140 Full

RESEARCH ESSAY
KEVIN LI
Partisan to Sovereign: The Making of the Bnh

Xuyn in Southern Vietnam,
T he Bnh Xuyn is conventionally portrayed as a criminal organization

that achieved unprecedented levels of notoriety, wealth, and influence
in southern Vietnam. Originally made up of disparate armed groupsled
by violent entrepreneurs and manned by local youths in and around Si
Gn-Ch Lnthat fought French reoccupation alongside the Vit Minh,
by the Bnh Xuyn had joined the non-communist Vietnamese
government and the French military as a bulwark against the southern
insurgency. Its leader L Vn Vin (alias By Vin), a onetime chauffer
and local gangster, became a major military and political figure, controlling
large swaths of territory including Si Gn-Ch Ln and parts of neighbor-
ing provinces; an armed force of nearly thirty-five hundred; a political mass
organization with a membership of several thousand; the National Police;
and a diverse business portfolio. In , before the Bnh Xuyns armed
confrontation with the National Army, By Vin represented a real threat to
the Ng nh Dim government.
How was the Bnh Xuyn, with neither the large pool of adherents of
a religious sect nor the ideological discipline of a political party, able to attain
such power? Between and , it skillfully traversed and shifted the
boundary between resistance and collaboration. Because the Bnh Xuyn
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140
PARTISAN TO SOVEREIGN 141
was viewed as being made up of strategically important and ideologically

malleable militants, agents of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV),
the Provisional Government of the Republic of Cochinchina, and the French
military vied for control of it. But these same entities were riven with
factionalismbetween the DRVs military and administrative organs,
between nationalists in the Cochinchinese government and the French, and
between French civilian and military intelligence services. This article
focuses on the pivotal period to show that the convergence of
interstate competition and intrastate conflict progressively strengthened By
Vins de facto power and legitimated his role as an informal sovereign.
By Vin and his lieutenants consistently staked out a position of anticolo-
nial resistance while defying exclusive categories of belonging. The political
cachet they gained through their fierce opposition to the French enabled
them to straddle the deep division between the Vit Minh and non-
communist nationalist camps. In this brief span, By Vin repeatedly drew
on his friendship with nationalist militants in both the DRV and the Repub-
lic of Cochinchina. These allies tried to harness By Vins nationalist rep-
utation and military force for their respective projects of decolonization, in
turn, becoming his source of political, economic, and logistical support. By
Vin and his confidants exploited slivers of space created by the state of
parcellized sovereignty in southern Vietnam to consolidate control over
the Si Gn-Ch Ln region while searching for a pathway to national
independence. The article shows that this period of progressive empower-
ment laid the foundation for the Bnh Xuyns emergence as a major political
and military force in the first half of the s.
By Vin and his lieutenants were savvy political actors who marshaled
their social and political capital to enact a dual-vision of sovereigntylocal
power and national independence. Yet, the existing framework within which
the Bnh Xuyn is discussed remains wedded to normative assumptions
about what constitutes legitimate and illegitimate political practice. An
important reason is that state propagandadeployed by both the southern
DRV in and the State of Vietnam/Republic of Vietnam under Ng
nh Dim in consistently pegged By Vin and Bnh Xuyn leaders
loyal to him as greedy traitors and henchmen of the French. Journalists and
historians writing in the ss echoed this representation of the Bnh
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Xuyn as a nefarious and self-serving entity. Joseph Buttinger claimed that

[t]hey were basically not interested in political propaganda. Murder was the
only political weapon they knew. Bernard Fall and Frances Hill compared
it to the Mafia and Murder, Inc. Ellen Hammer portrayed it as a mercenary
force, citing hearsay that considerable sums of money had changed hands
before By Vin agreed to support the non-communist Cochinchinese
Republic, and in a later publication flatly dismissed it as having scant social
usefulness. Alfred McCoy underscored the oddity of the Bnh Xuyns
expanding power after crossing over to the non-communist Vietnamese
government: The robbers had become the cops, the gangsters the govern-
ment. More recent work on southern Vietnam by Edward Miller and
Jessica Chapman have accorded greater recognition and agency to By Vin
as a nationalist, though their reliance on existing secondary accounts invari-
ably reproduces certain inbuilt biases. By Vin, for instance, remains a sin-
ister figure in both accounts. And the Bnh Xuyns involvement in vice
racketsgambling at the famed Grand Monde, prostitution at the Hall of
Mirrors, and opium traffickingcontinues to define its basic character to
a greater extent than any of its politial ambitions and activities. Zachariah
Mampilly, in his assessment of the scholarship on civil wars, illuminates
a central issue in existing treatments of the Bnh Xuyn: the tendency to
distill the nature of a highly complex political organization into its most
gasp-inducing components, lending credence to those who view all nonstate
armed groups as analogous to criminal organizations.
Moving beyond state-centric conceptions of political order, this article
examines the Bnh Xuyn not as a feudal appendage of warring states, but
as a claimant of Vietnamese sovereignty. The Bnh Xuyn leadership embod-
ied what political theorist Carl Schmitt imagined as the modern partisan.
This figure, personified by the guerrilla fighter, is distinguished from other
armed actorsand criminalsby his intense political commitment, ani-
mated by a deep bond with the soil. This tellurian character is the
partisans key source of legitimacy as autochthonous defenders of the home
soil. According to Eva Horn, the Schmittian partisan emerged as part of
a broader discourse among German intellectuals in the ss about
the possibility of regaining a position of autonomy beyond the binarism of
the U.S.-U.S.S.R. conflict. As a figure that transgresses the structure of Cold
War enmity, the partisan radiates the glamourand the dangerof total
political autonomy, of rsistance, or, as Carl Schmitt puts it, of political
irregularity. Jan-Werner Mller observes that partisans are inherently
ambiguous actors who blur the boundaries of conventional politics, con-
found legal categories and political distinctions to make states misappre-
hend their nature. Schmitts theory of the partisan captures the Bnh
Xuyns fierce engagement in armed resistance, its machinations for local
power, as well as its politically ambivalent relationship with state authorities.
Outlaw Partisans
In late September , at the outbreak of conflict with Franco-British forces,
the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP)-directed Southern Regional Resis-
tance Committee [y Ban Khng Chin Nam B] fielded a hastily organized
and heterogeneous armed force. It was made up of four army divisions [s
on]the First manned largely by former Garde Indochinoise soldiers, the
Second organized by i Vit adherents, the Third and Fourth by Japanese-
trained police and anticolonial elements. It also included contingents from the
Vanguard Youth [Thanh Nin Tin Phong], the General Labor Group [Tng
Cng on], and miscellaneous local armed groups. Part of this ragtag force
was charged with defending Si Gn-Ch Ln, which had been divided into
four fronts corresponding to the eastern (), northern (), western (), and
southern () flanks of the city. Despite their affiliation with the Vit Minh,
these groups largely operated autonomously. As David Marr writes, Once
fighting had begun on September, no Vietnamese leader controlled more
than a fraction of the combatants in and around Saigon.
Emerging from this mlange of unevenly organized forces was a confed-
eration of armed groups that later identified itself as the Bnh Xuyn, the
name of a notoriously lawless hamlet [p] south of Si Gn-Ch Ln. They
were led by violent entrepreneursgangsters [anh ch], martial arts masters
[thy v], labor corporals [cai]who controlled pockets of territory in and
around the city. Local farmers, laborers, fugitives, and neighborhood toughs
filled their ranks. These groups enthusiastically joined nationalist activists of
all stripes to establish a new order. Between late and , dozens of
groups dotting the Si Gn-Ch Ln region coalesced, by fits and starts, to
form the Bnh Xuyn Unified Force [Lin Qun Bnh Xuyn], which by
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encompassed seven well-armed detachments [chi i] (Nos. , , , , , ,

) totaling some two thousand men. These detachments became a formi-
dable military bloc within the Vit Minh.
That these armed groups flocked to the cause of national resistance was
not surprising, in retrospect. Archival documents, memoirs, and secondary
sources indicate that men who became the most prominent Bnh Xuyn
chiefs had forged close ties with intellectuals and political activistsboth
communist and non-communistoperating in Cochinchina. Pursued by
a common enemythe French colonial stateactivist and criminal devel-
oped a sense of solidarity. In , Nguyn Vn Mnh (alias Tm Mnh),
a martial arts teacher who would lead a Bnh Xuyn contingent on the south
side of Si Gn-Ch Ln, and Hunh Vn Tr (alias Mi Tr), a brigand in
B Quo who would become a Bnh Xuyn detachment commander on the
north side, appear to have been recruited to help launch the ICPs disastrous
Southern Uprisings [Nam K Khi Ngha]. Mi Tr and By Vin, the
latter a purveyor of protection in Ph Th, also became friends with ICP
member Nguyn Vn Trn (alias By Trn) who recalled enjoying protec-
tion from bandit chiefs [tng cp] during political meetings through-
out B im and B Quo. Despite their ICP connections, these men had
also forged relationships with non-communists like Maurice Thin
(smuggler-turned-nationalist operative), Lm Ngc ng and Trn Vn
n (pro-Japanese nationalists), among other anti-colonial activists. These
relationships between nationalists and violent entrepreneurs became key
conduits in the formation and deformation of the southern Vit Minh.
In November , when Nguyn Bnh arrived in southern Vietnam as the
DRVs representative [i din trung ng], he faced the difficult task of
corralling disparate armed groups while fighting off the onslaught of the
French Expeditionary Corps. In the months before Nguyn Bnh reached the
south, the Trn Vn Giu-led Vit Minh had been embroiled in a state of
chaotic violence and fragmentation. More troublesome still, by late October,
the French military, bolstered by reinforcements, had broken through the city
boundary and taken control of major transportation arteries and urban settle-
ments. In need of a unified military force, the DRV hoped that Nguyn Bnhs
pre-war southern experience, military talents, charisma, non-communist cre-
dentials, and prison contacts would allow him to unite more easily than
communist leaders such as Trn Vn Giu the various nationalist and religious
groups together into one military force under the DRVs control.
In this context, the Bnh Xuyn chiefs existing relationship with both
communist and non-communist nationalists, their historically adversarial
relationship with the French colonial state, their ability in wielding violence,
and their access to arms made them natural partners of activists and
intellectuals, not least the fledgling Vit Minh. Yet, important as the Bnh
Xuyns militant zeal and firepower were to the war effort, Vit Minh
recruiters were wary of the fighters potential unruliness. Trn Vn Giu,
the long-time ICP member and leader of the partys Vanguard faction, was
cognizant of the risks, arguing that the revolutionary party must control the
armed groups, only then are they stable, only then do they stand with the
people, only then can they fight; else, they will veer towards disorder and
indiscipline. This type of control was non-existent at the outbreak of war
in September , as local armed groups remained volatile and unpredict-
able, despite affirmations of allegiance to the DRV and growing interactions
with the state. The Bnh Xuyn forces were no exception. Though its
various leaders marshaled a numerically significant force and had access
to a relatively large quantity of arms, in Trn Vn Gius view, it did not
have much organization [khng c t chc g]. At the time, the name Bnh
Xuyn represented a spirit of unity rather than a hierarchical military force.
The diffuse structure hampered Nguyn Bnhs mission to streamline
military action. It was therefore pertinent to select a respected local figure
to preside over the Bnh Xuyns consolidation. He tapped Dng Vn
Dng (alias Ba Dng). Before World War II, this former duck herder
gained a reputation in the Cu Rch a area as a martial arts master with
upwards of a hundred followers, many of whom belonged to the under-
world [gii anh ch]. His stature allowed him to establish a protection racket
[s bo him] targeting riparian cargo traffic from western provinces to Ch
Ln. After a period on the run from French authorities, likely due to police
raids in the Bnh Xuyn area in March , he returned to Si Gn-Ch
Lns environs in to work for the Japanese shipbuilding firm Nichinan.
At this time, he used his role as a labor recruiter to shelter followers.
A French account claims that in September , the Japanese recruited
Ba Dng with the goal of creating an auxiliary force out of the outlaws.
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After the Japanese coup on March against the French, Ba Dng had an
even freer hand in organizing his men and establishing local control. In the
ensuing months, Ba Dng and other armed group leaders in the region
unleashed violence on perceived traitors [Vit gian] and Allied troops.
Despite some misgivings among ICP cadres, Ba Dng was the conve-
nient choice to spearhead the unification of Bnh Xuyn forces. In early
November, he had been elected commander [ch huy trng] of Si Gn-
Ch Lns southeastern flank (Front No.) by a contingent made up almost
exclusively of armed group leaderswarlords [th lnh lc lng ct c]
and swashbuckling gangsters [giang h ho hn] later communist histor-
ians called them. Even with what amounted to popular mandate among
local fighters, French intelligence described the intergroup relationship as
one based on mutual protection rather than hierarchical command. One
observer recalled that while the groups had adopted the Bnh Xuyn mon-
iker, they remained discreet forces . . . whose activities were directed inde-
pendently by their respective leaders. The nominal chief of the Bnh
Xuyn even had trouble integrating independent-minded neighborhood
bands. In one case, a Vanguard Youth contingent in Khnh Hi, led by
labor corporal Nguyn Vn Cng (alias Su Cng), broke off from the
Bnh Xuyn because he objected to burning his areas thatched dwellings per
Vit Minh orders. For good measure, he threatened to shoot any Bnh
Xuyn who crossed over to his zone.
Nguyn Bnh therefore urged Ba Dng to unify the Bnh Xuyn groups,
writing: You and your comrades should establish a Bnh Xuyn Inter-Zone
[Lin Khu Bnh Xuyn] and form a solid bloc rather than remain
scattered . . . I was charged with unifying forces in eastern Nam B. To help
me fulfill my mission, unify all the units [so we can] achieve victory.
Shortly after assuming command of Zone (covering eastern Cochinchina)
in December, Nguyn Bnh also named Ba Dng Deputy Chief of Zone
[Khu b Ph] to further shore up the Bnh Xuyns relationship with the
Vit Minh. The armed groups vowing allegiance to Ba Dng were, in
turn, reorganized into Detachments and , jointly referred to as Unified
Detachments [Lin Chi i ]. Soon after his promotion, however, Ba
Dng was killed in Bn Tre during an operation on February , . His
death dealt a serious blow to Nguyn Bnhs centralization efforts. The Vit
Minh initially even tried to hide the fact of his death to avoid shocking
[chn ng] his troops. Without Ba Dngs symbolic authority, Nguyn
Bnh faced the prospect of watching the confederation splinter.
A Necessary Partnership and Its Fault Lines

