Husserl and Brentano On Intentionality

International Phenomenological Society
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Husserl and Brentano on Intentionality

Author(s): James C. Morrison
Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 31, No. 1 (Sep., 1970), pp. 27-46
Published by: International Phenomenological Society
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HUSSERL AND BRENTANO ON INTENTIONALITY
"Finally, many people view phenomenology as a continuation of Brentano's
psychology. However highly estimate this work of genius, and however strongly
it (and other writings of Brentano's) has affected me in younger years, it must
still be said that Brentano has remained far from a phenomenology in our
sense.... Nevertheless, he has gained for himself the epoch-making service
of making phenomenology possible. He presented to the modem era the idea
of Intentionality, which he derived out of consciousness itself in immanent
description . . ." 1
The above is general knowledge in the philosophical world. However,
it is often assumed on the basis of these facts alone that Husserl's doctrine
of Intentionality is essentially the same as Brentano's. Hence scholars will
study the latter in order to find out what Husserl's conception of it is
and critics will attempt to refute Husserl and even phenomenology in
general by refuting Brentano. This is a mistake. Although it is true as a
matter of historical fact that Husserl was Brentano's student and first
derived this idea from him, it is not true that the meaning and importance
each gives to it is the same, even in fundamentals. I believe that a failure
to realize this has led to a great deal of misinterpretation and misunder-
standing of Husserl and phenomenology. It is the purpose of this essay
to attempt to show that Husserl's phenomenological views are very
different from and far more developed than Brentano's, and that he even
rejects (wholly or in part) many of the latter's, most important doctrines.
In order to clarify this problem I propose to discuss Brentano's well-
known attempt to distinguish mental and physical phenomena in which
he introduces the notion of "Intentional Inexistence." I will then take Up
Husserl's views on both the general problem of mental vs. physical
phenomena and on the more specific one of Intentionality. No attempt
will be made to give a complete account of Husserl's own views on
Intentionality, since to do so adequately would imply a discussion of his
whole philosophy. Also, I will concentrate almost exclusively on material
from the Logische Untersuchungen, since it is here that he makes most
explicit and detailed reference to Brentano.
1 Edmund Husserl, Ideen III, Martinus Nijhoff, Haag 1952, p. 59.
27
28 PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH
I.
The basic purpose of Brentano's chapter, "On the Basic Difference
Between Mental and Physical Phenomena" is ". . . the clarification of
the two terms: physical [physisches] phenomenon - mental [psychisches]
phenomenon." 2 He begins by asserting that "The entire world of what
appears to us falls into two great classes, the class of physical and that
of mental phenomena." 3 Brentano assumes this division and its exhaus-
tiveness to be obvious for he never attempts to argue for it. The method
he adopts is simply to find at least one (perhaps several) specific defining
characteristic of each class, i.e., a characteristic that all members of one
class have and no members of the other have. I believe that Brentano, in
the course of his analysis, finds altogether eight defining characteristics
of mental phenomena, although he does not accord all of them equal
significance. From his own, Husserl's and our point of view the most
important is Intenitonal Inexistence.
The first defining characteristic is given in terms of the notion of
presentation (Vorstellung).
(1) "Every presentation of sensation or fantasies offers an example of mental phe-
nomena: and I understand here by presentation not that which is presented
but rather the act of presenting. Thus, the hearing of a tone, the seeing of a
colored object, the sensing of warm or cold, as well as similar fantasy states
are examples .... 4
Here Brentano makes an important distinction between what is presented
and the act of presenting, the implication being that all mental phenomena
are acts. Further examples of acts include: thinking, judging, remem-
brance, expectation, doubt, fear, and willing.5 Examples of physical
phenomena, on the other hand, are colors, figure, a landscape, warmth
and cold, and pictures (Gebilde) that appear in fantasie.6
2 Franz Brentano, Psychologie vom Empirischen Standpunkte, Vol. I, Dunker &
Humblot, Leipzig 1874, pp. 102-3. (Hereafter: Psych.)
3 Die gesammte Welt unserer Erscheinungen zerfllt in zwei grosse Classen, in
die Classe physische und in die der psychischen Phinomene." Note Brentano's use
of the term "Erscheinung!'; we will see later that its ambiguities lead him into
difficulties. Psych. 101.
4 Psych. 103.
5 Psych. 103.
6 Psych. 104. Note that Brentano does not distinguish here between a sense-
quality (e.g., a color) and a physical object (e.g., a landscape) - both are called
physical phenomena. This ambiguity will be seen to be important later, in that it
seriously confuses his analysis.
HEUSSERL AND BRENTANO ON INTENTIONALITY 29
(2) "We may accordingly regard it as an indubitably correct determination of
mental phenomena that they are either presentations or (in the sense which
has been explained) rest on presentations as their basis." 7
Here Brentanomentions the traditional way of defining physical phenom-
ena in terms of extension and spatial determinativeness (lrtliche Be-
stimmtheit), the opposite holding for mental phenomena.8 He rejects this
solution because he believes some mental phenomena (tones and smells)
are not extended. Also, it could be argued that, during the first stages of
our experience, the objects of sight and other presentations are not expe-
rienced as localized in space. Conversely, we tend to locate our own
thoughts in "the space filled by use," i.e., in our bodies.9 Finally, the
above definition is rejected because it gives only a negative characteriza-
tion of mental phenomena.
(3) "Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the
middle ages have called the intentional (or mental mentalle) existence of an
object, and what we, although with a not wholly unambiguous expression, would
call the reference to a content, direction to an object (by which is not to be
understood a reality) or immanent objectivity." 10
That is, each mental phenomenon "contains [enthfilt] in itself something
as an object, though not always in the same way."
"In the presentation something is presented, in the judgment something is af-
firmed or denied, in love something loved, in hate hated, in desire desired,
etc. 92 i1
Further, it is not necessary that the object be an external one (iusserer
Gegenstand), for it is possible to desire not the tone itself but simply the
hearing of it.12 This raises certain problems about the "levels" of reflec-
tion which Brentano does not explicitly go into. But it is clearly implied
that the "object" of a given act (hearing) can be another act (the desire
to hear). Thus, in the case of desiring to hear a tone the tone is a (non-
act) object of the act of hearing which is itself the '~object" of another
