Concord Journal

THE
CONCORD REVIEW
I am simply one who loves the past and is diligent in investigating it.
Kung-fu-tzu (551-479 BC) The Analects
Yick Wo v. Hopkins Jeremy Rhee

Trinity School, Manhattan Island, New York
Tobacco Advertising Elizabeth Anne Johns
Whitney Young Magnet High School, Chicago, Illinois
South China Sea Rock Pang
Beyond English, China
Serbian Autonomy Shrey Agarwal
Strawberry Crest High School, Dover, Florida
Korean War Cathy Wu
Lawrenceville School, Lawrenceville, New Jersey
Dokdo Islands Matthew Waltman
Dwight-Englewood School, Englewood, New Jersey
Missouris Civil War Daniel H. Wang
Taipei American School, Taipei
Battle of Gettysburg Owen Tedford
Greenwich High School, Greenwich, Connecticut
Tiberius Gracchus Zhengdong Wang
Hamilton High School, Chandler, Arizona
Korean Financial Crisis Daniel W. Jo
Troy High School, Fullerton, California
Capital Punishment Ben Chiacchia
Lincoln High School, Lincoln, Rhode Island
A Quarterly Review of Essays by Students of History
Volume 26, Number Three $30.00 Spring 2016

THE CONCORD REVIEW
Volume Twenty-Six, Number Three Spring 2016
1 Jeremy Rhee
Yick Wo v. Hopkins
25 Elizabeth Anne Johns

Tobacco Advertising
53 Rock Pang
South China Sea
95 Shrey Agarwal
Serbian Autonomy
119 Cathy Wu
Korean War
141 Matthew Waltman

Dokdo Islands
157 Daniel H. Wang

Missouris Civil War
181 Owen Tedford

Battle of Gettysburg
221 Zhengdong Wang

Tiberias Gracchus
245 Daniel W. Jo
Korean Financial Crisis
265 Ben Chiacchia

Capital Punishment
314 Notes on Contributors

Editor and Publisher, Will Fitzhugh
e-mail: fitzhugh@tcr.org
website: tcr.org
The Spring 2016 issue of The Concord Review

is Volume Twenty-Six, Number Three
Partial funding was provided by: Carter Bacon, Earhart Foundation,

the History Channel, the Lagemann Foundation, Robert Grusky,
Jason May, the Rose Foundation, Kevin Zhang and other donors.
2016, by The Concord Review, Inc., 730 Boston Post Road, Suite 24,
Sudbury, Massachusetts 01776, USA. All rights reserved. This issue was
typeset on an iMac, using Adobe InDesign, and fonts from Adobe.
Editorial Offices: The Concord Review, 730 Boston Post Road,

Suite 24, Sudbury, Massachusetts 01776 USA [1-978-443-0022]
The Concord Review (ISSN #0895-0539), founded in 1987, is published

quarterly by The Concord Review, Inc., a non-profit, tax-exempt, 501(c)
(3) Massachusetts corporation. Subscription rates: $90 + s&h ($10 US /
$50 international) for four printed copies ($100/$140), or $60 for one
year of four ebook issues (PDF). Orders for 30 or more subscriptions
(class sets) will receive a 25% discount.
Subscription orders must be paid in advance, and change-of-address

information must be sent to your account information at tcr.org.
TCR Subscriptions: Subscribe at tcr.org, or by check mailed to 730 Boston

Post Road, Suite 24, Sudbury, MA 01776 USA; email: fitzhugh@tcr.org
The Editor will consider all manuscripts received, but can assume no responsibility
regarding them. All submitted manuscripts become the property of The Concord
Review for one year from the date of receipt. Essays may be on any historical
topic, should generally be 4,000-7,000 words or more, with Turabian (Chicago)
endnotes and bibliography, and may be submitted by email in RTF format in
Microsoft Word, after completing the submission form at tcr.org/submit and
payment of the $70 submission fee. Submitting authors also receive a one-year
subscription to the Electronic Edition of the Review. Essays in the Review are the
sole property of the Review and, as provided by Article One, Section Eight, of
the Constitution of the United States, to promote the progress of the useful
arts, may not be republished, photocopied, or reproduced without the express
written permission of The Concord Review, Inc. Authors will be notified the
month before their essay is published.
Copyright 2016, The Concord Review, Inc., all rights reserved
YICK WO V. HOPKINS
Jeremy Rhee
I n February 1874, Thistletons Jolly Giant, a weekly satirical

magazine based in San Francisco, published an incendiary cartoon
that contrasted the Darwinian evolution from ape to man with
the devolution of a Chinese man to a pig. The Chinaman, with
his exaggerated stereotypical features and Oriental fashion,
was shown to be regressing rather than progressing; his ponytail
[queue], one of the most important cultural and ethnic features
of Chinese men during that time, mockingly transformed into
the pigs tail.1
This cartoon encapsulates the contempt and scorn many
white Americans had for their Chinese neighbors, especially in
Northern California. San Francisco in the 1870s and 1880s was a city
of economic opportunity and racial intolerance. Founded in 1776,
and greatly expanded during the Gold Rush, Americas first city on
the Pacific Rim was a heady, diverse mixture. The Chinese found
themselves the targets of frequent violence and discrimination,
including a seemingly innocuous 1880 San Francisco ordinance
that was the center of a now-celebrated Supreme Court case.2 On
its face, the law was simply a fire prevention regulation that al-
lowed city inspectors to deny operating permits to local laundries
Jeremy Chung Hoon Rhee is a Senior at the Trinity School in Manhattan,

where he wrote this paper for Mr. Michael Berkowitzs United States
History class in the 2014/2015 academic year.
2 Jeremy Rhee
in wooden buildings. However, while most white businesses were

allowed to continue, all of the Chinese-owned and operated firms
were denied permits. This single ordinance threatened to end a
major source of revenue to a Chinese community that was already
effectively barred from most other ways of making a living.3
Yick Wo, a Chinese immigrant who had legally operated
a laundry in a wooden building for many years prior to the or-
dinance, was denied a permit under the new regime. When he
refused to close, the local court issued him a fine that he refused
to pay. Sheriff Peter Hopkins was responsible for arresting Yick
Wo and many other Chinese laundry owners. Hauled off to jail,
Wo applied for a writ of habeas corpus in his efforts to challenge
the legality of the ordinance. Over the next few years, the case
worked its way through the state and federal court systems until it
was granted certiorari review by the United States Supreme Court.
In 1886, the Supreme Court in Yick Wo v. Hopkins struck down the
ordinance on the basis that it violated the Equal Protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.4
While many scholars look back on this early case as a
shining example of the promise of the Equal Protection Clause
and the beginning of the end of racial discrimination, for almost
a century afterwards, the Supreme Court sided repeatedly with
white supremacy. Just ten years after Yick Wo, the Supreme Court
upheld racial segregation in Plessy v. Ferguson in a decision that
was actually not inconsistent with the holding in Yick Wo.5 Rather,
Yick Wo was able to succeed in his case not because the country
was ready to put racial discrimination in the past, but because
of a number of more practical and political factors. First, the
success of Chinese business owners and their contribution to
the economy, in spite of their ethnicity, garnered some respect
from the financial and political elite. In an age when all things
Darwinian dominated public discourse, the idea of an individual
attempting to prosper through hard work and diligence received
a degree of attention and respect. Second, the Chinese benefited
slightly from the nineteenth century view of Asians as less than
white but more than black in a social hierarchy of brownness.
Finally, the Supreme Court at the time of Yick Wo was just begin-
THE CONCORD REVIEW 3
ning to move in a direction that supported greater federal power

in how both the Supremacy Clause and Fourteenth Amendment
applied to the states, and this resulted in a favorable decision for
the plaintiff in Yick Wo. The salient factors in the significance and
legacy of the Yick Wo decision were economic, racial, and politi-
cal, although ultimately the decision did catalyze the movement
towards racial equality.
The Chinese experience in the United States began in the
late 1840s and early 1850s. A combination of internal rebellions
in the homeland and news of the Gold Rush in America sparked
mass Chinese migration to California. After the Taiping Uprising
of 1850 and the Nian Rebellion of 1851, millions of Chinese were
displaced, slaughtered, or left homeless. Disillusioned by social
chaos, famine, and demographic crises, many Chinese sought their
fortunes elsewhere. These pioneers, comprised of impoverished
farmers and fugitives from the revolts, saw the California Gold Rush
of 1848-1849 as a beacon of hope for reconstructing their familial,
financial, and social lives. These emigrants, who would later form
the Chinese diaspora, debarked from Canton and Macao towards
San Francisco, or Jinshan, as they called it: mountain of gold.6
Unfortunately, for most of the Chinese, the long trip across
the Pacific Oceans stormy waters did not lead to spectacular suc-
cess. The most giving lands had already been exhausted by earlier
and luckier Forty-Niners.7 And the lack of gold was not the only
immediate worry that greeted the new Asian immigrants. In 1850,
the new state of California passed a series of punitive taxes aimed
directly at the Chinese, with the most severe being a monthly head
tax of $20 on all foreign miners. When adjusted for modern-day
inflation, this tax amounted to nearly $500. Although this tax was
eventually lowered, the damage of its adoption had already been
done by the mid-1850s.8 After unsuccessfully working in mines that
had long been abandoned by forerunners, and being thoroughly
disincentivized by the high head tax, Chinese immigrants began
to move to other labor markets.
Faced with forging a livelihood in a distant land, the Chi-
nese population drifted into other lines of work such as heavy
construction, manufacturing, and domestic washing services. This
shift eventually triggered a race-based competition for jobs, and
4 Jeremy Rhee
this in turn increased racial tensions.9 Powerful businessmen and

agents at the time regarded Chinese workers as far more disci-
plined, consistent, and sober than their white counterparts. The
Chinese were frequently relied on by anti-union business owners
to serve as strikebreakers, as well as a source of labor who would
work for considerably less than the prevailing wage laborer. The
reputation of the Chinese as hard, cheap, dedicated workers led to
economic success and preference for Chinese workers over white
workers in some labor sectors.10 Having found multiple steady
sources of income, the Chinese population in America continued
to increase. A comparison of the United States Census of 1860
and 1870 demonstrates that Chinese population in America nearly
doubled from 35,565 to 63,254 in merely a decade.11 Along with
these increased numbers came a larger urbanized population
as greater concentrations of Chinese shifted from mountainous
rural areas to the growing western cities to accommodate their
changes in occupation from mining to other professions. Conse-
quently, although the Chinese comprised only one-twelfth of the
entire California population in 1870, their numbers accounted
for nearly one-fifth of the states entire labor force.12 The dramati-
cally increasing Chinese participation in the urban labor market
eventually led to ethnic tensions and scapegoating at the hands
of unemployed white workers and ambitious political leaders.
This racial animosity toward the Chinese population
manifested itself as violent mob attacks. Chinese residents were
targeted on the streets of San Francisco through a series of violent
personal assaults by white workers. According to the San Francisco
Chronicle, in February 1870 alone, there were three separate at-
tacks wherein Chinese pedestrians were hounded, taunted, and
chased through the streets of the city by hundreds of white men
and boys. In one attack, a frenzied mob was reported as knock-
ing and beating a helpless Chinaman to the point of stupor.13
Ethnic hatred also manifested itself in civically organized efforts.
In the late 1870s and early 1880s, a series of Anti-Chinese Laundry
associations were founded to promote an atmosphere of intimida-
tion against Chinese settlers and their businesses. These groups
went as far as adopting a constitution, electing their own officers
and creating aggressive public relations campaigns, all with the
collective aim of bringing down Chinese business owners.14 In
a short time, all of these efforts, coming from both outside and
within the law, would bear their poison fruit in the form of the
Laundry Ordinance of 1880.
In 1880, San Francisco passed the ordinance that would
trigger a legal reaction from the Chinese community and lead
to a landmark Supreme Court case. The city, in response to the
increasing racial and labor tensions, passed a series of local ordi-
nances in an effort to hinder Chinese acculturation efforts and
to disincentivize further immigration. One of these ordinances,
the Laundry Ordinance of 1880, targeted workers in the San
Francisco laundry market, of whom nearly 89% were of Chinese
descent.15 The ordinance required anyone who operated a laundry
in a building not made of brick or stone to obtain a special cer-
tificate of operation from the San Francisco Board of Supervisors.
Records showed that soon after the ordinance was passed, there
were approximately 280 certificate applications and of those, only
80 were granted. The 80 permits were all granted to Caucasians.
Not one Chinese laundry was granted a license.16
Yick Wo, one of the Chinese laundry business owners, had
operated in the same wooden building for 22 years. He continued
to operate his laundry without a license and was soon convicted and
fined $10.00 for violating the ordinance. Yick Wo refused to pay
the fine and was placed behind bars. He sued for a writ of habeas
corpus, claiming he was being unlawfully detained. With the help
of the Chinese Laundrymens Guild, Yick Wo was able to hire Hall
McAllister, one of the most accomplished lawyers in California,
to bring his case before the California State Supreme Court. Wo
lost all of his appeals at the state level, but was eventually granted
review before the United States Supreme Court. In a unanimous
decision, the Supreme Court held that San Francisco authorities
had acted in a discriminatory manner towards Chinese-owned
businesses and in doing so had violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court struck down
the Laundry Ordinance on this basis.17
In the years since Yick Wo, many scholars have noted the
progressive outcome of the decision and have characterized the case
as the start of a new era in the Supreme Courts relationship with
civil rights on a par with the later social progress of the 1960s civil
rights movement.18 However, this is a romanticized view of racial
6 Jeremy Rhee
politics and the Supreme Court at the time. Just ten years later, in
1896, the Supreme Court explicitly condoned racial segregation
in Plessy v. Ferguson. Rather than any genuine motivation for anti-
racism, a pro-business and pro-entrepreneurship sentiment had
much more to do with the outcome of Yick Wo than any desire to
provide racial minorities with equal footing.
Towards the end of the Gilded Age, a period of abundant
economic growth especially in the North and West, the federal
governments developing respect for the free market and small
businesses could be observed through its efforts to regulate indus-
try. This was done in order to keep markets vigorous and prevent
the destructive restraints of trade that emerged in the era. New
phenomena developed in big business through the establishment
of trusts, cartels, and monopolistic business practices. These new
powerful business organizations were not only revolutionary in
size, but also pioneered new and untried managerial methods and
practices. One of the most dominant industries, the railroad, aptly
represented the fiscal, environmental, and geographical scales of
these gigantic changes. But regardless of the magnitude and scope
of their operations, these firms remained profit-driven businesses.
Once a few firms began to compete for a local geographical market,
they began to adopt new techniques to restrain the competitive
edge of their rivals while simultaneously keeping prices as high
as possible. Railroads, for example, protected their profits by ap-
peasing national operators to the detriment of local firms. They
persisted in raising their freight storage and transportation rates
in rural areas. These profit-seeking and abusive practices led to
problems of destructive competition. It was this phenomenon that
spurred on new attempts by the states and the federal government
to regulate prices and industry.19
These new efforts on the part of the authorities manifested
themselves in different forms. Both on the state and federal level,
several new acts were passed to bar companies from engaging in
clear restraints of trade. Congress passed the 1887 Interstate Com-
merce Act and the 1890 Sherman Antitrust Act, and in doing so
directly interfered with markets in order to protect small firms
and consumers by keeping the competitive nature of the free
enterprise system intact. The Interstate Commerce Act mandated
that railroad businesses establish reasonable rates and discontinue
anti-competitive rebates. The Act also established the first federal

regulatory agency, the Interstate Commerce Commission, that was
empowered to prosecute those engaged in illegal monopolistic
activities.20 The intent behind the Sherman Antitrust Act was even
more unsparing. Under certain circumstances, the federal govern-
ment had the right to strike down combinations that acted in
restraint of trade.21 President Cleveland, who served two terms
during the Gilded Age, remarked that rampant capitalism that led
to monopolism was as bad or worse than communism itself, since
both systems, once perfected, would act in the same regressive
way to eliminate economic diversity and beneficial competition.22
In its almost reverential value for the free market system
and entrepreneurialism, the Supreme Court in Yick Wo tapped into
a much longer, deeper vein in 19th century American history. The
Supreme Courts emphasis on, and deference, for the intrinsic
values of hard work and labor were firmly rooted in the antebel-
lum Republican Free Soil Movement. This movement emanated
first from elements of the Whig Party and later formed the basis
of the Republican Party upon its founding in 1854.23 Its adherents
were not so much morally opposed to black slavery because it
denigrated slaves; rather, they sought to halt its expansion because
slavery gave wages, at least wages for those who performed physical
labor, little or no value.24 These ideals were embraced by a wide
variety of political leaders in the antebellum era. Lincoln, decades
before he became known as the Great Emancipator, made his
first political points as a Senatorial candidate in the 1850s as a
defender of Free Soil and Free Labor. Lincoln was so strong for
these ideals, that even in the years before the Civil War, he argued
that they should apply to all laborers, regardless of race or even
sex. Lincoln, in his debates with Stephen A. Douglas, drove home
[his beliefs] by choosing as his example a black woman.25 In such
a racially-charged era, it was extraordinary for any senatorial can-
didate to stand up for the fruits of labor of an African-American
woman, free or slave.26 Lincolns high regard for Free Soil and
Free Labor was echoed by almost every Republican in the 1850s.
In fact, according to historian Eric Foner, the Free Labor ideals
lay at the core of the Republican party and expressed a coherent
social outlook, a model of the good society. But this belief went
beyond mere outlooks and models. For Republicans, free labor
8 Jeremy Rhee
meant the ability to make genuine economic choices.27 In Yick

Wo v. Hopkins, Wo, by being forced to shutter his business by the
city of San Francisco and being imprisoned, in a real respect, was
deprived of the ability to make the economic choices that would
be available to any other free man. In essence, the incarceration
of Yick Wo was a direct violation of the Free Soil values.
The connections between the Yick Wo decision and the
Free Soil Movement go beyond their obvious parallels; they can
be traced directly to the decisions author, Justice Matthews. Be-
fore he became a Supreme Court Justice, he had made his early
career as a lambasting, rowdy Free Soil activist and politician in
antebellum Ohio. Matthews found himself as a member of the Ohio
Liberty men, which was a local component of the national Free
Soil movement.28 Justice Matthews reverted to his earlier beliefs
when he stated in the decision that Yick Wo must be permitted
to carry on his harmless and useful occupation, on which [he
depends] for a livelihood29 To Matthews, in tune with his Free
Soil convictions, Yick Wo had every natural right to profit and
advance from his own honest labor.
While respect for the free market and small business owners
began to permeate through state and federal levels, a newfound
respect for the Chinese as workers was also emerging. The crucial
role of Chinese labor was widely admitted in the West. Although
the growth of a nativist white population identified the Chinese
as enemies, the Chinese became indispensable to the growing
economy and proved themselves an essential component of the
working class.30 On the Central Pacific Railroad tracks, nearly 90%
of the 10,000 workers were Chinese. Characterized by the company
president, Leland Stanford, as quiet, peaceable, industrious [and]
economical, the Chinese and their replacement of white workers
saved the company approximately $5.5 million within a span of
three years from 1866 to 1869.31 One of the companys executives
even ventured to mainland China on several occasions during this
era to recruit workers for jobs in the United States.32 As laborers,
the Chinese were also omnipresent in the manufacturing industries
of California. According to the San Francisco Morning Call, nearly
half of the workers in the citys factories were Chinese.33 The social
and political elite respected the industrial and entrepreneurial
mentality of the Chinese working class, and this level of recogni-
tion reached even the highest echelons of American governance.

Aaron H. Palmer, a counselor to the Supreme Court, constantly
advocated for the immigration of Chinese workers: No people in
all the East are so well adapted for clearing wild lands and raising
every species of agricultural product . . . as the Chinese.34
The effectiveness of Chinese labor was not just confined
to the West. In 1870, a group of seventy-five Chinese workers ar-
rived in North Adams, Massachusetts, pioneering the Chinese
move to the East. Taking advantage of the newly completed
Transcontinental Railroad, this group of men settled in the small
factory town of North Adams to operate one of its shoe factories.
Once there, they gained employment at a number of different
factories where their practices of thrift, efficiency, and collective
cooperation were quickly noticed.35 Soon, the rural and isolated
hamlet gained national attention as local industrialists pointed
to statistical evidence indicating that the new workers boosted
productivity, and more importantly, increased profitability to the
local firms. In a singular instance, within three months of their
arrival, Chinese workers were producing more shoes than the
same number of local workers. Calvin T. Sampson, one of the
shoe factory owners, saved $840 in a weeks cost of production by
using Chinese labor.36 With the help of Chinese workers, North
Adams was transformed from a sleepy factory town into a regional
industrial powerhouse and the epicenter of thirty-eight factories
and numerous other dependent businesses.37 The competitive
edge of Chinese laborers was widely acknowledged in regional
and national publications, as the Boston Commonwealth declared:
They are with us! The Celestials . . . and all seventy-five of them
hard at work in the town of North Adams.38
Advocates for Chinese laborers and their right to work were
not just found in the boardrooms of corporations. Support for this
minority extended to the heart of the American government itself,
in the chambers of the United States Senate.The belief in the free
market systemand the fact that any attempt to interfere with it,
especially to promote ethnocentrism or racism, was fundamentally
a disservice to societyhad been a core tenet championed by
Stanley Matthews, United States Senator and later the Supreme
Court Justice who wrote the Yick Wo opinion. In a speech he made
as enator while arguing against the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882,
10 Jeremy Rhee
Matthews said that it made little sense for anyone to claim that a
man had a right to gain and prosper from honest employment
except if he were Chinese. Such a belief was, from his point of
view, regressive. Matthews further argued that such discrimina-
tion violated the sacred American proviso that free labor and its
power to transform was a unique gift of American capitalism. To
him, the notion that a young and vigorous system of economy
and government needed protection from such a hard-working
population falsely suggested that it had a fragile nature, not a
resilient one.39 Several years later, Matthews, as a Supreme Court
Justice, espoused these views in his Yick Wo opinion: No reason
whatever, except the will of the supervisors, is assigned why [the
Chinese] should not be permitted to carry on . . . their harmless
and useful occupation, on which they depend for a livelihood.40
The unanimous opinion reflected the Gilded Age attitude towards
competitive capitalism and identified the crux of the issue as the
Laundry Ordinances interference with property ownership and
an individuals attempt to make an honest living through labor.
The Chinese workers economic mobility and success also
enabled them to climb the social and racial hierarchy, where they
found themselves in between black and white. The ceremony and
completion of the first Transcontinental Railroad at Promon-
tory Point in 1869 was an event of symbolic significance for both
white and yellow America.41 Representatives of every govern-
ment branch, and business, gathered to watch the nailing of the
final golden spike that would complete the first Transcontinental
Railroad. Chinese, as result of their hard labor and diligence, en-
joyed a prominent role in the ceremony alongside Irish workers
and white investors. Government and business representatives
observed the picturesque image of the white and Chinese work-
ing class drive the last nails into the line [together].42 It was in
these years that, according to scholar Vivian Wu, Chinese settlers,
through their economic standing, evolved into Chinese-Americans,
whose positions in the so-called racial hierarchy would be as a
bridge between black and white. She writes in an article about the
Chinese in Mississippi that, upon their arrival, the Chinese were
treated the same as African-Americans.43 However, as the Chinese
entered the grocery business in Mississippi, they were able to suc-
ceed financially and become more able to challenge their racial
status in society.44 Over time, as the Chinese in Mississippi became

more economically mobile and independent, they ascended on
the hierarchy of brownness where they found themselves as not
quite white, but also not black.45
Many respected contemporary academics and scientists
also considered the Chinese as occupying a middle position be-
tween black and white. In an 1849 article published in the journal
Crania Americana, the author, Samuel Morton, President of the
Philadelphia Academy of Sciences, analyzed a collection of more
than 1,000 skulls.46 From these skulls, he derived the existence
of five separate human species: Caucasian, Mongolian, Malay,
American, and Ethiopian.47 He measured each races average
brain size to speculate on the worthiness and intelligence of each
ethnic group, and ultimately proclaimed that while the Caucasian
race was superior, the so-called Mongolian races were not without
their own attributes such as being intellectually active, capable of
imitation and filled with ingenuity.48 The author also classified
the lowest races as Ethiopians, characterizing them as having a
black complexion and the lowest grade of intellectual functionality,
and in doing so affirmed the existence of a so-called hierarchy
of brownness in academic spheres.
Many of these pseudo-scientific beliefs filtered into the
American legal and political mainstream. This point of view is
reflected in a comparison of the legislative syntax and nomencla-
ture of discriminatory laws. Typically, laws that addressed African
Americans were specific in nature and highly punitive. The Loui-
siana Separate Car Act, for example, specifically targeted African
Americans through the use of the derogatory term colored.
Discriminatory legislation aimed at African Americans was, in this
way, explicit in language and direct in its message.49 In contrast,
aside from the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, most discrimina-
tory acts that were aimed to suppress the Chinese were neutral
on their face. The legislation within San Francisco that dealt with
the Chinese population already living in San Francisco was very
careful only subtly to target the Chinese, unlike the explicit legisla-
tion that targeted African Americans in the South. The Laundry
Ordinance of 1880 itself never specifically or directly mentioned
the Chinese. Rather, the ordinance was written to apply to any
person or persons.50 Other San Francisco regulations similarly
12 Jeremy Rhee
employed generalized language in its efforts to target incoming

Chinese immigrants. One piece of legislation required every im-
migrant arriving through the port of San Francisco to pay a tax,
but never charged any duties for overland newcomers. This law
was directly targeted at Chinese settlers, who were the only im-
migrants who came from overseas. The lack of blatant language
shows some degree of sensitivity in tackling discriminatory issues
when dealing with the Chinese, which indicates the existence
and influence, however limited, of the Chinese position in the
hierarchy of brownness.
The Chinese Exclusion Act, the one famous instance
of explicit language used against the Chinese, proved to be an
exception. The federal government passed the legislation not
because of any concept relating to the hierarchy of brownness,
but, as scholar Mary Roberts Coolidge argued in her California
Thesis, because of the unique set of political circumstances and
forces that had aligned at the time.51 Coolidge stated in her thesis
that the state of California and its working class were the major
factors behind the passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act.52 The
increasing racial tensions between the Chinese and local whites
were exploited for the benefit of politicians.53 The unusually close
competition between the political parties on a national scale and
the growing electoral importance of California in congressional
and presidential elections were major factors in the political par-
ties embrace of Chinese immigration restriction. As observed in
the election of 1876, Democrats and Republicans, locked in fierce
competition, believed that the electoral votes from the West Coast
could make an important difference. Both parties, according to
Coolidge, were in a heated race to appease California voters and
gain their support.54
Another factor affecting the Chinese position in the hi-
erarchy of brownness was their legal and political links to the
Chinese Empire. Unlike African-Americans, who had no foreign
country to help in dealing with the white elites, the Chinese were
represented by a sovereign state with an official ambassador to
the United States. If the lives or property of the Chinese were in
any way harmed by federal, state, or local authorities, the United
States risked damaging international relations with China. Aaron
H. Palmer submitted to Congress an encouragement of expansion
of trade relations with China and specified the increasing impor-

tance of American relations with the East.55 Palmer and his beliefs
illustrated the growing importance of China as a friendly nation
and an economic trading partner. Furthermore, the establishment
of the Angell Treaty of 1880 between China and America protected
the rights of Chinese immigrants and granted them near-citizen
status. The political advantage that Chinese immigrants gained
from this international representation was exemplified in Yick Wo.
In the decision, Justice Matthews expressly mentioned the terms
of the treaty and its provisions that protected the rights of Chinese
residents of the United States: If Chinese laborers [...] meet with
ill treatment at the hands of any other persons, the Government
of the United States will exert all its powers to devise measures
for their protection.56
Federalism and the supremacy of United States federal
law and treaties over state law played a major role in the Yick Wo
decision on a few levels.57 In fact, although many scholars today
characterize the Yick Wo decision as a triumph of the Fourteenth
Amendment, many of the decisions main points actually did
not come from the Fourteenth Amendments Equal Protection
Clause. In the opinion, Justice Matthews specifically wrote that
the Laundry Ordinance had no legal standing because it was in
clear violation of the Angell Treaty of 1880; a treaty that firmly
guaranteed a large degree of civil and economic rights for Chi-
nese Imperial subjects residing within the United States. Justice
Matthews wrote that the discrimination against Chinese citizens
and the Laundry Ordinances purpose to drive the Chinese out of
business were serious violations of the treaty between the United
States and China.58 By citing the treaty, Matthews invoked the type
of federalism that had pre-dated the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment. He cited the text of the Supremacy Clause itself: all
treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme law of the land.59 The Angell
Treaty should therefore have been given higher priority than any
laws within the state of California, let alone a local ordinance. To
Justice Matthews, any behaviors that were prohibited by federal law
or treaty in any situation were not justified.60 This was consistent
with his general views on the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, a piece
of legislation he believed was a grave violation of the treaty with
14 Jeremy Rhee
China. To Justice Matthews, the Senates efforts to stop Chinese

immigration were unconstitutional, dishonorable, and cowardly.61
It was therefore no surprise that, given Matthews respect for the
federal governments agreements with other countries, he was
motivated to strike down a local ordinance that undermined the
federal governments promises.
Justice Matthews was also not the only champion of federal
power on the Court. During the Gilded Age, under the adminis-
trations of President Hayes and President Garfield, the Supreme
Court was dominated by six justices (Chief Justice Morrison Waite,
John Harlan, William Woods, Stanley Matthews, Horace Gray, and
Samuel Blatchford) who were all dedicated to using the Courts
considerable powers to expand federal authority and especially
to support federal power in the way the Fourteenth Amendment
was applied to the states, as well as in how federal power trumped
state power.62 In 1886, the same year as Yick Wo, the Supreme
Court in Wabash v. Illinois restricted states from intervening in
matters of interstate commerce in a further attempt to bolster
federal power. Justice Miller wrote in that decision that a statute
of a state, intended to regulate . . . the transmission of persons or
property . . . from one state to another, is not within that class of
legislation which the states may enact in the absence of legislation
by Congress.63 With this decision, the Supreme Court established
a clear distinction between state and federal power: states must
follow the lawmaking lead from Congress in matters regarding
interstate commerce.
These federalist approaches by the Supreme Court played
a crucial role in the Yick Wo decision. The justices saw this case as
an opportunity to construe the Fourteenth Amendment in a way
that limited state legislative power. The Court declared that the
Fourteenth Amendment protected all people within the United
States, regardless of state law, and added that congressional law
had provided an expansive definition of this protection at the
expense of the states in a recent series of revised federal statutes.
Citing an 1877 Revised Statute, Justice Matthews declared that all
persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the
same right in every State and Territory.64 Through the imposition
of the Fourteenth Amendment on the states, the Supreme Court
signaled that it was now carefully limiting the states lawmaking
rights. Yick Wo, therefore, represented a stricter approach to federal-

state relations as the Supreme Court restricted state legislative
prerogatives by upholding Yick Wos constitutional rights. These
efforts to limit state legislative rights were noted by some mem-
bers of the public after the decision. In an 1895 issue of Nation,
E.P. Clark contributed an opinion piece regarding Yick Wo where
he stated that the case was instrumental in expanding the scope
of federal interference in matters of State and even municipal
legislation. Clark went as far as accusing the Justices of going
beyond the scope of their own authority in an abusive manner.65
Although many celebrate Yick Wo v. Hopkins as a revolu-
tionary Equal Protection case that nullified prejudiced lawmak-
ing on the grounds of racial status, in reality, the greater weight
of the decision rested on other, more practical, aspects such as
economic values, a nuanced racial hierarchy, and a shift towards
greater federal power. However, it is also not accurate to state that
the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause did not play
a role in the case. In fact, the Fourteenth Amendment and its
minor application to Chinese immigrants after this case did mark
a significant development in the Supreme Courts interpretation
of the clause. Before Yick Wo, the Supreme Courts interpretation
of the Fourteenth Amendment dealt mainly with issues concern-
ing black freedmen and the protection of their political rights.
The Court, in fact, restricted the application of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the protection of freed black citizens and refused
to recognize that the Amendment could also protect economic
rights and the rights of other minorities.66 The Supreme Court in
Yick Wo, by applying the Fourteenth Amendment to the Chinese
plaintiff, introduced a novel, wider interpretation of the Equal
Protection Clause.
Therefore, even though Yick Wo was motivated by a num-
ber of factors other than actual anti-racism or anti-discrimination,
in a deeper way, Yick Wo really was as progressive as modern-day
scholars believe it to be, albeit in a different sense. The Supreme
Court seized on Yick Wo as a way to expand federal power under
the Fourteenth Amendment and legally to have more influence
over how the states operated with regard to their citizens. Although
it took almost another century for minorities of all ethnicities
to benefit from this expansion, Yick Wo was the first step toward
16 Jeremy Rhee
achieving equal protection under the laws. The Laundry Ordinance

of 1880 was ostensibly a neutral act that was supposed to apply
to all citizens, but in intent and application it actually harmed
minorities. The Supreme Court [decision] in Yick Wo did the op-
posite: while the Court intended mainly to help small businesses
and the economy, its language and the way it has been applied
has helped minorities through the centuries. In the end, despite
the Supreme Courts highly practical and self-serving motivations
in siding with Yick Wo, the results have played a part in reaching
our progressive age today.
Endnotes
1
The Jolly Giants Artist Agrees with Darwin, cartoon,
Thistletons Jolly Giant, February 21, 1874.
2
The Constitution Project: Yick Wo and the Equal
Protection Clause, Annenberg Classroom, accessed May 8,
2015, http://sunnylandsclassroom.org/Asset.aspx?id=1475.
3
Sen Hu and Jielin Dong, The Rocky Road to Liberty:
A Documented History of Chinese Immigration and Exclusion
(Saratoga, CA: Javvin Press, 2010), 182.
4
5
Plessy v. Ferguson. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
6
Jonathan D. Spence, Overseas Chinese, in The Search for
Modern China, Third ed. (New York: Norton, 1990), 202-204.
7
Ibid, 204.
8
Henry Kittredge Norton, THE CHINESE, The Virtual
Museum of the City of San Francisco, accessed May 5, 2015,
http://www.sfmuseum.org/hist6/chinhate.html.
9
Alexander Saxton, The Labor Force in California, in
The Indispensable Enemy: Labor and the Anti-Chinese Movement in
California (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), 5-6.
10
Ibid., 6.
11
United States, Department of the Interior, Census Office,
Report of the Superintendent of the Ninth Census, by Francis
A. Walker, accessed May 15, 2015, http://www2.census.gov/
prod2/decennial/documents/1870a-02.pdf. and
United States, Department of the Interior, Census Office,
accessed May 15, 2015, http://www2.census.gov/prod2/
decennial/documents/1860a-02.pdf.
12
Saxton, Indispensable Enemy, 7.
13
More Chinese Outrages, San Francisco Chronicle,
February 24, 1870, accessed April 20, 2015, ProQuest
Historical Newspapers [ProQuest].
14
Anti-Chinese Laundry, San Francisco Chronicle, July 3,
1882, accessed May 2, 2015, ProQuest Historical Newspapers
[ProQuest].
15
Sen Hu and Jielin Dong, The Rocky Road to Liberty:
A Documented History of Chinese Immigration and Exclusion
(Saratoga, CA: Javvin Press, 2010), 182.
18 Jeremy Rhee
16
17
Ibid.
18
Gabriel J. Chin, Unexplainable on Grounds of Race:
Doubts about Yick Wo, Arizona Legal Studies, September 2008,
1360, accessed April 13, 2015, doi:10.2139/ssrn.1075563.
19
Glenn Porter, Industrialization and the Rise of Big
Business, in The Gilded Age: Essays on the Origins of Modern
America, ed. Charles W. Calhoun (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly
Resources, 1996), 9-12, accessed May 1, 2015, https://
trinityschoolnyc.myschoolapp.com/app/student#topicdeta
il/30884/2299345/2299346/74096.
20
Interstate Commerce Act (1887), Our Documents,
accessed May 13, 2015, http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.
php?flash=true&doc=49.
21
Gary B. Nash, The Rise of Smokestack America, in The
American People: Creating a Nation and a Society, 7th ed., vol. 2
(Boston: Prentice Hall, 2011), 546.
22
Alyn Brodsky, Grover Cleveland: A Study in Character (New
York: St. Martins Press, 2000), 241.
23
Gary B. Nash, The American People: Creating a Nation and a
Society, 7th ed., vol. 1 (Boston: Prentice Hall,
2011), 396.
24
Eric Foner, Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of
the Republican Party Before the Civil War (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1970), Kindle edition, loc. 322.
25
Ibid.
26
Ibid., loc. 698.
27
Ibid., loc. 784.
28
Joseph G. Rayback, Free Soil; the Election of 1848
(Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1971), 103.
29
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
30
Saxton, Indispensable Enemy, xi.
31
Ronald T. Takaki, Iron Cages: Race and Culture in 19th-
Century America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990),
230.
32
Ibid.
33
Ibid., 232.
34
Ibid., 229.
35
Ibid., 232.
36
Ibid., 235.
37
Ibid., 233.
38
Ibid., 234.
39
Stanley Matthews, Speech of Hon. Stanley Matthews
of Ohio (speech), accessed May 20, 2015, http://babel.
hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=osu.32435000043174;view=1up;s
eq=1.
40
41
Takaki, Iron Cages, 231-232.
42
Ibid.
43
Vivian Wu Wong, The Chinese in Mississippi: A Race
In-Between, Trotter Review 7, no. 2 (September 23, 1993): 21,
accessed April 2, 2015.
44
Ibid.
45
Ibid.
46
John Kuo Wei Tchen and Dylan Yeats, Yellow Peril!: An
Archive of Anti-Asian Fear (London: Verso, 2014), 135.
47
Samuel George Morton and George Combe, Crania
Americana Or, A Comparative View of the Skulls of Various
Aboriginal Nations of North and South America. To Which Is Prefixed
an Essay on the Varieties of the Human Species (Philadelphia: J.
Dobson, 1839), 2-3, accessed April 17, 2015, https://books.
google.com/books?id=sBBCAAAAcAAJ&printsec=frontcover&
source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false.
48
Ibid.
49
The Louisiana Railways Accomodations Act, Railroads
and the Making of Modern America, accessed May 14, 2015,
http://railroads.unl.edu/documents/view_document.
php?id=rail.gen.0060.
50
51
Andrew Gyory, Closing the Gate: Race, Politics, and the
Chinese Exclusion Act (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 1998), 6.
52
Ibid.
53
Ibid., 7.
54
Ibid., 8.
55
Takaki, Iron Cages, 229.
56
57
Gabriel J. Chin, Unexplainable on Grounds of Race:
Doubts about Yick Wo, Arizona Legal Studies, September 2008,
1378, accessed April 13, 2015, doi:10.2139/ssrn.1075563.
58
Ibid.
59
U.S. Constitution, art. VI. cl. 2.
60
20 Jeremy Rhee
61
Stanley Matthews, Speech of Hon. Stanley Matthews
of Ohio (speech), accessed May 20, 2015, http://babel.
hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=osu.32435000043174;view=1up;s
eq=1.
62
Justices 1789 to Present, Justices 1789 to Present,
accessed May 4, 2015, http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/
members.aspx. and Thomas W. Joo, Yick Wo Re-revisited:
Nonblack Nonwhites and Fourteenth Amendment History,
review of Unexplainable on Grounds of Race: Doubts
about Yick Wo, University of Illinois Law Review, September 2,
2008, 1432, accessed April 20, 2015, Social Science Research
Network.
63
Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Railway Company v. Illinois, 118
U.S. 557 (1886).
64
65
E. P. Clark, Case of Yick Wo, Nation, June 16, 1895, 438-
439, accessed May 13, 2015, New York Public Library.
66
Thomas W. Joo, Yick Wo Re-revisited: Nonblack
Nonwhites and Fourteenth Amendment History, review of
Unexplainable on Grounds of Race: Doubts about Yick Wo,
University of Illinois Law Review, September 2, 2008, 1427
accessed April 20, 2015, Social Science Research Network.
Bibliography
Anti-Chinese Laundry. San Francisco Chronicle, July 3,

1882. Accessed May 2, 2015. ProQuest Historical Newspapers
[ProQuest].
Bernstein, David. Revisiting Yick Wo v. Hopkins. George
Mason University Law and Economics Research Paper Series 08-55,
(September 2008): 101-111. http://ssrn.com/abstract=1262930
Bow, Leslie. Racial Interstitiality and the Anxieties of
the Partly Colored: Representations of Asians under Jim
Crow. Journal of Asian American Studies 10, no. 1 (2007): 1-30.
doi:10.1353/jaas.2007.0000.
Brodsky, Alyn. Grover Cleveland: A Study in Character. New
York: St. Martins Press, 2000.
Capturing Chinawomen. San Francisco Chronicle, January
16, 1870. Accessed January 13, 2015. ProQuest Historical
Newspapers.
Chin, Gabriel. Unexplainable on Grounds of Race: Doubts
about Yick Wo. University of Illinois Law Review 2008, (September
2008): 1359-1412. http://ssrn.com/abstract=1075563
Clark, E. P. Case of Yick Wo. Nation, June 16, 1895.
Accessed May 13, 2015. New York Public Library.
Foner, Eric. Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of the
Republican Party Before the Civil War. New York: Oxford University
Press, 1970.
Gold, Steven J. From Jim Crow to Racial Hegemony:
Evolving Explanations of Racial Hierarchy. Ethnic and Racial
Studies 27, no. 6 (2004): 951-68. doi:10.1080/014198704200026
8549.
Gyory, Andrew. Closing the Gate: Race, Politics, and the Chinese
Exclusion Act. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
1998.
Higham, John. Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American
Nativism, 1860-1925. New York: Atheneum, 1969.
Hu, Sen, and Jielin Dong. The Rocky Road to Liberty: A
Documented History of Chinese Immigration and Exclusion. Saratoga,
CA: Javvin Press, 2010.
Interstate Commerce Act (1887). Our Documents.
Accessed May 13, 2015. http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.
php?flash=true&doc=49.
Joo, Thomas W. Yick Wo Re-revisited: Nonblack
Nonwhites and Fourteenth Amendment History. Review of
Unexplainable on Grounds of Race: Doubts about Yick Wo.
22 Jeremy Rhee
University of Illinois Law Review, September 2, 2008, 1427-440.

Accessed April 20, 2015. Social Science Research Network.
Justices 1789 to Present. Justices 1789 to Present. Accessed
May 4, 2015. http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members.
aspx.
Lee, Erika. The Chinese Exclusion Example: Race,
Immigration, and American Gatekeeping, 1882-1924.
Journal of American Ethnic History 21, no. 3 (April 01, 2002):
36-62. Accessed February 21, 2015. http://www.jstor.org/
stable/10.2307/27502847?ref=no-x-route:fc848a78ea96b88faa1
c394bfba6ca74.
Lee, Robert E. Gen. Lee on Chinese Immigration. San
Francisco Chronicle, March 27, 1870. Accessed January 17, 2015.
ProQuest Historical Newspapers.
Lee, Shelley Sang-Hee. A New History of Asian America. New
York: Routledge, 2014.
Matthews, Stanley. Speech of Hon. Stanley Matthews of
Ohio. Speech. Accessed May 20, 2015. http://babel.hathitrust.
org/cgi/pt?id=osu.32435000043174;view=1up;seq=1.
More Chinese Outrages. San Francisco Chronicle, February
24, 1870. Accessed April 20, 2015. ProQuest Historical
Newspapers [ProQuest].
Morton, Samuel George, and George Combe. Crania
Americana Or, A Comparative View of the Skulls of Various Aboriginal
Nations of North and South America. To Which Is Prefixed an Essay
on the Varieties of the Human Species. Philadelphia: J. Dobson,
1839. Accessed April 17, 2015. https://books.google.com/boo
ks?id=sBBCAAAAcAAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_su
mmary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false.
Nash, Gary B. The American People: Creating a Nation and a
Society. 7th ed. Vol. 1. Boston: Prentice Hall, 2011.
Nash, Gary B. The American People: Creating a Nation and a
Society. 7th ed. Vol. 2. Boston: Prentice Hall, 2011.
Norton, Henry Kittredge. THE CHINESE. The Virtual
Museum of the City of San Francisco. Accessed May 5, 2015.
http://www.sfmuseum.org/hist6/chinhate.html.
Ong, Paul M. Chinese Labor in Early San Francisco: Racial
Segmentation and Industrial Expansion. Chinese Labor in Early
San Francisco: Racial Segmentation and Industrial Expansion 8, no.
1 (October 1980): 69-92. Accessed February 17, 2015. Asian
American Studies Center.
Plessy v. Ferguson. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
Porter, Glenn. Industrialization and the Rise of Big

Business. In The Gilded Age: Essays on the Origins of Modern
America, edited by Charles W. Calhoun. Wilmington, DE:
Scholarly Resources, 1996. Accessed May 1, 2015. https://
trinityschoolnyc.myschoolapp.com/app/student#topicdeta
il/30884/2299345/2299346/74096.
Rayback, Joseph G. Free Soil; the Election of 1848. Lexington:
University Press of Kentucky, 1971.
Report of the Joint Special Committee to Investigate Chinese
Immigration. February 27, 1877. Ordered to Be Printed.
Washington: Govt. Print. Off., 1877. Accessed January 17, 2015.
https://archive.org/details/reportofjointspe00unit.
Saxton, Alexander. The Indispensable Enemy: Labor and the
Anti-Chinese Movement in California. Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1971.
Spence, Jonathan D. Overseas Chinese. In The Search for
Modern China, Third ed. New York: Norton, 1990.
Takaki, Ronald T. Iron Cages: Race and Culture in 19th-Century
America. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990.
Tchen, John Kuo Wei, and Dylan Yeats. Yellow Peril!: An
Archive of Anti-Asian Fear. London: Verso, 2014.
The Chinamen. San Francisco Chronicle, April 3, 1876.
Accessed January 2, 2015. ProQuest Historical Newspapers.
The Chinese. San Francisco Chronicle, April 1, 1876.
Accessed January 9, 2015. ProQuest Historical Newspapers.
The Constitution Project: Yick Wo and the Equal Protection
Clause. Annenberg Classroom. Accessed May 8, 2015. http://
sunnylandsclassroom.org/Asset.aspx?id=1475.
The Laundry Ordinance. San Francisco Chronicle, January
19, 1886. Accessed December 12, 2014. ProQuest Historical
Newspapers.
The Louisiana Railways Accomodations Act. Railroads and
the Making of Modern America. Accessed May 14, 2015. http://
railroads.unl.edu/documents/view_document.php?id=rail.
gen.0060.
The Jolly Giants Artist Agrees with Darwin. Cartoon.
Thistletons Jolly Giant, February 21, 1874.
Torok, John. Reconstruction and Racial Nativism: Chinese
Immigrants and the Debates on the Thirteenth, Fourteenth,
and Fifteenth Amendments and Civil Rights Laws. Asian
American Law Journal 3, (January 1996): 55-103.
United States. Department of the Interior. Census Office.
Report of the Superintendent of the Ninth Census. By Francis
24 Jeremy Rhee
A. Walker. Accessed May 15, 2015. http://www2.census.gov/

prod2/decennial/documents/1870a-02.pdf.
United States. Department of the Interior. Census Office.
Accessed May 15, 2015. http://www2.census.gov/prod2/
decennial/documents/1860a-02.pdf.
Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Railway Company v. Illinois. 118
U.S. 557 (1886)
Wong, Vivian Wu. The Chinese in Mississippi: A Race In-
Between. Trotter Review 7, no. (September 23, 1993). Accessed
April 2, 2015.
Yick Wo v. Hopkins. 118 U.S. 356 (1886)
THEY GOT LIPS? WE WANT THEM THE MARKETING OF

CIGARETTES TO CHILDREN, 1970-19981...
THE PROBLEM IS, HOW DO YOU SELL DEATH?
HOW DO YOU SELL A POISON THAT KILLS
350,000 PEOPLE PER YEAR, 1,000 PEOPLE A DAY?2
Elizabeth Anne Johns
In 1991, the journal JAMA published a research paper

that claimed that more than 90% of surveyed children made a
connection between a cigarette and a picture of a cartoon camel
representing R. J. Reynolds cigarettes. They were as familiar with
this character as they were with as Mickey Mouse.3 The article
concluded that children were being brought into a culture of
smoking, and as a result, they were more likely to smoke when
they were older. This and similar accusations contributed to a
watershed moment in the history of smoking. Decades of anti-
smoking campaigns had had an incremental, but not decisive,
effect on the tobacco companies. In the early 1990s, however,
public outrage boiled over, leading to a series of unprecedented
lawsuits that dramatically changed the standing of tobacco com-
panies in America.
Elizabeth Anne Johns is an 8th Grader at the Whitney Young Magnet

High School in Chicago, Illinois, where she wrote this paper for Mr.
Alan Edwards Social Studies course in the 2014/2015 academic year.
This paper reconstructs the history of how smoking was

sold to young people in the 1970s1990s, focusing especially on
the Joe Camel campaign. It examines the strategies used to attract
a new generation of smokers at a critical moment in the history
of smoking. The paper makes two inter-related arguments: one
focusing on the kinds of messages that marketers wanted to deliver,
and the other on the practices that delivered them. It argues that
Reynolds and other companies sought to manipulate social trends
in order to link cigarettes to teens values and fantasies: it argues
that Reynolds was trying to create new social trends, by redefining
cool (and smooth) as qualities that could be enhanced by a
cigarette. It also argues that companies responded in innovative
ways to legal bans on some mainstream forms of advertising, using
product placement and street-level marketing.
There is an enormous literature on tobacco advertising, but
relatively little that is written from a historical perspectivemost
scholarship comes out of sociology, political science, law, and the
medical fields.4 The major historical works are Robert Proctors
Golden Holocaust and Alan Brandts Cigarette Century, both of which
describe how smoking became ingrained in American society, and
how effective the tobacco companies were in marketing a prod-
uct that they knew to be life-threatening.5 Both books, and much
other literature on cigarette marketing, focus on the immorality
and deceptiveness of tobacco campaigns. Both have shown that
children became both an illegal and an important focus of smok-
ing companies; both are crucial exposs of tobacco culture and
enterprise. Now that this work has been done, it is possible to ask
related, but somewhat different questions, that analyse changes
in strategy and perception over time and between companies.
This essay seeks to develop an understanding of how the
Joe Camel campaigns (and others like it) were developed and
executed. What elements of popular culture were used to portray
Joe as a cool character? What avenues did the tobacco companies
pursue to reach young potential smokers? An account of where
the coolness of Joe Camel came from, and where, within and
beyond print media, Reynolds and other companies sought to
engage young smokers, will be of interest beyond its immedi-

ate significance to the history of smoking. It may shed light both
on the history of teen culture in the second half of the twentieth
century (a period in which the term teenager was coined, and
when young adult first became a significant commercial and
social category) and on the engagement of what later became
known as Big Tobacco with this culture.
Smoking Becomes Unhealthy

One of the most surprising aspects of the history of smok-
ing is how unusual smoking was just a hundred years ago. But as
Brandt and Proctor have shown, after cigarette production was
industrialized, the numbers of smokers rose. They jumped higher
with each World War, probably in part because governments in-
cluded cigarettes in soldiers rations. Throughout the first half of
the twentieth century, the numbers of smokers rose quickly, and
cigarette companies became accustomed to a steady growth in
demand for their products.6
Smoking was not exactly an accepted practice for children
during these years, and indeed there were some outspoken warn-
ings about it.7 But smoking was not made illegal for children in
all fifty states until the mid-twentieth century. Most adult smok-
ers had tried their first cigarette by their early teens. By 1945, the
average annual cigarette consumption was more than 3,000 per
adult, and it was going up.8
But in the late 1940s and early 1950s there were several
scientific publications that claimed a connection between smoking
and cancer.9 By 1950, all states had outlawed the sale of cigarettes
to minors. This decade also saw the first big decline in cigarette
consumption, though it rose again only a few years later.10 Then,
in 1964, the Surgeon General officially linked cigarettes to cancer
and other diseases.11 Every pack was printed with a health warning,
and a series of anti-smoking campaigns began.12
These events began a new period of controversy in the
history of smoking. Cigarette consumption began to decline again
after the Surgeon Generals report. Tobacco companies were los-

ing their oldest clients, and fewer children were taking their place.
Tobacco companies realized that they needed new advertising
strategies if they were to regain the ground that they were losing.
Todays teenager is tomorrows potential regular customer13

During the 1970s, tobacco companies worried about how
to build up their customer numbers. They studied facts about
smoking and smokers that were made available by the relatively
new field of market research, which had begun in the 1950s and
by the 1970s had transformed the kinds of information that could
be obtained by industries about the populations they were trying
to reach. Tobacco companies privately agreed that the key was to
convince young people, ideally younger than 18, to smoke. One
reason was that the population was getting younger: A 1975 mar-
keting report asserted that the 14-24 age group, represented 21%
of the population back in 1950, but now, in 1975, they represent
27%.14 There was a more basic reason to focus on these people:
most lifelong smokers began smoking in their teens, and had
committed to a brand before reaching 18. The Newport Cigarette
Company privately acknowledged in 1980 that the base of our
business is the high school student.15 So any cigarette company
that ignored teens would be giving a huge advantage to rival com-
panies.16 As this 14-24 age group matures, they would dominate
the cigarette economy for at least the next 25 years.17
These discussions were part of a major change in strategy.
The companies had advertised to children in the early twentieth
century, but after 1950 they mainly focused on men in their twenties
and thirtiesperhaps also expecting a kind of trickle-down effect
to younger relatives. But in the 1970s, facing a major decline in
future cigarette sales, tobacco companies began again to focus on
high school students, because they recognized that both smoking
habits and brand loyalty were often established by age 18.
A strategy to pull in younger people would have to deal
with at least two obstacles that had not existed before the 1970s.
First, tobacco companies had to contend with rising tides of anti-
smoking campaigns, led by both government entities and non-

profits. And, secondly, they also faced increasing limitations on
their ability to market cigarettes. In particular, in 1971 Congress
passed a federal law banning broadcast advertisements for ciga-
rettes.18 This obstacle only grew in significance, because during
the 1970s and 1980s, television became the most important way
to advertise most products.19 That is, it was not only the climate
of opinion that was changing: the media system for advertising
commodities to the U.S. population was changing, and the tobacco
industry was excluded from the benefits.
Television advertising began in the 1940s, but it was not
until many years later that it became more important than older
media, especially print. During the 1970s, television became the
most important medium for advertisers to reach consumers, pull-
ing in billions of advertising dollars.20 And these changes had an
especially powerful impact on children. When President Reagan
deregulated television advertising to children in the 1980s, an
explosion of promotional character toys transformed childrens
play habits. More generally, marketers reported in the 1980s that
the youth advertising market has come of age.21
Cigarette companies could not take advantage of the tele-
vision market, but they could take part in an equally significant
change: the social marketing revolution. During the 1970s and
1980s there was a shift away from an older products model
(talking about a products useful qualities), to a social model.
As one historian put it, it was a matter of discovering the right
cultural symbols and projecting them into the market through
advertising fiction.22
One part of this was the rise of social science research
into particular groups of consumers, including youth. By the late
1970s, there was a growing body of research into the aspirations,
habits, and purchasing power of various groups. Teenagers had
recently become a group. The very concept of the teenager was
invented by postwar social scientists and the marketing industry. 23
They detailed the media-use habits of youth, their brand knowledge
and interests. All of this opened up a vast field of information to

marketers.24
In this light, the question for cigarette companies became,
what did youth want, such that tobacco could become linked to it?
Earlier generations of cigarette advertisements had talked about
the mildness, the toastedness, or the smoothness of their
products. But market researchers told the tobacco companies that
what really mattered to youth was the opinions of other youth;
what really mattered was to be cool.
During this period, tobacco companies produced many
advertisements targeting young peoplethough they always in-
sisted to outsiders that their target audience was adults. In 1984,
Salem portrayed teens doing exciting, daring things;9 Lorillard
used pictures of young adults at sports events and parties with
cigarettes.10 The greatest campaign of all, however, was R. J.
Reynolds Joe Camel, which sought to shift the Camel brand from
older blue-collar customers to young, new smokers.25 Joe was first
introduced in Europe for a French advertising initiative in 1974
and later reworked for American marketing by Trone Advertis-
ing, a small firm in North Carolina.26 Joe Camel began as just one
campaign among several, but Joe eventually became the most
notorious character in tobacco advertising.
Joe Camel
The Joe Camel campaign was very different from other
tobacco advertising in its use of irony and humor. Its theme was
coolness, featuring a cartoon camel in a series of comical situa-
tions that both represented something a teenager might consider
cool, and at the same time, delivered a sense of irony. One of the
most appealing features of the campaign was its sarcastic nature.
It did not just put the viewers into the situations, it made fun of
the situations at the same time.
The Camel campaign grew quickly. Each month, readers
would see Joe in a new situation, each a male fantasy scenario de-
signed to appeal to teen boys and young men. It was as if the ads
were episodes in a developing story, with one character trying on

a series of classic identities of characters who embodied coolness
(such as James Dean, James Bond, and the actor Don Johnson,
star of the police drama Miami Vice). 27 One of the first ads, printed
in 1989 in Rolling Stone and many leisure and sports magazines,
featured Joe Camel dressed like James Deansunglasses, outfit,
and motorcycle gloves. He was even leaning against a car, in a
classic James Dean pose.
In one Hollywood-themed ad, Camel was posed in a t-shirt
and casual blazer, in front of a blonde in sunglasses and mini-dress
leaning on a bright red sports car, perhaps a Corvette; in the
background were the Hollywood sign and palm trees. In another
series of late 1980s ads inspired by the 1986 Tom Cruise movie,
Top Gun, Camel wore a parachute harness. Behind him a military
plane was lifting away from an aircraft carrier and a woman gazed
admiringly at Joe.28
The ads were a huge success, bringing the tiny Camel brand
(with around 4-5% of market share) immense publicityJoe Camel
was, within a few months, the most recognizable tobacco represen-
tative besides the Marlboro Man. In 1991, an industry commenter
attributed the campaigns success to its ability to break through
the clutter, the sameness, of cigarette advertising,29
Meet them where they live

The Camel campaign soon added another thread to the
ads: a list of smooth moves that smokers were invited to imagine
themselves making. Reynolds published foldout ads to describe
these moves in Rolling Stone in 1989.30 For instance, in Smooth
Move #334, How to impress someone at the beach, the reader
was instructed to run into the water, grab someone and pull her
back to the shorethe more she kicks and screams, the better.31
These smooth moves ads invited viewers to laugh at Joe
at the same time as they admired him. However, the campaign
was moving into the real world in a number of ways. In the early
1990s, Reynolds introduced a lotto card linked with a host of
Camel merchandise, and these could be purchased with Camel

Cash, coupons based on cigarette sales.32
A much more ambitious project was launched a year or
two later, when RJR invested in NASCAR races. NASCAR marketed
its own image of the rebel individualist, so the fit with Joe Camel
was natural.33 An industry video explained that car and motorcycle
racing routinely drew more spectators than the Super Bowl, and
brand loyalty to sponsored products was 93% during the events.
It argued that Camel, with its small market share of 4%, had enor-
mous growth potential because the potential audience was much
bigger than those who actually attended the races.34 The use of
sponsorship was one of the key ways that tobacco companies could
get their logos into broadcast media, through sports news coverage.
The Smokin Joe racing campaign combined sponsorship
of cool cars with interlinked merchandise and print advertise-
ments. RJR sponsored cars in the Winston Cup races and motor-
cycle competitions; 35 the driver who had made the smoothest
moves received a cash prize.36
Another strategy was product placement in movies and
video arcade games. Sponsorship practices dated from the early
twentieth century,37 but product placement became a significant
phenomenon beginning in the late 1970s, especially in movies.
Tobacco companies played a leading role in this surge. An early
example was Marlboros product placement in Superman II (1980),
in which Superman breaks through a Marlboro billboard.38
Buys n the Hood