In late February , Ba Dngs body was brought to Phc An, on the
northern edge of Rng Sc, where Bnh Xuyn chiefs and their forces had
assembled to honor him. After the ceremony, Bnh Xuyn commanders
gathered to choose Ba Dngs replacement. Either By Vin or Dng Vn
H was to become Ba Dngs successor. French sources indicate that
although By Vin was the preferred candidate to lead the combined Bnh
Xuyn forces, he insisted that Dng Vn H succeed his brother as chief of
Detachments . Vietnamese historians, on the other hand, claim that
Dng Vn H, with the support of Ba Dngs two subordinates, T Vn
Ri and inh Vn Nh, won more votes than By Vin, thwarting the latters
attempt to seize control. Both accounts agree that Dng Vn H emerged
as chief of Detachments , but it appears that Bnh Xuyn commanders
did not choose a leader to consolidate the Bnh Xuyn at the Phc An
meeting. That came about in mid-June, when By Vin called a meeting in
Ba Ging (an area in Rng Sc near the Soi Rp River) where he proposed
unifying the Bnh Xuyn forces as a matter of military necessity. The other
chiefs agreed and elected By Vin as supreme leader. Nguyn Bnh
approved the Ba Ging decision and also issued a communiqu on July
announcing By Vins promotion to Deputy Chief of Zone .
Vietnamese historians have framed By Vins ascent as a sinister plot by
a power hungry hedonist and infiltrators dispatched by French intelligence
to undermine the resistance. But the same historians concede that By Vin
gained the backing of his fellow commanders and that Nguyn Bnh, facing
intense military pressure and eager to win over the sizeable force and its
leader, endorsed the results of the Ba Ging gathering and promoted By
Vin. In fact, evidence suggests that Nguyn Bnh needed and encouraged
By Vin to consolidate the fragmented and unruly forces. In the months
following the Phc An memorial, By Vin informed Nguyn Bnh that he
was moving his troops from the mountains of B Ra, where the various Bnh
Xuyn groups had garrisoned, back to Si Gn-Ch Lns vicinities. The
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Zone Chief expressed surprise: I thought you [By Vin] were going to stay
and lead [Ba Dngs] fighters since comrade [Dng Vn] H . . . is still too
young and inexperienced. Although Nguyn Bnh did approve the latters
ascension to his brothers position, he was hardly enthusiastic. In contrast,
in the same April letter, Nguyn Bnh was effusive in his praise of By Vin
and Mi Tr, casting them as Ba Dngs worthy successors: It is truly
regrettable that comrade Dng Vn Vng [sic] has died, but his friends,
comrades By Vin and Mi Tr, are still here. I have great faith in your
loyalty during this protracted war. Then in May, Lng Vn Trng (alias
Hai Trng), Nguyn Bnhs liaison with the Bnh Xuyn, informed him of
Detachments s pitiable state. Ba Dngs death and the absence of
effective commanders had created a leadership void that could result in the
units disintegration. It is notable that Dng Vn H, the nominal com-
mander, was not mentioned once in this communication. With mounting
French assaults, the precipitous collapse of the Third and Fourth Divisions,
the January defection of Third Division chief Nguyn Ho Hip to the
French, and finally the potential collapse of Bnh Xuyn forces, Nguyn
Bnh not only accepted By Vins ascension and consolidation of the armed
groups but likely facilitated it. As T K, former Detachment commander
and later Zone chief, recalled, Nguyn Bnh appointed By Vin Deputy
Zone Commander with the specific aim of unifying the Bnh Xuyn forces.
Nguyn Bnhs July promotion of By Vin also constituted a strategic
move to deal with non-communists at the time. On April , at Nguyn
Bnhs instigation, a diverse contingent of political and religious leaders
among them representatives of the Ho Ho, Cao i, Vietnam Nationalist
Party [Vit Nam Quc Dn ng], Greater Vietnam Nationalist Party [i
Vit Quc Dn ng], the Vit Minh, and othersmet in B Quo and
established the broadly inclusive National United Front [Mt Trn Quc Gia
Lin Hip] against the French. Historians have seen the fronts formation as
Nguyn Bnhs attempt to win over and eventually neutralize the non-com-
munists. And the relationship was a tense one from the start. At a meeting
with Phm Thiu, southern DRVs Political Bureau chief, days after the fronts
creation, Hunh Ph S, the Ho Ho leader and front president, excoriated
the central government for its concessions to the French in the March
Accord and its neglect of the south, decrying it as a diplomatic failure [tht
bi v ngoi giao]. Front members, including Mi Tr and Lai Hu Ti (By

Vins proxy), also called for the dissolution of the Peoples Committees and
Resistance Committees, which, they claimed, had caused terror [gy nn cuc
khng b] among the people. Despite pledging allegiance to the DRV and
H Ch Minh, and denouncing Nguyn Ho Hips defection, the front was
a potentially disruptive adversary to Nguyn Bnh and the DRV. In May, the
disaffected front leaders engaged in negotiations with the French on a ceasefire,
but they failed to reach an agreement. By late August, with the DRVs own
front organization, the Association of United Vietnamese People [Hi Lin
Hip Quc Dn Vit Nam or Lin Vit], in place, Nguyn Bnh dissolved the
National United Front on central government orders.
During the National United Fronts brief existence, Mi Tr emerged as
an important figure, more so than By Vin. It was no accident that it was
founded at Mi Trs headquarters in B Quo. But he was an unlikely
political figure. Born in Tn Sn Nh in , Mi Tr worked as a carpenter
and farmer before garnering a reputation as a local outlaw in the s
and early s. He had a lengthy criminal record that included multiple
charges related to armed robbery, murder, prison escape (from Poulo Con-
dore), and anarchist activities. In , he adopted the Cao i religion
and, according to French intelligence, in started to recruit laborers
among the religions adherents for the Japanese. Through these pre-
activities and armed resistance from September onward, he became friends
with the fronts president and vice president, Hunh Ph S and V Tam
Anh. Within the front, he also acted as the de facto Bnh Xuyn Inter-Zone
representative. The circulation of a June front communiqu designating
Mi Tr as commander [t lnh] of a new armed force, however, alarmed
Nguyn Bnh. In an August letter, Nguyn Bnh indicated that he was well
aware of the front leaders machinations to undermine the southern Vit
Minh: They claim . . . that Nguyn Bnh is insincere and intends to kill men
of talent [i.e., non-communist nationalists], that Nguyn Bnh tries to break
up the forces of Detachments [Mi Tr] and [Phm Hu c]. They
suggest that you build up another [armed] force to confront [the Vit Minh]
one day. Nguyn Bnh reminded Mi Tr that harboring men like V Tam
Anh in his ranks amounted to acting against the central government, and
chided him for letting sentimentality override national interest.
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Given the brewing conflict between Nguyn Bnh and Mi Tr, the
timing of By Vins appointment appears hardly coincidental. Ignoring
Zone administrator V B Nhcs recommendation of Mi Tr as Deputy
Zone Chief, Nguyn Bnh obliquely cited present circumstances for his
choosing By Vin instead. Certainly, By Vin had positioned himself,
with the help of Lai Hu Ti and other advisors, to win the backing of other
Bnh Xuyn leaders when he called for unification. But equally significant
was Nguyn Bnhs support after the fact, which buttressed By Vins
institutional legitimacy within the broader resistance. For Nguyn Bnh, the
decision was motivated as much by military exigencies as political calcula-
tion. If nationalists critical of the DRVlike V Tam Anh and Hunh Ph
Shad the ear of Mi Tr, Nguyn Bnh would try to secure that of By
Vin. In the ensuing months of , even as Mi Tr became a target of
Nguyn Bnhs suspicion, the archival record shows little protest from By
Vin. In September, two of Mi Trs lieutenants (L Vn Trang and H
Trng Nguyn) were brought up on charges of disloyalty. Echoing his
message in August, Nguyn Bnh urged Mi Tr to prioritize the nations
interest. The next month, Zone authorities launched an investigation into
the presence of reactionaries [phn ng] in Mi Trs Detachment . In
response to the latters complaint that such accusations were harming the
units reputation, Nguyn Bnh curtly retorted: It is not as if these [reaction-
ary] factions are not in your midst, the negative public opinion [d lun bt
chnh] is not groundless [v c]. He believed Mi Tr and his staff knew
exactly who the reactionaries were since this faction had on many occasions
addressed the fighters, intentionally trying to lead them astray [c li ko h
i sai lc]. Even as Nguyn Bnh casted aspersions at every turn and Mi
Tr warily warded them off, By Vin seemingly stood on the sidelines. In late
October , an intermediary intimated By Vins concerns to Mi Tr:
Hearing of the disagreement between you and the Zone Chief [Nguyn
Bnh], By [Vin] is saddened by the fratricidal atmosphere [cnh ni da xo
tht] and promises to do everything he can to find an amicable resolution.
But By Vins relationship with Nguyn Bnh had broken down by ,
showing signs of strain as early as . In November, Nguyn Bnh was
wounded during an ambush. Vietnamese and French historians agree that
the attempted assassination was carried out in response to Nguyn Bnhs
handling of the National United Front. Though reliable information is

scant, it appears that while trying to neutralize front-affiliated detractors
of the DRV, Nguyn Bnh targeted two close allies of Mi TrNguyn
Thnh Long (alias Ba H), a member of the Bnh Xuyn who had served
under By Vin, and Bi Hu Phit, commander of the i Vit-funded B
i An in which later formed part of Bnh Xuyn Detachment . Cap-
tured Vit Minh documents also show that military consolidation under
Mi Tr and those Nguyn Bnh had explicitly deemed suspectV Tam
Anh, Bi Hu Phit, and L Vn Trangwas underway. Between September
and November , Mi Trs Detachment , Phm Hu cs Detach-
ment , and Bi Hu Phits B i An in [An in Army] officially
merged to form the Unified Detachments --An in, nominally in
response to Nguyn Bnhs call for self-sufficiency among military units.
It was on the suggestion of Mi Trs lieutenant, Su Section, that Nguyn
Bnh traveled to a pagoda to meet with disaffected subordinates of Nguyn
Thnh Long and Bi Hu Phit to ostensibly plan their commanders cap-
ture. It turned out to be a trap. Although it is debatable whether Mi Tr
himself was involved in the scheme, the fact that his close associates executed
a plan to kill Nguyn Bnh exacerbated existing tensions.
It is unclear if By Vin had knowledge of the ambush. But Nguyn Bnh
became incensed when By Vin refused a request to transfer Nguyn Thnh
Long and Bi Hu Phit, accused of planning the ambush, to the Southern
Public Security Service [S Cng An Nam B], opting instead to place them
effectively under his own protection. Months later, in a letter to Nguyn
Vn Trn, Nguyn Bnh accused Lai Hu Ti of complicity in the attack,
claiming that harboring Nguyn Thnh Long and Bi Hu Phit was a strat-
agem to conceal evidence. Whatever Nguyn Bnhs suspicions, By Vins
reluctance to cooperate is not surprising in light of the captured minutes to
a December meeting of the Nh B District Administrative Committee.
They reveal that around the time of the assassination attempt, Nguyn Bnh
started to clandestinely extend his influence inside the Bnh Xuyn forces. It
appears that a Vit Minh cadre, L c Ti, had been carrying out unspec-
ified activities among Bnh Xuyn fighters. Whatever he was involved in was
serious enough to require a fence-mending meeting with province- and
county-level Vit Minh leaders. During the meeting, the vice chairman of
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the Gia nh Provincial Vit Minh tried to distance the government from the
cadre, explaining that L c Tis work vis--vis fighters of the Bnh Xuyn
was on his personal initiative [vic lm c nhn t ng] and that he had since
been removed from all of his duties. Lai Hu Ti, By Vins representative, in
response, expressed willingness to forget all regrettable incidents that had
taken place. A French intelligence report from mid- claims that the
Zone Chief had tasked L c Ti with assassinating By Vin.
Southern DRVs Internal Struggle by Proxy

Though these incidents expose frictions in an already tense situation in the
south, they do not explain why By Vin ultimately left the resistance or why
it took until for him to do so. Observers and historians have described
the blowup between the Vit Minh and the Bnh Xuyn as close to inevitable,
but they overlook the significance of competition inside the Vit Minh.
I suggest that the growing rivalry between Nguyn Bnh and By Vin was in
part rooted in a contest for Si Gn-Ch Ln, a key military, economic, and
political battleground. But more than a turf war between strongmen, it also
represented a key front in the battle for control of the southern resistance
war between Nguyn Bnh and the DRVs southern leadership in both its
administrative and party organs.
As Christopher Goscha has noted, despite an overwhelming focus in the
scholarship on the agrarian nature of the Indochina War, a symbiosis
developed between the maquis and the city, where H Ni and Si Gn
played a pivotal role as battlefields and sources of materiel. But who
controlled this key arena of the war was hard to settle. In March , within
months of traveling south, Nguyn Bnh began building a special service of
the inchoate southern army, which came to be known as Action Committees
[Ban Cng Tc]. Unrivaled control over armed action was of paramount
importance to him, as the fractured nature of the southern resistance was
what had necessitated his own assignment to the south as the DRVs military
delegate. Beginning in January , Nguyn Bnh had decided to dissolve
existing armed units in Si Gn-Ch Lnincluding the predecessor to the
Vit Minh Public Security [Cng an], then known as the National Defense
Guard [Quc gia T v Cuc]and establish his own network. Designed
as a plainclothes wing of the army that could infiltrate the city to carry out
assassinations, property confiscations, and sabotage, these units were

instructed to bypass the administrative organs and report only to Nguyn
Bnh. Though intimidating, the six initial Action Committees proved less
than effective on the urban battlefield. French intelligence in Si Gn-Ch
Ln noted that Nguyn Bnh lacked the capacity to attack with scale because
the ragtag units routinely failed to execute orders, and frequently required
reorganization due to arrests by French security forces. Nguyn Vn Hm,
their chief commander, had to issue a circular to rein in unruly units,
chastising them for acting contrary to principles and beyond their jurisdic-
tion, and reminding them that once again, robberies, gambling, law and
order were outside their purview. When assessing the Action Committees,
he found them lacking organization, leadership, and discipline. Though the
administrative organs were not necessarily averse to armed activity in the city,
they likely chafed at Nguyn Bnhs unilateral power there, especially given the
urban units uneven effectiveness and lax discipline. Moreover, throughout
, particularly between the signings of March Accord and the September
modus vivendi, Nguyn Bnh had to be reminded time and again to cease
terrorist activities. In late , with the start of hostilities in the north, the
DRV had trouble turning on and off Nguyn Bnhs angry war.
During this period of turmoil, southern DRV leaders began discussing
plans to create an administrative-military organ to unify and regulate the
array of urban armed groups that had carved up Si Gn-Ch Ln. In
retrospect, it was the DRVs attempt to keep a volatile situation and a hot-
headed military leader in check. A vocal proponent of this move was Nguyn
Vn Trn (alias By Trn), former Commissioner of the National Defense
Guard and a member of the Southern Territorial Committee [X y Nam
b] of the ICP. A native of Ch m who attended Lyce Ptrus K, he
worked for the French-language communist paper Le Peuple and its clan-
destine Vietnamese-language counterpart Dn Chng [The People] during
the Popular Front period. To escape the French Srets dragnet at the end
of this period of relative openness, Nguyn Vn Trn fled into the moun-
tains. He reputedly befriended both By Vin and Mi Tr during this
time of self-imposed exile, and in late , fought alongside the two men
on the northern flank of Si Gn-Ch Ln. It was during this early period
in the conflict that the idea of unifying Si Gn-Ch Ln military activities
154 LI
under By Vin was initially broached. During a series of meetings in late