act, that of desiring. The point Brentano wishes to make is not that a
given act cannot be an object, but that every (mental) act has an object,
something it refers to.
7Note that it is neither asserted nor implied that all acts are presentations or
that all mental phenomena are presentations.
8 Psych. 111-2.
9 Psych. 114.
10 Psych. 115.
At Psych. 115.
12 Psych. 117-8.
(4) "[Mental phenomena] are perceived [wahrgenommen] only in inner conscious-
ness, while in the case of the physical only outer perception is possible." 13
Here, inner and outher perception are not defined, but one may assume
that the latter involves the bodily sense-organs, the former not. Also,
Brentano seems to think of inner perception as a kind of "introspection"
or inward "reflection."
(5) "If we thus say that mental phenomena are those which are grasped through
inner perception it is thereby implied that its perception is immediately
evident.? 14
Further,
"Inner perception ... is really the only perception in the genuine sense of the
word."
The reason for the last assertion is that the phenomena of outer perception
cannot be proven as "true and actual." 15 A serious ambiguity arises
here, for it is not clear whether Brentano is saying that this is so for
external perception in general (all cases) or only for any given case.
Nevertheless, it seems that he is asserting that the class of mental phenom-
ena is coextensive with that of objects of inner perception or "genuine"
perception and of evident (non-deceptive) perception.
(6) "It is not as if all mental phenomena are internally perceivable by every-
one ...; rather, it is apparent and was explicitly noted by us earlier that no
mental phenomenon is perceived by more than one individual." 16
This assertion is closely linked with (5) above. Brentano seems to think,
that because mental phenomena are perceived by inner perception, and
because only the latter is "genuine" perception, it follows that mental
phenomena are "private," accessible only to the individual person who
has them. By implication, physical phenomena are "public" and accessible
(perceivable) by more than one person.
(7) "... They [mental phenomena] are the only phenomena to which an actual as
well as intentional existence belongs." 1"
13 Psych. 118.
'4 Psych. 119. (My italics.)
15 Psych. 119.
16 Psych. 119.
17 Psych. 120.
HUSSERL AND BRENTANO ON INTENTIONALITY 31
To clarify this characteristic Brentano refers to a view held by Bain that
the notion that an unperceived (and also unperceivable?) physical world
acts on the mind is self-contradictory. Perception cannot be the effect
(Wirkung) of the unperceived and we cannot say what an object is inde-
pendent of perception. Bain's position here seems similar to that of
Berkeley, who also held that the concept of "material substance" is absurd
and self-contradictory. Brentano, on the other hand, resists this view,
for, if it is true, how could the belief in external objects existing indepen-
dent of perception and "causing" our perceiving of them ever arise?
Further, Brentano accuses Bain of confusing the sensation (Empfindung)
in the sense of what is presented with the (act) of sensing, a distinction
Brentano himself takes great pains to make. For Brentano, physical ob-o
jects exist outside the mind but nevertheless they have only an intentional
existence, ie., they are the objects of a possible perception. This view
has the twofold virtue of avoiding the self-contradictory concept of at
unperceived and unperceivable physical ojbect while at the same time
retaining the obvious and important distinction between what is perceived
and the act of perceiving it. Thus, there is no temptation to say (with
Bain and Berkeley) that physical objects are "part of" or "contained in"
our perception of them.'8 To this extent Brentano may be said to hold
some form of "idealism," though certainly not a subjectivist Berkelean
kind.
Finally, Brentano discusses Spencer's view that a distinguishing char-
acteristic of mental phenomena is that they emerge in consciousness
successively one at a time, whereas physical phenomena are synchronous,
i.e., they occur more than one at a time.'9 Brentano does not accept this
view completely, for he points out that Spencer must be thinking of the
life (consciousness) of only one organism,20 for clearly in the case of
two organisms each can have a (different) sensation or perception at the
same time. Furthermore, Brentano holds this can also be true for only
one organism. For example, one can have a presentation and make a
judgment about it at the same time.2' It is necessary to distinguish unity
and simplicity (which Spencer failed to do) and to realize that neither
necessarily excludes the other.22 Mental phenomena, though not simple
in the sense of occurring only one at a time, always appear as a unity,
i.e., appear as belonging to one consciousness. The implication also seems
to be that this consciousness retains its unity over a period of time during
18 Psych. 120-2. Note that this seems inconsistent with (3) above.
19 Psych. 122-3.
20 Psych. 123.
21 Thus, while seeing red I can judge, "I see red."
w Psych. 125.
the life of the organism. Thus, the final defining characteristic of mental
phenomena is.:
(8) Mental phenomena always appear to consciousness as a unity.23
I will now summarize what I believe are the basic defining character-
istics of mental phenomena for Brentano.
(1) All mental phenomena are acts
(2) All are either presentations or have these as their basis
(3) All have the characteristic of Intentional Inexistence (consciousness
= consciousness-of)
(4) All are perceived only in inner consciousness
(5) All are evident (nondeceptive)
(6) All are "private"
(7) All have actual as well as intentional existence
(8) All always appear as a unity
Having succeeded in distinguishing their respective "subject-matters"
(the range of entities which they study) Brentano is able to define psychol-
ogy and physical science. Physical science is the science of physical
phenomena (excluding images), i.e., all those phenomena which "emerge
in sensation (Empfindung)." Further, such a science assumes that sensa-
tions are the effect of a three-dimensional spatial and temporal world on
our sense organs. But as the science of physical phenomena it does not
describe the "absolute nature" of this world, but only ascribes to it
certain "powers".24 By implication physical phenomena are not these
"powers" themselves.25 Conversely, psychology is the science of all
mental phenomena but also includes in its subject matter certain non-
mental ones, e.g., images, though these are considered only as the "con-
tent" of mental phenomena.26
Before turning to Husserl I would like to point out what seem to me
to be obvious and fundamental confusions and inconsistencies in Bren-
tano's discussion. Note, for example, his assertion above that mental
phenomena are the "effects" of a spatiotemporal world. First, what
reasd~s are there for believing or even assuming this to be true, and
second, are the "objects" constituting this world physical ones? They cer-
23 Psych. 126.
24 Psych. 128.
25 Psych. 129.
26 Psych. 129-30. It is not clear why images are physical phenomena. The most
plausible interpretation would seem to be because they lack Intentional Inexistence.
The fact that they are "extended" is ruled out since Brentano does not accept non-
