Professional Documents
Culture Documents
PETER ZINOMAN
188
NHN VN GIAI PHM ON TRIAL 189
the orchestration of the trial. Given how little is known about the inner
workings of political trials in Vietnam, the Nguyn Xun Dng Report is
far and away the most significant source currently available on this impor-
tant topic as well as a fascinating window into this curious chapter in the
history of NVGP.
One critical subplot of the report that intersects with a core theme of this
special issue of the Journal of Vietnamese Studies concerns a conflict between
a hardline approach to the case pushed by the Vietnam Workers Party
(VWP) Central Committee and a more moderate posture favored by organs
of the DRV state such as the Security Police [Cng an], the Peoples Court
and the Procuracy [Vin Cng t]. While state organs viewed the defendants
as perpetrators of a moderate ideological transgression, the Central Com-
mittee insisted that they had committed espionage, a much more serious
crime that warranted a heavier punishment. The outcome of this clash sheds
light on the balance of power between the VWP and the DRV during the
postcolonial era, an important emerging theme in the scholarship on the
relationship between party, state and law in communist Vietnam. The crux
of the issue concerns the relative authority and influence of a putatively law-
bound state and a party that, throughout its history, has frequently behaved
as if it were above the law. This issue has been addressed recently for a slightly
earlier period by David Marr and debated productively by Christopher
Goscha and Philippe Papin, among others. The decisive resolution of the
conflict over the show-trial in favor of the hardline position championed by
the Central Committee contributes to our understanding of this issue by
providing one vivid illustration of the complete domination of the party over
the state during the era.
Another subplot of the report concerns the intense conflict between the
authorities and the two main defendants: Thy An, and Nguyn Hu ang.
Because these high-profile figures appeared fragile, anxious and extremely
circumspect after leaving prison over a decade after the trial, they tend to
come off as passive victims of state repression in many conventional histor-
ical accounts of NVGP. It is especially notable, therefore, that the report
discloses a previously unknown history of spirited and courageous resistance
to the authorities on the part of these two defendants throughout the course
of the proceedings against them.
NHN VN GIAI PHM ON TRIAL 191
She provided it with financial support, she taught its members English and
French, she exposed them to foreign films and literature and she regularly
hosted political and literary discussions. According to Nguyn Hu ang,
Thy An shared her interest in theater and film with NVGP members by
screening Hamlet and staging Marcel Pagnols Topaze. In October , she
also published a review of Japanese film that critically examined the role of
cinema. The writer L t commented on her impact in his confession: Each
time I left Thy Ans place, I felt myself more resentful of the Party, more
disillusioned.
are also several interesting short studies of the topic based on Eastern Euro-
pean diplomatic reporting. Perhaps the most important research on the
movement is by the Paris-based Vietnamese journalist and radio personality,
Thy Khu. From her perch at the popular Radio France Internationale (RFI)
during a pre-internet era starting in , she conducted on-air oral histories
with surviving members of the group: Hong Cm, L t, Nguyn Hu
ang and Trn Duy. In , she published the transcripts of her interviews
along with over a dozen brief journalistic studies of important figures and
issues in the history of the movement.
Most of the existing scholarship relies on published material from the
Vietnamese-language press of the era and interviews with elderly leaders of
NVGP about traumatic events four decades in the past. Whats been missing
is contemporaneous Vietnamese archival material about the movement and
its repression by the party-state. This material remains difficult to access
because the case remains sensitive inside the country and party archives are
closed to independent researchers including all foreign scholars. The
absence of material from official archives has left big holes in the historiog-
raphy. In particular, we know a lot more about the political project of the
movement as expressed in its writingsthan we know about how it was
viewed and dealt with by the party-state. On this topic, all that we have are
the relentless attacks against the movement published in the official press.
This is what makes the Nguyn Xun Dng Report such a revelation.
the Security Police. The autonomy of the investigation was also checked by the
Supreme Peoples Court, which appointed two research cadres [cn b
nghin cu] to the Procuracy to shape and monitor its work on the case.