November at By Vins headquarters in Cu Xng, Nguyn Vn Trn
argued that in order to achieve quick results, a streamlining of military
activities in Si Gn-Ch Ln and Ch Ln Province was necessary. Armed
group leaders gathered at the meeting (made up of neighborhood-level
Vanguard Youth leaders but also including Bnh Xuyn chiefs Dng Vn
Dng, Mi Tr, Nguyn Thnh Long, and Lm Vn c) elected By
Vin to be chief-of-staff. The retreat of major Vit Minh forces from the city
and its periphery forestalled the plan.
A year later, Nguyn Vn Trns idea was greeted with approbation from
members of the Si Gn-Ch Ln Administrative Committee. From their
perspective, the presence of four separate armed organizationsthe Vit
Minh Public Security, By Vins local guerrillas [du kch a phng],
suicide squads [cm t], and Nguyn Bnhs Action Committeescreated
jurisdictional overlap and frequent conflict. Nguyn Bnh and By Vin
seemed reluctant to discuss the matter, however. The Si Gn-Ch Ln
administrators thus enlisted Nguyn Vn Trn as a go-between. With his
intervention, the Si Gn-Ch Ln Administrative Committee, Hunh Vn
Vng (Si Gn-Ch Ln Public Security Services [Cng an Ty]), Nguyn Vn
Hm (head of Nguyn Bnhs Action Committees), and representatives sent
by By Vin and Mi Tr assembled to discuss the specifics for establishing
the Urban Military Affairs Committee [y ban Qun s Thnh]. The creation
of this committee, the conveners explained, would address the lack of coop-
eration, which had often caused the units to collide with one another. The
attendees elected By Vin as the committees chief-of-staff, while Nguyn
Bnhs man, Nguyn Vn Hm (alias Su Hm) became his deputy.
This bureaucratic move strengthened By Vins claim on Si Gn-Ch
Ln, cementing and legitimating his de facto influence there. Si Gn-Ch
Ln was By Vins home turffirst as a local tough in the s and s,
and then as a strongman Trn Vn Giu tapped to become the military chief
of the fledgling Si Gn-Ch Ln Resistance Committee. By Vin and the
substantial force under his command were not only a threat to Nguyn
Bnhs control over military matters; the Urban Military Affairs Committees
responsibility to regularize tax collection by armed units also compromised
his hold on the citys lucrative tax base. As much as Nguyn Bnh bemoaned
the fact that the city was not razed in the early days of French reconquest, Si
Gn-Ch Ln was an integral part of the Vit Minh political economy.
French journalist Lucien Bodard wrote that Saigon above all is a cash cow.
Nguyn Bnh, to survive, is literally grafted onto the prosperity brought by
war. From both a military and economic perspective, Nguyn Bnh had
little incentive to authorize a separate organ outside his immediate control.
In a March letter, Nguyn Ph Hu, vice chairman of the Si Gn-
Ch Ln Administrative Committee, clearly frustrated by Nguyn Bnhs
foot-dragging, urged him to officially approve [chun y chnh thc] the
establishment of the Urban Military Affairs Committee. This committee
did eventually come into being in the form of the Urban Command Com-
mittee [Ban Ch huy Thnh]. But in spite of the Si Gn-Ch Ln Admin-
istrative Committees maneuverswith the connivance if not approval of
the Territorial CommitteeNguyn Bnh was able to thwart any attempted
circumscriptions. In May, Nguyn Bnh set out to create a parallel organ called
the Si Gn-Ch Ln Military Command [Commandement Militaire de la
Place], which would claim military, administrative, and civil powers. And it
would answer directly to him because, he reasoned, the Urban Command
Committee lacked the capacity to handle military questions. So effective
were Nguyn Bnhs maneuvers that by October , the Second Bureau
[Deuxime Bureau, i.e., French military intelligence] reported that despite
policies to make Si Gn-Ch Ln independent of Nguyn Bnh, and not-
withstanding successive reorganizations of the Urban Command Committee,
Nguyn Bnhs influence over the city remained complete. Officially, By
Vin remained the president, but actual powers over the Self-Defense Force,
National Defense Force, and the Action Committees rested with Nguyn Bnh
and Nguyn Vn Hm. One can say that By Vin has been practically
eliminated from Saigon, the report concluded.
By Vins Alternative Lifelines

Even with the backing of Nguyn Vn Trn, whose influence at this time
cannot be underestimated, By Vin found himself in a precarious position.
His role in the Vit Minhs internal power struggle, though empowering,
placed him in the crosshairs of his fellow strongman. The rising tension
magnified the importance of By Vins pre- non-communist
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connections, especially his friendship with Nguyn Vn Thin (alias Maur-

ice Thin), which would prove vital to the creation of an alternative power
base and a potential source of political leverage. As a nationalist militant, he
used his position to help By Vin build his military, financial, and political
network in Si Gn-Ch Ln. Just as importantly, he shared and appealed to
By Vins patriotic impulse while delivering him the concrete means to
carry out his heroic struggle.
A competitive cyclist in his youth, Maurice Thin became well-known
as a secretive nationalist operative in Si Gn-Ch Ln. He dabbled in
horse racing, gambling, and illicit trade. According to French intelligence,
he first met underworld figures like Mi Tr and By Vin in , during
an arms sale. World War II saw him working at a Japanese mill, a job he
likely secured through a close friendship with Mitsushiro Matsushita, a Jap-
anese businessman and a spy sympathetic to Vietnamese nationalism.
Maurice Thin credited Matsushita with saving him from financial ruin.
After the March coup de force, he entered the service of Lm Ngc
ng, who replaced Marcel Bazin at the helm of the Special Police of
Eastern Cochinchina [Police Spciale de lEst] (PSE), the political arm of
the Cochinchinese Sret. With the security services no longer under
French control, Maurice Thin arranged for amnesty to be granted to those
who would serve the cause of the Fatherland, including By Vin and his
men. Just before Japanese capitulation, Maurice Thin was a leader and
primary arms supplier to the Si Gn-Ch Ln armed groups. By August
, he had joined the resistance led by Trn Vn Giu and became By
Vins secretary. At the same time, according to Franois Guillemot, Maur-
ice Thin joined the Greater Vietnam Nationalist Party [i Vit Quc
Dn ng] (VQD) after meeting Phm Huy L, the partys leader in the
south. He helped organize sabotage units as well as manage the partys
finances for a time. In November, he accompanied VQD leader
Phm Cao Hng to H Ni. French sources disagree over whether
Maurice Thin intended to ask the DRV for reinforcement or to propose
to Nguyn Hi Thn and other non-communist leaders a plan to oust Trn
Vn Giu. In any case, he returned to Si Gn-Ch Ln a few months
later empty-handed, deliberating whether to leave the communist-led Vit
Minh. In early March , he was arrested by the PSE, now back in
French hands, which handed him over to the Sret aux Armes. During
interrogation, he claimed to be in a position to rally the Bnh Xuyn leaders
By Vin, Mi Tr, and Lm Vn c (alias T T). It appears that he was
in custody until October when charges against him were dropped,
though he remained beholden to his captors.
The timing of Maurice Thins return to action was propitious. It was at
this point that By Vins relationship with Nguyn Bnh began to deterio-
rate and the battle for Si Gn-Ch Ln escalated. Equally important,
Nguyn Vn Xun had just months earlier replaced Le Vn Hoch as Prime
Minister of the Cochinchinese Republic, bringing noted nationalist Trn
Vn n into his government. While Nguyn Vn Trn and his allies
engaged in a cold war with Nguyn Bnh, By Vin used his official status
to assert his presence in the city. Maurice Thin emerged as a key player. His
arrest and consequent role as an informant circumscribed his activities, but
conversely, it was this unique position that enabled him to move in the
interstices of the conflict in ways few could. Maurice Thin established his
base at No. rue de Canton, from which he provided a key material and
political lifeline to By Vin. He supplied By Vins troops in Rng Sc with
fabric, vegetables, sugar, coffee, medicine, and arms and munitions via
a cadre of agents. By Vins sprawling urban networkthree Traitor
Elimination Committees [Ban Tr gian] and ten Military Espionage Com-
mittees [Ban Do thm Qun s]relied on Maurice Thin to provide
government-issued travel passes to help fighters infiltrate French military
positions, and to intervene on behalf of arrested agents. No doubt, Maur-
ice Thins activities blurred the boundary between the warring parties. For
example, the commander of the Traitor Elimination Committee reported
to By Vin that two agents were using French Second Bureau passes to
carry out activities, and of two newly recruited agents, one had worked in the
French Sret and the other in a Second Bureau Commando. With
a growing network of operatives and a strategically positioned collaborator,
By Vin was in a stronger position than the French had thought when they
pronounced his elimination from the city. To further fence his units off
from Nguyn Bnh, By Vin informed his Traitor Elimination Committees
that they did not have to report to Nguyn Bnh, effectively placing them
outside the Zone Chief s purview.
158 LI
By Vins collaboration with Maurice Thin was clearly a threat to

Nguyn Bnh. In the latters October arrest order, Maurice Thin was
described as an extremely dangerous operative sent by the French who not
only extorted from the Grand Monde and leaked numerous secret Vit Minh
orders to the enemy, but also managed to gain the good graces of detained
agents by intervening on their behalf. Throughout that year, to facilitate
the support activities, Maurice Thin created vital revenue streams through
protection rackets. Extortion, kidnapping, and boldfaced threats of terrorist
attack were routine methods he and his men employed, not unlike Nguyn
Bnhs own subordinates. No client was more essential or lucrative than
the gambling establishments. But his efforts encroached on existing financial
arrangements. According to one Action Committee member under interro-
gation, Nguyn Bnh had extorted two million piasters from operators of the
Grand Monde amusement park, who then decided to pay an additional five
to ten thousand per day for protection of the gambling enterprise in Ch
Ln. Merchants and pharmacists regularly made donations to ensure
protection as well.
But it was not only the fight over control of Si Gn-Ch Ln that drew
Nguyn Bnhs ire. By virtue of Maurice Thins key role, the territorial
struggle became inherently political. For reasons of both politics and self-
preservation, he fanned the smoldering tension between Nguyn Bnh and
By Vin. During this same period, Nguyn Bnhs harsh measures to cen-
tralize authority and bring into line politicized religious sects created
massive defections. Similar attempts to increase control were also employed
vis--vis the Bnh Xuyn, such as integrating a Vit Minh-commanded
regiment into the Bnh Xuyn forces, or severely punishing Mi Tr for
protecting Ho Ho leader Hunh Ph S, who was later executed. Amidst
this political turbulence, Maurice Thin vowed to win By Vin over to the
non-communist ranks. He and Lm Ngc ng sought to impress upon
non-communists and, above all, their French patrons, of the Bnh Xuyns
absolute commitment to the anti-Vit Minh cause. By Vin, aware of
Maurice Thins uncomprimising views and fearing for his safety, urged him
to be prudent and refrain from speaking against Nguyn Bnh: He
knows you are my friend and that you are my eyes and ears. Stay behind
us so we can support you in the fight against him. An informant inside
Action Committee also warned Maurice Thin that he was surrounded by