extendedness as definitive of the mental. Psych. 111-15.
HuSSERL AND BRENTANO ON INTENTIONALITY 33
tainly are not physical phenomena. Are we left, then, with two "realms"
of the physical, "objects" and phenomena? This leads to a radical dualism
which implies that no direct knowledge of the world which "causes"
physical phenomena is possible. It is also highly unlikely that any indirect
knowledge by inference is possible. At least, Brentano does not assert
there is or can be and he seems to think we are left in complete ignorance
of it. We assume that such a world exists, but say nothing about its nature,
other than it is three-dimensional spatially and temporally. And further,
how can we know this? Surely this assumption produces absurdity, in that
there would be two spatiotemporal "worlds," that of mental and physical
phenomena and that of the world of which they are the effect. The fact
that Brentano rejects space and time as defining characteristics of physical
and mental phenomena respectively is not to the point here, for no one
can deny that these phenomena appear to us in space and time and thus
have these characteristics. Brentano seems to have fallen into a rather
crude form of representational realism which is subject to precisely those
criticisms by Bain (and Berkeley) which he himself had earlier rejected
both as being necessarily valid in themselves and as applying to his own
position.
Another way of putting this same point is that Brentano has here (and
at other places in his analysis also) lost sight of the notion of intentional
existence and inexistence. For in ascribing the latter to all (and only)
mental phenomena and in asserting (against Bain) that physical phenom-
ena exist "outside" the mind and have only an intentional existence (i.e.,
are the objects of a possible perception) he was in effect denying both a
subjective idealism - all reality is "mental" - and the existence of an
unperceivable "cause" of phenomena, a "thing-in-itself." In other words,
a consistent application of the notion of Intentional Inexistence would
necessarily deny the possibility of assuming or even thinking of an
unperceivable "world-in-itself." This situation is made even more serious
when one considers his assertion that no mental phenomenon is perceiv-
able by more than one person. That is, all mental phenomena are by
nature "private." This, together with the assertion that only inner percep-
tion is genuine perception comes very close to solipsism, for it seems to
imply that all one can ever perceive are the "contents" of one's own
mind, and that since physical phenomena are unperceivable they are
therefore unknowable! Needless to say, such a view is absurd and would
render impossible a science of both mental and physical phenomena. I
am not claiming that any of Brentano's defining characteristics of mental
phenomena ((1) to (8) above) are in themselves inconsistent with one
another, but only that certain other things he says, including some of his
explanations of them, lead to serious inconsistencies and confusions. I
suggest further that the basic source of most (if not all) of these problems
is an insufficient grasp of Intentional Inexistence and a consequent failure
to carry through its full implications. And this brings us to Husserl and
Intentionality.
II.
Husserl appended a supplement to the second volume of the Logische
Untersuchungen called "Outer and Inner Perception - Physical and Men-
tal Phenomena." In it he begins by giving a short "history" of the devel-
opment of recent scientific and philosophical views about perception and
epistemology from the experiences and beliefs of "naive man." Since
many of Brentano's basic theses fall within the scope of this "history" it
makes a good starting place for our discussion of Husserl's criticism and
the development of his own conception of Intentionality.27
Husserl claims that the naive man distinguishes outer and inner per-
ception, and does so on the basis of a distinction of their respective
"objects." Thus, the former is perception of external things (Dinge), their
properties, relations, etc., and the latter is perception of the self and its
properties and relations.28 Philosophically, this naive belief is expressed
by Descartes in terms of the dualism of mens vs. corpus and Locke's
distinction between sensation and reflection. Sensation is the perception
of external things by means of the body, i.e., the sense organs, whereas
reflection (inner perception) is turned towards the mind and its "ideas"
and does not employ the bodily senses. Further, the distinction between
the two kinds of perception is drawn on the basis of a difference in the
way they arise. External perception results from the effects of external
things on the sense organs and inner perception through reflection on our
own minds.29 In addition, outer perception is regarded as intrinsically
deceptive (or at least always capable of deception) while inner perception
is evident. Because of this, it is implicitly accepted that only inner per-
ception is "worthy of the name." Through finding a descriptive character-
istic applying to all instances of the one class and to none of the other it
was believed possible to distinguish psychology from the sciences of
nature.30 Descartes, by emphasizing the evident, nondeceptive nature of
inner perception - while I doubt I cannot doubt that I doubt - and the
27 It is interesting to note the remarkable similarity of Husseri's "history" with
Ryle's account of the "genesis" of the "Myth of the Ghost in the Machine." Gilbert
Ryle, The Concept of Mind, Hutchinson & Co. Ltd., London 1960, Chap. I.
28 Edmund Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, Vol. II, Pt. 2, 3rd ed., Max
Niemeyer, Halle 1922, p. 222. (Hereafter: L.U.)
29 L.U. 11, 2. 223.
30 L.U. U, 2. 224.
unreliability of the senses, was led to the conclusion that the objects of
outer perception have only a phenomenal or "intentional" existence.31
We can thus divide phenomena into two classes, but not the objects in
themselves which we suppose to "support" them, i.e., souls and bodies
(Seelen and Kirper). The latter are "transcendent" and on the the level
of pure description we make no judgments about them.32 As should be
obvious, these views apply to a great extent to Brentano, and Husserl
makes explicit reference to him by saying that Intentional Inexistence was
given as a positive characteristic of inner mental phenomena. This is a
purely descriptive characteristic and thus has the obvious virtue of
avoiding any reference to a transcendent "metaphysical" world.33 The
mental and the physical are conceived of as phenomena given through
appearances (Gegebenheit der Erscheinungen). But as appearances they
are thought of as appearances of something, that is, as effects of (trans-
cendent) bodies on our souls through the sense organs. This may suffice
as a general "history" of Brentano's views and the philosophical tradition
in which they were deveoped. Let us now turn to Husserl's criticisms and
transformations of them.
First, Husserl says that Brentano holds that:
(a) inner perception mental = evident.
(b) outer perception = physical = nonevident (truigerisch).
That is, the class of entities denoted by each of the three terms in (a) is
coextensive, the same being true for the class denoted by the three terms