The Procuracys initial review of the case file supported the original
conclusion of the Security Police that the defendants had committed polit-
ical crimes of moderate severity. Under interrogation, defendants had admit-
ted to taking advantage of intellectual freedom in the DRV for newspaper
and book publishing, theatrical performance and film-screening to under-
mine the regime. The language here recalls article of the constitu-
tion, a notoriously vague and menacing statute that forbids any person to
use democratic freedoms to the detriment of the interests of the State and of
the people. Interviews with witnesses revealed that Nguyn Hu ang
had planned to collude with counter-revolutionary elements from the
universities and the commercial classes to form a counter-revolutionary
party known as the Humanism Party [ng Nhn vn]. The case file also
recorded Nguyn Hu angs rejection of the most severe charges against
him. During his interrogation (summarized in the report but not cited
verbatim), he admitted to mistakes in the realm of ideology and conscious-
ness but denied that his motive was subversive or counter-revolutionary.
Thy Ans confession also contained qualifications. According to the report,
she confessed to colluding with a leader of the reactionary Vietnamese
Nationalist Party in Hi Phng and with the spy chief Maurice Durand in
H Ni as part of a plot to corrupt the minds of our literary circles, distort
state policy and demoralize the people. But she insisted that these trans-
gressions did not rise to the level of counter-revolutionary subversion. More-
over, her contact with members of NVGP had occurred after Nhn Vn had
closed in December , a detail that Thy An underlined to refute the
charge that she had colluded with the group.
The investigation complete, the Procuracy decided to indict and pass
a verdict against the defendants for committing the following crime: taking
advantage of the rights to freedom and democracy, freedom of the press,
freedom to publish and freedom of assembly to spread subversive propa-
ganda, to blacken the name of the regime, to incite the masses to launch an
uprising. According to the report, this approach was supported by both the
Peoples Court and the Security Police.
NHN VN GIAI PHM ON TRIAL 197
Before moving forward, however, the court sought advice from above.
Because this was a big case with a wide influence, the report explained, the
Peoples Court submitted the case file to the Central Committee [trung
ng] to get its view on how to proceed. This remarkably unabashed
statement dovetails with conventional viewsboth popular and scholarly
about the absence of real judicial independence in the DRV. According to
Gareth Porter, protections for courts, judges and jurors written into DRV
constitutions have always been vitiated by the principle that party officials
are responsible for bringing the general trend of judicial judgments into line
with party policy. Legal scholars tend to highlight the control of local
courts by the Supreme Peoples Court (founded in ) and by VWP
administrative committees at the district and provincial levels. The
Nguyn Xun Dng Report supports this general view but it also offers
a rare verifiable example of the direct involvement of the Partys highest
political organthe Central Committeein determining a specific judicial
outcome. It is not known if the Central Committee meddled frequently in
this direct way in the workings of the courts or if the NVGP show-trial was
an exceptional case.
After reviewing the case file and examining recent episodes of interna-
tional espionage such as the Hungarian uprising, the Central Committee
rejected the Procuracys approach. Instead of prosecuting the defendants
narrowly for committing ideological crimes, the Central Committee urged
that they be charged with the more serious crime of espionage. According to
its reading of the case file, the key transgression in question was a plot by
a gang of subversive and counter-revolutionary spies to advance a program
of psychological warfare devised by the imperialists in order to encourage an
ideology of rebellion among the masses. The crime, in other words, was
a conspiracy guided by foreigners to overthrow the state. The reference to
the Hungarian uprising of October as an analogous act of espio-
nage suggests that high anxiety among DRV party officials generated by de-
Stalinization in Eastern Europe may have shaped the harsh approach to the
case that they eventually adopted.
In response to this pushback from the Central Committee, state officials
dug in their heels, albeit briefly. Some cadres of the court and the Procuracy
refused to accept the Central Committees view, the report stated. But, after
198 ZINOMAN
re-examining the file and the accompanying material, the prosecutors and
the Court grasped the wisdom of the Central Committees position. This
reinforced their consciousness and loyalty and enhanced their determina-
tion to supplement the investigation so as to expose the true essence of the
case in accordance with the Central Committees views. Following this
abject surrender to Party dictates, the Procuracy, the Peoples Court, and
the Security Police worked together supplementing the file, interrogating
and educating the defendants and preparing for the trial. The remainder of
the report provided a review and appraisal of these three critical tasks.