Nguyn Bnhs agents.
In spite of By Vins stated antipathy toward Nguyn Bnhs dicator-
ship and the prominence of his name in non-communist plans for an anti-
Vit Minh front, the Bnh Xuyn continued its fight against French
troops. Maurice Thin must have realized that By Vins feelings did
not translate to a rejection of the DRV leadership generally. There was little
indication that he was committed to abandoning the maquis or that he
disparaged communists from an ideological position. After all, By Vins
other confidant, Nguyn Vn Trn, had gathered substantial support among
Vit Minh leaders to place him in command of Si Gn-Ch Ln and, later,
Zone . As Nguyn Vn Sm, a leader of the National Unification Front
[Mt trn Quc gia Thng nht] who claimed to have won over the Bnh
Xuyn, observed, By Vin lacked a precise political tendency and re-
mained submissive to Nguyn Bnh. In August, By Vin also issued
a proclamation denouncing the French, Cochinchinese separatists, and
other sycophants [vut ui lng] and war profiteers [u c khng
chin] who spread rumors of the Bnh Xuyns support for them. He reit-
erated the groups commitment to the DRV: The Bnh Xuyn belongs to the
Bnh Xuyn fighters. The Bnh Xuyn belongs to the DRV. The Bnh Xuyn
belongs to all twenty-five million compatriots . . . On behalf of the fighters,
we affirm the Bnh Xuyns genuine commitment to the war of national
salvation. In practice, By Vin likewise complied with Vit Minh pol-
icies, often against Maurice Thins advice. This was evident in their dis-
agreement over the Vit Minhs blockade of rice transport into the city.
While By Vin instructed his troops to strictly enforce the blockade, Maur-
ice Thin deliberately contradicted the order. Months earlier, By Vin
had flatly refused his request to circumvent the blockade, citing the Vit
Minhs law against the transport of paddy. When By Vin failed to listen
to his entreaties and reiterated his order to destroy two cargo ships, Maurice
Thin swiftly issued a counter-order to try to block the action.
Choosing A Strongman
By Vin was no puppet; his indecision was studied. The delicate balancing
act had provided reprieve from French attacks while yielding support from
160 LI
the DRV brass. By , the Vit Minh administrative and party organs
had become weary of Nguyn Bnhs unilateral approach and his Mani-
chean mindset. Disagreements over treatment of the Bnh Xuyn reflected
a broader pattern of civil-military tension that permeated the resistance,
one where the Southern Administrative Committees preferred policy of
moderation and diplomacy ran up against Nguyn Bnhs policy of force.
According to Yves Gras, this fundamental disagreement in the Vit Minh
leadership led to the only victory the French won on the field: the rallie-
ment of the political-religious sects. In an effort to forestall another
schism after the exodus of the Cao i and the Ho Ho, the Resistance
Committee proposed naming Nguyn Vn Trnknown for his personal
relationship with Mi Tr and By Vinas its Military Inspector [Thanh
Tra Qun S y Ban Khng Chin]. He was tasked with clearing up
misunderstandings between different groups and unifying the resis-
tance. The tension between the Vit Minh strongmen became so crit-
ical that Phm Ngc Thun, vice chairman of the Southern Administrative
Committee, and Ung Vn Khim, its head of internal affairs, privately met
with Mi Tr, T T, and Lai Hu Ti (By Vins representative) in April
. In their report, Phm Ngc Thun and Ung Vn Khim noted the
indignation [ni lng ut c] that had been festering for some time and
underscored the need to resolve any misunderstandings [ng nhn] to
better unify the forces in the fight for independence. They sent Nguyn
Vn Trn to mediate between the two feuding parties. To maintain the
peace, he and Phm Ngc Thun would become the de facto decision
makers on all matters related to the Bnh Xuyn, though ostensibly in
consultation with Nguyn Bnh.
Nguyn Vn Trn, more than any other in the resistance, appreciated the
value of the Bnh Xuyn to the viability of the southern resistance. Uniquely
positioned as a credible voice vis--vis both the southern DRV leadership
and the Bnh Xuyn, he tried to solidify relations between the two. In
a March report to the Southern Administrative and Resistance Committees,
he wrote assuredly of the Bnh Xuyns commitment to the resistance: The
Bnh Xuyns political attitude remains the samesupport the government,
kill the enemy, eliminate traitors. He also tried to assauge fears of the Bnh
Xuyn following the Cao i to the French. According to the report, By
Vin was to have declared: Who dares to say we [the Bnh Xuyn] will not
fight the reactionary Cao i? . . . If the Vit Minh is defeated and the French
turn to eliminate the Bnh Xuyn, how can the Bnh Xuyn survive? In an
implicit criticism of Nguyn Bnh, Nguyn Vn Trn stressed that regard-
ing [the Bnh Xuyns] political position, one cannot casually say that they
will defect to the French, or be won over by the Ty Ninh Cao i or Hunh
Ph S. Nguyn Vn Trn was more direct in his criticism of Nguyn
Bnh in an April report he sent to the Territorial Committee. In defense of
the Bnh Xuyn, he flatly dismissed the suspicion that the group was about to
rally to the Cao i or to Hunh Ph S, and emphasized its loyalty to the
resistance. He explained that the Bnh Xuyn chiefs did not respect Nguyn
Bnh partly because the latter had not been impartial in his treatment of
Mi Tr. Nguyn Bnh, the letter continues, must be reminded of his mission,
which was to unify the southern armed forces. Nguyn Vn Trn stressed that
the cooperation of the Bnh Xuyn was crucial to safeguarding the commu-
nication and transportation artery connecting central and southern Vietnam
via B Ra and ng Nai. He, along with the Southern Administrative Com-
mittee, thus advocated a flexible method to preserve the relationship, while
Nguyn Bnh insisted on employing absolutist methods.
In July , the communist newspaper Gii Phng published an open
letter, penned by Eastern Zone Political Inspector H Vn Long, trying to
tactfully uphold the reputation of both Nguyn Bnh and the Bnh Xuyn.
He blamed the internal tensions on the provocation of the French and
traitors while praising the rectitude of the Bnh Xuyn: Seeing that the Bnh
Xuyn fighters patriotism could not be shaken, the French and its band of
sell-outs created a plan to divide the Bnh Xuyn fighters from the Zone
Chief. They sent secret agents into different organs of the army to instigate
indiscipline [xi dc (sic) lm nhng vic chm k lut]banditry, murder,
assassination of Zone Chief Nguyn Bnh, arrest and execution of govern-
ment agents. Though careful to hold both sides accountable, the letter
stressed that it is important . . . to pierce through exaggerations large and
small and to be fair and judicious in resolving all conflicts.
Alarmed by successive breaks with the Cao i and the Ho Ho, and
hardly comforted by Nguyn Vn Trns report on the Bnh Xuyn, the
Territorial Committee clarified its policy of cooperation at a conference in
162 LI
late December . The resolution that emerged placed the focus on unity.
French success in winning over the religious sects and the Franco-
Vietnamese effort to rally the Bnh Xuyn in order to create a pure nation-
alist [quc gia thun ty], anti-communist bloc exposed the need for the
resistance to strictly follow a policy of unification. More than ever, the
Territorial Committee concluded:
We must lead the resistance war but we do not have to wield all authority. We
must always be correct, generous, and sincere in our policy with other political
groups.
Close alliance and unity must be realized not just at the leadership level or at
conferences, but also at lower levels, in the quotidian activities of the resis-
tance. This and only this will prevent the French colonialists from exploiting
or instigating rightists and the disaffected to divide and create conflicts
between our organization and other genuinely patriotic groups.
The Territorial Committee and Administrative Committee communicated

their concerns about Nguyn Bnh to the leadership in H Ni. In March, L
Dun warned H Ch Minh and V Nguyn Gip that strife between
Nguyn Bnh and the Bnh Xuyn had become dire and asked for immediate
intervention without which, he cautioned, total political and military fail-
ure would result. He suggested promoting By Vin and Mi Tr to
higher posts to appease them. Likely with approval from above, plans were
put in place to replace Nguyn Bnh with By Vin. Nguyn Vn Trn, in his
memoir, claims that By Vins promotion was a major piece of L Duns
plan to wrest control of the southern resistance from Nguyn Bnh. The
plan was to promote Nguyn Bnh to Commander-in-Chief of southern
forces [Tng T lnh] (with L Dun himself as political commissar) and
thus dislodge him from a position of real power [bc ra khi chc v c thc
quyn]. By Vin would take his place as Zone chief, with Nguyn Vn
Trn as his political commissar.
Failure of the Neutral Zone

Just as the Vit Minh leadership moved to empower By Vin at Nguyn
Bnhs expense, the Republic of Cochinchina under Nguyn Vn Xun
stepped up efforts to win over the Bnh Xuyn chief. Until September
, when Nguyn Vn Xun rose to replace L Vn Hoch as prime

minister, French and non-communists of all stripes eagerly awaited a fallout
between Nguyn Bnh and the Bnh Xuyn that never took place. In the eyes
of Trn Vn n, then the Minister of Information, however, the fact that By
Vin had not compromised himself by rallying to the French (as the Cao i
had done) was key to his potential effectiveness as a leader in a non-
communist resistance. Trn Vn n believed that a viable nationalist resis-
tance needed a non-ideological figure with military capability. By Vin,
a hero of the resistance with neither religion nor party, fit the bill. Indeed,
Trn Vn n played a pivotal role in efforts to build a non-communist
coalition independent of the French. He was already a staunch proponent
of Vietnamese independence during his student days in Aix-en-Provence in
the s. In the s, after returning from his studies in France, he, as
many fellow nationalist intellectuals like Nguyn An Ninh, Dng Vn
Gio, and Nguyn Vn To had done, became a newspaperman, working
for uc Nh Nam [Southern Torch] and La Lutte [The Struggle]. The
following year saw Trn Vn n devote himself to political organizing,
which briefly landed him in prison. During the Japanese occupation, he was
said to have entered the service of the Japanese military police while pro-
moting Vietnamese independence as a leader of the Vietnam Restoration
Association [Vit Nam Phc Quc ng Minh Hi or Phc Quc]. Unable
to guarantee his safety in light of his anti-French activities, the Japanese kept
him in Singapore until after the March coup. The understandably
suspicious French bemoaned Trn Vn ns plan to make the Xun Gov-
ernment a genuinely nationalist government. After becoming Minister of
Information in late , according to the report, he sought to bring in
elements of his choice to form a solid nationalist core inside [the govern-
ment] that will back [Nguyn Vn Xuns] demands.
One key appointment was Lm Ngc ng who, through Trn Vn ns
initiative, became Chief of the National Intelligence Service in January
. Though he was a regular fixture at non-communist political meet-
ings, little biographical information is availabe. What we do know paints him
as a well-connected, militant nationalist with a knack for clandestine organiz-
ing. In , the Cochinchinese Sret reported that this Bc Liu landowner,
who had returned from France, was to be recruited into the Vietnam
164 LI
Restoration Association, the same organization of which Trn Vn n was the

general secretary. His whereabouts are unclear until the March coup when
he replaced Marcel Bazin as the head of the PSE, working under Hunh Vn
Phng and H Vnh K. It was in this role that he, through Maurice Thin,
first recruited By Vin and his men. After the return of the French, he led
a peripatetic political life, facilitating i Vit activities in the south, joining
Nguyn Ho Hips Third Division, then By Vins staff after the formers
defection, and becoming a member of the Vietnamese Democractic-Socialist
Party [ng Vit Nam Dn Ch X Hi] Central Committee.
The emergence of nationalist figures like Trn Vn n and Lm Ngc
ng steered the French-backed Cochinchinese Republic toward incubat-
ing rather than neutralizing nationalist resistance. In discussions with
Nguyn Vn Xun, Trn Vn n reasoned that if everyone simply left the
resistance, the French would have no need for nationalists and their demand
for independence would not be met. Instead, he wanted By Vin to
maintain a neutral zone [vng trung lp or khu trung lp], a territory to
which fighters who opposed both the Vit Minh and the French could
retreat. Afterward, Nguyn Vn Xun sent a letter to By Vin, via Maur-
ice Thin, broaching the idea of a neutral zone. In reference to the Bo i
Solution that had been gaining steam since late , Nguyn Vn Xun
informed By Vin that Franco-Vietnamese negotiations would achieve
good results, that they would bring together elites from all three regions
to form a government under the former emperor. In order to consolidate
a national force and to create a basis for the formation of a national army,
he advocated the creation of a neutral zone to concentrate nationalist fight-
ers as they awaited the conclusion of French negotiations with Bo i. The
choice of zone chief was up to By Vin. Sensitive to By Vins self-
perception, Nguyn Vn Xun assured him: The organization of this zone
[under him] in no way signifies surrender.
In early , Nguyn Vn Xun sent Trn Vn n to discuss the plan
with the French military then under General Boyer de la Tours command.
Antoine Savani, a Second Bureau agent considered a mastermind behind
the defection of the religious sects and credited with rallying By Vin, acted
as his representative. As TrnVn n recalled, he explained to Savani that
there would be no better fighter against the Vit Minh than an ex-Vit Minh.
Moreover, By Vins value was not just military but also political. For that
reason, the Bnh Xuyn cannot be seen as defectors [ngi u hng] to the
French . . . If L Vn Vin rallies [v thnh, lit. return to the city] there will
no longer be a Bnh Xuyn Zone and L Vn Vin himself will have become
a creature of the French. By this time, there was a marked shift in
perception in the French military toward the Bnh Xuyn. Whereas in
and early it saw the rallying of the Bnh Xuyn in largely military
terms (i.e., to reduce the Vit Minhs armed force and, more importantly, to
take their weapons off the battlefield), by late to early , the Bnh
Xuyns appeal encompassed its political capital as non-ideological and well-
respected partisans, singularly committed to the protection of the Father-
land. After consulting with de la Tour, Savani agreed to a neutral zone,
but pressed for regular French patrols. Trn Vn n recalls asking: If the
French frequent and patrol the area, then it is a French Zone. Why not let
the Provisional Central Government patrol it instead? Savani retorted:
[Because then] you can produce arms to fight us, who can stop you [then]?
Unwilling to accede to a genuinely neutral territory, the French command
broke off talks.
The Ralliement that Almost Wasnt

The impasse between nationalists inside the Cochinchinese Republic and the
French military doomed the neutral zone. In March, the three parties
Nguyn Vn Xuns government, the French military, and By Vinhad
agreed to a temporary truce while the idea of the neutral zone was discussed.
Under its terms, the French military would be given free movement on the
Soi Rp River in exchange for recognizing By Vins authority in his
territory and provisioning his troops. But on March , just as talks
between Trn Vn n and Savani broke down, a launch called Thanh Vn
traveling from Long Xuyn to Ch Ln was hijacked by a band proclaiming
to be part of the Bnh Xuyn. The men forced their way onto the vessel as
it passed through Gia nh, inflicting multiple fatalities, including two
French soldiers and French passengers. The rest of those on board were
robbed of their valuables and freed two days later in Bin Ho. According to
the Sret Fdrale report, a hostage recalled seeing Mi Tr and By Vin
among the Vit Minh. The latter was even said to have lectured them on the
166 LI
Vit Minhs goals of liberty and independence in the resistance war. The
Thanh Vn Affair marked a decisive break in the plan to rally the Bnh
Xuyn. Based on the Sret Fdrale report, By Vins complicity is apparent.
But the report raises a number of questions. Did By Vin intentionally
renege on the agreement or did other Bnh Xuyn leaders force his hand?
After all, in late similar dustups between Bnh Xuyn troops not under
By Vins direct command and French forces had nearly compromised the
fragile peace that Maurice Thin tried to maintain. The reports zealous
implication of By Vin in the attack suggests that the Sret Fdrale may
have used the incident as a pretext to foil the negotiations for ralliement being
orchestrated by military intelligence. The mistrust between the two intelli-
gence services was well-known. It was a legacy of the conflict between General
Philippe Leclerc, commander of the Expeditionary Corps, and Georges Thier-
ry dArgenlieu, High Commissioner to Indochina, in which the latter advo-
cated a more aggressive policy toward the DRV. DArgenlieu believed that
Leclerc was a victim of indoctrination and thus saw military intelligence as
similarly tainted, so he developed an intelligence service that gathered what
he deemed trustworthy information. By the end of , according to histo-
rian Jean-Marc Le Page, there existed two opposed services that practically
did not speak to each other. Even after Leclerc left Indochina in , the
civilian intelligence service regarded military intelligence with suspicion.
Viewed in this context, the Sret Fdrale had motivation to put an end to
negotiations involving suspect members of the Nguyn Vn Xun govern-
ment and sections of military intelligencethe Second Bureau (of French
forces in Cochinchina) and the Si Gn branch of the Historical Studies
Section [Section dtudes Historiques, Saigon] (SESAG).
The fallout was swift. After de la Tour and Savani rejected the idea of an
independent zone, all of the principal actors either fled or were arrested.
Trn Vn n briefly considered joining the Bnh Xuyn in the maquis, but
ultimately decided to go to France at the end of March. On April , Maurice
Thin was arrested on the charge of clandestinely supplying By Vins troops
and organizing and harboring his agents in Si Gn-Ch Ln. On April ,
Lm Ngc ng resigned from the National Intelligence Service and fled
with twenty agents to the maquis to join the Bnh Xuyn. Before leaving, he
penned a letter of resignation to Nguyn Vn Xun in which he lamented the
Prime Ministers failure to protect nationalists who had stood by him.