in (b).34 Although Brentano is here in accord with much of the philo-
sophical tradition Husserl feels convinced that not all these equivalences
are valid. For Husserl, inner and outer perception do not have completely
"the same epistemological character." Not every perception of the I
(des Ichs) is evident, if by I we mean the common sense notion of one's
own empirical personality.35 His example is that certain mental states
(Zustdnde) are not evident since they are perceived as having a location
in the body. For instance, a pain is experienced as in my tooth and not
(say) in my foot. Here, inner and outer perception are intimately and
intrinsically bound up in the total experience or perception, and any
possibility of deception in one aspect is immediately carried over to the
other. Furthermore, the deceptiveness is not simply a matter of our defec-
31 L.U. II, 2. 225.
32 L.U. II, 2. 226.
33 L.U. II, 2. 227.
34 L.U. HI, 2. 232.
35 L.U. II, 2. 231. One might suppose that Husserl has in mind here the falli-
bility of "introspection."
tive "interpretation" of what is "given" (e.g., a careless introspection).36
As the converse of his criticism of the equivalence between inner per-
ception and evidence Husserl criticizes that between outer perception and
nonevidence. Brentano is right in saying that much outer perception (e.g.,
of a house) is not evident.37 However, it does not follow from this that
all outer perception as such is not evident. Brentano fails to make a
distinction between the perception as related to the object (Gegenstand) -
the house - and perception as related to the "lived sensible contents"
(erlebten sinnlichen Inhalteri). The latter are the presenting sensations
(Empfindungen) and since, when perceiving a physical object we make no
judgment about them,38 we cannot be deceived about them. If, on the
other hand, we do turn our attention to these sensible contents we can be
mistaken.39 The point, however, is that since the sensible contents are
physical phenomena here is case of an evident outer perception. Al-
though Husserl does not here give an example what he seems to have in
mind is the following. When perceiving a house I have a sensation of its
color (say red). Ordinarily, I am "directed upon" the house and not my
perceiving of it. Thus, in making a judgment I would say, "The house is
red." However, if I turn my attention - reflect upon - my perceiving the
house I am turned toward the sensible content of my perception (not the
house itself). Thus, I am concerned with how the house appears to me,
and in making a judgment I judge not about the house but about its mode
of appearance ("The house looks red"). Here, the redness is conceived
of as a sensation - as a physical phenomenon - and not as an objective
property. It is physical (and not mental) in the sense that it is neither an
act nor is it intentional. But since I am not judging about the house as
it really is, but only about how it looks to me, I cannot be mistaken, i.e.,
the perception is evident.
Having denied Brentano's equivalences between inner and evident
perception and outer and nonevident perception Husserl goes on to make
a fundamental revision of Brentano's account.
"It is certain that the sphere of concepts inner and outer, evident and non-
evident perception do not coincide. The first pair is determined through the
concepts of mental and physical, however one may now separate them; the
second characterizes the fundamental epistemological opposition which we have
36 L.U. II, 2. 232.
37 We have seen above that it is not clear whether for Brentano outer percep-
tion can be of a house, a physical object, or whether it is always and only of
physical phenomena, there being a radical "gulf' between these. Objects are the
transcendent cause of phenomena and not (say) logical constructions out of them.
38 We judge about the house.
39 L.U. a, 2. 237.
studied in Investigation VI: the opposition between adequate perception (or
intuition [Anschauung] in the narrowest sense) . . and the merely supposed,
inadequate perception... ." 40
What Husserl wants to do is to replace Brentano's set of incorrect
equivalences wit hanother on the basis of the notions of adequate vs.
inadequate perception. This amounts to asserting that the distinction
between the mental and the physical is not to be drawn in terms of
evidence but rather in terms of adequacy. Thus, for Husserl:
inner perception mental = adequate
outer perception = physical = inadequate
To clarify the distinction between evidence and adequacy (which can
easily be confused, as in the case of Brentano) Husserl says, that the
opposite of the evident. is the deceptive (triigerisch), whereas the opposite
of the adequate is "incomplete fulfillment" (unvolikommene Erfifllung).41
To say that a perception is inadequate is simply to say that what is per-
ceived is not perceived completely. That is, at a given time there is some
aspect or property of the object which is not "given" or presented to me,
that does not appear.42 Conversely, in adequate perception the object is
perceived completely, just as it is.43
The distinction between adequate and inadequate perception is obvious
in the case of the perception of a physical object. The lattes cannot in
principle be perceived adequately for it is always seen from a point of
view - in perspectives (Abschattungen) - and there are an infinite number
of such perspectives which are perceivable. To say that a physical object
could be perceived adequately would amount to saying (for Husserl) that
at a given time it could be seen from all possible (an infinite number of)
points of view.44 And this is obviously impossible both in itself and for
a perceiver (like ourselves) who is himself located in space. Further, to
say (as Husserl does) that outer perception of physical objects is not
evident is simply to say that at any given time I could be deceived, though
this does not imply that we could be deceived at all times. Thus, for
Husserl, there is no problem of the "reliability" of the senses in general,
as there was for Descartes. (Husserl would no doubt agree that the pos-
sibility that we can be deceived in some cases implies that there must be
40 L.U. II, 2. 239.
41 L.U. II, 2. 239.
42 Of course, it might appear at a later occasion and must be able (in principle)
to appear at some occasion, but these considerations are not relevant here.
43 L.U. II, 239 ff.
e This absurdity is the converse of the "realist" one of a thing-in-itself, i.e., of
an object that unperceivable, that is, what it is independent. of perception in
general
in principle at least one case in which we are not deceived). In short,
Husserl rejects what we have designated as Brentano's fifth defining
characteristic of mental phenomena, that they are evident.
In Chapter I of the Fifth Investigation in Vol. II of the Logische
Untersuchungen Husserl begins by distinguishing three different tradi-
tional conceptions of consciousness.45
(a) Consciousness is the "total actual phenomenological permanence of
the mental J.' 46
(b) "Consciousness as inner awareness [Gewahrwerden] of one's own
mental lived-experiences [psychischen Erlebnissen]."
(c) 'Consciousness as the comprehensive designation for every kind of
'mental act' or 'intentional lived-experience."'
I would like first to take up relevant aspects of (c), for it is here I think,
that the most important of Husserl's criticisms of Brentano emerge.