Interrogating Thy An
The Nguyn Xun Dng Report describes the interrogation of Thy An as
an intense confrontation between unequal adversaries punctuated by dra-
matic acts of oppression and resistance plus one horrific episode of bodily
disfigurement. Thy An is a crafty spy, the account begins, experienced in
subverting the spirit of our revolution.
She employs all the tricks of the police informer. She initially confessed to
crimes such as fraternizing with our adversaries and supporting enemy plots.
But she is shifty. After confessing, she retracts; confesses and retracts again,
confusing her interrogators. Moreover, she employs shameless ploys; she
feigns madness and goes on a hunger strike. Her dramatic behavior peaked
when she poked out one of her eyes (and tried to poke out the other one), or
when she took off all of her clothes after being locked in a cell. During
interrogation, she always tried to measure the attitude of the interrogator.
It has long been known that Thy An lost an eye in the course of her
detention and imprisonment during the s and s but the circum-
stances of this tragic event have never been documented. Some accounts
claim that she suffered an accident while engaged in reformative labor.
Others maintain that she took out her own eye to protest the display of
a communist flag visible from the window of her prison cell. Produced by
a close partner of Thy Ans interrogators (if not a member of the team
itself), the Nguyn Xun Dng Report cannot be seen as a fully reliable
account of this episode. But it is revealing, nevertheless, that it treats Thy
Ans self-mutilation as one in a series of desperate gambits that she em-
ployed to obstruct and resist her interrogators.
Thy Ans combativeness also comes across in accounts of her energetic
verbal sparring. The report notes that she confessed to ideological errors
during her earlier police interrogation but, at the same time, denied emphat-
ically that she had engaged in espionage. She had remained in H Ni after
, she insisted, because she admired the North and hated imperialism.
She pushed back further by touting her progressive political credentials,
including her authorship of works that celebrated the revolution. She also
went on the offensive against her interrogators by calling attention to the
Partys many mistakes with the land reform.
200 ZINOMAN
She began to gain confidence in the resoluteness of our education and to show
repentance for her crimes against our regime. She claimed that, due to a high
level of brainwashing by the imperialists, she had a frightful impression about
our manner of dealing with spies. She had suspected that our way of dealing
with her and other guilty parties in detention (including the way we rushed to
tend to her after she poked her eye out) was a ruse. But now she began to see
through the distortions of the imperialists just as she began to recognize the
crimes that she had committed after the return of peace. She saw the leniency
of the government towards her, including the way that it facilitated her literary
activities. And she now saw that she had opposed the government and sub-
verted the revolution.
On the most crucial question at hand, Thy An admitted that she was a spy
whom the enemy had ordered to stay behind in order to subvert us. Regarding
other matters, such as her collusion with [Nguyn Hu] ang to launch
counter-revolutionary activities or to carry out the plots of the enemy, she
accepted culpability with relative ease. This helped to establish that this was
essentially a case of subversion and counter-revolutionary espionage.
content, refuting his claim that they expressed a constructive spirit. We then
dissected his arguments, breaking down his defenses and exposing the
counter-revolutionary character of his newspapers and articles. In spite of
these boasts, Nguyn Hu ang was likely a formidable opponent, especially
when challenged about the political content of his writing. Because he had
worked as a professional revolutionary activist and Vit Minh operative for
over two decades, his writings (including his essays in Nhn Vn) demon-
strated a deep engagement with theoretical Marxist-Leninism and Maoism.
Nguyn Hu angs effectiveness was acknowledged indirectly in Nguyn
Xun Dngs admission that we tried to avoid getting bogged down in
literary debates and maintain the initiative during the interrogation.
Finally, the report focused on Nguyn Hu angs subversive, counter-
revolutionary plotting, a crime much more dangerous, in the eyes of the
authorities, than his ideological deviation.
We asked about his plan to foment an uprising while the internal situation of
our country was in crisis and the socialist world faced serious upheavals such
as the uprising in Hungary and the protests in Pozna. When we asked him
about these matters, we both raised questions and offered critical analysis to
compel him to admit that he followed an ideology of opportunist revolution
[u c cch mng]or counter-revolution and as a result, he clearly opposed
the revolution. In addition, we reminded him of his discussions with Thy An
about the potential impact of Nhn Vn and about the proper guidelines for
their anti-revolutionary plotguidelines involving changes in strategic
direction, changes in key personnel and changes in organizational structure.
