, Galston (1988: 1286) insists that these intrinsic
virtues make "substantive" demands of liberal citizens, and so they
must if they are to frame our decisions. Yet it is not clear what sub-
stantial injunction is contained, say, in the virtue of "rational self-
direction." What does followingthis virtue entail? Is there more than
one way of practicingrational self-direction?If so, is one of these ways
more "liberal" than another? Likewise, does abiding by the intrinsic
virtue of "mutual respect" mean that I must treat others as equals?
And are these others equal in all or only in some respects? Finally,
does vigorousparticipationin civic affairspromotepersonal "autonomy,"
or can it occasionally detract fromit?
Galston does not answer these questions foran obvious reason. To
do so would entail a rejectionof his own commitmentto the idea that
there are a multiplicityof conceptionsof the "good life,"each of which
is compatible with the deontological "good" of rational moral agency.
And, as a liberal, he feelsthat he must respect this diversity.In other
words, providing more substance to the intrinsicvirtues than he does
would tie Galston to an especial vision of the "good." Since he is
unprepared forthis, since he is unwilling to abandon his allegiance to
liberal pluralism and neutrality(1988: 1287), he is forcedto leave his
intrinsicvirtues in a rather vague and insubstantial state. As such,
they are framed so loosely thatjust about any political scheme would
meet their demands. Hence, they lack the capacity to provide that
very direction to a liberal politics that Galston hopes to elicit from
them. In short,these intrinsicvirtueshave that abstractedand unsitu-
ated quality so irksome to the communitarians: they do not success-
fullybridge the gap between the deontological predicates fromwhich
theyderive and the instrumentalvirtuesto which theyare supposed to
590 The Western
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give meaning and purpose. The liberal citizen is left,then, at a loss as

to how she ought to act.
The power of Galston's proposals is furtherdiminishedby the ten-
sion between his instrumentaland his intrinsicvirtues. As he notes,
there may be times when, to take one example, the instrumentalvir-
tue of law-abidingnesswill run counterto the intrinsicvirtue of auton-
omous self-direction.Indeed, Galston (1988: 1288) declares that such
conflictsare the stuffof politics in a liberal state. Perhaps this is so.
But how do we know this ifthere is not more substance to the intrinsic
virtues than simply the admonition to act rationallyand in a morally
uprightfashion?Likewise, if such conflictsdo exist, how are theyto be
adjudicated? To wit, how do I know when rational self-directiondic-
tates obedience to the law and when it demands, say, civil disobedi-
ence? How much participationdoes the injunctionto autonomyrequire?
Without answers to such questions, it is simply not clear what an
awareness of the intrinsicvirtues contributesto my decision-making.
More to the point, these questions intimateanother problem with
the relationshipbetween the instrumentaland the intrinsicvirtues.
Specifically, they suggest that there is a too-sharp split between the
situated, instrumentalvirtues and the insubstantial, intrinsicones. I
can get a handle on the former.I have an idea what is meant by the
injunctionto obey the law, and I can understand why such obedience
is necessary to a well-orderedstate. But I have a harder time with the
notion that I am to pursue rational autonomy. Granted, this virtue is
appealing. But since there are few,regardless of theirpolitical predis-
positions,who openly renounce it, it is not clear what special demands
this virtue places on liberals. Thus, there seems to be a rathermarked
differencebetween the instrumentalvirtues which are clear, practica-
ble, and especially relevantto the workingsof a liberal regime and the
intrinsic virtues, which are obscure, theoretical, and, presumably,
pertinentto any formof politics, be it liberal or not.
That thisdistinctionshouldexistis not surprising.Afterall, Galston
selected his instrumentalvirtues precisely because they describe pat-
terns of behavior which both experience and common sense intimate
are necessary fora well-ordered,liberal-democraticregime. The gen-
esis of the instrumentalvirtuesis to be found in the on-going practices
of liberal citizens. In contrast, the intrinsic virtues are deductions
fromthe predicatesof moral agency: theirorigin is in the realm of the
a priori. Given their differentsources, it is to be expected that these
two formsof virtue mighthave littlein common. Hence, Galston con-
In Defense
ofLiberalism 591
cludes with a disjunction between theory and practice, and with no