(c) We saw above that Brentano accepted this as a defining character-
istic of mental phenomena (designated as (1) in our list above). We are
faced with a twofold problem at the start. Is consciousnecs essentially an
act and what is the relationship between conscious acts and what Bren-
tano means by mental phenomena? Husserl mentions two basic criteria
of the mental for Brentano, which by implication he believes are the most
important for him. The first is Intentional Inexistence. Moreover, for
Brentano there are three basic classes of mental phenomena: presenta-
tions, judgments, and feelings. Husserl interprets these as ways of inten-
ding an object.48 Thus, one way of intending an object is to present (e.g.,
perceive) it, another is to make a judgment about it, etc.
Husserl's first objection to this is that not all mental phenomena are
acts, and hence not all are intentional.49 Later in his discussion 50 Husserl
uses the example of a feeling of being burned to illustrate this point.
Such a feeling, he says, is like the contents of sensations (Empfindungs-
inhalten) of smoothness, red, and roughness. A pain (say) can be located
in the body, and in this loose sense "refers" to an object (say my tooth),
45 L.U. II, 1. 346. Husserl does not assert nor does he imply that this threefold
division is exhaustive; nor does he identify his own position with any one of them.
A close study of his important works shows that he appropriates elements from
all three but goes far beyond them in developing his own highly original views.
46 "Bewusstsein als der gesamte reelie phinomenologische Bestand des empiri-
schen Ich..."
47 L. U. HK, X. 3 66.
48 Vorstellungen, Urteilen and Gemfithsbewegungen.
L.U. II, 1. 367.
49 L.U. 1I, 1. 364. The implication seems to be that if a mental phenomenon
is an act then it is necessarily intentional; also, all intentional phenomena are acts.
50 L.U. II, 1. 388 ff.
but such a "referring" is not at all act-like in character. In short, pain
sensations and some other feelings are not acts. However, some feelings
are acts,> e.g.,, that of being pleased (Gefallen).51 To be pleased is to be
pleased about something, whether this be a real, existing object, a fact,
a mere possibility, or whatever. Brentano, of course, would have to con-
clude, that because some sensations and feelings are nonintentional they
are not acts and hence not mental phenomena. But Husserl thinks this
to be obviously false. Hence we must deny that all mental phenomena
are acts.
Again Husserl thinks it necessary to revise radically Brentano's ter-
minology. We saw earlier that he introduced the terms adequate-inade-
quate perception instead of evident-nonevident to bring out an essential
difference between mental and physical phenomena. Now he suggests
that the term mental phenomenon be avoided altogether and in its place
be used that of intentional lived-experiences (intentionale Erlebnisse).52
A further distinction must be made between the constitutive contents of
consciousness and lived-experiences on the one hand,- and the (say)
perceived object on the other. The object is in no sense a content or
constitutive part of my consciousness or of my lived-experiences. For
instance, when I perceive a thing (e.g., a box) I perceive it and not my
sensations or experiences of it. If I am perceiving at different times my
sensations may (and do) change, but I am nevertheless perceiving the
same box. Thus, the box, as the object of an intentional act of conscious-
ness is not the same as, nor is it reducible to, my experiences and sensa-
tions of it.53 The latter are immanent "contents" of my consciousness,
the former is transcendent.54
In addition, just as lived-experiences and contents of consciousness 5&
must be distinguished from the object or objective of consciousness, so
contents must be sharply distinguished,, not be confused with the acts of
consciousness, e.g., that act of perceiving the box.56
Husserl now points out that it is very misleading to speak as Brentano
does of the object which is perceived as "entering into" (treten) con-
51 L.U. II, 1. 388.
52 L.U. II, 1. 378.
53 In this sense Husserl is not a phenomenalist, though we shall see later other
senses in which he is sympathetic to this view.
54 L.U. II, 1. 382 ff. To say that an object is transcendent does not mean (for
Husserl) that it is beyond the possibility of experience. All it means in the present
context is that the object is not a lived-experience, is not "mental."
55 The relation between contents (Inhalten) of consciousness and lived-experiences
(Erleibnisse) is not wholly clear. For instance, are both acts?
56 L.U. II, 1. 380-1. We thus have the following rough schema: act-content-
object.
sciousness, as being "taken up," "contained" (enthalten) in consciousness
or the intentional lived-experience.&7 Such expressions blur the distinction
between the content and the object. A perceived physical object (or
"phenomenon") is not "in" consciousness or a "part" of it - it is always
transcendent. The immanent contents which belong to the constituents
of an intentional lived-experience are not themselves intended by the
latter, i.e., they are not the object of the act. I do not see color sensations
or color experiences but colored things. The thing is thus not a "bundle
of impressions" or an "idea." We should avoid all talk of immanent
objects. Only the acts and contents of consciousness are immanent.&8
To conclude the discussion of consciousness as act or lived-experience
I will mention briefly a point made by Husserl in regard to Brentano's
doctrine that all mental phenomena are either presentations or are based
on them (defining characteristic (2) above). Husserl undertakes a labori-
ous and difficult analysis of the notion of presentation, its relationship to
judgment, etc., but I will here cite only one small part of it, the distinc-
tion between two conceptions of presentation. The first distinction is that
a presentation is an act, e.g., of judging, or wishing; the second is that a
presentation is the matter of an act (Actmaterie), i.e., what is judged
about or wished for.&9 Now, every intentional conscious act has a matter
as its object or objective. If, in Brentano's thesis that all mental phenom-
ena are either presentations or are based on them only the second
meaning of presentation is used, then his view is acceptable to Husserl.60
However, what is needed is an analysis of presentation, which Brentano
certainly does not give.
(a) Consciousness is the total phenomenal content of the mental I.61
According to this view, the; act, contents and lived-experiences of the I
are real occurrences (Vorkomnisse) and are constantly changing, coming
into being and passing away. Examples are perceptions, fantasy presen-
tations, doubt, acts of thinking, pains, etc.62 But again Husserl warns
that we must be careful to distinguish these conscious mental experiences
from their "objects." For example, a color sensation, perceived or
imagined, is a content of consciousness but the colored object is not. It
will be remembered that Brentano began his discussion of the difference
between mental and physical phenomena by asserting, "The entire world
of what appears to us [unserer Erscheinungen] falls into two great clas-
57 Psych. 115-6.
58 L.U. II, 1. 371-5.
59 L.U. II, 1. 456.
60 L.U. II, 1. 458.
61 L.U. II, 1. 346.