Particularly galling was his failure to even register a protest when the Sret
Fdrale ransacked the offices of the National Intelligence Service and arrested
its agents en masse: The French keep hounding us while you remain passive.
Lm Ngc ng cautioned: You will lose all of your friends and support if
you do not adopt a more forceful attitude. You risk being a puppet without
being aware of it. Lm Ngc ng also sent a parting letter to Captain Huc,
head of SESAG, whom he fondly called a sincere and loyal friend. In it, he
shared his frustrations and explained his need to leave: My intention, as you
know well, was to break the Bnh Xuyn from the communists. And we almost
achieved our goal . . . had there not been service-to-service rivalry . . . I must go
to the maquis [now] because General Xun is too soft, he cannot protect me
against the Sret Fdrales [attacks]. He concluded by stressing that if the
Sret Fdrale continued to direct policy in Cochinchina, it would cost
France dearly.
With By Vins primary intermediaries out of the picture, the Sret
Fdrale proceeded to clamp down on his mens clandestine activities. On
April , Sret Fdrale agents arrested Ng Vn Nhn (alias Clment
Nhn), the onetime bank clerk, publisher of Ting Gi [The Call], and
French military intelligence agent on charges of supplying the rebel chief
with cash. Investigators uncovered an arrangement whereby Clment Nhn
helped Kim Chung (Cloche dOr) casino operators make weekly payments
to Maurice Thin to secure By Vins protection against terrorist attacks.
According to the report, Maurice Thin approached the casino operators
soon after the establishments opening to demand a substantial daily pro-
tection fee. Clment Nhn was called upon to negotiate a compromise. It
was agreed that Kim Chung would pay the Bnh Xuyn (i.e., By Vin) fifty
thousand piasters per day. Simultaneously, Clment Nhn was an agent of
SESAG. Fully aware of his agents conflicting roles, Captain Huc continued
to authorize his dual employment until Clment Nhn was arrested. In the
span of two months before the Sret Fdrale broke up the scheme, a sum
of over two and a half million piasters had been paid out by the casino.
This particular scheme exposed the ways in which both the Cochinchinese
government and the French military progressively empowered By Vin to
extend his control in Si Gn-Ch Ln.
168 LI
While the Franco-Vietnamese schemes devolved due to internal suspi-

cion and competition, all indications pointed to the DRV (not just the
southern leadership) intending to have By Vin replace Nguyn Bnh as
Zone Chief. In the lead-up to the official promotion, tensions between
Nguyn Bnh and the Bnh Xuyn escalated. The start of May saw repeated
skirmishes between the two sides. The Southern Territorial Committee
asked By Vin and Mi Tr to issue a declaration of their loyalty to the
DRV on the occasion of H Ch Minhs birthday. H Ch Minh
responded on May via secret telegram, thanking the Bnh Xuyn leaders
for their contributions. He urged them to contact the Government and the
General Directorate [B Tng Ch huy] when a problem cannot be
resolved. The very next telegram he sent was to Nguyn Bnh, stressing
the need to carefully discuss [cn thn bn bc] with the Resistance and
Administrative Committee and other military comrades in order to
uphold the principle of collective leadership [tp th lnh o]. H Ch
Minh reminded him to foster unity between soldiers and people, and inside
the army, in the interest of the Fatherland. But on May , , as By
Vin attended the meeting of southern resistance leaders in ng Thp
Mi, where he was promoted to Zone Chief, a purge would be initiated
at his base in Rng Sc. That night, several regiments loyal to Nguyn Bnh
and a number of units inside the Bnh Xuyn encircled and struck By Vins
headquarters in his absence, swiftly disarming and arresting his men while
confiscating evidence of his supposed treachery.
The operation had been in the works since March . But in May the
Southern Territorial Committee overrode Nguyn Bnhs decision to purge
the Bnh Xuyn and instructed him to inform his men of the amicable
resolution to the Bnh Xuyn question. Nguyn Bnh and his lieutenant
ignored the committees order and launched the purge while By Vin was
being promoted by the committee to Zone Chief. According to Nguyn
Vn Trn, Mi Tr reported to By Vin that his force in Rng Sc had
been purged, that T T and his son-in-law who resisted had been disarmed
and executed. Without a word, By Vin and Mi Tr left the conference.
The Southern Administrative Committee tried, in vain, to convince By
Vin to not leave. Nguyn Bnhs sinister plot [k qu], Nguyn Vn
Trn recounts, allowed him to defeat L Dun. The latter warned Nguyn
Vn Trn, in a disparaging reference to Nguyn Bnh, that guy [ci thng

] is a Trotskyist who has been hostile toward us since his time on Poulo
Condore. Though that moniker was almost certainly a shorthand expres-
sion of derision, the suspicion and hostility contained in L Duns remark
spoke to the intensity of his conflict with Nguyn Bnh. But the battle for the
southern resistance would not reach a resolution until the latters disappear-
ance as he made his way to the north in . Only then was the southern
party leadership able to consolidate the partys control over intelligence
opeartions and clandestine networks in Saigon-Cholon. In the mean-
time, one year after the purge, a DRV Inspection Delegation [Phi on
Kim tra Trung ng ng v Chnh ph] that evaluated the shortcomings
of the southern resistance offered a stinging assessment: With respect to the
policy of unity [in reference to the Territorial Committees December
resolution], the purge of the Bnh Xuyn . . . was a mistake in both concep-
tion and implementation. The result was not just By Vin taking a number
of troops to the French, but also bringing about disastrous consequences to
the [resistance] movement inside the city.
Re-Making the Bnh Xuyn as Anti-Colonial

Collaborator?
By Vins break with the DRV was neither expected nor straightforward.
For all intents and purposes, the prospects of rallying the Bnh Xuyn had
disappeared with Trn Vn n, Maurice Thin, and Lm Ngc ng. Even
the French militarys well-connected informants in Si Gn-Ch Ln, like
inh Vn Rt, Nguyn Ho Hip, and V Tam Anh, were surprised by the
news. After escaping ng Thp Mi with a small retinue of fighters and
finding his base irrecoverable, By Vin sent Lai Hu Ti to make contact
with the French military. The French immediately sent military intelli-
gence officers to discuss the terms for joining them. Only after some hesi-
tation did By Vin agree to a meeting, during which they reached
a provisional agreement whereby By Vin would rally to the Nguyn Vn
Xun government and Bo i, and recognize the French Union. In return,
the French promised to clear Rng Sc and provide funds for rallying the
remaining Bnh Xuyn troops. Yet even after the completion of the opera-
tions, it took further convincing by Savani for By Vin to rally. After
170 LI
tracking him down on the evening of June , Savani persuaded him to meet
with de la Tour at the Commissariat de la Rpublique. The next day he
signed a proclamation condemning the communist dictatorship, declaring
his will to fight it, and recognizing the Provisional Central Government and
the French Union. About a week later, Franco-Vietnamese authorities
held a ceremony where Prime Minister of the Provisional Central Govern-
ment Nguyn Vn Xun and Governor of Cochinchina Trn Vn Hu
welcomed By Vin. He gave an interview on the airwaves in which he
characterized his joining the French and the Nguyn Vn Xun government
as neither submission nor surrender, but collaboration. He was happy to see
the signing of the H Long Bay Agreement and wanted to quickly put an end
to the fratricidal struggle between the French and the Vietnamese.
By Vins apparent commitment to the fledgling state and the French
belied the ambiguous and contentious relationship that he had developed
with various factions of the Vietnamese and French authorities. After all, the
breakdown of the neutral zone plan due to French objections and Nguyn
Vn Xuns acquiescence made By Vin naturally suspicious. As early as
July, Nguyn Vn Xun informed de la Tour that Bnh Xuyn troops await-
ing processing had fanned out of their designated zone to engage in arbitrary
arrests, illegal exactions, and summary executions in the city. A source in
Nguyn Bnhs service reported that as soon as By Vin returned to town,
he immediately sent his sabotage agents to track down Vit Minh urban
organizations (i.e., Action Committees), not only in Ch Ln and Khnh
Hi, but also in the center of Si Gn. Subsequent reports from the
Municipal Police suggest that the Bnh Xuyn was aggressively establishing
its own urban action committees as well as protection rackets targeting
Chinese merchants in Si Gn-Ch Ln. While these activities checked
the presence of Vit Minh terror cells in the city, they also brought By
Vins men into repeated conflicts with local authorities. The initially
minor fracas over unclear territorial boundaries soon escalated into outright
violence against state agents. Growing concerns over the increasing fre-
quency of Bnh Xuyn transgressions prompted the frustrated Commis-
sioner of Cochinchina to write to Governor Trn Vn Hu, stating that
numerous appeals to both By Vin and his representatives had not yielded
any results. By December, the Prefect of Si Gn-Ch Ln reported
a jump in terrorist attacks coming from the Bnh Xuyn zone against his
investigators and accused the group of complicity. He explained that By
Vins men were systematically eliminating police agents to impede the
governments information gathering efforts.
Rallying By Vin was, no doubt, both a military and political coup. The
Cochinchinese Government (renamed the Provisional Central Government)
rushed to exploit the news for propaganda purposes, but neither the
French nor the Vietnamese authorities were nave about the potential risks
involved. Already dubious about the wisdom of rallying the Bnh Xuyn,
a Sret Fdrale report warned that By Vin and his mens participation in
pacification could do more harm than good if discipline was not
imposed. The concern communicated to the Provisional Government
was that the Bnh Xuyn would clear out the insurgents only to replace
them as extra-legal authorities. The protocol between the Bnh Xuyn
and Nguyn Vn Xuns government was thus designed to harness and
isolate the groups violence-wielding capacity. While granting the Bnh
Xuyn a zone in which it was charged with administration and policing,
the protocol specified that Bnh Xuyn troops could not move outside that
zone without permission. All Bnh Xuyn elements outside the zone must
be recalled, and all clandestine units dissolved. Moreover, the agreement
maintained that the zone would be open to civilian and military traffic.
But violent clashes with state agents became a recurring theme in the Bnh
Xuyns post-ralliement existence. While the Sret Fdrales report was
prescient, its assessment that the circumstances of ralliement allows South
Vietnamese authorities and the [French] military command to easily
impose discipline on By Vin and his men was deeply flawed. When
the group invariably stepped outside the bounds of acceptable behavior
and were evasive when called to account, the authorities chalked the
behavior up to its tendency toward illegality and labeled its activities
criminal [agissements dlictueux].
But what French and Vietnamese state agents saw as criminal constituted
the groups concrete actions in establishing local sovereignty. At least in the-
ory, it was a steppingstone to Vietnams postcolonial future. A Bnh Xuyn
political program furnished by a well-placed informant makes clear that
reducing the groups character to that of a criminal band was inaccurate and
172 LI
foolhardy. Despite his ralliement, By Vin continued to see himself as

nothing less than a patriotic hero destined for the history books. Flanked by
politically savvy lieutenants, he set out to remake the Bnh Xuyn as the
cornerstone of a Third Force, leading armed nationalist groups to support
Bo is return. Though recognizing the groups own position of weakness,
the program stressed that it would eventually win back the peoples confi-
dence because it did not collaborate with the French. In order to lead a viable
armed force in support of Bo i, the program laid out a plan of action to
rebuild the Bnh Xuyn. The path to self-empowerment comprised three steps:
) building its military by rallying fighters from the Vit Minh and recruiting
unaffiliated nationalists, ) expanding its territory to create nationalist zones,
and ) ensuring economic viability by monopolizing all commerce within its
zones. And even at this early stage in the groups reconstitution, the program
envisioned a governing role for the Bnh Xuyn and other Third Force mem-
bers: [A]t the very worst, supposing that Bo i goes down an incorrect path
[une voie errone], the Third Force itself will be able to . . . take charge of
national destiny, to lead the country to independence.
Conclusion
By Vins ralliement marked a turning point in the history of the Bnh
Xuyn. He and his lieutenants, between and , effectively achieved
each of the three goals set out in their political programa large autono-
mous nationalist zone, a robust military with police and intelligence arms, as
well as a foothold in the economyand used their growing clout to play
a major role in elite political organizing. Those Bnh Xuyn chiefs who sided
with Nguyn Bnh, on the other hand, were swiftly marginalized and their
forces integrated into the Vit Minh. Viewed in this context, the break-
away Bnh Xuyn [Bnh Xuyn ly khai], as Vietnamese historians refer to it,
not only achieved organizational survival but also remarkable political success.
From the outset, this article aimed to naturalize the Bnh Xuyn leaders as
political actors rather than crime lords. Carl Schmitts concept of the modern
partisan best captures the groups identification with resistance, its political
commitment to defending the home soil, its ideological promiscuity, as well
as its inherent irregularity vis--vis state authority. Schmitt recognized that
in a world where state sovereignty and state-based international law are
accepted as given, the partisan is bound to remain an odd, politically irrel-

evant figure, perhaps even a madman, but for the most part a mere crimi-
nal. But, as this article has tried to show, during the pivotal
period, factions within the DRV, the French military, and the ostensibly pro-
French Cochinchinese government courted By Vin, not just as guerrillas to
be neutralized or integrated, but as political allies. He and his men exploited
incongruities inside the competing states to stake their claims on local power.
True to its partisan mold, throughout the years after ralliement, a steady
stream of reports flowed from French and Vietnamese administrative, mili-
tary, and police agents complaining about this or that criminal activity the
Bnh Xuyn engaged in. But what state authorities saw as evidence of crim-
inality was often partisanship by other means.
K EVIN L I is currently a PhD candidate in the Department of History, UC