formulaindicating how this gap might be bridged. As a result, com-
munitarians, though pleased by the situatedness of the instrumental
virtues,are likelyto dismissthe intrinsicones as simplyanotherinstance
of liberal deontology.
AN OVERVIEW
The liberal responses to communitarianismappear, then, to lead
into a series of cul-de-sacs. If liberals employ an unalloyed deontology,
they are castigated for their unsituated-ness:their political ideals are
derided as abstract and insubstantial. However, when they adopt a
communitarianperspectivethey are accused of sacrificingliberal uni-
versalism and re-endorsingthe status quo. Finally, if they attemptto
avoid all this by adding some non-liberal vision, say that of civic-
republicanism, to theirliberal ideals, theyare taken to task forunder-
mining liberalism itself.The question, then, is whetherthere is a way
out of all this; is there a way to answer the communitarianswithout
succumbing to one or more of the problems suggested above?
One responseto thisquery is to attackthe critics.As Allan Buchanan
(1989) suggests, communitarians can be asked to account for their
own ethico-politicalcommitments.To date, no satisfactoryexposition
has been forthcoming.For all theirfelicitousrhetoric,the communitar-
ians have not, Buchanan avers, articulated a convincing rationale for
theirown pronouncements.They have not shown, forexample, why a
commitmentto a life of vigorous participationin communityaffairsis
a political good thatought to be fosteredeven at the expense of certain
liberal freedoms.Nor have theyexplained how theypropose to square
the demands of communitywith theirown commitmentto individual,
moral autonomy(e.g., Taylor 1976, 1979). In fact,as Irwin (1989: 45)
contends in his analysis of MacIntyre, it is not even clear that the
communitarianargument is itselflogically coherent.
Useful as these retortsto the communitariansmay be, they have
theirlimits.Afterall, enumeratingthe inadequacies of your opponent's
views, though psychologicallygratifying,does not establish the ade-
quacy of your own. The need, then, is fora vision of liberalism that,
thoughsituated,retains a sense of universalismand an appreciationof
basic liberal commitments;a vision that, though universalistic,pro-
vides substantial guidelines foractual decision-making.
While a full-blownrenderingof such a vision may be beyond our
grasp, some tentativesteps in its direction are possible. To see how,
592 The Western
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consideragain the communitarians'allegationsagainst liberalism. Basi-

cally, the latter come in two forms."Ends-oriented" communitarians
take liberalism to task forits failure to promote strongcommunal ties
withinthe polity. For these criticsliberalism's shortcomingsare moral
and prescriptive:because of its concern for such things as privacy,
rights,and individual freedom,liberalism allegedly does not espouse
the correctpolitical telosor "good." Instead, it fostersa society of iso-
lated and rootless individuals. In contrast,"analytic" communitarians
are more concerned by liberalism'sfailureto appreciate the social con-
stitutionof the person. For these critics,liberalism's shortcomingsare
empirical and epistemological.
By now both of these charges have been answered. The writingsof
Rawls and Walzer establish that there is nothing inherentlyanti- or
asocial about liberal conceptionsof distributivejustice. Likewise, Fred
Alford (1989) demonstratesthat strong, even intimate, interpersonal
bonds are possible within a liberal polity. Grant (1989) proposes that
liberal man's wants include a desire for the good will of others, and
Buchanan (1989) argues persuasivelythat there is nothingwithin the
liberal scheme of things that precludes either a socially constituted
reading of the liberal citizen or a polity in which the citizens seek
communal bonds. In sum, liberal citizens can be understood to be
products of their social world, they can have desires that tie them to
others,theycan even pursue a life of active civic participation.Hence,
there is nothing in contemporaryliberalism that recoils from the
communitarians' empirical understanding of human beings or pre-
vents the pursuit of the communitarians'political ends. Why, then, all
the controversy?
The answers to this question are contained in what has been said
so far. Retrospectively,it seems safe to say that the liberal was not
always prepared to announce the communitariancharacterof his polit-
ical vision: the factthathis politics could be situatedand could permit
active civic engagement passed unappreciated and unnoticed (for an
exception, see Mill 1861: 31). Unnoticed, that is, until the likes of
Sandel, MacIntyre, and Taylor forcedliberals to [re]frametheir pro-
nouncements so that liberalism's communitarian possibilities became
more apparent. In making this shift,however,new problems came to
the fore.To wit, now thatliberalism was situated,was it not also paro-
chial? Now that we know that political liberalism is not antitheticalto
the presence of strong communities within the polity, how do we
explain the liberal concern for rights, for autonomy, for individual
freedom? Here, then, we arrive at the difficultiesfaced by Buchanan