62 L.U. IL 1. 347.
ses. . ." 63 The use of the ambiguous term "appearance" can be very
misleading, and we saw that Brentano himself was not free of confusion
in this respect, e.g., in his failure to realize the transcendent nature of the
physical object and his tendency to reduce the physical to the mental
by speaking of the latter as being "contained in" consciousness, and as
"entering into" consciousness.64 It is reasonable to assume that a failure
to distinguished the different meanings of appearance is (at least partly)
at the source of these confusions. Husserl, on the other hand, is quite
clear on this point. Appearance, he says, can mean either the appearing
(erscheinen) of an object or the appearing (erscheinende) object. The
former is a "mental" lived-experience, the latter not. The appearance of
a thing (Dingerscheinung) is a lived-experience, but the thing that appears
is not. Expressed a bit differently, when I perceive a thing the thing
appears to me (in a certain way), but what I perceive is not the appear-
ance (of the thing) but the thing.65 By implication, appearances are not
"things," and what I perceive are not them but simply the thing that
appears. Also, things exist when I (or anyone else) do not perceive them,
but "appearances" exist only in perception, which simply means that to
say that it is being perceived by someone in a certain way. "The appear-
ances themselves do not appear, they are experienced." 66 One gets the
impression in reading Brentano that phenomena and appearance mean
basically the same thing. Such a view tends towards subjective idealism
and untimately solipsism, and also leads one to posit a thing-in-itself
"behind" the apearances or phenomena, as perhaps even "causing" them.
Husserl, in denying that objects are appearances or phenomena, avoids
falling into this position.
(b) Conscious is the inner awareness of one's own mental lived-experi-
ences.67 On this view (perhaps the most familiar in naive thought) con-
scious "accompanies" the contents and lived-experiences and is related
to them in such a way that they are its "objects." 68 According to this,
consciousness means much the same as inner perception,69 a term Bren-
tano frequently used, and which we gave as his fourth defining charac-
teristic of mental phenomena. Husserl, on the other hand, as wei have
already seen, strongly objects to the terms inner and outer perception, and
prefers to subsitute for them the concepts of adequate vs. inadequate
63 Psych. 101.
64 Psych. 115.
65 L.U. II, 1. 349 ff.
66 L.U. II, 1. 350.
T L.U. II, 1. 346.
68 Consciousness is conceived here as an "inner light."
69 L.U. II, 1. 354 ff.
perception. In regard, then, to our awareness of our lived-experiences,
such awareness can be adequate, but need not be. Thus, if our perception
is adequate then it is of my own lived-experiences, but the reverse does
not necessarily follow. In other words, I can fail to have an adequate per-
ception of a given lived-experience, but the latter are the only things of
which adequate perception is possible.70
Further, the I, for Husserl, is an empirical object (empirischer Gegen-
stand). As such, it is "reducible" to the contents and unity of conscious-
ness. But we can distinguish the momentary I (the empirical contents of
consciousness at a given time) from the I as that which remains and
persists through time. This distinction is analogous to that (in the physical
world) between the appearance of a thing and the thing that appears. The
latter also persists through time and remains a unity through its several
appearances. A basic difference between these two kinds of unity, how-
ever, lies in the fact that the unity of the physical thing is not phenom-
enal, that is, it is reducible to laws, e.g., the law of causality.7' Thus, we
can construct the following proportion. The complex of mental lived-
experiences: mental I appearances of the physical thing: physical
thing.72 There is thus no "pure" I "floating above" the empirical con-
tents of consciousness; 73 there is no primitive I as the "center" of the
relationships to all lived-experiences. The empirical I can perceive itself
just as it can external things - there is no need of a pure I (which cannot
perceive itself) to do this.
We may now compare Husserl's views about psychology and its rela-
tionship to natural science with those of Brentano. For Husserl, psycho-
logy studies the contents and lived-experiences of consciousness in order
to determine their origins, laws, causes, etc. It thus studies the empirical
I which is nothing but the unity of the relationships of these lived-
experiences to one another. Opposed to the empirical I are external
physical things which are intended by the I. They are not reducible to
mere presentations, but are given as objects. We may define the physical
world as the intentional correlate of all mental perceptions and judgments.
Thus, to the individual I corresponds the individual world, to the com-
munity of I's the social world and to the community of knowers the world
in itself. The Berkeley-Hume doctrine that bodies (Korper) are ideas
(Ideen) or "bundles" of ideas is false, for bodies are never perceived
"inwardly" (innerlich) and adequately as the former are, but always
70 LAU. II, 1. 354-5.
71 L.U. II, 1. 353-4.
72 L.U. II, 1. 361.
73 L.U. II, 1. 353. (Cf. Note 75.)
inadequately. Thus, Husserl ultimately rejects phenomenalism, which he
defines here as the view that the distinction between the mental and the
physical lies in a correlation of laws, avoiding any reference to "meta-
physical" entities like souls (Seele) and bodies. A phenomenalistic
psychology, then (one which Brentano certainly strove for) is a psychology
"without a soul," i.e., a psychology of mental phenomena.74 To this
extent Husserl would agree with phenomenalism, though, as we have seen
above, he clearly rejects any attempt to "reduce" physical objects to
phenomena ("sense-data"), appearances, or the contents and experience
of consciousness. And since this is a fundamental tenet of phenomenalism
(and empiricism in general), I think it fair to say that, on this ground
alone he rejects phenomenalism.75
'III.
Let us now conclude and attempt to summarize the results of our dis-
cussion. Husserl warns that there are two errors that must, above all, be
avoided. The first is the representational theory (Bildertheorie), according
to which the physical thing is "outside" conscious and its representatives
(Bilder, Vertreter) are "in" consciousness. The second error is that the
intentional object is immanent, i.e., is a sign (Zeichen) or representation.
These views are both fundamentally false. The intentional object is not
an "internal representation" and the external thing is not something
"represented." Rather, the intentional object is the transcendent, external
object.76
I have attempted to show above that Brentano, probably because of a
lack of ultimate clarity about the intentional nature of consciousness, was
led to hold certain views which are ultimately inconsistent with its true
meaning, e.g., he fell at times into a form of representationalism, sub-
jective idealism, and perhaps even solipsism. That is, he committed (or
came very close to committing) both the errors Husserl warns against
above. More specifically, we can summarize our discussion of Husserl's
74 This material is taken from the first edition of the Logische Untersuchungen,