These new forms of media advertising were not sufficient.
Tobacco also had to be brought into the neighborhoods and
offered directly to the users of the next generation. This was a
particularly good way to engage with teens because in the 1980s
teenagers saw movies together, in movie theaters (the internet did
not exist for most people until the 1990s, and it was not possible to
stream movies until the 2000s). Many movie theaters were in shop-
ping malls, which were where many teens spent as much of their
free time as they could; and those malls had arcade video games,
which were popular as a solitary and a group activity. Marlboro
worked particularly hard at product placement, in both movies
and arcade video games.39
Beginning in the 1980s, tobacco companies also took
their campaign to the streets to meet young smokers where they
livedliterally. Vans painted with company logos, and full of
promotional merchandise, toured the country, stopping in areas
chosen for extra promotion. Some of these vans were equipped
with large video screens on the sidevideo vans, they were
called in the industry. Strangely, the existence of these vans in
American neighborhoods has been largely overlooked among
historians of the subject. It is known that they operated in some
other countriesRobert Proctor has noted that vans or trucks
fitted with video monitors were active in rural Pakistan.40 But this
strategy was also implemented in America.
Promotional vans were not invented by the tobacco indus-
trypoliticians had used them for decades (with loudspeakers),
radiologists in public health campaigns carried x-ray machines
around local neighborhoods, and library vans brought circulat-
ing books into city neighborhoods ever since the 1950s. These
examples indicate that there was a certain degree of expectation
associated with vans carrying cultural messages. But their use by
the tobacco companies was far more strategically organized and
enacted on a far larger scale.
The vans would drive all over the country, especially in
urban Latino communities. They showed dramatic ads and invited
passers-by to play smoking-themed fairground games that they set
up on the street. One of the guidelines for the drivers of these
vans specified that, because video ads were not being broadcast
via the television, they could park next to schools and arcades
and show the ads to anyone. One of the videos, for example, was
Top Gunthemed and linked to similar print ads published in
1988-1989. It consisted of an unseen pilot performing tricks in
an airplane, impressing beautiful girls, and then landing on an
aircraft carrier, all with a pop soundtrack. At the end, Joe Camel
is shown winking.
The vans also carried games specific to the campaigns.
The idea seems to have been to use activities that were spoofs
of clichd fairground gamesCamel Frisbee Toss, the Wheel of
Camel, and the Cigarette Drop.41 Van drivers handed out free Joe
Camel playing cards to be used in a game involving promotional
music videos played from the sides of the trucks. This method was
not restricted to Joe Camelat least one other company, Winston,
used it as well.
There was a specific technology to this campaign. The vans
audio/visual systems were supplied by a company that bragged
that it allows access to school programs and dances, even in-
cluding high schools. 42 In guidelines for drivers, RJR instructed
that The van can drive by schools as moving media has been
excluded from the 500-foot rule.43 The video van would attract
a crowd wherever it appears, and its videos had proven to be a
tremendous promotional asset.44
As already mentioned, the video vans circulated in a number
of urban areas, targeting Latinos especially. The focus on Latinos
suggests that the use of video vans was not just motivated by the
fact that tobacco companies could not broadcast their ads. Latinos
were a fast-growing population, with high smoking rates, but they
did not spend a great deal of time on mainstream American media
(for instance Univision was founded in 1962, in Texas, and had
become a big source for Latino news and shows by the 1980s).
The vans may have been an attempt to reach a population with
huge smoking potential, which had not yet been targeted by the
bigger tobacco brands and was not likely to be reached by more
conventional media practices.
Judy J. Chapa, who held the position of RJRs Hispanic Field
Marketing Representative in Houston, reporting on the Houston
video van campaign in 1989, noted that it was a big success, but
added that it could be even more successful if changes were made
to adapt it to the tastes of Texas Latinos, by incorporating Tejano
music into the show, and tailoring other aspects of its content
to the diverse population, who came not only from Mexico but
other Latin American countries.45 The vans circulated in tours
of selected metropolitan areas, especially in the South and West,
from Miami to Los Angeles. A single van could tour many cities,
appearing in diverse locations in each one. For instance, one data
sheet listed multiple locations and events in San Antonio, Del Rio,
S. Padre Island, a town on the southern coast of Texas next to the
Mexican border, and a night club in the Texas city of Bermuda,
around 200 miles north of the border. The van stopped at a variety
of locations (in San Antonio it held sessions at the International
Speedway and at a Swap-o-Rama, and made a tour of all night
clubs and a softball tournament).46 Most of the video vans had
connections with stores, which would give out coupons for free
paraphernalia of the tobacco companies in accordance with how
many cigarette packs were bought at these locations. The coupons
(called Camel Cash) could be brought to the video vans for use,
thus promoting cigarettes and bringing attention to the advertis-
ing campaign simultaneously.
Along with providing access to schools, well-populated
sports games, and churches, video vans provided a sense of being
connected to the people who interacted with themit encour-
aged people to think of themselves as being part of a national
network (even though in fact the vans were not actually able to
be everywhere, this was the suggestion that they helped create).
Upon the beginning of the video van program, the training video
for new drivers encouraged them by saying, Its time for us to get
in gear, literally, as the Marlboro Van Program moves out in force
on every highway and bi-way across America.47 This cheerleading
attitude about the reach of the video vans pervaded many of the
tobacco companies planning documents.
The van program was not the biggest marketing invest-
ment that cigarette companies made, but it was not trivial: in
1993, Phillip Morris budget for its video van program amounted
to more than two and a half million dollars,48 and the budget grew
in order to maintain video vans continuously in major cities like
Los Angeles and Miami.49 The program was so large and cohesive
that drivers published a newspaper, The Weekly Bull, and awarded

prizes to the best and most productive teams.50 These van drivers
were supportive of each other and their company, and seemed
to have no feeling of guilt about their jobs. But they could have
no doubt that other people did not see them in the same light.
The van programs triggered several protests significant
enough to draw news coverage. For example, members of a 1997
San Diego protest were recorded chanting, hey, hey, Marlboro
Man, get inside your Marlboro Van. Take your butts away from
here. Dont forget your Marlboro gear.51 As protests gained
publicity across the country, van drivers were given specific in-
structions about how to respond when confronted. They were to
continue working, and to try to position themselves so that the
21 and older signage is clearly visible when the protestors were
recording video.52 The truck drivers were also prohibited from
commenting on their companies position on youth smoking.
One Marlboro van driver was reported as saying that as far as he
knows, theres no effort to get kids hooked on cigarettes. But he
says he cant talk about the issue.53 And although the van drivers
were frequently told that they could not sell to people younger
than 21, there was no procedure for checking ID or other form
of enforcing this rule.54
The Joe Camel campaign was a huge successamong
young people. In its first five years, in which Camel spent tens of
millions of dollars each year on advertisements, the market share
that Camel reported for youth rose by more than half. Its share of
the cigarette market for adults did not change at all.43
The anti-smoking campaigns

Anti-smoking campaigns developed beginning in the late
1960s, and they grew and became more organized over the next
three decades. Many of them (including campaigns by the American
Lung Association and the American Medical Association) focused
on children, attempting to keep teens from smoking their first
cigarette. Campaigners, parents, teachers, and former smokers
were enraged by the new tobacco campaigns of the 1980s-1990s
that seemed so clearly designed to target childrennone more

than the Joe Camel campaign.
The tobacco companies print advertisements were there-
fore countered by print media: TheChicago Tribunepredicted in
1982 that within a few years tobacco advertisements would be
compared with Nazi propaganda,55 and many other articles and
newspapers teamed up with anti-smoking groups. They also in-
terviewed famous political leaders and celebrities, and published
their views to try to convince fans to quit smoking. The American
Medical Association even launched a national initiative in schools
focused specifically on Joe Camel, enlisting teachers to get children
to participate in an anti-Joe Camel contest to increase awareness
of the dangers of smoking.56
But combating the new campaigns meant developing new
counter-influence strategies too. Anti-smoking agencies decided to
address the problem of cartoon smokers with cartoon smoke-pro-
moting villains and anti-smoking heroes. For instance, the British
Health Education Council invented an evil character called Nick
O Teen, enemy of Superman (and everyone else).57 In America, a
mini genre grew up to mock the Joe Camel campaign, using irony
to insinuate warnings about its dangers. One of the earliest and
best of these was a fake, satirical advertisement in Mad Magazine,
in which Joe Camel learns he has cancer of the hump.58
A similarly effective series came from cartoonist Scott Plous,
who imagined Joe Chemo enduring cancer in later life.59 Similar
contributions were made by a graffiti artist called Cancer Kid, who
altered billboards to create scenes involving diminutive Camel
kids. These efforts were effective partly because they brought
the same kind of irony and knowingness to anti-smoking that the
Joe Camel campaign had brought to smoking.
During the early 1990s, anti-smoking efforts became stron-
ger, partly motivated by outrage over the campaigns. The Washington
Post cited the JAMA article as having intensified public anger
at the tobacco industry.60 In 1992, The Economist magazine also
described Joe Camel as playing a special role in turning public
opinion against tobacco companies. The Joe Camel campaign
had worked too well: It quoted an industry executive as saying

that RJRs incredible success establishing its image among children
(as claimed by the 1991 JAMA article) makes us all look guilty in
the court of public opinion.61
Lawsuits against tobacco companies intensified during the
early 1990s. Employees of several tobacco companies, who had
formerly been involved in marketing, remembered the details of
advertising to children and testified about them. Terence Sullivan, a
former sales representative for Reynolds, recalled, we were target-
ing kids, and I said at the time it was unethical and maybe illegal,
but I was told it was just company policy.62 RJR sales representative
Terence Sullivan remembers someone asking him whom RJR was
targeting; whether they were high school children, junior high
school children, or even younger. The reply was They got lips?
We want them.63 Anex-Philip Morris executive said, just look at
the ads: it was ludicrous to deny that a cartoon character like
Joe Camel is attractive to kids.64 These whistleblowers fueled the
battle against tobacco companies all over the country.
The climactic public event came in 1994. Congressman
Henry Waxman, chair of the House health and environment
subcommittee, who had been campaigning against tobacco
since 1979, summoned the heads of four of the biggest tobacco
companies (R. J. Reynolds, Lorillard, Phillip Morris, and Brown
& Williamson) to testify in front of his committee. 65 All of them
insisted, under direct questioning, that they did not believe that
cigarettes were addictive, nor were they a threat to human health.
All of them were photographed holding up their hands to swear
that they would tell the truth. All of them then appeared on the
front pages of newspapers taking these oaths, and then quoted
denying that cigarettes were addictive. These pictures had a huge
effect on public opinion. From this moment it shifted decisively
against tobacco companies.
Conclusion
The outrage over the Joe Camel campaign played a sig-
nificant role in creating a level of public hostility that paved the
way for the cascade of events of the mid 1990sthe congressio-

nal hearings, and then a series of legal actions (the biggest was
brought by 40 states, which sued for costs they incurred treating
people who became ill from smoking). Although few of these
lawsuits succeeded, the penalties imposed in the few successful
cases made a huge difference. There was an additional major
benefit: during the legal process of discovery, massive amounts
of documentation became public. This documentation enabled
more successful legal cases (and, incidentally, further access to
company documents, which were used in work like Proctors and
Brandts, and this paper).
A storm of investigations and lawsuits followed from the
documentary revelations, culminating in the Master Settlement
Agreement of 1998. This was an out-of-court settlement in which
the tobacco companies paid 46 states $280 billion. The Joe Camel
campaign finally ended in 1997, in the middle of these negotiations.
Tobacco companies were forbidden to pay for product placement
in movies. State and local laws and regulations were passed to ban
smoking in various circumstances, and to tax cigarettes heavily.
Since that point, the tobacco companies have stepped up
their proclamations about their concern for the health of teenag-
ers and their commitment to keeping children from starting to
smoke. They have published many warnings aimed at informing
teenagers about the dangers of smoking. The same executives who
commissioned the research that led to the Joe Camel campaigns
have, in the last two decades, represented themselves as energetic
champions of childrens health. Despite all their efforts, the teen
smoking rate has fallen only slightly since its rise in the early 1990s:
at its peak it was 24-25% (1998), but it has only declined to 20% in
the present day, a result which some social scientists claim is the
expected and deliberate result of bad faith on the part of tobacco
industry educators. People who were at work selling Joe Camel
are now at work supposedly educating the very same cohort that
they were paid to entice, or more precisely have public profiles
that trumpet their responsibility for this. An interesting example
of such a career trajectory is that of Judy Chapa, the Hispanic
Field Marketing Director for Reynolds who, among other things,
was in charge of the Joe Camel video van project in the late 1980s
and 1990s. In 1999, she became the Executive Director of the

Republican National Committee during the Bush presidential
campaign, and got an appointment in the Bush administration.
She now has a position at a Washington advocacy group, as Vice
President for Corporate Social Responsibility, and information
that she has posted online describes her as an advocate for Latino
communities.66
In retrospect, it seems likely that one factor in the decline
of tobacco marketing to youth in America in the late 1990s and
early 2000s was the public reaction to the very success of cigarette
marketing in the early 1990s. As the Economist put it in 1992, the
Joe Camel campaign had succeeded too well for its own good.
The debate over tobacco, climaxing in the 1994 Congressional
testimony, taught the American people how effectively advertise-
ments could manipulate peoples values and desires, especially
that of children and young adults.
In the short termthe 1990sit seemed as if the public
outrage and controversy over tobacco were leading to a greater
public sophistication about how to cut through the deceitfulness
of powerful businesses. But as Robert Proctor and Alan Brandt
have both shown, tobacco companies, along with other Big cor-
porate interests, have been very successful at what Proctor calls
the deliberate creation of ignorance. The corporations did not
have to persuade people that their products were healthy, just that
it was not certain that the products were harmfuland since they
were not sure, they could argue that more research was needed.
This kind of maneuver was not unique to the tobacco industry.
Oil companies have made similar arguments about the causes of
climate change.67 The creation of scientific doubt has not been
a focus of this essay, but as a concluding question it seems worth
asking what role advertising may have played, indirectly, in the
creation of this uncertainty.
Endnotes
1
Acknowledgements: My interest in this topic first
developed during a group project for National History Day,
Making a Killing: The marketing of cigarettes to women and
children, 1968-1990, http://71584961.nhd.weebly.com/. My
intellectual debts to Making a Killing are acknowledged in
the notes. I would like to thank the members of my group:
Loretto Crofton, Aaliyah Taylor, Philip Sanders, and Yaritzel
Carlos; I would also like to thank Lisa Oppenheim of National
History Day. I am especially grateful to Mr. Alan Edwards, for
his encouragement, inspiration, and guidance.
2
Quoted in Clive Bates and Andy Rowell, Tobacco
ExplainedIn its own words. (London: Action on Smoking and
health (ASH), N.D.).
3
P. M. Fischer,M. P. Schwartz,J. W. Richards,A. O.
Goldstein,and T. H. Rojas, Brand logo recognition by
children aged 3 to 6 years. Mickey Mouse and Old Joe the
Camel, JAMA, 266(22)(Dec. 11, 1991): 3145-3148.
4
For instance, K. M. Cummings, C. P. Morley, J. K. Horan,
C. Steger, and N. R. Leavell,Marketing to Americas youth:
evidence from corporate documents, Tobacco Control, 11
(2002): i5-i17, at http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/tc.11.suppl_1.
i5(accessed February 10, 2015); Linda G. Pucci, Features
of sales promotion in cigarette magazine advertisements,
19801993: an analysis of youth exposure in the United
States.Tobacco Control. 1999, at dx.doi.org/10.1136/tc.8.1.29
(accessed Aug. 13, 2015).
5
Robert Proctor,Golden Holocaust: Origins of the Cigarette
Catastrophe and the Case for Abolition (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 2011); Allan M. Brandt,The Cigarette Century
(New York: Basic Books, 2007).
6
Brandt, Cigarette Century, chapter 1.
7
Life Magazine, cover, August 8, 1911. There was a picture
on the cover of this issue with a baby smoking a cigarette. In
1915, there was also a health warning published, with a quote
from biologist Davis Starr Jordan that said, The boy who
smokes cigarettes need not be anxious about his future, he has
none; quoted and described in Tobacco timeline 1900-1949,
at http://archive.tobacco.org/resources/history/Tobacco_
History20-1.html (accessed Aug 1, 2015).
8
CDC, Achievements in Public Health, 1900-1999: Tobacco
Use -- United States, http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/
mmwrhtml/mm4843a2.htm (accessed 20 July 2015).
9
Morton Levin, M.D. Tobacco Smoking and
Cancer,JAMA Network.Oct. 28, 1950.
10
There is no consensus on the reason for this, but one
possibility is that the cancer warnings were no longer fresh
news, and had faded from public attention. See Adult per
capita cigarette consumption, graph in Achievements in
Public Health, 1900-1999: Tobacco UseUnited States, 1900-
1999, at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml
mm4843a2.htm (accessed July 15, 2015).
11
Advisory Committee to the Surgeon General of
the Public Health Service, Smoking and Health, U.S.
Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Public Health
Service, Publication #1103, Washington DC, 1964.
12
Brandt, Cigarette Century, 111ff.
13
Quoted in Bates and Rowel, 30
14
R. J. Reynolds Company, Marketing Objective 1975, at
https://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/qbl69d00/pdf (accessed
Feb. 9, 2015).
15
Lorillard, Memo from executive T. L. Achey to former
Lorillard President Curtis Judge re Newport brand, August
30, 1978, at http://industrydocuments.library.ucsf.edu/
tobacco/docs/xtbl0135; M. E. Jonestone, H. G. Daniel, and
C. J. Levy, Young Smokers Prevalence, Trends, Implications,
and Related Demographic Trends. March 31, 1981; Bates
No. 10003908032013, February 14. Philip Morris. http://
industrydocuments.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco/docs/tnbl0191
(accessed September 30, 2015).
16
R. J. Reynolds, Planned Assumptions and Forecast
for the Period 1977-1986, March 15, 1976, R. J. Reynolds;
Minnesota Lawsuit. 1977-1986 (770000-860000). http://
industrydocuments.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco/docs/hqdb0102
17
Quoted in Carlos et al, Making a Killing.
18
http://druglibrary.eu/library/reports/nc/nc2b_10.htm
19
History: the 1970s, Advertising Age, http://adage.com/
article/adage-encyclopedia/history-1970s/98703/ (accessed
September 12, 2015).
20
Ibid. See also http://advertisinghistory.blogspot.
com/2009/12/era-of-testing.html (accessed September 12,
2015).
21
Quoted in Kline, Out of the Garden: Toys, TV, and Childrens
Culture in the Age of Marketing (New York: Verso Press, 1995),
174.
22
Ibid., 175.
23
Grace Palladino, Teenagers: an American History (New York:
Basic Books, 1997).
24
Discussed in Kline, 174-176.
25
D. Kirk Dickerson, Selling Sin: The marketing of socially
unacceptable products (Westport, CT: Praeger Press, 2003), 154-
155.
26
Stuart Elliott, Camels Success and Controversy,
December 12, 1991, at http://www.nytimes.com/1991/12/12/
business/the-media-business-advertising-camel-s-success-and-
controversy.html (accessed July 13, 2015).
27
Examples of Joe Camel ads in authors collection: Outdoor
Life, 1989, 184:2; Bassmaster, July/August 1990; 1989; Field and
Stream, Jan 1990; Sports Afield, April 1989; Outdoor Life, April
1988; Rolling Stone. 1988-1995.
28
Mark Evje, Top Gun boosting service sign-ups, Los
Angeles Times, July 5 1986.
29
Elliott.
30
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., Document Date:1989, Bates
Number: came3220, at https://industrydocuments.library.ucsf.
edu/tobacco/docs/ypnc0050; Camel Smooth Character, 1989,
Bates Number: came2612, at: https://industrydocuments.
library.ucsf.edu/tobacco/docs/mxnc0050 (both accessed July
28, 2015).
31
Philip Hilts, Tobacco chiefs say cigarettes arent
addictive, New York Times, April 15, 1994.
32
For a brief explanation of the program and an account
of a current lawsuit related to unredeemed vouchers, see
Daniel Siegal, R.J. Reynolds Looks To Snuff Out Camel Cash
Class Action, at http://www.law360.com/articles/577480/rj-
reynolds-looks-to-snuff-out-camel-cash-class-action (September
15, 2014)
33
Tom Wolfe, The last American Hero is Junior Johnson
Yes!, Esquire (1965): 68-87.
34
Long Haymes, RJR, Long Haymes Carr Lintas Smokin
Joes Racing Sales Video, 1994 (19940000), at http://
industrydocuments.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco/docs/tqhb0039
(accessed 3 September 2015).
35
Motorsports, Popular Mechanics, October (1995): 106.
36
Camel GT, Portland, Oregon, The Driver who makes
the smoothest move during the G. I. Joes Camel Gran Prix
July 30 at Portland International Raceway will collect a special
$2500 bonus from RJR, at https://industrydocuments.library.
ucsf.edu/tobacco/docs/hfhm0084 (accessed 8 August 2015).
37
Leon Gurevitch, The Cinemas of Transactions: The
exchangeable currency of GC attractions across audiovisual
economies, Journal of Television and New Media, Sage
Publications, New York, 11 (5) (2010): 367-385.
38
For a video clip of the appropriate moment
in Superman II, see: https://www.youtube.com/
watch?t=19&v=vkfUUqowQjA. More generally on product
placement see Rich Lyman, In the 80s: Lights! Camera!
Cigarettes, New York Times, March 12, 2002 and C. Mekemson,
and S.A. Glantz, How the tobacco industry built its
relationship with Hollywood, Tobacco Control 11 (2002): i81-i91
39
P. Gallant, Product placement in video games: are they
doing Too much?, 4 October 2013, at http://blogs.longwood.
edu/mediaandsociety02fall013/page/5/(accessed Sep.5
2015).
40
Proctor, Golden Holocaust, 63.
41
Gina L. Milnet, [Memo Referring to the Video Van
Concept]. 1989 January 4. Joe Camel: Mangini Lawsuit, at
http://industrydocuments.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco/docs/
znvv0095 (Accessed 12 July 2015).
42
Entertainment Video, 1988: N. A., Introduction.
Entertainment Videos Mobile Audio/Video system was
conceived to satisfy promotion requirements, 1988 April 21,
at http://industrydocuments.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco/docs/
ylhp0089 (Accessed 12 July 2015).
43
N. A., Stockdale Bk. Sampling - Video Van Guidelines
For 4/19 - 4/20 TRIP, April 12, 1990 RJ Reynolds, at http://
industrydocuments.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco/docs/fkjg0059
(Accessed 12 July 2015).
44
Entertainment Video.
45
Judy J. Chapa, Camel Video Van Video, February 14, 1989
RJ REYNOLDS, at http://industrydocuments.library.ucsf.edu/
tobacco/docs/lfvf0087 (Accessed 5 September 2015)
46
Video Van Fact Sheet, April 24, 1989 RJ Reynolds, at
nfll0092 (Accessed 5 September, 2015).
47
Marlboro Van Programtraining video transcript, 1997
December. Philip Morris. http://industrydocuments.library.
ucsf.edu/tobacco/docs/lmbw0167 (Accessed 5 September,
2015).
48
Powerforce. Philip Morris Pass Through Budget
(estimated, 1994 October. Philip Morris, at http://
industrydocuments.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco/docs/nlpy0217
(Accessed 5 September, 2015).
49
November Video Van Activity, 1989, at http://
industrydocuments.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco/docs/hznk0084
(Accessed 15 September 2015).
50
Weekly Bull. Special Edition issue no. 5, (February 1998).
Philip Morris, at http://industrydocuments.library.ucsf.edu/

tobacco/docs/tnww0041 (Accessed 5 September 2015).

51
Video Monitoring Services of America. Transcript News 8
nightside, 1997, June 25, at http://industrydocuments.library.
ucsf.edu/tobacco/docs/jrdy0004 (Accessed 9 July 2015).
52
D. Gross, Santa Barbara. 1993 June 24. Philip Morris,
qzbb0007, (Accessed 9 August 2015).
53
Video Monitoring Services of America, L.R., 1998.
54
Marlboro Van ProgramTraining Video Transcript, ND.
Legacy Tobacco Archives, at http://industrydocuments.library.
ucsf.edu/tobacco/docs/lmbw0167 (Accessed 9 August, 2015).
Centers for Disease Control, Changes in the Cigarette Brand
Preference of Adolescent Smokers, U.S. 1989-1993, MMWR
43(32):577-581, at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/
mmwrhtml/00032326.htm (August 19, 1994)
55
Peter J. Ognibene, To your [cough, wheeze]
health,Chicago Tribune, 09 Mar 1982; see Making a Killing.
56
AMA, Letter to elementary school superintendents,
1994, and John E. Calfee, The Historical Significance of Joe
Camel, Journal of Public Policy & Marketing, 19:2 (2000): 168-
182.
57
This episode is addressed in Making a Killing.
58
An ad theyll never show, Mad Magazine #294 (1990),
discussed in Making a Killing.
59
Scott Plous, Joe Chemo,Adbusters Magazine, 1996,
discussed in Making a Killing.
60
Ceci Connolly and John Mintz, For Big Tobacco, a
Future Without GOP Support, Washington Post (March 29,
1998): A1.
61
The Search for El Dorado, Economist (May 16, 1992):
21-22, p.22.
62
Quoted in David T. Courtwright, Forces of Habit: Drugs and
the Making of the Modern World (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 2009), 128.
63
Quoted in Bates and Rowell, Tobacco Explained (no page
number).
64 W.
Ecenbarger, Americas New Merchants of
Death,Readers Digest (April 1993): 50-57.
65
Myron Levin, and Alan C. Miller, For the Tobacco
Industry, Ex-Smoker Waxman Is the No. 1 Foe in Congress
Los Angeles Times, June 19, 1990.
66
https://www.linkedin.com/pub/judy-chapa/a/83b/161
67
Erik M. Conway, and Naomi Oreskes Merchants of Doubt
(New York, Bloomsbury Publishing, 2010).
Bibliography
A note on archival materials: This paper uses archival

materials contained in the Legacy Tobacco Online Archive,
UCSF Library, at: http://legacy.library.ucsf.eduhttp://legacy.
library.ucsf.edu. These materials are cited individually in the
bibliography, and can be identified by the presence of industry
documents in the URL.
Achievements in Public Health, 1900-1999: Tobacco Use
-- United States, 1900-1999, at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/
preview/mmwrhtml/mm4843a2.htm (accessed July 15, 2015).
An ad theyll never show, Mad Magazine #294, 1990.
Advertising: Camels success and controversy, New
York Times, 12 December 1991, at: http://www.nytimes.
com/1991/12/12/business/the-media-business-advertising-
camel-s-success-and-controversy.html.
Advisory Committee to the Surgeon General of the Public
Health Service, Smoking and Health, U.S. Department
of Health, Education and Welfare, Public Health Service,
Publication #1103, Washington DC, 1964.
American Medical Association (AMA), Board of Trustees,
Letter to Elementary School superintendents and principals,
announcing a contest to increase awareness among children

of the dangers of smoking, Chicago, American Medical
Association, 1993.
American Lung Association and Public Citizen, Dont
be fooled again: a report on the tobacco industrys lies and
deceptions, (1998), at http://www.citizen.org/tobacco/
fooled.htm (accessed 5 July 2015).
Bates, Clive, and Andy Rowell Tobacco ExplainedIn its Own
Words. London: Action on Smoking and Health (ASH), N.D.
Brandt, Allan M.,The Cigarette Century. New York: Basic
Books, 2007.
The burden of Joe Camel, Advertising Age, December 4
(1994): 22.
Calfee, John E., The Historical Significance of Joe Camel,
Journal of Public Policy & Marketing, 19:2 (2000): 168-182.
Camel GT, Portland, Oregon, The Driver who makes the
smoothest move during the G. I. Joes Camel Gran Prix July 30
at Portland International Raceway will collect a special $2500
bonus from RJR, at https://industrydocuments.library.ucsf.
edu/tobacco/docs/hfhm0084 (accessed 8 August 2015).
Camel Smooth Character, 1989, Bates Number :
came2612, at: https://industrydocuments.library.ucsf.edu/
tobacco/docs/mxnc0050 (accessed 28 July 2015).
Carlos, Yaritzel, Crofton, Loretto, Johns, Lizzie, Sanders,
Philip, and Taylor, Aaliyah, Making a Killing: The marketing
of cigarettes to women and children, 1968-1990, at
http://71584961.nhd.weebly.com/.
Centers for the Disease Control, Changes in the Cigarette
Brand Preference of Adolescent Smokers, U.S. 1989 1993,
MMWR 43(32):577-581, August 19, 1994, http://www.cdc.gov/
mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/00032326.htm (accessed 5 July
2015).
Chapa, Judy J., Camel Video Van Video, 1989 February 14.
RJ Reynolds, at http://industrydocuments.library.ucsf.edu/
tobacco/docs/lfvf0087 (Accessed 5 September 2015)
Chapa, Judy (Linked In public profile), at https://www.
linkedin.com/pub/judy-chapa/a/83b/161
Cohen, Susan, Joe Camel Wants you: tobacco, teens, and
advertising, Washington Post Magazine, Feb. 20 (1994).
Connolly, Ceci, and Mintz, John, For Big Tobacco, a Future
Without GOP Support, Washington Post, March 29 (1998):
A1, at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/

longterm/bigtobacco/tobacco29b.htm.
Conway, Erik M., and Oreskes, Naomi, Merchants of Doubt.
London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2010.
Courtwright, David T., Forces of Habit: Drugs and the making of
the modern world. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009.
Crain, Rance, Smoking out the truth in RJR leads,
Advertising Age, March 19 (1990): 27.
Cummings, K.M., Morley, C.P., Horan, J.K., Steger, C.,
and Leavell, N.R.,Marketing to Americas youth: evidence
from corporate documents, Tobacco Control, 11 (2002):
i5-i17doi:10.1136/tc.11.suppl_1.i5Accessed Feb. 10,
2015-http:// tobaccocontrol. bmj.com (accessed 10 February
2015).
Dickerson, D. Kirk, Selling Sin: The marketing of socially
unacceptable products, Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003.
Di Franza, JR,Richards, JW,Paulman PM,N. Wolf-
Gillespie,C. Fletcher,RD Jaffe,D. Murray, R.J.R.
Nabiscos cartoon camel promotes camel cigarettes to
children,JAMA.266:22 (Dec 11., 1991): 3149-53.
Ecenbarger, W., Americas New Merchants of
Death,Readers Digest (April 1993): 50-57.
Elliott, Stuart, Advertising: Camels success and
controversy, New York Times, 12 December 1991, at: http://
www.nytimes.com/1991/12/12/business/the-media-business-
advertising-camel-s-success-and-controversy.html
Entertainment Video, 1988: N. A., Introduction.
Entertainment Videos Mobile Audio/Video system was
conceived to satisfy promotion requirements, 21 April 1988
ylhp0089 (accessed 12 July 2015).
Evje, Mark, Top Gun boosting service sign-ups, Los
Angeles Times, July 5, 1986.
Fischer, P.M.,Schwartz, M.P.,Richards, J.W. Jr,Goldstein,
A.O.,Rojas, T.H., Brand logo recognition by children
aged 3 to 6 years. Mickey Mouse and Old Joe the Camel,
JAMA,266:22 (Dec. 11, 1991): 3145-8.
Gallant, P., Product placement in video games: are they
doing too much?, October 4, 2013, at http://blogs.longwood.
edu/mediaandsociety02fall013/page/5/ (accessed Sept.5
2015).
Gross, D. Santa Barbara. 1993 June 24. Philip Morris, at

qzbb0007, (accessed 9 August 2015).
Gurevitch, Leon, The Cinemas of Transactions: The
exchangeable currency of GC attractions across audiovisual
economies, Journal of Television and New Media, Sage
Publications, New York, 11:5 (2010): 367-385.
Hilts, Philip, Tobacco chiefs say cigarettes arent addictive,
New York Times, April 15, 1994, at: http://www.nytimes.
com/1994/04/15/us/tobacco-chiefs-say-cigarettes-aren-t-
addictive.html?pagewanted=all http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.
com/content/8/1/29.full (accessed 10 August 2015)
History: the 1970s, Advertising age, at http://adage.com/
article/adage-encyclopedia/history-1970s/98703/ (accessed 5
July 2015).
Jacob, M., Superman versus Nick O Teena childrens
anti-smoking campaign,Health Education Journal,44:1 (March
1985), 44:1, pp.15-18.
Jonestone ME, HG Daniel, CJ Levy, Young Smokers
Prevalence, Trends, Implications, and Related Demographic
Trends. 1981 March 31; Bates No. 10003908032013, February
14. Philip Morris. http://industrydocuments.library.ucsf.edu/
tobacco/docs/tnbl0191 (accessed September 30, 2015)
Kline, Stephen, Out of the Garden: Toys, TV, and Childrens
Culture in the Age of Marketing. Verso, 1995.
Levin, Morton, M.D. Tobacco Smoking and Cancer,JAMA
Network.Oct. 28, 1950. Web, athttp://jama.jamanetwork.com/
article.aspx?articleid=297350 (accessed Feb. 9, 2015).
Levin, Myron, and Miller, Alan C., For the Tobacco
Industry, Ex-Smoker Waxman Is the No. 1 Foe in Congress,
Los Angeles Times, June 19, 1990, at: http://articles.latimes.
com/1990-06-19/business/fi-264_1_tobacco-industry (accessed
21 August 2015).
Life Magazine, cover art, August 8, 1911.
Long Haymes, RJR, Long Haymes Carr Lintas Smokin
Joes Racing Sales Video, 1994 (19940000), at http://
industrydocuments.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco/docs/tqhb0039
(accessed 3 September, 2015).
Lorillard, Memo from executive T. L. Achey to former
Lorillard President Curtis Judge re Newport brand, August 30,
1978, at http://industrydocuments.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco/
docs/xtbl0135 (accessed September 30, 2015)
Lyman, Rich, In the 80s: Lights! Camera! Cigarettes!, New
York Times, March 12, 2002.
Marlboro Van Program training video transcript, 1997
December. Philip Morris. http://industrydocuments.library.
ucsf.edu/tobacco/docs/lmbw0167 (accessed 5 September,
2015).
Mekemson, C., and Glantz, S. A., How the tobacco industry
built its relationship with Hollywood, Tobacco Control, 11
(2002): i81-i91
Merryman, Walker, Young Smokers,Chicago Tribune, 26
December 1990.
Millman, Nancy, Fold tent on Old Joe, Camel told,Chicago
Sun-Times,March 10, 1992.
Milnet, Gina L. [Memo Referring to the Video Van
Concept]. January 4, 1989. Joe Camel: Mangini Lawsuit, at
znvv0095 (accessed 12 July 2015).
Motorsports, Popular Mechanics, October (1995): 106.
National Commission on Marijuana and Drug Use, History
of tobacco regulation: the ban on advertising, at http://
druglibrary.eu/library/reports/nc/nc2b_10.htm (accessed
September 12, 2015).
November Video Van Activity, 1989, at http://
industrydocuments.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco/docs/hznk0084
Ognibene, Peter J., To your [cough, wheeze] health,
Chicago Tribune, March 9, 1982: 15.
Palladino, Grace, Teenagers: an American History. New York,
Basic Books, 1997.
Pierce, J.P., and Gilpin, E. A., A historical analysis of
tobacco marketing and the uptake of smoking by youth in the
United States: 18901977.Health Psychology, 14(6) (1995): 500-
508.
Plous, Scott, Joe Chemo,Adbusters Magazine, 1996.
Powerforce. Philip Morris Pass Through Budget
(estimated, 1994 October. Philip Morris, at http://
industrydocuments.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco/docs/nlpy0217
Proctor, Robert,Golden Holocaust: Origins of the Cigarette

Catastrophe and the Case for Abolition. Berkeley: University of
California Press, 2011.
Pucci, Linda G. Features of sales promotion in cigarette
magazine advertisements, 19801993: an analysis of youth
exposure in the United States.Tobacco Control. 1999. http://
tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/8/1/29.full (accessed Feb.
13, 2014).
R. J. Reynolds Company, Marketing Objective 1975, at
https://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/qbl69d00/pdf (accessed
Feb. 9, 2015).
R. J. Reynolds, Planned Assumptions and Forecast for
the Period 1977-1986, March 15, 1976. R. J. Reynolds;
Minnesota Lawsuit. 1977-1986- (770000-860000). http://
industrydocuments.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco/docs/hqdb0102
(Accessed September 30, 2015)
R. J. Reynolds Targets Teens with its Sophisticated
Marketing Campaign,Tobacco and Youth Reporter, June 1, 1991.
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., Document Date:1989, Bates
Number: came3220, at https://industrydocuments.library.ucsf.
edu/tobacco/docs/ypnc0050 (accessed 28 July 2015)
The search for El Dorado, Economist, Saturday, May 16
(1992): 21-22.
Siegal, Daniel, RJ Reynolds Looks To Snuff Out Camel
Cash Class Action, September 15, 2014, at http://www.law360.
com/articles/577480/rj-reynolds-looks-to-snuff-out-camel-cash-
class-action (accessed 1 September 2015).
Stockdale Bk. Sampling - Video Van Guidelines For
4/19 - 4/20 TRIP, 1990. April 12. RJ Reynolds, at http://
industrydocuments.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco/docs/fkjg0059
(Accessed 12 July 2015).
Teinowitz, Ira (1994), RJR gets burned in cigarette War,
Advertising Age, August 29, 1994, at http://www.adage.com
(Accessed July 5, 2015).
Tobacco Timeline: The Twentieth Century 1900-1949
The Rise of the Cigarette, at http://archive.tobacco.org/
resources/history/Tobacco_History20-1.html (Accessed July 15,
2015)
Video ads no game to doctors,Chicago Tribune, January
21, 1990, 15C
Tursi, Frank, Susan E. White, and Steve McQuilkin, Lost

empire: the fall of R. J. Reynolds tobacco company, Winston-
Salem Journal, October 24, 1999.
Video monitoring services of America. Transcript News 8
nightside, 1997, June 25, at http://industrydocuments.library.
ucsf.edu/tobacco/docs/jrdy0004 (Accessed 9 July, 2015).
Video Van Fact Sheet, 1989 April 24. RJ Reynolds, at http://
industrydocuments.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco/docs/nfll0092
Weekly Bull. Special Edition issue no. 5, (February 1998). 28.
Philip Morris, at http://industrydocuments.library.ucsf.edu/
tobacco/docs/tnww0041 (Accessed 5 September, 2015).
Wolfe, Tom, The last American Hero is Junior Johnson
Yes!, Esquire, 1965, 68-87.
THE TERRITORIAL HISTORY OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA
Rock Pang
T he South China Sea is one of the most strategically

important areas in Asia today, not only because it possesses a
large number of potential oil and fishery resources but also be-
cause it is located in an area essential to trade with eastern Asia.
To complicate matters further, China, Vietnam, the Philippines,
Malaysia, Indonesia, and Brunei each claim various small islands
in the region as national territories.1 Four archipelagos lie within
the South China Sea; among these, the major areas of territorial
dispute include the Paracel Islands, the Spratly Islands, and the
Macclesfield Bank.2 The islands and territories of the Paracels
are generally categorized into two groups, the western Crescent
Group and the northeastern Amphitrite Group; both regions are
heavily disputed, primarily by China and Vietnam. Similarly, the
aforementioned nations constantly vie for control over the Spratly
Islands and their roughly 3,000 features. Likewise, China and the
Philippines both claim sovereignty over the Scarborough Shoal in
the Macclesfield Bank. Current animosity regarding control over
the region, however, marks a stark contrast to the relative rapport
between powers in earlier eras.
Rock Pang is a Senior in the Beyond English program in China, where

he wrote this paper for David Scott Lewis History Research Paper course
in the 2014/2015 academic year.
54 Rock Pang
From prehistory to the Yuan Dynasty (1271 CE-1368 CE),

the coastal empires in this region shared these territories and
enjoyed a peaceful trade. During the Yuan Dynasty, however, pow-
erful Western countries became involved with and seized control
over various features in the South China Sea. This relationship
between Western countries and the South China Sea held until
after World War II, when Western interest in the area declined.
After the Communist Party attained power in 1949, China under-
took unilateral actions in the area that instigated conflict with its
neighbors, leading to international territorial disputes that have
persisted to the present. While China, Vietnam, and the Philippines
consistently assert historical claims for sovereignty in the region,
this history proves far more byzantine than suggested.
This essay will review the South China Seas intricate terri-
tory from prehistory to the present, demonstrating that, according
to historical territorial possessions, none of these countries has a
legitimate claim to the entirety of the sea and its associated land
masses. The author will further illustrate that political vicissitudes,
ideological clashes, and various national actions have made the
current situation particularly convoluted.
The South China Sea: Prehistory to 1368

Human activity in the South China Sea dates back to 1.5
million years ago, when findings show that the so-called Java
Man lived both in China and Java. Homo sapiens then developed
in the same area some 50,000 years ago, after which the region
evolved into a vital economic hub for trade between civilizations.
Gradually, these early societies adopted similar forms of feudalism
influenced by elements of a shared Indian culture.3 Unlike their
successors, ancient peoples active in the South China Sea did not
contest possession of the area, nor did they attempt to annex these
territories. Instead, they shared the essential region in order to
encourage mutually beneficial trade between civilizations.
Prehistory
Victor Paz, a Philippine archaeologist, contributed greatly
to the understanding of ancient civilizations in the South China
Sea with his 2005 discovery of jewelry made from tiny cone-shaped
shells. This finding demonstrated the Neolithic heritage of ancient
life in the Ill Cave, a site in the northern Palawan province of
the Philippines, and affirmed the existence of ancient civilizations
in the region.4 While the exact origin of these crafts remains un-
certain, the fact that they integrate elements of multiple cultures
indicates close contact between early civilizations around the sea.
Ancient human activities in the South China Sea were si-
multaneously extemporaneous and interdependent, as suggested
by Wilhelm Solheims Nusantao Maritime Trading and Commu-
nication Network Theory. According to this theory, elements of
culture disseminated via the central-periphery theory of population
radiation generally occur in a primarily unidirectional manner.
Anachronistic artifacts, however, such as jade lingling-o, an ancient
Philippine necklace pendant, and bicephalous earrings found in
Vietnam and Taiwan, demonstrate that cultural items were traded
in a multitude of directions. This evidence indicates that there likely
existed a trade network between these civilizations,5 invalidating the
theoryin favor of some Chinese claimsthat ancient residents
in Southeast Asia originally migrated from Taiwan. Discovery of
similar items in different regions shows that cultures developed and
then expanded through the bustling trade network; the activities
also suggest that income disparity was minimal in these cultures.
Such semi-nomadic people shared the sea, which was considered
a collective community.6 The Nusantao people of Southeast Asia
developed a lifestyle consistent with coastal trading communities,
dependent on trading and fishing, and without ethnic identities
and delineated territories.
This archaeological evidence thus demonstrates that, pre-
historically speaking, the South China Sea was home to a variety
of cultures with a common lifestyle and trade. These conditions
laid the foundation for future commerce and cooperation.
56 Rock Pang
Communication Between Empires Surrounding the South

China Sea
The South China Sea has consistently been strategically
pivotal, as it connects East Asia to the Indian Ocean; accordingly,
the region cultivated a prosperous business network. During the
first ten centuries CE, a traditional Indian-influenced political
pattern gradually developed under which the various empires
generally adopted a cooperative position toward the common
sea.7 While different empires assumed dominant roles at different
times, it is important to note that China was not the predominant
power in the South China Sea at this time, in contrast to current
claims by Chinese officials.8
Funan, Champa, and Srivijaya, all independent Chinese
tributaries, were the three Southeast Asian states most involved
in early trade in the South China Sea.
During the rise and fall of regional powers, these states
were significantly influenced by an ancient Indian political pattern
called the mandala system. The mandala system was an extremely
fluid and dynamic model, as allegiances of the constituent cities
shifted depending on their fluctuating relationships with the
monarch at the center of the empire.9 The authority of kings from
different states diminished as their distance from the center of
their kingdoms increased. Moreover, one community might rec-
ognize more than a single authority but only if those authorities
remained powerful.
A similar adoption of the mandala system gave these states
a shared framework for cooperation. Nevertheless, this systems
hidden challenges eventually emerged when Western countries
became involved with the regions politics.
Funan
In the first centuries CE, the first state to play a dominant
role in the South China Sea trade was the Funan Empire, an in-
dependent kingdom spanning from Southern Vietnam to western
Cambodia. Funan controlled a crucial geographical location on
the trade route to China and had an exceptionally advantageous

climate, both contributing to the empires prosperity. After the
Roman Empire developed a fruitful trade with Southeast Asia
and the Chinese market began demanding goods from Southeast
Asia, Funan developed as a thriving regional hub. Trade, however,
depended significantly on the seasons; while sailing from South
China to Funan was straightforward in winter thanks to an advanta-
geous northeast monsoon, there was a long wait until June when
the same ships could use the southwest monsoon to sail back to
China. Furthermore, ships needed to be in port before the harsh
typhoon season in July. Despite these difficulties, the advantageous
location and generally accommodating climate made Funan an
excellent entrepot for trade ships.
Funan became well known for its friendly and peaceful
maritime trade, primarily via the South China Sea. One way the
state developed this reputation was by establishing a beneficial
relationship with the Jin Empire in South China; in 357 CE, the
emperor of Funan sent a tamed elephant to secure a healthy trade
partnership.
Funan additionally sent ambassadors to India to help regu-
late sea trade.10 Hence, for almost three centuries, Funan adopted
the dominant role in the South China Sea trade and attracted
many traders due to its reputed affability. Concurrently, Funans
sea power increased. One example of this strength comes from a
Chinese account of the third century CE, which claimed that the
Funan ship might have been over fifty meters long with as many
as four sails and able to carry approximately 700 people and 600
tons of cargo per trip.11 The spectacular number of seamen, pas-
sengers, and ships well supported this large maritime commerce.
Overall, the peaceful Funan state capitalized on its geologi-
cal location and predictable climate to serve as a hospitable hub
en route to China. Funan did not focus on securing the South
China Sea but instead on maintaining strong relations with its sur-
rounding countries, promoting trade in the area. It was the same
maritime commerce, however, that accelerated the downfall of
Funan. Because of excessive dependence on sea trade, Funan did
58 Rock Pang
not develop a supportive agriculture. As Srivijaya, a rising power

in the Sumatra, and nearby Champa, developed into invaluable
trading centers, they became key features on regional trade routes;
Funan was eclipsed by its rivals and collapsed in 550 CE.
Champa and Srivijaya

After Funans decline, Champa developed into a thriving
empire in Southern Vietnam. Established in 192 CE, Champa
secured great prosperity in the fourth century CE through mari-
time trade. Unlike Funan, which valued sociability and peace,
Champa became notorious for its support of piracy. However,
despite Champas illicit approaches to achieving profit, the state
did not seek to monopolize the South China Sea, with ambitions
contrary to those of many nations in the region today.12
While the king of Champa eventually concentrated on
a more mutually beneficial maritime trade in the South China
Sea, he initially instigated a great deal of conflict in the region.13
Champa had tacit and often volatile trade relations with Liu
Song, a southern Chinese empire in the Southern and Northern
Dynasties. Because Liu Song did not have access to land routes
from China to the West, the empire developed a trade dependent
on maritime routes that were often harassed by Cham piracy. As
pirates suffocated Chinas maritime trade, Liu Song was forced
to encroach upon Cham territory in 446 CE. However, Liu Songs
purpose was to eliminate problems in these transnational waters
rather than to intentionally declare sovereignty over the South
China Sea.14 Following a Chinese attack, Champa limited acts of
piracy toward Chinese vessels, allowing for a relatively peaceful
trade relationship to develop between the two empires. In 1155
CE, an envoy from Champa presented 65,579 catties of aromatics
to China, reinforcing the relationship between the two powers.15
Srivijaya, another tributary state of China, was established
primarily on the island of Sumatra in 650 CE and was also friendly
toward its surrounding states. Srivijaya developed an intimate rela-
tionship with China during the pro-trade and pro- communication
Tang Dynasty. In 902 CE, Srivijaya sent a tributary mission and in
1155 CE, the ambassadors presented 111,615 catties of frankincense

and sandalwood to China, demonstrating further stability in the
bond between the two empires.16 Ancient Srivijaya relied on the
South China Sea as a necessary passage for trade.17 Because they
adhered to similar mandala systems, the three states of Srivijaya,
Champa, and Funan all established flexible boundaries over the
South China Sea, focusing on trade across the shared ocean.
Ancient Empires on the Chinese Mainland

For centuries, the dynasties who controlled the southern
shore of the South China Sea were different from those controlling
the inland areas of what is now China. From the third century CE
to the sixth century CE, China was a civilization pretending to be
a state,18 where the northern-based kingdoms looked inward and
those of the south looked outward.19 The southern-based kingdoms
of China, soon defeated by their northern-based counterparts,
engaged in commerce with the Southeast Asian empires. In the
current era, it is difficult for the northern Chinese who took power
to trace the history of trade activities mainly conducted by their
now extinct southern counterpart. Moreover, rather than those of
the north, it was these southern empires that sent ships through
the South China Sea, and there is little archaeological evidence
to suggest that any Chinese ships completed trade voyages across
the South China Sea until the tenth century CE.20
Admittedly, ancient China was quite powerful, but this fact
alone does not prove that China was the first empire to control
the South China Sea. In the first millennium CE, the Zhou Em-
pire drove Vietnamese troops out of Chinese territory. In 221 CE,
the Chinese Qin Empire conquered Vietnam, which recovered
its independence after 15 years. In 220 CE, the Han Dynasty was
divided into what became known as the Three Kingdoms, a period
with tripartite Chinese forces. The Wu state, one of the eponymous
three kingdoms, dominated Southern China. This territorial pos-
session continued until 265 CE when Jin, a later southern empire,
replaced the Wu state as the prevailing force in the region. The
Jin state collapsed, however, and lost control over Vietnam in 420
60 Rock Pang
CE.21 Notably, all of these early expansions occurred on the land

rather than the waters of the South China Sea.
According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Peoples
Republic of China, Yang Fu of the East Han Dynasty made refer-
ence to the Spratlys [Nansha Islands] in his book entitled Yiwu
Zhi, a document upon which Chinese officials are heavily reliant.22
However, historical evidence suggests that Yangs research most
likely involved questioning foreign traders arriving at ports rather
than independent voyagers.23 In the trade with Funan, Champa,
and Srivijaya, nearly all of the boats were sent by the Southeast
Asian states; there were few Chinese traders voyaging to Southeast
Asia through the South China Sea.
Song Dynasty
During the Song Dynasty, China sent a multitude of ships
to voyage across the South China Sea. In 987 CE, Song sent four
missions abroad to encourage trade with foreign states. In 989 CE,
private Chinese traders were permitted to voyage throughout the
region. Then, urged by merchants and governors, Song promoted
the maritime trade to an even greater extent. The Song coinage
became a medium of exchange as far away as Sumatra and Java,
and the currency circulated rapidly around the South China Sea
trade network.24 Nevertheless, because travel through the South
China Sea was thought to be especially dangerous, Chinese sailors
called it Wanli Shitang.25 According to a Chinese account from
1178 CE, Zhou Qufeis Lingwai Daida, Wanli Shitang was a vast
archipelago filled with dangerous rocks.26 Therefore, although
the Song encouraged openness, the dynasty remained tentative
and, to some extent, afraid of the South China Sea until 1279 CE
when the Yuan Dynasty took power.
Yuan Dynasty
Yuan was the first empire to invade the South China Sea,
interrupting what had become a peaceful trade routine, and acting
in a manner that is very much in line with contemporary Chinese
policy. In 1279 CE, the Yuan Dynasty began with a show of power
and aggressiveness when Kublai Khan, the ruler of Yuan, sent a

maritime army to attack coastal Southeast Asian empires.27 During
the invasion, Chinese geographer Guo Shoujing arrived in the
Scarborough Shoal, one area currently under dispute between
China and the Philippines, to conduct Measurement of the Four
Seas research. According to the PLA Daily, Guo was the first person
who ever surveyed the Scarborough Shoal.28 However, evidence
suggests that Cham pirates arrived on the feature a century earlier
but found it too inhospitable for habitation.
Eventually the cost of an enduring, remote invasion of the
South China Sea only served to weaken the nomadic empire of Yuan,
at which point excursions through the region only contributed
further to its downfall. Conversely, empires that sustained a peace-
ful trade in the South China Sea maintained power for centuries.
From prehistory to 1368 CE, people around the South
China Sea nourished cooperation and significant trade between
empires. Based on historical sovereignty alone, no single country
holds claim to the entire area. The Nusantao people cherished
the South China Sea and considered it a necessary passage for
trade. The Southeast Asian empires surrounding the South China
Sea increasingly valued its importance as well. Nonetheless, in
contrast to the territorial disputes in the region today, the various
nations of the South China Sea did not declare sovereignty over
the seas territories.
Before the tenth century CE, little historical evidence ex-
ists suggesting that the Chinese sent ships to the South China Sea,
but China clearly was an important receiver on the southeastern
trade route. Contrary to contemporary Chinese claims, ancestors
of empires in Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei
were predominant inhabitants centuries before the first Chinese
voyage in the South China Sea. Furthermore, after this time, the
Chinese Yuan Dynasty attempted to dominate the South China
Sea militarily, only to find failure.
62 Rock Pang
The South China Sea: 1368-1949

Following the Yuan Dynasty, the Ming and Qing dynasties
began sending commercial vessels through the South China Sea,
but most Chinese merchants were reluctant to enter the area
until the middle of the nineteenth century. Prior to the twentieth
century, the boundaries of the South China Sea were constantly
manipulated by Western countries. Furthermore, the involvement
of Western powers using a modern international territory system
conflicted with regional traditional political patterns, complicat-
ing the issue of territorial claim. As Western explorers realized
the importance of the South China Sea, countries, particularly in
the West, began to seize features in the area. Nevertheless, after
World War II, even Western nations failed to agree upon sover-
eignty in the South China Sea. Meanwhile, the Republic of China
(Kuomintang) devoted itself to a massive map-making campaign
and early occupation in the South China Sea.
Ming Dynasty
Regionally, the Ming Dynasty became notorious for starting
the Seclusion Policy following the fall of the Yuan Dynasty. The
Ming emperor feared foreign intervention and banned private
maritime trades, although unofficial trade was never exterminated.
During the prominence of the Ming Dynasty, the eunuch voyage
(The Seven Voyages of the Ming Chinese Treasure Fleet) became a
highlight. Zheng He, the commander of the eunuch voyage, was a
close confidant of the Ming emperor and conducted seven excur-
sions to the Indian Ocean. This lavish expedition aimed to over-
whelm foreign peoples and convince them indisputably of Mings
power.29 The troops stopped at Champa and Sumatra, and, during
the third voyage in 1409-1411, battles broke out between Zhengs
forces and those of a local small kingdom in the Malay Peninsula.
Eventually, Zheng captured the Malay leader and escorted him
back to China. Zheng flaunted Chinese military prowess for each
country he passed, amounting to a pro-expansionist excursion30
through which Ming sought to assert regional dominance.
After the ostentatious eunuch voyage, Mings court laid

aside its ships, allowing them to rot.31 Disturbed by domestic con-
flicts, Mings emperors prevented private maritime business. As a
result of this action, the Mings outlook toward the sea became less
sophisticated, as the Emperors began again to consider the South
China Sea in accordance with the theory of Wanli Shitang, which
stressed the danger of that sea area. During this time, Chinese
smugglers became active voyagers in the South China Sea, and it
was these seamen who assisted the Portuguese on their journey to
China.32 Furthermore, the official Seclusion Policy suggests that the
Ming Dynasty retreated from the islands where the Yuan people
had arrived. Hence, the Scarborough Reef, currently claimed
by China, was lacking both permanent inhabitants and frequent
patrols during this era. In contrast, the Cham Empire was still
maintaining peaceful trades throughout the South China Sea.33
Maritime trade in the South China Sea increased during
the second half of the 1500s as the Ming government sought to
overcome financial burdens. In 1567, the Ming government opened
its coast and removed the private sea trade restriction.
During this time, Western businessmen developed a rising
demand for Chinese products, such as porcelain, while the Chinese
increased their exports in exchange for more silver.
Clashes Over Political Ideology

By the 1500s, Western explorers had begun scientific expe-
ditions and surveys in the South China Sea. When Vasco da Gama
voyaged from Europe to India in 1498, Portugal not only avoided
an Arab blockade but also carved out a convenient maritime trade
route. The Asian continent attracted Western merchants who
exploited this new trade route, causing territorial disputes for
the raw materials. In 1511, Portuguese Admiral Afonso de Albu-
querque defeated the Sultan of Malacca, gaining control over the
maritime passage to the Eastern Spice Islands. Later, Ferdinand
Magellan, a Portuguese circumnavigator funded by Spain, reached
the Spice Islands from the Pacific Ocean in 1521, only to be killed
in the Philippines. Another Spanish expedition was attacked by
64 Rock Pang
the Portuguese, contributing further to the conflicts between the

two countries over Asian spices. As a result of the 1529 Treaty of
Zaragoza, Portugal gained sovereignty over Indonesia while the
Spanish acquired dominion over the Philippines. The two nations
agreed on the South China Sea as a border partition.
However, the rise of the Netherlands and England soon
put an end to Spanish and Portuguese control in the region.
The development of modern Western sea theories exacerbated
contention as both the Netherlands and England debated legal
delineations of territories in the South China Sea. Concurrently,
the Dutch East India Company increased Dutch influence in
Southeast Asia. Targeting the South China Sea, the Netherlands,
Spain, Portugal, and England disputed sovereignty in the territory.
Hugo Grotius, a Dutch jurist, laid the foundations for
free sea doctrines in 1609, basing his theories upon the mare
liberum (the free sea), which argues that the sea, like air, cannot
be completely occupied by one power but should be free for all
to use.34 According to mare liberum, the sea should be considered
international territory; thus, Grotius argued, no country should
hold sole sovereignty over the South China Sea. Grotius, however,
contributed to free sea trade and worked to abolish maritime
monopolies for the sake of the Dutch international economic
expansion. Under Grotius claim, Dutch merchants would have
free access to sea trade throughout the region, including travel
through the South China Sea.
An opponent of Grotius, John Seldenwho was working
for the English king to protect Englands dominion over the sea
declared that, although ships had the right to innocent passage
through another states waters, states also had a right to restrict
access to those waters under certain circumstances. The open sea
could be occupied and therefore was not necessarily open to
all.35 Later, Selden and Grotius theories merged to some extent,
creating the so-called cannon shot rule that allowed states to
control the waters up to three or four nautical miles from their
coasts.36 These early offshore territorial sovereignty theories were
developed with the interests of specific companies and countries
in mind, thus ensuring that they would only further contribute

to territorial disputes over the South China Sea.
Three decades later, the 1648 Peace of Westphalia de-
manded fixed boundaries to distinguish sovereignty, establishing
a new discourse surrounding the South China Sea. This Euro-
pean consensus, however, conflicted with the regions traditional
mandala system. Adhering to the Peace of Westphalia, European
countries deemed that sovereign countries should have consistent,
declared boundaries and that all territories held by a sovereign
country should be treated equally.37 Conversely, the mandala sys-
tem deemed that there should instead be gradual transitions in
authority with no acknowledged ruler. Smaller territories might
recognize more than one sovereign power or possibly none at all.38
As a result, the seas borders became ambiguous, with regional
empires refusing to declare sovereignty. It was only when power-
ful colonial countries came to the area that the transition from
fluid frontier to fixed frontier laid the foundations for current
conflicts in the South China Sea.39
Qing Dynasty
As Western powers flocked to the region and contributed
to political conflict in Southeast Asia, the Qing Dynasty in China
became uninterested in the South China Sea. Qing was the last
dynasty in China, and is well known for its Seclusion Policy, which
reinforced the early prohibition against incorporating advanced
European technology. During Qing, Western countries increased
their military power, as demand for access to the Chinese market
increased. After the Opium Wars, China reverted to an almost
colonial society in which the South China Sea was controlled by
various Western countries. Similarly, states surrounding the South
China Sea were eradicated or colonized so that sovereignty over
the sea fully transferred to Western countries.
Despite resistance from southern merchants, the Qing
government banned sea trade again as a means of consolidating
Qing power. As with Mings policy, this limitation proved coun-
66 Rock Pang
terproductive to trade. So, the trade ban was lifted and Chinese
merchants set sail again to the wide South China Sea in 1684.
Western Exploration in the South China Sea

By the seventeenth century, Western sovereignty in China
had become extremely limited; the Spanish restricted their con-
trol of Manila, the Portuguese claimed only Macao and Timor,
the Dutch had been dislodged from Formosa Island, and the
English respected Southeast Asian border customs.40 After 1684,
when private trade was again legalized, Chinese merchants began
participating in Southeast Asian business activities, contributing
to an economic boom in the South China Sea.
However, fearing dangers associated with Wanli Shitang,
such as shoals and other unknown risks, China refused to send
expeditions farther south. Instead, China promoted economic
activities just on the edge of the South China Sea. It was thus an
English captain, John Harle, who first encountered and named
the Macclesfield Bank in 1701.41 Similarly, it was also a British
ship that discovered and named the Royal Captain Shoal and
the Scarborough Shoal in 1748.42 At the cost of their lives, these
explorers made unprecedented contributions to the knowledge
of the region and stimulated modern exploration of the South
China Sea.
Concurrently, Vietnamese efforts to explore the region
proved largely successful. European companies began entrusting
the Vietnamese government to rescue or salvage ships lost in the
South China Sea, while Vietnamese fishermen visited nearly every
island in these waters.43 Moreover, in 1795, the British East Indian
Company (EIC) sent ships to accurately map the South China Sea,
and in 1810, they successfully disproved the Wanli Shitang theory.44
It took time, however, for many Chinese to accept the
idea that the South China Sea was safe. As late as 1843, the Qing
writer Wang Wentai still supported the interpretation of Wanli
Shitang. Wang still believed that the Paracels were 500 kilometers
long and extremely treacherous, writing in the Wanli Shitang
[...] there are big rocks, but we do not know anything about it.45
The Qing Dynastys reluctance thus delayed Chinese occupation
in the South China Sea.
While the Qing Dynasty hesitated to explore the South
China Sea, colonial powers began securing territory in the region.
As people became much more informed about the nature of the
South China Sea, industrial countries came into the region and
continued direct expansion in south, east, and southeast Asia.46
Concomitantly, Great Britain defeated France in the Napoleonic
Wars, thus ensuring a new English hegemony in the eighteenth
century. To open the Chinese market following this victory, Britain
declared the Opium Wars of 1840 and 1860, which resulted in
the Qing ceding Hong Kong and opening five ports to English
trade. Simultaneously, Great Britain seized the Malacca Straits.
Despite the fact that the East India Company was essentially bank-
rupt, it maintained its colonial efforts in the South China Sea and
eventually claimed Sabah, an eastern Malaysian state at the rim of
the Spratly Islands, as British territory.47
France also became involved in territorial disputes in the South

China Sea.
Motivated by perceived ill treatment of Catholic missionar-
ies, France seized Danang in 1858. Soon after, France colonized
Saigon in Vietnam and, subsequently, Cambodia and Annam
became French protectorates.48 France then seized the Gulf of
Tonkin, a controversial sea area disputed by Vietnam and China.
Despite this claim, in 1887 China signed a boundary agreement
with France, recognizing French control of Tonkin.
Meanwhile, the German Reich conducted a series of sur-
veys around the Paracel Islands between 1881 and 1884 and used
these surveys to create maps of the area. As a result of its victory
in the Spanish-American war, the United States annexed the Phil-
ippines and became interested in gaining additional territories
in the South China Sea. Moreover, Japan soon developed a ter-
ritorial interest in the region, investing in the Pratas Islands after
Nishizawa Toshiji, a Japanese businessman, argued that producing
68 Rock Pang
fertilizer from the islands guano would be particularly lucrative.49