In the end, he admitted his crimes. Hence, with regard to Nguyn Hu ang,
we achieved a positive result with him admitting both his crimes and his
collusion with Thy An.
During education, we did not try to cajole the defendants or promise leniency.
Rather, we pointed out to them the good and humanitarian nature of our
regime and its humane treatment of counter-revolutionary elements like
themselves during arrest and detention. For example, when Thy An poked
out her eye, we cared for her and administered medicine . . . We induce
a voluntary response from defendants during interrogation; we do not torture,
coerce or abuse anyone.
We only make use of the big stick and giant spike [ao to ba ln] to scare
the defendants and to persuade them to testify. We require that the defendants
declare all the deeds that they have done. But it is natural for them to try to
protect themselves. For example, they may try to frame a counter-
revolutionary act as something done to further the revolution or benefit the
people. If we come off as hot-headed or try to coerce the defendants with
a big stick and giant spike or interrupt their testimony, the defendants may
stop testifying or refuse to reveal everything. They may lose faith in us or view
our methods as a form of entrapment. Hence, we must guarantee the
NHN VN GIAI PHM ON TRIAL 205
defendant the freedom to speak about anything. Once they have revealed
everything, we can start the struggle to explain to them the essential character
of their counter-revolutionary ideology and activities. When defendants are
stubborn, and boldly refuse to testify further, our response is to ask small
questions about transgressions that the defendants have already admitted.
This forces them to struggle ideologically with themselves or to mobilize their
own words against them which can induce them to abandon their stubborn
attitude.
The Court
As described in the report, the main goal of the courtroom trial was to
clearly demonstrate to the public at large the significance of espionage
and counter-revolutionary subversion in the case. Not only did this didactic
objective reflect the distinct politico-educational function of the court sys-
tem in the DRV, but it revealed official anxiety about a growing public
skepticism towards the governments case. The report linked this skepti-
cism to the slowness of the investigation: The length of time that it has
taken us to investigate and try the case raised fears that we did not have
enough evidence to make the charges stick. To prove espionage and
counter-revolutionary subversion in the face of mounting public doubt,
the trial needed to show that the defendants conspired together as part of
a clandestine clique or a broader seditious network. Each defendant has
committed a crime, the report explained. From the outside it looks like
they are disconnected. But, in fact, these crimes are related in that they are all
controlled by [Nguyn Hu] ang. The court must expose these
connections.
Prosecutors believed that a carefully planned program of cross-
examination in court was critical to the successful public airing of their case.
All elements of the cross-examinationfrom the order of the questions to
206 ZINOMAN
the content of the questions to the style of the questions must support one
requirement: to demonstrate the presence of espionage and counter-
revolutionary subversion. For Thy Anthe first defendant to be ques-
tionedprosecutors planned to expose her as a high-level spy taking orders
from the enemy. Once Thy An was outed in this way, the guilt of other
defendants could be confirmed through their association with her. Hence,
a critical goal of the interrogation of Nguyn Hu ang was to corroborate
his collusion with Thy An. In addition, prosecutors planned to expose his
counter-revolutionary face, his support for the imperialists, his backing
for a revolt of the masses, his plans to flee South, and his work on Nhn
Vn. Other defendants faced different accusations. Prosecutors questioned
the publisher Trn Thiu Bo to expose him as a reactionary capitalist and
Phan Ti to portray him as a literary hooligan who turned his home into
a counter-revolutionary club that recreated the decadent life style of the
occupation era. The questioning of L Nguyn Ch focused merely on how
he had helped to make arrangements for Nguyn Hu ang to flee South,
a minor transgression but one that amplified the conspiratorial cadence of
the espionage charge.
Concern with the dynamics of cross-examination reflected the desire of
the prosecutors to secure public confessions that mirrored admissions of
guilt that had been made in private. We require that defendants admit
to spying and counter-revolutionary activities in their public testimony
just as they did in the course of their police interrogation. We must discour-
age retractions. Later, the report reiterated the significance of cross-
examination and public confession: [Our charges] must be backed-up by
confessions made by the defendants and upon corroborating documents.
The testimony of the defendant is the most crucial element for drawing up
an indictment.