1900-01, Chap. I, par. 7. It does not appear in the second and third editions.
75 Another sense in which Husserl is sympathetic to phenomenalism is his de-
fining the I in terms of empirical contents and his denial of a "pure" I. Of course,
after the Logische Untersuchungen he rejects this view, principally in the Ideen
where the notion of a transcendental philosophy and hence of a transcendental ego
is fully developed. Phenomenology and phenomenalism should not be confused.
76 L.U. II, 1. 421-5. This does not imply that all intentional objects are external
physical ones, since "ideal" objects (e.g., essences (Wesen)) are intentional objects.
To say that an object is intentional is to say simply that it is the object (referent)
of an actual or possible act of consciousness. It implies nothing about the objects
"reality"l or "mode of being."
criticism of Brentano by referring to our list of the latter's eight defining
characteristics of mental phenomena.
Husserl denies (1) - all mental phenomena are acts - since sensations
and certain feelings are clearly "mental" yet do not refer to an object
other than themselves. He accepts (2) with the important reservation that
presentation be taken in the sense of act only (in which case (2) is
trivially true). He accepts (3) - all act-mental phenomena have Inten-
tional Inexistence - only in its bare form, i.e., all consciousness is con-
sciousness=of. But he goes on to develop his own highly original notion
of Intentionality, denying many of the basic aspects of Brentano's own
analysiS,.77 Husserl rejects (4) and (5) by substituting for the term inner
perception that of adequate perception and by distinguishing adequate
perception from evidence. (8) is accepted (with certain clarifications) to
the extent that consciousness can be conceived of as identical with the
unity of "mental phenomena" and that the latter are always experienced
as a unity persisting through time. Husserl accepts (7) in that he defines
the physical world as the correlate of intentional acts of consciousness.78
Thus, the physical world is not "actual" in the sense that it must be con-
ceived as the object of a possible consciousness, whereas consciousness
itself is actual in the sense that its object need not be real or existent
and its acts, qua acts, are not intentional objects.79 Characteristic (6) -
that of the "privacy" of all mental phenomena - was not explicitly dis-
cussed, though I think we may suppose that Husserl would not reject it
altogether, since i one sense it is trivially true. For instance,. you cannot
have my pain since if you did it would be your pain and not mine. And
the converse is true in regard to my having your pains.
In my discussion I have concentrated on Husserl's detailed criticism
of Brentano in the Logische Untersuchungen. I would now like to con-
clude with a short statement of what I think his most fundamental
objection is, based on the later developments of phenomenology from a
"descriptive psychology"' in the Logische Untersuchungen to the mature
statement of phenomenology as a transcendental philosophy in the Ideen
(1913). One must be clear about the fundamentally different motives and
aims of each thinker. Brentano was concerned to ground psychology on
77 It should be onted that Brentano never uses the term "Intentionality" and
Husserl never uses that of "Intentional Inexistence" except when referring to
Brentano or Scholasticism. This fact by itself should give pause to critics and
interpreters of Husseri who think his views to be the same as Brentano's and hence
can refute him by refuting Brentano.
78 To this extent Husserl rejects traditional "realism," which for him is com-
mitted ultimately to the existence of a thing-in-itself.
79 Of course, an intentional act can become the "object of another act; e.g., one
can htink about thinking.
empiricist-naturalist principles and to delineate its own peculiar subject
matter as opposed to that of the natural physical sciences. Thus, for
him, the notion of Intentional Inexistence was significant as a defining
characteristic of mental phenomena. For Husserl, on the other hand,
not psychology but philosophy was his central concern. More specifi-
cally, the significance of Intentionality lay in its implications for the
establishing of philosophy as a "rigorous science." Such a science is pos-
sible only on the basis of a radical critique of knowledge, which critique
would strive to trace all our knowledge back to its original sources in
immediate experience, to the evident self-givenness of all beings. This is
the basic meaning of: To the things themselves (Zu den Sachen selbst)!
And since the things themselves are first "given" - constituted - in sub-
jectivity, the intentionality of consciousness becomes the guiding "clue"
for the project of a phenomenological philosophy. All this, of course,
lies very far from Brentano.
In the view of the later developments in the Ideen it becomes clear
that Huserl regards Brentano's psychology and philosophy, and hence his
notion of Intentional Inexistence, as a naive and dogmatic Naturalism.80
That is, Brentano conceived consciousness - mental phenomena - as
inner-worldly and mundane. They are thus part of nature just as physical
phenomena are. To this extent, the laws of psychology are natural laws,
whether or not they are ultimately reducible to the laws of physics. In
other words, for Husserl, Brentano's fundamental mistake lay in not
seeing that the intentional structure of consciousness ultimately implies
that all beings in the world are relative to consciousness in so far as
they must be conceived as a possible correlate or object of consciousness,
and that therefore the latter itself cannot be part of the world or nature,
but must be transcendental.8' The final justification and clarification of
the meaning of this transcendental idealism must be left to Husserl him-
self and his writings. Suffice it to say here that Brentano's basic error
consists in not understanding the transcendental implications of his notion
of Intentional Inexistence and hence the inadequacy of any "naturaliza-
tion of consciousness." On the other hand, perhaps his greatest contri-
bution was in seeing the formal structure of consciousness as conscious-
ness-of and the inadequacy of the traditional conception of consciousness
and the mind as "thinking substance" (Cartesian rationalism) and/or a
"bundle of ideas" (empiricism). Closely allied with this insight is that of
the difference between a descriptive and genetic psychology, which dis-
80 Cf. Husserl's Ideen III, Martinus Nijhoff, Haag 1952, p. 156.
81 This, for Husserl, is the utlimate meaning of Descartes' Cogito.
inction opened the path for Husserl's own radically original conception
of a transcendental phenomenological psychology.
"... However much I see in the [Brentano's] transformation of the Scholastic
concept of Intentionality a great discovery, through which alone phenomenology
has become possible, one must still essentially distinguish the pure psychology,
in my sense, implicitly contained in phenomenology and the psychology of
Brentano." 82
And, of course, such an "essential distinction" is even more necessary in
regard to Husserl's transcendental phenomenology as a whole.
JAMES C. MORRISON.
UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO.
82 Ideen HI. p. 155.