The Cantonese government, however, foiled this plan by spend-
ing 130,000 silver dollars to convince the Japanese to vacate the
Pratas.50 This evidence suggests that the Pratas were historically a
Chinese territory; they are currently controlled by the Taiwanese
Republic of China.51
As Western countries became increasingly involved in the
region, the settling of territorial disputes in and around the South
China Sea created borders between the regions countries. The
Philippines and Indonesia were split by an agreement between
Portugal and Spain in 1529; the line between Malaysia and Indo-
nesia was largely fixed by the British and the Dutch in 1842; the
Chinese-Vietnamese border was dictated to the Chinese by the
French in 1887; the general frontiers of the Philippines were set
by the U.S. and Spain in 1898; and the border between the Philip-
pines and Malaysia was constituted by the U.S. and Britain in 1930.52
Efforts by the Qing and Republic of China (Kuomintang)

As other Southeast Asian states were completely colonized,
the moribund Qing government made a final endeavor for do-
minion over the South China Sea.
Encouraged by the successful negotiation of the Pratas
Islands, Zhang Yenjun, governor of the Guangdong province,
made efforts to ensure that the South China Sea was recognized
as Chinese territory.53 In 1909, he dispatched ships to the Paracel
Islands; these ships cruised around, made surveys, and fired the
occasional cannon to claim the islands for China. Soon afterward,
the Paracel Islands appeared on Chinese maps for the first time.54
Following the fall of the Qing Dynasty, the Republic of
China was established in 1912 and made a number of claims to
these islands that the Chinese government still maintains today.55
The unilateral map-making progress intensified in the pe-
riod of the Republic of China. Contrary to the last map of the Qing
Dynasty Almanac, the 1912 map produced by the new republican
government did not include the Paracel Islands.
However, in 1914, the New Geographical Atlas of the

Republic of China contained the first Chinese map to include a
line drawn across the South China Sea, dividing the Pratas and
the Paracel island groups. It went no farther south than 15N,
and, according to the cartographer, referred to borders as they
existed prior to 1736.56 In 1916, the Map of National Humiliation
highlighted the loss of Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Tonkin but the
South China Sea was noticeably absent.57
This map-making campaign then became far more vigorous and

controversial.
In 1933, three years after French occupation of the Sprat-
lys began, the government established the Review Committee for
Land and Water Maps.58 In the Newly-Made Chinese Atlas, the
government expanded its southern sea border to 7N, this time
including the Spratly Islands.59 In 1935, the Chinese government
unilaterally published a journal in which 132 islands in the South
China Sea were claimed as Chinese territories, including islands
both in the Paracels and Spratlys.60
The Republic of China continued to promote cartographi-
cal efforts that benefitted Chinese territorial claims. In April of
1935, the Map of Chinese Islands in the South China Sea stretched
the border to 4N, including the James Shoal.61 The James Shoal,
however, is over 1,000 miles from the Chinese mainland but less
than 50 miles from the Malaysian coast, weakening Chinas claim
for sovereignty in the region. Additionally, in the Map of Chinese
Domain in the South China Sea, the Republic of China assumed
Chinese territorial possessions, including the Paracel Islands, the
Spratly Islands, the Pratas Islands, and the Macclesfield Bank.62
The Chinese government today is still fundamentally dependent
on borders delineated by the Republic of Chinas Kuomintang
government.
These vigorous map-making campaigns suddenly ended
with the Japanese invasion in 1937. As Japanese forces invaded
the capital of Nanjing, China focused on military resistance, with
the South China Sea becoming a so-called Japanese lake. Dur-
70 Rock Pang
ing World War II, Japan occupied Woody Island in the Paracels
and Itu Aba in the Spratlys. It was not until 1945 that U.S. forces
eliminated the Japanese Itu Aba military base and the fortune of
the South China Sea transferred to the U.S. However, the U.S.
could not determine which country had the most legitimate claim
to sovereignty over the South China Sea. Because the region was
of no vital interest to the U.S., at the 1944 Yalta Conference it was
suggested that the South China Sea fall under the control of the
projected international organizationwhat would become the
United Nations. Due to Frances long history of pursuing control
in the region, however, France was reluctant to negotiate.63 As a
result, the U.S. left sovereignty over the South China Sea in an
ambiguous state.64
The South China Sea soon became an area contested
by the Philippines, Vietnam, France, and China. In 1946, the
Philippines declared independence from the U.S. and argued
that the Spratly Islands were rightly Philippine territory.65 In the
same year, the Kuomintang government seized the Spratly Islands
from Japan and published new names for each of the islands;
no country protested this action.66 Concurrently, the French
navy sent a minesweeper to set a stone marker on Itu Aba in the
Spratlys, declaring the island French property. In the same year,
China sent ships to the Spratlys and left markers.67 In 1947, the
Chinese Geography Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs
drafted a list of new names for all the islands in the South China
Sea,68 increasing the total number of Chinese islands from 132 to
159.69 Notably, in the 1947 Location Map of the South China Sea
Islands, the eleven-dash line created by this conglomeration of
newly claimed islands stretched from Taiwan to the coast of Brunei
to the Gulf of Tonkin. This well-known legacy was the first time
the Kuomingtang government officially marked the South China
Sea as Chinese territory, including the Paracel Islands, the Spratly
Islands, the Pratas Islands, and the Macclesfield Bank.70 The gov-
ernment soon stated that it would negotiate precise boundaries
with countries according to the principles of international laws,
but it did not make any changes to the map.
Western explorers were the first to survey the islands of the

South China Sea. Then, as a result of the subsequent downfall of
multiple Asian empires and military development in Europe and
the U.S., the South China Sea was quickly seized by Western states.
Powerful military capability enabled Western countries to overcome
ideological clashes between the mandala and modern sovereignty
systems. Moreover, it was Western countries that manipulated the
boundary in the South China Sea before the twentieth century.
However, given that other Southeast Asian countries were largely
controlled as colonies, the government of the Republic of China
made unilateral cartographical claims across the South China Sea.
After World War II, international society felt ambiguous toward
this area. The Republic of China became active in the South China
Sea but created disputes with the Western countries, which had
earlier surveyed the regions islands. At the end of the Kuomintang
period, because various surrounding countries claimed sovereignty
over the islands with little international agreement, the territorial
conflict over the South China Sea became even morecomplicated.
The South China Sea: 1949-Present

After the establishment of the Peoples Republic of China,
the current period of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) control over
China, Chinese military power increased, and China enhanced its
military presence in the South China Sea. However, few countries
would consent to the Chinese and Vietnamese notions that a
single party should completely occupy all of the territories in the
South China Sea. The growing assertiveness on the Chinese side
was notably based upon claims made by the Kuomintang govern-
ment. In the twenty-first century, to combat suspicions aroused
regarding Chinas commitment to peaceful diplomacy, due to
the predominant military presence of the Peoples Liberation
Army Navy (PLAN) in the South China Sea, China made several
friendly gestures and adopted the take and talk policy, in which
it appealed to negotiation, yet refused to withdraw forces from
the islands.71
72 Rock Pang
The Peaceful 1950s

The first half of the 1950s saw no major skirmishes in
the South China Sea. Almost all of the interested countries were
bogged down by other internal issues and were incapable of ex-
panding their presence on the islands. The Peoples Republic of
China was not active; its only action was in the Paracels. In 1950,
the Peoples Republic Army occupied Woody Island after Taiwan
withdrew from it, a move indicating Chinese control of the Am-
phitrite Group. Meanwhile, France occupied Pattle Island, an
action indicating a perceived control over the Crescent Group.72
China did not respond militarily to the French initiative due to
its involvement in the Korean War, rendering Pattle Island the
only territory that was militarily occupied by a sovereign country
in the South China Sea at the time.73 Facing similar internal is-
sues, Vietnam experienced harsh national conflicts between the
decline of French colonialism and the rise of communist leader
Ho Chi Minh; neither power was particularly interested in territo-
rial ownership in the South China Sea. Although the Philippines
announced sovereignty over the Spratly Islands, it did not submit
its claim at the 1951 San Francisco Peace Conference because the
Philippines did not have a military powerful enough to support
this claim. After the Second World War, no country surrounding
the South China Sea had the capability to control it, a situation
that further complicated territorial politics in the region.
A few years later, as countries recovered from World War
II, the South China Sea became the target of almost all of its
surrounding countries, a time during which all involved parties
made sweeping territorial claims. Because there existed little in-
ternational agreement, these assertions were primarily spurred by
each countrys national interests in 1953.75
In 1958, China took the first action in which the govern-
ment formalized its claims to the whole South China Sea through
its Declaration on the Territorial Waters.74 Because China and Viet-
nam had both adopted communist ideologies, China transformed
the U-shaped line with eleven dashes to the nine-dash line,
removing two dashes in the Gulf of Tonkin to support Vietnamese
independence. In reaction to this Chinese courtesy, in 1956 North

Vietnam declared that, according to Vietnamese data, the Xisha
[Paracel] and Nansha [Spratly] Islands are historically part of
Chinese territory.76 After 1975, however, Vietnam was reunified
and declared sovereignty over the Spratlys and Paracels based
upon previous French colonization of the islands. The reunited
Vietnam reasserted its claim to the entirety of the archipelagoes,
denying the former agreement.77
The Philippines joined this dispute in 1950 after Toms
Cloma discovered an unoccupied island in the Spratlys near Pala-
wan. Cloma declared this island the country of Freedomland
and asked for support from the UN, only to receive protests from
all countries associated with the South China Sea.78 Although the
Philippine government ignored Cloma, Manila ultimately adopted
these new territories, named them Kalayaan, and annexed them
to the Palawan Province.
Factors for Chinese Actions

In the 1970s, due to shifting international relations,
Chinese-supported nationalism, and new countries entering the
dispute, the South China Sea situation became even more intri-
cate. Meanwhile, these factors also encouraged China to become
more assertive in its actions. Chinese military power grew expo-
nentially in the 1970s and the government paid closer attention
to the islands in the South China Sea; under a specific goalthe
recovery of so-called lost territories79China further increased
its claim of sovereignty in the region.
The shift in regional political dynamics during this period
bolstered Chinese confidence in the South China Sea. Despite the
fact that China, the Soviet Union, and North Vietnam were all
communist countries, the relationship among these nations was
often tenuous. In 1969, the bond between China and the Soviet
Union was particularly strained as the two nations headed toward
a border war in northern China. Moreover, because the motiva-
tions for the war against South Vietnam differed between China
and North Vietnam, the latter sought assistance from the Soviet
74 Rock Pang
Union. While China was concerned that the Soviet Union might
send troops if North Vietnam won the war, the 1972 rapproche-
ment between the U.S. and China emboldened China.
Bolstered by the support of the U.S., the Chinese presence
in the Paracels became a strategic effort to pre-empt the Russians
from using the islands after the Vietnam War.80
Chinese nationalism was another significant factor con-
tributing to further Chinese naval aggression in the South China
Sea. Because Chinese politicians named the period between the
Opium Wars and the establishment of the Peoples Republic of
China the Century of Humiliation,81 citizens became aroused
and indignant when territorial disputes threatened to harm na-
tional interests. Declaring that the South China Sea was about to
be invaded by an ambitious southeastern country, the Chinese
government reinforced support for maritime irredentism.82 This
philosophy upheld the acquisition of Chinese territories because
of the humiliating history in the late nineteenth century and
propagated the idea that China was going to be excluded from
the South China Sea. China claimed that the South China Sea was
an exclusive and integral part of the nation and argued that the
regions islands had been Chinese territory since ancient times.83
Sino-Vietnamese Clashes in 1974

In 1970, Chinese forces began to survey the islands in the
South China Sea and upgraded military equipment on Woody
Island, which had been seized again by the CCP in 1955. In 1974,
China went much further by renewing its claim for sovereignty
over the Paracels. Without giving Vietnam any notice, China
sent its navy to control the Paracels, initiating the possibility of a
sea battle. On January 14, the Chinese landed on Robert Island,
near South Vietnams Pattle Island,84 and planted flags on Money
Island.85 The Chinese defended Duncan Islandwhich had been
occupied by Vietnam since 195986against Vietnamese soldiers,87
opening fire against Vietnamese naval vessels, destroying four
Vietnamese flotillas, and dashing Vietnamese hopes for peaceful
negotiation. The Chinese navy then shelled and occupied Robert
Island before taking control of Money Island. Pattle Island, dis-

covered by France and transferred to South Vietnam in 1956, was
then swept with [Chinese] artillery.88 As previously mentioned,
Robert Island, Duncan Island, Money Island, and Pattle Island are
all included in the Crescent Group, which had been ceded from
France to South Vietnam in 1956. Its counterpart, the Amphitrite
Group, was primarily occupied by China after the Second World
War. Above all, Chinas actions during this time displayed an as-
sertive posture to support its claim to the Paracels, expanding this
assertion to include most of the islands disputed with Vietnam.89
After the reunification of Vietnam in 1975, the relations
between the Peoples Republic of China and Vietnam reached a
climax. After being pillaged by the Chinese navy in 1974, Vietnam
repudiated its original recognition in 1956 that the Paracels and
the Spratlys both belonged to China; instead, Vietnam focused on
defending the Spratly Islands. Hanoi further seized six islands from
South Vietnam just before the fall of Saigon in 1975. However, in
contrast to its assertive approach with the Paracels, Chinas strategy
to seize the Spratlys was initially peaceful, partly because China was
incapable of quickly occupying the Spratly archipelagos. Hence,
China just condemned the Vietnamese territorial claims in the
Spratlys at first. As Deng Xiaoping came into power in China and
suggested the policy of reformation and opening, the South China
Sea became an attractive area to support Chinas economy due
to its vital resources and strategic trade routes.90 Dengs growing
interest in the region was supported and bolstered by Liu Huaq-
ing, commander of the Chinese Navy.
This experienced commander posited that active green-
water defense was needed; he advocated a more aggressive strategy,
aiming to seize the sea areas between the mainland coast and the
first-island chain, including a chain from Taiwan, the Philippines,
Borneo, and Singapore.91
However, just before the Chinese navy sent ships to the
Spratlys, Malaysia and Brunei entered the South China Sea dispute
and claimed territories in the Spratlys.
76 Rock Pang
Contrary to the alleged historical evidence provided by

Vietnam, China, and the Philippines, Malaysia based its claim for
twelve territories in the Spratlys on the continental shelf principle.
According to Article 76 and Article 77 of the United Nations Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the coastal State does
not have to proclaim the continental shelf to exercise sovereign
rights over the continental shelf which contains submarine areas
that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural pro-
longation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental
margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines
from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured where
the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend up to
that distance.92 Similarly, Brunei did not provide historical evi-
dence but instead sought to advance the continental shelf theory.93
However, Malaysia and Brunei were far less contentious in terms
of territories claimedparticularly Brunei, which only claimed
two islands without military backup.
The 1982 adoption of UNCLOS was an international
agreement that further complicated the situation in the South
China Sea. On the one hand, it significantly validated claims by
Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei, which all gained
internationally-recognized titles for portions of the Spratlys94
indicating a stance against the militarily and politically powerful
China. On the other hand, the proposal of Exclusive Economic
Zones (EEZ) would eventually trigger future territorial disputes.
UNCLOS defines the EEZ as an area beyond and adjacent to the
territorial sea where coastal states have the right to explore and
manage natural resources.
Inhospitable islands, reefs, and even shoals were targeted
for occupation because governments wanted to exploit potential
crude oil and develop fisheries in the EEZs. According to the
UNCLOS, features of islands that can support human habita-
tion or economic life generate a 200-nautical-mile EEZ, while
rocks features that cannot support human habitation or
economic lifegenerate a 12-nautical-mile territorial sea but no
EEZ.95 Therefore, countries evaluated the huge potential of the
South China Sea and even attempted to send people to harsh

features to attest that a rock could support life. Countries did
not want to miss any potential for exploring oil resources, and
Beijing was thus uncompromising in its claim for islands in the
South China Sea.
Clashes in the Spratlys in 1988

After preparing for nearly a decade, China ventured to
the Spratly Islands in 1988. Chinese actions soon precipitated
the 1988 clash in the Spratlys by adding a site there in response
to a UNESCO mandate that countries establish monitoring sta-
tions as part of a survey of the worlds oceans in 1987. The PLAN
soon arrived at the site, Fiery Cross Reef, which was submitted to
UNESCO as a world heritage site.
Nevertheless, Fiery Cross Reef was extremely inhospitable.
Unlike normal management of such an observatory, China used
its position on this reef to springboard larger action in the South
China Sea. Admiral Liu ordered the South Sea Fleet to conduct
PLANs first combat patrol in the region,96 claiming that the
Spratlys are [a Chinese] territory, which we will frequently visit
from now on.97 China thus treated the site as a military monitor-
ing post, which rendered Fiery Cross Reef the trigger point of a
1988 Sino-Vietnamese clash.
Vietnam was alarmed by Chinese assertiveness. In reaction,
the Vietnamese occupied Ladd Reef, Discovery Great Reef, and
Tennent Reef.98 As it turned out, obtaining Fiery Cross Reef did
not deter the Chinese from venturing into the southern part of
the Spratlys. Vietnam continued to lose territories as China con-
tinued its expansion. On February 18, 1988, instigating a second
confrontation, China invaded Cuarteron Reef, whose sovereignty
was transferred from France to Vietnam following the Vietnam
Warthe only part of London Reef not guarded by the Vietnam-
ese army at the time. This surprise attack made Hanoi insecure,
pushing Vietnam to supervise each of their sites in the broader
Union Bank. On March 13, the Chinese invaded Johnson Reef,
one feature in the Union Bank, with Vietnamese soldiers arriving
78 Rock Pang
almost simultaneously. Conflict ensued that resulted in the death

of seventy-two Vietnamese soldiers.99 By April 1988, in addition to
Fiery Cross Reef, Cuarteron Reef, and Johnson Reef, the Chinese
had seized control over McKennan Reef, twelve miles away from
Union Bank, Subi Reef, ten miles away from a Philippine island,
and Gaven Reef, which sat in the disputed area between China
and Vietnam. Eventually holding six territories in the Spratlys,
China gradually achieved its active green-water defense goal.
This security, however, was short lived, as the Mischief Incident
occurred soon afterward.
The Mischief Incident

Before 1995, Chinas main competitor in the South China
Sea was Vietnam. In nearly three decades, as Chinese military
power increased, the Chinese had seized four territories in the
Paracels and six territories in the Spratlys from Vietnam. Three
years later, Beijing was poised to continue with its expansion by
seizing territories belonging to the Association of Southeast Asia
Nations (ASEAN), spurring international protests.100
In 1995, however, China turned its attention to Mischief
Reef, an unoccupied territory internationally accepted as part of
the EEZ of the Philippines. This Chinese unilateral action under-
mined the authority of international laws and threatened further
expansion across the South China Sea using military means.101 At
that time, the economy in the Philippines was in complete disar-
ray and the U.S. naval base in Subic Bay had closed, leaving the
Philippines defenseless.102
The Mischief Incident began with the pursuit of oil in the
Spratlys. Manila wanted to recover its economy by securing po-
tential oil in the sea near Palawan, appointing Alcorn Petroleum
to assess its value.103 Beijing, however, had awarded drilling rights
to an American company, Crestone, allowing them to explore oil
resources near the Vanguard Bank, which had been occupied by
Vietnam since 1989.
In response, Vietnam dispatched ships to block the Cres-

tones contract area.104
When the Alcorn company arrived at Mischief Reef in
January 1995, the crew found that a Chinese infrastructure had
already been established and that the reef was surrounded by hostile
boats.105 This finding worried the Philippine government because of
Chinas superior military power. In response, the Chinese explained
that the Chinese vessels in the reef were merely passing fishing
boats rather than a military presence.106 However, in February, a
satellite photograph told the truth: there were hundreds of tons
of wood and steel, prefabricated housing units, communications
equipment, and all of the men and materials required to set up
four bases in Mischief Reef,107 disproving Chinas explanation.
A shocked Philippine government immediately called for
the destruction of these markers. By mid-June, many Chinese mark-
ers had been destroyed and sixty-two Chinese sailors arrested.108
Eventually, China opened negotiations with the Philippines and
on August 10, 1995, they reached a consensus on the South China
Sea, in accordance with the principles of the 1982 Convention on
the Law of the Sea.109 However, while China and the Philippines
had become allies on paper, China did not withdraw its military
presence from the Spratlys.
Chinas halfhearted negotiations and the discontinua-
tion of a Philippine military presence on Mischief Reef abetted
the second Mischief Reef Incident. While Beijing and Manila ac-
tively negotiated on paper, the Chinese navy continued fortifying
Mischief Reef between 1998 and 1999, adding anti-aircraft guns
and new communications equipment.110 This time, Philippine
military response was weaker, causing China to assume that the
international reaction to this incident would be weaker as well.111
The Philippine position was further undermined when the U.S.
decided to remain neutral during the crisis. Watching Mischief
Reef fall under the control of Chinese naval ships and weapons,
the Philippines could do nothing but lament that, as President
Ramos states, until the Mischief Reef situation was normalized,
the country would not feel safe and secure as regard[ed] Filipino-
80 Rock Pang
Chinese bilateral relations[The Philippines] would always be

on the alert.112 The Philippine stance showed intransigence and
indicated the unlikeliness of any future compromise.
Chinas seizure of Mischief Reef was the first major occu-
pation in the South China Sea following the end of the Cold War.
This occupation enhanced regional concern over an expansionist
China and worries that China would seek to dominate the South
China Sea through military means.113 In 1995, these fears proved
justified when the Chinese navy proceeded to occupy Natuna
Island, an area included in the Indonesian EEZ. In 1993, at the
Track-Two Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the
South China Sea, the Chinese government noted nearby waters
as Chinese territory, directly violating UNCLOS principles.114
Indonesia sent officials to Beijing and reclaimed the territories,
citing UNCLOS. In a response similar to that given during Philip-
pine protests, the Chinese reaction was ambivalent. Beijing agreed
to negotiate further but maintained its military presence in the
Natuna Islands nonetheless.
The end of the twentieth century saw only one successful
and peaceful solution to territorial disputes in the South China
Sea: the boundary delimitation of the Gulf of Tonkin. Almost
half a century after Beijing eliminated two of the dashes in the
eleven-dash line, Beijing and Vietnam formed an agreement on
the Gulf of Tonkin in 2000. Of the area subject to delineation in
the Gulf, Vietnam obtained 53.23% and China 46.77%.115 This
peaceful negotiation established a booming trade between China
and Vietnam, suggesting that a peaceful coexistence, rather than
invasion, might be a more prosperous solution to the South China
Sea disputes.116
Chinese Solutions in the Twenty-first Century

In the twenty-first century, following international pressure
for peace, China became a status quo state and halted its expan-
sion in the South China Sea. However, this peaceable demeanor
was hardly supported through actionChinas take and talk
policy did not change much. As the trend of globalization ex-
panded, Southeast Asian countries and China formed a mutually

dependent trade relationship, an arrangement that prevented
aggressive conflicts in the South China Sea, despite the lack of
territorial resolution. China consistently maintained that further
negotiation was required before a settlement could be reached
while it simultaneously refused to allow for the status quo in this
region to change.
Then, in 2002, the Declaration on the Conduct of the Par-
ties in the South China Sea called upon the peaceful relationship
between China and ASEAN nations to consolidate cooperation.117
This declaration played a role in relieving tension in the South
China Sea, stating, the Parties concerned reaffirm that the adop-
tion of a code of conduct in the South China Sea would further
promote peace and stability in the region and agree to work, on
the basis of consensus, towards the eventual attainment of this
objective.118 More importantly, the countries emphasized the
significance of settling disputes without resorting to the threat
or use of force, [but instead] through friendly consultations and
negotiations by [the] sovereign states directly concerned, in ac-
cordance with universally recognized principles of international
law.119 In theory, because countries agreed to bolster stabilization,
provoking conflicts would become difficult at best. To a certain
extent, the declaration maintained the status quo, ensuring that
the Chinese military presence in the islands occupied in the later
twentieth century could not be easily interrupted by Southeastern
Asia.
Despite the focus on hypothetical peaceful means to
deal with the territorial disputes, the declaration was considered
very weak, according to the preceding Philippine President
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo,120 because this declaration is a politi-
cal document without legal binding force.121 In the declaration,
none of the countries contesting sovereignty made concessions
with regard to their claims; they simply promised not to support
these claims with military might. These countries continued to
consolidate their territorial claims and build structures in the
disputed territories, thus failing to prevent further skirmishes in
82 Rock Pang
the South China Sea. China sent its navy to the four islands in
the Paracels and six islands in the Spratlys. Vietnam approved a
plan to move people to its controlled islands and build logistical
structures. The Philippines has developed tourism in its occupied
islands. Malaysia used soil to raise the level of the Swallow Reef
in order to construct hotels, an airstrip, and facilities for scuba
divers.122 Above all, though countries were in agreement with
the ideal of cooperation, this declaration did not effectively and
pragmatically resolve the crisis.
During the period from 1949 to the present, disputes over
the South China Sea reached flash points for a series of conflicts,
with all of the involved coastal countries making aggressive claims.
These developments took place against a backdrop of significant
changes in Chinas relations in the region, as well as the coastal
states growing awareness of their maritime rights in the South
China Sea.123 China has played an active role in this area, but its
desire for the potential resources available in the region has made
its stance rigid and even aggressive, as demonstrated by the clashes
in 1974, 1988, and 1995. However, adhering to an international
call for peace, China has not militarily seized any additional ter-
ritories in the South China Sea since the Mischief Incident.
Conclusion
As this paper has discussed, the South China Sea connects
trade between the Indian Ocean and East Asia and is home to
numerous oil and fishery resources.
However, vying for sovereignty in this sea area has caused
further dissent and conflict in the region. Supporting a desire for
territorial ownership on this strategically significant sea, China,
Vietnam, and the Philippines all claim sovereignty based on his-
torical evidence. Because Chinese military power is much greater
than that of other claimants, however, a situation has arisen in
which countries organize ostensibly friendly negotiations where
no actual concessions are made.
From a historical perspective, no single nation has a

legitimate claim to sovereignty over the entire area. In ancient
times, the Nusantao people seemed to consider the South China
Sea home to all sea tribes in both the Indian and Pacific Ocean.
Later, major empires around the South China Sea shared this
region and promoted mutually beneficial trade. After 1368, it was
the Chinese Seclusion Act and the fear stemming from the Wanli
Shitang theory that kept China from visiting this region; during
the Qing Dynasty, sovereignty over the South China Sea was almost
entirely held by Western countries. After the Chinese awakening
in 1911, however, the Kuomintang attempted to claim sovereignty
via map-making campaigns and international consensus; the CCP
relied heavily on these principles after the Kuomintang govern-
ment was defeated. By remaining consistent with this position,
the CCP instigated skirmishes in the Paracels and Spratlys to seize
control of the territoriesactions that were deemed threatening
by Vietnam and the Philippines.
Following a shift of focus to globalization, such impetuous
military actions became rare, but countries remained unwilling to
make territorial concessions. As countries continued to rewrite the
history of this sea in their favor, perhaps only the silent reefs could
possibly tell the truth of this millennia-long territorial history.
84 Rock Pang
Endnotes
1
Nguyen Hong Thao, Vietnam and the Code of Conduct
for the South China Sea, Ocean Development & International
Law 32, no. 2 (2001): 105130.
2
Ulises Granados, The South China Sea and Its Coral
Reefs During the Ming and Qing Dynasties, East Asian History,
no. 33 (2007): 114.
3
Bill Hayton, The South China Sea: The Struggle for Power in
Asia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014), 32.
4
Ibid., 12.
5
Wilhem G. Solheim, Archaeology and Culture in Southeast
Asia: Unraveling the Nusantao (Quezon City: University of the
Philippines Press, 2006), 57139.
6
Ibid.
7
Robert D. Kaplan, Asias Cauldron: The South China Sea and
the End of a Stable Pacific (New York: Random House, 2014),
258; Hayton, South China Sea, 32.
8
Yumin Sheng, Economic Opennness and Territorial Politics
in China (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2011),
112.
9
Exhibit 2 Mandate: Firstly, Whats It All About? Sea
Indianisation Museum, accessed September 23, 2015, http://
sea-indianisation-museum.weebly.com/mandala.html.
10
Miriam T. Stark, After Collapse: The Regeneration of Complex
Societies (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2006), pp.144-
167.
11
Pierre-Yves Manguin, Trading Ships of the South China
Sea, Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 36,
no. 3 (1993): 25380.
12
Jung-pang Lo, China as a Sea Power, 11271368
(Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2012).
13
Mingjiang Li, The Peoples Liberation Army and Chinas
Smart Power Quandary in Southeast Asia, The Journal of
Strategic Studies 38, no. 3 (2015): 373.
14
Hayton, South China Sea, 17.
15
Lo, China as a Sea Power, 200.
16
Ibid.
17
Daojiong Zha, Security in the South China Sea,
Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 26, no. 1 (2001): 3351.
18
Lucian W. Pye, China: Erratic State, Frustrated Society,
Foreign Affairs, September 1990, accessed September 22, 2015,
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/45998/lucian-2- pye/
china-erratice-state-frustrated-society.
19
20
Ibid., 12.
21
Ibid., 15.
22
Historical Evidence to Support Chinas Sovereignty over Nansha
Islands, official government edition (Beijing, the Peoples
Republic of China: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2000).
23
Jianming Shen, Chinas Sovereignty over the South
China Sea Islands: A Historical Perspective, Chinese Journal of
International Law 1, no. 1 (2002): 113.
24
25
Lowell Bautista, Dispute Settlement in the Law of the
Sea Convention and Territorial and Maritime Disputes in
Southeast Asia: Issues, Opportunities, and Challenges, Asian
Politics & Policy 6, no. 3 (2004): 37687.
26
Shen, Chinas Sovereignty, 119121.
27
Lo, China as a Sea Power, 289290.
28
Hongru Tian, Cong lishi he fali kan feilvbin tiaoqi nanhai
zhengduan, China Military Online, accessed September 1,
2015, http://youth.chinamil.com.cn/qnht/2014- 02/26/
content_5783971.htm.
29
Sue Gronewald, The Ming Voyages, Asia for Educators,
Columbia University, accessed September 20, 2015, http://
afe.easia.columbia.edu/special/china_1000ce_mingvoyages.
htm#voyages.
30
Ibid.
31
Ibid.
32
Roderich Ptak, Ming Maritime Trade to Southeast Asia
13681567: Visions of a System, in From the Mediterranean
to the China Sea: Miscellaneous Notes, ed. Claude Guillot, Denys
Lombard, and Roderich Ptak (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz,
1998), 157192.
33
Andrew Hardy, Mauro Cucarzi, and Patrizia Zolese, eds.,
Champa and the Archaeology of My Son (Vietnam) (Singapore:
National University of Singapore, 2009), 4560.
34
35
Reid Barbour, John Selden (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 2003), 208209.
36
37
Treaty of Westphalia, Avalon ProjectTreaty of
Westphalia, Yale Lilian Goldman Law Library, accessed
86 Rock Pang
September 1, 2015, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/

westphal.asp.
38
39
Ibid., 56.
40
Wu Shicun and Ren Huaifeng, More Than a
Declaration: A Commentary on the Background and the
Significance of the Declaration on the Conduct of the Parties
in the South China Sea, Chinese Journal of International Law 2,
no. 1 (2003): 311.
41
42
David Hancox and Victor Prescott, Secret Hydrographic
Surveys in the Spratly Islands (London: Asean Academic, 1999),
72.
43
Edyta Roszko, Commemoration and the State: Memory
and Legitimacy in Vietnam, Sojourn: Journal of Social Issues in
Southeast Asia 25, no. 1 (2010): 128.
44
Kerry Lynn Nankivell, The Stories Nations Tell, in Three
Voices, Asian Security 11, no. 1 (2015): 8997.
45
46
The South China Sea Disputes: Documents and
Context, Chinese Law and Government 46, nos. 34 (2013):
1021.
47
Jacques deLisle, Troubled Waters: Chinas Claims and
the South China Sea, Orbis 56, no. 4 (2012): 608642.
48
Ibid., 57.
49
Ralf Emmers, Geopolitics and Maritime Territorial Disputes in
East Asia (London: Routledge, 2010), 67.
50
51
Ibid.
52
Ibid., 59.
53
Shen, Chinas Sovereignty, 9899.
54
Monique Chemillier-Gendreau, Sovereignty over the Paracel
and Spratly Islands (Leiden: Springer Netherlands, 2000), 101.
55
South China Sea Disputes, 1021.
56
Jinming Li and Dexia Li, The Dotted Line on the
Chinese Map of the South China Sea: A Note, Ocean
Development & International Law 34, no. 3 (2010): 287295.
57
William A. Callahan, The Cartography of National
Humiliation and the Emergence of Chinas Geobody, Public
Culture 21, no. 1 (2009), http://publicculture.org/articles/
view/21/1/the-cartography-of-national-humiliation-and-the-
em.
58
59
Keyuan Zou, The Chinese Traditional Maritime
Boundary Line in the South China Sea, International Journal of
Marine and Coastal Law 14, no. 1 (1999): 2755.
60
Stefan Talmon and Bing Bing Jia, The South China Sea
Arbitration: A Chinese Perspective (Oxford, UK: Hart Publishing,
2014), 3.
61
Li and Li, Dotted Line, 289.
62
Ibid.
63
Ang Cheng Guan, The South China Sea Dispute
Revisited, Australian Journal of International Affairs 54, no. 2
(2000): 20115.
64
65
66
Junwu Pan, Toward a New Framework for Peaceful Settlement
of Chinas Territorial and Boundary Disputes (Leiden: Koninklijke
Brill NV, 2009), 172.
67
68
Li and Li, Dotted Line, 287295.
69
Ibid., 289290.
70
Ibid., 290.
71
72
M. Taylor Fravel, Strong Border, Secure Nation: Cooperation
and Conflict in Chinas Territorial Disputes (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2008), 273274.
73
DeLisle, Troubled Waters, 615.
74
Emmers, Geopolitics and Maritime Territorial Disputes, 68.
75
Sigfrido Burgos Cceres, Chinas Strategic Interests in the
South China Sea: Power and Resources (London: Routledge,
2014), 112.
76
N. Han, Diplomacy of Contemporary China (Hong Kong:
New Horizon, 1990), 332411.
77
Pan, Toward a New Framework, 174.
78
Chien-peng Chung, Domestic Politics, International
Bargaining and Chinas Territorial Disputes (London: Routledge
Curzon, 2004), 127-144.
79
Michael Studeman, Calculating Chinas Advances in the
South China Sea, Naval War College Review 51, no. 2 (Spring
1998): 10.
80
Guan, South China Sea, 203.
81
Kaplan, Asias Cauldron, 204.
82
Stein Tnnesson, An International History of the Dispute in
the South China Sea (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), 23.
83
Chung, Domestic Politics, 128.
88 Rock Pang
84
Fravel, Strong Border, Secure Nation, 280.
85
Ge Xu, Tiemao Gu Haijiang: Gongheguo Haizhan Shiji
(Beijing: Haichao Chubanshe, 1999), 289290.
86
Marwyn S. Samuels, Contest for the South China Sea (New
York: Methuen, 1982), 8687.
87
88
89
Thao, Vietnam and the Code of Conduct, 105121.
90
Patrick M. Cronin, ed., Cooperation from Strength: The
United States, China and the South China Sea (Washington, DC:
Center for a New American Security, 2012), 9.
91
92
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10,
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397.
93
Christopher C. Joyner, The Spratly Islands Dispute:
Legal Issues and Prospects for Diplomatic Accommodation,
in Cooperative Monitoring in the South China Sea: Satellite Imagery,
Confidence-Building Measures, and the Spratly Islands Disputes, ed.
John C. Baker and David G. Wiencek (Westport, CT: Praeger,
2002), 20.
94
Allan Shephard, Testing the Waters: Chinese Policy in the
South China Sea (Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre,
1996), 10.
95
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10,
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397.
96
97
Huaqing Liu, Liu Huaqing Huiyilu (Beijing: Jiefangjun
Chubanshe, 2004), 494.
98
99
Lee G. Cordner, The Spratly Islands Dispute and the
Law of the Sea, Ocean Development and International Law 37
(1994): 64.
100
Clarence J. Bouchat, Dangerous Ground: The Spratly Islands
and U.S. Interests and Approaches (Carlisle Barracks, PA: United
States Army War College Press, 2013), 99100.
101
John C. Baker and David G. Wiencek, Security Risks of a
South China Sea Conflict, in Baker and Wiencek, Cooperative
Monitoring in the South China Sea, 61.
102
103
Daniel J. Dzurek, The Spratly Islands Dispute: Whos on
First?, Maritime Briefing 2, no. 1 (1996): 167.
104
105
106
Rodney Tasker, A Line in the Sand, Far Eastern Economic
Review 115 (1995): 14.
107
Ian James Storey, Creeping Assertiveness: China, the
Philippines and the South China Sea Dispute, Contemporary
108
109
Joint Statement on RP-PRC Consultations on the South
China Sea and on Other Areas of Cooperation, August 910,
1995, quoted in Emmers, Geopolitics and Maritime Territorial
Disputes, 71.
110
111
Leszek Buszynski and Iskandar Sazlan, Maritime
Claims and Energy Cooperation in the South China Sea,
Contemporary Southeast Asia 29, no. 1 (2007): 149.
112
113
Baker and Wiencek, Cooperative Monitoring in the South
China Sea, 61.
114
Sam Bateman, UNCLOS and Its Limitations as the
Foundation for a Regional Maritime Security Regime, Korean
Journal of Defense Analysis 19 (2007): 38, quoted in Emmers,
Geopolitics and Maritime Territorial Disputes in East Asia, 71.
115
Keyuan Zou, The Sino-Vietnamese Agreement on
Maritime Boundary Delimitation in the Gulf of Tonkin, Ocean
Development and International Law 36, no. 1 (2005): 15.
116
Ibid., 1327.
117
Wu Shicun and Keyuan Zou, eds., Maritime Security in
the South China Sea: Regional Implications and International
Cooperation (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company,
2009), 912.
118
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South
China Sea, Brunei-Cambodia-China- Indon.-Laos-Malay.-Myan.-
Phil.-Sing.-Thai.-Viet., November 4, 2002, http://www.asean.
org/asean/external-relations/china/item/declaration-on-the-
conduct-of-parties-in-the-south-china-sea.
119
Ibid.
120
Federico Bordonaro, The Spratlys Resurface, Asia
Sentinel, November 29, 2006, 29.
121
Wu and Zou, Maritime Security in the South China Sea, 10.
122
123
Chi-Kin Lo, Chinas Policy towards Territorial Disputes: The
Case of the South China Sea Islands (London: Routledge, 1989),
33.
90 Rock Pang
Bibliography
Baker, John C., and David G. Wiencek. Security Risks of a

South China Sea Conflict. In Cooperative Monitoring in the South
China Sea: Satellite Imagery, Confidence-Building Measures, and the
Spratly Islands Disputes, edited by John C. Baker and David G.
Wiencek, 61. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002.
Barbour, Reid. John Selden. Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 2003.
Bautista, Lowell. Dispute Settlement in the Law of the Sea
Convention and Territorial and Maritime Disputes in Southeast
Asia: Issues, Opportunities, and Challenges. Asian Politics &
Policy 6, no. 3 (2004): 375396.
Bouchat, Clarence J. Dangerous Ground: The Spratly Islands
and U.S. Interests and Approaches. Carlisle Barracks, PA: United
States Army War College Press, 2013.
Buszynski, Leszek, and Iskandar Sazlan. Maritime Claims
and Energy Cooperation in the South China Sea. Contemporary
Cceres, Sigfrido Burgos. Chinas Strategic Interests in the South
China Sea: Power and Resources. London: Routledge, 2014.
Callahan, William A. The Cartography of National
Humiliation and the Emergence of Chinas Geobody. Public
Culture 21, no. 1 (2009). http://publicculture.org/articles/
view/21/1/the-cartography-of-national-humiliation- and-the-
em.
Chemillier-Gendreau, Monique. Sovereignty over the Paracel
and Spratly Islands. Leiden: Springer Netherlands, 2000.
Chung, Chien-peng. Domestic Politics, International Bargaining
and Chinas Territorial Disputes. London: Routledge Curzon,
2004.
Cordner, Lee G. The Spratly Islands Dispute and the Law
of the Sea. Ocean Development and International Law 37 (1994):
6174.
Cronin, Patrick M., ed. Cooperation from Strength: The United
States, China and the South China Sea. Washington, DC: Center
for a New American Security, 2012.
DeLisle, Jacques. Troubled Waters: Chinas Claims and the
South China Sea. Orbis 56, no. 4 (2012): 608642.
Dzurek, Daniel J. The Spratly Islands Dispute: Whos on
First? Maritime Briefing 2, no. 1 (1996): 167.
Emmers, Ralf. Geopolitics and Maritime Territorial Disputes in
East Asia. London: Routledge, 2010.
Fravel, M. Taylor. Strong Border, Secure Nation: Cooperation

and Conflict in Chinas Territorial Disputes. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2008.
Granados, Ulises. The South China Sea and Its Coral Reefs
During the Ming and Qing Dynasties. East Asian History, no. 33
(2007): 109128.
Guan, Ang Cheng. The South China Sea Dispute
Revisited. Australian Journal of International Affairs 54, no. 2
(2000): 201215.
Han, N., ed. Diplomacy of Contemporary China. Hong Kong:
New Horizon, 1990.
Hancox, David, and Victor Prescott. Secret Hydrographic
Surveys in the Spratly Islands. London: Asean Academic, 1999.
Hardy, Andrew, Mauro Cucarzi, and Patrizia Zolese, eds.
Champa and the Archaeology of My Son (Vietnam). Singapore:
National University of Singapore, 2009.
Hayton, Bill. The South China Sea: The Struggle for Power in
Asia. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014.
Historical Evidence to Support Chinas Sovereignty over Nansha
Islands. Official government edition. Beijing, the Peoples
Republic of China: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2000.
Joyner, Christopher C. The Spratly Islands Dispute: Legal
Issues and Prospects for Diplomatic Accommodation. In
Cooperative Monitoring in the South China Sea: Satellite Imagery,
Confidence-Building Measures, and the Spratly Islands Disputes,
edited by John C. Baker and David G. Wiencek, 1734.
Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002.
Kaplan, Robert D. Asias Cauldron: The South China Sea and
the End of a Stable Pacific. New York: Random House, 2014.
Li, Jinming, and Dexia Li. The Dotted Line on the Chinese
Map of the South China Sea: A Note. Ocean Development &
Li, Mingjiang. The Peoples Liberation Army and Chinas
Smart Power Quandary in Southeast Asia. The Journal of
Strategic Studies 38, no. 3 (2015): 359382.
Liu, Huaqing. Liu Huaqing Huiyilu. Beijing: Jiefangjun
Chubanshe, 2004.
Lo, Chi-Kin. Chinas Policy towards Territorial Disputes: The Case
of the South China Sea Islands. London: Routledge, 1989.
Lo, Jung-pang. China as a Sea Power, 11271368. Singapore:
National University of Singapore Press, 2012.
92 Rock Pang
Manguin, Pierre-Yves. Trading Ships of the South China

Sea. Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 36, no.
3 (1993): 253280.
Nankivell, Kerry L. The Stories Nations Tell, in Three
Voices. Asian Security 11, no. 1 (2015): 8997.
Pan, Junwu. Toward a New Framework for Peaceful Settlement of
Chinas Territorial and Boundary Disputes. Leiden: Koninklijke
Brill NV, 2009.
Ptak, Roderich. Ming Maritime Trade to Southeast Asia
13681567: Visions of a System. In From the Mediterranean
to the China Sea: Miscellaneous Notes, edited by Claude Guillot,
Denys Lombard, and Roderich Ptak, 157192. Wiesbaden:
Harrassowitz, 1998.
Pye, Lucian W. China: Erratic State, Frustrated Society.
Foreign Affairs, September 1990. Accessed September 22, 2015.
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/45998/lucian-2-pye/
china-erratice-state- frustrated-society.
Roszko, Edyta. Commemoration and the State: Memory
and Legitimacy in Vietnam. Sojourn: Journal of Social Issues in
Samuels, Marwyn S. Contest for the South China Sea. New York:
Methuen, 1982.
Shen, Jianming. Chinas Sovereignty over the South
China Sea Islands: A Historical Perspective. Chinese Journal of
Sheng, Yumin. Economic Opennness and Territorial Politics in
China. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2011.
Shephard, Allan. Testing the Waters: Chinese Policy in the South
China Sea. Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre, 1996.
Shicun, Wu, and Ren Huaifeng. More Than a Declaration:
A Commentary on the Background and the Significance of
the Declaration on the Conduct of the Parties in the South
China Sea. Chinese Journal of International Law 2, no. 1 (2003):
311319.
Solheim, Wilhem G. Archaeology and Culture in Southeast
Asia: Unraveling the Nusantao. Quezon City: University of the
Philippines Press, 2006.
Storey, Ian James. Creeping Assertiveness: China, the
Philippines and the South China Sea Dispute. Contemporary
Studeman, Michael. Calculating Chinas Advances in the
South China Sea. Naval War College Review 51, no. 2 (Spring
1998): 10.
Talmon, Stefan and Bing Bing Jia. The South China Sea
Arbitration: A Chinese Perspective. Oxford, UK: Hart Publishing,
2014.
Tasker, Rodney. A Line in the Sand. Far Eastern Economic
Review 115 (1995): 14.
Thao, Nguyen Hong. Vietnam and the Code of Conduct
for the South China Sea. Ocean Development & International Law
32, no. 2 (2001): 105130.
The South China Sea Disputes: Documents and Context.
Chinese Law and Government 46, nos. 34 (2013): 10170.
Tnnesson, Stein. An International History of the Dispute in the
South China Sea. Abingdon: Routledge, 2009.
Wu, Shicun, and Keyuan Zou, eds. Maritime Security in
the South China Sea: Regional Implications and International
Cooperation. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company,
2009.
Xu, Ge. Tiemao Gu Haijiang: Gongheguo Haizhan Shiji.
Beijing: Haichao Chubanshe, 1999.
Zha, Daojiong. Security in the South China Sea.
Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 26, no. 1 (2001): 3351.
Zou, Keyuan. The Chinese Traditional Maritime Boundary
Line in the South China Sea. International Journal of Marine and
Coastal Law 14, no. 1 (1999): 2755.
. The Sino-Vietnamese Agreement on Maritime
Boundary Delimitation in the Gulf of Tonkin. Ocean
Development and International Law 36, no. 1 (2005): 1324.
94 Rock Pang
Winston S. Churchill
A History of the English-Speaking Peoples [Abridged]
London: Cassell, 1998, p. 294
At Cokes prompting the Commons now went on

to frame the Petition of Right. [1628] Its object was to curtail the
Kings Prerogative. The Petition complained against forced loans,
imprisonment without trial, billeting, and martial law. These and
others of the Kings proceedings were condemned as being
contrary to the rights and liberties of the subjects, and the laws
and statutes of the nation. Unless the King accepted the Petition
he would have no subsidies, and must face the wars to which
Parliament had incited him as best he could. Charles, resorting to
manoeuvre, secretly consulted the judges, who assured him that
even his consent to these liberties would not affect his ultimate
Prerogative. When his first evasive answer was delivered, a howl
went up from the great majority of all assembled. He fell back upon
the opinion of the judges and gave full consent. The Commons
voted all the subsidies, and believed that a definite bargain had
been struck.
We reach here, amid much confusion, the main
foundation of English freedom. The right of the Executive
Government to imprison a man, high or low, for reasons of State
was denied. At the back of the Parliament movement in all its
expressions lay a deep fear. Everywhere in Europe they saw the
monarchies becoming more autocratic. The States-General,
which had met in Paris in 1614, had not been summoned again;
it was not indeed to be summoned until the clash of 1789. The
rise of standing armies, composed of men drilled in firearms and
supported by trains of artillery, had stripped alike the nobles and
the common people of their means of independent resistance.
Rough, as the times had been in the earlier centuries, bills and
bows were a final resource which few kings had cared to challenge.
But now on the Parliamentary side force as yet was lacking...
THE SERBIAN STRUGGLE FOR AUTONOMY

AND WORLD WAR I
Shrey Agarwal
Context
A fter two centuries of conflict with the Ottoman Empire,

the precursor to modern Serbia emerged from the ashes of war
with the Treaty of Bucharest in 1812.1 When Napoleons invasion
of Egypt in 1798 abolished the Ottoman threat to the ethnic Serbs,
Serbia was able to wrest partial autonomy from its Turkish overlords
with the aid of the Russians, although they couldnt remove Turk-
ish troops from the region until the mid 19th century.2 Because
Russia and Serbia shared a similar language, ethnicity, and reli-
gion, the Russians supported the Serbs side during their war for
independence and for many years beyond in what historian David
Mackenzie calls an unequal but sporadic relationship.3 Nonethe-
less, the collective entity of Serbia with its particular customs,
language, and identity continued the struggle for autonomy that
began in the centuries before with the Ottomans, the Hapsburgs,
the Turks, and finally the Soviets after the First World War. By the
end of the period, roughly spanning 1300 to 1900, Serbia finally
Shrey Vardhan Agarwal is a Senior at Strawberry Crest High School, in

Dover, Florida, where he wrote this IB Extended Essay for Mr. Christopher
Kopel in the 2014/2015 academic year.
96 Shrey Agarwal
emerged as a recognized nation under Karadorde Petrovic in

1813.4 The context of violent struggle, however, continued to
haunt the nation into the beginning of the 20th century, driving
Serbia to a course of action that ultimately incited the Great War.
Milos Obrenovic, the man who succeeded Karadorde,
rivaled him in ideologies and even assassinated Karadorde to
maintain his own influence with the common people. Milos was
often ridiculed as a Turkish puppet, but he dedicated himself to
the peasantry throughout his reign. Although from 1819 to 1839,
Milos Obrenovic was successful in creating a strong educational
system and assisting the peasant class, the aristocracy drove him
out after the Homestead Law, which essentially secured economic
stability for the peasantry.5 A new regime was instated under Alek-
sander Karadordevi, who did not in fact rescind the Homestead
Law, much to the horror of the aristocracy.6 From 1842, Serbian
leadership was characterized by constant spurts of nationalism,
defined as the need to unify under common ethnicity,7 amplified
by the threats of foreign intervention and internal struggle with the
government. These threats forced the Serbs to organize collectively
for progress. Liberalist ideas limiting the power of the monarchy
seeped in through newly educated intellectuals and clashed with
the conservative aristocracy intent on preserving the status quo.
Intellectuals focused on reforming the government, particularly
by adding a constitution. The Constitution-defenders, a subsidiary of
the progressive party, was created for this very purpose in 1842.8
They believed that the time for a despotic monarchy had long
passed, looking to the western powers like France and Britain as
their role models. Beyond the borders, however, the Hapsburgs
continued their persecution of the Slavs, just as the Ottomans had.
Once the Ausgleich Compromise of 1867 excluded
Slavs from any power in government in favor of the Magyars,
Serbians felt both that the Austrians had cheated them and that
the Magyars did not deserve to rule, intensifying their opposition
to the Austrian throne.9 In fact, this bitter struggle between the
Serbs and the Austro-Hungarian Empire extended through the
outbreak of World War I in 1914. Following the assassination of
Archduke Franz Ferdinand and the July Crisis,10 the Serbs con-
stantly rebelled against the Austrian leadership, first by refusing
to negotiate with them and secondly by refusing the ultimatum
terms. On one hand, Serbia felt cheated of its rightful claim to
territories within the Balkan and Ottoman regions, while on the
other, both regions were critical of Serbian dissent within their
respective borders. Events such as the mass murder of Serbs after
the Herzegovina uprising in 1852 exacerbated mutual misgivings,11
paving the way for more uprisings in the same region throughout
the 1870s. Little more than a decade after the first uprising, ten-
sion quickly escalated over the influence of Hungarian ministers
like count Gyula Andrassy, who under article 8 of the Ausgleich
Compromise had a considerable weight on foreign policy. Article
8 effectively made the Hungarian minister a minister of foreign
affairs as well, meaning that now the Magyars, another prominent
rival of the Serbs, had a powerful say in Serbian treatment within
the state. The dual-monarchy crisis from Ausgleich further com-
promised the view native Serbs had towards their own monarchy,
viewing all monarchies as oppressive without a proper legislative
body. Since a movement away from the monarchy dominated the
changes that characterized Serbia during this periodseeing the
monarchy as perhaps an outmoded form of governmentthe
idea of an uncontrollable and hostile foreign monarch added
insult to injury, further catalyzing the violence that erupted in
the latter half of the century.
World War I provided the perfect opportunity to bolster
Serbian power in the Balkans while eliminating the Austrian threat
and liberating the oppressed Bosnians. Following the successes of
Camillo di Cavour and Otto Von Bismarck in nationalizing Italy and
Germany respectively,12 many felt it was Serbias birthright to use
blood and iron13 (Bismarcks phrase) to subdue its enemies. The
question arises: to what extent did Serbian political developments
in the 19th century, aligned with nationalist rhetoric, influence
its decision to risk war with Austria-Hungary?
98 Shrey Agarwal
The Pan-Slavic Effort

Serbian nationalismthe drive for Serbian autonomy based
on a desire for homogeneity in terms of culture and identitywas
the primary reason that moved Serbia to confront Austria-Hungary.
The Black Hand, the military conspiracy that assassinated Arch-
duke Franz Ferdinand and led the way to the Great War in 1914,
was inspired by the perceived greatness of the nascent Serbian
nation.14 It resulted in a sense of nationalist frustration starting
with the Serbian Revolution of 1805 through the 19th century
when no real progress was made in the Pan-Slavic movement, due
to measures such as Ausgleich. When diplomacy failed, Serbian
black hands took action through assassination and other acts of
terror. The Serbs hated the Austrian-Hungarian Empire, which
in turn feared the rising Pan-Slavic movement by which Slavs in
the Balkan region aspired to create their own nation-states, of
which Serbia was considered to be the head. Having little to lose,
Serbian black hands high up in the chain of command felt the
assassination of the Archduke would be a catalyst to the forma-
tion of such states.
Historian John Etty questions what role the Serbian revo-
lution of 1805-1815 played in inciting the Great War a century
later, arguing that most British and Eastern European historical
sources often show negative bias towards the Austrians and the
Germans.15 Even so, it is difficult to deny that the Pan-Slavic move-
ment emerged in 1815 all across the Balkans, as provinces tried
to create statements asserting their independence, popularized
in the anthem Hey, Slavs.16 The colors of new Serbiablue, white,
and redbecame the colors of the Pan-Slavic movement.
Nationalism was particularly dangerous in Serbia because
of the indelible memory of the 1389 battle with the Turks at
Kosovo. Serbia was unpredictableand resurgent nationalism
was dangerous for both Serbia and its neighbors. The legacy of
Heavenly Serbia17 from that 1389 defeat had robbed Serbs of
their self-esteem as well as their powers of self-determination,
transforming the state from a Eastern European capital to a power-
less and stateless province of the Ottoman Empire.18 The battle of
Kosovo became a rallying cry for the 19th century Serbs who again
threw themselves at the Ottomans. However, this time there was a
common interest for the Serbsnational independence.19 Under
the same flag flown 400 years earlier, the Serbians prevailed. As
Swiss sociologist Norbert Elias points out, the loss of power is al-
ways traumatic: states and other social units which have lost their
claim to a position of highest rank in the elimination struggles
of their day often require a long time, even centuries, to come to
terms with this changed situationand perhaps they never man-
age it.20 Even four hundred years after wresting control from the
Ottomans, the Kosovo experience was still fresh in the minds of the
Serbs, intensified by the fact that they now felt threatened by the
West and other powers in the Balkans. With Serbias geographic
location, the Serbs paranoia translated to hostility at every bor-
derthe Austro-Hungarians to the north, the Ottomans to the
south, and the Bulgarians to the east. These Serbian fears fostered
national insecurity, and despite precautionary acts to contain it
from the government, eventually led Serbians to strike out against
the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the 20th century.
The Serbian struggle for independence from the Ottoman
Empire set a precedent for the burning nationalism that marked
the 19th century. It followed the sentiments of the sacrifice of 30,000
Serbs in the failed defense of Kosovo in 1389 against the same
opponent, the Ottomans.21 The fact that the Ottomans in the 14th
century were leagues apart from the 19th century Ottomans was
trivial; it was all about the emotions surrounding the confronta-
tion. The message that the 19th century Serbian war sent was clear:
Serbians would continue fighting until they felt secure within their
land. Serbia reared its nationalistic horns at the rest of the world,
and the energy of this movement pervaded all aspects of Serbian
society, whether it was the Serbian government, the Serbian citi-
zens, or even those ethnic Serbs who lived in Turkey and Austria.
It grew to engulf a territory encompassing much more land than
just that under the Ottoman rule. A Serb was now anyone who
shared the same language, history, and identity of the newly freed
Serbians. This new Pan-Slavic movement, born between 1800 and
1815, set the stage for the conflict to come.22
100 Shrey Agarwal
Once the Ottomans bitterly conceded independence to

the Serbs, the Serbian government took the first steps towards
consolidating its power. Rather than focusing on a stable and cen-
tral bureaucracy for Serbia whether through the 1815 monarchy
or establishing a constitution, then leader Karadorde pursued
immediate reform under a shaky regime held in place solely by
his authority.23 Karadorde was an interesting individual, working
for a series of bandits before being accepted into the rebel army.
His leadership in the Serbian revolution as the supreme voda, or
commander, saw him command 30,000 of the territorys youth,
which may have influenced his liberal-minded reforms. Serbia saw
immediate improvement in education levels and literacy rates, but
the government was left in tatters once Miloss men assassinated
Karadorde, fearing his popularity.24 Milos ironically criticized
Karadorde for his failure in government during the two years
he led the people, although Milos himself channeled vast funds
into spreading liberal ideology and continuing the educational
development of the region. Inevitably, Karadordes failure to
centralize the government doomed the course of Serbias growth:
government stability would prove elusive. There were too many
inconsistencies in the regimes of Karadorde and Milos, as well as
a lack of homogeneity in policy, to establish a firm foundation.
Karadordes choice to forego a constitution in favor of
direct rule also yielded unforeseen consequences: reforms in edu-
cation fostered Serbian liberalism.25 Although there are conflict-
ing views regarding the source of Serbian nationalist sentiment,
it is clear that education played an important role. Although his
regime was short-lived with his death, Karadorde had focused
extensively on the educational system and Milos continued with
the development of the Velika kola, the first upper school in
Serbia that actually followed Karadordes original intentions.26
Intellectuals like Dositej Obradovi, who were not only well-read,
but also influential, took advantage of the educational system to
spread liberal ideas throughout the nation. These ideas targeted
the aristocracy and attempted to limit their control on the region
by empowering the overwhelmingly agrarian population, almost
90% of Serbia at the time.27 Once again, the results were ironic
the government-prioritized education to spread economic growth

and wealth, although it only succeeded in spreading nationalism
and activism in the state, which came back to strike the monarchy
only decades later. Keeping this in mind, although many histori-
ans consider that the Serbian Revolution played a key role in the
birth of romantic nationalism in Europe, the movement did not
truly have definition until combined with the ideas of Giuseppe
Garibaldi and Camillo de Cavour, which came less than thirty
years after Serbia appeared. Garibaldi and Cavour both preached
unity and romantic nationalism: positive-minded, optimistic, and
focused on the idea of unity,28 as well as the more relevant ideals
to Serbia: ethnic identity, shared culture, and self-determination.
On the other hand, Bismarcks orchestrated actions in
Germany provided a militaristic example of the use of national-
ism in contrast to Cavour and Garibaldi, not only as a means to
centralize but also as a means effectively to organize the military.
The events of the Austro-Prussian war in 1866 and the Franco-
Prussian war in 1871 show such effective organization, where
the Prussian Empire decisively defeated both European powers,
Austria-Hungary and France. Ironically, Bismarck used romantic
nationalism as a means of inspiring a strong military, beginning
with his appointment to the office of Minister-President in 1862,
when he aspired to unite the German volk under one army.29
Because nationalists and strong public leaders already inhabited
Serbia, Bismarks successful mobilization of nationalist feelings
provided an example for Serbia to increase its aggression for its
Balkan territories during the late 1870s. The Serbs militarized
following Napoleons model Grand Arme, and called tens
of thousands of Serbs into the army for future conflicts like the
Serbo-Bulgarian war in 1885. The military recruitment drew on
the Pan-Slavic movement of the mid-century with the original ro-
mantic nationalism, which many historians claim emerged from
the French Revolution. The strong educational base that the early
leaders of Serbia established from the 1830s to the 1850s under
Milos may have detracted from a stronger government, but they
placed Serbia on the path to war by giving radical nationalists
102 Shrey Agarwal
the Serbian peoplethe power of education and western liberal

thought, perhaps the most influential weapons in policy-making.
Another important nationalist issue was ethnicity. Because
the Yugoslavs or Southern Slavs viewed themselves differently
from the Slavs in the Serbian territory, their separate sense of
identity and religious differences (Orthodox Christians vs. Catholic
Christians)30 produced regional fault lines that further enhanced
the notion of militaristic nationalism among the Serbs. Regional
conflicts emerged too, with confrontations on the border between
the two groups. In the mid-19th century, the split between the
Slavs often had detrimental effects, but by the end of the 19th
century, more pressing issues over Austrian control brought the
two groups together.
Though the different Slavic groups distrusted each other,
they hated their Ottoman and Austrian overlords more. To put this
into context, it was better for ethnic Serbs to be together, rather
than half of them to be controlled by another force, like the Ot-
tomans. For this reason, the Treaty of San Stefano only further
angered the Serbians in 1878, granting them something that they
already believed they possessedautonomywhile forcing them
under collective European pressure in the Congress of Berlin to
give Bosnia to Turkey.31 Particularly frustrating to the Serbs was
the fact that a large portion (43%) of Bosnias inhabitants were
actually Serbian Orthodox Christians, and that Serbia had already
conquered the territory from Turkey in 1876.32 Even more frustrat-
ing to Serbia was the fact that the population of Bosnia welcomed
Serbian annexation because the Turkish Muslims oppressed the
Christian Serbs. For these reasons, it was incomprehensible to
Serbia why the Congress of Berlin would cede this territory to a
country unfit to rule a hostile population. The perceived inter-
ference in Serbias quest to become a homogenous nation-state
led to escalating violence. Militarism and an arms buildup lasted
until 1912, when Serbia decisively beat the Bulgarian and Turkish
forces in the Balkans, sealing their dominance in the region.33 For
a nation that had had 400 years of submission to the Turks, estab-
lishing regional control was an open door: the Balkans werent
enough. Prime Minister Pasic said in 1913 the first round is won.
Now for the second roundagainst Austria.34 Militaristic nation-
alism played an important role in Serbian developments in the
late 19th century. Serbia actively sought war with Austriawhich
they achieved through World War I.
The final step came with the development of the afore-
mentioned Black Hand, whose motto itself was Ujedinjenje ili Smrt
(Union or Death).35 Preceding this level of radical thought, Serbia
was represented by the old nationalist group of Narodna Odbrana
(National Defense), created to spread propaganda advocating
the rights of ethnic Serbs in Austro-Hungary in 1908. When that
group failed to get much leeway, paramilitary aggression became
an unofficial government resource, under the table so to speak.
The Black Hand, composed of Serbian officials, high-ranking army
officers, and government leaders, spread anti-Austrian propaganda
and planned assassinations to reunite the people of Greater Ser-
bia under full Serbian leadership, regardless of where they were
located, north or south.36 Yet before tensions with the Southern
Slavs could be dissolved, the Austrian problem loomed larger, as
it was a mutual conflict drawing together all Slavs, regardless of
location. It is highly doubtful that Serbia expected anything greater
than a regional confrontation to emerge from its confrontation
from Austria (World War 1). Serbia and its Black Hand were only
concerned with achieving the goal of national unity under a Pan-
Slavic banner. Preceding this conflict, nationalist ideals emerged
in radical forms such as assassinations, uprisings, and other acts
of violence, as well as in more civic forms such as the patriotism
depicted by the tens of thousands of Serbians who supported the
Black Hand.37 Ironically, public support escalated into these more
violent forms of nationalism.
On June 28, 1912, the Black Hand assassinated Archduke
Franz Ferdinand of Austria and set off a series of events leading to
the First World War. Elsewhere, outside Serbian interests, tensions
had been escalating throughout Europe, including militarism
among the European powers Germany and Britain. An intricate
alliance system polarized the continent, and issues of European
104 Shrey Agarwal
imperialism in Africa as well as Asia had spread these polarities

across the globe.38 Many historians claim these are the real causes
of war, and Serbian nationalism played a minor role. Nonetheless,
it is evident that Serbia had planned to seize control of its sur-
rounding territories a century before the outbreak of World War
I. The Serbian people were filled with a burning hatred for their
oppressors and that, in its various forms, might have been the
ultimate trigger of the war. Without the Black Hand and Serbian
aggression in the region, tension would have remained, although
there is little probability that European powers would resort to
war after evaluating the costs. Only an ignition of the scope of
the assassination could tip the regional tension over a threshold
required for war. Yet preoccupied solely by national interests,
Serbia could not comprehend the risk of the global war it incited.
The Levels of Analysis on the Decisions of 19th Century Serbia