The Trial
Among the reports most important revelations about the trial was its
acknowledgement that both the indictment and sentence were prepared
beforehand. This forthright admission supports a view of the trial as more
of a political and educational performance than as an open-ended judicial
proceeding. At the same time, however, the report touted the protection of
NHN VN GIAI PHM ON TRIAL 207
various elements of due process by the DRV legal system. The juxtaposition
of these liberal boasts with the courts complete lack of autonomy and utter
politicization is among the most striking and incongruous features of the
Nguyn Xun Dng Report and reflects the schizophrenic nature of DRV
statecraft.
The trial took place on January , and ran for eleven hours from
a.m. to p.m. It was attended by over five hundred representatives from
different government offices, the majority of whom the report identified as
intellectuals. In addition to Chief Justice Nguyn Xun Dng, the case
was presided over by three Peoples Assessors who participated in adjudi-
cation. The Peoples Assessor was a communist institutional innovation
designed to bring the people into the judging process and to distinguish
the DRV court system from its elitist French colonial predecessors. One
Peoples Assessor at the trial was an unnamed representative from the Gen-
eral Confederation of Trade Unions. Another was a printer, referred to in
the report as Comrade Ct, who worked at the Xun Thu Publishing House.
According to official accounts, the government had been induced to move
against NVGP when public-spirited workers from the Xun Thu House
objected to printing Nhn Vn. A third Peoples Assessor, Phng Bo
Thch, was a veteran journalist and member of the recently established
Journalism Association who had joined the Vit Minh during the late colo-
nial era after a distinguished career as a newspaperman. The presence of
a professional journalist among the peoples assessors reflects the DRV legal
principle that defendants ought to be judged by a jury of their peers, defined
in class and/or occupational terms.
Two other officials who played an active role in the trial were Dng Vn
m, the head of the Procuracy and Xun Sng a defense lawyer who
served as counsel for the defendants. The report does not indicate whether
Xun Sng enjoyed meaningful access to his clients prior to the trial but
it does boast that he was allowed to speak freely in court. We did not
constrain the defense lawyer, the report insisted, rather, we allowed him
to freely express his ideas and to carry out his duty to defend the defen-
dants. The report pointed to the tolerant attitude towards the defense
lawyer as an emblem of the enlightened quality of the DRV court system:
The arrangement of all the elements of the trial, including of the defense,
208 ZINOMAN
symbolizes the truly democratic character of our court system. The report
also claimed that defendants were apprised of certain rights including the
right to respond to the declarations of witnesses, the right to access new
evidence so as to prepare a defense and the right of the defendants to testify
to whatever they wish, without limits.
The courts first order of business was the cross-examination of Thy An,
followed by the introduction of incriminating testimony about her from
additional witnesses. The session was successful as Thy An confessed to
all of her crimes in a concrete manner. The court turned next to Nguyn
Hu ang. In addition to cross-examining him about his many crimes,
prosecutors questioned Thy An about his supervision of policy, personnel
and organizational issues connected to Nhn Vn. He admitted that he
played a major role in the journal from tending to its finances to writing its
major articles. He also conceded that he crafted articles to distort and
blacken the regime and to incite the masses. The report also pointed out
some mistakes made by the authorities, especially in the cross-examination
of Nguyn Hu ang:
The trial achieved its objectives, but in the latter part of the interrogation of
[Nguyn Hu] ang, there were shortcomings and a lack of initiative. We let
Nguyn Hu ang make roundabout testimony. We lacked flexibility. We
depended too much on the plan; therefore our struggle was messy. This error
occurred because we overestimated the enemy. Although we mastered the files
and the documents thoroughly and although all of the defendants had been
crushed during the investigation process, we remained fearful that they would
rise up and oppose us during the trial. Hence, we relied too much on the plan,
which we thought would ensure us a victory. We did not dare change the plan
to make it more efficient.
not this was actually a spy case. But after the trial, they recognized that it
truly was and even wondered why the sentences given to Thy An and
[Nguyn Hu] ang were so light. Among students and intellectuals
in general, the unanimous opinion is that this was, indeed, a spy case.
Observers were also impressed with the fair and professional way that the
trial was carried out. One was quoted in the report saying: A democratic
trial, good, brief, civilized; no abuse, no oppression.