and Galston. In short,even ifwe suspect that the communitariancrit-
icisms of liberalism can be circumvented,even if we thinkliberalism
permits a social rendering of the self and a collective, participatory
thrustto liberal politics,how do we square these possibilitieswith tra-
ditional liberal ideals and aspirations?
As yet our answers to this question are inadequate. Still, one thing
is clear. While more and more liberals have adopted communitarian
coloration, they have not done so without risk: they have weakened
liberalism's critical purchase and its universalistaspirations. To avoid
these losses, some liberals have drawn upon non-liberal political ide-
ologies. Some have turned to republicanism, others to participatory
democracy, and yet others to Aristotle.But in each instance, still fur-
ther problems have emerged. Put bluntly, it has proven difficultto
keep intactliberal ideals thatare ensconced withinnon-liberalschemes.
This suggests that if liberal political theoryis to flourish,it will need
to find withinitselfthe resources required to defend and account for
itself.
It suggests somethingelse as well. Some of the difficulty liberals
have had may stem fromthe approach they have taken. For all their
variety,most contemporaryexpositions of liberalism continue to rely
on a search forthose principleswhich will vindicate the liberal persua-
sion; they seek to put liberalism on secure, philosophically-justifying
grounds. This is readily apparent in Galston's case, and remains so as
well even in Rawls's more recent reformulations.But it may be that a
differenttack is warranted.
A MORE SUBSTANTIAL LIBERALISM
In order to get some purchase on a more satisfactoryvision of lib-

eral politics,let us agree, then, that the presuppositionsof Rawls and
Galston are correct. Any secular political theory must assume that
individuals or, as Kant would have it, all rational beings see their
actions as potentiallymeaningfuland evaluable; and that as a conse-
quence, rational self-direction,autonomy,and mutual respect consti-
tute appropriate featuresof life within a good polity. Let us further
accept, in line with Godel's Theorem, that there is no way to prove
these presuppositions:theyare at the limits of political theorizing.We
cannot do withoutthem precisely because they are entwined in our
notion of ethico-political agency itself; and we cannot prove them
594 The Western
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because any proof would require the use of a language drawn from
outside the realm of political discourse. Finally, let us concur with the
communitarians'most elemental empirical claims: humans are social
creatures. The ways in which humans thinkand act are, in good mea-
sure, framed by their social milieu. Is there a way to link these pre-
suppositionswith the actual behavior of liberal citizens such that some
sense can be made of a liberal politics? In short, is there a way to
bridge the gaps between the transcendentalveritiesof deontology,the
"truths"of human behavior, and the empirical "facts of life" in a lib-
eral democratic regime? I thinkso. But I also suspect that the way to
approach this task reversesthe route taken by many liberal theorists.
As we have seen, for example, Galston tries to move from his
deontological predicates into the realm of practical politics by way of
his liberal virtues. But in so doing, he comes close to breaking his
commitmentto liberal pluralism. To avoid this, Galston leaves his
intrinsicvirtues in an insubstantial state: these virtues remain in the
sphere of the deontological predicates. Similarly, Buchanan tries to
establish that a respect forliberal political ideals is a preconditionfor
the developmentof those integratedcommunitiessoughtby some com-
munitarians. A "real" communitypresupposes, Buchanan avers, that
its members have freelychosen theircommitments.This sounds good,
it replays ideas made familiar by Mill (1859), but it too rests on the
assumption thatwe can derive practical, political injunctionsfromthe
predicates of moral agency. In short, Buchanan, too, seeks to move
fromthe deontologyof freeagency down to actual politics.
If we come at all this fromanother direction,I thinkwe can make
more headway. Let us abandon the effortto deduce practical injunc-
tions fromdeontological predicates. And let us not entangle ourselves
tryingto show how the realization of these predicatesin actual practice
is a preconditionforthe existenceof meaningfulcommunities.Instead,
let us see these predicates of agency for what they are: to wit, the
boundary conditionsformodern political thought.They are the limits
within which political discourse- any political discourse- proceeds.
Though theyare unprovable, theyare also indisputable. The only way
to reject them is to step outside the sphere of political discourse. So
while the religiouszealot or the behavioral reductionistmay have little
tolerancefor"rationalself-direction," "autonomy,"and "mutual respect,"
the political agent is constitutedby them.
However, the fact that these ideals set the limits of political dis-
course means that it is difficultto deduce only and uniquely liberal
injunctions from them. With a little imagination, it is possible to