Nationalism dominated Serbian policy-making in the 19th
century, setting the government up for war with Austria in the 20th.
Guided by then-liberal political ideals, the Serbian government
tried its best to create a system of enlightened self-determination
for all Serbs, which was impossible without a unified Serbia.
Joseph Nye created a system for measuring outcomes in history
and international relationships based on political choices, which
he coined levels of analysis39 that tend to look at a funnel of
choices.40 Effectively, this method looks at a tree of choices; as
each choice is fulfilled, the list of outcomes and available choices
narrows. This method can be applied to Serbia from 1809 to 1914,
as each choice the government made set up the options for the
next, and effectively limited the possible outcomes until war was
the only remaining choice. Nyes criteria can be applied to the
Serbian entity beginning once again with the Serbian revolution.
After the successful revolution of 1805-1815, Serbian
government lacked stability. As aforementioned, following the
reform of the educational system, new liberal thought clashed
with the conservative aristocracy. Eventually, Mihaljo Obrenovi
ascended the throne as Serbias first enlightened despot in 1860.41
Mihaljo had the potential to lead his country two ways following
the nationalistic surge of the 1850s. Rather than focus on devel-
oping the Serbian economy from its agrarian status into a more
industrialized economy, Mihaljo followed the examples of his
Slavic predecessors Catherine the Great and Peter the Great in
an effort to modernize Serbia in preparation for war, focusing on
cultural and behavioral changes in a society that had historically
clung strongly to its heritage.42 But there were many differences
between the days when Catherine the Great and Peter the Great
were modernizing their nations and the time Mihaljo followed
their lead; his predecessors already had a strong bureaucracy set
up under the previous monarchies and a solid agricultural base
to build on. Furthermore, the people of Russia a century earlier
had no literacy, no experience with the Western liberalism that
raged across Serbia.
Such a course of action by Mihaljo did not achieve many
of his goals. Eventually after he was coerced into abdication for
disrespecting the Turkish constitution that had been established
in Serbia, the next prince, Alexander Karadordevi, renounced
most of Mihaljos policies and reverted to those of Karadorde
and Milos which focused on education, although he did success-
fully add a civil code.43 Although Mihaljos war preparations led
to increased economic productivity, Serbias lack of economic
equality again prevented any real progress as wealthy aristocratic
land owners only got richer. Furthermore, the poorer Serbian
classes resented Mihaljo, as they saw him as a despot, abusing his
power. The serfs didnt believe that they themselves were benefit-
ting from westernization. If we examine this phenomenon from
the standpoint of the funnel of choices, following the govern-
ments inability to centralize efficiently, the failure of Mihaljos
top-down policies stirred class tensions. Although the military of
Serbia was mostly from the lower and middle classes, the major-
ity of the money was concentrated in the upper class, incurring a
new level of unity within the other classes. Now in addition to
the national enmity against Austria, there also emerged internal
tension against the Turkish-dominated economic system that the
majority of the classes lived under. This majority did have one thing
106 Shrey Agarwal
in common howeverthe military. In Nyes levels of organization,

class resentment would be a long-term factor for the outbreak of
war because it blocked off other branches in the tree of choices
Serbia was capable of making, such as expanding the pig-farming
industry and maintaining a strong bureaucracy like its powerful
European neighbors.
Additionally, an important development eventually influ-
encing the decision of the Serbian government for war was the
adoption of the Ausgleich dual monarchy in Austria-Hungary.
As mentioned before, this outraged Serbians by essentially subject-
ing them to the Magyars, whom the Austrians allowed to control
half of the monarchy, and forcing Serbia into a corner in terms
of political decision-making. Unless Serbia took action, Magyars
would repress their Serbian counterparts due to splits in language,
culture, and political views.44 Ausgleich radicalized Serbian gov-
ernment, or as the Serbs saw it, forced them to radicalize. Beller
addressed the nationalism issue as a factor in government when
he stated: ...not only had the Monarchy collapsed under its own
internal contradictions, but it had left a very dangerous legacy of
over-dependence on bureaucracy and fierce national rivalries.45
Eventually, the decision of the Austrian monarchy fueled Serbian
hatred and left Austria vulnerable to retaliation from the Serbs.
Although regionally recognized as an autonomous power
after the revolution, Serbia only gained the ability to act indepen-
dently with the eviction of the Turkish troops by mid-century. Even
then for the majority of the 19th century, Turkish influence pressured
Serbian legislation into giving Serbia only a perceived autonomy.
Turkish military presence was kept to control any tension along
the borders, yet the Serbian monarchs often struck deals with the
Ottoman Empire in order to secure power for themselves, as seen
with Obrenovi before his abdication. In the long-term funnel of
choices, the lack of true sovereignty left ethnic Serbs insecure
about their freedom, leading to rash acts of violence. Swaim com-
ments on the state of Serbian independence once it took hold:
it was an extremely violent and apocalypticand I would add
racistidea from the very beginning.46 Finally in 1878, the Rus-
sians helped the Serbians gain international recognition in the

Russo-Turkish war, which some saw as a mistake. Serbia was not
ready for sovereignty because of the conservative-liberal split in
ideology, the lack of a government, and the clash of nationalas
well as classtensions within the state itself. In fact, independence
served as a catalyst (an alternate pathway) for violent government
action, as it removed the accountability of the shaky Serbian re-
gime to any other entity. This suggests that only an outside force
could keep Serbia answerable to its own people. Looking at Nyes
model, there were two options following the Russo-Turkish war.
First, European powers could have held off recognizing Serbian
independence. Although this option would have certainly angered
the Serbs, it would have appeased the other factions in the area
and probably sustained the Ottoman Empire for a longer period
while avoiding major violent conflicts. Instead, Russia decided
that Serbia was ready, even though Serbia contained multiple
enclaves of different ethnicities. Swaim notes that systematic
repression47 resulted from this decision because the Serbian gov-
ernment clearly privileged Slavs over other ethnicities. Even after
reviling notions of foreign dominance and the policies of division,
Serbia decided to continue policy-making that antagonized others
instead of empathizing with them.
On the economic front, the Serbian government had the
chance to industrialize, to catch up with its modernizing counter-
parts. Once again, rather than taking this option, which promised
economic stability and peaceful coexistence, Serbia prematurely
took an aggressive stance in forgoing the chance to modernize.
Within a year, Serbia made a move on the Balkans, infuriating
the Ottomans as well as the rest of Europe. Less than 10 years
after the conclusion of the Russo-Turkish war, Serbia engaged
in violence with Bulgaria, actually allowing Bulgaria to unify.48
Following Nyes model, these aggressive decisions harken back
to Karadorde near the beginning of the previous century and
the original framers of the Serbian government. Their decision
manipulated the trauma the Serbians felt after the revolution
and kept Serbia in a state of victimization rather than proactive
growth. The memory of Serbian trauma was used repeatedly as an
108 Shrey Agarwal
excuse to justify rash and unjust behavior. Such thinking meant

that in the minds of Serbian leaders, unless Serbia could become
mono-religious and under one ethnicity, it could not be secure.
Clashes between Eastern Orthodox Christians, Roman Catholic
Christians, and Muslims, magnified in intensity,49 while acts under
Milan Obrenovi, the Serbian prince since 1869, increased polar-
ization among the various Serbian communities.
Following the aggression, the next step in Serbias eventual
path to war related to internal civil tension. The abdication of Mi-
haljo Obrenovi revealed corruption within the Serbian monarchy,50
which in addition to generating turmoil within the government
itself, combined with the humiliating defeat at the hands of Bul-
garia in 1885. This perfect storm therefore allowed Bulgaria to
unify against Serbian aggression and against Serbian wishes. The
disaster with Obrenovis abdication was actually a direct result of
premature Serbian independence, as it allowed the monarchy to
manipulate the serfs and the farmers unchecked, showing Nyes
model in action. Furthermore, the abdication, compounded with
the loss to Bulgaria, created strong class sectionalism between serfs
and the aristocracy, eradicating any real progress any of the rulers
had made since the Serbian revolution in the beginning of the
century. In terms of international relations, the Serbian government
really had only one sensible option: to retreat from international
politics and focus on creating domestic growth, similar to what
the United States chose to do after Washingtons farewell address
and the War of 1812, where it denounced international activism
in order to industrialize and out-compete European countries.51
If not domestic growth, then at least domestic stability should
have been at the forefront of the agenda. Instead, Serbia chose
to continue a radical policy, misled by the profoundly violent
conviction that if they did not displace and harm others to control
territory, they would be slaughtered.52
The final choice in the narrowing field of options was the
Pig War with Austria-Hungary in 1906. Pork, Serbias largest export,
held together the Serbian economy as a functional satellite to that
of Austria, its largest market. In fact, in 1906, the Serbian export
to import ratio of pork was almost 161%,53 suggesting the monu-

mental weight for its pork exports. After Serbia decided to import
arms from France in 1905 following a trade of 150,000 pigs from a
banker (hinting future aggression),54 it also enacted tariffs limiting
Austrian goods, and essentially closed the border in 1908.55 These
three actions led Austria to withhold buying Serbian pork while
initiating a blockade. That year itself, the export to import ratio
declined to 100% within Serbia.56 However, in the years leading up
to the blockade, Serbia had already created contingency plans with
Bulgaria beginning in April 1904. It conducted secret commercial
negotiations until 1905, although the Serbian-Bulgarian Customs
Union wasnt effective until 1906,57 when Serbian-Austrian hostil-
ity rose. In Nyes eyes, the compound issues regarding importing
French ammunitions as well as going behind Austrias back to
negotiate trade deals with Bulgaria would have induced Austrian
hostility, and certainly Serbia saw it as potentially provocative. At
tremendous cost, Serbian ships went around the continent to bypass
the blockade. Subjecting conflict to self-interest, Serbia became
overly selfish and jeopardized its economic relations in the Balkans.
Stronger, however, was the anger procured by Austrias blockade,
which prompted aggression towards Austria in the Black Hands
assassination of Franz Ferdinand by Dimitrijevi, the commander
of the Serbian army and its intelligence agency. Dimitrijevi was
already hailed as a radical by assassinating Serbian pro-Austrian
King Aleksander I in an event historically labeled as the May
Coup on May 28, 1903.58 The same officers who helped him plan
the assassination of the king in his royal palace presumably aided
him in the next step: attacking the Austrian heir. From this coup,
the Serbian government formerly under the House of Obrenovi
switched to the House of Karadordevi, one more aligned to the
interests of Russia and France than Austria.59 The assassination of
Franz Ferdinand was yet another demonstration of Dimitrijevis
hatred towards Austria, and the final step in the funnel of choices
leading to warfare.
After the assassination, the only viable option to resolve the
power struggle in Europe was war. One intriguing and substantial
demonstration of Serbian military overconfidence was seen in the
110 Shrey Agarwal
response to the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum stating that Serbia

must agree To take judicial proceedings against accessories to the
plot of the 28th of June who are on Serbian territory; delegates of
the Austro-Hungarian Government will take part in the investiga-
tion relating thereto.60 Austria knew that this demand violated the
Serbian constitution, drafted mid-19th century, which prohibited
foreign officials from influencing internal Serbian affairs. Having
an Austrian commissioner enter the country and inspect operations
was a direct violation of this constitutional term. Even so, Serbias
denial of Austrian terms expanded far beyond concern for their
constitutions inviolability. Serbia wanted warthey wanted to
establish hegemony as well as homogeneity in the area.
Conclusion
War was the culmination of a hundred years of geographical
circumstances and government decisions, fostering nationalism
and hatred simultaneously, stunting Serbian development, and
twisting the nations point of view until it seemed the only option.
The Great War showed how powerful nationalism was
when manipulated by government. Slobodan Milosevic used this
same reasoning to pursue and justify genocide in Serbia during
the end of the 20th century,61 tracing grievances all the way back
to Ottoman rule. Although the Great War only lasted 4 years, it
projected the turmoil in Serbia across the rest of the region, ironi-
cally pushing back the Pan-Slavic movement by decades because
of unstable political conditions in the region with the breakup of
both the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires. The irony lay
in the idea that Serbia engaged in war in the hopes of pursuing
Pan-Slavism in the Balkan region. Ultimately, Pan-Slavism was
not achieved, nor did Serbia become any larger, instead it lost its
sovereignty to the combined province of Yugoslavia that emerged
after the war. The level of international involvement in the war
detracted from Serbias goal, by introducing both trench and
global warfare, which decimated the European landscape and
threw Pan-Slavism to the back of the European agenda. Had
the European alliance system not resulted in such a large-scale
conflict, perhaps Pan-Slavic efforts could have been preserved.

However, the Yugoslavia that emerged in 1918 was so rooted in
turmoil that nothing sizeable could be achieved until it finally col-
lapsed alongside the Soviet Union between 1989-1991,62 enabling
the emergence of modern-day Serbia.
In the war reparations clause, the Treaty of Versailles (1919)
blamed Germany for the conflict and crippled its economy.63 In
reality, although not held responsible, Serbia shares the burden of
triggering the Great War due to a mixture of flawed government
policies and the uprising of uncontrolled nationalist sentiment.
Being among the victors, Serbia naturally set some of the terms and
levied the blame on the defeated. However, an analysis of Serbian
policies and actions preceding the war show how important early
political and cultural developments were to Serbias incitement
of World War I.
112 Shrey Agarwal
Endnotes
1
Charles Jelavich and Barbara Jelavich, The Establishment
of the Balkan National States: 1804-1920 (St. Louis: University of
Washington Press, 1977) p. 35 The Serbs were given certain
autonomous rights and the Russians arbitrated Turkish
movement out of the country.
2
Gabor Agosten and Bruce Alan Masters, Encyclopedia
of the Ottoman Empire (New York: Infobase Publishing, 2009)
pp. 518-519 The last Ottoman soldiers did not leave until
the year 1867, and Serbia only became fully recognized as an
independent entity in 1878, after the Congress of Berlin
3
John Cox. Revived Serbia: The Wars of Independence and the
Building of a New Country. The History of Serbia (Connecticut:
Greenwood Press, 2002) p. 40 Reference to David Mackenzie
4
Ibid., p. 43
5
Steven Sowards. Twenty-Five Lectures on Modern Balkan
History (East Lansing: Michigan State University, 1996)
http://staff.lib.msu.edu/sowards/balkan/Lecture No. 5
discusses the effects of the Homestead Acts, which banned the
subdivision of farms and protected peasants from usurers and
bankruptcies as well, angering the aristocracy.
6
Sowards, Lecture No. 5
7
Nationalism. 2015. In Merriam-Webster.com. Retrieved
February 26, 2015, from http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/nationalism. Nationalism in the simplest tense is
defined as loyalty and devotion to ones nation.
8
Cox, p. 49
9
Oskar Jszi. The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy
(Chicago University Press, 1929) p. 28 Shows the partisanship
against the Serbs with the new Dual Monarchy.
10
David Stevenson. Cataclysm: The First World War as Political
Tragedy (New York: Basic, 2004) p. 174 The July Crisis refers
to the period after the assassination on June 28th when
the European alliance system was tested and the Austrian
ultimatum was delivered to Serbia. The constant rebellion
refers to Serbias rejection of the ultimatum terms and
continued aggression.
11
Rodolphe Archibald Reiss. The Kingdom of Serbia:
Infringements of the Rules and Laws of War Committed by the Austro-
Bulgaro-Germans; Letters of a Criminologist on the Macedonian Front
(London: University of Toronto, 1919) p. 64 This Herzegovina
uprising from 1852-1862 was the first of many. Led by Luka
Vukalovi, these uprisings were a way by which the Serbs and

the Croats could push for economic development in areas like
Montenegro, which emerged as a recognized entity by the end
of this first uprising.
12
A.J.P. Taylor. The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 18481918
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1956). P. 163 Cavour and
Garibaldi were successful in bringing together the two halves
of Italy: Cavour the north and Garibaldi the south. The two
men had different ideologies with Cavour being the more
romantic nationalist, although ultimately they achieved the
same goalItalian unification.
13
Norbert Elias. The Germans: Power Struggles and the
Development of Habitus in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1997) p. 33
14
Lawrence Swaim. Trauma Bond: An Inquiry into the Nature
of Evil (Alresford: John Hunt Publishing, 2013) p. 114 The
Serbians who joined the Black Hand, mostly army generals
and government officials were deluded into believing that
systematic terror through their acts would be the best way to
pursue Serbian goals of Pan-Slavism.
15
John Etty. Serbian Nationalism and the Great War (History
Today, March 2009) Etty questions other historians and their
use of primarily British sources to attribute the cause of the
Great War to Serbian nationalism, calling this a coy tactic.
16
17
Branimir Anzulovic. Heavenly Serbia: From Myth to Genocide
(New York: New York University Press, 1999) p. 2 The term
Heavenly Serbia refers to the pride that Serbians felt towards
their homeland following the Kosovo defeat, seen in records
of oral stories and tradition passed from one generation to the
next.
18
Anzulovic, p.14 The narrator directly blames the Serbian
defeat as the beginning of Serbian cultural decline throughout
the centuries, claiming that the oral stories from centuries past
were much richer.
19
Anzulovic, p. 76
20
Elias, p. 8 Elias compares the Germans to the Serbians
by taking a look at the Holy Roman Empire conglomerate
of German states and their transition into Prussia following
the Renaissance, relating that instance to the development of
independent Serbia during the 19th century.
21
Etty, The sacrifice of 30,000 Serbs was mythologized for
the centuries to come because each following generation
114 Shrey Agarwal
remembered the battle as a symbol of Turkish oppression.

However, Etty questions the impact of the Serbian revolution
because the Ottoman force they defeated in the 19th century
was quite different in terms of power than the one that
defeated them in the 14th.
22
Steven Pavlowitch. Serbia: The History of an Idea (New
York: New York University Press, 2002) p. 183 The Pan-Slavic
movement, often associated with the beginning of Romantic
Nationalism, inspired many Balkan states following the
French Revolution and Napoleons defeat at Waterloo. This
movement aimed at the unity of all Slavic peoples in Europe.
23
Cox, p.43
24
Jelavich, p. 207
Not only was Milos fearful of Karadordes return, but also
the Ottomans played a role in this assassination as they did
not want another uprising ruining the remaining power they
kept in the area. This assassination was controversial as it is
uncertain whether Karadorde wanted to regain power or
simply return to the country.
25
Pavlowitch, p. 145
26
Cox, p. 42
27
Anzulovic, p.268
28
Taylor, p. 183
29
Elias, p. 164
30
Cox, p. 61
31
Oles Smolansky. San Stefano, Treaty of (1878) (Encyclopedia
of the Modern Middle East and North Africa, 2004) San Stefano
was a peace treaty between Russia and the Ottoman Empire
ending the Russo-Turkish war and creating Bulgaria against
Serbian wishes, although the treaty did officially recognize
Serbia as a nation.
32
Taylor, p. 142
33
Cox, p. 73
34
Taylor, p. 116
35
Swaim, p. 123
36
Stevenson, p. 211
37
Swaim, p. 125
38
Stevenson, p. 234
39
Joseph Nye and David Welch. Understanding Global
Conflict and Cooperation: An Introduction to Theory and History
(Boston: Pearson Longman, 2011) p. 41 The levels of analysis
refer to long-term and short-term indicators for changes
in international relations, whether that be the level of the
individual, the state, or the international system. Most of the

issues here deal with the state level and the international
system level, as Serbia manifests its role in the global World
War.
40
Nye, p. 48 The funnel of choices looks at long-term and
short-term decisions which ultimately lead to an outcome
41
Gale Stokes. Politics as Development: The Emergence of
Political Parties in 19th Century Serbia (Durham: Duke University
Press, 1990) p. 66
42
Pavlowitch, p.189
43
Cox, p. 68
44
Swaim, p. 146
45
Steven Beller. Francis Joseph (Harlow: Addison Wesley
Longman, 1996) p. 9
46
Swaim, p. 80
47
Swaim, p. 84 Systematic repression refers to the political
repression of groups other than the Serbs in Serbia, essentially
limiting their political efficacy.
48
Cox, p. 70 The Serbo-Bulgarian war took place in
November 1885, lasting only two weeks. The war alarmed
Serbia because of the creation of greater Bulgaria in the
Balkans, which they felt threatened their Pan-Slavic efforts.
Austria promised Serbia territorial gains but the Serbians
instead lost their gains, ostracizing the Serbs from support of
the Austro-Hungarian Empire.
49
Albrecht Schnabel. Southeast European Security: Threats,
Responses, Challenges (New York: Nova Science Publications,
2002) p.25
50
51
George Herring. From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign
Relations since 1776 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008)
p. 62 Washingtons farewell address addressed U.S. non-
interventionism, but the war of 1812 made it inevitable.
Industrial growth during the 19th century rose exponentially
after the war of 1812, showing the effectiveness of non-
interventionist ideology, allowing the U.S. to outcompete
major powers like Germany and Britain in industrial output.
52
Swaim, p. 92
53
Glenny Misha. The Balkans 1804-1999: Nationalism, War
and the Great Powers (London: Granta, 1999) pp. 281-282 This
book references these statistics from the 1911 version of the
Encyclopedia Britannica. From the data, the trade balance
(in thousands GBP) showed a surplus of 436% in 1907, yet a
116 Shrey Agarwal
deficit of 6% the following year, highlighting the impact of the

measures taken against Serbia.
54
Misha, p.276
55
Stevenson, p.364
56
Misha, p. 281
57
Cox, p. 94
58
Stevenson, p. 478
59
Stevenson, p. 491
60
Austria-Hungary. The Austro-Hungarian Ultimatum to Serbia
(Vienna: Imperial and Royal Government, 1914) This article
stated that at any time, Austria-Hungary could send officials
to Serbia to check on the state, insinuating that Austria could
meddle in Serbian affairs through the government itself.
61
62
Sowards, Lecture No. 25 Sowards says most of the action
occurring in Yugoslav during this time period falls under
the senseless violence part of journalism, highlighting the
instability in the area
63
Elias, p. 304 The Treaty of Versailles forced Germany to
pay debts of the war, money it didnt possess, as well as give
up its most economically productive territories to France
under the guise that the area could be a target for aggression.
Effectively, the combination of these events left the German
government in tatters, with the value of the mark deflating
astronomically, while the victorious countries abstained from
accountability.
Bibliography
Anzulovic, Branimir. Heavenly Serbia: From Myth to Genocide.

New York: New York University Press, 1999. Print.
Austria-Hungary. The Austro-Hungarian Ultimatum to Serbia.
Vienna: Imperial and Royal Government. 1914. Print.
Basista, Jakub. Austro-Hungarian Ultimatum to Serbia and
the Serbian Reply. Milestone Documents. Accessed August
9, 2015. https://www.milestonedocuments.com/documents/
view/austro-hungarian-ultimatum-to-serbia-and-the-serbian-
reply.
Beller, Steven. A Concise History of Austria. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2006. Print.
Colovic, Ivan. Politics of Identity in Serbia. New York: New York
University Press, 2002. Print.
Cox, John K. Revived Serbia: The Wars of Independence
and the Building of a New Country. The History of Serbia.
Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 2002. Print.
Elias, Norbert. The Germans: Power Struggles and the
Development of Habitus in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries.
New York: Columbia University Press, 1997. Print.
Etty, John. 2009 Serbian Nationalism and the Great
War, History Today, last modified March 2009, accessed 12
April, 2015, http://www.historytoday.com/john-etty/serbian-
nationalism-and-great-war.
Fromkin, David. Europes Last Summer: Who Started the Great
War in 1914? New York: Random House, 2004. Print.
Kaplan, Robert D. Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History.
New York: St. Martins Press, 1993. Print.
Misha, Glenny. The Balkans 1804-1999: Nationalism, War and
the Great Powers. London: Granta, 1999. Print.
Mowat, R.B., Select Treaties and Documents to Illustrate the
Development of the Modern European States-System. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1915. pp.79-83. Print.
Nye, Joseph S., and David Welch. Understanding Global
Conflict and Cooperation: An Introduction to Theory and History.
Boston: Pearson Longman, 2011. Print.
Pavlowitch, Steven K. Serbia: The History of an Idea. New York:
New York University Press, 2002. Print.
Reiss, Rodolphe Archibald. The Kingdom of Serbia:
Infringements of the Rules and Laws of War Committed by the Austro-
Bulgaro-Germans; Letters of a Criminologist on the Macedonian Front.
London: University of Toronto, 1919. Print.
118 Shrey Agarwal
Schnabel, Albrecht. Southeast European Security: Threats,

Responses, Challenges. New York: Nova Science Publications,
2002. pp.23-59. Print.
Serbia. Serbian Response to Austro-Hungarian Ultimatum.
Belgrade: Royal Government. 23 July 1914. Print.
Smolansky, Oles M. San Stefano, Treaty of (1878)
Encyclopedia of the Modern Middle East and North Africa. 2004.
Encyclopedia.com. 9 March 2015
Sowards, Steven. Twenty-Five Lectures on Modern Balkan
History. East Lansing: Michigan State University, 1996. Web.
http://staff.lib.msu.edu/sowards/balkan/
Stevenson, David. Cataclysm: The First World War as Political
Tragedy. New York: Basic, 2004. Print.
Stokes, Gale. Politics as Development: The Emergence of Political
Parties in 19th Century Serbia. Durham: Duke University Press,
1990. Print.
Swaim, Lawrence. Trauma Bond: An Inquiry into the Nature of
Evil. Alresford: John Hunt Publishing, 2013. Print.
Taylor, A.J.P. The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 18481918.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1956. pp. 156-194. Print.
Taylor, A.J.P. Origins of the Second Great War. London: Hamish
Hamilton Publishers, 1961. Print
THE KOREAN WAR OUTBREAK:

HOW A SURPRISE ATTACK CHANGED
U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AGAINST
COMMUNISM IN ASIA
Cathy Wu
On June 25 , 1950, North Korean troops alarmed

th
Americans and the world by crossing the 38th parallel with the
intention to conquer South Korea in three weeks and to integrate
the entire Korean Peninsula under the communist regime.1 This
attack, approved by the Soviet Union and Maos communist China,
occurred under all three countries assumption that the United
States and the United Nations would not intervene. Up to that time,
the U.S. had undertaken very limited involvement in protecting
South Korea and containing communism in Asia in general, for it
devoted most of its attention to communism in Europe.2 However,
as the communist countries had not expected, the attack actually
provoked a strong American response that foreshadowed many
of the U.S.s subsequent foreign affairs in the East. The outbreak
of the Korean War triggered the Truman administrations foreign
policy change from limited containment of communism in Asia
Cathy Wu is a Junior at the Lawrenceville School in Lawrenceville, New

Jersey, where she wrote this paper for Mr. David S. Figuera-Ortizs Forces
that Shaped the Modern World course in 2014/2015.
120 Cathy Wu
to full diplomatic and military involvement in countering com-

munism in Asia, thus causing the U.S. to assume its role as a global
leader, (with the support of the UN).
At the end of World War II, the U.S. was largely concerned
with protecting Eastern Europe because of a series of communist
advances from the Soviets. During the Potsdam Conference, the
Soviet Union refused to compromise on certain postwar settle-
ments in Europe, leading to the beginning of a West-East divide
in Europe between the free world and the communist world.3 In
the following months at the meetings of the Council of Foreign
Ministers, more Soviet-Western disagreements over territories,
atomic weapons control, and U.S. economic aid caused the
former Soviet-Western alliance to end.4 On February 9, 1946,
Stalin announced his fourth Five-Year Plan, which emphasized
a buildup of heavy industry and the military, further angering
Western nations.5 Subsequently, U.S. ambassador George F. Ken-
nan wrote his Long Telegram, a document that outlined the
inevitability of the Soviet threat and urged Americans to resist
Soviet expansionism.6 Kennan further expounded his theories
in a 1947 article for Foreign Affairs magazine, arguing that the
expansionist tendencies of the Soviet Union necessitated an ac-
tive Western opposition that would contain the Soviet Union.7
However, Kennans ideology, which many Americans fol-
lowed, entailed a limited containment policy that implied a focus
on mainly the Western world. He believed that the U.S. could not
afford to indiscriminately protect all regions that were in potential
danger of a communist takeover. Instead, the U.S. had to priori-
tize the areas that were at the most risk.8 According to Kennan:
The limitations on [what] this nation, or any other single na-
tion, can accomplish with that margin of its energies and mate-
rial production which it can afford to devote to outside affairs are
greater than we are often inclined to remember. It is imperative,
therefore, that we economize with our limited resources and that
we apply them where we feel that they will do the most good.9
Under this assumption, many of Kennans followers be-
lieved that U.S. military defense and economic aid would
do the most good in Europe and should therefore be con-

centrated on certain European areas instead of elsewhere.
The U.S. devoted sizable troops and substantial resources
to Europe to counter the communist pressure it perceived from
that continent. When Britain withdrew its economic and military
support from Greece and Turkey in 1947, President Harry S.
Truman announced the Truman Doctrine, asking Congress for
$400 million to assist the Greek government against the Greek
Communist Party and to protect Turkey from general communist
threats.10 A year later, the Marshall Plan dedicated $13 billion to
helping Europeans recover from the war and establish strong
economies so that Western nations could have the economic and
social bases for free political systems. In addition to these long-
term commitments to European security, the U.S. also responded
to short-term threats with sufficient counteractive efforts. When
the Soviet Union blocked all land routes around the western-
occupied part of Berlin, the U.S. worked with Britain to execute
the Berlin Airlift for almost a year, until the Russians discontinued
the blockade.11 To further ensure political and military stability in
Europe, the U.S. signed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
treaty in 1949, forming a defensive alliance connecting together
itself, Canada, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Iceland, Denmark, and
the countries that were part of the earlier Treaty of Brussels.12
While committing to the defense of Europe, the U.S.
avoided overspending its energy and resources elsewhere. Since
it considered Asia a peripheral interest compared to Europe, it
allocated less attention toward communist advances in Asia. For
instance, the situation with the Chinese civil war demonstrated
that, although the U.S. did become involved in Asia, it refrained
from a full-scale intervention. Initially, the 1945 Marshall Mission
to China attempted to negotiate a coalition of the Nationalist
and communist governments, but the effort failed and civil war
continued in China.13 Afterward, Patrick Hurley, an American
ambassador to China, accused the Truman administration of sid-
ing with the Chinese communists. Critics such as Hurley noted
that the Marshall Mission had been willing to let the communists
122 Cathy Wu
partially rule China whereas U.S. sought noncommunist govern-

ments in Europe. In this way, the Truman administration was not
applying containment policy equally in Europe and Asia, but
instead underestimating the importance of Asia in the power
struggle between communists and the free world. Furthermore,
despite spending resources on China, the government was help-
ing China in an uncoordinated and hesitant manner, as opposed
to its firm and assertive approach in Europe.14 Washington rarely
gave Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-Shek the full aid that he re-
quested, and it even reduced the munitions sent to China in the
years 1946 and 1947.15 Truman administration leaders justified
their limited support by explaining to the American people
that China, unlike European countries, was too large and full of
difficult terrain, making military intervention hard to manage.
Therefore, these American government leaders would not spend
an even larger sum of money on an initiative that had such un-
certain results.16 As Secretary of State Dean Acheson explained:
[Full-scale] intervention would have required the expenditure
of even greater sums than have been fruitlessly spent thus far,
the command of Nationalist armies by American officers, and
the probable participation of American armed forcesland, sea,
and airin the resulting war. Intervention of such a scope and
magnitude would have been resented by the mass of the Chinese
people, would have diametrically reversed our historic policy,
and would have been condemned by the American people . . .
Acheson thought the U.S. did not have the ability to change the
outcome of the Chinese civil war because the failure of the National-
ists stemmed from their own loss of faith in themselves and could
only be remedied if the Nationalists fixed their own internal prob-
lems.17 He also underestimated the potential impact of a communist
takeover in China, thinking that helping China was not worth the
valuable funds that could be used to continue the Marshall Plan.
With this mindset, the U.S. did not use its full capacity to help China,
and the Chinese Communists eventually took over China. Some
Americans attributed the loss of China to the decisions of Acheson
and others who agreed with him.18 In these critics opinion, the
U.S. might have been able to expel the Chinese communist forces
had policymakers correctly viewed the Chinese civil war as a large

security threat and supplied more military aid to Nationalist China.
Around the same time, President Harry S. Truman con-
curred with Acheson that the U.S. should not interfere too heavily
in Asian affairs. After the Chinese Communist Party conquered
China and the Nationalists fled to Formosa, Truman stated, The
United States has no desire to obtain special rights or privileges
or to establish military bases on Formosa at this time. Nor does
it have any intention of utilizing its Armed Forces to interfere in
the present situation. He believed that Formosa had the capacity
to defend itself against communist encroachment from Mainland
China and that the U.S. should not involve itself militarily in a
Chinese civil conflict.19 This strategy in dealing with Formosa
reflected his general view that Asian peoples had responsibility
for their own governments and that, by unnecessarily intruding,
the U.S. would only provoke other nations anger and blame.
Under the influence of Truman, Acheson, and other
likeminded individuals, the U.S. government limited its Pacific
foreign influence to a certain predetermined region. Acheson had
drawn a defensive perimeter that ran from the Aleutians to Japan,
then through the Ryukyu Islands and finally to the Philippines,
excluding other Asian regions including Taiwan and Korea. This
defensive perimeter marked the area where the U.S. promised
to provide aid. In Achesons Speech on the Far East, he noted
that the American government could not guarantee military
assistance to any Asian countries outside U.S.s Asian defensive
perimeter. According to him, U.S. military aid in those outside
areas was impractical and unnecessary, for Asian peoples should
control their own nations success, and the U.S. military forces
may not always be capable of solving aggression problems in Asia.20
As the U.S. government proceeded with Achesons decision, it
assumed the role of a cautious bystander that did not deem itself
capable of or obligated to intrude extensively in Asian affairs.
While this policy was in place, an ongoing debate occurred
within Washington over whether the U.S. should expend more
effort on protecting Asia. One faction of policymakers argued that
124 Cathy Wu
the U.S. needed to engage in a more involved anti-communist

endeavor in Asia and start strengthening American troops in
Asia. Even though this military proposal was beyond the U.S.s
military capacity at the time, this faction believed that the changes
were necessary to prevent Stalin from controlling more of Asia
and making it impossible for the U.S. and its allies to defeat the
expanded communist forces. The opposing faction argued that
the U.S. should not undertake imprudent ventures for controlling
communism in Asia. They believed that the U.S. had to allocate
its limited resources and military power mostly to Europe, for
the U.S.s economic capacity could not support full foreign in-
tervention on a global scale. In fact, these ventures in Asia might
sacrifice the U.S.s position of influence in Europe, a position
gained through the successful Truman Doctrine and Marshall
Plan.21 Back then, the latter faction prevailed in the government.
Prior to the Korean War, Korea had been a region of inter-
national conflict for years. It was a Japanese colony from 1910 to
the end of WWII. Following the removal of Japanese forces from
the peninsula, it lacked a colonial power or a native government
that could resume political rule. Thus, the Korean peninsula was
divided into various political groups, with the two major ones
being the communist revolutionaries in the North led by Kim
II-Sung and a noncommunist faction in the South led by Syng-
man Rhee. Meanwhile, the U.S. and the Soviet Union sought to
occupy Korea. In 1945, the two powers divided Korea at the 38th
parallel so that the Soviets occupied Kims northern region while
the Americans occupied Rhees southern region.22 During the
next few years, the Soviet Union and the U.S. failed to reach an
agreement on the terms of the unification of Korea. The hostil-
ity between North Korea and South Korea only grew as their two
occupying powers escalated the global competition for control.23
Although the U.S. occupied one side of a progressively
polarizing peninsula, it was nevertheless reluctant to overspend
on troops in South Korea. The members of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff thought, the U.S. has little strategic interest in maintaining
its present troops and bases in Korea. The April 1948 National
Security Council file on Korea reasoned that the U.S. should only
offer conditional support to South Koreahelp South Korea only
to the extent that existing resources would allow and not dedicate
itself to a full commitment from which it could not disengage.24
The U.S. governments choices regarding Korea resembled its
decisions in China and elsewhere in Asia, decisions that came
from the cautious government faction that was adverse to inter-
vention in Asia. As a consequence, without enough restraining
presence from foreign troops, the tension between the two parts
of Korea grew and opened up more possibility for aggression.25
During the period leading up to the Korean War, Asias
power dynamics shifted in favor of communism, causing Americans
to reconsider the significance of communist threat in Asia. By the
second half of 1949, the Soviet Union had successfully developed
an atomic bomb, ending the U.S. monopoly on nuclear weapons.
This new Soviet advantage reduced the American power to deter
Soviet expansion, as America was no longer the only country that
possessed the nuclear bomb. In October of the same year, the
Chinese Communist Party came to power. Moreover, the Soviet
Union united more closely with communist China in the 1950
Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance,
signed after Truman and Acheson made their two aforementioned
statements. Unlike the 1945 Sino-Soviet Treaty between Stalin and
Chiang Kai-Shek, this treaty occurred between Stalin and Mao,
thus uniting two communist powers. The two parties promised to
protect each other against foreign threats, to not participate in
any alliances aimed against the other party, to consult each other
in issues regarding their common interests, and to strengthen
their economic cooperation.26 These terms implied that, if Maos
government were to invade Formosa or if the Soviet Union were to
support North Koreas plan to attack South Korea, then the U.S.
would have to face the combined forces of these two communist
countries in any attempt to intervene. In an America already con-
cerned about how its past actions might have allowed a communist
victory in China and motivated the Soviets to take more risks in
Korea and Southeast Asia, these new power shifts prompted some
people to question their governments current foreign policies.
126 Cathy Wu
Further criticisms from some Americans pressured the Tru-

man administration to reconsider its non-interventional policies.
John Foster Dulles, a Republican politician who criticized Americas
containment policy in his book, War or Peace, contended that Tru-
mans defensive policies in Asia were not sufficiently protecting
the world from communism. His book argued that the Truman
administration had grown complacent because of the general
triumph over communism in Western Europe through NATO, the
Truman Doctrine, and the Marshall Plan. Stalin, however, had real-
ized his difficulty of expanding in Europe and had thus diverted
his focus to Asia. In Dulless opinion, this Soviet tactic was one
that the U.S. government had failed to recognize and prevent.27
According to Dulles, the communist victory in China and the
communist progress in Indochina demonstrated that Stalin was
making gains in Asia, and as a result of these communist successes
in Asia, there has been a very definite shift in the balance in the
world, and that shift has been in favor of Soviet Communism.28
Under the critiques of foreign policy analysts such as Dulles,
the government launched the drafting of NSC-68, a memoran-
dum written by the Policy Planning Staff under the supervision
of Paul Nitze.29 The document thoroughly reviewed U.S. defense
strategies and analyzed different possible future strategies: con-
tinuing existing policies, isolationism, war, or rapidly building
the power of the free world. It concluded that the U.S. needed to
execute the last optionto quickly increase political, economic,
and military involvement in protecting the free world.30 Nitze
believed that the U.S. could not simply keep the status quo and
defensively respond to Soviet advances. Instead, it needed to put
pressure on the Soviet Union and gradually wear away Soviet
power by having a long-term military commitment. In the NSC-
68s proposed strategy, all areas were vital, and the U.S. could not
afford to suffer any defeats, however small they may seem. After
all, the Soviets, backed by their atomic bomb, would continually
try to expand their power through subversion and proxy wars
around the globe. Thus, all areas were important enough for the
U.S. to try to protect, for any of them might affect the global po-
sition of the communists or the Western world.31 Regarding the

necessary means to accomplish this goal, the NSC-68 noted that
The frustration of the Kremlin design requires the free world to
develop a successfully functioning political and economic system
and a vigorous political offensive against the Soviet Union. These,
in turn, require an adequate military shield under which they
can develop. It is necessary to have the military power to deter, if
possible, Soviet expansion, and to defeat, if necessary, aggressive
Soviet or Soviet-directed actions of a limited or a total character.32
In particular, the U.S. was the leader of the free world going
against the Soviet Union, the other major power the world, so
the U.S. had the obligation to assemble enough military power
to overcome the Soviet Union and its allies.33 This conclusion
reflected the new awareness of having to contain communism in
Asia, and this awareness progressively developed as more commu-
nist advances in the East drew Americans attention and unease.
Despite having embraced the ideas of world leadership
outlined in the NSC-68, the Truman administration was unwill-
ing to implement the significant budgetary and military changes
required to increase involvement in the East. Since the NSC-68s
plans required a tripling of the national defense budget and a
greater mobilization of the military, Trumans administration
did not execute all these plans before the Korean War.34 Instead,
there was debate in the government over the economic implica-
tions, and the dissent prevented NSC-68 from passing Congress.
Opponents of NSC-68 wished to restrict the defense spending,35
and they contended that the communist threat was not as large
as the other side believed it to be. Proponents of NSC-68, includ-
ing Dulles, argued that the U.S. economy had the capacity to
support the necessary military expenses.36 They also emphasized
the urgency and great extent of the growing communist powers.
Amidst the debates, Truman decided to adhere to his planned
defense budget ceiling of $13.5 billion for 1951, a budget smaller
than the NSC-68s plans called for. In May of 1950, he even in-
formed a press conference, The defense budget next year will
be smaller than it is this yearand we are continually cutting it
by economies.37 He intended to cut the budget down to around
128 Cathy Wu
$5 billion to $7 billion.38 For Truman at that time, countering

communism in Asia was still less important than gaining support
through restraining national spending.39 With no major crisis to
push the administration into changing its policies, the ideas con-
tained in NSC-68 were not implemented before the Korean War.
Meanwhile, communism was taking a step in the East. For
a period since early 1949, North Korean leader Kim II-Sung had
been persistently seeking Stalins approval for an attack on South
Korea. Kim knew that North Korea needed the backing of larger
powers if it wanted to succeed in the military undertaking. At first,
Stalin cautioned North Korea against provoking a war through a
surprise invasion. He feared an intervention from the Americans
and a subsequent major confrontation. After some time, though,
Stalin felt more secure in authorizing the attack because Washing-
ton had given signals that it would not intervene much in the East.
Eventually, both China and the Soviet Union felt safe enough to
assent to the attack plan and offer support when needed. Finally
having attained the necessary approval, Kim ordered his forces
to invade across the 38th parallel, in June 1950, unintentionally
bringing the Americans and the United Nations into action.40
Because the U.S. government had already established and
seriously considered ideas about opposing Asian communism, the
outbreak of the Korean War triggered an immediate foreign policy
change in America. After the war started, Americans realized that
Stalin had allowed the war to proceed only because the U.S. had
expressed unwillingness to intervene in Asia and had removed
troops from South Korea.41 They realized that their passive actions
in Asia had emboldened Stalin. Within a few days of the attack,
Truman not only dispatched forces to Korea, but also declared
a new foreign policy that was very different from the previous
one. His statement on June 27th, two days after the North Korean
invasion, outlined four decisions he had made to counter com-
munism in the Pacific area. Firstly, he sent the 7th Fleet to Formosa
to preempt any attacks on the island. Secondly, he increased and
accelerated military aid to the Philippines. Thirdly, he ordered
accelerated military assistance to French forces in Indochina
and to the forces of the Associated States in Indochina. Lastly, he

declared that the U.S. would use force to uphold international
law since the North Korean aggression had violated the Charter
of the United Nations.42 Among these new changes, the Formosa
case exemplified how the Korean War outbreak prompted the
U.S. to expand its military power to areas outside the earlier Asian
defensive perimeter and to thereby oppose Achesons previous
principles. The decisions regarding the Philippines, Indochina,
and the enforcement of international law meant that the gov-
ernment began to spend more resources on defense in Asia.
As a matter of fact, the wars outbreak had validated some
pre-existing ideas of using more force to suppress communisms
growth in Asia. The attack had proved correct Dulless views about
the extent of potential communist aggression. Consequently, Tru-
man was very willing to consult Dulles and change U.S. interven-
tion strategies according to Dulless views, which included using
more force to impede Soviet risk-taking in spreading communist
rule.43 The administration fully embraced Dulless opinion that:
If our conduct indicates a continuing disposition to fall back and
allow doubtful areas to fall under Soviet Communist control, then
many nations will feel confirmed in the impression, already drawn
from the North Atlantic Treaty, that we do not expect to stand firm
short of the North Atlantic areaIf our conduct seems to confirm
that conclusion, then we can expect an accelerated deterioration of
our influence in the Mediterranean, Near East, Asia and the Pacific.44
Asian communism became a much more significant issue for
the U.S., as Americans realized the undeniable presence of
communist ambitions in Asia and the potential for these Asia
areas to substantially alter the power balance between the two
dominant ideologies in the world. As Truman said, The attack
upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that communism
has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent
nations and will now use armed invasion and war.45 With the
invasion, Truman had finally received enough incentive to take
action in tackling the issue in the East. The U.S. then operated
under the new assumption that, if the free world kept losing
130 Cathy Wu
influence in places such as Korea, then democracy will progres-

sively lose its position in Asia and communism would dominate.
The surprise invasion, furthermore, affirmed NSC-68s
claim that all small areas in Asia were vital interests that could shift
the global positions of communism and the free world, allowing
one to gain much greater influence than the other. Originally, NSC-
68 sat on Trumans shelves without formal authorization, but the
Korean War outbreak had proven the urgency of issues outlined
in NSC-68 and greatly helped it gain approval. After the Northern
attack, Truman implemented the strategies in NSC-68 and had
much less difficulty getting the necessary congressional funding.46
Contrary to the previously projected defense budget ceiling of $13.5
billion for the fiscal year 1951, Truman requested a total of $48.2
billion from Congress that year, exceeding the projected ceiling
by 257 percent.47 Thus, instead of fearing economic sacrifices for
the military as before, the Truman administration had become
aware that the U.S. must contribute a lot of economic resources to
protect the free world. In the Radio and Television Address to the
American People on the Situation in Korea, Truman requested
that the U.S. increase production to make us of its full economic
capacity so it could accommodate the added military spending.
He outlined three parts of an economic plan, two of which rallied
ordinary American citizens to contribute to the growth of national
military power. The first part was ensuring that the government
directed enough military supplies toward essential purposes and
refrained from wasting efforts on nonessential uses. The second
part was preventing inflation by limiting the use of credit and
raising taxes.48 This second part of his outline aimed to alter the
domestic economy in order to serve the needs of foreign defense
funding, a tactic that Truman had previously avoided. Thirdly,
Truman prepared to increase the production of goods used by
the military, offering government assistance to industries and
calling the businessmen and workers to join in the effort.49 Over-
all, the Truman administration took various kinds of nationwide
economic measures to ensure that U.S. would have the economic
and military capacity to carry out NSC-68s proposed plans. These
new sacrifices and adjustments reflected the administrations
determination to execute its new foreign policy, for it had begun

to view communism prevention in many third-world Asian coun-
tries as absolutely essential and worth the budgetary implications.
Not only was the entire nation going to join together on
the efforts of a new economic plan, but the government had also
agreed on a new ideology that guided its subsequent actions. The
first part of this ideology, as Truman explained, is that The free
nations have learned the fateful lesson of the 1930s. That lesson
is that aggression must be met firmly. Appeasement would lead
only to further aggression and ultimately to war.50 After all, at
the onset of World War II, the other European nations attempt
to appease German and Japanese ambitions only further fueled
these two nations confidence and aggression. Likewise, in Asian
countries, a continued lack of defensive measures would likely
encourage communists to advance into more territories, pos-
sibly leading to a major confrontation between the free world
and the communist world and possibly causing another world
war. Secondly, the communists had proven themselves to be ag-
gressive powers that endangered the moral principles of the free
world. For Truman, [a]n act of aggression such as [the invasion
by North Korea] creates a very real danger to the security of all
free nations. The attack upon Korea was an outright breach of
the peace and a violation of the Charter of the United Nations.
Since the communists were willing to conduct such lawless ag-
gression, Truman emphasized that the United Nations and the
rest of the free world must promptly respond to the threat in
order to ensure global safety.51 Thirdly, the U.S. believed that
WWII had already positioned it as a world leader. Whereas Europe
was in ruins after the war, the U.S. suffered no damage and had
an economy that grew remarkably during the war. In terms of its
military, the U.S. possessed the worlds biggest Navy, the worlds
strongest Air Force, an imposing Army, and the nuclear bomb.52
Thus, the U.S. must play the most proactive role in fighting com-
munism, for no other country would have the ability to do so if
Americans withdrew their involvement. Our country stands be-
fore the world, Truman conveyed to the American people, as an
example of how free men, under God, can build a community of
132 Cathy Wu
neighbors, working together for the good of all. That is the goal
we seek not only for ourselves, but for all people.53 The U.S. felt
a heavier responsibility for the entire worlda sense of obligation
to protect not just Europe, but Asia and the rest of the globe as
well. Accordingly, since the start of the Korean War, it has more
actively countered gradual, piecemeal communist aggression in
the East. In all, the shift from Kennans containment policy to
the NSC-68 ideology indicated the drastic contrast between the
administrations prewar and postwar mindsets. Whereas the old
foreign policy was a Europe-centered, limited containment effort,
the new NSC-68 strategy consisted of more active prevention, and it
involved a lot of attention to Asia, Europe, and the world as a whole.
These policy changes enacted at the onset of the Korean
War not only applied to Asia during the period of the war, but
also significantly impacted subsequent U.S. foreign affairs around
the globe. Essentially, the NSC-68 ideologies embraced during the
war provided a basis for many later actions toward communism.
Between 1950 and 1953, the U.S. signed a series of defense and
peace treaties with Asian countries such as Japan, Korea, and
the Philippines to reinforce its position of power in Asia, and
many of these treaties last to the present day.54 During the entire
decade after the start of the war, the national security expenses
always stayed above 50 percent of the federal budget.55 In the
same decade, the U.S. also globalized its alliances that previously
stayed within Europe; it created the SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty
Organization) to counter communism in Southeast Asia, and it
soon joined its Asian and European alliances in the Baghdad Pact,
which later became CENTO (Center Treaty Organization).56 Be-
sides strengthening its forces in Asia, the U.S. also permanently
stationed troops in Europe and worked toward integrating West
Germany into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.57 Fur-
thermore, NSC-68 ideas provided the foundation for Americas
overall Cold War strategy in the ensuing years.58 When the U.S.
faced communist threat in places such as Cuba, Vietnam, and
Russia, it took preventive measures of eliminating or trying to
eliminate suspected pro-Soviet leaders.59 On the whole, this new
method of preventing potential communist development around
the globe requires several times more effort and resources than
the old method of limited containment. Yet, as Truman informed
Americans, We know that the cost of freedom is high. But we are
determined to preserve our freedomno matter what the cost.60
Thus, lessons from the Korean War have justified extensive mili-
tary expenditures and international involvement up to this day.
Today, many might view the Korean War as a forgotten
war, perhaps because no borders changed as a result of the war,
and no considerable shift in power balance seemed to take place
immediately afterward. However, by showing the U.S. how far
the communist movement would go, this war was the crucial,
final nudge in a chain of policy reconsiderations in Washington,
prompting the implementation of NSC-68. Before the war, the
U.S. was new to its world leader position and in an experimental
stage of debating, forming, and testing new policies. Afterward,
Washington had reached a consensus on foreign policy against
communism; the leaders fully developed the overarching prin-
ciples and ideology for all future foreign affairs with Asian com-
munism and communism in general. Their revised approach
was stabilized, and it lasted through subsequent Democratic
and Republican presidencies alike. As a result of the new policy,
the U.S. became not just an active defender of the free world in
Europe, but a defender of Asia and the entire free world. There-
fore, the Korean War led to policy changes that had a lasting his-
torical impact; these changes raised the U.S. to the position of a
global power that leads the world through its strategy and actions.
134 Cathy Wu
Endnotes
1
David Halberstam, The Coldest Winter: America and the Cold
War (New York: Hyperion, 2007), 1.
2
Alice Lyman Miller and Richard Wich, Becoming Asia:
Change and Continuity in Asian World Relations Since World War II
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), 68-69.
3
Robert J. McMahon, The Cold War: A Very Short
Introduction, Very Short Introductions (New York, NY: Oxford
University Press, 2003), 22-24.
4
Ibid., 25.
5
Ukraine, in Encyclopaedia Britannica, http://ezproxy.
lawrenceville.org:2216/EBchecked/topic/612921/
Ukraine/30083/Soviet-Ukraine-in-the-postwar-
period?anchor=ref404626 (accessed July 5, 2015).
6
George F. Kennan, The Long Telegram, February
22, 1946, Harry S. Truman Library and Museum, https://www.
trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/coldwar/
documents/pdf/6-6.pdf (accessed July 2, 2015).
7
George F. Kennan, in Encyclopaedia Britannica, http://
ezproxy.lawrenceville.org:2216/EBchecked/topic/314760/
George-F-Kennan?anchor=ref251367 (accessed July 5, 2015).
8
John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical
Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 30.
9
George F. Kennan, Address to the Academy of Political
Science, November 10, 1949, Box 1, Kennan Papers, Seeley
Mudd Library, Princeton.
10
McMahon, The Cold War: A Very Short Introduction. Very
Short Introductions. New York, NY: Oxford University Press,
2003. 28.
11
United States, in Encyclopaedia Britannica, http://
United-States/77885/The-United-States-since-1945#ref613164
(accessed July 5, 2015).
12
McMahon, 33.
13
Marshall Mission, in Encyclopaedia Britannica, http://
Marshall-Mission (accessed July 5, 2015).
14
Thomas G. Patterson, Meeting the Communist Threat:
Truman to Reagan (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989),
55-56.
15
Ibid., 60.
16
Ibid., 65.
17
Dean Acheson on United States Position in China,
August 5, 1949, Modern History Sourcebook, http://legacy.
fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1949-acheson-china.html
18
Patterson, 70-71.
19
Harry S. Truman, The Presidents News Conference,
1950, in Harry S. Truman 1945-1953 (Washington D.C.:
United States Government Printing Office, 1950), http://
trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=574&st=&st1=
(accessed April 15, 2015).
20
Speech on the Far East, Central Intelligence Agency,
http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_
conversions/44/1950-01-12.pdf (accessed April 21, 2015).
21
C. L. Sulzberger, U.S. Policy Makers Divide On Blocking
Soviet in Asia, New York Times, January 17, 1949.
22
Korean War, in Encyclopaedia Britannica, http://ezproxy.
lawrenceville.org:2216/EBchecked/topic/322419/Korean-
War (accessed July 5, 2015).
23
William Stueck, Korean War: An International History
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 3.
24
A Report to the President by the National Security
Council on the Position of the United States with Respect to
Korea, April 2, 1948, Harry S. Truman Library and Museum,
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/
koreanwar/documents/index.php?pagenumber=1&document
date=&documentid=kr-7-1 (accessed July 5, 2015).
25
Miller and Wich, 67.
26
Conclusion of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship,
Alliance and Mutual Assistance, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of the Peoples Republic of China, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/
mfa_eng/ziliao_665539/3602_665543/3604_665547/t18011.
shtml (accessed July 2, 2015).
27
Richard H. Immerman, John Foster Dulles: Piety,
Pragmatism, and Power in U.S. Foreign Policy (Wilmington, DE:
Scholarly Resources, 1999), 31.
28
John Foster Dulles, War or Peace (New York:
Harrap.1950), quoted in Immerman, John Foster Dulles,
(Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1999), 31.
29
Gaddis, 88.
30
A Report to the National Security Council - NSC 68,
April 12, 1950, Harry S. Truman Library and Museum, https://
136 Cathy Wu
www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/
coldwar/documents/pdf/10-1.pdf (accessed July 2, 2015).
31
Hal Brands, What Good Is Grand Strategy?: Power and
Purpose in American Statecraft from Harry S. Truman to George W.
Bush (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014), 46.
32
A Report to the National Security Council - NSC 68.
33
Efstathios T. Fakiolas, Kennans Long Telegram and
NSC-68: A Comparative Theoretical Analysis. (George Kennan,
National Security Council Memorandum), East European
Quarterly 31, no. 4 (January 1, 1998).
34
35
S. Nelson Drew, ed., NSC-68: Forging the Strategy of
Containment with Analyses by Paul H. Nitze (Washington D.C.:
National Defense University Press, 1996), 3.
36
Gaddis, 99.
37
Ibid., 113.
38
Drew, 3.
39
40
Ibid., 68-69.
41
William Stueck, Rethinking the Korean War: A New
Diplomatic and Strategic History (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2002), 214-215.
42
Harry S. Truman, Statement by the President on the
Situation in Korea, 1950, in Harry S. Truman 1945-1953
(Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing
Office, 1950), http://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/
viewpapers.php?pid=800 (accessed April 15, 2015).
43
Immerman, 30.
44
Neal H. Petersen et al., eds., Volume VI, East Asia
and the Pacific, 1950, Foreign Relations of the United
States (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1976), Document 183, https://history.state.gov/
historicaldocuments/frus1950v06/d183 (accessed July 2,
2015).
45
Truman, Statement by the President on the Situation in
Korea.
46
Gaddis, 109.
47
Ibid., 113.
48
Harry S. Truman, Radio and Television Report to
the American People on the Situation in Korea, 1950, in
Harry S. Truman 1945-1953 (Washington D.C.: United States
Government Printing Office, 1950), http://trumanlibrary.
org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=861&st=&st1= (accessed
April 15, 2015).
49
Ibid.
50
Ibid.
51
Ibid.
52
Patterson, 41-42.
53
Truman, Radio and Television Report to the American
People on the Situation in Korea.
54
U.S. Strategic and Defense Relationships in the Asia-
Pacific Region, Doc. (2007).
55
Chester J. Pach, Korea, Impact of, in U.S. History
in Context, ed. John P. Resch (Detroit: Macmillan
Reference, 2005), http://ic.galegroup.com/ic/uhic/
ReferenceDetailsPage/ReferenceDetailsWindow?failOverType
=&query=&prodId=UHIC&windowstate=normal&contentMod
ules=&display-query=&mode=view&displayGroupName=Refer
ence&limiter=&u=lawr21149&currPage=&disableHighlighting
=false&displayGroups=&sortBy=&source=&search_within_resu
lts=&p=UHIC%3AWHIC&action=e&catId=&activityType=&sca
nId=&documentId=GALE%7CCX3427300384 (accessed April
15, 2015).
56
57
Pach.
58
Gordon R. Mitchell and Robert P. Newman, By Any
Measures Necessary: NSC-68 and the Cold War Roots of the
2002 National Security Strategy (working paper, University of
Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA, May 2006), 1.
59
Ibid., 6-7.
60
Truman, Radio and Television Address to the American
People on the Situation in Korea.
138 Cathy Wu
Bibliography
Brands, Hal. What Good Is Grand Strategy?: Power and Purpose
in American Statecraft from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush.
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014.
Central Intelligence Agency. Speech on the Far East.
Central Intelligence Agency. http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/
default/files/document_conversions/44/1950-01-12.pdf
Digital History. Digital History. http://www.digitalhistory.
uh.edu/index.cfm (accessed July 5, 2015).
Drew, S. Nelson, ed. NSC-68: Forging the Strategy of
Containment with Analyses by Paul H. Nitze. Washington D.C.:
National Defense University Press, 1996.
Dulles, John Foster. War or Peace, New York: Harrap,1950.
Fakiolas, Efstathios T. Kennans Long Telegram and NSC-
68: A Comparative Theoretical Analysis. (George Kennan,
National Security Council Memorandum). East European
Quarterly 31, no. 4 (January 1, 1998).
Gaddis, John Lewis. Strategies of Containment: A Critical
Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War.
New York: Oxford University Press, 1982.
George F. Kennan. In Encyclopaedia Britannica. http://
George-F-Kennan?anchor=ref251367 (accessed July 5, 2015).
Halberstam, David. The Coldest Winter: America and the Cold
War. New York: Hyperion, 2007.
Harry S. Truman Library and Museum. United States
Government Printing Office. http://www.trumanlibrary.org
Immerman, Richard H. John Foster Dulles: Piety, Pragmatism,
and Power in U.S. Foreign Policy. Wilmington, DE: Scholarly
Resources, 1999.
Kennan, George F. Address to the Academy of Political
Science. November 10, 1949. Box 1. Kennan Papers. Seeley
Mudd Library, Princeton.
Korean War. In Encyclopaedia Britannica. http://ezproxy.
lawrenceville.org:2216/EBchecked/topic/322419/Korean-War
Marshall Mission. In Encyclopaedia Britannica. http://
Marshall-Mission (accessed July 5, 2015).
McMahon, Robert J. The Cold War: A Very Short Introduction.