Husserl and Brentano On Intentionality

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Husserl and Brentano On Intentionality

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International Phenomenological Society

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

Husserl and Brentano on Intentionality

"Finally, many people view phenomenology as a continuation of Brentano's

it (and other writings of Brentano's) has affected me in younger years, it must

sense.... Nevertheless, he has gained for himself the epoch-making service

of making phenomenology possible. He presented to the modem era the idea

of Intentionality, which he derived out of consciousness itself in immanent

The above is general knowledge in the philosophical world. However,

of Intentionality is essentially the same as Brentano's. Hence scholars will

study the latter in order to find out what Husserl's conception of it is

and critics will attempt to refute Husserl and even phenomenology in

general by refuting Brentano. This is a mistake. Although it is true as a

each gives to it is the same, even in fundamentals. I believe that a failure

to realize this has led to a great deal of misinterpretation and misunder-

standing of Husserl and phenomenology. It is the purpose of this essay

to attempt to show that Husserl's phenomenological views are very

rejects (wholly or in part) many of the latter's, most important doctrines.

In order to clarify this problem I propose to discuss Brentano's well-

known attempt to distinguish mental and physical phenomena in which

he introduces the notion of "Intentional Inexistence." I will then take Up

Husserl's views on both the general problem of mental vs. physical

phenomena and on the more specific one of Intentionality. No attempt

will be made to give a complete account of Husserl's own views on

Intentionality, since to do so adequately would imply a discussion of his

whole philosophy. Also, I will concentrate almost exclusively on material

from the Logische Untersuchungen, since it is here that he makes most

explicit and detailed reference to Brentano.

1 Edmund Husserl, Ideen III, Martinus Nijhoff, Haag 1952, p. 59.

The basic purpose of Brentano's chapter, "On the Basic Difference

Between Mental and Physical Phenomena" is ". . . the clarification of

the two terms: physical [physisches] phenomenon - mental [psychisches]

phenomenon." 2 He begins by asserting that "The entire world of what

of mental phenomena." 3 Brentano assumes this division and its exhaus-

he adopts is simply to find at least one (perhaps several) specific defining

characteristic of each class, i.e., a characteristic that all members of one

the course of his analysis, finds altogether eight defining characteristics

of mental phenomena, although he does not accord all of them equal

important is Intenitonal Inexistence.

The first defining characteristic is given in terms of the notion of

(1) "Every presentation of sensation or fantasies offers an example of mental phe-

nomena: and I understand here by presentation not that which is presented

are examples .... 4

Here Brentano makes an important distinction between what is presented

are acts. Further examples of acts include: thinking, judging, remem-

brance, expectation, doubt, fear, and willing.5 Examples of physical

phenomena, on the other hand, are colors, figure, a landscape, warmth

and cold, and pictures (Gebilde) that appear in fantasie.6

2 Franz Brentano, Psychologie vom Empirischen Standpunkte, Vol. I, Dunker &

Humblot, Leipzig 1874, pp. 102-3. (Hereafter: Psych.)

3 Die gesammte Welt unserer Erscheinungen zerfllt in zwei grosse Classen, in

difficulties. Psych. 101.

physical phenomena. This ambiguity will be seen to be important later, in that it

seriously confuses his analysis.

(2) "We may accordingly regard it as an indubitably correct determination of

has been explained) rest on presentations as their basis." 7

Here Brentanomentions the traditional way of defining physical phenom-

ena in terms of extension and spatial determinativeness (lrtliche Be-

stimmtheit), the opposite holding for mental phenomena.8 He rejects this

solution because he believes some mental phenomena (tones and smells)

rienced as localized in space. Conversely, we tend to locate our own

above definition is rejected because it gives only a negative characteriza-

tion of mental phenomena.