In concluding remarks on the trial, the report lamented that the DRV
press failed to give the court adequate credit for its success. After the trial,
we should have promoted it in the press, the report complained. Unfor-
tunately, there was only one newspaper article published and it did not focus
on the issue of espionage or on the reactionary and destructive nature of the
case. Nor did it include the confessions of Thy An and Nguyn Hu ang.
This complaint by the Peoples Court of H Ni about a lack of coverage of
the trial in the government press is probably less a sign of political or
institutional conflict between different organs of the DRV state and more
of an indication of a simple lack of coordination caused by the political
systems weak administrative capacity and poor management skills.
Observations
A concluding section of the report entitled Observations related a handful
of thoughts and opinions on the experience of the case. The first two
observations took the form of lessons, emphasizing the need to recognize
the supreme power of the Party over the operation of the Peoples Courts.
The court operates within the dictatorial system of the state and serves
political demands, the report explained. Therefore it is always subject to
the leadership of the Party. This case has illustrated this theoretical point.
Had it not been for the leadership of the Party we would have crafted a case
ill-fitting the crime. We would not have exposed the true plot of the enemy.
A second observation continued in the same vein: Given its function, the
court needs to be tightly led and to have its political attitude strengthened by
the Party. This will allow it to achieve a unified ideology in every activity.
During the case, the ideological leadership of the cadres was not tight at first.
Hence, some people had doubts. It was only after the ideology of the doubt-
ers was gradually molded that we achieved good results.
210 ZINOMAN
A third observation chided the Peoples Court and the Procuracy for
over-relying on the police file and making few new discoveries based on
their own investigation. This reflected the reoccurrence of bad old habits
such as passivity and lack of initiative. A fourth observation reiterated the
importance of tight coordination between the police, the prosecutors and the
court while a fifth comprised a series of suggestions regarding the interlinked
process of interrogation, education and trial preparation.
Conclusion
In addition to illuminating an important but previously opaque chapter in
the history of NVGP and its repression by the party-state, the Nguyn Xun
Dng Report sheds a broader beam of light upon the history of communist
Vietnamese legal culture and on the relationship between the Party and the
state in the DRV after it secured sovereign authority over the northern half
of the country in . In general, the report indicates that DRV legal and
security officials paid lip service to norms of due process, including notions
of individual rights. This may be seen in the care taken by police and court
officials to ground charges leveled against the accused in documentary evi-
dence, to reject physical torture during interrogation, to permit the accused
to speak in their own defense and to provide defendants with the appearance
of legal representation in court. On the other hand, these trappings of due
process coexisted with legal practices symptomatic of the political culture of
communist dictatorship. Traces of this harsher legal culture may be seen in
the emphasis prosecutors placed on educating defendants during the
course of pre-trial detention and in their refusal to permit legal counsel to
be present during interrogations or to mount a genuine defense of the accused
during the trial itself. A more important indication of the true character of the
DRVs legal culture may be seen in Nguyn Xun Dngs strikingly casual
admission that the verdict in the case was prepared prior to the trial and in the
careful measures taken by officials to stage-manage the court proceedings so
as to convey an intimidating political message to the public at large. Finally,
the outcome of the conflict over the proper charges to be leveled against
the defendants as described in the Nguyn Xun Dng Report confirms the
naked dominance of Party authority over the legal and policing organs of the
state during this formative period in the history of the DRV.
NHN VN GIAI PHM ON TRIAL 211
ABSTRACT
Notes
. P.V. Ngy --, Ta n Nhn Dn H Ni x v gin ip Nguyn
Hu ang v Thy An [January , , H Ni Peoples Court Tries the Spy
Case of Nguyn Hu ang and Thy An], (bo) Nhn Dn [Humanity],
October , , , .
. Trung tm lu tr quc gia III, Phng Gio S Nghin Cu Vn Hc ng Thai
Mai, H s : Ti liu ca ban chp hnh hi lin hip vn hc ngh thut VN
v cuc u tranh chng nhm ph hoi Nhn Vn Giai Phm trn mt trn
vn ngh nm [Documents of the Executive Committee of the United
Association of Vietnamese Literature and Arts regarding the Struggle against the
Subversive Clique Nhn Vn Giai Phm on the Cultural Front in ], Gii
thiu kinh nghim cng tc ca Ta n v v gin ip phn cch mng ph
hoi hin hnh Nguyn Hu ang v Thy An [Introducing our experience
working with the court on the subversive, counter-revolutionary espionage case
212 ZINOMAN
involving Nguyn Hu ang and Thy An], Chnh n Nguyn Xun Dng,
H Ni, April , . Hereafter: the Nguyn Xun Dng Report.