Berkeley. He is writing a social and political history of southern Vietnam
during decolonization with a particular focus on the Bnh Xuyn. This article
grew out of his dissertation research, undertaken with the support of the
John L. Simpson Memorial Research Fellowship in International and
Comparative Studies (Institute of International Studies, UC Berkeley), the
Social Science Research Council's International Dissertation Research
Fellowship (with funds provided by the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation) and
the Fulbright-Hays Doctoral Dissertation Research Abroad Fellowship (US
Department of Education). Part of the article was originally presented at the
State in Vietnam and the State of Vietnamese Studies Workshop held at
Harvard University. He would like to thank the organizersHaydon Cherry,
Claire Edington, and Hue-Tam Ho Taias well as the participants for their
valuable feedback. He would also like to thank Peter Zinoman and the
journals anonymous reviewer for their suggestions.
ABSTRACT
The decade following the end of World War II saw the rise of the Bnh Xuyn
as a formidable military and political force. How did the Bnh Xuyn emerge
as local sovereigns? Eschewing the predominant criminal framework that
has dominated our understanding of the groups ascent, this article shows
that competition to court the Bnh Xuyn between the southern DRV and the
174 LI
French-sponsored Vietnamese governments as well as power struggles within

those same state entities strengthened the Bnh Xuyns local power. This
pattern of interstate and intrastate competition in the early years of the First
Indochina War laid the foundation for the groups contentious relationship
with its nominal Franco-Vietnamese patrons after its ralliement in .
KEYWORDS: Bnh Xuyn, decolonization, partisan, sovereignty
Notes
. See Vadim Volkov, Violent Entrepreneurs: The Use of Force in the Making of
Russian Capitalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, ). An alternative term is what
Thomas Gallant has called military entrepreneur. According to Thomas
Gallant, military entrepreneur refers to a category of men who take up arms and
who wield violence or the threat of violence as their stock in trade. Given the
blurred boundary between the legal and illegal, legitimate and illegitimate, even
state and organized crime, the term does not limit inquiry to armed actors on one
side of a fluid legal boundary. As Gallant notes: All bandits were military
entrepreneurs, but not all military entrepreneurs were bandits. Decoupling the
user of force from the criminal is key to understanding armed groups during
decolonization. See Thomas Gallant, Brigandage, Piracy, Capitalism, and State
Formation: Transnational Crime from a Historical World-Systems Perspective,
in States and Illegal Practices, ed. Josiah Heyman (Oxford: Berg, ), .
. Both the DRV and the Franco-Vietnamese authorities constituted what Paul
Staniland calls divided state apparatuses. He emphasizes the need to disag-
gregate government when examining the relationship between states and
militias, as divided state apparatuses may be associated with competing
ideological projects. Factionalized security forces or political elites that control
those security forces can have heterogeneous notions of appropriate roles for
armed groups, and state policy will therefore vary according to which arm of
the state is acting. Militias, Ideology, and the State, Journal of Conflict
Resolution () (): .
. Thomas Blom Hansen and Finn Stepputat, Sovereignty Revisited, Annual
Reivew of Anthropology, no. (): .
. Zachariah Mampilly, Parcellized Sovereignty: The State, Non-State Actors and
the Politics of Conflict in Africa, Ufahamu: A Journal of African Studies, ()
().
. Bulletin de renseignements (SESAG): A/s Commentaires V.M. sur la reddition
des Binh Xuyen, traduction dun communiqu de Nguyen Binh [On Vit Minh
comments on the surrender of the Bnh Xuyn, translation of a communiqu

from Nguyn Bnh], No., August , , H , SHD. Tran, Nu-Anh,
Contested Identities: Nationalism in the Republic of Vietnam ()
(PhD dissertation, UC Berkeley, ), -. Jessica Chapman, Cauldron of
Resistance: Ngo Dinh Diem, the United States, and s Southern Vietnam
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, ), .
. Buttinger, .
. Bernard Fall, The Political-Religious Sects of Viet-Nam, Pacific Affairs v. ,
no. (): ; Frances Hill, Millenarian Machines in South Vietnam,
Comparative Studies in Society and History, v. , no. (): .
. Ellen Hammer The Struggle for Indochina (Stanford: Stanford UP, ), .
Hammer, A Death in November: America in Vietnam, (Stanford: Stanford
UP, ), .
. Alfred W. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug
Trade (New York: Lawrence Hill Books, ), .
. Edward Miller casts By Vin as a venal and cruel gangster, who controlled
the vice rackets of the city, including casinos and brothels, and participated in
an opium-trafficking scheme run by French intelligence. In Jessica Chapmans
account of the wild south, she concludes that despite larger, national political
concerns, By Vin and the Bnh Xuyn to be sure . . . were motivated largely
by the less-than-lofty ambitions of protecting and enhancing their own wealth
and power. Misalliance: Ngo Dinh Diem, the United States, and the Fate of
South Vietnam (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, ), . Chapman, .
. Zachariah Mampilly, Rebel Rulers: Insurgent Governance and Civilian Life
during War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, ), .
. Carl Schmitt, The Theory of the Partisan: A Commentary/Remark on the
Concept of the Political, trans. A.C. Goodson (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State
UP, ), .
. Schmitt, .
. Schmitt, .
. Horn, .
. Jan-Werner Mller, An Irregularity that Cannot Be Regulated: Carl Schmitts
Theory of the Partisan and the War on Terror, Notizie di Politeia: Rivista di
Etica e Scelte Pubbliche Vol. (): . Emphasis in the original.
. David G. Marr, Vietnam: State, War, Revolution, (Berkeley: UCP,
), . Trn Hi Phng, Phng Thanh Lu, Lch S Si Gn-Ch Ln-Gia
nh Khng Chin, [History of Resistance in Si Gn-Ch Ln-Gia
nh Khng Chin, ] (TP HCM: nxb TP HCM, ), .
. Lch S Si Gn-Ch Ln-Gia nh Khng Chin, .
. Marr, .
176 LI
. H Sn i, Tm Chng, H Khang, B i Bnh Xuyn: Lin Chi i

v (TP HCM: nxb Thnh Ph H Ch Minh, ), .
. Savani, .
. Nguyn Hng, By Vin: Th lnh Bnh Xuyn [By Vin: Leader of the Bnh
Xuyn] (H Ni: Vn Hc, ), . Trn Kim Trc, Ti Git Nguyn Bnh:
Hi k ca Tham mu Trng Trung on Bnh Xuyn [I Killed Nguyn
Bnh: The Memoir of the Chief of Staff of Bnh Xuyn Regiment ] (Si Gn:
ng Nai, ), . Pierre Darcourt, Bay Vien: Le Maitre de Cholon [By Vin:
Master of Ch Ln] (Paris: Hachette, ), , , .
. Nguyn Hng, Nam B: Nhng Nhn vt Lch s [Southern Vietnam: Historical
Personages] (H ni: nxb Cng An Nhn Dn, ), . Hi ng Ch o
Bin Son Lch S Khi Ngha Nam K [Editorial Board for the History of the
Southern Uprising], Lch S Khi Ngha Nam K [History of the Southern
Uprising] (H Ni: nxb Chnh Tr Quc Gia, ), .
. Nguyn Vn Trn, Vit cho M v Quc Hi [Writing for Mother and the
National Assembly] (Westminster, CA: Vn Ngh, ), .
. ng Cng Sn Vit Nam, Thng V Tnh y Long An [Vietnamese
Communist Party, Standing Committee of Long An Province], Ch Ln: Lch
S Chn Nm Khng Chin [Ch Ln: Nine Years of Resistance] (H Ni: Qun
i Nhn Dn), .
. Ibid., .
. Christopher Goscha, A Popular Side of the Vietnamese Army: General
Nguyn Bnh and War in the South, in Naissance dun Etat-parti: le Vit Nam
depuis [The Birth of a Party-State: Vietnam since ], eds. Goscha and
Benot de Trglod (Paris: Les Indes Savantes, ), .
. Trn Vn Giu, Hi K [Memoir ] (Dayton, OH: Thi i
Mi, ), .
. Marr, .
. Trn Vn Giu, .
. Nguyn Hng, Nguyn Bnh: Huyn Thoi v S Tht [Nguyn Bnh: Legend and
Fact] (H Ni: Vn Hc, ), . Nguyn Hng recounts an incident
where a French doctor rushing across town to see a patient was executed despite
ICP-member Nguyn Vn Trns admonishment to the contrary. The latter
reportedly was deeply frustrated by the unruly nature of Bnh Xuyn fighters.
. Nguyn Hng, Ngi Bnh Xuyn, .
. Rapport politique du mois de Mars [Political Report of March ], No.
/C/API, April , , Goucoch D , Trung Tm Lu Tr Quc Gia II
[National Archives Center No.] (TTLTQG), H Ch Minh City.
. A.M. Savani, Notes sur les Binh Xuyen [Notes on the Bnh Xuyn] (Saigon: [s.n.]
), . B i Bnh Xuyn, . Nichinan was, at the time, a base for the Cao
i Youth Group, building vessels for the Japanese by day and conducting
military drills by night. See Tachikawa Kyoichi, Independence Movement in
Vietnam and Japan during WWII, NIDS Security Reports, No. (): .
. Jean Lartguy, Soldats Perdus et Fous de Dieu: Indochine (Paris:
Presses de la Cit, ), .
. B i Bnh Xuyn, .
. Activit du Viet-Minh Binh-Xuyen [Vit Minh activity in Bnh Xuyn]
(Service de la Sret), Note No./PSE, November , , R , Service
Historique de la Dfense [Defense Historical Services] (SHD), Vincennes.
. B i Bnh Xuyn, . Thng V Tnh y Long An, Ch Ln: Lch s
Chn Nm Khng Chin (H Ni: nxb Qun i Nhn Dn, ), . ng
y, B Ch Huy Qun S TP HCM, Qun i Nhn Dn, Lch S Lc Lng
V Trang Thnh Ph H Ch Minh, , . Lch S Si Gn, Ch Ln,
Gia nh Khng Chin, .
. Activit du Viet-Minh Binh-Xuyen (Service de la Sret), Note No./PSE,
November , , R , SHD.
. L Hng Lnh, Anh Ba Nguyn Bnh, in X U Nam B Vi Chin Khu ng
Thp Mi Huyn Thoi, Ban Chp Hnh ng B Tnh ng Thp (TP
HCM: nxb Tr, ).
. Activit du Viet Minh dans le secteur de Khanh Hoi, Vinh Hoi, Tan Thuan
[Vit Minh activity in the Khnh Hi, Vnh Hi, Tn Thun areas], Note No.
/PSE, November , , R , SHD.
. Nguyn Hng, Nguyn Bnh, .
. Lc Lng V Trang Thnh Ph H Ch Minh, .
. B i Bnh Xuyn, .
. Savani, . Si Gn, Ch Ln, Gia nh Khng Chin,
. Savani, .
. B i Bnh Xuyn, .
. B i Bnh Xuyn, .
. Si Gn, Ch Ln, Gia nh Khng chin, .
. Captured Document: Nguyn Bnh, Communiqu, Unnumbered, July , ,
H , SHD.
. B i Bnh Xuyn, . Si Gn, Ch Ln, Gia nh Khng Chin, .
. Captured Document: Nguyn Bnh letter to By Vin and Mi Tr (Chi i
), No. /NB, April , , H , SHD.
. Nguyn Hng, Ngi Bnh Xuyn, .
. Captured Document: Lng Vn Trng letter to Nguyn Bnh (translation),
No./.S., H , SHD.
. inh Vn Nh had asked to be sent to Saigon for medical treatment while T
Vn Ri was under investigation, according to Lng Vn Trngs letter.
178 LI
. Franois Guillemot, Dai Vit, Indpendance et Rvolution au Vit-Nam: Lchec de

la Troisime Voie, [i Vit, Independence and Revolution in Vietnam:
The Failure of the Third Way, ] (Paris: Les Indes Savantes, ), .
. T K, T K: V Tng Trung Kin v Ngha Hip [T K: A Faithful and
Chivalrous General] (TP HCM: nxb Tr, ), .
. Trn Vn n, Brochure: Fronts Historiques [Nhng Mt Trn Lch S]
[Historical Fronts] (translation), July , , . No./S, H , SHD.
. Christopher Goscha, La Guerre par dAutres Moyens: Rflexions sur la
Guerre du Vit Minh dans le Sud-Vietnam de [War by Other
Means: Reflections on the Vit Minh War in South Vietnam from to
], Guerre Mondiales et Conflits Contemporains (): . Guillemot,
. Yves Gras, Histoire de la Guerre dIndochine [History of the Indochina
War] (Paris: Plon, ), .
. Captured Document: Mt Trn Quc Gia Lin Hip Nam B, T Bin Bn
Cuc hi ngh gia cc on th chnh tr, qun s v tn gio hin ng hot
ng Nam B [National United Front, proceedings from a conference
between political, military, and religious groups currently active in the South],
April , , H , SHD.
. Captured Document: Procc Verbal de la Runion ouverte h au Cabinet
Militaire [Minutes to the Meeting that started at : at the Military Cabinet]
(translation), June , , H , SHD.
. See V Tam Anh, Front dUnion Nationale du Viet Nam: Projet de Creation
dune Zone Neutre [Front of National Union of Vietnam: Plan for the
Creation of a Neutral Zone], No.bis, June , , H , SHD.
. Guillemot, .
. Renseignements de Fichier (CEFEO Bureau): Concernant le nomm Huynh
Van Tri dit Muoi Tri, dit Tri Ba Queo [Concerning Hunh Vn Tr, aka Tr B
Quo], No. /.S., August , , H , SHD.
. Notice de renseignements concernant Nguyen Van Thien dit Maurice Thin dit
Tu Thien [Concerning Nguyn Vn Thin, aka Maurice Thin, aka T Thin]
(SDECE), March , R , SHD.
. Even though Mi Tr is listed in the minutes to the meeting as representing
the Bnh Xuyn Inter-Zone, closer examination shows that only he, Bi Hu
Phit (commander of i Vit-affiliated force, B i An in, which became
part of Bnh Xuyn Detachment ), and By Vin (via proxy) were involved
with the Front. Dng Vn H (Detachments ), Nguyn Vn Mnh, and
Mai Vn Vnh (Detachment ) did not appear on any meeting rosters.
. Captured Document: Thng Co: Mt Trn Quc Gia Lin Hip Quyt Ngh
T Chc Qun S Tm Thi [National United Front Resolution to
Temporarily Organize Military Affairs], June , , H , SHD.
. Captured Document: Nguyn Bnh letter to Mi Tr and T c, Chi i &