derive the virtuesrequired of a thoroughlyilliberal regime fromthese
predicates; and to do so withoutviolating the notions of "rational self-
direction,""autonomy,"and "mutual respect." All that is required is a
sufficiently flexible reading of the predicates themselves. As it hap-
pens, both Galston and Rawls demand just such flexibility:they fear
that in its absence both political pluralism and liberal neutralitywill
be lost (Galston 1988: 1288, n.1). So, if we are to avoid building lib-
eralism on so shiftinga foundationthat any political injunctions can
be legitimatelyconstructedon it, we need to begin not withdeontologi-
cal predicates of agency but with the details of life within a liberal
democraticregime. As Kant (1785: 3) said when confrontinga similar
situation, we must rely on a practical "judgment sharpened by
experience. . . " consequently, we should frame our injunctions as
well as account for our liberal ideals on the basis of actual, liberal
practices, ratherthan tryingto deduce and justifyliberalism fromthe
rather too-porous notions of self-directionand rational autonomy. If
we do so aright, both our injunctionsand our ideals will be situated.
And theywill also, by definition,fitwithin the limits imposed by the
deontological predicates.
Parenthetically,none of this implies that the transcendentalpred-
icates are useless and best forgotten;in fact, theyhave a role to play.
Specifically,even though they cannot provide substantial direction to
decision-making- even thoughtheyare too vague to give us the "good"
solution to every political controversy--theycan indicate which deci-
sions and policies are beyond the pale. For example, we may not know
exactly what formof affirmativeaction program reflectsan appropri-
ate commitmentto Galston's intrinsicvirtue of "mutual respect," but
we do know that the policy of apartheid does not. In this way, then,
the transcendentalpredicates,as well as the virtuesderived fromthem,
serve as checks on our decision-making.They may not tell us what we
should do, but they can steer us away from that which we need to
avoid.
Now, then, we need to see how an approach to defendingliberal-
ism based on actual practices might work, and how this differsfrom
the schemes examined so far. Consider, therefore,a crucial, liberal
political ideal, to wit, the notion of "rights"understood as "negative"
freedoms. As one might expect, Galston's scheme suggests that the
justificationforsuch rightsis to be found in the predicates of rational,
moral agency. that is, "rights"are, like the intrinsicvirtues, deduced
596 The Western
PoliticalQuarterly
fromthe "good." Hence, these "rights"are valued because theypermit