. Originally from Qunh i Village, Qunh Lu District, Ngh An Province,
Nguyn Xun Dng graduated summa cum laude from the Indochinese Law
College and was appointed Chief Justice of the Tonkin Appeals Court under the
French. His appointment to the Peoples Court of H Ni after indicates
some continuity in legal personnel from the colonial to postcolonial era. Email
correspondence with Trn Kin, July , .
. It does not explain, for example, why this odd assortment of defendants was
singled out for judicial sanction.
. David Marrs Vietnam: State, War and Revolution () (Berkeley:
University of California Press, ) and H-Diplo Roundtable Reviews , no.
(), http://h-diplo.org/roundtables/PDF/Roundtable-XIV-.pdf.
. For recent research on , see Polly Jones, The Dilemmas of De-Stalinization:
Negotiating Cultural and Social Change in the Khrushchev Era (New York:
Routledge, ) and Terry Cox, Challenging Communism in Eastern Europe:
and it Legacy (New York: Routledge, ).
. For a useful brief biography of Nguyn Hu ang, see Christopher Goscha,
Historical Dictionary of the Indochina War (): An International
and Interdisciplinary Approach (Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian
Studies Press, ), . More information is in Thy Khu, Nhn Vn
Giai Phm v vn Nguyn i Quc [Nhn Vn Giai Phm and the
Question of Nguyn i Quc] (Falls Church-VA: Ting Qu Hng, ):
.
. Peter Zinoman, Nhn Vn Giai Phm and Vietnamese Reform Communism
in the s: A Revisionist Interpretation Journal of Cold War Studies , no.
(Winter ): .
. Nhng cuc trao i gia Heinz Schutte va Nguyn Hu ang [Conversations
between Heinz Schutte and Nguyn Hu ang] (ti H Ni nhng ngy v
thng , v thng nm , thng v thng nm , thng
nm .) Typescript provided by Heinz Schutte.
. Zinoman, Nhn Vn Giai Phm and Vietnamese Reform Communism in the
s: A Revisionist Interpretation, . See, footnote .
. V Ngc Phan, Nh vn hin i: ph bnh vn hc, [Modern Writers: Literary
Criticism] (H Ni: Tn Dn, ).
. Lu M Trinh, History, Memory and Hair in Thy Ans Short Stories,
(Seminar Paper for History , UC Berkeley, June, ).
. Georges Boudarel, Cent fleurs closes dans la nuit du Vietnam. Communimse et
Dissidence (Paris: Editions Jacques Bertoin, ); Georges
Boudarel, Intellectual Dissidence in the s: The NhnVn - Giai Phm
NHN VN GIAI PHM ON TRIAL 213
Affair, Adapted from the French by Phi-Linh Baneth The Vietnam Forum, no.
().
. Alec Holcombe and Li Nguyn n, The Heart and Mind of the Poet Xun
Diu, , Journal of Vietnamese Studies , no. (Summer ),
.
. Heinz Schtte, Hundred Flowers in Vietnam, , (SUDOSTASIEN
Working Papers No. , Berlin, . Published by the Department of Southeast
Asian Studies Humboldt University).