Very Short Introductions. New York, NY: Oxford University
Press, 2003.
Miller, Alice Lyman, and Richard Wich. Becoming Asia:
Change and Continuity in Asian World Relations Since World War II.
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Peoples Republic of China.
Conclusion of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance
and Mutual Assistance. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Peoples Republic of China. http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_
eng/ziliao_665539/3602_665543/3604_665547/t18011.shtml
Mitchell, Gordon R., and Robert P. Newman. By Any
Measures Necessary: NSC-68 and the Cold War Roots of the
2002 National Security Strategy. Working paper, University of
Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA, May 2006.
Modern History Sourcebook. Fordham University. http://
legacy.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/modsbook.asp (accessed July
5, 2015).
Pach, Chester J. Korea, Impact of. In U.S. History
in Context, edited by John P, Resch. Detroit: Macmillan
Reference USA, 2005. http://ic.galegroup.com/ic/uhic/
ReferenceDetailsPage/ReferenceDetailsWindow?failOverType=
&query=&prodId=UHIC&windowstate=normal&contentModul
es=&display-query=&mode=view&displayGroupName=Referen
ce&limiter=&u=lawr21149&currPage=&disableHighlighting=fa
lse&displayGroups=&sortBy=&source=&search_within_results=
&p=UHIC%3AWHIC&action=e&catId=&activityType=&scanId
=&documentId=GALE%7CCX3427300384 (accessed April 15,
2015).
Patterson, Thomas G. Meeting the Communist Threat: Truman
to Reagan. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989.
Petersen, Neal H., William Z. Slany, Charles S. Sampson,
John P. Glennon, and David W. Mabon, eds. Volume VI, East Asia
and the Pacific, 1950. Foreign Relations of the United States.
Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v06/
d183 (accessed July 2, 2015).
Stueck, William. Korean War: An International History.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995.
. Rethinking the Korean War: A New Diplomatic and
Strategic History. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002.
Sulzberger, C. L. U.S. Policy Makers Divide On Blocking
Soviet in Asia. New York Times, January 17, 1949.
140 Cathy Wu
Truman, Harry S. Special Message to the Congress

Reporting on the Situation in Korea. 1950. In Harry S. Truman
1945-1953. Washington D.C.: United States Government
Printing Office, 1950. http://trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/
viewpapers.php?pid=822 (accessed April 15, 2015).
Truman, Harry S. The Presidents News Conference. 1950.
In Harry S. Truman 1945-1953. Washington D.C.: United States
Government Printing Office, 1950. http://trumanlibrary.org/
publicpapers/index.php?pid=574&st=&st1= (accessed April 15,
2015).
. Radio and Television Report to the American
People on the Situation in Korea. 1950. In Harry S. Truman
1945-1953. Washington D.C.: United States Government
Printing Office, 1950. http://trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/
index.php?pid=861&st=&st1= (accessed April 15, 2015).
. Statement by the President on the Situation in
Korea. 1950. In Harry S. Truman 1945-1953. Washington D.C.:
United States Government Printing Office, 1950. http://www.
trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/viewpapers.php?pid=800
Ukraine. In Encyclopaedia Britannica. http://ezproxy.
lawrenceville.org:2216/EBchecked/topic/612921/
Ukraine/30083/Soviet-Ukraine-in-the-postwar-
period?anchor=ref404626 (accessed July 5, 2015).
United States. In Encyclopaedia Britannica. http://
United-States/77885/The-United-States-since-1945#ref613164
U.S. Strategic and Defense Relationships in the Asia-Pacific
Region, Doc. (2007).
BETWEEN TWO ROCKS AND A HARD PLACE:

THE TERRITORIAL DISPUTE OVER THE DOKDO ISLANDS
Matthew Waltman
For more than 60 years, South Korea and Japan have

been arguing over the sovereignty of a pair of rocky islets in the
East Sea (Sea of Japan) known as Dokdo, or Tokdo, in South Ko-
rea, Takeshima in Japan, and the Liancourt Rocks in the United
States and other western nations.1 Both Japan and South Korea
lay claim to the islets. This territorial dispute has been one of the
most significant barriers to the establishment of good relations
between South Korea and Japan. For South Korea, Japans claim
to Dokdo is inextricably intertwined with its 35-year history of
colonial rule, during which Koreans were forced to submit to the
sovereignty of Japan. South Korea views Japans territorial claims
as evidence of its continued refusal to accept responsibility for
its colonial behavior. South Korea and Japan must find a way to
solve this controversy in order to promote peace and stability in
the region. Given South Koreas de facto control of the territory
and the complex issues of historical memory raised by this dis-
pute, the best solution might be for Japan to acknowledge South
Koreas sovereignty over Dokdo in exchange for South Koreas
agreement to allow Japan to share in the natural resources in the
Matthew Waltman is a Senior at the Dwight-Englewood School in

Englewood, New Jersey, where he wrote this paper for the Sejong Korean
Scholars Program online in the 2014/2015 academic year.
142 Matthew Waltman
surrounding waters. Resolving this territorial dispute would not

only ease tensions in the region, but would also present a unique
opportunity for South Korea and Japan to open a new dialogue
about their shared past in the hopes of moving forward towards
a shared future.
Dokdo is located approximately 215 kilometers from the
east coast of South Korea and 211 kilometers from the southwest
coast of Japan. It is comprised of two rugged islets and some
32 smaller rocks, and covers a total area of less than two square
kilometers (approximately 56 acres).2 It is largely uninhabited
except for a Korean octopus fisherman and his wife who are paid
by the Korean government to live there, as well as a small coast
guard detachment.3 The territorial dispute over Dokdo is one of
the most hotly contested issues between Japan and South Korea
stemming from the colonial era, together with Japans past refusal
to acknowledge its culpability for the Japanese imperial armys
use of sex slaves or comfort women during World War II, its
distortion of historical facts in Japanese middle and high school
textbooks, and visits by Japanese officials to Yasukuni Shrine, which
commemorates Japanese war criminals (along with Japans other
wartime dead).4 Many scholars contend that of these historical
grievances, the territorial dispute over Dokdo should be the easi-
est to resolve.5 However, this has not proven to be the case. Unless
South Korea and Japan resolve this dispute, issues of historical
memory ensure that the conflict will remain contentious.
Background of the Dispute
The roots of the Dokdo conflict date back to the Russo-

Japanese War of 1904-1905. When war broke out, Japanese troops
entered Korea and coerced Korea to become a Japanese protector-
ate.6 Japan formally annexed Korea in 1910. During its subsequent
35-year occupation, the Japanese colonial administration inflicted
great suffering on the Korean people. On February 22, 1905, in
the midst of Japans imperial expansion, the Shimane Prefecture, a
local Japanese authority, adopted an ordinance that incorporated
Dokdo into Japanese territory. Japan claimed that since the islets
were unoccupied, they were eligible for incorporation under the

international law doctrine of terra nullius.7 Given this historical
chain of events, Japans appropriation of Dokdo has become in-
separable in the minds of Koreans from the period of Japanese
colonial rule and the subjugation and humiliation of the nation
at the hands of Japan.8
Following Japans defeat in World War II, the Allied Pow-
ers renounced Japans claim to Dokdo. On January 29, 1946,
the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) issued
SCAP Instruction #677, which excluded Dokdo from Japans ad-
ministrative control.9 However, it also provided that nothing in
this directive shall be construed as an indication of Allied policy
relating to the ultimate determination of the minor islands.10
This wording enabled Japan later to argue that the SCAP directive
did not represent a final decision on the sovereignty of Dokdo.
Several years later, when the Allied powers drafted the
1951 San Francisco Peace Treatywhich officially ended World
War II in the Pacificthey left the issue of Dokdo unresolved.
During the treaty negotiations, Japan lobbied to be recognized as
the owner of Dokdo, but its efforts ultimately failed. Early drafts
of the treaty provided that Dokdo belonged to South Korea, but
later drafts included it as Japanese territory.11 The final version
of the treaty, however, makes no mention of Dokdo. Article 2(a)
of the treaty provides for Korean sovereignty over the islands of
Qualpart, Port Hamilton, and Dagelet, but it is silent as to Dokdo.12
It has been argued that the decision to exclude Dokdo from the
treaty had little to do with assessing the historical claims, and
everything to do with geopolitical concerns arising from the Cold
War.13 For example, historians Seokwoo Lee and Jon M. Van Dyke
assert that the drafters made no mention of Dokdo in the treaty
because they did not want to shut the door on the possibility of
using Dokdo for U.S. military needs and had a substantial interest
in having the San Francisco Peace Treaty signed quickly, to limit
the possibility that Japan or South Korea might fall under the
Communist sphere of influence.14 Regardless of the reason, the
144 Matthew Waltman
failure to address the sovereignty of Dokdo in the treaty laid the

groundwork for future clashes over the territory.
While the San Francisco Peace Treaty left the sovereignty
of Dokdo an open question, South Korean president Syngman
Rhee provided his own answer. In January 1952, shortly after the
treaty was signed, Rhee proclaimed South Koreas jurisdiction
over a portion of the East Sea that included Dokdo, establishing
what has become known as the Rhee Line.15 Japan responded
to Rhees action with angry protests. It also proposed that South
Korea submit the territorial dispute to the International Court
of Justice (ICJ), a specialized court tasked with resolving disputes
between countries under international law.16 South Korea refused.
Despite their continued disagreement over the sovereignty
of Dokdo, in June 1965, South Korea and Japan entered into a
treaty normalizing relations between the two countries. Like the
San Francisco Peace Treaty, the normalization treaty makes no
mention of Dokdo.17 During the treaty negotiations, Japan made
efforts to raise the Dokdo issue, but South Korea rebuffed them.
Given its physical possession of the territory, South Korea felt no
need to negotiate. However, both sides pledged to seek a peaceful
settlement of any future disputes through diplomatic channels.18
With respect to Dokdo, such peaceful settlement has yet to occur.
Competing Arguments of Japan and Korea regarding Dokdo

Japan and South Korea both have very different perspec-
tives on the issue of ownership of Dokdo. Japan claims that Dokdo
is indisputably an inherent part of the territory of Japan, and
that Koreas occupation of the islets is unlawful.19 It argues that
its rights to the territory extend back to the seventeenth century
when Japanese merchants used Dokdo as a navigation port and a
hunting ground for sea lions. The Japanese government asserts
that when it annexed Dokdo in 1905, it was simply reaffirming
Japans sovereignty over the territory. In addition, Japan points
to the omission of Dokdo from the list of South Korean territo-
ries in the San Francisco Peace Treaty as further evidence that
sovereignty lies with Japan.20 Finally, it argues that, although it
has repeatedly offered to resolve dispute before the ICJ, South

Korea has refused, which demonstrates the weakness of its claim.21
Japans arguments, however, are widely considered to be weaker
than those of South Korea.
In contrast to Japan, South Korea claims that Dokdo has
always been Korean territory. It argues that the islands were first
incorporated into the Shilla Dynasty in 512 A.D. and points to
old maps and land surveys to support its historical claims.22 In
addition, it asserts that Japan illegally annexed Dokdo in 1905 as
a prelude to colonial rule. For many Koreans, Japans attempt to
claim Dokdo serves as a painful reminder of the colonial era, and
they view ceding sovereignty of Dokdo to Japan as the equivalent
of experiencing the shame and humiliation of Japanese coloniza-
tion all over again.23 They also feel an intense national pride over
Dokdo. In the words of one South Korean man, When Japan
claims Dokdo as its own territory, we Koreans feel as outraged as
if someone pointed at our wife and claimed that she is his own.24
This historical memory and national pride are motivating factors
in South Koreas unwillingness to submit the territorial dispute
to the ICJ.
As between these conflicting arguments, South Korea has a
significant advantage over Japan, because it has de facto possession
and control over Dokdo. Over the years, South Korea has strength-
ened its claim under international law by exercising affirmative
acts of sovereignty, such as building a lighthouse, helicopter pad,
barracks, and two small desalinization plants on Dokdo.25 None-
theless, Japan persists in its territorial claim.
Rising Tensions over Dokdo

The dispute over Dokdo has been the subject of increased
tension between Japan and South Korea in recent years. For
example, in May 2004, members of the Japanese conservative
group, Shimane, set off for Dokdo by boat to claim the territory
for Japan. Their mission sparked a diplomatic crisis, with South
Korea threatening military action if the boat got too close to
Dokdo. Ultimately, Japan backed down and had its coast guard
146 Matthew Waltman
escort the boat back to Japan, while at the same time declaring
that it was the true owner of Dokdo.26
This incident was not the last time Japan would try to as-
sert its sovereignty over Dokdo. In 2005, the Shimane Prefecture
adopted an ordinance to recognize February 22nd as Takeshima
Day to commemorate the 100th anniversary of Japans annexa-
tion of Dokdo.27 The local officials established the event because
they believed the national government was failing to educate its
citizens sufficiently about Japans territorial claim.28 South Korea
responded to the Takeshima Day ordinance with violent demon-
strations. One man set himself on fire in front of the Japanese
embassy and an elderly woman and her son cut off their fingers
to protest Japans resurgent imperialism.29 The Japanese ambas-
sador to South Korean escalated tensions when he told the press
that he did not understand why Korea was so upset, since, after
all, the islands belonged to Japan.30
In 2008, this diplomatic rift deepened when Japan referred
to Dokdo as its territory in a Japanese teaching guide for middle
school students. In response, the South Korean government
temporarily recalled its ambassador from Japan and its citizens
launched anti-Japanese protests. One group of angry protestors
expressed their outrage by decapitating pheasants, the national
bird of Japan, in front of the Japanese embassy in Seoul.31 In a
rare act of solidarity, North Korea weighed in on the side of South
Korea, and stated that all Koreans, with a united force, should
squash [the Japanese] attempt to steal Dokdo.32
However, Japan has not been the sole instigator of trouble
when it comes to Dokdo. In August 2012, Lee Myung-bak became
the first South Korean president to visit Dokdo. Shortly afterwards,
he announced that if the Japanese emperor ever intended to visit
South Korea, he should first apologize for Japans colonial atroci-
ties.33 These actions ignited a firestorm of controversy in Japan. To
many Japanese, Lees visit to Dokdo was seen as an unnecessary
provocation and his comments about the emperor offensive.34
The tension between South Korea and Japan over Dodko
has created something of a conundrum for the United States as
it tries to pivot back to Asia. The United States historically has

taken no position on this territorial dispute between two of its
staunchest allies.35 Yet, despite its policy of neutrality, the United
States has a strong interest in resolution of the Dokdo issue. As
researcher Daniel Sneider has observed, the dysfunctional rela-
tionship between South Korea and Japan threatens to undermine
U.S. security interests, including dealing with a rising China and
an aggressive North Korea.36 Nonetheless, at present, the United
States has refused to intervene for fear that such action would be
perceived as favoring one side over the other.
For an issue that has generated such animosity, the territo-
rial dispute over Dokdo has little strategic significance for South
Korea or Japan. Nor do the islands themselves have any direct
economic value.37 There is nonetheless an economic dimension
to the Dokdo dispute. Although the islets are barely habitable, the
surrounding waters include fertile fishing grounds and are also
believed to contain large reserves of gas hydrate, a potential energy
source.38 The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS) grants a party that has sovereignty over offshore
territory also has an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) over 200
nautical miles of the surrounding sea.39 Thus, the establishment of
sovereignty over Dokdo would provide whichever country owned
it the right to claim entitlement to the rich fishing grounds and
potential natural gas reserves in the surrounding waters.40 In re-
cent years, South Korea and Japan were able to negotiate fishery
agreements that provided for shared fishing rights in the area and
set quotas on the number of fish each nation could catch so as
not to deplete the supply.41 Although these agreements did not
address the question of sovereignty over Dokdo, they nevertheless
provide optimism that the two sides can come together to negoti-
ate a compromise of the broader territorial dispute.
Today, however, the Dokdo issue remains a barrier to the
establishment of good relations between South Korea and Japan.
In fact, a recent report by the Asian Institute for Policy Studies
acknowledged that this dispute remains the biggest obstacle to
improving relations between the two countries.42 Given North Ko-
148 Matthew Waltman
reas nuclear ambitions and Chinas growing dominance, it would

seem that Japan and South Korea have every incentive to resolve
this territorial dispute. However, given the emotionally-charged
nature of the dispute based on issues of history memory, finding
a workable solution remains challenging.
Potential Solutions to the Dokdo Dispute

Given this background, what is the best option for resolving
this territorial dispute? There are three potential solutions: (1)
maintain the status quo; (2) submit the dispute to the International
Court of Justice; or (3) acknowledge South Koreas sovereignty
over Dokdo, while allowing Japan to share in the exploitation of
the natural resources in the surrounding waters. Each of these
options is discussed in turn.
One potential solution to the Dokdo problem is for Japan
and South Korea to agree to do nothing and leave the issue un-
resolved. Some historians have noted that the two countries have
managed the contentious island dispute without catastrophic
consequences for over sixty years.43 As a result, they argue that
Japan and South Korea should simply maintain the status quo
for the foreseeable future. However, this approach is an unwise
option, especially given the growing threat of North Korea and
an increasingly belligerent China. Even without these risks, it is
unlikely that the issue will simply go away with the passage of time.
In both Japan and South Korea, schoolchildren are taught about
the territorial dispute from each countrys unique perspective.
For instance, in South Korea, elementary school students are
given materials that emphasize love of territory and defending
our sovereignty.44 To reinforce this lesson, they are also provided
with supplemental textbooks, with titles such as Lets Get Dokdo
Right and Forever-land Dokdo.45 In Japan, students likewise receive
instruction about this dispute from an early age. In addition, the
Japanese government announced earlier this year that it intends
to revise its official teaching manuals to emphasize Japans territo-
rial rights to Dokdo. This revision is seen as part of the efforts of
Japans conservative government to instill nationalism in Japanese
youth.46 Both countries educational indoctrination ensures that

without some form of resolution, the Dokdo dispute will be passed
down to the next generation.
A second option for resolving the Dokdo dispute is for
both sides to agree to submit the issue to the ICJ for a binding
determination. However, as mentioned previously, this is not an
appealing option to South Korea for several reasons. First, South
Korea has little incentive to submit the issue to the ICJ because
it already controls Dokdo. Thus, it sees no reason to voluntarily
subject itself to a legal proceeding that might change the current
landscape. Second, for many Koreans, the Dokdo question is too
interwoven with issues of historical memory to be resolved by a
tribunal. As one scholar states, at least for Korea, the issue is not
about rational resolution; rather, it hinges on pride, history, and
national identity.47 From South Koreas viewpoint, losing Dokdo
would be akin to a post-facto legitimization of Japans colonial
rule.48 South Korea also fears that by agreeing to submit the case to
the ICJ, it might somehow be perceived as conceding that Japans
sovereignty claim is valid. Similarly, while Japan has proposed sub-
mitting the issue to the ICJ on several occasions, some question
the wisdom of this approach.49 After all, since Japans territorial
claims to Dokdo are generally considered to be much weaker
than those of South Korea, why would Japan set itself up to lose?
The best resolution is for Japan to relinquish its claim to
Dokdo in exchange for the ability to share in the economic re-
sources of the surrounding waters. Japan and South Korea could
even call on the United States to help broker a deal. This would
require a concession from Japan and would undoubtedly be a
tough sell, especially given Japans conservative government.50
However, the risks outweigh the rewards for several reasons. First,
the proposed resolution would be a significant step towards im-
proving bilateral relations with South Korea and promoting peace
and stability in region. Second, it would allow Japan and South
Korea to cooperate in exploiting potentially lucrative natural gas
reserves.51 These countries have previously shown a willingness to
compromise on territorial issues when they entered into the 1998
150 Matthew Waltman
and 2002 fisheries agreements that permitted them to jointly fish

in the waters surrounding Dokdo.52 This provides reason to hope
that they could negotiate a broader solution regarding sovereignty
and resource allocation that would benefit both countries.
In addition, by acknowledging South Koreas sovereignty
over Dokdo, Japan would bolster its claims in a separate territorial
dispute with China over the Senkaku Islands, known as Diaoyu
in China. Both China and Japan claim sovereignty over this terri-
tory, which is strategically located approximately 250 miles west of
Okinawa and is surrounded by oil-rich waters.53 Japan is in posses-
sion of Senkaku, just as South Korea is in possession of Dokdo. By
recognizing South Koreas sovereignty over Dokdo, Japan would
theoretically be strengthening its own position with respect to
Senkaku by establishing that de facto control of island territories
is a recognized and acknowledged basis for sovereignty.54 Japan
and China recently announced their intent to resume diplomatic
discussions about Senkaku.55 Perhaps this will provide an impetus
for South Korea and Japan to do the same regarding Dokdo.
As long as the territorial dispute regarding Dokdo remains
unresolved, it will continue to evoke bitter memories of the past
among South Koreans. Certainly, there are other issues that must
be dealt with arising from Japans wartime aggression, including
the forced coercion of thousands of Korean women into sexual
slavery during World War II.56 However, removing one of these
historical issues from the debate provides an opening for a con-
structive dialogue on the others. Whether Japan and South Korea
can ultimately negotiate a resolution of the Dokdo dispute remains
to be seen. However, one thing is certain: resolving the territorial
issue would be an important step in advancing the relationship
between the two countries and promoting security in the region,
and would provide a useful precedent for future cooperation.
Endnotes
1
Since this paper was written for the Sejong Korean
Scholars Program, the islands will be referred to herein by
their Korean name, Dokdo.
2
Mark S. Lovmo, The Territorial Dispute over Dokdo,
Dokdo-research.com, http://dokdo-research.com/page4.html
(accessed October 14, 2014).
3
Mark Selden, Small Islets, Enduring Conflict: Dokdo,
Korea-Japan Colonial Legacy and the United States, Asia-
Pacific Journal: Japan Focus 16 (2011), http://www.japanfocus.
org/-Mark-Selden/3520 (accessed October 13, 2014).
4
Ashley Rowland, Hana Kusumoto, and Yoo Kyong Chang,
Claimed by Both Seoul and Tokyo, a Tiny Island Outcropping
Stirs Nationalistic Fervor, Stars and Stripes, February 27, 2014,
http://www.stripes.com/claimed-by-both-seoul-and-tokyo-tiny-
island-outcroppings-stir-nationalist-fervor-1.269934 (accessed
October 25, 2014).
5
Selden, Small Islets.
6
Michael J. Seth, A Concise History of Modern Korea
(Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2010), 33.
7
Michael A. McDevitt and Dmitry Gorenburg, The Long
Littoral Project: Sea of Japan (Alexandria, VA: CNA, 2013), 15,
https://www.cna.org/research/2013/long-littoral-project-sea-
japan (accessed November 1, 2014).
8
9
Sean Fern, Tokdo or Takeshima? The International Law
of Territorial Acquisition in the Japan-Korea Island Dispute,
Stanford Journal of International Law 5, no.1 (2005), 85, http://
web.stanford.edu/group/sjeaa/journal51/japan2.pdf
10
Quoted in Lovmo, Territorial Dispute.
11
Kimie Hara, 50 Years from San Francisco: Re-Examining
the Peace Treaty and Japans Territorial Problems, Pacific
Affairs 74, no. 3 (2001), 369, www.jstor.org/stable/3557753
12
Fern, Tokdo, 80.
13
14
Seokwoo Lee, and Jon M. Van Dyke, The 1951 San
Francisco Peace Treaty and its Relevance to Sovereignty
over Dokdo, Chinese Journal of International Law 9, no. 4
(2010), 751-752, http://chinesejil.oxfordjournals.org/
content/9/4/741 (accessed October 25, 2014).
152 Matthew Waltman
15
Fern, Tokdo, 80.
16
Lee and Van Dyke, San Francisco Peace Treaty, 753.
17
18
Fern, Tokdo, 80.
19
Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Takeshima,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2004), http://www.mofa.
go.jp/region/asia-paci/takeshima/ (accessed October 14,
2014).
20
Ibid.
21
Jeffrey Hays, South Korea and Japan Dispute over the
Takeshima/Dokdo Islands and Japan Sea Name, Facts and
Details (January 2013), http://factsanddetails.com/japan/
cat22/sub149/item2922.html (accessed November 1, 2014).
22
McDevitt and Gorenburg, Long Littoral Project, 15.
23
Garrett Bowman, Why Now is the Time to Resolve
the Dokdo/Takeshima Dispute, Case Western Journal of
International Law 46, nos. 1 and 2 (2013), 440, http://law.case.
edu/journals/JIL/Documents/46CaseWResJIntlL1.20.Article.
Bowman.Digital.pdf (accessed October 25, 2014).
24
Choe Sang-Hun, Fight Over Rocky Islets Opens Old
Wounds between South Korea and Japan, New York Times,
October 4, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/05/
world/asia/south-korea-and-japan-fight-over-rocky-islets.
html?_r=0 (accessed October 16, 2014).
25
Fern, Tokdo, 87.
26
Alexis Dudden, Troubled Apologies (New York: Columbia
27
Ibid., 2-3.
28
Rowland, Kusumoto, and Chang, Claimed by Both Seoul
and Tokyo.
29
Bowman, Now is the Time, 434.
30
Dudden, Troubled Apologies, 3.
31
Hays, South Korea.
32
Jonathan Berkshire Miller, Dokdo Still Limits Tokyo
and Seouls Strategic Rapproachment, East Asia Forum 31
(March 2012), http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/03/31/
dokdo-still-limits-tokyo-and-seoul-s-strategic-rapprochement/
(accessed December 1, 2014).
33
Hays, South Korea; McDevitt and Gorenburg, Long
Littoral Project, 20.
34
and Tokyo.
35
Lovmo, Territorial Dispute.
36
Daniel Sneider, The U.S. Can Facilitate Healing
between Japan and South Korea, Washington Post, October
31, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/daniel-
sneider-the-us-can-facilitate-healing-between-japan-and-south-
korea/2013/10/31/d4db3d84-40b3-11e3-a751-f032898f2dbc_
story.html (accessed November 1, 2014).
37
38
39
Benjamin K. Sibbett, Tokdo or Takeshima? The
Territorial Dispute between Japan and the Republic of
Korea, Fordham International Law Journal 21, no. 4 (1998),
1606-1607, http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.
cgi?article=1573&context=ilj (accessed October 25, 2014).
40
Fern, Tokdo, 81.
41
Ibid., 88.
42
and Tokyo.
43
44
45
Ibid.
46
Mari Yamaguchi, Japan to Teach Territorial Claims in
Schools, San Diego Union Tribune, January 27, 2014, http://
www.utsandiego.com/news/2014/jan/27/japan-to-step-up-
education-on-territorial-claim/ (accessed November 1, 2014).
47
48
Park and Chubb, South Korea and Japan.
49
50
Emma Chanlett-Avery, An Island Strategy for Japan, in
Challenges Facing Japan. (Washington, D.C.: Maureen and Mike
Mansfield Foundation, 2014), 22, http://mansfieldfdn.org/
mfdn2011/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/NFF_revised_v1.pdf
51
52
Ibid., 442.
53
Japans Territorial Disputes, SPICE, Stanford Program
on International and Cross-Cultural Education (July 2005),
http://spice.fsi.stanford.edu/docs/japans_territorial_disputes
54
55
Jane Perlez, China and Japan, in Sign of a Thaw, Agree
to Disagree on a Disputed Island Group, New York Times,
November 8, 2014, p. A6.
154 Matthew Waltman
56
Martin Fackler, Japans Right, Rewriting War, Attacks
Newspaper, New York Times, December 3, 2014, p. A1.
Bibliography
Bowman, Garrett. Why Now is the Time to Resolve the

Dokdo/Takeshima Dispute. Case Western Journal of International
Law 46, nos. 1 and 2 (2013): 433-462. http://law.case.edu/
journals/JIL/Documents/46CaseWResJIntlL1.20.Article.
Bowman.Digital.pdf (accessed October 25, 2014).
Chanlett-Avery, Emma. An Island Strategy for Japan. In
Challenges Facing Japan. Washington, D.C.: Maureen and Mike
Mansfield Foundation (2014): 21-25. http://mansfieldfdn.org/
mfdn2011/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/NFF_revised_v1.pdf
Dudden, Alexis. Troubled Apologies. New York: Columbia
Fackler, Martin. Japans Right, Rewriting War, Attacks
Newspaper. New York Times. December 3, 2014: A.1.
Fern, Sean. Tokdo or Takeshima? The International Law
of Territorial Acquisition in the Japan-Korea Island Dispute.
Stanford Journal of International Law 5, no. 1 (2005): 78-89.
http://web.stanford.edu/group/sjeaa/journal51/japan2.pdf
Hara, Kimie. 50 Years from San Francisco: Re-Examining
the Peace Treaty and Japans Territorial Problems. Pacific
Affairs 74, no. 3 (2001): 361-382.www.jstor.org/stable/3557753
Hays, Jeffrey. South Korea and Japan Dispute over the
Takeshima/Dokdo Islands and Japan Sea Name. Facts and
Details. January 2013. http://factsanddetails.com/japan/cat22/
sub149/item2922.html (accessed November 1, 2014).
Japan. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA).
Takeshima. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. 2004. http://
factsanddetails.com/japan/cat22/sub149/item2922.html
(accessed November 1, 2014).
Japans Territorial Disputes. SPICE. Stanford Program on
International and Cross-Cultural Education. July 2005. http://
spice.fsi.stanford.edu/docs/japans_territorial_disputes
Lee, Seokwoo, and Jon M. Van Dyke. The 1951 San
Francisco Peace Treaty and its Relevance to Sovereignty over
Dokdo. Chinese Journal of International Law 9.4 (2010): 741-
762. http://chinesejil.oxfordjournals.org/content/9/4/741
Lovmo, Mark S. The Territorial Dispute over Dokdo.
Dokdo-research.com. http://dokdo-research.com/page4.html
McDevitt, Michael A., and Dmitry Gorenburg. The Long
Littoral Project: Sea of Japan. Alexandria, VA: CNA, 2013: 1-41.
https://www.cna.org/research/2013/long-littoral-project-sea-
japan (accessed November 1, 2014).
Miller, Jonathan Berkshire. Dokdo Still Limits Tokyo and
Seouls Strategic Rapproachment. East Asia Forum. March 31,
2012. http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/03/31/dokdo-still-
limits-tokyo-and-seoul-s-strategic-rapprochement/ (accessed
December 1, 2014).
Park, Dong-Joon, and Danielle Chubb. South Korea
and Japan: Disputes over the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands.
East Asia Forum. August 17, 2011. http://www.eastasiaforum.
org/2011/08/17/south-korea-and-japan-disputes-over-the-
dokdotakeshima-islands/ (accessed October 14, 2014).
Perlez, Jane. China and Japan, in Sign of a Thaw, Agree
to Disagree on a Disputed Island Group. New York Times.
November 8, 2014: A.6.
Rowland, Ashley, Hana Kusumoto, and Yoo Kyong Chang.
Claimed by Both Seoul and Tokyo, a Tiny Island Outcropping
Stirs Nationalistic Fervor. Stars and Stripes. February 27, 2014.
http://www.stripes.com/claimed-by-both-seoul-and-tokyo-tiny-
island-outcroppings-stir-nationalist-fervor-1.269934 (accessed
October 25, 2014).
Sang-Hun, Choe. Fight Over Rocky Islets Opens Old
Wounds Between South Korea and Japan. New York Times.
October 4, 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/05/
world/asia/south-korea-and-japan-fight-over-rocky-islets.html?_
r=0 (accessed October 16, 2014).
Selden, Mark. Small Islets, Enduring Conflict: Dokdo,
Korea-Japan Colonial Legacy and the United States. Asia-
Pacific Journal: Japan Focus 16 (2011). http://www.japanfocus.
org/-Mark-Selden/3520 (accessed October 13, 2014).
Seth, Michael J. A Concise History of Modern Korea. Lanham,
MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2010.
Sibbett, Benjamin K. Tokdo or Takeshima? The
Territorial Dispute between Japan and the Republic of
Korea. Fordham International Law Journal 21, no. 4 (1998):
156 Matthew Waltman
1606-1646. http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.
cgi?article=1573&context=ilj (accessed October 25, 2014).
Sneider, Daniel. The U.S. Can Facilitate Healing Between
Japan and South Korea. Washington Post. October 31, 2013.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/daniel-sneider-
the-us-can-facilitate-healing-between-japan-and-south-
korea/2013/10/31/d4db3d84-40b3-11e3-a751-f032898f2dbc_
story.html (accessed November 1, 2014).
Yamaguchi, Mari. Japan to Teach Territorial Claims in
Schools. San Diego Union Tribune. January 27, 2014. http://
www.utsandiego.com/news/2014/jan/27/japan-to-step-up-
education-on-territorial-claim/ (accessed November 1, 2014).
MISSOURIS CIVIL WAR:

THE STORY OF AN OVERLOOKED STATES
FAILED ATTEMPT TO ABANDON THE UNION
Daniel H. Wang
No historical topic has perhaps managed to captivate the

American mind quite as thoroughly as the Civil War. To this day,
it is still remembered as the United States bloodiest war and the
consequences and implications of the war continue to reverber-
ate through our society today. Lincoln and Davis, Lee and Grant,
Fredericksburg and Gettysburg. These are all names engrained in
the collective American consciousness. However, despite the large
repository of Civil War knowledge that is available, there remain
stories that are often left incomplete. This paper will seek to help
round out Missouris story at the time.
During the immediate buildup to the Civil War, from late
1860 to early 1861, the United States was thrust into a period of
great political turmoil and chaos as men and women on either side
of the Mason-Dixon Line had to cast their lot with either the newly
forming Confederate States of America or the preexisting Union.
This period saw generals like Robert E. Lee and Thomas Stone-
wall Jackson handing in their commissions because they could
Daniel H. Wang is a Senior at Taipei American School in Taipei, Taiwan,

where he wrote this paper for Mr. Richard Arnolds United States History
course in the 2014/2015 academic year.
158 Daniel H. Wang
not bring themselves to wage war against the states to which they
belonged. However, this period also saw five technically southern
states abandon their southern sisters and remain in the Union.
Perhaps most significant of these five was the state of Missouri. The
issue of slavery had been critical in Missouri through much of its
history. For example, the Missouri Compromise of 1820 was passed
to resolve a dispute over slavery in Missouri, the famous Dredd
Scott case was initially handled by Missouri Courts, and Border
Ruffians based in Missouri sallied across the border into Kansas
during the Bleeding Kansas period. However, despite its status as
a large, slaveholding, southern state, Missouri remained within the
Union as the other large, slaveholding, southern states seceded.
This raises a couple of questions. First, one must question
Missouris significance. Why was Missouri important in the 1860s?
Why were both North and South eager to win the allegiance of
Missouri? And second, why did Missouri remain in the Union
when all the other southern states had already left?
To understand Missouris significance in the 1860s, one
must consider these three factors: population, military supplies,
and geography.
Given that manpower was one of the Unions greatest
strengths and one of the Confederacys greatest weaknesses, the
population of the various states was a key factor when comparing
their relative importance.1 Based on the census of 1860, Missouri
was an extremely valuable state because it had a large population.
The total population in Missouri at the time of the 1860 census
was recorded as 1,182,012 people of whom 114,931 were slaves.2
This left a total free population of 1,067,081 people. To put this
number into perspective, Missouri had a larger population than
every southern state except Virginia, which had a free popula-
tion of 1,105,453, according to the census. Considering that the
population of Missouri was approximately equivalent to 22% of
the entire Confederacys population of 4,784,984, if Missouri had
joined the Confederacy, the Southern population would have
increased significantly. While this number was still dwarfed by
the population of the Union at over 20 million, a loss or gain of
more than 1 million people would still have been a considerable

portion of the total populations of either the Union or the Con-
federacy. This made Missouri one of the most important states as
far as population was concerned because its populace could have
been very beneficial to either side during the conflict.
In the 1860s, to be well prepared for war meant having
adequate supply lines, adequate weaponry, and adequate cloth-
ing.3 These facts served to increase Missouris significance because
the state had an important weapons depot known as the St. Louis
Arsenal. The St. Louis Arsenal was an extremely valuable military
asset that had the potential to alter the outcome of the war.4 The
supplies in the arsenal, if seized by the Confederacy could have
significantly changed the balance of power, especially considering
the fact that supply shortages consistently plagued the Confeder-
ate armies throughout the war and were one of the Confederacys
greatest weaknesses.5 This was evident even in the first couple
of months of the war. For example, the Missouri state militia
had resorted to arming themselves with simple hunting rifles,
shotguns, or outdated army surplus muskets; not the latest rifle-
muskets or carbines that the Federal forces had at their disposal.
6
If Missouri had joined the Confederacy and brought all the new
weapons with them, the war might have worked out differently
for a variety of reasons.
First, at the St. Louis Arsenal, there were enough arms and
ammunition to supply an entire Confederate army.7 The arsenal
held more than 60,000 muskets, 45 tons of gunpowder, and 1.5
million cartridges.8 By comparison, the Army of Northern Virginia
just before the battle of Gettysburg had around 70 thousand men
including noncombatants. 60,000 rifle muskets would almost
certainly have equipped most if not all of the infantry units. The
second reason was, the St. Louis arsenal also had machines used
to manufacture weapons. Taking into consideration the fact that
industry was, as a whole, underdeveloped in the southern states,
the seizure of such machines would have been extraordinarily ben-
eficial.9 While this likely would not have been able to completely
bridge the gap between the North and the Souths industrial out-
160 Daniel H. Wang
put, it certainly would have helped slightly equalize the disparity

in arms and munitions.
The third reason for Missouris significance was its loca-
tion. Missouri is situated upon both the Mississippi and Missouri
Rivers which makes Missouri the gateway to the west. In those
times, control of the Missouri River was essentially equivalent to
control of the West because the Missouri River was the primary
route westward.10 Because the two rivers meet within Missouri,
specifically at St. Louis, which was the second largest port city,
Missouri was the key to the west.11 The Mississippi River was also
extremely significant due to its function as a major highway. If either
side gained control of it, the strategic advantages would be many.
If the Confederacy took Missouri, it would have gained con-
trol of the Mississippi River, which could have affected the outcome
of the war. During the Civil War, rivers were extremely important
for a couple of reasons. Firstly, whichever army controlled the river
could transport troops to any point along the river far more rapidly
than a marching pace. Essentially, the rivers were used in a similar
function to the railroads.12 Control of the Mississippi River would
have allowed the Confederacy to transport troops from Louisiana
all the way to Illinois.13 Second, control of rivers made for far more
flexible supply lines. Instead of being forced to rely upon the roads
and caravans of slow moving wagons, supplies desperately needed
at the front lines could be transported almost directly to the front
lines by means of the rivers.14 Another reason is that, during the
Civil War, an army advancing overland with its flank to a hostile
controlled river would risk being ambushed in the rear.15 Because
troops and supplies could be moved flexibly along the length of
the river, armies risked being out-flanked and surprised.16 Such an
advantage was tremendous. In Sun Tzus famous Art of War, Sun
Tzu stated that Rapidity is the essence of war: take advantage of
the enemys unreadiness, make your way by unexpected routes, and
attack unguarded spots.17 This speed and surprise which Sun Tzu
refers to is exactly what full control of the Mississippi River would
have given the Confederacy. The Union could not have allowed
the Confederacy such an important advantage and fought many
battles to seize control of the Mississippi. These Union attempts to

gain control of the Mississippi culminated with the July 1863 vic-
tory at Vicksburg, which effectively split the Confederacy in two.18
Another incentive to the Union for taking the Mississippi River
would have been the prospect of completely suffocating trade and
commerce within the Confederacy because the Mississippi river
served as a vital line of communication and trade throughout
the south.19 Thus, Missouri becomes doubly significant because
both sides needed Missouri to further their plans regarding the
Mississippi River. The Confederacy needed Missouri in order to
gain full control of the Mississippi River and the Union needed
Missouri in order to gain a foothold from which they could plan
for seizing the rest of the Mississippi.
To answer the first question, Missouris significance can
be boiled down to three main factors. First, Missouris population
was about 5% of the Unions total population or about 22% of
the Confederacys total population. Whichever side won Missouri
gained a big population increase. Second, Missouri was home to
the St. Louis Arsenal, a weapons depot that was large enough to
equip an entire Confederate army, and also the home to an im-
portant weapons factory which could have significantly increased
the Confederacys weapons production. Finally, Missouris geo-
graphic location commanding both the Mississippi and Missouri
Rivers would have given a strategic advantage to whichever army
commanded it.
The question of why Missouri remained in the Union is
far more complex and much more difficult to answer. To find the
best answer, I believe there are three main factors to take into
consideration. These three factors are public opinion, government
intervention, and military action. This papers analysis of public
opinion will consider both the composition of the Missouri state
government and the voting trends of the general public in order
to determine whether the public was more unionist or secession-
ist. In analyzing government intervention, this paper will seek to
determine if the federal government attempted to offer Missouri
a deal to remain in the Union. Finally, to determine whether mili-
162 Daniel H. Wang
tary intervention played a role, this paper will look for evidence of
military action aimed at seizing control of Missouri and suppressing
secessionist sentiment before Missouri had the chance to secede.
Public opinion in Missouri was very divided in late 1860
and early 1861. In January 1861, Missouri swore in Claiborne Fox
Jackson as their new governor.20 Jackson was staunchly pro-slavery
and pro-secession.21 In the gubernatorial election of 1860, Jack-
son defeated his nearest competitor by more than 10,000 votes,
showing that the majority of the public supported him.22 However,
this in itself was not a sufficient indication of the publics opinion
regarding secession from the Union because, while Jackson had
a reputation as a secessionist, on the campaign trail he took a
stance in favor of the Union in order to appeal to the unionist
portion of the electorate.23 In fact, his platform while campaign-
ing was essentially that, as long as states rights were respected,
Missouri would remain in the Union. Because Jackson only took
a strong secessionist stance after the election and inauguration
of Lincoln to the Presidency, it is entirely possible that he drew a
significant portion of his support from unionists.24 Thus, while it
is tempting to take the election results as proof of pro-secession
public opinion, the results are less simple. A further indication
that a majority of Missourians may have in fact been in favor of
remaining in the Union was, when Missouri voters elected a state
convention to determine whether Missouri would secede, the
convention was entirely composed of delegates with strong union-
ist outlooks, indicating perhaps that the people of Missouri really
did not want to secede.25
An edition of the Daily Missouri Republican dating from
the first of January in 1861 provided an example similar to that
of Governor Jacksons election. On the front page, there is a long
special report from Brigadier General D. M. Frost, describing
his recent expedition into Kansas in order to bring order to the
border.26 He said, In order to carry out the spirit of...Excellencys
instructions...to repel invasion...restore peace to the border, it
would be necessary to leave a considerable force in the district, until
such time as the confidence...our own people could be restored,
and the enemies of their peace and safety brought to Justice.27

In essence, Brigadier General Frost believed that a strong military
presence was needed in Kansas to keep the civilian population safe
from their enemies. While this may not seem significant at first
glance, by considering the enemy which the article referred to,
one can see that the government of Missouri aligned itself with a
pro-slavery agenda. In this same article, General Frost said, gen-
eral impression was that Montgomeryobtained the command of
an organized body [of men], and would give battle, I accordingly
returned to my camp and sent an express to the infantry Brigade
ordering that command to cross the country and join me
within easy striking distance of Montgomerys Fort.28 This quote
identified a man named Montgomery as an enemy whom Frost
moved to engage while he was deployed in Kansas.29
Upon doing further research, this Montgomery can be no
other than James Montgomery, a jayhawker who famously raided
Ft. Scott.30 While it was true that Montgomery may have been
considered an enemy simply because he answered violence with
violence, the following statement seemed to indicate that he was
considered an enemy at least partly because he was an abolitionist:
his friends and followers content[ed] themselves by assembling
in convention at Mound City and passing a series of treasonable
and inflammatory resolutions.31 While this paper was unable to
find copies of these resolutions, given the fact that Montgomery
was an abolitionist and a jayhawker, it is safe to assume that the
resolutions could only have called for the abolition of slavery. The
fact that such resolutions are referred to as both treasonable
and inflammatory revealed a few things about the government
of Missouri. First, the use of the word treasonable indicates that
espousing abolitionist views is literally considered a betrayal of the
state. Second, the use of the word inflammatory indicates that
the government did not want abolitionist ideals to spread into
their state because they would upset the status quo. Altogether,
this seemed to point to the conclusion that public sentiment was
at least sympathetic to the cause of the secessionists due to the
fact that the views of the government were very pro-slavery. How-
164 Daniel H. Wang
ever, after considering more articles, this paper believes such a

conclusion incorrect.
In the same issue of the Daily Missouri Republican, there is
another article on the front page titled From Cape Girardeau
County which really served to illustrate just how complicated the
situation in Missouri was at the time.32 In the article, a farmer from
Cape Girardeau County wrote to the Daily Missouri Republican to
express his thoughts about the politics within the state.33 Writing
the letter on December 21, 1860, the farmer explained that he
was writing because he felt deeply concerned, if not alarmed, at
the present threatened condition of the country.34 It was not im-
mediately clear whether he supported Union or secession but he
soon made it clear by writing, Your paper having been the fearless
and uncompromising defender of the Union and the constitution,
during the past 30 years, to my own personal knowledge, I am
happy to witness that it still occupies the same proud and enviable
position, amid the storms that agitate this great nation.35 One can
conclude that this farmer is most certainly pro-union due to his
apparent delight that the Daily Missouri Republican was a defender
of the Union and the Constitution. Furthermore, this quote indi-
cated pro-union sentiment had been a part of Missouris political
atmosphere for more than thirty years and continued into 1861.
The farmer made this even clearer by saying, Nothing is more cer-
tain, than that the great majority of the substantial classes of Cape
Girardeau county are true to the Union and the Constitution.36
However, this article also shows us that secessionist sentiment was
present and perhaps even rising during this period. Besides writing
that he supported the Union, the farmer also wrote, The South
East Democrat was galvanized into another temporary existence.
the last issue, however, came out in its true colors. It has taken
strong secession grounds, and argues, or attempts to argue, that
Missouri will gain vastly in a .. and commercial point of view.37
This excerpt showed that there most certainly was a strong seces-
sionist sentiment present in Missouri as well because a different
newspaper had published articles which presented arguments in
favor of secession.38 From Cape Girardeau County shows that as
1860 ended and 1861 began, public opinion was not definitely in
favor of secession. However, it also showed that certain politicians

and newspapers were making gains by promoting secession. Mis-
souri was a state about to explode into its own civil war.
Another significant aspect of public opinion was the
substantial German immigrant population in Missouri that, for
the most part, despised slavery, the plantation system, and the
aristocratic southerners who perpetuated the system.39 The Ger-
man immigrant population in Missouri was not insignificant; in
fact, by 1861, a visitor to St. Louis would have had fair reason to
believe he had ended up somewhere in Germany.40 The German
immigrants made up such a considerable portion of the popula-
tion that the immigrant children in public schools were simply
given lessons in German rather than English.41 Notable among
these Forty-Eighters 42 was a man named Henry Boernstein who
became the publisher of Anzeiger des Westens, one of the largest
newspapers in Missouri. Henry Boernstein, as one of the most
powerful Republicans in Missouri was quickly able to gain support
for Abraham Lincoln among the migrants through distribution
of his newspaper.43
In the presidential election of 1860, Lincoln was able to
win two of Missouris counties: Gasconade and St. Louis.44 This
seemed inconsequential but it showed that Missouris public opin-
ion was at least less decidedly against Lincoln than that of other
states because, of all 996 counties in the South, only two counties
from Missouri supported Lincoln.45 Despite the small measure of
support Lincoln received from German immigrants in St. Louis
and other unionists in Gasconade, Lincoln was soundly defeated
in Missouri.46 As a result, his election to the Presidency must have
left the electorate of Missouri feeling rather bitter. This shift in
sentiment can be seen in the increased hostility towards the Ger-
man immigrants of St. Louis who had been staunch supporters
of Lincoln.47 If native Missourians had favored Abraham Lincoln
and his unionist policies, they should have flocked to support the
German immigrant organizations that were still trying to promote
Republican ideals throughout the state.48 Instead, they began arm-
ing themselves and clamoring for secession.49 While there were
166 Daniel H. Wang
still some segments of the population that were firmly unionist

and even supported Lincoln, the truth was that the election of
Lincoln served to generate extremely negative sentiment among
the populace at large. Thus, public opinion may have initially been
fairly evenly divided but after the election and inauguration of
Lincoln, public opinion quickly shifted against the federal govern-
ment. This led to the conclusion that public opinion could not
have been the primary factor in maintaining Missouris position
with the Union.
As public opinion has been ruled out as the primary factor,
this paper shall now consider political maneuvering on the part
of the federal government. Soon after C.F. Jackson was sworn in
as governor, Abraham Lincoln requested that Missouri provide
men for the Union army.50 This was an indication of at least an
attempt to pull Missouri into the Union fold. A request for troops,
if granted, would have officially tied Missouri to the cause of the
Union for two main reasons. First, granting the request for troops
would have been recognition of the authority of the federal gov-
ernment, something which the secessionist states refused to do.
Second, if Missouri had officially given troops to the command
of the federal government, secession at that point would have
been a forfeiture of the lives of thousands of their own young
men. Missouri was faced with the decision of either throwing away
the possibility of secession or refusing the federal government.
Furthermore, requesting troops was a subtle indication that the
federal government would not tolerate secession. By asking for
troops, Lincoln indicated that he was willing to use military force
to crush any attempt at secession because the troops would have
been used to suppress the rebellion. Lincoln was openly asking
Missouri to side with him and threatening to use military force
to crush them if they sided with the secessionists. However, this
attempt to pull Missouri firmly into the Union was quite rudely
rebuffed. Governor Jackson wrote the following letter in response
to the request for troops: Sir, Your requisition is illegal, unconsti-
tutional and revolutionary; in its object inhuman and diabolical.
Not one man will Missouri furnish to carry on any such unholy
Crusade against her Southern sisters. Respectfully, C. F. Jackson.51
Jackson recognized that any troops he provided Lincoln would

be used to wage war against the states in open secession. As such,
he must have recognized the implicit threat: that military conflict
would befall any state which seceded. However, the government
of Missouri rejected the offer and ignored the implicit threat.
Through this letter, the government of Missouri communicated
two messages. First, the Missouri state government had outright
rejected the authority of the federal government by claiming
that a troop requisition was illegal. Second, the Missouri state
government had aligned itself with the states that seceded from
the Union by referring to them as Missouris Southern sisters.
This fact was recognized by both the Confederate and
Union governments. On April 29, 1861, the Provisional Congress
of the Confederate States of America received a communication
from the President of the Confederate States of America.52 In
this statement, Jefferson Davis said I might have refrained from
taking active measures for our defense if the States of the Union
had all imitated the action of Virginia, North Carolina, Arkansas,
Kentucky, Tennessee, and Missouri by denouncing the [Union]
call for troops as an unconstitutional usurpation of power to which
they refused to respond.53 This indicated that the Confederacy
was well aware that Lincoln issued a troop requisition and that
they were pleased that at least some states, Missouri among them,
refused to answer the call. Furthermore, it indicated that because
most of the States answered Lincolns request Jefferson Davis had
to take active measures for [their] defense.54 In essence, by late
April of 1861 the Confederacy had recognized that the situation
had deteriorated to open war and they were desperately hoping
that more states would refuse to give troops to the federal gov-
ernment. On the same day, the Secretary of the Treasury for the
Confederate States of America, Christopher Memminger, proposed
a resolution That the Committee on Finance be instructed to
inquire and report upon the expediency of excepting imports
from the States of Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, Arkansas,
Kentucky, Missouri, Maryland, and Delaware from the operation
of revenue laws, and that they have leave to report by bill.55
168 Daniel H. Wang
This showed how desperate the Confederacy was to acquire

the southern states that had not seceded because, the Confeder-
ate government was legitimately considering waiving all tariffs or
taxes upon any goods imported from those states.56 Essentially,
the Confederate government offered free trade to the remain-
ing southern states. Later in the year, on May 3, the Confederacy
formally declared war on the United States, saying war exists be-
tween the Confederate States and the Government of the United
States and the States and Territories thereof, except the States of
Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Kentucky, Arkansas, Missouri
and Delaware, and the Territories of Arizona and New Mexico.57
However, despite these incentives, Missouri still remained within
the Union. Does this mean the federal government offered Mis-
souri a better deal than the Confederacy?
The federal government also realized that Missouri was
aligning itself more with the Confederacy and less with the Union.
On July 5, 1861, in a statement to the 37th Congress of the United
States, President Lincoln said Yet, none of the States commonly
called slave States, except Delaware, gave a regiment through regu-
lar State organization. A few regiments have been organized within
some others of those States by individual enterprise, and received
into the government service.58 This statement recognized that all
the Border States except Delaware had rejected the authority of
the federal government by refusing to provide troops to be used
against the southern States in open secession.
Lincoln also said, In the border States, so calledin
fact, the middle Statesthere are those who favor a policy which
they call armed neutrality: that is an arming of those States to
prevent the Union forces passing one way, or the disunion the
other, over their soil. This would be disunion completed it
would tie the hands of the Union men, and freely pass supplies
from among them to the insurrectionists, which it could not do
as an open enemyIt would do for the disunionists that which,
of all things, they most desirefeed them well, and give them
disunion without a struggle of their own. It recognizes no fidelity
to the Constitution, no obligation to maintain the Union, and
while very may who have favored it are, doubtless, loyal citizens, it
is , nevertheless, very injurious in effect59 This statement showed
what Lincolns position on any possible secession was. He showed
here that his goal was one Union at any cost. There was no solution
or compromise for him on the issue, which meant that retaining
control of Missouri along with the other Border States would be
imperative. Important to keep in mind however, is the fact that
the overall statement was meant to advocate pursuing more ag-
gressive military actions against states in open insurrection. In
this statement, Lincoln was not proposing any political maneuvers
or deals that would serve to keep Missouri and the other Border
States in the Union.60 He was proposing increasing the scale of
military actions to rapidly suppress insurrection. Thus, it is safe to
conclude that the Union did not offer Missouri a better deal than
the Confederacy; in fact, the reverse appears to be true. However,
despite the fact that the government of Missouri not only received
a superior offer from the Confederacy but also ignored the federal
governments threats, Missouri remained within the Union. This
indicated that while political maneuvers were employed, nothing
major was decided by cutting deals one way or the other.
Seeing as neither political maneuvering nor public opinion
could be credited with keeping Missouri in the Union, we must
now turn to military actions and intervention on the part of both
the federal and confederate governments.
After Lincolns election in 1860, both unionist and seces-
sionist groups began rapidly arming themselves and preparing
for combat.61 Unionists formed underground organizations and
conducted drills in secret while secessionists had the option of
joining the pro-secession state militia.62 As both sides began to
form militant organizations, tensions steadily mounted. It soon
became clear to the unionists that the militia intended to seize the
St. Louis Arsenal, so they urgently requested that the War Depart-
ment send some form of reinforcement. 63 The War Department
sent Captain Nathaniel Lyon at the head of a small contingent of
United States Army regulars in order to reinforce the depleted
garrison of the St. Louis Arsenal.64
170 Daniel H. Wang
Nathaniel Lyon was born in Connecticut and graduated

from West Point as an officer in 1841.65 He had a reputation for an
unpredictable and explosive temper.66 Before the Civil War, Lyon
had served in the Second Seminole War in Florida, and in the
Mexican War, and he was stationed in Kansas during the violent
bleeding Kansas period.67 He was by no means an abolitionist.68
The only issue that concerned him was preserving the Union.69
For Nathaniel Lyon, the very idea of secession was anathema. Fur-
thermore, Lyon already established quite a reputation for being
an extremely intense officer. One of his soldiers remarked, He
struck us as a man devoted to duty, who thought of duty, dreamed
of duty, and had nothing but duty on his mind.70 When this
man arrived in St. Louis, he immediately began to build a tacti-
cal advantage for himself. Lyon was tasked with defending the St.
Louis Arsenal, but he had nowhere near enough men to do so.71
When he arrived in St. Louis, he discovered thousands of able
bodied but underequipped men who would be willing to join his
force as volunteers in the form of the German immigrants who
had supported Lincoln.72 With this influx of volunteers, Lyon was
able to build up a sufficient force to deter any potential assault or
raid that the state militia may have launched against the arsenal;
however, he still did not have the ability to launch any offensive
of his own against the state militia.73
Upon news of the surrender of Fort Sumter, Governor Jack-
son ordered the enforcement of blue laws and police conducted
raids on the various German beer gardens that had previously
been allowed to operate on Sundays. 74,75 Furthermore, Jackson
ordered that the English language was now the only official business
language and also withdrew funding from public schools in order
to build up the militia.76 This was meant to hamper the powers
and abilities of any pro-Union groups within Missouri because the
Germans were known to be ardent unionists. Upon hearing news
of the enforcement of blue laws, the Anzeiger des Westens, carried
this headline: Not One Word MoreNow Arms Will Decide.77
The Germans of St. Louis answered their newspapers call
to arms by flocking to Lyons banner.78 Within days, Lyon was able
to muster more than 4,000 recruits, all but one hundred of them
German, into his new army.79 After arming all his men, Lyon com-
pleted the task he had been set to do, defend the St. Louis Arsenal.
He spread a rumor through St. Louis that he would be sending
the weapons away by trolley car.80 The militia men ambushed the
trolley cars only to find rusty out-of-date weaponry from the reserve
rooms of the Arsenal while 25,000 brand new rifle-muskets and
carbines were taken away by steamship.81 With the supplies of the
Arsenal saved, Lyon had a numerical and strategic advantage over
the state militia; however, Lyons hands were tied in that he had
no legitimate reason to assault the militia encampment. 82 After
all, Missouri technically was not an enemy of the United States
because they had not joined the Confederacy.83
In early May, this opportunity was finally afforded to Lyon
when the Confederacy made a blunder. The government of the
Confederacy, eager to pull Missouri into the fold, sent a secret
shipment of weapons to the local militia.84 However, because the
shipment had to be unloaded from the steamship by longboat and
many of the longboat rowers were Germans, as soon as the ship-
ment arrived, Lyon knew about it.85 Just to verify that the militia
had indeed received a shipment of weapons Lyon disguised him-
self as an old lady and rode a coach into the militia encampment
pretending to be delivering food to a nephew.86 Having verified
that the militia had indeed received weapons, on the 10th of May,
Lyon led his yet untested and poorly trained army through the
streets of St. Louis to surround Camp Jackson, demanding the
surrender of the state militia that was encamped there.87 This
event sparked riots in the streets, but Lyon was quickly able to
quell these riots and move on with his plans to seize control of
Missouri.88 After the incident at Camp Jackson, Governor Jackson
met with Lyon to try to negotiate some sort of a truce; however,
these negotiations failed and no understanding was reached.89
Jackson then summoned the remaining state militia to his side and
began retreating into central Missouri with Lyon pursuing him.90
After a series of battles, the Confederacy made one last
desperate bid for Missouri by sending the newly formed Western
172 Daniel H. Wang
army to reinforce the depleted militia forces.91 Lyons forces were

less than half of the combined might of the Rebel army that it was
facing. Lyon could either retreat to wait for reinforcements but
risk being overrun or launch a surprise attack of his own. Lyon
decided that he would attack.92 In the ensuing battle, Lyon was
fatally shot and the Union had to concede the field to the Con-
federate Army.93 However, the Confederates were not organized
enough to capitalize on their advantage and the Unions Army of
the West was allowed to retreat to Springfield.94 In this final effort,
the Confederacy managed to take control of the Southwestern
portion of Missouri where Jacksons government was forced into
exile.95 Despite the defeat at Wilsons Creek, through a combination
of military action and sheer force of personality, Brigadier General
Nathaniel Lyon had been able to oust the democratically-elected
secessionist government and install a unionist government in its
stead.96,97 As a result, even though it would later become the site
of many bloody guerrilla conflicts throughout the war, Missouri
never seceded from the Union. 98
While the textbooks often ignore the importance of Mis-
souri during the Civil War, this paper concludes that Missouri was
one of the most important states, especially during the months
leading into the opening of hostilities. Due to the large popula-
tion of more than one million people, Missouri would have been a
significant portion of either the Unions or the Confederacys total
populations. This importance was augmented by the presence of
the St. Louis Arsenal which contained enough munitions to equip
a large army all on its own. Furthermore, the St. Louis Arsenal also
contained a couple of very important machines that were used to
manufacture weapons, making the Arsenal more than just a simple
weapons depot. However, Missouri was significant for more than
just its resources in both manpower and munitions. Missouri also
held a very prime strategic location in that it controlled access to
the Missouri River, and also offered access from the Mississippi
River to the Ohio River and thus the heartland of the North or vice
versa. Any one of these reasons alone would have been enough to
guarantee Missouris importance. However, the fact that Missouri
possessed all three of these elements made Missouri one of the

most strategically important states in the Civil War.
Because Missouri was such an important state, understand-
ing why Missouri remained within the Union is important. Though
popular opinion should certainly be considered when determining
why Missouri remained in the Union, this paper concludes that
public opinion in Missouri was very complicated. The best that
can be said is that public opinion in Missouri was mostly neutral;
thus, public opinion is not the main reason Missouri remained in
the Union. When considering political maneuvering, this paper
concludes that the South offered a much better deal to Missouri
than the North. Both the Union and the Confederacy recognized
that control of the Border States was vital. However, President
Davis tried to win the border states to his side by offering incen-
tives while President Lincolns statement to Congress indicated
that he expected nothing less than complete obedience from all
the states and that failure to do so would result in military action.
Therefore, the federal government really did not offer any incen-
tives for Missouri to remain in the Union which means that such
things cannot be the reason Missouri did not secede. However,
when looking at military action, one can immediately observe that
Brigadier General Nathaniel Lyon and his force of predominantly
German volunteers performed marvelously at both protecting the
important resources of the St. Louis Arsenal, and also ousting the
secessionist state government and checking Confederate interests
in Missouri through a series of skirmishes and battles. Thus, the
second conclusion that this paper has reached is that Missouri
was preserved for the Union primarily through military actions
and the sheer force of will that Brigadier General Nathaniel Lyon
embodied.
Would our world be quite different today had Missouri fallen
to the Confederacy in 1861? While we cannot know for certain,
the conclusions seem inescapable. Our world would most likely
look very different today if the Confederacy had won Missouri.
The tangible resources like land, people, and weapons that Mis-
souri had to offer could have had a significant effect on the course
174 Daniel H. Wang
of the war. Just as important would be the intangible resources

which Missouri could have provided like morale. Furthermore,
had Missouri deserted the Union, it is not entirely unimaginable
that some of the other border states would follow suit. These fac-
tors, when combined, might have led to a Confederate victory
over the Union, which would have changed the course of history
as we know it. So why are the findings of this paper important?
To put it concisely, this paper helps to show us why the Civil War
ended with a Union victory and the dissolution of slavery in the
United States.
Endnotes
1
The Union had a free population in excess of 22 million
while the Confederacy had a free population of just 4.8
million.
2
Results from the 1860 Census, chart, The Civil War
Home Page, accessed August 26, 2015, http://www.civil-war.
net/pages/1860_census.html.
3
Ibid.
4
Adam Goodheart, Civil Warfare in the Streets: After Fort
Sumter, German Immigrants in St. Louis Flocked to the Union
Cause and in Bloody Confrontations Overthrew the Local
Secessionists, American Scholar 80, no. 2 (2011): 22.
5
Christine M. Kreiser, Missouri Mayhem, Americas Civil
War 26, no. 3 (2013): 59.
6
Goodheart, Civil Warfare in the Streets, 25.
7
Ibid., 25.
8
Ibid., 23.
9
Ibid., 23.
10
Ibid., 21.
11
Ibid., 20.
12
Sam Smith, The River War, Civil War Trust, accessed
August 25, 2015, http://www.civilwar.org/education/history/
navy-hub/navy-history/the-river-war.html?referrer=https://
www.google.com.tw/?referrer=http://www.civilwar.org/
education/history/navy-hub/navy-history/the-river-war.html.
13
Ibid.
14
Ibid.
15
Ibid.
16
Ibid.
17
Sun Tzu, The Art of War, ed. Dallas Galvin, trans. Lionel
Giles (New York, USA: Barnes & Noble Classics, 2003), 49.
18
Smith, The River War, Civil War Trust.
19
Ibid.
20
Claiborne Fox Jackson, Historic Missourians, accessed
April 26, 2015, http://shs.umsystem.edu/historicmissourians/
name/j/jackson/.
21
Inaugural Address, photograph, Historic Missourians,
accessed April 26, 2015, http://shs.umsystem.edu/
historicmissourians/name/j/jackson/.
22
Ibid.
23
Claiborne Fox Jackson, Historic Missourians.
24
Ibid.
176 Daniel H. Wang
25
Ibid.
26
The Republican, Daily Missouri Republican (St. Louis,
MO), January 1, 1861,1.
27
Ibid., 1.
28
Ibid., 1.
29
Ibid., 1.
30
James Montgomery Raids Fort Scott, Civil War on
the Western Border, accessed August 25, 2015, http://www.
civilwaronthewesternborder.org/timeline/james-montgomery-
raids-fort-scott.
31
The Republican, 1.
32
Farmer, From Cape Girardeau County, Daily Missouri
Republican (St. Louis, MO), January 1, 1861, 1.
33
Ibid., 1.
34
Ibid., 1.
35
Ibid., 1.
36
Ibid., 1.
37
Ibid., 1.
38
Ibid., 1.
39
40
Ibid., 22.
41
Ibid., 22.
42
Name for people who had immigrated to the U.S. to flee
the aftermath of the democratic revolts in Europe in 1848.
43
44
The 1860 Election in Missouri, The 1860 Election in
Missouri, http://www.missouridivision-scv.org/election.htm.
45
1860, Harp Week, accessed August 26, 2015, http://
elections.harpweek.com/1860/Overview-1860-2.htm.
46
Ibid.
47
48
Ibid., 23.
49
Ibid., 23.
50
Claiborne Fox Jackson to Abraham Lincoln, April 17,
1861.
51
Ibid.
52
S. Doc. No. 234, 58th Congress, 2nd sess.
53
Ibid.
54
Ibid.
55
Ibid.
56
Ibid.
57
Ibid.
58
U.S. House Journal 36th Cong., 1st sess., 5 July 1861
59
Ibid.
60
Ibid.
61
62
Ibid., 23.
63
Significance of the Arsenal will be discussed later in this
paper
64
Nathaniel Lyon, Historic Missourians, accessed April
26, 2015, http://shs.umsystem.edu/historicmissourians/
name/l/lyon/index.html.
65
Ibid.
66
Ibid.
67
Ibid.
68
Ibid.
69
Ibid.
70
Ibid.
71
Ibid.
72
73
Ibid, 24.
74
Blue Laws are laws that were designed to restrict/
ban certain activities on Sundays for religious purposes.
For example, it was illegal to attend plays or sell alcohol on
Sundays.
75
76
Ibid., 25.
77
Ibid., 26
78
Ibid., 26
79
Ibid., 26
80
Ibid., 26.
81
Ibid., 26
82
Ibid., 26
83
Ibid., 28
84
Ibid., 27.
85
Ibid., 27.
86
Ibid., 28.
87
Ibid., 29.
88
Ibid., 30.
89
Claiborne Fox Jackson, Historic Missourians.
90
Ibid.
91
Kreiser, Missouri Mayhem, 56.
92
Ibid., 56.
93
The Battle of Wilsons Creek. Civil War Trust. (accessed
August 25, 2015). http://www.civilwar.org/battlefields/wilson-
s-creek.html?referrer=https://www.google.com.tw/.
178 Daniel H. Wang
94
Ibid.
95
Ibid.
96
97
Nathaniel Lyon was promoted to the rank of general
following the Camp Jackson incident.
98
Matthew C. Hulbert, How to Remember This Damnable
Guerrilla Warfare, Civil War History 59, no. 2 (2013): 143.
Bibliography:
The Battle of Wilsons Creek. Civil War Trust. Accessed