the realization of rational and meaningfulautonomy. In point of fact,
however,I suspect thatthe appeal of "rights"has a more earthysource
and, hence, a more prosaic rationale. As denizen of a liberal demo-
cratic regime, I esteem my negative liberties not because they reflect
transcendentaltruth,but because theygive me an opportunityto pur-
sue my desires withoutfear of interferenceby others.That is, my most
elemental self-awareness--my most rudimentary mode of nosce
teipsum - informsme that I am a desiring being. Before anythingelse,
I am conscious of the fact that I have wants, and that I wish to have
these wants satisfied. Moreover, it is these wants that put me, in
Hobbes's (1651: 160) phrase, into "motion." Thus, the startingpoint
forboth my actions and my cogitations,be they political or not, is to
be found in my quest forfelicity.
As a member of a liberal society, though, no sooner do I begin
pursuing my desires than I realize that otherscan inhibitmy endeav-
ors, they can preventme fromachieving felicity,they can restrictmy
actions, theycan seize thatwhich I want. In fact,theycan even coerce
me into serving theirwill. This realization leads me to want a sphere
of activityin which my will reigns, if not supreme, at least unfettered.
I want, in short, guarantees as to my freedomof movement. Conse-
quently,along withthosearound me, I begin enumeratingthose actions
which each of us may undertakefreefromexternalinterference.There
will probably be a consensus that some of these enumerated actions
ought to be unfettered.Additionally,we may agree that certain types
of actions will be left to the individual simply because we lack the
power to impose a preferredpattern of behavior on others. Finally,
some acts will be leftto the individual because we thinkthem precon-
ditions for the exercise of other, appropriately independent choices.
Roughly speaking, then, this is how we come to frameour "rights."Of
course, this picture is incomplete. It says nothingabout why a partic-
ular set of rightsis selected, nor about whetherconflictsover rightsare
to be adjudicated by an awesome leviathan or a limited state. Neither
does it anticipate the explosion of rights-claimsthat comes after we
begin to appreciate the political and rhetoricalutilityof announcing
that our actions are undertaken as a matter of right. But for the
moment, these mattersare not especially important.
What is significantis that this snapshot of the genesis of rights,
while too commonplace to push very far, nonethelesssuggests several
advantages to be gained by deriving our commitmentto rightsfrom
our wantsratherthan fromsome transcendentalpredicates.For instance,

such a derivation reflectstheir actual source. The moral notions we
have, the ideals that we proclaim, are precipitates of our desires as
well as of the experiences that we have in pursuit of them. Only after
the fact do these moral notions achieve the airy and refinedstatus of
deductions fromfirstprinciples. In addition, seeing rightsas products
of wants ensures that our discussion of them will be situated. Rights-
claims can be seen as grounded on and emanating from the actual
desires of people.
By extension,embedding our understandingof rights,and indeed
all of our liberal commitments,in our wants and actions ensures that
these values have prescriptivepower, even if only a parochial one.
Since these rightsemanate fromactual circumstances,since they are
fashionedin order to deal with concreteproblems, theyspeak to these
problems directly.For example, though we have given the idea of a
rightto freespeech a paramount place in our ideological pantheon, it
stillprovides us with substantial guidance in our decision-making.We
can, in actual situations,get a sense of what this ideal demands. And
while we may not all agree on the implications of this standard in
everycircumstance,we can nonethelessengage in a meaningfuldialogue.
Consider, for instance, the recent controversysurrounding the
"desecrationof the flag." Differentsides in this debate can understand
what the other is saying, and they can recognize that competing val-
ues are at play withintheirarguments. For instance, since I favorfree
political speech, even of the expressive sort, my commitmentto the
rightof free speech leads me to support the Supreme Court decision
Texasv. Johnson (105 L. Ed. 2nd 342 (1989)). At the same time, I know
that those seeking an outrightban on "flag-burning"do not fall within
one camp. Some wish to limit free expression for the sake of some
othervalue, call it symbolicchauvinism. Others wish to preserve free
expression while banning the behavior of flag desecration. These pol-
icy differencesnotwithstanding,we can engage one another in a dia-
logue. Since our discourse is situatedin our on-goingpractices, since it
is constitutedby our shared vocabulary, we can each recognize what
the other is saying, and what values each is pursuing.
Lastly, such a situated view of our rights-claimsallows for that
flexibilitycharacteristicof our day-to-daypractices. Afterall, rights
are absolute only when they become ensnared in the rhetoric of
deontology. In practice, be it legal, political, or social, we recognize
that rightsare bounded: that, to use Flathman's (1984) terminology,
598 The Western
PoliticalQuarterly
rights can be "moderated." For example, I may have rights to free

