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The Concept of Validity in a Theory of Social Action

Carsten Heidemann
Social & Legal Studies 2008 17: 109
DOI: 10.1177/0964663907086461

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 THE CONCEPT OF VALIDITY IN
A THEORY OF SOCIAL ACTION

CARSTEN HEIDEMANN
Kiel, Germany

KEY WORDS

discourse theory; social theory; validity; Habermas; Alexy

THE DOUBLE ASPECT OF DISCOURSE THEORY, AS DEVELOPED

BY HABERMAS

D
ISCOURSE THEORY, as developed by Habermas, may be assigned to
two different theoretical mainstreams: to those varieties of linguistic
philosophy which claim to be rightful heirs of traditional meta-
physics, and to those parts of hermeneutic sociology which are concerned
with the nature of social and particularly communicative action.
According to Habermas, the historical development of metaphysics or
First Philosophy is characterized by two paradigmatic shifts (Habermas,
1988: 201). Originally, metaphysics was ontological in nature. In the wake
of the Cartesian revolution, ontology was superseded by philosophy of
consciousness and cognition which focused on the necessary conditions of
recognizing something as being or existing. Philosophy of consciousness in
turn was transformed in the course of the linguistic turn by incorporating a
transcendentally moulded conception of language (Habermas, 1988: 56),
according to which the constitution of facts by cognition necessarily takes
language as its medium. A further development was achieved by the insight
of discourse theory that the transcendental capacities cannot be ascribed to
the grammatical systems of linguistic rules as such; rather, the linguistic
synthesis is the result of successful acts of communication.
But Habermass original aim is to establish a critical theory of society. Part
of this theory of society is his conception of universal pragmatics, which goes
hand in hand with discourse theory. It is the task of universal pragmatics to

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110 SOCIAL & LEGAL STUDIES 17(1)

identify and reconstruct the universal conditions of the possibility of com-

munication (Verstndigung) (Habermas, 1976: 174). As action aiming at
communication is, for Habermas, the basic type of social action, universal
pragmatics may be taken to be reconstructing the necessary presuppositions
of social action from the perspective of a participant.
At first glance, these two explanations of the status of Habermass theory
do not seem to differ in a serious way; in fact, they seem to complement each
other. No matter which theoretical framework we opt for, the theory aims
at elaborating the universal presuppositions of communicative or speech
acts. But the perspectives are different. If discourse theory is taken to be the
legitimate successor of ontology-superseded-by-epistemology, it is funda-
mentally a theory of objective validity, and as such it is concerned with the
pragmatic conditions of the possibility of objectivity. In so far as it deals with
the conditions of the validity of assertive sentences, it may be understood as
a theory of (the possibility of) truth. In contrast, universal pragmatics as a
theory of social action is not fundamentally a theory of validity; rather, it
focuses on the conditions of an agreement between social actors. This differ-
ence can be shown by reconstructing Habermass argument for the necessity
of a discourse.
The typical method of communication is, according to Habermas, com-
munication by speech acts. By performing speech acts, the speaker raises
different claims; among them claims to truth and normative correctness
(Habermas, 1976: 246), which must, according to Habermas, be redeemed on
demand in a real discourse (Habermas, 1992: 69). As far as Habermass theory
is taken to be a sociological theory of communication, the necessity of thus
redeeming the claim might be explained by the fact that any agreement fails
if a claim raised by a speaker is doubted and is not further defended with
reasons. But as far as his theory is taken to be a theory of validity, the
argument remains vague.
On one hand, Habermas in his earlier writings appeals to the thesis that
any correspondence theory of truth is untenable. Facts as the apparent corre-
lates of true sentences appear as objects only internal to the communicative
enterprise of discourse and only as long as the cognitive claim raised with
an assertion is made the subject of discussion (Habermas, 1989: 134). So the
meaning of fact cannot be explained without pointing to discourses in which
suspended claims raised by assertions are checked, and the correspondence
theory of truth must be given up in favour of a consensus theory of truth.
On the other hand, Habermas appeals to Wittgensteins private language
argument. There is, he maintains, a close connection between validity and
linguistic meaning, and meaning is something which necessarily implies inter-
subjectivity: You cannot follow a rule privatim, and you cannot continuously
use an expression with an identical meaning as an isolated subject (Habermas,
1988: 118); accordingly, validity presupposes intersubjectivity as well.
A more detailed argument can be found for the case that claims to norma-
tive validity must be discursively redeemed. In everyday communicative
practices, these claims play an important role in co-ordinating actions. Co-
ordination of actions presupposes a real consensus. If normative validity