August 25, 2015. http://www.civilwar.org/battlefields/wilson-s-
creek.html?referrer=https://www.google.com.tw/.
Daily Missouri Republican (St. Louis, MO). The Republican.
January 1, 1861.
The 1860 Election in Missouri. The 1860 Election in
Missouri. http://www.missouridivision-scv.org/election.htm.
Farmer. From Cape Girardeau County. Daily Missouri
Republican (St. Louis, MO), January 1, 1861, 1.
Geiger, Mark W. Indebtedness and the Origins of Guerrilla
Violence in Civil War Missouri. Journal of Southern History 75,
no. 1 (2009): 49-82.
Goodheart, Adam. Civil Warfare in the Streets: After Fort
Sumter, German Immigrants in St. Louis Flocked to the Union
Cause and in Bloody Confrontations Overthrew the Local
Secessionists. American Scholar 80, no. 2 (2011): 20-32.
HarpWeek. 1860. Harp Week. Accessed August 26, 2015.
http://elections.harpweek.com/1860/Overview-1860-2.htm.
Hulbert, Matthew C. How to Remember This Damnable
Guerrilla Warfare. Civil War History 59, no. 2 (2013): 143-68.
Inaugural Address. Photograph. Historic Missourians.
Accessed April 26, 2015. http://shs.umsystem.edu/
historicmissourians/name/j/jackson/.
Jackson, Claiborne Fox. Claiborne Fox Jackson to Abraham
Lincoln, April 17, 1861.
Kansas City Public Library. James Montgomery Raids Fort
Scott. Civil War on the Western Border. Accessed August 25,
2015. http://www.civilwaronthewesternborder.org/timeline/
james-montgomery-raids-fort-scott.
Kreiser, Christine M. Missouri Mayhem. Americas Civil War
26, no. 3 (2013): 56-59.
Results from the 1860 Census. Chart. The Civil War Home
Page. Accessed August 26, 2015. http://www.civil-war.net/
pages/1860_census.html.
Smith, Sam. The River War. Civil War Trust. Accessed
August 25, 2015. http://www.civilwar.org/education/history/
navy-hub/navy-history/the-river-war.html?referrer=https://
www.google.com.tw/?referrer=http://www.civilwar.org/
education/history/navy-hub/navy-history/the-river-war.html.
State Historical Society of Missouri. Claiborne Fox
Jackson. Historic Missourians. Accessed April 26, 2015. http://
shs.umsystem.edu/historicmissourians/name/j/jackson/.
State Historic Society of Missouri. Nathaniel Lyon.
Historic Missourians. Accessed April 26, 2015. http://shs.
umsystem.edu/historicmissourians/name/l/lyon/index.html.
Tzu, Sun. The Art of War. Edited by Dallas Galvin. Translated
by Lionel Giles. New York, USA: Barnes & Noble Classics, 2003.
180 Daniel H. Wang
To the People of the State of New York: AFTER an

unequivocal experience of the inefficacy of the subsisting
federal government, you are called upon to deliberate on
a new Constitution for the United States of America. The
subject speaks its own importance; comprehending in its
consequences nothing less than the existence of the UNION,
the safety and welfare of the parts of which it is composed, the
fate of an empire in many respects the most interesting in the
world. It has been frequently remarked that it seems to have
been reserved to the people of this country, by their conduct
and example, to decide the important question, whether
societies of men are really capable or not of establishing good
government from reflection and choice, or whether they are
forever destined to depend for their political constitutions on
accident and force. If there be any truth in the remark, the
crisis at which we are arrived may with propriety be regarded
as the era in which that decision is to be made; and a wrong
election of the part we shall act may, in this view, deserve to be
considered as the general misfortune of mankind.
This idea will add the inducements of philanthropy

to those of patriotism, to heighten the solicitude which all
considerate and good men must feel for the event. Happy
will it be if our choice should be directed by a judicious
estimate of our true interests, unperplexed and unbiased
by considerations not connected with the public good. But
this is a thing more ardently to be wished than seriously to
be expected. The plan offered to our deliberations affects
too many particular interests, innovates upon too many local
institutions, not to involve in its discussion a variety of objects
foreign to its merits, and of views, passions and prejudices little
favorable to the discovery of truth.
Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist Papers,

October 27, 1787, Number one (p. 1). Kindle Edition.
FAILURE OF THE CONFEDERATE

EN ECHELON ATTACK AT GETTYSBURG
Owen Tedford
Introduction
T he Confederacy might have won the Civil War were it

not for the failures in command on July 2nd, 1863, at the Battle of
Gettysburg in what Major General George G. Meade would later
describe as one of the severest contests of the war.1 General
Robert E. Lee led his Army of Northern Virginia of approximately
seventy-five thousand troops against the newly appointed Meades
Army of the Potomac, consisting of ninety thousand troops.2 Be-
tween the two armies more than forty-three thousand combatants
were killed, wounded, or missing by the end of the battle, making
it the bloodiest battle of the Civil War.3 However, the controversy
around this battle exists because there is widespread belief that
the decisive Confederate loss at Gettysburg was a major turning
point of the Civil War.4 This belief has driven historians to try to
pinpoint the specific turning point of the battle. The result of
this work has often placed a emphasis on events such as the 20th
Maines defense of Little Round Top or Picketts Charge. However,
Owen Tedford is a Senior at Greenwich High School in Greenwich,

Connmecticut, where he wrote this paper for Ms. Karen Boyeas United
States History course in the 2014/2015 academic year.
182 Owen Tedford
in actuality these parts of the battle played a much smaller role in

the grand scheme of the battle than is popularly believed. These
events are seen as the grand moments of the battle and as such
the general public, including most historians, have perhaps given
too much weight to these events. The true critical point of the
battle actually occurred during the battle for Cemetery Hill on
July 2nd: victory was within the Confederates grasp, but due to
Confederate errors triumph slipped away. With it went the Con-
federacys last chance to win the war.
Historiography
The first contribution to the historiography of the Battle of
Gettysburg came from John Bachelder. Bachelder began his work
when he followed the Union Army after the battle, interviewing
officers as well as privates.5 From these interviews, Bachelder cre-
ated a map of the battle, published between 1864 and 1866, which
is widely considered to be the most accurate map of the battle
after several Gettysburg corps commanders verified its accuracy.6
Bachelders work has been saved in a collection, which includes
his correspondence with commanders on both sides of the battle,
and is currently on display at the New Hampshire Historical So-
ciety. In 1880 Congress paid Bachelder fifty thousand dollars to
create an authoritative, written account of the battle.7 However,
instead of using his own work, Bachelder chose to use The War of
the Rebellion: a Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Con-
federate Armies, a collection of the after-battle reports, to write the
account. At the time it was met with widespread disappointment;
the accounts reception was so poor that the War Department
chose not to publish his work.8 This decision of not using his cor-
respondence had the unintended consequence of concealing the
letters for almost a century. The historian who unearthed them
became one of the most admired for his influential work on the
Battle of Gettysburg.9
1968 marked the next major contribution to the study
of the battle, as it was the year that Edwin B. Coddingtons work,
The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command, was published. In
his work Coddington put forth his belief that Meade only saved
the battle because of his ability to move troops around, but this
movement caused the expenditure of a great number of men,
with most brigades sustaining thirty to forty percent casualties.10
Coddingtons work was compelling due to both its comprehensive
nature and, more significantly, its use of Bachelders collection.
Coddingtons work was the first comprehensive study of the entire
Gettysburg Campaign, which began after the Battle of Chancel-
lorsville and concluded with the Confederate retreat across the
Potomac. To this day, Coddingtons work is considered to be the
bible for any serious student of the campaign and has not been
eclipsed despite the continual discovery of new primary sources.11
The second reason that Coddingtons work is of such great sig-
nificance is because he was the first to use Bachelders work as a
major resource. The use of Bachelders correspondence added
a new depth to Coddingtons book. Because of the insight that
Coddingtons work achieved, Bachelders work was brought back
to the canon of Gettysburg literature. Therefore, Coddingtons use
of Bachelders correspondence was significant for both Bachelder
and Coddington. Had Coddington not used Bachelders letters,
then neither of those historians would be remembered as signifi-
cantly as they are now. But, because Coddington wrote the first
comprehensive study of the Gettysburg campaign and he was the
first to use Bachelders correspondence, he will be remembered.
The most recent important contribution to Gettysburg
historiography came from Harry Pfanz who wrote a trilogy of books
dedicated to the battle titled GettysburgThe Second Day (1987),
GettysburgCulps Hill and Cemetery Hill (1993), and Gettysburg
The First Day (2001). Pfanzs work is noteworthy for his extensive
use of primary sources, which included a number of diaries and
regimental histories that had rarely been used beforehand. Like
Coddington, Pfanz again brought a new level of detail to histo-
riography on the Battle of Gettysburg. Pfanzs work also has a
special significance because of his service as a lieutenant in the
field artillery during World War II, which largely influenced his
analyses.12 His service gave Pfanz a perspective that many histori-
ans of the Battle of Gettysburg lack and explained the emphasis
184 Owen Tedford
that Pfanz placed on the role artillery played in the battle where
other historians consider its use more as an afterthought. As for
Pfanzs thesis regarding the second day of battle at Gettysburg,
he believes that the [Confederate attack] broke down when
Wrights brigade was pushed off of Cemetery Ridge due to a lack
of support.13 Pfanz also served as the Chief Historian at the Get-
tysburg National Park for ten years, and many of the resources
that he used have been collected at the Gettysburg National Parks
library for display in Pfanzs name. The legacy that he left behind
will make it easier for future historians to access many of the rare
primary sources that Pfanz used.
Background
At the close of battle on July 1st, the Union held a strong
position to the south of the town of Gettysburgthey camped at
a position centered on Cemetery Hill and Culps Hill with more
than twenty-seven thousand troops from the First, Second, and
Eleventh Corps.14 This position was where the Union had fallen
back to after losing Oak Ridge to the northwest of the town ear-
lier in the day.15 From these hills, the Union troops held the high
ground over the town with Cemetery Hill about eighty feet about
the center of town and Culps Hill another one hundred feet
higherquite simply these elevations dominated the town.16
About forty-two thousand troops had been engaged between the
two sides with more than nine thousand Union dead and about
sixty-eight hundred Confederate dead.17 The Confederates, in
contrast, did not have most of their army on the field by midnight
of July 2nd; at this time, only Lieutenant General Richard Ewells
Corps and Lieutenant General A.P. Hills Corps had arrived.18 Two
of Lieutenant General James Longstreets three divisions were
located four miles away and would arrive on July 2nd, but the third
division would not make it in time for the second day of battle.19
Overnight, the Union received reinforcements as well with the
arrival of the Fifth and Twelfth Corps as well as the Third Corps
in the early morning.20 The last Union corps, the Sixth, was thirty-
five miles away in Manchester, Maryland, but arrived at the battle
by late afternoon after a forced march. Its presence contributed

to the turning of the Confederate tide at the southern extreme
of the battlefield.21
At dawn on July 2nd, Lee had a strong infantry force at
his disposal but was still short. Confederate Major General J.E.B.
Stuarts cavalry, for one, which boasted excellent reconnaissance
abilities, was sorely missed.22 Additionally, of Lees eight divisions
at the battlefield, three had suffered losses already and due to
geographical complications, Ewells corps was separated from the
rest of the army.23 Lee began his day by meeting with Longstreet,
Hill, and Hood starting at 5:00 a.m.24 From this meeting, and
after examining the situation from his headquarters, Lee came
up with the plan:
to crush the Union left with an irresistible en echelon attack. This
style of attack would strike the extreme left of the Union line first
and then progress, with fresh units pushed into the fray, northward,
roughly following the Emmitsburg Road. Simultaneously, Lee hoped
a successful demonstration by...Ewells 2nd Corps against the Union
right...would constrain Meade from pulling troops out of line to
reinforce his left. If things went well Ewell could even convert his
diversion into a real assault and turn the Union right...Hills 3rd
Corps, facing the Union center, was assigned a two-pronged role.
He would threaten the enemys center, to prevent re-enforcements
being drawn to either wing, and co-operate with his right division
[Maj. Gen. Richard H. Andersons] in Longstreets attack.25
Although some historians challenge the fact that Lee planned an
en echelon attack, all of the brigade commanders in Andersons
division except Mahone, who wrote a tiny report, uphold the
fact that Lee planned for an en echelon attack.26 As the morning
continued, Union Major General Daniel Sickles Third Corps
arrived in full by 9:00 a.m. At the same time, on the Confederate
side, Andersons division was set in place for Longstreets corps
to position from.27 However, despite Andersons division being in
place by then, Longstreet insisted that, It was fully eleven oclock
when General Leeordered the movement.28 This would be
the first of many Confederate delays throughout the day. Their
next misstep immediately followed when Longstreet delayed his
march into position by waiting for General Laws brigade because
186 Owen Tedford
he [feared] that [his] force was too weak to venture to make an

attack [so he] delayed until General Laws brigade joined its divi-
sion.29 During this march some delay ensued in seeking a more
concealed route to hide from view of Little Round Top.30 The
ensuing countermarch proved to be immensely difficult owing
to the rough character of the country in places and the fences
and ditches we had to cross.31 Unfortunately for the Confed-
erates, the countermarch added three miles, or one hour and
twenty minutes, to the total march in order for Longstreet to get
in position.32 While this unfolded on the Confederate side, the
Union had similar problems when Sickles decided to move his
entire corps forward just as Longstreets corps was finally getting
in position.33 Sickles divisions, commanded by Major General Da-
vid Birney and Brigadier General Andrew Humphreys, were fully
in position by 3:30 p.m. and 4:00 p.m. respectively.34 Longstreet
had set up with Lieutenant General John Bell Hoods division
farthest south and Major General Lafayette McLaws division in
between Hoods division and Andersons division.35 In Hoods
division, Brigadier General Evander Laws brigade set up in the
front right, Brigadier General Jerome Robertsons brigade to its
left, with Brigadier General Henry Bennings brigade behind
Laws brigade, and, lastly, Brigadier General George Andersons
brigade was behind Robertsons brigade.36 McLaws division set up
with Brigadier General Joseph Kershaws brigade in front right,
next to Robertsons brigade.37 Next was Brigadier General William
Barksdales brigade to the front left, with Brigadier General Paul
Jones Semmess brigade behind Kershaws brigade and Brigadier
General William Woffords brigade behind Barksdales brigade.38
At 3:00 p.m., the Confederate pre-assault bombardment
began.39 After an hour of artillery fire, Longstreets corps began
its attack.40 The Confederate assault began with Hoods divisions
attack against Devils Den and Little Round Top.41 When Sickles
moved his corps forward to respond, he unintentionally left no
troops to protect the heights of the Round Tops.42 Fortunately for
the Union, Meades Chief Engineer, Brigadier General Gouver-
neur K. Warren, noticed the exposed position and brought over
Vincents brigade from Major General George Sykes Fifth Corps
to save the position.43 From the Round Tops, the battle spread
northward to the Wheatfield and the Peach Orchard as the Con-
federates began to commit more brigades to the fight.44 When
the Union position in the Peach Orchard broke under pressure
from McLawss division, his division added its weight to the attack
against the Wheatfield.45 When Major General Winfield Hancock
saw this collapse at the Peach Orchard, he sent Brigadier General
John Caldwells division from farther north on Cemetery Ridge
to try to prop up the Union position in the Wheatfield.46 By 6:00
p.m., the Union line had broken into full retreat, but Meade pulled
Union troops from the Fifth, Sixth, and Twelfth Corps to stabilize
the situation and prevent a total collapse.47 This consolidation of
troops weakened other Union positions along Cemetery Ridge
and allowed Brigadier General A. R. Wrights brigade to pierce
the center of the Union line on Cemetery Ridge.48 But, due to a
lack of support from the rest of Andersons division, troops from
the Second, Eleventh, and Twelfth Corps pushed back Wrights
brigade, ending the attack on the Union left.49
Meanwhile, on the Union right flank, the troops on Culps
Hill and East Cemetery Hill spent the morning digging trenches.50
The Confederate attack on this front, much like the other Confed-
erate attacks on that day, was in the en echelon form from left to
right, beginning with Major General Edward Johnsons divisions
attack against Culps Hill and working around to Major General
Jubal Earlys division and, lastly, Major General Robert Rodes divi-
sion.51 The attack began once Ewells artillery heard Longstreets
guns open up, and the Union artillery eventually won the ensuing
artillery battle, defeating the Confederate artillery.52 After this
defeat, it was another two hours until Ewells corps attacked on
the whole of [the Union] fronta few minutes before 7 p.m.53
Of Earlys division, only two brigades were initially committed, and
though they broke the Union line, the rest of Earlys division was
not committed and neither was Rodes division.54 The tide then
turned against the Confederates as Union counterattacks forced
them back, to end combat for the day.55 Between the Union and
Confederate armies, there were at least 16,500 casualties.56 How-
188 Owen Tedford
ever, the actual number is probably higher but uncertain, because

of poor Confederate reporting.57
As the battle ended on July 2nd, Lee was unshaken by
the failures that the Confederates had experienced and was de-
termined to fight with resolve on the next day. Longstreets last
division, Picketts, arrived that night, fresh and ready to be used
on July 3rd.58 Lee initially planned to renew the attack across the
entire front, beginning with Johnsons division on Culps Hill at
daylight.59 Unfortunately for the Confederates, the Union divi-
sions on Culps Hill launched a counterattack just before dawn,
reclaiming the entirety of Culps Hill.60 With this loss of position,
Lee had no choice but to change his plan, meaning that instead
of Longstreet pressing his attack against Little Round Top again,
Lee settled on a full-frontal assault, which has since been named
Picketts Charge.61 This assault ended in utter catastrophe for the
Confederates, with Picketts division suffering casualty rates up-
wards of sixty percent in the units participating.62 After his defeat,
Lee was left with no choice but to begin his retreat back to Virginia.
Thesis
The Battle of Gettysburg was the turning point of the Civil
War. Within the battle itself, the conflict that occurred on July 2nd
was the turning point of the battle. General Longstreets attack
was successful in that it turned Meades attention to the Union
left flank and forced Meade to pull troops away from other parts
of the battle (a problem Sickles forward line exacerbated). This
weakening of Meades line, particularly at the critical point of
Cemetery Hill, presented opportunities for other Confederate
troops through the en echelon style of attack. However, poor
management by the Confederate Generals Anderson, Early, and
Rodes at these trying moments ended up costing them the victory.
Sickles Position
Sickles decision to move his corps forward to the Em-
mitsburg Road from its position on the southern portion of
Cemetery Ridge unintentionally aided the Confederates. The
first issue with Sickles line came because Humphreys had orders
to extend Birneys line northwest and connect Sickles line with
Caldwells division back on Cemetery Ridge.63 However, Caldwell
had no similar orders to advance his division, thus this forward
movement left an interval of about five hundred yards between
Caldwells left flank and Humphreyss right flank as one was on
Cemetery Ridge and one was on the Emmitsburg Road.64 Later
the Confederate attack would exploit this gap in helping to break
the position at the Peach Orchard, forcing more troops away from
Cemetery Hill, increasing the odds of a Confederate success.
Therefore, this already big gap became an even larger issue as the
day and the Confederate attack went on. The second issue with
Sickles line was the length of his line. The position that Sickles
wanted to occupy, according to Meades chief of artillery Briga-
dier General Henry Hunt, wouldrequire a larger force than
the Third Corps alone to hold it.65 His line would be one and a
half miles long, double the length of the line that Sickles corps
was supposed to occupy on Cemetery Ridge.66 Sickles corps was
too small to hold the line, leaving soft spots in his front and no
reserve to stop the inevitable breakthroughs in his line.67 Sickles
was even aware of these shortcomings of his line sharing Meades
doubts as to [his] being able to hold so extended a linewith
one corpsagainst the rebel army; but that, if supported, the line
could be held.68 Therefore, not only had Sickles created a line
that was in a bad position, but his corps was unable to hold its
line without reinforcements, meaning that he had already helped
the Confederates move troops away from Cemetery Hill. Even if
these troops did not come from Cemetery Hill immediately, the
Confederate plan would force the Union army to eventually pull
reinforcements from behind Cemetery Hill. The last issue with
Sickles decision to move forward was his belief that the forward
position enabled [him] to hold commanding ground, which, if
the enemy had been allowed to takeas they would have taken
it if [he] had not occupied it in forcewould have rendered our
position on the left untenable; and, in [his] judgment, would
have turned the fortunes of the day hopelessly against us.69 This
judgment of his was wrong because his new line left Little Round
190 Owen Tedford
Top unoccupied, which was the key to the Federal position and
could dominate Sickles position.70 The Confederate attack came
very close to successfully capturing Little Round Top, and the
Union Army only saved Little Round Top with the lucky arrival
of Vincents brigade and the 20th Maine.71 Hence, Sickles third
mistake nearly cost the Union Army their entire position because
he chose not to occupy Little Round Top. In conclusion, Sickles
decision to move forward was full of errors and increased the odds
of success for the Confederate attack because his position created
gaps in the Union defensive line, required additional forces to
hold the line, and left Little Round Top unoccupied. The Confed-
erates took advantage of these mistakes and translated them into
success, and only the mistakes of the Confederate generals later
in the day turned the battle against the Confederates.
Longstreets Attack
Longstreets corpss attack began at Devils Den. Sickles
forward line had already given the Confederate troops an advantage
because there were few troops left at Devils Den. This allowed
Hoods division [to outflank]Sickles advanced line at Devils
Den before it could be reinforced to make its position tenable.72
The Confederate attack began with Robertsons brigade with
Bennings brigade and Andersons brigade in support.73 Under
this concentrated attack, Wards brigade, which held a thin line
because it had to cover the left end of the corps and the army was
forced back and it was then relieved, due to being exhausted
and nearly destitute of ammunition.74 In order to compensate
for this new gap in the Union line, Birney shifted troops from
other parts of his thin line to reinforce Devils Den.75 Wards
brigades collapse began the collapse of Sickles line and the left
of the Union Army.76 This collapse set in motion the chain of
events requiring Union troops to be shifted continually towards
the southern end of the battlefield. If these troops were not sent
to Devils Den, the Confederates would have marched right over
Little Round Top and into the rear of the Union Army. There-
fore, the movement of troops was a necessary evil for the Union
Army, and would cause problems for its defense as the battle went
on because the movement of troops would weaken other strong
points of the Union line. The Confederate attack at Devils Den
was successful because it defeated the Union troops who were
designated to oppose the attack and the attack had drawn more
troops away from Cemetery Hill.
The next progression of the battle on the Confederate
right was to Little Round Top. When Brigadier General Gouver-
neur K. Warren, Meades chief engineer, arrived on the scene
at Little Round Top, he found no Union troops on the hill and
Confederate troops charging towards the position.77 Meade had
already ordered for the Fifth Corps to be moved from acting as
a reserve behind Culps Hill over to Little Round Top however,
fearing that the Fifth Corps would not arrive in time, Warren or-
dered Humphreys to move his division from its position on the
Emmitsburg Road to Little Round Top.78 General Sickles, when
called upon by General Warren, through [Lieutenant Ranald S.
Mackenzie], to furnish troops for the defence of that position,
refused to do so, stating that his whole command was necessary
to defend his front.79 This order was overturned within minutes
when Warren saw Vincents brigade, from the Fifth Corps, coming
towards Little Round Top.80 Vincents brigade was immediately
deployed on a little spur to the left and rear of the peak of the
hill, a position that dominated the saddle between [Little Round
Top and Big Round Top], to face the Confederate onslaught.81
Battery D of the Fifth United States under Lieutenant Charles E.
Hazlett joined Vincents brigade on Little Round Top at about
4:30 p.m.82 With Vincents brigade under tremendous pressure
from Laws brigade, the only attacking Confederate brigade,
Warren was forced to pull the 140th New York under Colonel
Patrick ORorke, which was part of Brigadier General Stephen H.
Weeds brigade.83 ORorkes regiment was intended to go down
the Wheatfield Road to the Peach Orchardinstead it charged
pell-mell down the southern face.84 The rest of Weeds brigade
later joined ORorkes regiment and helped anchor the Union
line at Little Round Top.85 Although successful, the defense of
Little Round Top created problems later in the day because two
192 Owen Tedford
Fifth Corps brigades had been pulled from going to the Peach
Orchard.86 This would lead to issues in the defense of the Peach
Orchard because these troops from the Fifth Corps could not be
committed to the fight later. Here the Confederate attack was
again successful because it had drawn two brigades while attacking
with only one. Therefore, the battle at Little Round Top can be
considered a success for the Confederates because it continued
the pull of Union troops to the southern end of the battlefield.
The Union line in the Wheatfield was centered about
Colonel Regis de Trobriands brigade. 87 One of de Trobriands
brigade tasks was to support Grahams brigade and Wards bri-
gade. 88 In doing so, it had given up the 3rd Michigan, 17th Maine,
and 40th New York, which left de Trobriand holding the Wheat-
field with two of his regiments, less than one-third of troops.89
To compensate for the weakness of de Trobriands line, Tiltons
brigade and Sweitzers brigade, from the Fifth Corps were sent to
reinforce his position.90 The 115th Pennsylvania and the 8th New
Jersey further reinforced De Trobriands position.91 The Confed-
erate assault against the Wheatfield came in several waves with
each successive wave becoming more successful than the prior
wave. The first attack came at about 5 oclock from Andersons
brigade against de Trobriands reinforced line and was turned
back without making any breakthroughs.92 The second wave
came at about a quarter to 6 oclock again from Andersons
brigade, but this time his brigade received reinforcements from
Kershaws brigade on his left and broke de Trobriands original
line. 93 With this breakthrough, Meade directed[Hancock] to
send a division to the assistance of the Third Corps, with orders
to report to General Sykes, commanding Fifth Corps, and the
First Division, under Brigadier-General Caldwell, was dispatched
to the scene of conflict.94 With the arrival of Caldwells division,
the second Confederate attack was repulsed.95 The third Confed-
erate push came from Woffords brigade, Semmes brigade, and
Kershaws brigade, and using the Wheatfield Road as a guide,
routed Caldwells line.96 Caldwell recommitted Sweitzers brigades,
Colonel John Brookes brigade, part of Caldwells division, and
had Days and Burbanks brigades join the fight to try to stop this
Confederate breakthrough.97 These units were not enough to stop

the Confederate charge, and ultimately were forced back onto
Little Round Top.98 With the triumph of the Confederate attack,
there were no Federal units [left] west of Plum Run and south of
the Wheatfield road.99 Seven brigades of Hoods and McLaws
divisions had encountered ten brigades from the Second, Third,
and Fifth corps, and had shattered them.100 The Confederate
onslaught at the Wheatfield had been a total success. They had
forced the Union to pull in tons of reinforcements from all over
the battlefield in order to try to hold the position. These troops
efforts would all be in vain as they did not stop the waves of Con-
federate assaults. The success of the Confederate attack established
momentum in the Wheatfield, which would overflow into success
in the Peach Orchard and was key in building Confederate mo-
mentum throughout the rest of the day.
At the Peach Orchard, Barksdales brigade led the Con-
federate attack. The Union position consisted of troops from
Grahams brigade with four regiments facing west along the Em-
mitsburg Road, one facing south along the Wheatfield Road, and
one skirmishing to the west of the Emmitsburg Road.101 Lieutenant
Colonel Freeman McGilvery commanded the artillery at the Peach
Orchard.102 Four batteries from the Artillery Reserve reinforced
his initial force of three batteries from the Third Corps Artillery
Brigade.103 As the battle for the Peach Orchard went on, five more
batteries from the Artillery Reserve and two from the Fifth Corps
Artillery Brigade replaced and reinforced McGilverys initial
force.104 Between these fourteen batteries, a total of seventy-eight
artillery pieces had come through the Peach Orchard for the Union
Army, over one-fifth of the Union Armys artillery.105 When the
Confederate attack began against the Wheatfield, Graham asked
Humphreys for reinforcements and received the 73rd New York,
which was put in place behind the 114th Pennsylvania facing west
along the Emmitsburg Road.106 Graham also received the 2nd New
Hampshire, which faced south along the Wheatfield Road, and
the 7th New Jersey, from Burlings brigade.107 To compensate for
the pressure coming from Kershaws attack near the Wheatfield,
Graham moved one of his regiments along with one from de Tro-
194 Owen Tedford
briands brigade and one from Wards brigade to the left of the
2nd New Hampshire to extend the southern flank of the salient
at the Peach Orchard.108 These four regiments then crossed the
Wheatfield Road to fight against Kershaws left regiments.109 When
these brigades crossed the road, they exposed the right flank of
Grahams main line to the 21st Mississippis attack.110 This attack
simultaneously threatened the rear of the regiments that moved
forward, forcing their withdrawal.111 Three of these regiments
reformed, but when Barksdales brigade over ran the southern
flank of Grahams main line, these regiments were forced to retreat
again.112 At this moment, the 17th Mississippi began to wheel to
the north putting it on the left flank of the rest of Grahams main
line that had not been overrun yet.113 This wheel then forced back
the rest of Grahams line.114 During this attack, Grahams brigade
suffered forty-nine percent casualties, the 2nd New Hampshire lost
more than fifty-four percent, the 73rd New York lost more than
forty-six percent, and McGilvery batteries lost more than twenty-
four percent, extremely high losses for that branch of service.115
The Confederates had been completely successful at the Peach
Orchard and had totally crushed the Union line. The defense was
a disaster for the Union because the Peach Orchard was not only
a lynchpin of the Union line, but it was also one of the highest
concentrations of Union troops on the entire battlefield. Therefore,
the Confederate attack had been successful once again because
the attack had forced back a large concentration of Union troops
that included those who were drawn from elsewhere on the field.
Thus, despite the Unions superior numbers, the Confederates
were still drawing troops away from Cemetery Hill, the ultimate
goal of the Confederate attack.
Following the total collapse of Sickles position at the
Peach Orchard, the only hope for the Union to save the line
was for more troops to be sent to the southern end of the field.
The ensuing fight is what Longstreet described as the grappling
for the crowning point.116 This process began when McGilvery
re-established a line of artillery on Cemetery Ridge with some
thirteen to fifteen artillery pieces from four batteries. Shortly
thereafter, two more batteries joined McGilverys line, each with
four pieces.117 In order for McGilvery to establish this line, he

had to sacrifice the 9th Massachusetts Battery, a suicidal task for
artillery without infantry support.118 The battery held its ground
for twenty minutes, but this came at the high cost of losing four
of the six artillery pieces and three of the four officers.119 After
the establishment of McGilverys initial line, the 21st Mississippi
overran another battery and two other batteries retired, leaving
McGilverys line at its weakest point.120 Fortunately for McGilvery
and the Union Army, the Sixth Corps arrived just in time to save
the left from Longstreets attack, which would have collapsed
ten minutes later according to Colonel Emory Upton of the 121st
New York, an officer in the Sixth Corps.121 With the Sixth Corps
arrival, the final troops were committed to the fight.122 The Fifth
Corps had one uncommitted division, Crawfords, with two bri-
gades, Fishers and McCandless.123 Fishers brigade was pulled
away from Crawfords main line to support Vincents brigade in
taking Big Round Top.124 When Ayress division was forced from
the Wheatfield, McCandless brigade prepared for the impend-
ing Confederate attack.125 Instead of waiting for the Confederate
attack, McCandlesss brigade charged, an action that stopped
Confederate breakthrough and push them back to the east side of
the Wheatfield.126 When Nevins brigade and Wheatons brigade
of the Sixth Corps were arriving to the battlefield and saw this
charge, they joined in as well.127 When the Sixth Corps arrived,
[Meade] immediately directed the Fifth Corps to move over to
our extreme left, and the Sixth to occupy its place as a reserve for
the right. This would not last long as Meade would then decide
to bring the Sixth Corps to the left.128 Therefore, the Confederate
attack on the southern portion of Sickles line had been a success.
It had smashed the Union troops who were initially present on its
front and had forced the Union generals to become so concerned
that they were taking troops from anywhere on the battlefield in
order to try to preserve this line, when the Confederate attack
was not focused here. Meades movement of the Sixth Corps is a
clear example of this as he was pulling away the only reserve that
the right flank had. At this point, Lee and the Confederate Army
had the Union Army right where he wanted it: the Confederate
196 Owen Tedford
Army was defeating any troops that the Union Army put in de-
fense and this was forcing troops to continually be drawn away
from Cemetery Hill.
Until this point, Humphreys divisions front had been
relatively quiet in terms of the Confederates attack. However, for
this reason, his division had been redistributed elsewhere on the
battlefield. For example, Burlings brigade was left with only one
of its six regiments, the 5th New Jersey.129 The other five had gone
to Peach Orchard and to support Ward near Devils Den.130 With
the collapse of the Peach Orchard, a large interval remained on
the left, Hancock wrote.131 Humphreys left was in the air, and,
as a result, Barksdales brigade hit Humphreys line from the
south on its exposed flank.132 At the same time, pressure began
to come from Wilcoxs brigade in the east.133 Brigadier General
Joseph Carrs brigade and Humphreys northern brigade, were
aligned with the 1st Massachusetts on the far right, just in front of
the 26th Pennsylvania.134 The 74th New York, of Colonel William
Brewsters brigade, was behind the 26th Pennsylvania, but the 74th
New York was then forced to move behind the 73rd New York to
defend against Barksdales attack, another example of areas un-
der pressure being prioritized over other areas of the field.135 To
further compensate for the pressure from Barksdales brigade,
Humphreys had to draw back Brewsters brigade forming a right
angle with Carrs brigade, perpendicular to the Emmitsburg
Road.136 Unfortunately for Humphreys, this action would not be
enough and his line began to collapse under the Confederate
pressure.137 Brewsters brigade collapsed first, which forced Carrs
to collapse under the combined pressure from Barksdales brigade
and Wilcoxs brigade.138 Both the 120th New York and the 11th
New Jersey, sacrificed themselves in order to slow the Confeder-
ate onslaught [Barksdales brigade], losing 53 percent and 56
percent of their men, respectively, before finally being forced to
retreat.139 To try to hold together Humphreys crumbling line,
Hancock sent the 19th Massachusetts, 42nd New York, 19th Maine,
and Willards brigade.140 Willards brigade attacked Barksdales
three regiments that had wheeled north and were now attack-
ing northeast.141 Willards brigade was successful in turning back
Barksdales brigade.142 Following this Union success, Hancock sent

more stabilizing troops from Gibbons division and the artillery
reserve.143 Humphreys believes,
Had [his] Division been left intact...[he] should have driven the
enemy back, but this ruinous habit (it dont deserve the name of sys-
tem) [emphasis in the original] of putting troops in position & then
drawing off its reserves & second line to help others, who if similarly
disposed would need no such help, is disgusting.144
Humphreys complaint points to the fatal flaw of the Union Army
on the day. His division had been ransacked for the purpose of
supporting positions already under pressure while his was not. The
practice of continually pulling troops from the quiet areas of the
front created problems for Humphreys and forced his position to
collapse. This collapse forced Hancock to try to salvage Humphreys
line. And, although he was successful in saving Humphreys line,
Hancocks expenditure of troops would allow for Andersons divi-
sion to break through Hancocks main line. Therefore, although
Barksdales brigade and Wilcoxs brigade had been turned back,
they were successful in drawing more troops away from the main
Union linecreating opportunities for Andersons division. His-
torian Allen Guelzo best summarizes the Union situation at this
time of the battle writing that,
Hancock, like Sykes, Caldwell, and every other Union general that
afternoon, managed to shore up Dan Sickles misbegotten line along
the Emmitsburg Road by robbing divisions and brigades from anyone
not under immediate pressure and sending them to suffocate the
emergencies breaking out in place after place from Devils Den to
Plum Run. But there was going to come a moment where some part
of the Union defenses was going to find itself so denuded by emer-
gencies elsewhere that it would have nothing left for its own defense
and nowhere to borrow more.145
The stage had been set for the first Confederate breakthrough.
The attack up until this point had been successful at drawing away
Union troops at the critical point. Hancockhad been peeling
off regiments, brigades, and divisions to send someplace else all
afternoon.146 Despite this removal of troops to save Sickles line,
the Second Corps still held a line between the Copse of Trees
and Cemetery Hill.147 Unfortunately, the removal of troops had
198 Owen Tedford
left a mile-wide gap to the left of the Second Corps until the Fifth
Corpss line was reached near Little Round Top.148 In his current
line, Hancock had two brigades of Gibbons division and Hays
division at his disposal, equivalent to less than half of the Second
Corps remained in its position on[Cemetery] ridge.149 Three
batteries around the Angle were supporting Hancocks corps.150
To compensate for the gap to Hancocks right, General Gibbon
extended his line to the left by adding to it his reserve brigade.151
This thinned out Hancocks main line on Cemetery Ridge and
increased the Confederates odds of success. To give Gibbon time
to complete this movement, Hancock put out the 15th Massachu-
setts and 82nd New York to attempt to slow down the Confederate
attack from Andersons division.152 Wilcoxs brigade and Langs
brigade both broke through Carrs line opposing them, leaving
the 82nd New York and the 15th Massachusetts outflanked on their
left.153 The pressure of the Confederate troops on their flank and
the 22nd Georgia, the right regiment of Wrights line, forced back
these regiments.154 With momentum building, Wrights brigade
attacked and overran Perrins battery on its way towards Cemetery
Ridge.155 To try to prevent Wrights brigade from making it to Cem-
etery Ridge, Hancock sent forward Thomass battery and Weirs
battery.156 These batteries required infantry support to hold their
line, which came from the 1st Minnesota.157 In order to protect the
batteries from being overrun, the 1st Minnesota had to take on
a suicide mission of charging headlong into the oncoming Con-
federate assault.158 Ordered to capture those colors by General
Hancock, the 1st Minnesota consisting only of 262 soldiers charged
in the most gallant manner against 2,468 Confederates from
Wilcoxs brigade and Langs brigade.159 The only reason behind
this attack was Hancocks hope that, by sacrificing one brigade,
he would send more reinforcements to save his line.160 Despite
suffering eighty-two percent casualties, the 1st Minnesota stalled
Wilcox and Langs attack enough to prevent it from reaching the
crest.161 This brave attack from the 1st Minnesota was not enough
to prevent Wrights brigade from breaking through the Union line
and gaining a position on Cemetery Ridge.162 Hancock knew the
breakthrough was coming and had thus requested reinforcements
from elsewhere on the field.163 These reinforcements were two

divisions from the First Corps, troops that made up the reserve
behind Cemetery Hill.164 In addition, Brigadier General Alpheus
Williams division was sent over from Brigadier General Henry
Slocums Twelfth Corps.165 None of these near thirteen thousand
troops would play a big role in turning back the Confederate
attack but they were still sent and were effectively wasted on the
day.166 The success of the Confederate attack continued through
this point and it had begun to achieve the breakthrough that
was expected as a result of Lees plan. Whether Wrights position
would hold or not was what remained to be seen, however. With
several uncommitted Confederate brigades, it would seem logical
to suppose that the Confederacy could reinforce Wrights position
and build off of it to break the Union position. Unfortunately for
the Confederates, the mismanagement of these incoming troops
would be the cause of the loss, a loss that seemed very improbable
at that time during the battle.
Ewells Attack
On the Confederate left flank, the attack of Ewells corps
began with Johnsons divisions attack on Culps Hill. Lee intended
Ewells offensive either to prevent Union reinforcements from
reaching Longstreets front or to exploit the absence of those
forces in his own front. The exploitation was about to begin.167
The opportunity for exploitation came because Longstreets as-
saults had been so successful at drawing troops away from Culps
and Cemetery Hills. The timing of Ewells attack was perfect such
that, About the time [Ewell began]the attack, major units of the
Twelfth Corps were pulling out of their lines and forming for the
march to reinforce [Hancock].168 With this removal of troops, the
defense of the line previously held [by the Twelfth Corps was left]
to the remaining brigade of the Second Division, commanded by
Brigadier-General Greene, who held the left of the Twelfth Corps,
[which] now [became] the extreme right of the army.169 To try
to reinforce the Union position, Meade sent Brigadier General
Thomas Neills brigade, of the Sixth Corps, when it arrived to the
200 Owen Tedford
south of Culps Hill around 6:00 P.M.170 Although this unit would
not make any significant contribution to the defense of Culps Hill,
it was another 1,775 troops pulled away from defending the salient
that was forming at Cemetery Hill.171 This left the defense of the
entire Union right flank to less than fourteen hundred soldiers
supported by six pieces of artillery.172 The removal of the rest of
the Twelfth Corps forced Greene to lengthen his line to occupy
all vacated works, stretching his already weak line even thinner.173
Fortunately for Greene, when other Union commanders saw the
incoming Confederate attack, they responded quickly and sent
over reinforcements, which allowed Greene to extend his line in
force.174 Greene received one regiment from the Second Corps,
seven from the Eleventh Corps, and two from First Corps on the
northern slope of Culps Hill despite the pressure on their front
from Ewells attack.175 Despite seeming to be a large number of
troops coming to Greenes aid, these ten regiments only doubled
the strength of Greenes brigade and were still not enough to
prevent Johnsons division from making serious gains against the
Union position.176 On Johnsons extreme left, Steuarts brigade
occupied the trenches that Greene had not defended.177 Johnsons
divisions attack was therefore a success. It accomplished its dual
task of both drawing troops away from Cemetery Hill and making
breaks in the Union line where the opportunity presented itself
because of the Union troops that had been removed. Therefore,
the Confederate attack had continued to be a success, making
breaks in the Union line when possible and forcing the removal
of troops from the area around Cemetery Hill.
When Early began his attack there were at most five thou-
sand men on Cemetery Hill in Howards 11th Corps.178 Of the 11th
Corpss six brigades, all but one had been beaten badly the day
before.179 An example of this was in the 17th Connecticut, which
had about thirty-nine killed on the first day; over ten percent of
the regiment.180 The one good brigade was guarding the west side
of Cemetery Hill, away from where Early would attack.181 Further
reducing his defensive force, Howard sent over Schimmelfennigs
brigade to Culps Hill before Early had attacked.182 Also compound-
ing the issue, Wadsworths division of the 1st Corps moved from the
northern face of Culps Hill, a better position to support Cemetery

Hill from, to the south to help Greenes brigade once Wadsworth
felt that he was not going to be attacked.183 To compensate for
this movement, Brigadier General Adelbert Ames shifted his divi-
sions line to his right out of fear of Johnsons attack. To do this,
Ames had to move the 33rd Massachusetts and 41st New York to
the right, forcing Colonel Andrew Harris to extend his brigade to
cover the open gap, which required the pulling of the 17th Con-
necticut from the center of his line to the right of his line.184 The
movement of the 17th Connecticut created a hole that had to be
filled, which Harris tried to do by extending the 107th Ohio and
the 25th Ohio to the right towards the 75th Ohio, but he was too
late to do this before Earlys attack began.185 This thin line at the
base of Cemetery Hill, with no more than one thousand troops
facing more than four thousand, broke within three minutes of
the start of the Confederate attack.186 Some of Amess divisions
line held33rd Massachusetts and 41st New York held on the right
and the 75th Ohio and the 17th Connecticut held in the center,
while the rest of the regiments crumbled.187 By breaking through
the Union line, the Confederate troops engaged the artillery on
Cemetery Hill in hand-to-hand combat, an uncommon sight on
the Civil War-era battlefield.188 The brutality of this fighting was
recorded in letters written by members of the 17th Connecticut,
which were then collected by William H. Warren into a bound,
unpublished manuscript. In this collection, one of the soldiers
commented on the fighting on Culps Hill at this time of the battle,
writing that [The Confederates] would not run, nor could we
[the 17th Connecticut] make them run; they clubbed their muskets
on us.189 This description aptly portrays both the savagery and
the desperation at these critical moments in the battle. Amess
division was in need of all the help from Schurz division it could
get to support Harris brigade and try to prevent a Confederate
breakthrough.190 Schurz was willing to send over four regiments
from his division.191 Further reinforcing Harris brigade were
four regiments from Hancocks Second Corps.192 Earlys attack
had achieved its purpose of breaking through the Union line on
Cemetery Hill. In addition, it had drawn more troops away from
202 Owen Tedford
where the ultimate attack would fall from Rodess division and
Penders division. Therefore, the Confederate attack had continued
its successful path of drawing troops away from the critical point,
setting up the final parts of the en echelon attack for success.
Confederate Failures
Everything up until now had gone to plan, and the Con-
federate Army had the Union Army at its mercy. However, the
Confederate failures would now begin and would proceed to
cost the Confederates the battle because the victory had been set
up for the taking but was lost by the failures. The failures for the
Confederates began first in Andersons division. Lang had seen
Wilcoxs brigade, on his right, begin to retreat, so Lang began to
retreat his brigade as well.193 Lang had also seen the enemy troops
passing on his right flank in the space that Wilcox had vacated,
which created a fear that his brigade would be surrounded.194
Langs retreat exposed the right flank of Wrights brigade, and
its left was exposed to Webbs brigade who could attack Wrights
brigade because there was no pressure on its front.195 This pres-
sure should have come from Poseys brigade and Mahones bri-
gade, but Posey did not advance, which had isolated the left of
Wrights brigade.196 Poseys excuse for not advancing was that he
had misunderstood orders that he was supposed to attack with his
full brigade and instead only put out a thin line just west of the
Emmitsburg Road.197 Mahone had been originally ordered to be
a reserve for the division and interpreted this order to act as an
inert reserve never attacking and just holding the original posi-
tion for the Confederates to fall back to if necessary.198 Mahone
refused to attack even when an aide was sent directly from Ander-
son ordering him to attack.199 By outflanking Andersons right,
the Union forced the Confederates to the west of Cemetery Hill
to retreat.200 Most of the blame for this failure rests with Poseys
brigade and Mahones brigade. These brigades would have kept
pressure on the Union line near Cemetery Hill, and would have
reinforced Wrights position on Cemetery Ridge. It follows then
that with continued pressure, the Union line would have suf-
fered more breakthroughs nearer to Cemetery Hill and Wrights

brigades position would have become tenable. Unfortunately for
the Confederates, the mistakes in Andersons division would not
be the end of Confederate mistakes on the day.
Similar to the failures in Andersons division, the failures
along Ewells front in Earlys division and Rodess division were
primarily concerned with not committing enough troops to sup-
port the gains of the initial breakthroughs. Early had had success
on Cemetery Hill and had broken through the Union line and all
that remained to be done was to hold the breakthrough against
the Union counterattacks, and the day and battle would have
been won for the Confederates. When Colonel Samuel Carrolls
brigade attacked the salient that the Confederates had formed,
the brigade struck the flank, the most vulnerable part of the
Confederate breakthrough, because of the lack of reinforcements
from Earlys division.201 Had there been more reinforcements,
the troops who were supposed to follow the attack would have
defended the flanks of the salient, but these troops did not come
and Hayss brigade had to retreat from the commanding ground
it had taken on Cemetery Hill.202 What makes this a failure in com-
mand is that Gordons Brigade was to follow up on their success
but did not because Early did not see it fit to continue in what
he perceived would have been a useless sacrifice of life.203 This
perception from Early only existed because of his lack of support.
Had he committed more men, he would have better supported
his own men.
Both Early and Anderson failures are inexcusable; however,
they pale in comparison to Rodes errors. Rodes never committed
any troops from his division to the fight on the second day, and
his failure prevented the commitment of an additional two bri-
gades from Penders division, commanded by Brigadier General
James Lane, to the fight.204 The reason why Rodes never got his
division into the fight was because he did not get his division out
of the town of Gettysburg in time to attack.205 This was a failure
on Rodes part because there was no good reason that he should
have not got his division out of Gettysburg. In the morning of
204 Owen Tedford
July 2nd, a report circulated among Ewells subordinates that the

attack of Longstreet would be delivered at 4 oclock.206 Following
this report, Ewell ordered that [the] attack to be made by his
whole corps. Rodes and [Early] were to be in readiness to begin
the attack as soon as Johnsons muskets should be heard on the
left, and Johnsons attack was to begin shortly after Longstreets
attack began.207 Timing should not have been an issue for Rodes.
He knew when the attack in Ewells corps was supposed to begin
and he knew that he was supposed to be ready to attack. Also, in
Rodes coordination with Lane, he had informed Lane that [he]
would attack just at dark.208 This shows both Rodes intention to
attack as well as his awareness of the timing of when his attack
was supposed to be. Therefore, the blame for Rodes division not
attacking rests only with Rodes. He had the power to decide when
his division would move from Gettysburg and, because of his poor
choice in timing, his division never attacked. Rodes choice meant
that the Confederate attack was short just over eleven thousand
troops.209 These uncommitted troops would have faced the weaken-
ing Union line on Cemetery Hill, something Rodes had observed
himself.210 When Rodes was to attack, the defense of Cemetery
Hill [was left] to three regiments of Smiths brigade[and] seven
weak regiments of Krzyzanowskis and Costers brigade, which
amounted to a little over twenty-eight hundred soldiers.211 Despite
the Cemetery Hills defensive advantages, the undersized defensive
force would not have stood up against Rodes division and Lanes
division. Rodes failure to correctly time his attack in cooperation
with Earlys attack and the rest of the Confederates attacks was
the most egregious failure and was the ultimate deciding factor in
the battle. Both Earlys failures and Andersons failures, although
inexcusable, were not uncommon failures of generals during the
Civil War and, therefore, are somewhat understandable and still
acceptable at such a critical juncture in the battle. Rodes failure,
on the other hand, was inexcusable and should be considered one
of the greatest blunders of the Civil War. According to historian
Edward Coddington, if Rodes had been able to mount an attack
in conjunction with Earlythe defenders of Cemetery Hill would
have had a hard time of it[and] the story of the Confederate
offensive on July 2nd might have had a different ending, for Cem-
etery Hill was vulnerable to attack from two directions.212 Camp-
bell Brown, Ewells primary assistant, wrote that, Ewells attack

on Cemetery Hill had been admirably timed & failed because
of Rodes failure to co-operate.213 Ultimately, the blame for the
Confederate loss on July 2nd rests on Rodes shoulders. However,
Anderson and Early also must share some of the blame for their
failures stopped the momentum of the Confederate attack up
until that point. The day was not lost though until Rodes deci-
sion not to attack.
Conclusion
The Confederate Army of Northern Virginia lost the
Battle of Gettysburg on July 2nd at the critical point, Cemetery
Hill. The attack up until that point had gone according to plan
with Union troops being drawn away from Cemetery Hill because
of the Confederate exploitation of the Union Armys thin line.
Sickles positioning of Third Corps further unintentionally aided
the Confederate exploitation. Therefore, the opportunity for the
Confederate victory was there for the taking, but was lost due to
the failures of Generals Richard Anderson, Jubal Early, and Robert
Rodes in command. These men together share the blame for cost-
ing the Confederate Army the Battle of Gettysburg. The failures
of those on July 1st and 3rd are less significant because after July 1st
the Confederates still had a chance to win the battle, and by July
3rd the battle was already lost. It should be noted that the Union
Army did not win the Battle of Gettysburg although it emerged
victorious. Rather, the Confederates lost the battle. The Union
Army was not in a position advantageous to winning the battle,
which is why the offensive movements were Confederate-led and
why it was up to the Confederate Army to win or lose the battle,
while the Union Army was at the mercy of the Confederates.
Therefore, the failures on July 2nd lost General Robert E. Lees
army the battle and the Civil War, as this was the battle that sealed
the Confederacys fate.
206 Owen Tedford
Endnotes
1
Robert N. Scott, ed., The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation
of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, vol.
27, bk. 1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1880-1901), 72, http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/
records/list.cfm.
2
Sonia Benson, Daniel E. Brannen, Jr., and Rebecca
Valentine, Battle of Gettysburg, in UXL Encyclopedia of U.S.
History (Detroit, MI: Gale, Cengage Learning, 2009), 1, http://
ic.galegroup.com.
3
Ibid.
4
Ibid.
5
John E. Carey, John Bachelder: Gettysburgs Historian
and Mapmaker, Civil War Stories of Inspiration, last modified
August 30, 2008, https://civilwarstoriesofinspiration.
wordpress.com/2008/08/30/john-bachelder-
gettysburg%E2%80%99s-historian-and-mapmaker-2/.
6
Ibid.
7
Ibid.
8
Ibid.
9
Ibid.
10
Edwin B. Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in
Command (1968; repr., New York, NY: Touchstone, 1997), 446.
11
Brett Schulte, Top 10 Gettysburg Books: A Civil War
Bloggers Event, TOCWOCA Civil War Blog, last modified
May 28, 2009, http://www.brettschulte.net/CWBlog/best-civil-
war-books/top-10-gettysburg-books-civil-war-bloggers/.
12
Harry Pfanz, His Books on Gettysburg, The Second
Day, Gettysburg: Culps Hill and Cemetery Hill, and His
Research on Gettysburg, Day One, interview by Paul
Kenworthy, Gettysburg Discussion Group, http://www.gdg.
org/Research/Authored%20Items/pfanz.html.
13
Pfanz, His Books on Gettysburg, interview, Gettysburg
Discussion Group.
14
Battle of Gettysburg: Confederate General Richard
Ewells Failure on the Heights, Historynet.com, last modified
June 12, 2006, http://www.historynet.com/battle-of-
gettysburg-confederate-general-richard-ewells-failure-on-the-
heights.htm.
15
Patricia D. Netzley, Gettysburg, Battle of, in Greenhaven
Encyclopedia of the Civil War, ed. Kenneth W. Osborne (San
Diego, CA: Greenhaven Press, 2004), http://ic.galegroup.

