QUASI DELICT

a. DEFINITION

b. DISHTINGUISHED FROM TORTS

c. ELEMENTS

GR NO. 48006, July 08, 1942

FAUSTO BARREDO
~vs~
SEVERINO GARCIA & TIMOTEA ALMARIO, RESPONDENTS.

There is a distinction between civil liability arising from criminal negligence (governed by the Penal Code) and responsibility for fault or
negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the civil Code, and that the same negligent act may produce either a civil liability arising
from a crime under the Penal Code, or a separate responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code.
Still more concretely, the authorities above cited render it inescapable to conclude that the employerin this case the defendant-
petitioneris primarily and directly liable under article 1903 of the Civil Code.
While the terms of article 1902 of the Civil Code seem to be broad enough to cover the drivers negligence, nevertheless article 1093
limits cuasi-delitos to acts or omissions not punishable by law. But inasmuch as article 365 of the Revised Penal Code punishes not
only reckless but even simple imprudence or negligence, the fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code has apparently
been crowded out. It is this overlapping that makes the confusion worse confounded. However, a closer study shows that such a
concurrence of scope in regard to negligent act causing does not destroy the distinction betweem the civil liability arising from a crime
and the responsibility for causi-delitos or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligent act causing damages may produce civil liability
arising from a crime under article 100 of the Revise Penal Code, or create an action for causi-delito or culpa extra-contractual under
articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code.

GR NO. L-24803, May 26, 1977

PEDRO ELCANO & PATRICIA ELCANO, IN THEIR CAPACITY AS ASCENDANTS OF AGAPITO ELCANO, DECEASED,
~vs~
REGINALD HILL, MINOR, & MARVIN HILL, AS FATHER & NATURAL GUARDIAN OF SAID MINOR

The concurrence of the Penal Code and the Civil Code therein referred to contemplate only acts of negligence and not intentional
voluntary acts deeper reflection would reveal that the thrust of the pronouncements therein is not so limited, but that in fact it
actually extends to fault or culpa.

the corresponding provision to said Article 1093 in the new code, which is Article 1162, simply says, Obligations derived from quasi-
delicts shall be governed by the provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of this Book, (on quasi-delicts) and by special laws. More
precisely, a new provision, Article 2177 of the new code provides:

ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability
arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the
defendant.

According to the Code Commission: The foregoing provision (Article 2177) though at first sight startling, is not so novel or
extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while
the latter is a culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always had its own foundation and individuality, separate from
criminal negligence. Such distinction between criminal negligence and culpa extra-contractual or cuasi-delito has been sustained
by decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain and maintained as clear, sound and perfectly tenable by Maura, an outstanding Spanish
jurist. Therefore, under the proposed article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt
or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a
quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana. But said article forestalls a double recovery.

GR NO. L-33171, May 31, 1979

PORFIRIO P. CINCO, PETITIONER-APPELLANT,

~vs~
HON. MATEO CANONOY, PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE THIRD BRANCH OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CEBU, HON.
LORENZO B. BARRIA, CITY JUDGE OF MANDAUE CITY, SECOND BRANCH, ROMEO HILOT, VALERIANA PEPITO & CARLOS
PEPITO, RESPONDENTS-APPELLEES.

The jural concept of a quasidelict is that of an independent source of obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of
as a felony. Article 1157 of the Civil Code bolsters this conclusion when it specifically recognizes that:

Art. 1157. Obligations arise from:

(1) Law;

(2) Contracts;

(3) Quasi-contracts;

(4) Acts or omissions punished by law; and

(5) Quasidelicts. (1089a) (Underscoring supplied)

It bears emphasizing that petitioners cause of action is based on quasidelict. The concept of quasidelict, as enunciated in Article
2176 of the Civil Code (supra), is so broad that it includes not only injuries to persons but also damage to property. [7] It makes no
distinction between damage to persons on the one hand and damage to property on the other. Indeed, the word damage is used
in two concepts: the harm done and reparation for the harm done. And with respect to harm it is plain that it includes both
injuries to person and property since harm is not limited to personal but also to property injuries. In fact, examples of quasidelict in
the law itself include damage to property. An instance is Article 2191(2) of the Civil Code which holds proprietors responsible for
damages caused by excessive smoke which may be harmful to persons or property.

GR NO. 97336, February 19, 1993

GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, PETITIONER,

~vs~
HON. COURT OF APPEALS & MARILOU T. GONZALES, RESPONDENTS.

Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict thus:

 Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed
by the provisions of this Chapter.

is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of willfulness or intent. Quasi-delict, known in Spanish legal treatises
as culpa aquiliana, is a civil law concept while torts is an Anglo-American or common law concept. Torts is much broader than culpa
aquiliana because it includes not only negligence, but intentional criminal acts as well such as assault and battery, false imprisonment
and deceit. In the general scheme of the Philippine legal system envisioned by the Commission responsible for drafting the New Civil
Code, intentional and malicious acts, with certain exceptions, are to be governed by the Revised Penal Code while negligent acts or
omissions are to be covered by Article 2176 of the Civil Code. [22] In between these opposite spectrums are injurious acts which, in the
absence of Article 21, would have been beyond redress. Thus, Article 21 fills that vacuum. It is even postulated that together with
Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, Article 21 has greatly broadened the scope of the law on civil wrongs; it has become much more
supple and adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts. [23]

In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the opinion, and so hold, that where a mans promise to marry is in
fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes
the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her
and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent
to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the
fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such
injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.

