The Past and Present Society

The Military Participation Ratio

Author(s): S. Andreski and Philip Abrams
Source: Past & Present, No. 26 (Nov., 1963), pp. 113-114
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of The Past and Present Society
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/649909
Accessed: 24-04-2015 15:39 UTC

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Communication
THE MILITARY PARTICIPATION RATIO
IN HIS INTERESTING ARTICLE "THE FAILURE OF SOCIAL REFORM:
I918-I920", Past and Present,
no. 24, Mr. PhilipAbrams,apartfrom
attributing to me the miraculouspowerof beingable to reformulate
in I954 a statement by anotherauthorpublishedin I958, imputesto
me a viewwhichI have neverexpressed. I have never"postulated
... a 'militaryparticipation ratio' as a sufficient
determinantof a
community'ssocial order" (p. 45) but only as one of the most
important determinants.
Whatis moreimportant, the evidenceadducedin the articledoes
noteven supporttheconclusionthat"in its crudeformthe 'military
participation ratio'theorywill not do" (p. 62). The authorrightly
pointsout thatthe promisesof social reformmade duringthe war
were disregardedafterwards, but he overlooksthe obvious point
that when the war ended conscriptionas well as the extensive
recruitment of volunteersceased,and the armedforcesbecameonce
more small and professional. The promisesof a more equitable
sharingof the good thingsof life were made when the military
participation ratiowas high,and theyweredisregarded whenit went
down.
University College,Ibadan S. Andreski

PhilipAbramswrites:

Dr. Andreskimakes three points. May I commentbrieflyon

each of themand at the same timemakeit clear that I regardhis
MilitaryOrganization and Societyas a mostcogentessayand one that
historianscan ill affordto ignore. It suffers,however,froma
commonfaultof pioneeringworksin sociology,over-abstraction.
I do not of course credit Dr. Andreskiwith any miraculous
prescience. The theorythat I took him to have re-formulated
derives,as I pointedout,fromAristotle. I thinkthisis clearin the
text.
NeitherI norDr. Andreskisupposehimto havetreateda Military
Participation Ratioas thesufficientdeterminantofsocialstratification
in all societies. As he saysin his book"such a contentionwouldbe
absurd". But I remainconvincedthatthe wholeargumentof his
essayentailstheassumptionthatMPR is a sufficient determinantof
stratification.The wholeelaborateapparatusof his book,especially

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 II4 PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 26

of ch. 2, is surelysenselesswithoutsuch an organizingassumption.

This seems to me to becomeexplicitin assertionsand conclusions
made on pp. 29, 33, 4I, 7I, and throughout ch. Io. The theoretical
inferenceunderlying the argumentis clearlythat MPR can act as
a sufficient determinant of stratificationand the empiricalproblem
which then arises is under what social-structural and cultural
circumstances does MPR actuallyexertits determining influence and
whenand by whatis thisinfluenceblocked?
That Dr. Andreski'sthinkingis dominatedby the hypothesisof
the MPR as a sufficient determinant is nowhereclearerthanin the
lastparagraphofhis Communication.Here,if I understand him,he
claimsthatthereasonthepre-I914patternof stratification persisted
afterthe war was becausethe pre-I914MPR was restoredafterthe
war. One cannot have it both ways. If it is not a reasonable
hypothesis thatthe MPR is a sufficient determinant of stratification
then his finalpoint is misleadingand insubstantial.It is surely
insubstantial anyway:thearmedforceswerealso disbandedin I945;
Francehas had a highMPR based on conscription sinceI792 (and in
the navysince the I66os), Denmarksince I850; the highestMPRs
todayare to be found(if we excludecitizenarmies)in Franceand
Turkey. As I triedto argue,an MPR hypothesis in a crudeform
(i.e., as offeredin Dr. Andreski's last paragraph) notdo.
will
If, on theotherhand,Dr. Andreskidoes taketheMPR hypothesis
in theformI attribute it to him seriously,thena hostof interesting
researchproblemsare opened up. In my articleI triedto explore
one or twoof theseproblems. I argued,and remainconfident, that
the promisesof social reformmade in I914-I8 were doomed even
beforethe war ended. For one thingthereformers failedto think
the
through problem of redistributing income - and the technical
organization of the war did not forceredistribution on the country;
but withoutredistribution the promiseof reformhad to be a sham.
This is a problemof the mentalhorizonsof a particulargroupof
politicians. To use the MPR hypothesis fruitfullyone has, I think,
to explorethepoliticaland ideologicalcontextof warquiteminutely.
In order to advance his main conceptionwith forceand clarity
Dr. Andreskiquite legitimately eschews such detailed empirical
exploration (p. 40). But in doingso he has leftit to otherswho are
temptedby his stimulating ideas to see whatsense can be made of
themin particularhistoricalsituations, and to makethe appropriate
qualifications.

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