speech, to the use of my property,to privacy, etc. But each of these
can be abridged in the face of other, competing rights.Indeed, each
can even be restrictedby a demonstrationof"compellingstateinterest."
To returnto the example at hand, some argue that the polity'sneed
for unifyingsymbols legitimates restrictionson flag desecration, so
long as these restrictionsdo not inhibitfree,political speech. The fact
that this argument can be made, that I can make sense of it, that I
may even accept limitationson my rightsas legitimate, can only be
explained if I find the source of my rightsto be within the on-going
practices of the communityof which I am a part. For were I to see
rightsas emanating fromtranscendentalprinciples,each limitationon
them would be unprincipled and illegitimate. Further, were "rights"
transcendentalthings, I would need to discover a calculus to employ
on those occasions when rights conflictedor when compelling state
interestsoverwhelmed them. This latter task would surely push me
still furtherinto the indecipherable ether and, as a consequence, sub-
ject me to yet furthercommunitariancriticism.
Thus, our "rights"are fabrications.Granted, they are especially
powerfulrhetoricaldevices. They have a unique place in our political
vocabulary; hence, the frequentlyobserved effortof political interests
to convert their preferencesinto rights-claims.But this merely con-
firmsour sense that "rights"are artificescreated in response to the
circumstances we meet in our quest for felicity.And they are given
theirparticularcontentin responseto the particularsituationsin which
we findourselves at the time we framethem.
The same is no doubt true for our other liberal values and com-
mitments:theytoo have theirsource in our pursuit of happiness. As a
matter of fact, as I examine my wants furtherI discover that along
with my quest for such traditionallyliberal goals as "freedom" and
"privacy," I also desire things which entail an involvementwith oth-
ers. My experiences withinthe family,forexample, suggest the felic-
ity to be had throughintimacy,while my engagement in civic affairs,
perhaps initiated for personal benefit, reveals the instrumentaland
intrinsicrewards of collective endeavors. Additionally my participa-
tion in a division of labor informsme of the practical worthof mutual
exchange. Thus, the satisfactionof my wants leads me into a variety
of interactionswith others,each of which relies on and constitutesits
own peculiar formof "community."In this sense, then, my wants as
liberal citizen make me a communally"constitutedself"(Walzer 1990:
21). What this suggests is that the liberal is not merely a privatized
acquisitor locked in a perpetual strugglewith others,nor is she inces-
santly driven by the fear that others are about to exploit her. Such
fearsmay be part of her constitution,but theyare not all of it. Equally
a part of the liberal citizen is the search for communityand for the
rewards of collectiveenterprise.Indeed, it is preciselythe presence of
these communitiesthat both allow forand elicit my concern forrights.
But even ifthis is so, even ifthe pursuit of personal autonomyand
rights is tempered as well as constitutedby an equally compelling
drive forcollectiveties, how can we get beyond the suspicion that our
commitmentto liberal, political values is anythingmore than coinci-
dence? How can we see these values as somethingotherthan the paro-
chial and ephemeral preferencesof agents who just happen to live in
liberal democratic regimes? In short, how can we invest our varied
liberal commitments,admittedlythe product of our unique situation,
with a more enduring and expansive appeal?
First, of course, we can contend that the commitment to such
thingsas "rights,""freedom,"and "mutual respect," conformwith the
requirementsof the deontological predicates of secular moral agency
outlinedby Rawls and Galston. And theydo. Certainly there is every
reason to believe that these liberal values reflectthe ideals of "rational
self-direction,""autonomy," and "mutual respect." But as we noted,
this does not mean very much: it does not ensure the uniqueness of
liberalism. Nor does it secure the incontrovertiblecharacter of liberal
values. Other, competingmoral schemes can meet the rathertoo-loose
stricturesof these predicates with equal ease.
Second, we can and should establish the coherence of liberalism:
we should demonstratethe consistencyboth of our values and of our
actions. For example, we can show how a principledand liberal regime
allows forthe existenceof "rights,"fostersthe practice of "freechoice,"
and promotes"mutual respect." In so doing, we announce, in Ronald
Dworkin's (1986) words, the "integrity"of our political vision. This is
to the good. It implies that our values are not merely an aggregation
of transientand unrelated preferences.Rather, theyconstitutea fam-
ily of commitmentsthat are systematicallylinked with one another.
Moreover, this step allows us to satisfyHollis's (1975) hint that any
respectable ethico-politicalscheme ought to demand a coherent life
plan fromthose who espouse it. But even with all this, we cannot say
that liberal values somehow "trump" every competing ideology. For
other political schemes may also have the attributeof internal consis-
600 The Western
PoliticalQuarterly
tency. But if neitherliberalism's potential for integrityand coherence