GR NO. 108017, April 03, 1995

MARIA BENITA A. DULAY, IN HER OWN BEHALF & IN BEHALF OF THE MINOR CHILDREN KRIZTEEN ELIZABETH, BEVERLY
MARIE & NAPOLEON II, ALL SURNAMED DULAY, PETITIONERS,
~vs~
THE COURT OF APPEALS, FORMER EIGHTH DIVISION, HON. TEODORO P. REGINO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE
OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION, QUEZON CITY, BR. 84, SAFEGUARD INVESTIGATON &
SECURITY CO., INC., & SUPERGUARD SECURITY CORPORATION, RESPONDENTS.

Article 2176, where it refers to fault or negligence, covers not only acts not punishable by law but also acts criminal in character,
whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, as eparate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether
or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually
charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the
two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3,
Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same
act considered as quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal
act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that
culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law.

GR NO. L-35095, August 31, 1973

GERMAN C. GARCIA, LUMINOSA L. GARCIA, & ESTER FRANCISCO, PETITIONERS,

~vs~
 THE HONORABLE MARIANO M. FLORIDO OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL, MARCELINO
INESIN, RICARDO VAYSON, MACTAN TRANSIT CO., INC., & PEDRO TUMALA Y DIGAL, RESPONDENTS.

The essential averments for a quasi-delictual action under Articles 2176-2194 of the New Civil Code are present in this case, namely:
a) act or omission of the private respondents;
b) presence of fault or negligence or the lack of due care in the operation of the passenger bus No. 25 by respondent Pedro Tumala
resulting in the collision of the bus with the passenger car;
c) physical injuries and other damages sustained by petitioners as a result of the collision;
d) existence of direct causal connection between the damage or prejudice and the fault or negligence of private respondents; and
e) the absence of pre-existing contractual relations between the parties.
The circumstance that the complaint alleged that respondents violated traffic rules in that the driver drove the vehicle at a fast clip in
a reckless, grosssly negligent and imprudent manner in violation of traffic rules and without due regard to the safety of the passengers
aboard the PU car does not detract from the nature and character of the action, as one based on culpa aquiliana.
The violation of traffic rules is merely descriptive of the failure of said driver to observe for the protection of the interests of others, that
degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, which failure resulted in the injury on petitioners.
Certainly excessive speed in violation of traffic rules is a clear indication of negligence. Since the same negligent act resulted in the
filing of the criminal action by the Chief of Police with the Municipal Court (Criminal Case No. 4960) and the civil action by petitioners,
it is inevitable that the averments on the drivers negligence in both complaints would substantially be the same. It should be
emphasized that the same negligent act causing damages may produce a civil liability arising from a crime under Art. 100 of the
Revised Penal Code or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual under Arts. 2176-2194 of the New Civil Code.

GR NO. 74761, November 06, 1990

NATIVIDAD V. ANDAMO & EMMANUEL R. ANDAMO, PETITIONERS,

~vs~
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (FIRST CIVIL CASES DIVISION) & MISSIONARIES OF OUR LADY OF LA SALETTE, INC.,
RESPONDENTS.

Article 2176 of the Civil Code imposes a civil liability on a person for damage caused by his act or omission constituting fault or
negligence, thus:

Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-
delict and is governed by the provisions of this chapter.

Article 2176, whenever it refers to fault or negligence, covers not only acts not punishable by law but also acts criminal in
character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal
act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, (if
the tortfeasor is actually charged also criminally), to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only
to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary.[13]

The distinctness of quasi-delicts is shown in Article 2177 of the Civil Code, which states:
Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability
arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the
defendant.

According to the Report of the Code Commission the foregoing provision though at first sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinary
when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is
a distinct and independent negligence, which is a culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always had its own
foundation and individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such distinction between criminal negligence and culpa extra-
contractual or cuasi-delito has been sustained by decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain.

GR NO. 4977, March 22, 1910

DAVID TAYLOR, PLAINTIFF & APPELLEE,

~vs~
THE MANILA ELECTRIC RAILROAD & LIGHT COMPANY, DEFENDANT & APPELLANT.

While it is the general rule in regard to an adult that to entitle him to recover damages for an injury resulting from the fault or
negligence of another he must himself have been free from fault, such is not the rule in regard to an infant of tender years. The care
and caution required of a child is according to his maturity and capacity only, and this is to be determined in each case by the
circumstances of the case.
The law fixes no arbitrary age at which a minor can be said to have the necessary capacity to understand and appreciate the nature
and consequences of his own acts, so as to make it negligence on his part to fail to exercise due care and precaution in the
commission of such acts; and indeed it would be impracticable and perhaps impossible so to do, for in the very nature of things the
question of negligence necessarily depends on the ability of the minor to understand the character of his own acts and their
consequences; and the age at which a minor can be said to have such ability will necessarily vary in accordance with the varying
nature of the infinite variety of acts which may be done by him.

GR NO. 50959, July 23, 1980

HEIRS OF PEDRO TAYAG, SR., PETITIONERS,

~vs~
HONORABLE FERNANDO S. ALCANTARA, PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC. & ROMEO VILLA Y CUNANAN,
RESPONDENTS.

The essential averments for a quasi delictual action are:

(1) an act or omission constituting fault or negligence on the part of private respondents;

(2) damage caused by the said act or omission;

(3) direct causal relation between the damage and the act or omission; and

(4) no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties.

A separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or
acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores,
and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In
other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e), Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime
is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been
committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent
acts which may be punishable by law.