, No./LD, August , , H , SHD.
. Captured Document: Nguyn Bnh letter to V B Nhc (Trng Vn Phng
Khu B), No./L.D., August , , H , SHD.
. Darcourt, .
. Captured Document: Nguyn Bnh letter to Mi Tr (translation), No./.
D., September , , H , SHD. Captured Document: Nguyn Bnh
letter to Mi Tr (Detachment commander) (translation), September ,
, H , SHD.
. Captured Document: Nguyn Bnh letter to X (Detachment Staff), No..
QS, October , , H , SHD.
. Captured Document: Lm Vn Kt letter to Mi Tr, unnumbered, October
, , H , SHD.
. According to Franois Guillemot, one of the reasons for By Vins turning
against Nguyn Bnh was the execution of Hunh Ph S. Guillemot, .
. B i Bnh Xuyn, .
. B i Bnh Xuyn, . Philippe Hubert, Les Binh Xuyen: tude dun
Groupement Politico-Militaire au Sud Vietnam, [The Bnh Xuyn:
Study of a Politico-Military Group in South Vietnam, ] (Mmoire de
Matrise, Universit Paris VII Jussieu, ), .
. Captured Document: Procs verbal de la runion // (Ve Quoc Doan, Troupes
unies, Chi Doi et , An Dien-Binh Xuyen, VQD de la rgion Saigon/Cholon)
[Minutes to the meeting of //], No./ CL E, January , , H ,
SHD. Captured Document: Procs verbal de la runion // [Minutes to the
meeting of //], No./ CL A, January , , H , SHD.
. Trn Kim Trc, .
. Captured Document: Phm Hng letter to Nguyn Vn Trn, unnumbered
note, January , , H , SHD.
. Savani, .
. Captured Document: U Ban Hnh Chnh Qun Nh B, Bin Bn Hi Ngh
Hnh Chnh Qun S [Nh B County Administrative Committee,
Proceedings of the Administrative and Military Conference], December ,
, H , SHD.
. Vue densemble de la situation militaire V.M. en Cochinchine [Overview of the
Vit Minh military situation in Cochinchina] (Service de la Sret), No./
PSE, June , , SPCE , Centre dArchives dOutre-Mer (CAOM),
Aix-en-Provence. See also Savani, .
. Savani, . Goscha, A Popular Side of the Vietnamese Army, .
. Christopher Goscha, Vietnam: Un tat N de la Guerre, [Vietnam:
A State Born of War, ] (Paris: Armand Colin, ), .
180 LI
. Goscha, La Guerre par dAutres Moyens, . It is interesting to note that

Nguyn Vn Trn was made the Commissioner of the National Defense Guard
[y trng Quc gia T v Cuc] in late , which suggests at least once
potential source of friction with Nguyn Bnh. His deputy, Cao ng Chim
became the chief of public security [Cng an] in early .
. tude sur les Ban Cong Tac [Study of the Action Committees] (me Bureau),
No./, August , , H , SHD.
. Bulletin dInformation du Secteur Saigon-Cholon, Deuxime Quinzaine de
Janvier [Information Bulletin of the Si Gn-Ch Ln Sector, Second Half
of January ], No./, January , , H , SHD.
. Nguyn Vn Hm, Trng Ch Huy Cng Tc Saigon-Cholon, Thng Sc
[Nguyn Vn Hm, Action Committee Commander of Si Gn-Ch Ln,
Communiqu], S /TS, June , , H , SHD.
. It is likely that for these reasonsineffectiveness and impunitythat the Si
Gn-Ch Ln Administrative Committee reclassified the Action Committees
as guerrilla companies [i i du kch] in November . Vietnamese
historians claim that this reclassification and reorganizations unified the
armed and quasi-armed forces active in the city, placing them under the direct
command of the Territorial Committee and the local urban authority. See Lch
S Si Gn, Ch Ln, Gia nh Khng Chin, .
. Goscha, A Popular Side of the Vietnamese Army, .
. Nguyn Cng Khnh, Lch S Bo Ch Si Gn-TP. H Ch Minh,
[History of the Press in Si Gn-H Ch Minh City, ] (TP HCM: nxb
Tng Hp TP HCM, ), .
. Trn Vn Giu, . Nguyn Vn Trn, .
. Nguyn Hng, S Thc Ho Ho: Tiu Thuyt T Liu [The Ha Ho
Disciple: A Documentary Novel] (Hu Giang: nxb Tng Hp Hu Giang,
), .
. Nguyn Vn Trn, Vit Cho M v Quc Hi, .
. Bulletin de reinseignements (me Bureau): Runions tenues Cau-Xang
(Duc-Hoa) les et , Procs verbal de la runion [Meetings held in
Cu Xng (c Ho) on and , Minutes to the meetings], No. P/
, December , , H , SHD.
. Ibid. See also Julie Pham, Revolution, Communism, and History in the Thought
of Trn Vn Giu (PhD dissertation, University of Cambridge, ), .
. Christopher Goscha, Colonial Hanoi and Saigon at War: Social Dynamics of
the Viet Minhs Underground City, War in History () (): .
Goscha, Un tat N de la Guerre, .
. Lucien Bodard, La Guerre dIndochine: LEnlisement [The War of
Indochina: Stalemate] (Paris: Gallimard, ), .
. Nguyn Ph Hu (Ph Ch Tch y Ban Hnh Chnh a Phng Saigon-

Cholon) [Vice Chairman, Administrative Committee of Si Gn-Ch Ln]
letter to Nguyn Bnh (U Vin Qun S Nam B) [Military Commission of the
South], S /TV, March , , H , SHD.
. Fiche (me Bureau): Concernant lorganisation du Commandement Militaire
rebelle dans la rgion de Saigon-Cholon [Concerning the organization of rebel
Military Command in the Si Gn-Ch Ln Region], No./ S, July ,
, HCI Conseiller Politique (Conspol) , CAOM.
. Fiche de renseignements (me Bureau) sur la Cochinchine [Intelligence file on
Cochinchina], No./.S, October , , H , SHD.
. Unless otherwise noted, information in this paragraph are drawn from Notice
de renseignements: Concernant Nguyen Van Thien dit Maurice Thin dit Tu
Thien [Concerning Nguyn Vn Thin, aka Maurice Thin, aka T Thin]
(SDECE), March , R , SHD.
. Rapport (Service des dserteurs japonais): Concernant la recherch de D.J.
[Concerning the investigation of four Japanese deserters], No./Z, October ,
, H , SHD. For more on Matsushitas activities, particularly those
involving the Cao i, see Dean Meyers and My-Van Tran, The Crisis of the
Eighth Lunar Month: The Cao Dai, Prince Cuong De and the Japanese in
, International Journal of Asian Pacific Studies Vol., No. ().
. Savani, .
. Guillemot, .
. Notice de renseignements: Concernant Mr. Pham-Cao Hung alias Truong
Tuan Hung alias Cap Giang [Concerning Mr. Pham Cao Hung alias Truong
Tuan Hung alias Cap Giang] (Service de Scurit du Haut-Commissariat au
Nord Vietnam), unnumbered, August , R , SHD.
. Note de renseignements sur Nguyen Van Thien dit Maurice Thin [Intelligence
note on Nguyn Vn Thin, aka Maurice Thin], unnumbered, undated, H
, SHD.
. Renseignements (Sret aux Armes par Commissariat Police Spciale de lEst),
No., March , , H , SHD.
. Renseignements (me Bureau), No./S, December , , H , SHD.
. Tu Van Lang (Chef du Service dEspionnage Militaire No.) letter to Maurice
Thin, No., January , , found in Bulletin de renseignements No. a/s
documents trouvs dans les papiers de Maurice Thien [Regarding documents
found in the papers of Maurice Thin], No. /S, May , , H ,
SHD.
. Triu Ngc Long (Trng Ban Tr Gian S ), Phc trnh bo co ln Khu B
Ph [Triu Ngc Long (Commander of the Traitor Elimination Committee No.
), Report to the Deputy Zone Chief], November , , H , SHD.
182 LI
. Document in Traduction de documents trouvs le dans

lopration du Nhabe [Translation of documents found on during
the Nh B operation], /S, December , SHD .
. Nguyen Binh (Commissaire Militaire), Ordre Secret [Nguyn Bnh (Military
Commissioner), Secret Order], No./T, October , , H , SHD.
. During a Si Gn-Ch Ln Administrative Committee meeting, local military
commanders denounced the abuses committed by the Action Committees:
arbitrary arrests, extortions, etc . . . and those by the committees placed under the
orders of Bay Vien. See Note (Sret Fdrale): Runion de dirigeants Viet
Minh de la Rgion Saigon-Cholon [Meeting of Vit Minh leaders of the Si Gn-
Ch Ln Region], No. /SG/, September , , Conspol , CAOM.
. Goscha, Un tat N de la Guerre, .
. Renseignements (me Bureau): Ravitaillement des rebelles en Cochinchine
[Supplying rebels in Cochinchina] (Source: Sret Fdrale, interrogatoire dun
prvenu), No./, March , , H , SHD.
. Bulletin de renseignements (me Bureau): Attitude du Viet Minh vis--vis des
Binh Xuyen [Vit Minh attitude toward the Bnh Xuyn], No./S, April ,
, H , SHD.
. Bulletin de renseignements (SESAG): A/s lutte dinfluence entre Nguyen Binh
et les Nationalistes [Regarding the struggle for influence between Nguyn Bnh
and the Nationalists], No., April , , H , SHD.
. Bulletin de renseignements (SESAG): A/s extraits dune letter ecrite par Bay Vien
Maurice Thien (Traduction) [Regarding excerpts of a letter written by By Vin
to Maurice Thin (Translation)], No., November , , H , SHD.
. Bulletin de renseignements (SESAG): A/s condamnation mort de Maurice
Thien par les V.M. [Regarding the sentencing of Maurice Thin to death by the
V.M.], No., November , , H , SHD.
. Bulletin de renseignements (SESAG): A/s des Binh Xuyen [Regarding the Bnh
Xuyn], No., August , , H , SHD.
. Renseignements (me Bureau): A/s du Thanh Bo Dia Phuong Dan Xa Dang,
No.//X, March , , H , SHD.
. L Vn Vin (Khu B Ph Khu , Nc Vit Nam), Bnh Xuyn (Thanh Minh),
August , , H , SHD.
. Captured Document: Decree issued by L Vn Vin (Zone Deputy Chief) on
October , , found in Traduction des documents trouvs le .. dans
lopration du Nhabe [Translation of documents found on during
the Nh B operation], No./S, December , , H , SHD.
. Renseignements (me Bureau): A/s lettre addresse par Bay Vien Maurice
Thien [Regarding a letter By Vin addressed to Maurice Thin] (translation),
No. /, July , , H , SHD.
. Captured Document: Trinh Van Quang (Ban Tru Gian No.) letter to Maurice
Thin (alias Thong Che), No.T.G./, November , , found in Bulletin de
renseignements (SESAG), November , , H , SHD.
. Yves Gras, . Factions of the Cao i rallied to the French between
November and January , bringing along , men.
. Note de renseignement (me Bureau): Action politique et militaire du
commandement Viet Minh en Indochine du Sud [Political and military action
of the Vit Minh command in southern Indochina], No./, February ,
, H , SHD.
. Phm Ngc Thun (Ph Ch Tch), Ung Vn Khim (y Vin Ni V),
Nguyn Vn Trn (Phi Vin y Ban Khng Chin Min Nam Vit Nam), Bin
Bn [Phm Ngc Thun (Vice Chairman), Ung Vn Khim (Internal Affairs),
Nguyn Vn Trn (Delegate of the Resistance Committee of Southern
Vietnam), Minutes], April , , H , SHD.
. Phc rnh thng nm (Phi vin y Ban Khng Chin Min Nam Vit
Nam) [Report, March (Envoy of the Resistance Committee of Southern
Vietnam)], unnumbered, undated, Folder , y Ban Khng Chin Hnh
Chnh Nam B (UBKCHCNB), TTLTQG, H Ni.
. Bulletin de renseignements (me Bureau): Attitude du Viet Minh vis--vis des
Binh Xuyen, No./.S, April , , H , SHD.
. H Vn Long, Gia Chin S Bnh Xuyn v K.T. Khu [Between the Bnh
Xuyn Fighters and the Zone Chief], Gii Phng [Liberation] (July ,
), H , SHD.
. Ngh Quyt i Biu Hi Ngh X y ngy , , , ,
[Resolution of the Representative Meeting of the Territorial Committee on ,
, , , ], http://dangcongsan.vn/cpv/Modules/News/
NewsDetail.aspx?co_id=&cn_id=, accessed --.
. Renseignements, No./D.TS, April , , Folder , HCI, CAOM.
. Nguyn Vn Trn, .
. Bulletin de renseignements (SESAG): A/s du plan de regroupement des
rsistances nationalistes quenvisagerait le Ministre Tran Van An [Regarding
Minister Trn Vn ns plan to organize nationalist resistance groups], No.
, December , , H , SHD.
. Notice de renseignements: Concernant M. Tran Van An [Concerning Mr. Trn
Vn n], attached to Sjour en France de M. Tran Van An, Ministre de
lInformation du Gouvernement Provisoire de Cochinchine [Minister of
Information of the Provisional Government of Cochinchina Mr. Trn Vn ns
stay in France], No. Cab., March , , Ministre des Affaires
trangres [Ministry of Foreign Affairs], Srie Asie-Ocanie Indochine ,
Archives Diplomatiques de France [Diplomatic Archives of France], La
184 LI
Courneuve. Nguyn Hoi Vn, Tiu S C Trn Vn n [Biography of Trn