nor its capacity to meet the standards of the deontological predicates
will suffice,how, then, are we to convince othersthat liberalism is the
best, or at least a better,political regime? How can we secure forlib-
eralism a more universal appeal?
In the end, I suspect that the best we can do is to practice liberal-
ism: to pursue politics in a way that accords well with the liberal con-
cern for the equal freedomof each citizen. Thus, any enduring and
widespread appeal that liberalism ultimatelysecures will result from
the desirabilityof the liberal way of life that we practice. Others may
be drawn to liberalism, theymay (or may not) findits politics estima-
ble and worthy.But iftheydo, it will not be because we produce some
'irrefutable'philosophical demonstrationof the superiorityof liberal-
ism. Instead, it will be because liberalism appears to them a compel-
ling and attractiveway of going about politics that addresses theirown
wants and needs in an effectivefashion.
This may seem a rathertimorousconclusion: it lacks the panache
of incontrovertibleproofs. But politics is not an activitythat offerstoo
much in the way of clarity,nor admits too much in the way of proof.
Even so, thisconclusionmay not be quite as tentativeas it firstappears.
In fact, there is reason to believe that liberal political ideals, both as
espoused and as (haltingly) effectedin liberal polities, have gained a
wide following. Some have even suggested that the Western ideal of
liberal democracy stands triumphant,its ideological opponents either
exhausted or discredited. Admittedly, this suggestion unduly over-
states and simplifiesmatters: in the rush to announce the success of
liberal ideology,both the tensionswithincontemporaryliberalism and
the enduring appeal of nationalist, ethnic, and sectarian rhetoricare
overlooked. Still, theremay be somethingto this claim. The actions of
the students in Beijing and recent developments in Eastern Europe
proclaim the resonance of liberal ideals; so, too, do the aspirations of
many in southernAfrica. And while it is true, as the suppression in
Tiananmen Square demonstrates,that steps toward a more liberal pol-
itics can be halted by force,and theycan be sidetrackedby the replay-
ing of traditional ethnic hostilities,witness the travails of Romania
and Yugoslavia, still what is at work in these situationsis not an alter-
native political vision to thatof liberalism. Often, it is pure and simple
force.
Finally, too, there is the word of liberalism'smost daunting critics,
the communitarians.For all theirreservations,forall theirassaults, in
the end even they tend to speak of liberal values with considerable
respect. MacIntyre may announce the virtue of strong communities
which fosterthe development of those coherent narrativeswhich can
investour lives withmeaning, and Sullivan may fearthe nihiliststrains
withinliberalism, but both swear allegiance to the accomplishmentsof
a liberal politics. Much the same may be said of Taylor. His challenge
to liberalism aside, it is to its values of freedomand autonomythat he
is attached. Hence, the appeal of liberalism is to be seen in the follow-
ing it has acquired as well as in the attractivenessof its way of address-
ing human wants and desires. No more compelling defense of liberal-
ism is feasible; certainlynothingmore is politicallynecessary. As Mill
(1861: 34) put it, "we have not only all the proof which the case
admits of, but all of which it is possible to require. ... "
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Some will be dismayed by what is suggested here. A few may

indict it forimperialisticallyimposing Western,liberal values on those
who do not share this"ideology." They will contend thatthe liberalism
espoused above is predicated on parochial, Western conceptions of
personhood, of desiring, and the like; and theywill suspect that com-
mending this vision to others is tantamountto advising the latter to
foresaketheirown ethico-politicalconvictions.Of course, thiscultural-
relativistanxiety derives fromWestern, indeed liberal, commitments
to tolerance and pluralism. So the concerns of the relativistare really
those of the liberal; as long as the values of tolerance and pluralism
are honored, the extensionof liberal values can, as recent events sug-
gest, be more the result of emulation than of coercion.
In contrast, other critics may think the present suggestions too
modest: theywill be disappointed by the factthat a liberalism built-up
from the wants of liberal citizens is not likely to produce a scheme
repletewithdemands fora full-bodiedsense ofautonomyand a thorough-
going egalitarianism. Instead, "negativefreedom"and somethingakin
to the "differenceprinciple" are more likely to be the desired norms.
But while this may disappoint some, and while a more positive vision
of freedom and a more complete equality could be appropriate ends
forliberal politics, securing even a minimally egalitarian distribution
of resources as well as some measure of negative liberty ought to
sufficefor now. For those in America's inner cities, for those of the
'democracy movement'in China, and forthose contestingapartheid in
602 The Western
PoliticalQuarterly
South Africa, achieving even these modest goals will be a substantial