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 HEIDEMANN: THE CONCEPT OF VALIDITY 111

claims are contested, they can only be redeemed by intersubjective recog-

nition. This calls for a real discourse, where individuals may utter their own
undistorted interests and have to expose them to the critique of others
(Habermas, 1992: 778).
These arguments, however, are not persuasive. The consensus theory of
truth may offer an alternative to a correspondence theory, but, as a compre-
hensive theory of truth, it too is deficient. This need not be elaborated here,
for, under the sustained attack by philosophers such as Cristina Lafont,
Albrecht Wellmer and Lutz Wingert, Habermas has already given up on the
idea that there is any constitutive relation between truth and consensus
(Habermas, 2003).
Habermass pointing to Wittgensteins private language argument in order
to explain the necessary relation between truth and performing a discourse is
not helpful either, because he doesnt give a thorough analysis of the argu-
ment. Habermas formulates the conclusion of the private language argument
as follows:
Nobody can follow a rule just for himself, in a solipsist way; for to be able to
handle a rule competently presupposes a capacity to take part in an established
social practice which, for any subject, is given, as soon as he reflectively realises
his intuitive knowledge in order to justify himself vis--vis other subjects.
(Habermas, 2001: 72)

But this falls short of the aim of showing that there is an internal connection
between discourse and truth. There is even a strong suspicion that the argument
is counterproductive to Habermass enterprise, for Wittgensteins conception
of rule-following, which is fundamental to his private language argument,
focuses on the idea that maintaining the competence of following rules is a
matter of training (Abrichten) (Wittgenstein, 1953: 206) which is exactly
what taking part in a discourse is not.
Although Habermass argument for the necessity of a real discourse to
establish the validity of normative sentences is more plausible, it destroys the
parallel between the (primary) claims to truth and to normative correctness
raised by assertive and regulative speech acts, respectively. If practical dis-
course is just a means of solving current social conflicts, then it seems to be
necessary indeed that those possibly affected by the outcome of the conflict
get a chance of articulating their particular interests and to expose them to
the critique of others so that a solution might be achieved which is accept-
able for everybody. Such a procedure would, if successful, result in a
compromise; the discourse would consist of speech acts of negotiating, and
it would not in the least be the pragmatic equivalent of a cognitive procedure
leading to objectively valid norms.
The dilemma is this: if we want to arrive at objectively valid norms, then
letting anyone affected by a regulation utter private interests would be just a
matter of getting at data for the actual normative discourse aiming at objec-
tively valid results; it would not be constitutive of its results. A constitutive
role might be ascribed to this process only if we regard the discourse simply
as a matter of negotiating to strike a fair compromise.

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112 SOCIAL & LEGAL STUDIES 17(1)

THE DOUBLE ASPECT OF DISCOURSE THEORY, AS DEVELOPED BY

ALEXY

Alexys discourse-theoretical conception of normative cognition is based on

that of Habermas, but it is more obviously designed to be a theory of validity.
Alexy (1996: 343) takes discourse theory simply to be a procedural theory of
practical correctness according to which a norm is correct or valid if it might
be the result of a rational practical discourse. But there are also strong
elements of a theory of social action throughout Alexys writings.
Basically, Alexys argument resembles Habermass: establishing a norm as
valid requires performing a real discourse that lives up to the rules, which are
constitutive of an ideal speech situation. On the level of argumentation,
these rules embody the liberal ideas of universality and autonomy; they are,
according to Alexy, necessary conditions of any rational practical reasoning.
Whether Alexys argument succeeds depends on whether he demonstrates
that there must be a discourse before any norm of morality might be called
correct or valid. Alexy mentions essentially two different reasons why forming
practical judgements judgements about moral norms should necessarily
depend on performing a discourse. Contrary to Habermas, practical judging
does not simply aim at ascertaining a common interest, but at a just balan-
cing of particular interests. This balancing is possible only by weighting the
particular interests, which affords an argumentation. There is a normative
reason why such an argumentation should include those affected by the
regulation, namely, the principle of autonomy. Whosoever denies that the
interpretation and weighting of some individuals interests are, in the end,
this individuals own affair, does not respect that individuals autonomy nor
take them seriously as an individual (Alexy, 1996: 3467). In addition, there
is an external reason for the necessity of a non-monological discourse:
someone who is not omniscient but who is interested in truth or correctness
will value the discourse as a source of arguments (Alexy, 1996: 347).
The second argument need not be examined further in this context, because
it may at best establish a heuristic but not a constitutive relation between
the performance of a real discourse and the objective validity of its result.
However, the first argument deserves closer attention. Although Alexy
avoids the problematic thesis that practical discourse is concerned with estab-
lishing a common interest, he nevertheless concentrates on the concept of an
interest, and the procedure of balancing interests remains vague. As with
Habermas, it is doubtful whether allowing individuals to utter their interests
is not just a process of gaining data for the genuine practical discourse (Alexy,
1991: 408). Moreover, appealing to the principle of autonomy is problematic.
This principle is not implied in the rules of discourse. Although it is legitimate
to introduce it into discourse theory, the question arises whether this does not
shift the burden of proof from discourse theory to quite a different philoso-
phical tradition. Alexy (1995) tackles this problem by trying to demonstrate
that the principle of autonomy is a presupposition of any rational practical
discourse, after all:

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 HEIDEMANN: THE CONCEPT OF VALIDITY 113

To get at the principle of autonomy, the notion of genuine participation in a

discourse has to be given another, stronger interpretation. According to this
interpretation, a genuine participation in a discourse presupposes that the
participant really wants to solve social conflicts by an agreement which was
achieved and controlled by discourse . . . Whosoever wants to solve social
conflicts by an agreement which was achieved and controlled by discourse,
accepts the right of his interlocutors to orientate their behaviour by standards
which, after sufficient consideration, they judge to be correct and, therefore,
valid. (pp. 14950)

But although this argument might back the thesis that we should grant other
persons the right to orientate their behaviour by standards they judge to be
correct, it does not follow that we should grant them the right to give
expression to their particular interests. More importantly, the argument tends
towards interpreting the practical discourse as (simply) aiming at the solution
of social conflicts. This aside, there is a petitio principii where the principle
of autonomy is employed to justify the necessity of a discourse for establish-
ing objectively valid norms, as long as the principle of autonomy itself is valid
only in relation to a real discourse. This is the case, because the conception
of a genuine participation in discourse presupposes that a discourse is really
performed and not just in the mind of a solitary thinker.
Alexy (1995: 1323) gives another discourse-theoretical argument, starting
at the speech act of assertion and analysing its normative implications. It
combines a transcendental pragmatic argument relying on the normative
implications of the claim to correctness raised by an assertion, a utilitarian
argument, according to which it is helpful to pretend to keep to the rules
implied by asserting something, and an anthropological argument, according
to which human beings are interested in correctness and to utter an assertion
means taking part in the most fundamental of all human life-forms.
On one hand, the argument avoids the problem of justifying the necessity
of a real discourse, for its starting-point is a trigger for a real discourse: the
speech act of asserting something. On the other hand, the necessity of backing
the transcendental pragmatic argument with further arguments indicates that
it is well nigh impossible to leap from a speakers faithfully observing all rules
which are connected with the speech act of asserting something to the truth
or correctness of the content of the speech act.
But Alexy does not attempt to achieve this feat, anyway; he is just concerned
with demonstrating that the necessary rules connected with the speech act of
asserting oblige the speaker to treat the interlocutors in a certain way, that
these rules are universally valid, and that they have some impact as rules of
action outside the discourse as well. He dubs this procedure a direct justifi-
cation of norms by discourse theory, in contrast to an indirect justification
which is delivered if certain norms are shown to be the (possible) outcome
of a correct discourse-theoretical procedure (Alexy, 1995: 146).
This argument is not in the vein of discourse theory any longer. Besides,
it is purely hypothetical. We are obliged to keep to the rules of asserting if,
and only if, we perform this kind of speech act; but we are not obliged to

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114 SOCIAL & LEGAL STUDIES 17(1)

assert something. If we react to an argument by beating the speaker, the

speaker cannot coherently reproach us for having violated the rules of assert-
ing because it was not our intention to assert anything. On the other hand,
if it were true that in asserting we necessarily presuppose that we and our
interlocutors have, principally, equal rights, this does not oblige us to treat
them as equals outside the narrow context of our transient participation in a
language game.

SUMMARY

To summarize very briefly: there is a strong internal tension to be found in

the discourse theories of Habermas and Alexy, for they couple elements of a
classical theory of validity with elements of a theory of social action from the
point of view of a participant. But they have not successfully argued for the
case that the presuppositions of objective validity and of successfully partic-
ipating in a certain social practice are one and the same.

REFERENCES

Alexy, R. (1991) Theorie der juristischen Argumentation, 2nd edn. Frankfurt am Main:
Suhrkamp.
Alexy, R. (1995) Recht, Vernunft, Diskurs. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
Alexy, R. (1996) Grundgesetz und Diskurstheorie, pp. 34360 in W. Brugger (ed.)
Legitimation des Grundgesetzes aus Sicht von Rechtsphilosophie und Gesell-
schaftstheorie. Baden-Baden. Nomos Verlag.
Habermas, J. (1976) Was heit Universalpragmatik?, pp. 174272 in K.-O. Apel (ed.)
Sprachpragmatik und Philosophie. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
Habermas, J. (1988) Nachmetaphysisches Denken. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
Habermas, J. (1989) Vorstudien und Ergnzungen zur Theorie des kommunikativen
Handelns. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
Habermas, J. (1992) Moralbewutsein und kommunikatives Handeln. Frankfurt am
Main: Suhrkamp.
Habermas, J. (2001) Kommunikatives Handeln und detranszendentalisierte Vernunft.
Stuttgart: Reclam.
Habermas, J. (2003) Truth and Justification. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Wittgenstein, L. (1953) Philosophical Investigations. Oxford: Blackwell.

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