. Hirohide Kurihara, Changes in the Literary Policy of the Vietnamese Workers
Party, , in Takashi Shiraishi and Motoo Furata, eds. Indochina in the
s and s (Ithaca: Southeast Asia Program Cornell University, ),
. Kuriharas original Japanese-language essay was published in Ajia,
Afurika gengo bunka kenky [Journal of Asian and African Studies], ;
Kim Ninh, A World Transformed: The Politics of Culture in Revolutionary
Vietnam, (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, ) (chapter
Intellectual Dissent: The Nhn Vn - Giai Phm Period); Nguyn Ngc Tun,
Socialist Realism in Vietnamese Literature: An Analysis of the Relationship
between Literature and Politics, PhD dissertation, Victoria University,
(chapter : The Nhn Vn- Giai Phm Affair, a Peace Crisis); Shawn McHale,
Vietnamese Marxism, Dissent, and the Politics of Postcolonial Memory: Trn
c Tho, , Journal of Asian Studies , no. (Feb. ), . Vu
Gia, Phan Khi Ting Vit, Bo Ch V Th Mi [Phan Khi Vietnamese
Language, the Press and New Poetry] (H Ch Minh City: i Hc Quc Gia,
). L Hoi Nguyn, V Nhn Vn Giai Phm T gc nhn mt tro lu
t tng, mt cuc cch mng vn hc khng thnh, originally published on
the poet Nguyn Trng Tos blog, republished on the website Bauxite Vit Nam,
August , : http://boxitvn.wordpress.com////v%E%BB%A-
nhn-van-giai-ph%E%BA%Am-t%E%BB%AB-gc-nhn-m%E%BB%t-tro-l
%C%Bu-t%C%B-t%C%B%E%BB%Fng-dn-ch%E%BB%A-m%E%
BB%t-cu%E%BB%c-caacu/ (accessed August , ), Zinoman, Nhn
Vn Giai Phm and Vietnamese Reform Communism in the s: A Revi-
sionist Interpretation.
. Balazs Szalontai, Political and Economic Crisis in North Vietnam, ,
Cold War History , no. (Nov. ), ; Martin Grossheim, The Lao ng
Party, Culture and the Campaign against Modern Revisionism: The Democratic
Republic of Vietnam Before the Second Indochina War, Journal of Vietnamese
Studies , no. (Winter ): .
. Thy Khu, Nhn Vn Giai Phm v vn Nguyn i Quc.
. Mark Sidel, The Constitution of Vietnam: A Contextual Analysis (Portland: Hart
Publishing, ), .
214 ZINOMAN
. This material evidence included draft manuscripts of the lead article from
issue # of Nhn Vn and correspondence between Nguyn Hu ang and
several bourgeois, reactionary writers.
. The Supreme Peoples Court was a new judicial body established in to
replace the disbanded Ministry of Justice.
. Sidel, The Constitution of Vietnam: A Contextual Analysis, .
. Gareth Porter, Vietnam: The Politics of Bureaucratic Socialism (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, ): .
. Penelope Nicholson, Judicial Independence and the Rule of Law: The Vietnam
Court Experience, Australian Journal of Asian Law , no. (May ), ;
Nicholson, Borrowing Court Systems: The Experience of Socialist Vietnam
(Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, ), .
. Thy Khu, Nhn Vn Giai Phm v vn Nguyn i Quc, .
. At the same time, he refused to retract some of his controversial opinions such as
his admiration for the artist Nguyn Sng.
. The French experience also impacted the NVGP court case because the Moscow
show-trials on which it was loosely modeled were both conceived and perceived
as Soviet renditions of the highly theatrical public trials of the French Revolution.
Julie A. Cassiday, Marble Columns and Jupiter Lights: Theatrical and Cinematic
Modeling of Soviet Show Trials in the s, The Slavic and East European
Journal , no. (Winter ): .
. Eugene Huskey, Vyshinskii, Krylenko, and the Shaping of the Soviet Legal
Order, Slavic Review , no. / (Autumn-Winter ), . Vyshinskii was
particularly sensitive to the educative role of law. In the current conditions, he
wrote, revolutionary legality assumes special importance not only as a weapon
of proletarian struggle against class enemies, but as a school of educating and
reeducating unstable elements in the laboring classes.
. Walter D. Connor, The Manufacture of Deviance: The Case of the Soviet Purge,
, American Sociological Review , no. (August ), .
. Human Rights Watch, Public Insecurity: Deaths in Custody and Police Brutality
in Vietnam, Sept. , , https://www.hrw.org/report////public-
insecurity/deaths-custody-and-police-brutality-vietnam (accessed July , ).
. Elements from the intelligentsia and the mass were skeptical about the case.
Most suspicious has been the amount of time it has taken to investigate and try
the case. This has raised fears that dont have sufficient evidence to make the
charges stick. On the Educational Role of Courts in communist systems, see
Luke T. Lee, Chinese Communist Law: Its Background and Development,
Michigan Law Review , no. (Feb. ), .
. Nicholson, Borrowing Court Systems, .
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