com.
16
Douglas Southall Freeman, Gettysburg to Appomattox, vol.
3, Lees Lieutenants: A Study in Command (New York, NY: Charles
Scribners Sons, 1944), 90.
17
Gettysburg Campaign, in Encyclopedia of the Confederacy,
ed. Richard Nelson Current (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster,
1993), http://ic.galegroup.com.
18
Robert N. Scott, ed., The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation
of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, vol. 27,
bk. 2 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1880-1901), 358, http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/
records/list.cfm.
19
Ibid, 358.
20
James Warner Bellah, Soldiers Battle: Gettysburg (New York,
NY: David McKay Company, 1962), 104-105.
21
Gettysburg Campaign, in Encyclopedia of the Confederacy.
22
Matt Spruill, Decisions at Gettysburg (Knoxville, TN:
University of Tennessee Press, 2011), 23.
23
William D. Hewitt, The Confederate Deliberate Attack:
5 P.M. July 1 to 8 P.M. July 2, in The Most Shocking Battle
I Have Ever Witnessed: The Second Day at Gettysburg, vol. 11,
Gettysburg Seminar Papers (Washington, D.C.: National Park
Service, 2008), 14-18, http://npshistory.com/series/symposia/
gettysburg_seminars/11/essay1.pdf.
24
Bellah, Soldiers Battle: Gettysburg, 102.
25
Eric A. Campbell, The Key to the Entire Situation: The
Peach Orchard, July 2, 1863, in The Most Schocking Battle
I Have Ever Witnessed: The Second Day at Gettysburg, vol. 11,
Gettysburg Seminar Papers (Washington, D.C.: National Park
Service, 2006), 149, http://npshistory.com/series/symposia/
26
Scott, The War of the Rebellion, vol. 27, bk. 2, 618, 622, 631,
633.
27
Allen C. Guelzo, Gettysburg: The Last Invasion (New York,
NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 2013), 245; Christian G. Samit, Battle
of GettysburgDay Two, Historynet.com, http://www.
historynet.com/battle-of-gettysburg-day-two.htm.
28
James Longstreet, Lee in Pennsylvania, in The Annals
of the War, Written by Leading Participants North and South
(Philadelphia, PA: Times Publishing Company, 1879), 422,
https://archive.org/details/annalsofwar00philrich.
208 Owen Tedford
29
Harry W. Pfanz, GettysburgThe Second Day (Chapel Hill,
NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1987), 118; Scott,
The War of the Rebellion, vol. 27, bk. 2, 358.
30
Scott, The War of the Rebellion, vol. 27, bk. 2, 358.
31
Lafayette McLaws, Gettysburg, in Southern Historical
Society Papers (Richmond, VA: Southern Historical Society,
1877), 7:69, http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=
Perseus%3Atext%3A2001.05.0120%3Achapter%3D2.6%3Apag
e%3D69.
32
Spruill, Decisions at Gettysburg, 58-59.
33
James A. Hessler, Sickles at Gettysburg: The Controversial Civil
War General Who Committed Murder, Abandoned Little Round Top,
and Declared Himself the Hero of Gettysburg (New York, NY: Savas
Beatie, 2009), 130.
34
Ibid., 130.
35
Carol Reardon and Tom Vossler, The Gettysburg Campaign:
June-July 1863(Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History
United States Army, 2013), 36, http://www.history.army.mil/
html/books/075/75-10/CMH_Pub_75-10.pdf.
36
Ibid., 36.
37
Spruill, Decisions at Gettysburg, 65.
38
Ibid., 65.
39
40
Samit, Battle of GettysburgDay Two, Historynet.com.
41
42
James R. Brann, Americas Civil War: Defense of Little
Round Top, Historynet.com, last modified September 1,
2006, http://www.historynet.com/americas-civil-war-defense-
of-little-round-top.htm.
43
Ibid.
44
45
Karlton D. Smith, Honor-Duty-Courage: The 5th Army
Corps during the Gettysburg Campaign, in Mr. Lincolns
Army: The Army of the Potomac in the Gettysburg Campaign, vol.
6, Gettysburg Seminar Papers (Washington, D.C.: National
Park Service, 2007), http://npshistory.com/series/symposia/
gettysburg_seminars/6/essay6.htm.
46
47
48
U.S. Army Center of Military History, Gettysburg Staff Ride:
Briefing Book (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military
History, 2013), 10,12, http://www.history.army.mil/StaffRide/
Gettysburg/gettysburg_2010.pdf.
49
Reardon and Vossler, The Gettysburg Campaign: June-July,
44.
50
Battle of Gettysburg: Confederate, Historynet.com.
51
Ibid.
52
53
Gettysburg Campaign, in Encyclopedia of the Confederacy;
54
55
Ibid.
56
Ibid.
57
Ibid.
58
Ibid.
59
Ibid.
60
Ibid.
61
Ibid.
62
Netzley, Gettysburg, Battle of, in Greenhaven
Encyclopedia of the Civil War.
63
Pfanz, GettysburgThe Second Day, 137.
64
Regis De Trobriand, Four Years with the Army of the
Potomac, trans. George K. Dauchy (Boston, MA: Ticknor
and Company, 1889), 495, https://archive.org/details/
fouryearswitharm02trob.
65
Henry J. Hunt, The Second Day at Gettysburg, in
Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, ed. Robert U. Johnson and
Clarence C. Buel (New York, NY: The Century Co., 1884-1887),
3:301-302, http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/books/battles/vol3/
index.cfm.
66
67
Ibid, 147.
68
U.S. Congress, comp., Report of the Joint Committee on the
Conduct of the War at the Second Session Thirty-Eighth Congress
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1865),
299, https://archive.org/details/aby3709.0004.001.umich.
edu.
69
Ibid., 298.
70
Kent Gramm, The Chances of War: Lee, Longstreet,
Sickles, and the First Minnesota Volunteers, in The Gettysburg
Nobody Knows, ed. Gabor S. Boritt (New York, NY: Oxford
University Press, 1997), 94-95.
71
Guelzo, Gettysburg: The Last Invasion, 261.
72
73
Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study, 402-403.
210 Owen Tedford
74
Terry Latschar, My Brave Texans, Forward, in I
ordered no man to go when I would not go myself, 129; Scott,
The War of the Rebellion, vol. 27, bk. 1, 494.
75
38.
76
Pfanz, GettysburgThe Second Day, 264-265.
77
Hessler, Sickles at Gettysburg: The Controversial, 151.
78
Ibid., 151.
79
80
Hessler, Sickles at Gettysburg: The Controversial, 151.
81
82
83
Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study, 396.
84
Ibid., 396.
85
Ibid., 396.
86
87
88
Ibid., 520.
89
John W. Busey and David G. Martin, Regimental Strengths
and Losses at Gettysburg (Hightstown, NJ: Longstreet House,
1986), 51; Scott, The War of the Rebellion, vol. 27, bk. 1, 520.
90
91
92
Pfanz, GettysburgThe Second Day, 294-295; Scott, The War
of the Rebellion, vol. 27, bk. 1, 881-882.
93
Ibid.
94
95
96
Pfanz, GettysburgThe Second Day, 294-295; Campbell,
The Key to the Entire, in The Most Shocking Battle, 186.
97
98
99
Ibid., 302.
100
Ibid., 302.
101
Campbell, The Key to the Entire, in The Most
Shocking Battle, 164-165.
102
103
Scott, The War of the Rebellion, vol. 27, bk. 1, 235-236.
104
Ibid., 235-236.
105
Ibid., 235-236.
106
107
Shocking Battle, 165.
108
109
Ibid., 318.
110
Karlton D. Smith, We Drop a Comrades Tear: Colonel
Edward Lyon Bailey Second New Hampshire Infantry at
Gettysburg, in I ordered no man to go when I would not go
myself: Leadership in the Campaign and Battle of Gettysburg, vol.
9, Gettysburg Seminar Papers (Washington, D.C.: National
Park Service, 2002), 111, 113, http://npshistory.com/series/
symposia/gettysburg_seminars/9/essay5.pdf.
111
Ibid., 111, 113.
112
Ibid., 113.
113
114
115
116
James Longstreet, Gettysburg-Second Day, in From
Manassas to Appomattox (New York, NY: Mallard Press, 1991),
372.
117
118
119
Ibid., 193.
120
Ibid., 195-196.
121
Salvatore G. Cilella, Jr., Uptons Regulars: The 121st New
York Infantry in the Civil War (Lawrence, KS: University Press of
Kansas, 2009), 196.
122
42.
123
124
Ibid., 392-393.
125
Ibid., 392-393.
126
127
Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study, 410; Pfanz,
GettysburgThe Second Day, 398-389.
128
129
130
Ibid., 746.
131
132
Eric A. Campbell, Sacrificed to the Bad Management...
of Others.: Richard H. Andersons Division at the Battle of
Gettysburg, in The High Water Mark of an Army: The Army of
Northern Virginia in the Gettysburg Campaign, vol. 7, Gettysburg
212 Owen Tedford
Seminar Papers (Washington, D.C.: National Park Service,

1999), 114, http://npshistory.com/series/symposia/
133
Ibid., 114.
134
135
Ibid., 368.
136
137
Ibid., 320.
138
Ibid., 320.
139
140
Pfanz, GettysburgThe Second Day, 376; Campbell,
Sacrificed to the Bad Management..., in The High Water
Mark, 116,132.
141
Pfanz, GettysburgThe Second Day, 404, 406.
142
143
Campbell, Sacrificed to the Bad Management..., in The
High Water Mark, 116,132.
144
145
146
Ibid., 342-343.
147
148
Ibid., 390.
149
Guelzo, Gettysburg: The Last Invasion, 322, 346.
150
151
152
153
Ibid., 319.
154
Matt Atkinson, We Were Now Complete Masters of
the Field: Ambrose Wrights Attack on July 2, in The Most
Shocking Battle I Have Ever Witnessed: The Second Day at
Gettysburg, vol. 11, Gettysburg Seminar Papers (Washington,
D.C.: National Park Service, 2008), 214, http://npshistory.
com/series/symposia/gettysburg_seminars/11/essay7.pdf.
155
Campbell, Sacrificed to the Bad Management..., in The
High Water Mark, 118.
156
157
Ibid., 323.
158
Ibid., 326.
159
D. X. (David Xavier) Junkin and Frank H. Norton,
The Life of Winfield Scott Hancock: Personal, Military, and
Political (New York, NY: D. Appleton and Company, 1880),
97, http://archive.org/stream/lifeofwinfieldsc00junkrich/
lifeofwinfieldsc00junkrich_djvu.txt; Busey and Martin,

Regimental Strengths and Losses, 39, 185.
160
161
162
Ibid., 389.
163
164
Ibid., 423.
165
166
Busey and Martin, Regimental Strengths and Losses, 20, 88.
167
A. Wilson Greene, Slocum and the Twelfth Corps on July
1-2, in Three Days at Gettysburg: Essays on Confederate and Union
Leadership, ed. Gary W. Gallagher (Kent, OH: The Kent State
168
169
Scott, The War of the Rebellion, vol. 27, bk. 1, 120-121.
170
171
Busey and Martin, Regimental Strengths and Losses, 74.
172
173
Eric Ethier, Battle of Gettysburg: General George Sears
Greene at Culps Hill, Civil War Times Magazine, December
1997, http://www.civilwar.org/battlefields/gettysburg/
gettysburg-history-articles/battle-of-gettysburg-general.html;
174
175
Guelzo, Gettysburg: The Last Invasion, 349; Harry W. Pfanz,
GettysburgCulps Hill and Cemetery Hill (Chapel Hill, NC: The
University of North Carolina Press, 1993), 272; Coddington,
The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study, 431.
176
Ethier, Battle of Gettysburg: General.
177
Pfanz, GettysburgCulps Hill and Cemetery, 217.
178
179
Pfanz, GettysburgCulps Hill and Cemetery, 240-242.
180
William H. Noble, History of the 17th Regiment
Connecticut Volunteer Infantry, in Ye Histoire of Ye Town of
Greenwich: County of Fairfield and State of Connecticut, by Spencer
P. Mead, LL.B. (New York, NY: Knickerbocker Press, 1911;
Harrison, NY: Harbor Hill Books, 1979), 246; Busey and
Martin, Regimental Strengths and Losses, 82.
181
Pfanz, GettysburgCulps Hill and Cemetery, 240-242.
182
Ibid., 213.
183
Ibid., 213.
184
Ibid., 247-248.
185
214 Owen Tedford
186
187
Albert W. Peck, Second Day at Gettysburg, 1887, in
History of the Seventeenth Connecticut Volunteers or Fairfield County
Regiment, comp. William Henry Warren, 8th ed. (n.p.: n.p.,
1906), 3:101; C. Frederick Betts to Henry Allen, July 2, 1884, in
History of the Seventeenth Connecticut Volunteers or Fairfield County
1906), 3:286; Noble, History of the 17th, in Ye Histoire of Ye
Town, 246.
188
189
Oscar St. John, Oscar St. John at Gettysburg, 1898, in
History of the Seventeenth Connecticut Volunteers or Fairfield Country
1906), 3:190-191.
190
191
192
Pfanz, GettysburgCulps Hill and Cemetery, 220, 263-264,
268.
193
194
Ibid., 414.
195
Ibid., 417.
196
44; Guelzo, Gettysburg: The Last Invasion, 332.
197
198
199
Ibid., 333.
200
201
202
Freeman, Gettysburg to Appomattox, 134.
203
Troy D. Harman, Richard Ewell, Robert E. Lee, and
Cemetery Hill: The Importance of Ewells Attack on July 2
Has Been Missed, in The High Water Mark of an Army: The
Army of Northern Virginia in the Gettysburg Campaign, vol. 7,
Gettysburg Seminar Papers(Washington, D.C.: National Park
Service, 1999), 92, http://npshistory.com/series/symposia/
gettysburg_seminars/7/essay5.pdf; Scott, The War of the
Rebellion, vol. 27, bk. 2, 470.
204
205
Confederate General Richard Ewells Failure on the
Heights, Civil War Trust, last modified 2014, http://www.
civilwar.org/battlefields/gettysburg/gettysburg-history-
articles/confederate-general-richard.html.
206
Freeman, Gettysburg to Appomattox, 129.
207
Jubal A. Early, Leading Confederates on the Battlefield:
A Review by General Early, in Southern Historical Society Papers
(Richmond, VA: Southern Historical Society, 1877), 4:277-
278, http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseu
s%3Atext%3A2001.05.0039%3Achapter%3D35; Gettysburg
Campaign, in Encyclopedia of the Confederacy.
208
209
Busey and Martin, Regimental Strengths and Losses, 163,179.
210
211
Pfanz, GettysburgCulps Hill and Cemetery, 263; Busey and
Martin, Regimental Strengths and Losses, 83-84, 86.
212
213
Pfanz, GettysburgCulps Hill and Cemetery, 282.
Bibliography
Atkinson, Matt. We Were Now Complete Masters of

the Field: Ambrose Wrights Attack on July 2. In The
Most Shocking Battle I Have Ever Witnessed: The Second Day
at Gettysburg, 211-30. Vol. 11 of Gettysburg Seminar Papers.
Washington, D.C.: National Park Service, 2008. http://
npshistory.com/series/symposia/gettysburg_seminars/11/
essay7.pdf.
Bellah, James Warner. Soldiers Battle: Gettysburg. New York,
NY: David McKay Company, 1962.
Benson, Sonia, Daniel E. Brannen, Jr., and Rebecca
Valentine. Battle of Gettysburg. In UXL Encyclopedia of U.S.
History. Vol. 1. Detroit, MI: Gale, Cengage Learning, 2009.
http://ic.galegroup.com.
Betts, C. Frederick. C. Frederick Betts to Henry Allen, July 2,
1884. In History of the Seventeenth Connecticut Volunteers or Fairfield
County Regiment, compiled by William Henry Warren, 282-87.
8th ed. Vol. 3. N.p.: n.p., 1906.
Brann, James R. Americas Civil War: Defense of Little
Round Top. Historynet.com. Last modified September 1, 2006.
http://www.historynet.com/americas-civil-war-defense-of-little-
round-top.htm.
Busey, John W., and David G. Martin. Regimental Strengths
and Losses at Gettysburg. Hightstown, NJ: Longstreet House,
1986.
Campbell, Eric A. The Key to the Entire Situation: The
Peach Orchard, July 2, 1863. In The Most Shocking Battle
I Have Witnessed: The Second Day at Gettysburg, 147-210. Vol.
216 Owen Tedford
11 of Gettysburg Seminar Papers. Washington, D.C.: National

Park Service, 2006. http://npshistory.com/series/symposia/
. Sacrificed to the Bad Management... of Others.:
Richard H. Andersons Division at the Battle of Gettysburg.
In The High Water Mark of an Army: The Army of Northern Virginia
in the Gettysburg Campaign, 103-35. Vol. 7 of Gettysburg Seminar
Papers. Washington, D.C.: National Park Service, 1999. http://
npshistory.com/series/symposia/gettysburg_seminars/7/
essay6.pdf.
Carey, John E. John Bachelder: Gettysburgs Historian
and Mapmaker. Civil War Stories of Inspiration. Last modified
August 30, 2008. https://civilwarstoriesofinspiration.wordpress.
com/2008/08/30/john-bachelder-gettysburg%E2%80%99s-
historian-and-mapmaker-2/.
Cilella, Salvatore G., Jr. Uptons Regulars: The 121st New York
Infantry in the Civil War. Lawrence, KS: University Press of
Kansas, 2009.
Civil War Trust. Confederate General Richard Ewells
Failure on the Heights. Civil War Trust. Last modified 2014.
http://www.civilwar.org/battlefields/gettysburg/gettysburg-
history-articles/confederate-general-richard.html.
Coddington, Edwin B. The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in
Command. 1968. Reprint, New York, NY: Touchstone, 1997.
De Trobriand, Regis. Four Years with the Army of the
Potomac. Translated by George K. Dauchy. Boston, MA:
Ticknor and Company, 1889. https://archive.org/details/
fouryearswitharm02trob.
Early, Jubal A. Leading Confederates on the Battlefield: A
Review by General Early. In Southern Historical Society Papers,
241-81. Vol. 4. Richmond, VA: Southern Historical Society,
1877. http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus
%3Atext%3A2001.05.0039%3Achapter%3D35.
Ethier, Eric. Battle of Gettysburg: General George Sears
Greene at Culps Hill. Civil War Times Magazine, December
1997. http://www.civilwar.org/battlefields/gettysburg/
gettysburg-history-articles/battle-of-gettysburg-general.html.
Freeman, Douglas Southall. Gettysburg to Appomattox. Vol. 3
of Lees Lieutenants: A Study in Command. New York, NY: Charles
Scribners Sons, 1944.
Gettysburg Campaign. In Encyclopedia of the Confederacy,
edited by Richard Nelson Current. New York, NY: Simon &
Schuster, 1993. http://ic.galegroup.com.
Gramm, Kent. The Chances of War: Lee, Longstreet,

Sickles, and the First Minnesota Volunteers. In The Gettysburg
Nobody Knows, edited by Gabor S. Boritt, 75-100. New York, NY:
Oxford University Press, 1997.
Greene, A. Wilson. Slocum and the Twelfth Corps on July
1-2. In Three Days at Gettysburg: Essays on Confederate and Union
Leadership, edited by Gary W. Gallagher, 169-203. Kent, OH:
The Kent State University Press, 1999.
Guelzo, Allen C. Gettysburg: The Last Invasion. New York, NY:
Alfred A. Knopf, 2013.
Harman, Troy D. Richard Ewell, Robert E. Lee, and
Cemetery Hill: The Importance of Ewells Attack on July 2
Has Been Missed. In The High Water Mark of an Army: The
Army of Northern Virginia in the Gettysburg Campaign, 83-102.
Vol. 7 of Gettysburg Seminar Papers. Washington, D.C.: National
Hessler, James A. Sickles at Gettysburg: The Controversial Civil
War General Who Committed Murder, Abandoned Little Round Top,
and Declared Himself the Hero of Gettysburg. New York, NY: Savas
Beatie, 2009.
Hewitt, William D. The Confederate Deliberate Attack:
5 P.M. July 1 to 8 P.M. July 2. In The Most Shocking Battle I
Have Ever Witnessed: The Second Day at Gettysburg, 1-38. Vol.
Hunt, Henry J. The Second Day at Gettysburg. In Battles
and Leaders of the Civil War, edited by Robert U. Johnson and
Clarence C. Buel, 290-313. Vol. 3. New York, NY: The Century
Co., 1884-1887. http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/books/battles/
vol3/index.cfm.
Junkin, D. X. (David Xavier), and Frank H. Norton. The Life
of Winfield Scott Hancock: Personal, Military, and Political. New
York, NY: D. Appleton and Company, 1880. http://archive.org/
stream/lifeofwinfieldsc00junkrich/lifeofwinfieldsc00junkrich_
djvu.txt.
Latschar, Terry. My Brave Texans, Forward and Take
Those Heights!: Jerome Bonaparte Robertson and the Texas
Brigade. In I Ordered No Man to go When I Would Not go Myself:
Leadership in the Campaign and Battle of Gettysburg, 122-42. Vol.
218 Owen Tedford

Longstreet, James. GettysburgSecond Day. In From
Manassas to Appomattox, 362-84. New York, NY: Mallard Press,
1991.
. Lee in Pennsylvania. In The Annals of the
War, Written by Leading Participants North and South, 414-46.
Philadelphia, PA: Times Publishing Company, 1879. https://
archive.org/details/annalsofwar00philrich.
McLaws, Lafayette. Gettysburg. In Southern Historical
Society Papers, 64-90. Vol. 7. Richmond, VA: Southern Historical
Society, 1877. http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=
Perseus%3Atext%3A2001.05.0120%3Achapter%3D2.6%3Apag
e%3D69.
Netzley, Patricia D. Gettysburg, Battle of. In Greenhaven
Encyclopedia of the Civil War, edited by Kenneth W. Osborne. San
Diego, CA: Greenhaven Press, 2004. http://ic.galegroup.com.
Noble, William H. History of the 17th Regiment
Connecticut Volunteer Infantry. In Ye Histoire of Ye Town of
Greenwich: County of Fairfield and State of Connecticut, by Spencer
P. Mead, LL.B., 243-51. Harrison, NY: Harbor Hill Books, 1979.
First published 1911 by Knickerbocker Press.
Peck, Albert W. Second Day at Gettysburg. 1887. In History
of the Seventeenth Connecticut Volunteers or Fairfield County Regiment,
compiled by William Henry Warren, 97-101. 8th ed. Vol. 3.
N.p.: n.p., 1906.
Pfanz, Harry W. GettysburgCulps Hill and Cemetery Hill.
Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1993.
. GettysburgThe First Day. Chapel Hill, NC: The
University of North Carolina Press, 2001.
. GettysburgThe Second Day. Chapel Hill, NC: The
University of North Carolina Press, 1987.
. His Books on Gettysburg, The Second Day,
Gettysburg: Culps Hill and Cemetery Hill, and His Research
on Gettysburg, Day One. Interview by Paul Kenworthy.
Gettysburg Discussion Group. http://www.gdg.org/Research/
Authored%20Items/pfanz.html.
Reardon, Carol, and Tom Vossler. The Gettysburg Campaign:
June-July 1863. Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History
United States Army, 2013. http://www.history.army.mil/html/
books/075/75-10/CMH_Pub_75-10.pdf.
Samit, Christian G. Battle of GettysburgDay Two.

Historynet.com. http://www.historynet.com/battle-of-gettysburg-
day-two.htm.
Schulte, Brett. Top 10 Gettysburg Books: A Civil War
Bloggers Event. TOCWOCA Civil War Blog. Last modified
May 28, 2009. http://www.brettschulte.net/CWBlog/best-civil-
war-books/top-10-gettysburg-books-civil-war-bloggers/.
Scott, Robert N., ed. The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of
the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Vol. 27, bk.
1. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1880-
1901. http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/records/list.cfm.
, ed. The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the
Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Vol. 27, bk. 2.
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1880-1901.
http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/records/list.cfm.
Smith, Karlton D. Honor-Duty-Courage: The 5th Army
Corps during the Gettysburg Campaign. In Mr. Lincolns
Army: The Army of the Potomac in the Gettysburg Campaign. Vol.
gettysburg_seminars/6/essay6.htm.
. We Drop a Comrades Tear: Colonel Edward
Lyon Bailey Second New Hampshire Infantry at Gettysburg.
In I ordered no man to go where I would not go myself: Leadership in
the Campaign and Battle of Gettysburg, 101-21. Vol. 9 of Gettysburg
Seminar Papers. Washington, D.C.: National Park Service,
2002. http://npshistory.com/series/symposia/gettysburg_
seminars/9/essay5.pdf.
Spruill, Matt. Decisions at Gettysburg. Knoxville, TN:
University of Tennessee Press, 2011.
St. John, Oscar. Oscar St. John at Gettysburg. 1898. In
History of the Seventeenth Connecticut Volunteers or Fairfield Country
Regiment, compiled by William Henry Warren, 190-91. 8th ed.
Vol. 3. N.p.: n.p., 1906.
U.S. Army Center of Military History. Gettysburg Staff Ride:
Briefing Book. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military
History, 2013. http://www.history.army.mil/StaffRide/
Gettysburg/gettysburg_2010.pdf.
U.S. Congress, comp. Report of the Joint Committee on the
Conduct of the War at the Second Session Thirty-Eighth Congress.
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1865.
https://archive.org/details/aby3709.0004.001.umich.edu.
220 Owen Tedford
Weider History. Battle of Gettysburg: Confederate General

Richard Ewells Failure on the Heights. Historynet.com. Last
modified June 12, 2006. http://www.historynet.com/battle-of-
gettysburg-confederate-general-richard-ewells-failure-on-the-
heights.htm.
CATALYST FOR REFORM IN THE ROMAN REPUBLIC:

TIBERIUS GRACCHUS AND THE LEX SEMPRONIA AGRARIA
Zhengdong Wang
Abstract
T he Roman Republics standing as a paragon of sophis-

ticated civilization is due in large part to its law codes designating
the rights of the Roman people. This paper identifies Tiberius
Sempronius Gracchus as the catalyst for a series of rapid changes
to the social structure of the Republic in the period 133 BCE
through 88 BCE, which extended to Roman plebeians civic privi-
leges pivotal in developing Roman law. The essay first explores
the effect Tiberius family ancestry and early career had on his
later success as a reformer. Tiberius famous land distribution
reform, the lex Sempronia agraria, is compared to prior attempts
to regulate Romes ager publicus, or public land. A review of the
conflict over Tiberius law, culminating in his death, focuses on
the class tensions he aroused. Finally, this essay investigates the
origins of the subsequent period of reform, and concludes that
those reforms would not have occurred as freely as they did without
Tiberius progressive career. Tiberius, through the lex Sempronia
Zhengdong Wang is a Junior at Hamilton High School, in Chandler,

Arizona, where he wrote this paper as an Independent Study in the
2014/2015 academic year.
222 Zhengdong Wang
agraria, prompted challenges to previously clear class distinctions,

impacting Roman society beyond land distribution.
Introduction
The ancient Roman civilization made a lasting impact on
egalitarian governance. Not only did Roman law influence Medieval
and early-Modern law in Europe, but Latin legal concepts, such
as the principle that one is innocent until proven guilty, endure
to the present day. Yet, Roman law standards only became robust
through centuries of tempering in the forge of republican politics.
A paradigm shift in the idea of Roman class equality
occurred after the Third Punic War. The Republic, focused on
conquering Carthage during the war, neglected the welfare of the
common people. Families of those serving in the military were
often illegally forced to sell their land to wealthy landowners, giv-
ing rise to extensive latifundia and spreading poverty across the
masses.1 Seeking an advocate in the land crisis, the people elected
Tiberius Gracchus to the office of tribune. Tiberius introduced
the lex Sempronia agraria,2 a law intended to impartially redistrib-
ute Romes illegally held ager publicus3 back to the impoverished.4
Tiberius altered the fundamental social structure of the
Republic through the lex Sempronia agraria. Wealthy landowners,
unwilling to relinquish their estates, staunchly opposed the law.
The lex Sempronia agraria divided the rich and the poor, escalating
the conflict from one of land distribution to one over plebeian
social status. The civil strife resulting from Tiberius actions rallied
the common people to support further change. The following
improvements in plebeian rights, military conscription rates, and
even the citizenship granted to Romes Latin allies can be traced
back to the clash of classes Tiberius provoked.
The Gracchi Ancestry

Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus (163 BCE133 BCE)
benefited from several early opportunities to advance his public
career. Tiberius leveraged his family name, the gens Sempronia, to
boost his popularity with the common people and navigate Romes
political arena.5 The advantages that accrued from his family
name helped Tiberius build the public support and the political
expertise needed for him to later pass the lex Sempronia agraria.
Tiberiuss social background played an important part
in developing his public standing. His father, Tiberius Gracchus
the Elder, was once censor and twice consul of Rome.6 Although
Tiberius Gracchus the Elder was an affluent member of the
aristocracy, he was a plebeian, not a patrician.7 Thus, while his
wealth and status afforded Tiberius Gracchus the Elder great
advantages, the public attributed his respected position to fame
earned through military and political achievement, rather than
the accident of his birth.
In his early career, Tiberius leveraged his fathers reputation
to secure pivotal positions. These filial bonds brought Tiberius
the attention of his brother-in-law, Scipio Aemilianus.8 Aemilianus
was consul at the time and the commander of the siege of the city
of Carthage. His favor provided Tiberius the means to participate
publicly in the defining battle of the Third Punic War.9 Aemilia-
nus also gave Tiberius leadership experience with a position of
authority in the planning and execution of the siege.
[Tiberius] led all the young men in discipline and bravery; yes, he was
first to scale the enemies wall, as Fannius says, who writes also that
he himself scaled the wall with Tiberius and shared in that exploit.10
Tiberius seized this opportunity and gained both popularity and
experience. Coeval accounts not only praised Tiberius courage
in battle and as a commander, but also mention that Tiberius
returned to Rome a military hero.11 Tiberius, rather than simply
accepting the authority of his post, took every chance to improve
his public image alongside his political gravitas.
Tiberius, as quaestor, later fought in the Second Numantine
War under the consul Gaius Mancinus.12 Once again Tiberius made
use of his powerful political connections, earning a reputation as
the savior of the legion. During the campaign, Mancinus lost a
series of battles against the Numantines and attempted to retreat
out of enemy territory. When Mancinuss legion was surrounded,
224 Zhengdong Wang
the Numantines refused to negotiate peace with anyone other

than Tiberius Gracchus:
[T]he enemy declared that they had confidence in no Roman save
only TiberiusThey had this feeling towards the young man not
only on his own account (for he was held in very high esteem by the
Numantine soldiery), but also because they remembered his father
Tiberius [the Elder], whomade a peace with the Numantines, to
the observance of which with integrity and justice he always held the
Roman people.13
Tiberius negotiated a truce with the Numantines. The Numantines
in turn granted Mancinus and his legion safe return to Rome, even
returning to Tiberius his quaestors ledgers confiscated earlier
in the negotiationsan uncommon charity from an otherwise
belligerent enemy of the Republic.14 According to historians at
the time, Tiberius effectively saved the lives of more than twenty
thousand Romans in addition to resolving the conflict.15 Tiberius
Gracchus the Elders reputation as an honorable general qualified
his son to open communications with the Numantines. Tiberius
was able to save his own life, the lives of the entire legion, and gain
a diplomatic victory partly through the far-reaching influence of
his family name.
Tiberius family name protected him a second time upon
his return to the capital. The people of Rome did not support
the peace treaty with the Numantines.16 Even the Senate refused
to honor Tiberius agreement, disavowing Mancinus by releas-
ing him to the Numantines bound and unarmed.17 Yet, Tiberius
suffered no blame for facilitating the trucethe Senate praised
Tiberius for his actions in salvaging the situation. Aemilianus
himself impressed on the Senate that Tiberius compromise was
the only possible resolution to Mancinuss disastrous leadership,
rather than a betrayal of the campaigns goals.18
The respect the Numantines had for Tiberius Gracchus
the Elder from the First Numantine War allowed Tiberius to sur-
vive the Second.19 Furthermore, the Roman people shared the
Numantine peoples respect for Tiberius father. Combined with
Aemilianus advocacy, this respect not only spared him the death
sentence the Senate imparted on Mancinus, but even improved
his public image. Remembered as the first soldier over the wall
in Carthage and the savior of more than twenty thousand Roman
soldiers in Numantia, Tiberius secured a favorable public standing
well before his tribunate.
Tiberius later capitalized on his public stature to bolster
the lex Sempronia agraria. His interactions with the Roman poor in
his campaign originally inspired him to propose his land reform
and seek additional social changes. Moreover, Tiberius reputation
emboldened his supporters to keep his law alive against affluent
opposition, an obstacle prior reforms failed to overcome.
Investigating Prior Roman Agrarian Legislation

A minority in the Senate had made several unsuccessful
attempts to more impartially regulate land distribution among the
citizens of the Republic before Tiberius tribunate. Agricultural
reform began over two centuries before the Third Punic War,
yet met with little success. The tribunes Gaius Licinius Stolo and
Lucius Sextius Lateranus passed the lex Licinia Sextia in 367 BCE.
This law set the maximum allotment of land per citizen to 500
iugera, or about 325 acres.20 However, wealthy landowners and Ro-
man censors all frequently neglected to adhere to the lex Licinia
Sextia.21 The statesman Gaius Laelius, a close friend of Aemilianus,
proposed during his praetorship of 145 BCE that allotments of
land should be granted for veterans and the needy.22 Laelius idea
met with strong opposition from the landowning members of
the Senate, and no legislation passed. Aemilianus himself is said
to have realized that many of the poor lacked land to farm, but
he took no action considering the strength of the wealthy who
opposed Laelius.23
Two main issues plagued land laws before Tiberius intro-
duced the lex Sempronia agraria. First, previous reformers lacked
the political capital to fight the influential landowners opposing
equal land distribution. In contrast, Tiberius enjoyed great pub-
lic support as an admired plebeian soldier and politician. The
common people, remembering Tiberius accomplishments in
his youth, catapulted the lex Sempronia agraria to the forefront of
226 Zhengdong Wang
Romes political agenda. Whereas Laeliuss proposal had been

quietly put down by the wealthy Senate, Tiberiuss plebeian support
base ensured that land reform remained in the public spotlight.
Second, prior reforms such as the lex Licinia Sextia failed
to address the root cause of the unequal land distributionthe
demands of Romes military. Romes wars required the conscrip-
tion of many plebeians, requiring these poor farmers and small
landowners to leave home for decades at a time.24 Despite the
fact that these wars annexed swaths of Cisalpine Gallic and Car-
thaginian lands, the families of drafted soldiers often became
dependent on larger, wealthier landowners to survive.25 In many
cases, economic hardship forced the poor to sell their land to
the rich.26 Tiberius brother Gaius Gracchus wrote a pamphlet
which credits Tiberius inspiration for the lex Sempronia agraria
to witnessing the dearth of inhabitants in the country, and that
those who tilled its soil or tended its flocks there were barbarian
slaves on route to Numantia.27
Gaiuss pamphlet uncovered that in several cases, latifundia
owners replaced employed freedmen with slaves, dismissing the
poor from the land they had farmed.28 The widespread use of slave
labor contributed to a lack of work for the lower classes. As fewer
and fewer poor found the opportunity to earn an income adequate
to raise a family, a gradual decline in births resulted.29 Over the
years, the impact this poverty had on the plebeian population
became evident as military enlistment decreased dramatically.30
Whereas civilian labor could be detailed to slaves, the Roman
military needed to be filled with free citizens, generally from the
multitude in the plebeian class.31
Romes constant demand for troops contextualizes the need
for reliable land reformthe plebeian dependence on Romes
elite stemmed from Romes dependence on the conscripted. It
is possible that the issue of military conscription was especially
urgent in Tiberius time, as Rome suffered many casualties in the
Punic Wars, yet still required soldiers to fight in the Numantine
Wars (154 BCE152 BCE) and the Achaean War (146 BCEun-
known date).32
The threat of a less effective military coupled with pub-

lic disorder among the poor were undesirable offshoots of the
unreliable enforcement of land legislation before the era of the
Gracchi. The origins of the frequent disregard for the lex Licinia
Sextia, explains historian Alvin H. Bernstein, stemmed from what
was at first vast parcels of vacant land conquered in Greece and
Spain. This original lack of labor persuaded Roman censors to
neglect enforcing the law, for the next best alternative to illegal
use was to let the land remain unproductively idle.33 Over time,
the leniency censors gave to latifundia owners became hard to
reverse, and the lex Licinia Sextia was ignored altogether. The lex
Licinia Sextia did not contain provisions to redistribute illegally
held ager publicus, which would have created a new generation
of farmers. Instead, the law focused on preventing more citizens
from acquiring excess ager publicus.34 Thus, the lex Licinia Sextia
never had a lasting impact on Rome, and may even have had an
overall negative impact on society, considering Romes diminish-
ing military conscription rates.
The Lex Sempronia Agraria

Tiberius identified the cause of inequitable land distribu-
tion and reflected this in his law. Tiberius likely intended the lex
Sempronia agraria to encourage military enlistment as well as to
ensure employment for the poor. Among the plebeian popula-
tion, the lex Sempronia agraria met with widespread praise because
it entailed obvious individual benefits. In political circles, the
proposal gained support by promising to provide a steady supply
of peasant levies to fill Romes legions.
Stressing the importance of reinforcing earlier land laws,
Tiberius avoided introducing many new provisions in the lex
Sempronia agraria. Rather, the law augmented the lex Licinia Sextia,
reiterating that citizens were allowed to hold a maximum of 500
iugera of land.35 Like the lex Licinia Sextia, the lex Sempronia agraria
pertained to ager publicus, rather than previously owned private
land. A citizen might continue to own a large estate, provided that
228 Zhengdong Wang
no part of the land was ager publicus in excess of the limitations

set by the lex Licinia Sextia.
Tiberius also took steps to guarantee that such measures
would be enforced. Under the lex Sempronia agraria, plots of ager
publicus distributed to the poor could not be sold. The historian
Philip Kay suggests, therefore, that the redistributed land became
comparable to private land.36 The Roman state retained some
control over the newly designated ager privatus vectigalisque, tax-
able private land, by collecting rent and bestowing official titles
upon the citizens receiving the land.37 Under this new system, the
rich could not again acquire large parcels of ager publicus without
violating the sanctity of a citizens private land.38 Plebeians could
safely farm, improving population counts and thus military enlist-
ment numbers under the enforcement measures imposed by the
lex Sempronia agraria.
Although much of the law echoed the lex Licinia Sextia,
Tiberius added provisions of his own design. One controversial
article differentiating the lex Sempronia agraria from the lex Licinia
Sextia was the redistribution of land.39 Tiberius aimed to restore to
the poor the land they previously owned by taking the ager publicus
rich landowners had in excess of the legal limit. The lex Sempronia
agraria required that any landowner currently occupying over 500
iugera of land relinquish it to another in need of land. By redis-
tributing land, Tiberius not only pursued accelerated population
growth, but also sought to promote class equality.
Because Tiberius wished to further class equality, the lex
Sempronia agraria did not wantonly seize the assets of the rich in
order to better the poor. Previous edicts had demanded pun-
ishment for wealthy landowners who exploited impoverished
peasantsthe lex Sempronia agraria was more lenient. Tiberius
merely required those citizens possessing illegally obtained land
to bestow the land to others in need.40 The lex Sempronia agraria
even compensated landowners for their losses.41 This clause no-
tably did not anger the common people, who adored Tiberius.42
Such compromise is indicative of Tiberius vision for improving
the state of the Republic as a whole rather than catering to the

needs of the disadvantaged class alone.
Tiberius person contributed to the popularity of the lex
Sempronia agraria. As a member of the plebeian class, Tiberius was
eligible to be elected tribune.43 Promising land reform to benefit
victims of wealthy landowners who took advantage of the lax en-
forcement of the lex Licinia Sextia, Tiberius became tribune in 133
BCE.44 Because Tiberius had preserved a favorable public image
since his youth, he enjoyed public support previous reformers
lacked. As he was also an eloquent speaker, and had a platform
popular with the masses, he was able rapidly to submit the bill for
the lex Sempronia agraria. This quote from one of Tiberius speeches
documents the way he roused the poor to back his reform:
[Plebeians] fight and die to support others in wealth and luxury, and
though they are styled masters of the world, they have not a single
clod of earth that is their own.45
Although Tiberius promised to benefit both the common people
and the security of the state with his law, wealthy landowners vehe-
mently opposed the lex Sempronia agraria. Exploring the rationale
behind the oppositions concerns reveal motives more complex
than simple greed. Appian documents that the rich had many
legitimate claims on ager publicus, stating that the land was given
as a dowry or as security on a loan. Others mentioned that their
ancestors were buried on the land.46
Some accounts at the time propagated a glorified perspec-
tive of the reform, placing more value on the lands benefits to the
poor and neglecting the non-monetary value of the land to the
rich. After generations residing on ager publicus (obtained from
censors who would rather not have left the land vacant), landowners
became outraged at the perceived injustice of the seizure of lands
now considered their private property. Transcending economic
loss, the sentimental attachment to their land caused the wealthy
much understandable distress.
230 Zhengdong Wang
Analyzing Opposition Action

Tiberius campaign to pass the lex Sempronia agraria aroused
intense resistance among wealthy landowners. When introduc-
ing the lex Sempronia agraria, he ignored proper tribune conduct.
Tiberiuss popularity with the common people obviated the need
to first present his law to the Senate, as was traditional. According
to the historian H. H. Scullard, Tiberius encouraged the public to
intervene in the Senates lawmaking and foreign policy, showing
undue hastiness.47
Tiberius opted to bypass the Senate and immediately
present the lex Sempronia agraria to the plebeians, disregarding
the custom for the Senate to first discuss a bill.48 Although he
did not break any laws by ignoring the established tradition, he
exhibited a disrespect and arrogance uncharacteristic of tribunes
at the time. Rather than intending to deliberately spite the Senate,
Tiberius likely bypassed the tradition in the interest of political
expediency, understanding that the public would support the lex
Sempronia agraria. Gathering a sizeable plebeian backing for the
law would prevent the wealthy in the Senate from repressing Ti-
berius proposal as they did with Laelius. This maneuver forced
opponents of the law to intensify their actions to combat Tiberiuss
growing support base.
Tiberius decision to include the aforementioned land
redistribution clause alienated additional politicians. The wealthy,
faced with the prospect of relinquishing large tracts of land, were
all the more motivated to defeat the bill. As Cicero reflected in a
later speech, the wealthy viewed the seizure of land as an attack
on the rights of the quintessential Roman citizen.
The nobles strove against it, because they saw that discord was excited
by it; and because, as the object of it was to deprive the wealthy men
of their ancient possessions, they thought that by it the Republic was
being deprived of its defenders.49
Tiberius political activity catalyzed the escalation of tensions
between the rich and the poor. Wealthy landowners created a
figurehead to directly oppose the lex Sempronia agraria by convinc-
ing Marcus Octavius, another tribune, to veto the bill.50 Octavius
friendship to Tiberius at first caused him to hesitate, but he was

eventually influenced to do so. Octavius participation despite his
personal friendship with Tiberius demonstrates the magnitude of
the increasing division between classes.
Octavius opposition, far from mitigating Tiberius zeal,
caused Tiberius to amend his proposal so as to be even stricter to
illegal landholders. The revised lex Sempronia agraria now evicted
landowners from illegally obtained land without compensation.51
This decision may have been a calculated move to affirm his stance
on plebeian rights, as Tiberius retracted the concession intended
to appeased landowners. Following this, Octavius continued to
veto the bill, and Tiberius continued to refuse a compromise.
Class relations deteriorated further.
Tiberius resorted to another unconventional political
tactic to combat Octavius. On the day of the vote, Tiberius drew
up legislation to strip Octavius of his tribunate under the premise
that Octavius was deliberately obstructing the will of the people.52
Similar to when he presented the lex Sempronia agraria to the
people before obtaining Senate approval, this move aggravated
the wealthy with its audacity. Cicero even asserted that depriving a
fellow tribune of his powers ultimately caused Tiberius downfall.53
Deposing Octavius, albeit an extreme action, was less outrageous
than Octavius constant veto.54 As a tribune, the people had elected
Octavius to represent their interests. Instead, Octavius surrendered
to the influential wealthy, and vetoed overwhelmingly supported
legislation. Furthermore, Octavius continuously imposed his veto.
Even in situations when tribunes clashed over legislation, precedent
called for the minority veto to withdraw in a political deadlock.55
In the end, the opposition failed to prevent the ratifica-
tion of the lex Sempronia agraria, as the assembly passed the law
after Tiberius impeached Octavius. Tiberius, his brother Gaius
Gracchus,56 and his father-in-law Appius Claudius were chosen to
survey and distribute the land.57 The Senate, thoroughly seeded
with aristocrats the law targeted, used a number of legal mea-
sures to hinder Tiberius efforts. The Senate denied Tiberius the
customary operations tent and restricted his funds to nine obols
232 Zhengdong Wang
daily, or about one and a half times one mans daily wages.58 The
uncompromising attitude of both supporters and opponents of
the lex Sempronia agraria exacerbated class tensions.
The Death of Tiberius Gracchus

Tiberius murder is consequential in extending the legacy
of the lex Sempronia agraria for one leading reason: the martyring
of the peoples representative further fueled the clash of classes. If
the wealthy had not publicly killed Tiberius, subsequent reforms
may not have been so widespread and progressive. Because Tiberius
had already inspired such a fervor for social change by passing
the lex Sempronia agraria, Tiberius murder probably created more
difficulty for the wealthy opposition than had Tiberius remained
alive to die a natural death.
Tiberius murder occurred soon after his one-year term
as tribune. Relying on his strengthened popularity after success-
fully implementing the lex Sempronia agraria, Tiberius aimed to
be reelected tribune the following year.59 Tiberius enacted more
publicly favorable laws to gain support for his bid. These included
decreasing the time plebeians were required to serve in the mili-
tary, granting several plebeian-favored appeals, and augmenting a
previously all-Senator judicial committee with equestrians.60 Con-
sidering the speed at which Tiberius produced these propositions,
he likely instituted this series of reforms primarily to assure his
reelection rather than out of genuine concern for his constituents.
Tiberius became associated with the mob, and support for him
in the Senate disappeared as what few allies he had withdrew for
fear of provoking the rich.61
Plutarchs account of the day of the vote describes a tip-
ping point in the heightened tensions that had accumulated since
Tiberius introduced the lex Sempronia agraria. Shortly before voting,
a senator named Fulvius Flaccus caused a disturbance by running
up to Tiberius and warning him that a wealthy party was plotting
to kill him.62 A simple misunderstanding followed this:
Those who were farther off, however, wondered at what was going
on and asked what it meant. Whereupon Tiberius put his hand to
his head, making this visible sign that his life was in danger, since the
questioners could not hear his voice. But his opponents, on seeing
this, ran to the Senate and told that body that Tiberius was asking for
a crown; and that his putting his hand to his head was a sign having
that meaning.63
When this news reached the Senate, a wealthy Senator named
Publius Scipio Nasica accused Tiberius of attempting to crown
himself kingthe crime of tyrannyand demanded Tiberiuss
execution.64 When the consul Publius Mucius Scaevola refused
to act without a trial, a number of armed senators accompanied
Nasica out of the Senate building to the rostra to kill Tiberius
themselves.65 In total, about three hundred people died in the
riot, among them Tiberius.
Public disorder following the riot forced Nasica to leave
Italy, despite his duties in the capital as the acting pontifex maxi-
mus.66 Even Aemilianus, who arrived from Numantia to quell the
unrest in Rome, was confronted by the mob for opposing Tiberius
policies. In an unsympathetic reaction to Tiberius death, he re-
sponded with Homers quote, So perish also all others who on
such wickedness venture.67 Aemilianus was interrupted by the
people, something that [they] had never done before, accord-
ing to Plutarch.68 Tiberius death induced the common people
to revolt openly against the political system. The controversy over
the lex Sempronia agraria, combined with public anger at Tiberius
murder, inspired an unrest which prompted the people to push
for additional social change in Rome.
Legacy of the Conflict

Tiberius accomplishments influenced many events in
later years. After his death, the Roman government fulfilled the
lex Sempronia agraria. Although the wealthy in the Senate could
have repealed the law now that Tiberius was dead, they did not
do so.69 Modern historian David Stockton conjectures that the
wealthy did not wish to add insult to injury, and that the law did
not completely lack for sponsors.70
234 Zhengdong Wang
It is debatable whether or not Tiberius achieved the stated

purpose of the lex Sempronia agraria, as complications arose in the
course of executing the law. Because Tiberius perished in the riot,
land redistribution continued with two new surveyors, Fulvius
Flaccus (the senator who warned Tiberius before his death) and
Papirius Carbo.71 When restoring ager publicus to the common
people, the surveyors indirectly caused discontent among Romes
Latin allies. Plots of ager publicus illegally owned by the rich were
quickly becoming exhausted, but many of the poor still needed
land. The surveyors decided to reacquire ager publicus previously
subsidized to the Latins.72 Although the state owned the land the
Latins occupied, and had every right to reclaim it, this action an-
gered Latins who had assumed that loyalty to Rome would ensure
their indefinite possession of the land. To protest this seizure,
the Latins called on Aemilianus to defend their claim. Aemilia-
nus was not only respected among the Latins, but also remained
influential in Rome.73
Aemilianus argued that Flaccus and Carbo did not have
the Latin peoples best interests in mind, and favored Romans
when taking back land. Convinced, the Senate invalidated Flaccus
and Carbo as surveyors. To continue the work of the lex Sempronia
agraria, the Senate delegated the consul Tuditanus to judge land
distribution. However, after realizing the tediousness of the task,
Tuditanus immediately left for a military campaign against the
Illyrians.74 This effectively put an end to the laws power to redis-
tribute land, since the only legal authority capable of arbitrating
land distribution had gone to war.
Up until Aemilianuss intervention, the lex Sempronia agraria
redistributed a great deal of land. Archeologists have found Grac-
chan boundary stones along the entire Italian peninsula, from
Picenum to Apulia.75 The law also effectively encouraged the poor
to reproduce. According to Livy, the census count was 318,823 in
131 BCE compared to a count of 394,736 in 125 BCE, a substantial
rise of over 75,000 people in a mere six-year period.76 Others are
more skeptical of Tiberius achievement, citing the short opera-
tional life of the law as a failure. Although plebeian rights devel-
oped through the land redistribution, attempts to circumvent the
law, as in the case with the Latins, persisted. One historian goes
as far as to say that the lex Sempronia agraria was the work of an
idealist rather than of a clear-sighted and practical statesman.77
Nevertheless, the lex Sempronia agraria at least contributed to higher
conscription rates and plebeian landholdings in the consecutive
years. Regardless of the laws observable success, Tiberius impact
on Roman society can be noticed in the reforms his law inspired
as well as what he accomplished directly.
The political career of his brother Gaius Gracchus deserves
mention, as he capitalized on the revolutionary atmosphere Ti-
berius set to enact further reform. One of the earliest laws Gaius
introduced was the lex de abactis, which mandated that anyone
deposed from public office be denied the opportunity to hold
any future office, acknowledging the difficulties Octavius caused
Tiberius.78 Gaius also passed the lex de provocatione, prohibiting
the use of capital punishment without the peoples sanction,
removing a tool patricians used to threaten the plebeian class.79
Also introducing his own economic reforms, Gaius passed the lex
Sempronia frumentaria, the first law in Roman history to regulate
the purchase and sale of grain: an early form of government price
fixing.80 Gaius then expanded the lex Sempronia agraria, setting up
charters for Roman colonies in newly conquered areas, including
one in Carthage.81 While Gaius Gracchus may have been just as
prolific and ambitious as his late brother, his reforms likely would
not have occurred as rapidly and as unimpeded as they did without
the progressive mood Tiberiuss career created.
One of the most radical changes Tiberius life and death
brought about was ubiquitous Latin citizenship. The aforemen-
tioned seizure of Latin land under the lex Sempronia agraria strained
Romes relations with the Latins, highlighting differences in social
standing. Afflicted by the sudden loss of ager publicus, the Latin
allies of the Republic began to fall into poverty. The inequality of
wealth and land ownership was a primary reason the previously
content client states of Rome revolted in the Social War (91 BCE
88 BCE).82 Roughly half of Romes Latin allies rebelled after
proposals to grant universal Latin citizenship failed in the Senate.83
Following the Social War, the specifics of which are not
germane to this study, the Republic granted important politi-
236 Zhengdong Wang
cal concessions to the Latins. All Latin states that did not revolt
received full citizenship.84 Tiberius goal of class equality in Ro-
man society indirectly exposed the difficulties in defining Latin
social standing in Roman society. Whether or not one views the
Latin revolt as successful, the act of rebellion compelled Rome
to acknowledge her allies. Tiberius and the lex Sempronia agraria
achieved long-coveted social privileges for Romes Latin allies,
resolving a disputed point of conflict about Latin social status in
Roman society.
Conclusion
Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus is primarily remembered
as the author of the lex Sempronia agraria. Yet, the various reforms
which occurred after Tiberiuss death, including but not limited
to Gaius Gracchus reforms, all stemmed from the changed politi-
cal conditions his career incited. Furthermore, without Tiberius
legislation, Roman society would not have met the prerequisite
state of affairs needed for the Latins to challenge Rome for the
privilege of citizenship. From childhood, Tiberius powerful fam-
ily connections helped him secure his positions. Tiberius early
achievements fashioned him into a popular politician capable
of attaining the land reform others failed to accomplish. Finally,
Tiberius death intensified the impact of his actions in life by
expanding the political aftershocks of the lex Sempronia agraria.
Influencing the Roman state in issues greater than simple
land distribution, Tiberius and the lex Sempronia agraria initiated
a concatenation of events that caused a decisive adjustment of
power in the Republics class structure, as the rights of Roman
plebeians and the Latins advanced in several areas. Rather than
offer incremental improvement, Tiberius Gracchus catalyzed social
reform in the Roman Republic.
Appendix A: Offices of the Roman Republic85
Censor
Two censors recorded the census and tax assessments. More
relevant to this paper, censors documented and enforced the use
of Roman ager publicus.
Consul
Two consuls, elected each year, acted as senior executive
officers of the state. Consuls presided over Senate assemblies,
governed provinces, and led Roman legions in major conflicts.
Pontifex Maximus
The pontifex maximus was the highest ranking religious
authority in Rome. In the Republic, the holder of this office
performed rituals and duties specific to the pagan state religion.
Praetor
Eight praetors served as judges. Praetors took the administra-
tive duties of consuls when the consuls were not in Rome.
Quaestor
Romes financial administratorsaround twenty quaestors
served the Republics many provinces and armies.
Tribune
Ten tribunes a year were elected from the plebeian class,
introducing legislation and voting to balance the interests of the
patrician class.
238 Zhengdong Wang
Endnotes
1
The Roman latifundium was a large parcel of privately owned
land. These estates relied on slave labor to function, and
specialized in cash crop agriculture rather than subsistence
farming.
2
Lex Sempronia agraria translates to the agrarian law of
Sempronius.
3
The ager publicus was public land of Rome. This land was
usually obtained through conquest in Romes many wars. Ager
publicus, although state-owned, could be distributed among
Roman citizens for various utilitarian purposes.
4
Saskia T. Roselaar, Public Land in the Roman Republic: A
Social and Economic History of Ager Publicus in Italy, 396-839 B.C.
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) p.223.
5
In Ancient Rome, an individuals gens referred to his or her
family. The gens Sempronia included several people of historical
importance, many of them consuls.
6
Richard Miles, Carthage Must Be Destroyed: The Rise and Fall of
an Ancient Civilization (New York: Viking, 2011) p.437.
7
Roman society was divided into two classes, patricians
and plebeians. Patricians were aristocrats and nobles, while
plebeians were the common people.
8
A. E. Astin, Scipio Aemilianus (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1967) p.13.
9
Adrian Keith Goldsworthy, The Punic Wars (London: Cassell,
2000) p.178.
10
Plutarch, Lives, Volume X: Agis and Cleomenes. Tiberius and
Gaius Gracchus. Philopoemen and Flamininus, trans. Bernadotte
Perrin (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1921)
p.153.
11
Henry C. Boren, The Gracchi (New York: Twayne Publishers,
1969) p.26.
12
Ibid., p.37.
13
Plutarch, p.155.
14
Boren, p.39.
15
Erik Hildinger, Swords Against the Senate: The Rise of the Roman
Army and the Fall of the Republic (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo
Press, 2002) p.5.
16
Ibid., p.8.
17
Ibid.
18
Astin, p.136.
19
John A. Walsh, Tiberius Gracchus (TR. PL. 133 B.C.),
The Numantine Affair, and the Deposition of M. Octavius,
Classical Philology 73, no. 3 (1978) p.201.
20
Roselaar, Public Land in the Roman Republic, p.101. Many
modern day historians conjecture that this restraint applies
only to ager publicus, as the idea of private ownership was
extremely important at the time. Roselaar argues that the lex
Licinia Sextia may have applied to both public and private land,
but no consensus exists. Some historians refer to the lex Licinia
Sextia as the lex Licinia or Stolos law.
21
Ibid.
22
Howard Hayes Scullard, From the Gracchi to Nero: A History of
Rome from 133 B.C. to A.D. 68 (London: Routledge, 1982) p.22.
23
Ibid., p.23.
24
Plutarch, p.163.
25
Ibid.
26
Ibid.
27
Ibid.
28
Ibid. p.161.
29
Boren, p.80.
30
Ibid.
31
Scullard, p.22.
32
George C. Kohn, Dictionary of Wars (New York: Infobase
Publishing, 1986) p.3. The Achaean War began the same year
the Third Punic War ended. Although the threat to Romes
Mediterranean dominance was over, her need for soldiers
continued.
33
Alvin H. Bernstein, Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus: Tradition and
Apostasy (London: Cornell University Press, 1978) p.125.
34
Roselaar, Public Land in the Roman Republic, p.223.
35
Ibid. The law granted additional 250 iugera for each child.
36
Philip Kay, Romes Economic Revolution (Oxford and New York:
Oxford University Press, 2014) p.184.
37
Saskia T. Roselaar, Ager publicus in the Roman Republic and
the Evolutionary Theory of Land Rights, in The Italians on the
Land: Changing Perspectives on Republican Italy Then and Now,
ed. Arthur Keaveney and Louise Earnshaw-Brown (Newcastle:
Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2009) p.23.
38
Ibid.
39
40
Plutarch, p.165.
41
Ibid.
240 Zhengdong Wang
42
Ibid.
43
Goldsworthy, p.400. See Appendix A.
44
John Boardman, Jasper Griffin, and Oswyn Murray, eds.,
The Oxford History of the Classical World (Oxfordshire: Oxford
University Press, 1986) p.411.
45
Plutarch, p.165.
46
Appian, The Civil Wars, Books 1-3.26, trans. Bernadotte Perrin
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1913) p.19.
47
Scullard, p.28.
48
Hildinger, p.39.
49
Marcus Tullius Cicero, The Orations of Marcus Tullius Cicero,
trans. Charles Duke Yonge (London: G. Bohn, 1851) p.202.
Although the majority of Roman soldiers hailed from the
plebeian class, the wealthy considered themselves to be
defenders of the Republic as well, as many were members of
the Senate and controlled state affairs.
50
Boren, p.53. In the time of the Republic, the veto of a single
tribune prevented the passing of a law. Thus, Tiberius had to
overcome Octavius politically to pass the lex Sempronia agraria.
51
Plutarch, p.167.
52
Ibid. The justification that Octavius obstructed the will of
the people rested on the fact that Octavius refused to allow
the lex Sempronia agraria to be put to a vote, for fear that the
overwhelming support among the mob would result in the
laws ratification.
53
Bernstein, p.185.
54
Ibid., 174.
55
Ibid., 185.
56
Plutarch, p.175. At this time, Gaius Gracchus was serving
under Aemilianus in Numantia.
57
Astin, p.221.
58
Plutarch, p.175. The obol was an ancient silver coin, worth
one-sixth of a drachma.
59
Ibid., 63.
60
Hildinger, p.42.
61
Plutarch, p.185.
62
Ibid., 187.
63
Ibid., 189.
64
Bernstein, p.222.
65
Ibid. The rostra was a large platform in the city of Rome
where speakers would deliver orations to an audience below.
66
Boren, p.69.
67
Plutarch, p.197.
68
Ibid.
69
Appian, p.39.
70
David Stockton, The Gracchi (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1979) p.88.
71
Appian, p.39.
72
73
Astin, p.239.
74
75
Ibid. p.244.
76
Boren, p.80. The population increase becomes more
apparent when including the numbers in the period prior
to the lex Sempronia agraria. From 136 BCE to 131 BCE,
the population grew from 317,933 to 318,823. Comparing
this with the population count of 394,736 in 125 BCE, it is
safe to conclude that the lex Sempronia agraria succeeded in
contributing to population growth as a whole. These numbers
cannot be taken as perfect, however. Roselaar mentions several
theories which may have skewed the census. New landowners
may have been more likely to register for the census, or
censors may have counted landowning citizens more carefully.
77
Frank Burr Marsh, A History of the Roman World from 146 to 30
B.C. (London: Methuen, 1963) p.49.
78
Stockton, p.116.
79
Scullard, p.32.
80
Stockton, p.126.
81
Scullard, p.33.
82
Roselaar, Public Land in the Roman Republic, p.10. The
name Social War derives from the Latin term socii, which
translates to allies.
Boardman, p.413. Romes reacquisition of ager publicus
83
remained a major concern of the Latins throughout the entire

period from the ratification of the lex Sempronia agraria to the
onset of the Social War. In 91 BCE, the Latins protested the
new distribution plans of Marcus Livius Drusus, which further
diminished the Latin share of Roman ager publicus.
84
Ibid., 414.
85
Goldsworthy, p.400.
242 Zhengdong Wang
Bibliography
Appian. The Civil Wars, Books 1-3.26. Translated by