step forward.Put differently, Marx may have been partly rightwhen
he intimatedthat the liberal's political equality is hollow in the face of
gross socioeconomic inequalities. Still, the norms of "equality before
the law" and "one man, one vote" are not empty: theydo mean some-
thing. Likewise, "negative liberty"may seem pale when compared to
its more positive cousins. But that hardly means that its realization
will not be a real and substantial gain formany of those strugglingfor
freedomtoday.
Finally, some may be anxious about the earthy foundations
undergirdingthe liberalism offeredhere: they will be troubled by its
lack of an inspiring,justificatoryedifice. To wit, "rights"that emanate
fromwants,"freedoms"thatderivefroma will to act, and "communities"
that emerge in response to mundane desires seem intellectuallydis-
abled. A liberalism constitutedby such notions provides little in the
way of secure and incorrigiblefirstprinciples.However, "rights"derived
fromwants and "communities"developed in response to desires, may,
their philosophical disabilities aside, prove vigorous and compelling:
politically,at least, it is fromjust such wants and desires that liberal
ideals emerge. And it is the implementationof these ideals in actual
practice that gives liberalism its vitality.
Perhaps, then, political theoristsneed to move away froman essen-
tialistapproach. Rather thanjustifyingliberalism by deducing it from
principleswhose substance remains foreverbeyond our grasp, we will
accomplish more if we can simply account forthe values that liberals
espouse. We can describe the source of these values in the wants of
human beings, we may trackthe ways in which these values are linked
to one another to forma coherentscheme of politics, and we can sug-
gestwhythisliberal way of going about politicsseems especiallyrespon-
sive to the wants of human beings in both their private and public
lives. Granted, such endeavors abandon the quest for transcendent
foundations: they leave the defense of liberalism to political practice
ratherthan to philosophic legislation. But as Locke mightput it, such
an "underlaborer's"approach need not abdicate the convictionthat lib-
eral values will appeal to a wide audience. Nor need such a liberalism
deny its capacity to provide substantial guidance to decision-making.
In fact,this formof liberalism can provide a model of political life for
others,and a sense of directionforthose living withinliberal regimes.
More than this can not to be expected of a liberal theoryof political
life.
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The titleofthisessaymay seem ironic,perhapsevenpointless.

The clearest example of liberal theory'seffortto absorb the com-

Received: September 26, 1989

tions as well as by his failure to promote tightlyintegrated,morally

justice is secured and tyrannyavoided by relyingon a multiplicityof

quo (Smith 1986: 123). As a consequence, Walzer's approach, his own

LOOKING BEYOND LIBERALISM

thingis amiss. Liberalism cannot,on its own terms,justifysuch practices

fact,Galston findsthese deontological premises implicitin the workof

Suggestive as Galston's approach may be, it is not without

give meaning and purpose. The liberal citizen is left,then, at a loss as

cludes with a disjunction between theory and practice, and with no

consideragain the communitarians'allegationsagainst liberalism. Basi-

freedom? Here, then, we arrive at the difficultiesfaced by Buchanan

A MORE SUBSTANTIAL LIBERALISM

In order to get some purchase on a more satisfactoryvision of lib-

injunctions from them. With a little imagination, it is possible to

fromthe "good." Hence, these "rights"are valued because theypermit

our wantsratherthan fromsome transcendentalpredicates.For instance,

rights can be "moderated." For example, I may have rights to free

tency. But if neitherliberalism's potential for integrityand coherence

Some will be dismayed by what is suggested here. A few may

South Africa, achieving even these modest goals will be a substantial

Taylor, C. 1976. "Responsibility for Self." In A. Rorty, ed., The Identitiesof

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