Vn n], September , (email correspondence with author on November
, ).
. Bulletin de renseignements (SESAG): A/s Activit politique Vietnamienne
Groupe de Tran Van An [Regarding Vietnamese political activityTrn Vn
ns Group], No., November , , H , SHD.
. Nguyn Hoi Vn, Ni Chuyn vi C Trn Vn n, Ma Xun
[Talking with Trn Vn n, Spring ], April , .
. Arrt: Lam Ngoc Duong est design Chef du Service National de Renseignements
[Order: Lm Ngc ng is appointed Chief of the National Intelligence Service],
No.-S/MD-Cab/S, January , , Folder D -, Ph Th Hin Nam Vit
[Office of the Governor of Southern Vietnam] (PTHNV), TTLTQG.
. Rapport mensuel (Sret Intrieure, Cochinchine) Mai au Juin
[Monthly report (Internal Sret, Cochinchina) May to June ],
Conspol , CAOM.
. Fiche (SESAG): Sur Lam Ngoc Duong [On Lm Ngc ng], in Bulletin de
renseignements (SESAG), No., June , , H , SHD. See also
Nguyn Hoi Vn, Ni Chuyn vi C Trn Vn n, Ma Xun .
Guillemot, .
. Trn Vn n, Li thm vn L Vn Vin v Thnh [Additional Information
on L Vn Vins Return to Si Gn], in i Thm Cu Th Tng Nguyn Vn
Xun (Private Papers), . I want to offer my thanks to Mr. Nguyn Vn Trn
(Paris) and Dr. Nguyn Hoi Vn (Vitr), two close confidants of the late Trn Vn
n, as well as Mrs. Trn Vn n (Rennes) for their hospitality and willingness to
share with me his unpublished multivolume autobiographical writings.
. Pierre Dabezies, Forces Politiques au Viet Nam [Political Forces in Vietnam]
(Thse pour le Doctorat, Universit de Bordeaux, ), .
. Bulletin de renseignements (SESAG): Lettre du Gnral Xuan, Prsident du
Gouvernement Provisoire du Sud Viet Nam Bay Vien (Traduction) [Letter
from General Xun, President of the Provisional Government of Southern
Vietnam, to By Vin (Translation)], No., January , , H , SHD.
. Christopher Goscha, Historical Dictionary of the Indochina War ()
(Copenhagen: NIAS Press, ), .
. TrnVn n, .
. Amiral dArgenlieu (Haut-Commissaire de France, commandant en Chef) to
Gnral Valluy, Traitement des rebelles condamns de droit commun, faisant
leur soumission [Admiral dArgenlieu (High Commissioner of France,
commander-in-chief) to General Valluy, Treatment of rebels convicted of
common crimes, offering their surrender], No. /EMP, February , ,
H , SHD.
. Project de convention pour une trve [Draft agreement of a truce],

Unnumbered, Undated, Folder D -, PTHNV, TTLTQG.
. Note (Sret Fdrale): Attaque de la chaloupe Thanh-Vn [Attack on the
launcher Thanh Vn], No. -S, April , Folder D -, PTHNV,
TTLTQG.
. Maurice Thin letter to Bertrand (me Bureau), September , , H
, SHD.
. Philippe Devillers, Histoire du Vit Nam de [History of Vietnam
from to ] (Paris: ditions du Seuil, ), .
. Jean-Marc Le Page, Les Services Secrets en Indochine [The Secret Services in
Indochina] (Paris: Nouveau Monde, ), .
. Ibid., .
. So far as I can tell, the reports and interrogation transcripts about the Thanh
Vn hijacking, found at both SHD and CAOM, were all produced by the Sret
Fdrale.
. Trn Vn n, .
. Notice de renseignements: Concernant Nguyen Van Thien dit Maurice Thin
dit Tu Thien (SDECE), March , R , SHD.
. SDJ report to me Bureau: La fuite de Mr. Lam Ngoc Duong [The flight of
Mr. Lm Ngc ng], SDJ No., April , , H , SHD.
. Lm Ngc ng letter to Nguyn Vn Xun, April , , in Bulletin de
renseignements (SESAG): A/s lettres crite par Lam Ngoc Duong, Chef du
Service National des Regnseignements du Gouvernement du Sud Viet Nam avant
son dpart en dissidence [Regarding letters written by Lm Ngc ng, Chief of
the National Intelligence Service of the South Vietnamese Government, before he
left in dissent], No. , April , , H , SHD.
. Lm Ngc ng letter to Captain Huc, April , , in Bulletin de
renseignements (SESAG), A/s lettres crite par Lam Ngoc Duong, Chef du
Service National des Regnseignements du Gouvernement du Sud Viet Nam
avant son dpart en dissidence, No. , April , , H , SHD
. Affaire Clment Nhon (Sret Fdrale): Ravitaillement dun chef rebelle en
espces sous lassentiment dun Officier des Services Secrets Franais [Clment
Nhn Affair: Supplying a rebel chief with cash with the consent of a French
Secret Services Officer], No./S, May , , H , SHD.
. Lartguy, .
. Ralliement des Bnh Xuyn, June , , Folder , HCI, CAOM.
. Hai bc mt in gi Khu V [Two secret telegrams sent to Zone V], /TRT
and /TRT, H Ch Minh Ton Tp, Tp (), http://dangcongsan.
vn/cpv/Modules/News/NewsDetail.aspx?co_id=&cn_id= (accessed
November , ).
186 LI
. Gnral Blaizot (HCI) to Ministre de la France dOutre-Mer, Ralliement de Bay

Vien et des Bnh Xuyn [Ralliement of By Vin and the Bnh Xuyn], No.
/Cab, July , , HCI , CAOM.
. Captured Document: Phm Ngc Thun (Chairman, Southern Administrative
and Resistance Committee) to L Vn Vin and Nguyn Vn Trn, No./TV/
DB, June , , in Note (Sret Fdrale): Ralliement de By Vin, No. /
SG-I, June , , Folder , HCI, CAOM.
. Nguyn Vn Trn, .
. Christopher Goscha, Intelligence in a Time of Decolonization: The Case of the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam at War (), Intelligence and National
Security, Vol., No. (): .
. See L Hng Lnh, n ng Thp Mi [Coming to ng Thp Mi], in
X y Nam B vi cn c ng Thp Mi.
. V.M. No.: Vrification [de] la nouvelle de dsarmement des troupes Binh
Xuyen, et les activits des communistes annamites [Verification of news of the
Bnh Xuyn troops disarmament, and the activities of communist Vietnamese],
No./Z, June, , H , SHD.
. Lartguy, .
. A.M. Savani, Note sur le ralliement des Binh Xuyen, No. /S, June ,
, HCI , CAOM.
. Bulletin de renseignements: Activits politique et Informations diverses
[Political activities and various information], No. /MI/AP, June ,
Folder D -, PTHNV, TTLTQG.
. Bay Vien rencontre les Presidents Xuan et Tran Van Huu [By Vin meets
Presidents Xun and Trn Vn Hu], Union Franaise June , attached
to Note: Ralliement de Bay Vien, No. SG-I, Folder , HCI, CAOM.
. Letter from Nguyn Vn Xun to General Boyer de la Tour, Unnumbered,
July , Folder B -, PTHNV, TTLTQG.
. V.M. No.: Rendez-vous avec Mr. Hoi (agent de N.B.), tabli par No...Z.
[Meeting with Mr. Hi (agent of Nguyn Bnh), set up by agent No...Z.], No.
/Z, July , , H , SHD.
. Rapport: Bay Vien aurait fait transporter dans son cantonnement FM,
mitraillettes [By Vin reportedly sent machine guns, submachine guns
to his camp], No. , September , D -, PTHNV, TTLTQG;
Rapport quotidien du au Aot [Daily report of to August
], No. , August , Folder D -, PTHNV; Letter -C,
August , Folder D -, PTHNV; Recommencement des exactions
[Renewed exactions], No. , September , Folder B -,
PTHNV; Agissements Bnh Xuyn [Bnh Xuyn schemes], No. -C,
November , D -, PTHNV. According to letter -C, from the
Prefect of Si Gn-Ch Ln Region, Ch Ln rice merchants were sum-

moned to a Bnh Xuyn Action Committee office to discuss important
questions.
. Activit Bnh Xuyn [Bnh Xuyn activities], No. /Cab, October , D
-, PTHNV, TTLTQG. The group tried to move into Vnh Hi, east of the
designated zone, only to be rebuffed by the Prefect of Si Gn-Ch Ln;
a month later it set up an Action Committee (Ban Cng Tc) north of the Canal
de Doublement, again outside its designated zone.
. Les agissements et lattitude de certains lments Bnh Xuyn [The schemes and
attitude of certain elements of the Bnh Xuyn], No. SC/Cab/AP, Folder D
-, PTHNV, TTLTQG.
. Attitude des rallis Bnh Xuyn [Attitude of the rallied Bnh Xuyn], No.
C-Cab, December , Folder D -, PTHNV, TTLTQG.
. Letter /Mi./DAP, Folder B -, PTHNV, TTLTQG.
. Robert Frances (Sret Fdrale), Ralliement de Le Van Vien [sic] dit Bay Vien,
No. , July , Folder , Ph Th Tng Nht Cng Ho
[Office of the President of the First Republic] (PTTICH), TTLTQG.
. Ralliement des Bnh Xuyn, Unnumbered, July , Folder ,
PTTICH, TTLTQG.
. Protocole de lAccord provisoire entre le gouvernement provisoire du Sud Viet
Nam et les troupes Bnh Xuyn [Draft of the provisional agreement between the
Provisional Government of Southern Vietnam and the Bnh Xuyn troops],
Unnumbered, Undated, Folder D -, PTHNV, TTLTQG.
. Robert Frances (Sret Fdrale), Ralliement de Le Van Vien dit Bay Vien, No.
, July , Folder , PTTICH, TTLQG.
. Agissements dlictueux des Bnh Xuyn, No. -C, April , Folder D -
, PTHNV, TTLTQG.
. Programme Politique et de Propagande du bloc des combattants Bnh Xuyn
[Political and Propaganda Program of the Bnh Xuyn fighters], No. /S/
Cab/AP, Folder , HCI, CAOM.
. Rle assign lArme Binh Xuyen (Plan dAction) [Role assigned to the Bnh
Xuyn Army (Plan of Action)], No. /S/Cab/AP, Folder , HCI, CAOM.
. Programme Politique, .
. Bulletin de renseignement (SESAG): A/s activit politique V.M.puration
chez les Binh Xuyen resistants [Regarding Vit Minh political activityPurge
of Bnh Xuyn resistance fighters], No., November , , H ,
SHD.
. Mller, .

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RESEARCH ESSAY

Partisan to Sovereign: The Making of the Bnh

T he Bnh Xuyn is conventionally portrayed as a criminal organization

Journal of Vietnamese Studies, Vol. , Issue -, pps. . ISSN -X, electronic -

was viewed as being made up of strategically important and ideologically

Xuyn as a nefarious and self-serving entity. Joseph Buttinger claimed that

encompassed seven well-armed detachments [chi i] (Nos. , , , , , ,

A Necessary Partnership and Its Fault Lines

bi v ngoi giao]. Front members, including Mi Tr and Lai Hu Ti (By

handling of the National United Front. Though reliable information is

Southern DRVs Internal Struggle by Proxy

assassinations, property confiscations, and sabotage, these units were

under By Vin was initially broached. During a series of meetings in late

By Vins Alternative Lifelines

connections, especially his friendship with Nguyn Vn Thin (alias Maur-

By Vins collaboration with Maurice Thin was clearly a threat to

Action Committee also warned Maurice Thin that he was surrounded by

The Territorial Committee and Administrative Committee communicated

Failure of the Neutral Zone

, when Nguyn Vn Xun rose to replace L Vn Hoch as prime

Restoration Association, the same organization of which Trn Vn n was the

The Ralliement that Almost Wasnt

Prime Ministers failure to protect nationalists who had stood by him.

While the Franco-Vietnamese schemes devolved due to internal suspi-

Vn Trn, in a disparaging reference to Nguyn Bnh, that guy [ci thng

Re-Making the Bnh Xuyn as Anti-Colonial

foolhardy. Despite his ralliement, By Vin continued to see himself as

accepted as given, the partisan is bound to remain an odd, politically irrel-

K EVIN L I is currently a PhD candidate in the Department of History, UC

French-sponsored Vietnamese governments as well as power struggles within

KEYWORDS: Bnh Xuyn, decolonization, partisan, sovereignty

comments on the surrender of the Bnh Xuyn, translation of a communiqu

. H Sn i, Tm Chng, H Khang, B i Bnh Xuyn: Lin Chi i

. Franois Guillemot, Dai Vit, Indpendance et Rvolution au Vit-Nam: Lchec de

. Captured Document: Nguyn Bnh letter to Mi Tr and T c, Chi i &

. Goscha, La Guerre par dAutres Moyens, . It is interesting to note that

. Nguyn Ph Hu (Ph Ch Tch y Ban Hnh Chnh a Phng Saigon-

. Document in Traduction de documents trouvs le dans

Courneuve. Nguyn Hoi Vn, Tiu S C Trn Vn n [Biography of Trn

. Project de convention pour une trve [Draft agreement of a truce],

. Gnral Blaizot (HCI) to Ministre de la France dOutre-Mer, Ralliement de Bay

Prefect of Si Gn-Ch Ln Region, Ch Ln rice merchants were sum-

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