Bernadotte Perrin. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1913.
Astin, A. E. Scipio Aemilianus. Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1967.
Bernstein, Alvin H. Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus: Tradition
and Apostasy. London: Cornell University Press, 1978.
Boardman, John, Jasper Griffin, and Oswyn Murray. The
Oxford History of the Classical World. Oxfordshire: Oxford
Boren, Henry C. The Gracchi. New York: Twayne Publishers,
1969.
Cicero, Marcus Tullius. The Orations of Marcus Tullius Cicero.
Translated by Charles Duke Yonge. London: G. Bohn, 1851.
Goldsworthy, Adrian Keith. The Punic Wars. London: Cassell,
2000.
Hildinger, Erik. Swords Against the Senate: The Rise of the
Roman Army and the Fall of the Republic. Cambridge, MA: Da
Capo Press, 2002.
Kay, Philip. Romes Economic Revolution. Oxford and New
York: Oxford University Press, 2014.
Kohn, George C. Dictionary of Wars. New York: Infobase
Publishing, 1986.
Marsh, Frank Burr. A History of the Roman World from 146 to
30 B.C. London: Methuen, 1963.
Miles, Richard. Carthage Must Be Destroyed: The Rise and Fall of
an Ancient Civilization. New York: Viking, 2011.
Plutarch. Lives, Volume X: Agis and Cleomenes. Tiberius and
Gaius Gracchus. Philopoemen and Flamininus. Translated by
Bernadotte Perrin. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1921.
Roselaar, Saskia T. Ager publicus in the Roman Republic
and the Evolutionary Theory of Land Rights. In The Italians
on the Land: Changing Perspectives on Republican Italy Then and
Now, Edited by Arthur Keaveney & Louise Earnshaw-Brown.
Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2009.
Roselaar, Saskia T. Public Land in the Roman Republic: A
Social and Economic History of Ager Publicus in Italy, 396-389 B.C.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.
Scullard, Howard Hayes. From the Gracchi to Nero: A History of
Rome from 133 B.C. to A.D. 68. London: Routledge, 1982.
Stockton, David. The Gracchi. Oxford: Clarendon Press,

1979.
Walsh, John A., and M. Gwyn Morgan. Tiberius Gracchus
(TR. PL. 133 B.C.), The Numantine Affair, and the Deposition
of M. Octavius. Classical Philology 73, no. 3 (1978): 200-210.
244 Zhengdong Wang
Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790) New

York: Penguin Books, 1999, pp. 417-418
When I see the spirit of liberty in action, I see a strong

principle at work; and this, for a while, is all I can possibly know
of it. The wild gas, the fixed air, is plainly broke loose: but we
ought to suspend our judgment until the first effervescence
is a little subsided, till the liquor is cleared, and until we see
something deeper than the agitation of a troubled and frothy
surface. I must be tolerably sure, before I venture publicly
to congratulate men upon a blessing, that they have really
received one. Flattery corrupts both the receiver and the
giver; and adulation is not of more service to the people than
to kings. I should therefore suspend my congratulations on
the new liberty of France, until I was informed how it had
been combined with government, with public force, with the
discipline and obedience of armies, with the collection of
an effective and well-distributed revenue, with morality and
religion, with solidity and property, with peace and order, with
civil and social manners. All these (in their way) are good
things, too; and without them, liberty is not a benefit whilst it
lasts, and is not likely to continue long. The effect of liberty to
individuals is that they may do as they please: we ought to see
what it will please them to do, before we risk congratulations,
which may be soon turned into complaints. Prudence would
dictate this in the case of separate, insulated, private men. But
liberty, when men act in bodies, is power. Considerate people,
before they declare themselves, will observe the use which
is made of powerand particularly of so trying a thing as a
new power in new persons, of whose principles, tempers, and
dispositions they have little or no experience, and in situations
where those who appear the most stirring in the scene may
possibly not be the real movers...
EXPLORING THE KOREAN FINANCIAL CRISIS (19971998):

A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Daniel W. Jo
Introduction
O n December 3, 1997, the Korean Government an-

nounced that it would implement an historic International Mon-
etary Fund (IMF) rescue package ($21 billion) for the countrys
faltering economy. Then, the Korean Government agreed to
receiving financial assistance from the World Bank ($10 billion),
the Asian Development Bank ($4 billion), and its neighboring
countries (approximately $23 billion). In accordance with the
Memorandum of Understanding submitted to the IMF, Koreas
overall economy was overseen by the IMF, and the Korean Gov-
ernment promised to accelerate the implementation of an eco-
nomic reform program. The economic reforms included fixing
the financial regulatory system, restructuring insolvent corporate
and financial institutions, and revising the Bank of Korea (central
bank) Act.
The impact of the crisis was enormous. By the end of
April 2001, in the wake of the crisis and economic reforms, the
Daniel W. Jo is a Junior at Troy High School in Fullerton, California,

where he wrote this paper for Mr. David Shirotas Asian History course
in the 2014/2015 academic year.
246 Daniel W. Jo
government had to dispose of approximately 30% of its financial

institutions from 1997.1 Accordingly, a large number of people
lost their jobs or became part-time workers. Not only did the cri-
sis result in economic restructuring, but it also led to social and
cultural reforms in the country. Since then, Korean people have
been calling this painful financial crisis period the IMF crisis.2
Right before the financial crisis, Koreas economic per-
formance was generally favorable. During the first three quarters
of 1997, the real gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate was
approximately 6 percent and the inflation rate stayed around 4
percent, while the external current account deficit was less than 3
percent of the GDP. Also, the governments fiscal balance for 1997
projected a small deficit, and the monetary supply was closer to
the bottom of the target range in line with the inflation objective.3
The Korean financial crisis occurred as part of a series of
East Asian crises, following the Thai crisis in July 1997. The col-
lapse of the Thai financial market in July 1997 was followed by a
series of financial crises in other Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN)4 and, finally, in Korea. The spread of the financial
crises from the ASEAN to Korea generated controversial dialogue
that the contagion effect beyond domestic fundamentals as a
primary factor contributed to the historical Korean financial crisis.
Widespread usage of terms such as contagion implied that, like
the flu, one countrys shock or crisis transmits to other vulner-
able countries.5
How did the financial crises within ASEAN economies result
in the transmitted contagion effect of Koreas financial crisis? What
are the main causes and important lessons of the Korean financial
crisis? To answer this question, this paper will focus on the root
cause of fundamental problems in an historical perspective, as
well as the nature of the contagion in the Korean financial crisis.
Evolution of the Crisis from Thailand to Korea

On July 2, 1997, the Thai Government announced the
abolition of the fixed exchange rate system and called on the IMF
for assistance, because despite the Thai Governments currency
market intervention to defend the baht, the speculative attack on

the Thai baht continued to intensify. The bahts exchange rate
against the dollar suddenly rose from B 24.35 to B 29.00 and, by the
end of July, to B 32.00.6 The speculative attacks and international
capital outflows were due to concerns that the Thai baht would
be devalued and political instability would result.
Following the Thai bahts collapse, neighboring ASEAN
currencies began to be affected, and then neighboring Southeast
Asian countries eventually abandoned defending their curren-
cies, adopting more floating exchange rate systems. Under great
uncertainties, the abolition of pegged exchange rates, and the
policies allowing exchange rates to float, led to further falling.
On July 11, the Philippine government said it would allow the
peso to move in a wider range against the dollar and Indonesia
widened its rupiah trading band. On July 14, the Malaysian central
bank abandoned the defense of the ringitt and the currency fell
further as Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad began to attack
hedge funds as rogue speculators.7
In October 1997, the financial crisis that stayed within the
ASEAN started to spread to Taiwan and Hong Kong. On October
17, the devaluation of the Taiwan dollar dealt a heavy blow to
global investors sentiments.8 Due to competitive relations and
high linkages between Taiwan and Hong Kong, international in-
vestors were concerned that the pegged exchange rate of Hong
Kongs dollar could be changed, affecting Hong Kongs financial
market. Then, on October 23, one week after the devaluation of
the Taiwan dollar, the Asian crisis was coupled with a massive stock
sell-off in Hong Kong.9
In November 1997, immediately after the financial cri-
sis in Taiwan and Hong Kong, international investors became
concerned about the situation in Korea, fearing large financial
companies could face bankruptcies due to the chain of several
large companies financial turmoil since the collapse of the Hanbo
Steel company in January. Along with bad news about economic
fundamentals, government policy mistakes and political distress
further lowered confidence in Korean financial markets. For
248 Daniel W. Jo
instance, international investors fears were heightened by the

announcement that the Korean government planned to suspend
the default of the nonviable Kia Motor Group, the eighth biggest
chaebol,10 which could affect the balance sheet of creditors such as
large commercial banks.11 In addition, in the midst of the presi-
dential election campaign, Korea became embroiled in a political
football match between the opposition party and former president
Kim Young-Sam for the suspicious connection between Mr. Kims
son and a chaebol, Hanbo Steel. Also in November, global investors
negative sentiments increased when credit rating agencies, such
as Standard & Poor and Fitch, downgraded Koreas sovereign rat-
ing.12 On November 21, Korea, one of the miracle economies
and a member of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD), announced it was seeking the IMFs
assistance with bowl in hand because it did not have enough
foreign exchange reserves to last even one month.13
Causes of the Crisis: Contagion vs. Fundamental

Because the Korean financial crisis was not expected by
the majority of experts prior to its occurrence, a number of stud-
ies have been advanced to explore the origin of the crisis. While
theories of the causes of the crisis vary in their descriptions, in
general, they can be divided into two primary views, contagion-
based vs. fundamental-based. The contagion-based view is that,
even though macroeconomic fundamentals of Korea were not
very vulnerable, the contagious movements of speculative attacks
from Southeast Asian countries brought about the financial crisis
in Korea. The contagion effects have several different definitions,
which include the common external shocks models, the macroeco-
nomic interdependence models, and the pure contagion models.
The second view is that the financial crisis in Korea was
rooted in internal fundamental problems. They argue that chae-
bols undertook excessive risk-taking or overinvestment, which ac-
cumulated non-performing loans (NPLs) in the banking sector,
and consequently, banks were vulnerable to external shocks. The
vulnerable fundamentals were based on moral hazard on the
part of the banks since they were backed up by the Korean govern-
ment to promote its favored industries. Further, other scholars
argue with the historical perspectives that the traditional Korean
economic system, characterized by close relationships between
the state, the banks, and the chaebols was shaped by the particular
economic development strategy that Korea pursued.14
The Nature and the Channel of the Contagion Effect

The first category of contagion studies are the common
external shocks models. One example of a common external
shock to the crisis-suffered Asian countries was the substantial ap-
preciation of the United States (U.S.) dollar against the Japanese
yen before the crisis during 1995 and 1996.15 Because most crisis-
stricken Asian countries had pegged their exchange rates to the
U.S. dollar, the substantial appreciation of the U.S. dollar led to
current account deficits within these Asian countries before the
crisis of 1997. However, empirical studies about the degree of Asian
currencies overvaluation before the crisis have shown a wide range
of results from moderate overvaluation to even undervaluation.16
Another example of a common external shock to the
crisis-stricken Asian countries was the role of the common lender,
which is the creditor of Japanese banks.17 According to the argu-
ment, because most Asian countries had borrowed from Japanese
commercial banks, collecting loans by the Japanese banks in the
face of the Thai crisis resulted in contagious crises in the region.
Another argument supporting the role of the common lender in
Asian crises asserts that when the banks in a creditor country are
exposed to a financial crisis, a credit crunch occurs in the host
countries as a result of a substantial reduction of investments by
the creditors.18 However, a problem in these arguments is that
the behavior of Japanese banks was not unique in collecting loans
from the countries, but the behavior of the Japanese and American
banks were quite similar in proportional terms.19
The second category of contagion studies is the model that
stresses the interdependence of the markets, such as trade linkages
or financial linkages. According to these models, a crisis in one
250 Daniel W. Jo
country has an impact on the economic fundamentals of other

countries due to strong interdependence across the countries.20
The channel of the shock transmission can be explained not only
by trade linkages, but also by financial sector linkages.21 However,
the weakness of this view is that economic interdependence, such
as the extent of bilateral trade between Southeast Asian countries
and Korea, is insufficient to explain the extent of contagion of
the Asian crisis.22
The third category of contagion studies are the pure
contagion models or the financial panic models, which state that
those contagion effects were brought about by so-called herding
behavior in which many investors jumped on the bandwagon.23
In the pure contagion model of crisis spread, the transmission of
the crisis occurs due to the investors expectations swinging from
excessive optimism to excessive pessimism, which is independent
of economic fundamentals.24 On the other hand, some scholars
who doubt the pure contagion models suggest views that the inves-
tors behavior was a more reasonable reaction to risk premia than
financial panic or herd behaviors.25 One of these scholars argues
that the major speculative runs on other Asian currencies, espe-
cially on South Korea, occurred with considerable lags, suggesting
that they were not the result of blind panic and herd instincts.26
Another argument for contagion is the wake-up call
model. According to this model, the Asian crisis spread due to
27
similar economic problems in several countries. For instance, the

Thai crisis in 1997 worked just like a wake-up call, which led in-
ternational investors to reassess other emerging Asian economies,
where they found similar economic problems, such as large exter-
nal debt, poor financial supervision, and trade account decline.28
The above-mentioned literature on the contagion of the
Asian crisis show various aspects regarding the nature and the
channels of crisis spread. My perspective on contagion effects in
this paper is more in line with the wake-up call model than with
the pure contagion model, because there was a substantial time
lag between the Thai crisis and the Korean crisis due to investors
reasonable reactions to the bad news about Koreas fundamental

problems, which is described in the next section.
Fundamental Problems: The Moral Hazard

A typical view argues that Korea was subject to the financial
crisis in 19971998 due to internal fundamental problems, which
is the moral hazard theory.29 Moral hazard problems can be found
in the asset management activities of banks. Under a situation of
asymmetric information between a bank and a company in which
a bank cannot assess the inside story of a company, if a govern-
ment provides an implicit guarantee (bailout), a moral hazard
problem could grow where a bank neglects to qualify a borrower
and a company then riskily invests the borrowed money.
According to the moral hazard theory, a crucial cause of
the Korean financial crisis is the fact that the Korean government
provided an implicit guarantee to Korean banks, which led to
reckless lending by Korean banks as well as over-investment by big
Korean companies.30 Consequently, over-investment by chaebols
brought about bubbles in asset markets, such as real estate and
stock markets; then, NPLs increased in the process of the bubbles
bursting, and the financial crisis finally occurred. Once signs of the
bubble bursts were noticed, accompanied by substantial amounts
of capital outflows, the currency crisis and the financial crisis oc-
curred simultaneously.
Also, the moral hazard theory says that moral hazards
existed in international banks, which exacerbated the Korean
crisis. That is, international banks imprudently provided loans
to the Korean government as well as to Korean financial institu-
tions, having confidence in an implicit guarantee (bailout) by the
Korean government and by the IMF.31
Thus, according to the moral hazard view, government-
sponsored industrial policy caused the Korean banks moral haz-
ard, which provided excessive credit to firms. As big Korean firms
(chaebol) pushed ahead with growth initiatives, over-investment
and overlapping investment accumulated. Consequently, Korean
252 Daniel W. Jo
financial institutions were structurally fragile to external shocks.

This argument is best summed up in the following passage from
the Economist:
Most of the financial mess is of Asias own making, and nowhere is this
clearer than in South Korea. For years, the government has treated the
banks as tools of state industrial policy, ordering them to make loans
to un-creditworthy companies and industries. (15 November 1997)32
The moral hazard model provides important implications that the
Korean financial crisis was due to internal fundamental problems,
which was inherent in the statebankchaebol nexus. However, ac-
cording to several critics on the moral hazard model, the moral
hazard view is not enough to fully explain the Korean financial
crisis.
Critics argued that there was little room for moral haz-
ard for firms in the Korean industrial policy, because from 1993
with the inauguration of the Kim Young Sam administration,
the Korean government very rapidly dismantled the traditional
industrial policy, except for R&D support in some high technol-
ogy industries.33 Another critic argued that it is like being unable
to ban fire insurance simply because fire insurance leads some
homeowners to have a moral hazard of being careless with their
fireplaces. The same is true of the lender of last resort role by the
IMF as well as the local government, which is rather helpful in
preventing a financial crisis.34 Also, other critics argued that it is
hard to explain that the reason why international banks provided
huge dollar amounts to Korean banks and companies was due to
the implicit guarantee (bailout) by the Korean government and by
the IMF. This is because the Korean government had insufficient
international reserves to guarantee a huge amount of external
debt in the private sector, and because the IMF could provide a
bailout to the government debt only.35
Fundamental Problems: The Transition Failure in an Historical

Perspective
Other fundamental-based views characterized the Korean
crisis as a transition failure in an historical perspective, where
Koreas plan to move away from the old model was neither well-
conceived nor was it well-implemented.36 These views argued that
the demise of the developmental state in industrial policy, as well
as reckless financial liberalization, critically contributed to the
crisis, by removing the restraints on duplicative investments and
possibly creating more room for cronyism.37
This view argued that even though there were some prob-
lems with the traditional Korean system, which were in need of
change, since the late 1980s the Korean government had dismantled
the old ones without careful planning and without efforts to put
alternative mechanisms in place.38
The typical results of the Korean governments policy shift
were in financial liberalization, including capital account liberal-
ization, as well as industrial policy. Traditional Korean industrial
policy, based on the statebankchaebol nexus, started to be dis-
mantled from the late 1980s and was completed by the mid-1990s,
terminating the five-year economic development plan by 1993.39
At the same time, from the late 1980s, the Korean government
rapidly pursued a financial liberalization policy, especially capital
market opening.
The transition failure of the Korean development model
resulted in mismanagement of financial liberalization and the
failure of cross-border capital liberalization. Even though financial
liberalization could play a positive role in developing the banking
system by giving more managerial independence to private banks,
a liberalization policy failure existed in setting up the institutions
and regulations to lead stable foreign debts by private sectors.
A rapid build-up of private foreign debts and an unstable
foreign debt structure in the 1990s was caused by a rapid and lax
cross-border financial liberalization policy under a weak domestic
financial sector. Especially due to liberalization on foreign com-
mercial bank loans, Koreas private sector external debt to GDP
ratio (%) sharply increased from 15.6 at the end of 1993 to 40.9
at the end of 1996, right before the crisis.40
254 Daniel W. Jo
At that time, Korean financial institutions foreign debt

structure was very vulnerable to a liquidity crisis due to both ma-
turity and currency mismatches. A liquidity mismatch and a cur-
rency mismatch occurred as Korean banks had short-term external
debts (mostly denominated in dollars) and long-term lending
(mostly denominated in Korean won). Thus, as foreign creditors
refused to roll over maturing debts, both the banking crisis and
the currency crisis occurred together. Before the crisis, the Korean
government was unaware of this huge maturity mismatch in which
about 64% of the foreign bank debt was short-term borrowing with
a maturity of less than one year, and 85% of the foreign debt was
lent to firms with a long-term maturity.41
Relative to the foreign exchange reserves, Koreas short-
term debt was at a high level. The ratio of short-term external debt
to foreign exchange reserves was 2.06 at the end of June 1997.
Even relative to the crisis-stricken Asian countries, Koreas ratio
of short-term debt to international reserves was the largest.42 As
international creditors sensed that there were small international
reserves relative to short-term external debts, foreign banks over-
reacted by withdrawing their lending from the Korean private
sector.43
Another policy failure in Koreas capital market opening
was the absence of any specific preparations and implementation
plans for the sequential liberalization of foreign direct investment
(FDI), foreign portfolio investment, and cross-border bank lend-
ing to Korea. In the Korean case, the proportion of cross-border
bank lending and foreign portfolio investment was significantly
greater than the proportion of FDI, which made the structure of
the Korean economy vulnerable to external shocks.44
The Korean governments decision to liberalize cross-
border financial flows was a consequence of substantial surplus
in Koreas trade account in the late 1980s, especially against the
U.S., which was due to the Korean wons depreciation. Accusing
Korea of manipulating its exchange rate, the U.S. demanded
that Korea should advance its financial liberalization programs
and make the liberalization programs more transparent.45
After a series of bilateral talks between Korea and the U.S.

since 1989, they reached an agreement on a three-stage blueprint
for the liberalization and opening of the financial sector. The
blueprints for financial liberalization were announced in 1992,
and then as the Kim Young Sam government came into power in
1993, liberalization was greatly accelerated. In 1995, regulation
on foreign short-term bank loans was significantly reduced.46 In
addition, as the Kim Young Sam government joined the OECD
in 1996, Korea had further external and internal pressures for
financial market opening, which in turn increased borrowings by
the Korean private sector.47
The rapid build-up of short-term foreign debts was led
by inexperienced merchant banks, which were newly licensed by
the Kim Young Sam government in the name of financial liber-
alization. That is, 24 merchant banks were newly licensed during
1994-1996 in addition to the six merchant banks that existed
before the liberalization policy.48 Even though, unlike deposit
banks, inexperienced merchant banks were actually not subject
to financial supervision.49
Post-Crisis Financial and Corporate Reforms

After the standby arrangement with the IMF on December
3, 1997, although all the major local newspapers lamented that it
was a day of national humiliation, a consensus began to emerge
that the crisis should be viewed as an opportunity to fix all that
was wrong with Korea Inc. and revitalize the economy.50
In accordance with the Memorandum of Understanding
submitted to the IMF, Koreas overall economy was overseen by
the IMF. The IMFs recommendations in exchange for the standby
credit included the following three reformation programs. First was
the financial liberalization prescription to reform the exchange
rate system as well as the external balance of payments. The IMF
requested a free floating exchange rate system, a full-scale liberal-
ization of international capital flows, and the abolition of controls
on imports. However, the exchange rate could not be liberalized
as determined in the markets because the concern was that, if
256 Daniel W. Jo
the won strengthened against the Japanese yen, Korean exports

could be hurt. So, the basic stance of the government was to try
to contain the yen/won exchange rate at 100/W1,000 or lower.51
Second, the IMF requested a restrictive monetary policy
and fiscal prudence to stabilize exchange rates and to enhance
the balance of payments. Due to a tight monetary policy, the
overnight call rate increased from about 12 percent on December
1, 1997, to about 30 percent by the end of 1997.52 However, the
Korean government and the IMF switched the macroeconomic
policy from a restrictive policy to a gradual easing since March
1998, because criticisms began to surface that the IMFs restrictive
policy manual, which worked in the case of the South American
crisis, led the Korean economy to shrink further due to the rising
debt burden of the corporate sector.53
Third was the prescription for restructuring the financial
sector as well as the corporate sector. This was due to, as mentioned
above, the moral hazard views that the financial crisis was caused
by bad loans and overinvestment, which was inherent in the nexus
among the state, bank, and chaebol.
The overall financial restructuring program included
strengthening financial supervision, disposing of insolvent financial
institutions and consolidation, reforming the deposit insurance
system as well as internal governance of financial companies.
Thus, the Financial Supervisory Commission was established in
April 1998, and then the Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
ratio was strictly applied as a deciding indicator of the soundness
of financial institutions (8% for commercial banks and 4% for
small financial institutions), along with introduction of prompt
corrective action measures.54 Further, the government disposed of
572 ailing financial institutions by the end of April 2001 (27.2%
of the total financial institutions were in existence by the end
of 1997) by injecting 137 trillion won of public funds into the
financial sector.55
The corporate restructuring program included resolu-
tion of distressed or failing companies, and improving corporate
governance to instill credible management transparency and
accountability of chaebol owners.56 The corporate restructuring

programs were mainly directed for the purpose of weakening, and
eventually dismantling, the chaebols.57 The government urged the
creditor banks to include companies belonging to the top chaebols
on the list that were judged as nonviable, and the creditor banks
agreed to cut off additional credit from the companies on the
list.58 Also, the government implemented the prohibition of loan
guarantees among chaebol affiliates, and new financial supervision
criteria to restrain possible over-investment by the corporate sec-
tor. However, the corporate restructuring program consequently
resulted in incoherence and confusion in the restructuring pro-
cess. This was because reducing the corporate debtequity ratio
to prohibit overinvestment and simply dismantling the chaebol
could not provide answers for a desirable corporate structure in
a new Korean economy.59
While the Korean government restrained the chaebols, the
government undertook enhancing FDI and small- and medium-
sized companies. However, the results of this policy virtually failed.60
Even though public funds spent in supporting the new
SMEs, in the form of investing in or lending to the companies,
increased by 36 times from 34.4 billion won ($28.7 million) in
1997 to 1,237 billion won ($1,030.8 million) in 1999, it was un-
fortunately accompanied by the bursting of the huge speculative
bubble in the KOSDAQ market (Korean version of NASDAQ).61
Also, most of the increases in FDI were related to asset sales by
Korean companies and financial institutions, and were not the
result of green field investments.62
In general, the financial and corporate reforms in Korea
after the crisis contributed to restoring the Korean economy by dis-
solving ailing financial and nonfinancial companies, recapitalizing
weak companies, and reducing debt ratios by chaebols. Nonetheless,
the NPLs in the financial sector were offset by public funds. The
corporate reform policy to dismantle the chaebol structure and to
prohibit over-investment by chaebols, incurred huge costs in the
Korean economy. This was due to the inappropriate prescription
258 Daniel W. Jo
for corporate restructuring, which was based on the moral hazard

views as the main cause of the Korean financial crisis.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have explored the Korean financial crisis for
19971998 from an historical perspective, focusing on the issues
of the root causes of the fundamental problems, the nature of the
contagion effect to Korea, as well as the post-crisis restructuring.
Regarding the contagion effect from Southeast Asian countries
to Korea, I have discussed several kinds of contagion models, as
well as the evolution of the Asian financial crises from Thailand
to Korea. I then have presented evidence that supports the wake-
up-call views, rather than the pure contagion views. That is, the
Asian crisis was transmitted to several countries due to similar
economic problems, such as large external debt, poor financial
supervision, and trade account decline.
Also, regarding the root causes of the Korean financial crisis,
I have discussed fundamentals-based views, such as the moral hazard
view and the transition failure view, from an historical perspective.
The moral hazard theory, which is a typical fundamentals-based
view adopted by the IMF, says that the financial crisis was mainly
due to too much intervention by the government in the markets,
ordering the banks to provide excessive credit to un-creditworthy
chaebols. I have argued that the transition failure view from an
historical perspective is more plausible than the moral hazard view
in explaining the fundamental cause of the financial crisis. The
transition failure view says that the process of transitioning from
a government-oriented economy to a market-oriented economy
resulted in the mismanagement of financial liberalization and the
failure of cross-border capital liberalization, which was caused by
the rapid build-up of private foreign debts and an unstable foreign
debt structure before the financial crisis.
I have also argued that, although post-crisis financial and
corporate reforms contributed to restoring the Korean economy
from the crisis, those restructuring policies incurred huge costs.
This was due to an inappropriate prescription based on the moral
hazard views as the main cause of the crisis. The experience of

the financial crisis in Korea and its post-crisis reforms may pro-
vide important lessons when managing other potential financial
crises, especially in an emerging market economy in the process
of economic transition.
260 Daniel W. Jo
Endnotes
1
Jang-Sup Shin, and Ha-Joon Chang, Restructuring Korea
Inc. (London: Routledge, 2003) p.97
2
Martin Fackler, Lessons Learned, South Korea Makes
Quick Economic Recovery, New York Times, January 6, 2011
(http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/07/world/asia)
3
Kyu-Sung Lee, The Korean Financial Crisis of 1997: Onset,
Turnaround, and Thereafter. (Washington DC: World Bank,
2011), p.88
4
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations: a regional
organization located in Southeast Asia, which covers Thailand,
Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, the
Philippines, Indonesia. Of those countries, Thailand, Malaysia,
Singapore, the Philippines and Indonesia severely suffered
from the Asian financial crisis.
5
The term contagion itself is conceptually too broad to
distinguish several different forms of shock that can transfer
across countries (Taimur Baig, and Ilan Goldfajin, Financial
Market Contagion in the Asian Crisis, IMF Staff Papers 46, no.
2 (1999) p.169).
6
Lee, p.13
7
Taimur Baigm, and Ilan Goldfajn, 1998, Financial
Market Contagion in the Asian Crisis, IMF Working
Paper 98/155 (Washington: International Monetary Fund,
November). p.46
8
Stephan Haggard, The Political Economy of the Asian
Financial Crisis. (Washington DC: Institute for International
Economics, 2000) p.3
9
Lee, p.13
10
Korean form of family-owned conglomerate.
11
Lee, p.20
12
Ibid., p.21
13
J. Shin, and H. Chang, p.35
14
Ibid., p.33
15
I. Goldfajn, and R. Valdes, The Aftermath of
Appreciations, Quarterly Journal of Economics 114 (1999) p.229.
16
Menzie D Chinn, Before The Fall: Were East Asian
Currencies Overvalued? Emerging Markets Review 1 (2000)
p.120.
17
G. Kaminsky, and C. Reinhart, On Crisis, Contagion and
Confusion, Journal of International Economics 51, no. 1 (2000)
p.145.
18
C. Van Rijckeghem, Weder B. Sources of Contagion: is
it Finance or Trade? Journal of International Economics 54, no. 2
(2001), p.293.
19
T. Willett, A. Budiman, A. Denzau, G. Jo, C. Ramos and J.
Thomas, The Falsification of Four Popular Hypotheses about
the Asian Crisis, The World Economy 27, no. 1 (2004), p.37.
20
B. Eichengreen, A. Rose, and C. Wyplosz. 1999.
Contagious Currency Crises: Channels of Conveyance. In
Changes in Exchange Rates in Rapidly Development Countries, ed.
Ito and Krueger, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, p.29.
21
Kaminsky and Reinhart, pp.145-146.
22
Ibid., p.160.
23
George Soros, The Crisis of Global Capitalism. (New York:
Public Affair Press, 1998) pp.101-102.
24
G. L. Kaminsky, and S. L. Schmukler. 1999. What
Triggers Market Jitters: A Chronicle of the Asian Crisis.
Journal of International Money and Finance 18 (1999) p.558.
25
Thomas D. Willett, (2000) International Financial
Markets as Sources of Crises or Discipline: The Too Much, Too
Late Hypothesis, Princeton Essays in International Finance No.
218. p.18.
26
Ibid., p.22.
27
M. Goldstein, 1998. The Asian Crisis: Causes, Cures,
and Systemic Implications, Washington, DC: Institute for
International Economics, p.18.
28
Ibid., pp.20-21.
29
P. Krugman 1999. What Happened to Asia? in R. Sato et
al. (eds.) Global Competition and Integration. New York: Kluwer
Academic Publishers. p.315
30
Ibid., p.320.
31
M.P. Dooley, 2000. A Model of Crises in Emerging
Markets, The Economic Journal, 110, p.260.
32
J. Shin, and H. Chang, p.42
33
Ibid., p.44.
34
R Chang, . and A. Velasco, 1998, The Asian Liquidity
Crisis, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Working Paper 98-11. p.46.
35
T. D. Willett, , p.27.
36
J. Shin, and H. Chang, p.66.
37
Ibid., p.45.
38
Ibid., p.82.
39
Ibid., p.70.
40
Lee, p.41.
262 Daniel W. Jo
41
Chang, H., H. Park and C. Yoo, 1998, Interpreting the
Korean Crisis: Financial Liberalization, Industrial Policy and
Corporate Governance, Cambridge Journal of Economics 22,
p.739.
42
Lee, p.59.
43
Ibid., p.58.
44
Ibid., p.57.
45
Park, W. 1996, Financial Liberalization: the Korean
Experience, in T. Ito and A.O. Kruger, eds., Financial
Deregulation and Integration in East Asia, Chicago: Chicago
University Press: p.251.
46
Chang, H., H. Park and C. Yoo, p.738.
47
Lee., p.53.
48
Chang, H., H. Park and C. Yoo, pp.738-739.
49
Ibid., p.739.
50
Lee., p.74.
51
Ibid., p.166.
52
Ibid., p.134.
53
Furman, J. and J. Stiglitz, 1998, Economic Crises:
Evidence and Insights from East Asia, Brookings Papers on
Economic Activity, 1998 (2), pp.96-97.
54
Shin, J. and H. Chang, p.97
55
Ibid., p.97.
56
Lee., p.154.
57
Chang, H., H. Park and C. Yoo, p.742.
58
Lee., p.157.
59
Shin, J. and H. Chang, p.92
60
Ibid., p.103.
61
Ibid., pp.109-110.
62
Ibid., p.104.
Bibliography
Baig, Taimur, and Ilan Goldfajin, Financial Market

Contagion in the Asian Crisis, IMF Staff Papers 46, no. 2
(1999) pp.167-219
Baig, Taimur and Ilan Goldfajn, 1998, Financial Market
Contagion in the Asian Crisis, IMF Working Paper 98/155
Washington: International Monetary Fund, November, pp. 1-
61.
Chang, H., H. Park and C. Yoo, 1998, Interpreting the
Korean Crisis: Financial Liberalization, Industrial Policy and
Corporate Governance, Cambridge Journal of Economics 22,

pp.735-746.
Chang, Roberto and Andrs Velasco, 1998, The Asian
Liquidity Crisis, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Working Paper
98-11. pp. 1-59.
Chinn, Menzie D., Before The Fall: Were East Asian
Currencies Overvalued? Emerging Markets Review 1 (2000) pp.
101-126.
Dooley, Michael P. (2000), A Model of Crises in Emerging
Markets, The Economic Journal, 110, pp.256-272.
Eichengreen, B., Rose, A. and C. Wyplosz. 1999.
Contagious Currency Crises: Channels of Conveyance. In
Changes in Exchange Rates in Rapidly Development Countries, ed. Ito
and Krueger, pp.29-56. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Fackler, Martin, Lessons Learned, South Korea Makes
Quick Economic Recovery, New York Times, January 6, 2011
(http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/07/world/asia)
Furman, Jason and Stiglitz, Joseph E. 1998, Economic
Crises: Evidence and Insights from East Asia. Brookings Papers
on Economic Activity, 1998 (2): pp. 1-135.
Goldstein, M. 1998. The Asian Crisis: Causes, Cures, and
Systemic Implications. Washington, DC: Institute for International
Economics.
Goldfajn, I., Valdes, R., 1999. The Aftermath of
Appreciations. Quarterly Journal of Economics. 114, pp. 229-262.
Haggard, Stephan, The Political Economy of the Asian Financial
Crisis. (Washington DC: Institute for International Economics,
2000)
Kaminsky, G., and C. Reinhart, On Crisis, Contagion and
Confusion, Journal of International Economics 51, no. 1 (2000)
pp. 145168
Kaminsky, G. L. and S. L. Schmukler. 1999. What Triggers
Market Jitters: A Chronicle of the Asian Crisis. Journal of
International Money and Finance 18 (1999) pp. 537560.
Krugman P. 1999. What Happened to Asia? in R. Sato et
al. (eds.) Global Competiton and Integration. New York: Kluwer
Academic Publishers.
Lee, Kyu-Sung, The Korean Financial Crisis of 1997: Onset,
Turnaround, and Thereafter. (Washington DC: World Bank, 2011)
Massion, Paul, Contagion: Macroeconomic Models with
Multiple Equilibria, Journal of International Money and Finance
18 (1999) pp.587602
264 Daniel W. Jo
Park, W. 1996, Financial Liberalization: the Korean

Experience, in T. Ito and A.O. Kruger, eds., Financial
Deregulation and Integration in East Asia, Chicago: Chicago
University Press: pp.247-276.
Rijckeghem C Van, Weder B. Sources of Contagion: Is It
Finance or Trade? Journal of International Economics 54, no. 2
(2001), pp.293308.
Shin, Jang-Sup and Ha-Joon Chang, Restructuring Korea Inc.
(London: Routledge, 2003)
Soros, George. (1998). The Crisis of Global Capitalism. New
York: Public Affair Press.
Willett, T., A. Budiman, A. Denzau, G. Jo, C. Ramos, and J.
Thomas, The Falsification of Four Popular Hypotheses about
the Asian Crisis, The World Economy 27, no. 1 (2004), p. 37.
Willett, Thomas D. (2000) International Financial Markets
as Sources of Crises or Discipline: The Too Much, Too Late
Hypothesis, Princeton Essays in International Finance No. 218.
VOX POPULI VOX DEI: THE HISTORY OF CAPITAL

PUNISHMENT AND ITS RELATIONSHIP
TO PUBLIC OPINION IN THE UNITED STATES
Ben Chiacchia
C apital punishment was not at first a choice for the

United States. Derived from English common law1 and other
Western legal traditions, the adoption of the death penalty was
assumed from the creation of British North America. With such
a strong emphasis placed on judicial precedent and considering
the history of capital punishment in England in the years prior
to colonization, the incorporation of the death penalty into the
American penal system was inevitable.
The exercise of capital punishment in the United States,
however, has been controversial in the United States and inter-
nationally, and has on many occasions been the center of intense
political scrutiny and deliberation. In the absence of an explicit
constitutional provision including capital punishment, public
opinion has played a prominent role in the use and limitation
of the death penalty. In keeping with the rule of the majority, a
principle of American politics since the Revolution, the use of the
death penalty has been largely contingent on popular will. The
Benjamin Patrick Chiacchia is a Senior at Lincoln High School in Lincoln,

Rhode Island, where he wrote this paper for Ms. Gracieta Smalls AP
United States History course in the 2014/2015 academic year.
266 Ben Chiacchia
work of activists on both sides of the debate has helped to shape

the use of the death penalty, both within individual states and at
the federal level.
As a social and legal institution, capital punishment pre-
dates slavery and even popular governance in the U.S. The first
execution was carried out at the Jamestown Colony, under the
command of John Smith, in 1608.2 Under colonial statutes, espe-
cially in the New England colonies, where Puritanism reigned in
nearly all aspects of life, Biblical standards were often used to levy
punishment. Crimes including idolatry, witchcraft, various forms
of disrespect to elders, and work on Sunday were all treated as
capital offences. However, colonies could not afford to execute
large numbers of their populations, many of whom had violated
at least one Biblical proscription, leading colonial governments
to limit the use of capital punishment.3 Still, the rate of execution
was much higher in colonial times; with a sixteen-fold difference
in the number of executions per 100,000 in the mid 18th century
compared to the period between 1926 and 1935.4
This period was also known for use of torture and painful
execution, what would today be classified as cruel and unusual
punishment under the 8th Amendment. These executions were
often politically motivated, and usually came in the face of religious
and social upheavals. In many ways, the use of execution became
an element of social interaction and political expression. The
fact that people bore witness to death regularly, combined with
religious convictions on morality and sin, and the legal attitudes
of royal and religious colonial governments, made execution a
public spectacle and a tool by which the states controlled the
population.5 After the transition to English control, the penal
systems of the thirteen colonies became roughly comparable, with
eleven crimes punishable by death in each colony.6
After the Revolution, and despite the abolitionist senti-
ments of many Enlightenment philosophers that inspired the
Founding Fathers, the United States retained the institution of
capital punishment. As Europe, especially Britain, steered towards
abolition both for capital punishment and slavery (with the former
only achieving full abolition in 1998), many individual states ex-

panded both. The North saw a brief period of abolitionist success
prior to the Civil War, with Rhode Island and Wisconsin following
Michigans ruling to abolish the death penalty for all crimes but
treason in 1846.7 The movement faltered during the 1850s, as the
fight against slavery took precedence. However, by the turn of the
century, a handful of states either abolished or limited the use of
execution.8 The reforms of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era
did not pass over capital punishment, however, as activists success-
fully lobbied first the federal government and then eight states
of diverse political makeup and geographical location to limit or
abolish capital punishment.9
Like many of the Progressive reform movements, however,
death penalty abolition stalled by the 1920s. Many previously abo-
litionist states reinstated capital punishment, and the remaining
vestiges of reform focused on making the process more humane
rather than abolishing it.10 At the height of the First Red Scare in
the 1920s and 1930s, as well as racial discrimination in the legal
system, the use of capital punishment peaked, with some years
in the 1930s averaging more than one hundred and fifty execu-
tions.11 Tensions escalated once again in the 1950s as the Second
Red Scare and the trial of spies Julius and Ethel Rosenburg led to
increased paranoia and political calls to execute members of the
Communist Party of the United States (CPUSA).12
After this period of political turmoil, the United States
found itself the target of criticism from many NATO and other
western nations. By the late 1950s, several states turned towards
abolition, though some would eventually reinstate capital punish-
ment.13 A major victory for the abolition movement came in 1972
with a 5-4 decision in Furman v. Georgia, which declared capital
punishment unconstitutional under the 8th Amendments ban on
cruel and unusual punishment.14
This ruling was reversed soon thereafter by the Courts
ruling in Gregg v. Georgia (1976), in which the majority held that
execution is not necessarily a form of cruel and unusual punish-
ment.15 This ruling effectively condoned the use of capital pun-
268 Ben Chiacchia
ishment for murder. Since this ruling, the number of executions

has increased, peaking in 1999, with ninety-eight executions
performed that year. Since 1999, the number of executions has
decreased, with thirty-five performed in 2014 and fifteen in the
first six months of 2015.16 Several rulings by the Supreme Court
have limited the circumstances for execution, though thirty-one
states plus the U.S. Military and the Federal government retain the
death penalty. The most recent state to abolish capital punishment
was Nebraska, which did so in 2015. Roughly a month later, the
Supreme Court ruled in Glossip v. Gross that the use of the drug
midazolam for executions was constitutional on the grounds that
the deterrence of inmate pain is not the primary concern of capital
punishment. The Court ruled that the 8th Amendment was not
violated, as the prisons could not find a more suitable alternative
to replace midazolam. The drugs efficacy has raised concerns
over using lethal injection as a form of capital punishment, as a
series of controversial, botched executions revealed the drugs
ineffectiveness for preventing pain and inducing coma.17
Today, each state selects the method by which execution
is performed. Thirty-four states, including three states that have
abolished the death penalty but have inmates remaining on death
row, the Federal government, and the Armed Forces use lethal
injection as their primary means of execution.18 In almost all
circumstances, a three-drug cocktail of sodium thiopental (prior
to its discontinuation in 2010, after which drugs like midazolam
became more common for executions), pancuronium bromide,
and potassium chloride are used to induce coma, stop breathing,
and initiate cardiac arrest.19
Since its inception in the Middle Ages, hanging has been
used as a method of execution in various jurisdictions. It was the
primary means of execution in the United States until the late 19th
century and has been implemented in various forms in the United
States, with suspension and short drop methods eventually replaced
in most areas by long and standard drops, which are designed to
inflict quicker death by paralysis via neck-breaking as opposed to
asphyxiation.20 However, issues of decapitation and asphyxiation
still occurred, and currently only two states, Washington and New
Hampshire (though a third, Delaware, legally has it as an option,
though it switched permanently to lethal injection),21 retain it as
a secondary method.
Electrocution is maintained by eight states as a secondary
method of execution.22 All cases of execution by electrocution in
the United States have used a variant of the electric chair, a device
first used in 1890. The condemned individual is restrained in a
chair, electrodes are attached at the head and legs, and sponges
are used to direct the flow of electricity. The inmate receives any-
where from 500 to 2,000 volts of electricity in the initial shock,
after which subsequent shocks are given until death results. This
method has fallen out of favor due to frequent infliction of burns
to the prisoner and discomfort produced for prison staff and wit-
nesses by the sight of convulsions and burning, the sounds of the
condemned, and the smell produced by burning the inmates
tissues.23
The gas chamber was introduced in Nevada in 1924 as an
attempt at making the process of capital punishment more hu-
mane. As of 2015, five states retain the gas chamber as a secondary
execution means; four utilize hydrogen cyanide gas, while Okla-
homa has listed nitrogen gas asphyxiation as a potential means
of execution in the event that lethal injection is unavailable.24 In
all cases, the condemned is restrained in a chair similar to the
one used in electrocution, after which the gas is introduced. In
the case of hydrogen cyanide, the gas induces unconsciousness
followed by death from poisoning, while in the case of nitrogen
the gas displaces breathable oxygen, leading to asphyxiation.25
While only two states still list death by firing squad as a
secondary execution method, it may see resurgence in Utah as the
primary method of execution due to the lack of available execution
drugs.26 This method requires restraining the prisoner before a
firing squad of five men. Four of the shooters have live ammuni-
tion, while one is given blanks. The shooters target the heart,
and death typically results from blood loss and cardiac trauma.27
270 Ben Chiacchia
Despite the decline in executions, the United States rank

in the top five nations by number of executions in the world as of
2014.28 Since 1976, the United States executed 1,411 people, with
more than one third of executions taking place in Texas alone.29 Of
those executed since 1976, 783 or 55.5% have been white, 490 or
34.7% have been black, 114 or 8.0% have been Latino/Hispanic,
and 24 or 1.7% have been of another race.30 The total number of
death row inmates across all states plus the Federal government
and the U.S. Armed Forces currently stands at 3,002 inmates. Of
these, 1,284 or 42.77% are white, 1,251 or 41.67% are black, 386
or 12.86% are Latino/Hispanic, and 81 or 2.69% are of another
race.31 There is a significant difference between the number of
male and female prisoners on death row, with females represent-
ing only 1.9% of the condemned as of April of 2014.32
The current controversy over the death penalty is not
new. Despite the punishments prolific use throughout the his-
tory of the United States, prominent individuals on both sides of
the debate have voiced opinions and affected American policy.
Even enlightenment thinkers, many of whom influenced such
documents as the Declaration of Independence and Constitution
of the United States, were divided on the issue. Immanuel Kant,
perhaps best known for his Critique of Pure Reason (Kritik der reinen
Vernunft, 1781) wrote famously in The Metaphysics of Morals (Die
Metaphysik Der Sitten) that, whoever has committed murder, must
die.33 Voltaire, the pseudonym of French satirist, philosopher, and
social critique Franois-Marie Arouet, opposed such a view, com-
menting in his Philosophical Dictionary (Dictionnaire Philosophique,
1764), Let the punishments of criminals be useful. A hanged
man is good for nothing, and a man condemned to public works
still serves the country, and is a living lesson.34
The work of Cesare Beccaria, an 18th century Milanese legal
philosopher, provided perhaps the most comprehensive support
for abolition of the death penalty in the time coinciding with
American independence.35 His work On Crimes and Punishments
(Dei delitti e delle pene, 1764) influenced the minority of Founding
Fathers, notably Dr. Benjamin Rush and Thomas Jefferson, who

took abolitionist stances on the issue of capital punishment.36
Abolitionists have never comprised the majority of Ameri-
cans, though the movements support peaked with a plurality
of 47% during the mid-1960s.37 Historically, the movement has
been associated with liberals, Progressives, and religious groups,
though in some instances conservatives have spearheaded aboli-
tion, as was the case with the vote to abolish the death penalty in
Nebraska in 2015.38
Three major waves of abolition have taken root in the
United States. The first was only a part of a wider movement, that
being the campaign against public execution. Prior to the 1830s
and the rise of wider democracy under the Jackson administration
that was widely publicized by Alexis de Tocqueville, executions
were held in public, and the town square often included a gal-
lows.39 However, states moved executions to penal facilities, and
the movement as a whole collapsed.
The second wave was also incorporated into a wider move-
ment, in this case the Progressive movement. While the call for
abolition was eclipsed by more popular reform efforts, especially
labor reform, urban justice, and the suffrage movement, abolition-
ists successfully swung several states.40 The effect was short-lived in
many cases, however, as many of these states reversed their bans.
Additionally, with World War I and the First Red Scare looming
in the horizon, it proved difficult for the movement to continue.
In fact, the only element of this wave of death penalty abolition
that endured was the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), an
organization that has since become one of the most prominent
groups in the abolition movement.41
Starting in the late 1950s, the third wave of abolition
emerged as an offshoot by opponents of capital punishment in
Europe, many of whom had begun to win an end to the death
penalty in their home countries. Legislation became viewed as
inefficient due to the number of states that had overturned bans.
Instead, most of the focus turned toward court cases involving capi-
tal punishment. Despite this, several states still passed legislation,
272 Ben Chiacchia
though once again bans proved fleeting. However, the efforts of

advocacy and protest by groups like the ACLU and the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP)42
paid off, as reflected in the case of Furman v. Georgia (1972). The
court ruled in a 5-4 decision that the form of capital punishment
in use at that time violated the 8th and 14th Amendments and was
thus unconstitutional, and issued a moratorium on its use.43 The
moratorium was ultimately overturned in Gregg v. Georgia (1976),
in which the Court sanctioned reinstatement of the death penalty
in states successfully demonstrating that their execution practices
complied with the 8th Amendment.44
Currently, most advocacy against the death penalty comes
from human rights organizations, legal advocacy groups, and po-
litical organizations dedicated to the anti-death penalty campaign.
Aside from the NAACP and ACLU, groups like Amnesty Interna-
tional,45 and the National Coalition to Abolish the Death Penalty,46
as well as a substantial number of religious groups, churches, and
faith-based organizations have voiced their opposition to capital
punishment.47
Since the death penalty has always been an element of
the American penal system, with the exception of the four-year
moratorium under Furman, campaigns to maintain it have not
developed as often, except when its continued existence has been
threatened by abolitionists. Most people support capital punish-
ment,48 as do political organizations like Justice For All,49 Klaas
Kids Foundation,50 and the National Center for Policy Analysis,51
and scholars such as Robert Blecker.52 These organizations and
individuals cite deterrence, adequate justice, prison size, and cost
as reasons for continuation of the death penalty.
Several key aspects of the death penaltys purpose, its ef-
fects, and its validity as a punishment include the deterrence effect,
the cost of imprisonment, effect of the penalty on policing, the
concept of justice and the qualifications for execution, the moral-
ity of execution, and the debate over physical and psychological
pain incurred by the condemned.
Deterrence takes two general forms in criminology: gen-

eral and specific. Specific deterrence targets a specific behavior
or crime to prevent, while general deterrence aims to outline the
boundaries of illegal and legal behavior and sets consequences
to prevent transgression.53 A significant problem exists in assess-
ing the validity of whether capital punishment deters crime due
to the highly contradictory nature of studies on deterrence and
rates of homicide.
Recently, despite remaining in favor of the use of capital
punishment, the American public has less faith in capital punish-
ment as an element of deterrence, with polls showing decline from
62% of respondents supporting the deterrence theory in 1985 to
32% in 2011.54 Among researchers and criminologists, however,
results are more closely divided.
In recent years, a number of studies have been published
whose results indicate that there is a deterrent effect to capital
punishment, with the number of homicides prevented by the
institution varying from eighteen in an Emory University study
to as low as three in another study.55 Proponents have cited deter-
rence as reason enough to maintain the death penalty, as its use
is morally justifiable if it in fact saves innocent lives.
Many other studies have contradicted the findings of
studies like the one conducted by Emory University, however. In
a study by the National Research Council, researchers evaluated
a number of post-Gregg v. Georgia studies on the effect of capital
punishment on homicide rates, and determined that the research
was fundamentally flawed and was not useful in determining any
relationship between the death penalty and murder rates.56
Another study from Northwestern University indicated
that the majority of criminologists, 88%, claimed that the death
penalty has no deterrent effect when it comes to homicide.57
Numerous anti-death penalty groups, including Amnesty Inter-
national, have used this study as evidence of capital punishments
inability to deter.58
274 Ben Chiacchia
Despite claims of empirical support coming from both

abolitionist and pro-death penalty camps, it is difficult to assess
the validity of the deterrence argument, and so other aspects of
the practice of capital punishment take precedence in debate.
Proponents of the death penalty cite the cost of the U.S.
prison system in support of capital punishment. Some pro-death
penalty organizations maintain that executing murderers is finan-
cially advantageous considering the cost of housing prisoners for
life.59 However, this claim is almost universally refuted by major
studies across the country. Since the end of the moratorium on
the death penalty, Indiana alone spent around $37.1 million on
cases seeking the death penalty, while in Florida the cost is upwards
of $50 million more than it would have been had all capital cases
sought life without parole instead.60 The cost of an individual
death penalty trial is estimated at approximately $1 million to
$1.3 million,61 though some estimates place this figure as high as
$5 million,62 compared with $775,000 for a murder case seeking
life without parole.63
One reason for the cost is connected to the conditions on
death row and the legal protocol followed in death penalty cases.
The most obvious connection between the cost of a death penalty
case and protocol is the appeals process. Each death row convict
receives a direct appeal to overturn either the conviction or the
death sentence, which can then be appealed by the prosecution
or the defendant (whichever loses at the appellate level) to the
Supreme Court of the United States. The Supreme Court may issue
a writ of certiorari to review the case, which typically only occurs in
cases without precedent or with some novel element.64
Other avenues of appeal are available through the fed-
eral courts, such as in cases where issues of federal law are raised
during trial or in the events leading up to trial. Lobbying for or
receiving executive clemency can result in a governor issuing a
stay of execution for an inmate. In the case of a federal case, the
President can commute the sentence.65
The lengthy structure of the appeals process for capital
punishment cases results in many cases in inflated costs. The ap-
peals process for just one case, of convicted murderer and gang
leader Stanley Williams, cost the state of California $1 million,66
and this is not an isolated case. Death penalty appeals often run
into the hundreds of thousands, if not millions of dollars,67 and
often extend the time of incarceration substantially, thus further
burdening the states treasury. Since 1976, California has spent
nearly $4 billion on death row inmates, despite the fact that only
thirteen executions have been performed.68
Proponents of capital punishment have also asserted that
it provides an indispensable tool for law enforcement officials.
Some studies have indicated that authorities in localities without
the death penalty are less successful in securing plea bargains in
murder cases with lengthy sentences compared with jurisdictions
retaining the death penalty.69 Opponents of capital punishment
have argued against these findings, however, citing the success of
non-death penalty states and questioning the quality and validity
of data used in studies regarding the effect of the death penalty
on the plea bargaining process.70
Abolitionists have also countered the idea of coerced plea-
bargaining. Organizations opposed to the death penalty argued
that using death to leverage a plea bargain can force those without
adequate legal representation or those who have been treated
unfairly or unconstitutionally by the police to plead guilty and
accept a lengthy prison term, thus forfeiting their right to a jury
trial for fear of being sentenced to death, regardless of guilt.71
One such case of coercive pleas bargaining leveraged by
capital punishment came with the 1987 conviction of Johnny Lee
Wilson of Aurora, Missouri. Wilson, found to be mentally handi-
capped, was implicated in the murder of a seventy-nine year old
local woman and subsequent arson of her home. While no evidence
of his involvement was discovered, police began investigating the
claim based on a tip from a local boy who had developed a repu-
tation at school as a habitual liar. After duress in multiple hours
of police interrogation, Wilson confessed. While he retracted his
confession, he was still charged with capital murder, to which he
plead no contest to avoid the death penalty. He maintained his
276 Ben Chiacchia
innocence over the next eight years, until finally being exonerated
by then-Missouri governor Mel Carnahan.72
Cases such as this, as well as the twenty death row inmates
exonerated by DNA since 1989,73 evidence supporting the claim
that 4% of those sentenced to death are likely innocent,74 and
dozens of claims of wrongful execution during the previous de-
cades75 provide a reason to abolish capital punishment, as they
view the potential to incarcerate or execute an innocent person
as too high a risk.
Even in instances leading to capital punishment where
plea bargains were not made, duress can be used to extract false
confessions. Though never exonerated or pardoned, the case
of Leo Jones of Florida has attracted considerable attention for
the illegal tactics allegedly used by police during interrogation.
During a twelve-hour interrogation, Jones attorney claimed that
he had been subjected to beatings, threats, and a forced game of
Russian roulette. Eventually, Jones confessed to the murder of a
Jacksonville police officer. Attorneys sought a new trial in light
of new testimony claiming that the police officers intentionally
framed him, and two officers who had arrested and interrogated
Jones had been fired for brutality, a claim that could have poten-
tially corroborated Jones story. However, Jones lost his appeal for
clemency and was executed March 24, 1998.76
In the case of Alan Gell, a North Carolina man wrongfully
sentenced to death for the murder of a truck driver, prosecutorial
misconduct lead to a death penalty conviction. The prosecution
deliberately withheld evidence during trial, including a confession
of perjury from one of Gells accusers, testimony from a number
of witnesses who had seen the victim alive after the alleged date
of the murder, and the statement of a doctor who put the date
of death out of the realm of possibility for Gell to have been the
murderer. Despite this evidence existing since before the first
trial, Gell spent six years on death row before being exonerated
in 2004.77
The debate over capital punishment tends to become less
concrete when the idea of justice becomes a topic of argument.
Justice as it pertains to the death penalty most commonly involves

fitting the punishment to the crime committed, bringing closure
for the loved ones of a victim, and providing due process of the
law for the accused.
Debate over the fairness of capital punishment has been
a deeply divisive topic throughout the history of capital punish-
ment. The idea of fairness is subjective, and as such it has and
can be difficult to apply in a court of law. Much of what has been
ruled fair comes in the form of Supreme Court rulings on capital
punishment.
Aside from the rulings in Furman v. Georgia and Gregg v.
Georgia, the Supreme Court has ruled on many cases that have
changed major aspects of the death penalty in the United States.
The ruling in Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968) made it mandatory
that anyone assigned to jury duty in a capital case be willing to
sentence the convicted criminal to death independent of personal
beliefs. While not mandating death, this rulings importance
lies in the fact that it requires consideration of the use of capital
punishment in death penalty cases in those jurisdictions where
the death penalty is legal. The death sentence of Witherspoon,
was ruled unconstitutional however, as the Illinois law in ques-
tion automatically dismissed any juror who questioned the death
penalty, which violated the 6th Amendment (impartial jury) and
the 14th Amendment (due process).78
The combined rulings of three cases are responsible for
the bar on executions for those committing offences other than
murder and treason. In Coker v. Georgia (1977), the Supreme
Court ruled that death sentences for rape were unconstitutional
on the grounds that they violated the 8th Amendment (cruel and
unusual punishment).79 Five years later, Enmund v. Florida (1982)
established that it was unconstitutional to execute a killer who had
not intended to kill the victim, on the grounds that it too violated
the 8th Amendment.80 Finally, in Kennedy v. Louisiana (2008), the
court ruled that despite the heinous nature of the crime (in this
case the rape of a child), it violated the 8th Amendment to sentence
a convict to death when death did not result.81
278 Ben Chiacchia
The age of the condemned at the time of the crime has

also affected imposing the death penalty historically. While several
cases have changed the age at which an offender may be given a
death sentence, and though the U.N. Convention on the Rights
of the Child specifically bans executions and death sentences for
minors,82 the United States never ratified the treaty. Up until the
ruling in Roper v. Simmons (2005), it was legal in the United States
to put individuals to death who had committed crimes as minors
(an earlier Supreme Court ruling had set the limit for execution
at over sixteen years of age at the time of crime for which the
individual was sentenced to death). Roper ruled the execution of
those convicted of crimes as minors violates the 8th Amendments
provision on cruel and unusual punishment.83
Prior to this ban, cases of child execution did occur in the
United States. The case of George Stinney, a fourteen-year-old
African American boy in South Carolina who was convicted of
the murder of two white girls, ended with his execution in 1944.
On top of his death at the age of fourteen, the youngest of any
American convicts to be put to death at the time of his execution,
Stinneys trial became notorious as an example of Jim Crow era legal
injustice. After allegedly confessing in a private interrogation with
no witnesses, Stinneys trial lasted a mere two hours, after which
time the jury took just ten minutes to convict him and sentence
him to death. Eighty-four days following the murders, Stinney was
executed by electrocution. He sat on a stack of books, as he was
too small for the electric chair, and during the electrocution an
ill-fitted mask exposed his contorted face to the crowd of witnesses.
Despite the injustice of his trial, Stinney was not exonerated until
2014, seventy years after his execution.84
The final criterion established by the Supreme Court in-
volves the condemneds ability to understand his/her guilt and/
or the reason for being executed. The Supreme Courts ruling in
Ford v. Wainwright (1986) established a bar on the execution of the
insane (by legal definition, confirmed by court-hired profession-
als) or those who are unable to understand the severity of their
crime(s) and the reason they are being executed.85 This did not
automatically prevent execution for those for those with low IQs or
who were considered mentally retarded (in a medical and legal
legal sense). Executions for such individuals were ruled unconsti-
tutional in the case Atkins v. Virginia (2002),86 reversing a previous
decision in Penry v. Lynaugh (1989), which had allowed for such
executions at the jurys discretion, though states were allowed to
issue stricter standards than those required under federal law.87
Advocates of capital punishment have highlighted the
importance of closure, or a sense of finality and comfort for the
family and friends of the victim, especially in cases of extreme
brutality, the murder of children, or mass murder cases. To
many death penalty advocates, the emotional pain and suffering
incurred by the relatives of the victims is worse, or at least should
take precedence over the physical pain of execution for the con-
demned, and thus execution serves a role in bringing closure.88
In some cases, including the murders of Tia, Tyron, and Tahlia
Hendricks, a mother and her two children stabbed to death by
Caron Montgomery in Ohio, the death penalty brought closure
according to the family expressed in statements made to the press
in the aftermath of the sentence. Speaking for Tia Hendricks after
the sentence, Anita Hayes was quoted as saying, She [would have]
felt comforted to know that he will be put to death.89
Many studies have indicated, however, that closure is not
a primary concern of many families, and in an increasing number
of cases, victims families have begun to advocate against execu-
tion in capital cases. Groups like California Crime Victims for
Alternatives to the Death Penalty, Murder Victims Families for
Reconciliation, Murder Victims Families for Human Rights, and
Journey of Hope all represent a growing faction of anti-capital
punishment victims groups.90
A recent pushback by victims families was seen in the trial
of Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, the surviving perpetrator of the April 15,
2013 Boston Marathon Bombing. On May 15, 2015, a jury sentenced
Tsarnaev to death for the murders of four people, three killed in
the bombing and one murder in a shootout at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology.91 What was notable, aside from the fact
280 Ben Chiacchia
that similar convicted terrorists like Theodore Kaczynski, Zacar-

ias Moussaoui, and Eric Rudolph received life terms rather than
the death penalty, was the fact that many of the victims family
members came out in open opposition to his execution prior to
his death sentence. The most widely publicized opposition came
from Bill and Denise Richard, the parents of Martin Richard, an
eight year old boy killed during the bombing. In their co-authored
op-ed, the Richards state:
As long as the defendant is in the spotlight, we have no choice but
to live a story told on his terms, not ours. The minute the defendant
fades from our newspapers and TV screens is the minute we begin
the process of rebuilding our lives and our familyWe believe that
now is the time to turn the page, end the anguish, and look toward
a better futurefor us, for Boston, and for the country.92
A number of other groups and individuals have voiced similar
opposition before and since the sentence, though the ruling still
asked for the death penalty.
Building from this argument, the wider debate surrounding
the justice of capital punishment comes to the question of whether
it is a fair way to punish convicted killers. Supporters of the death
penalty cite retribution as a primary goal of punishment, and
argue that punishment should be proportional to the crime com-
mitted. Some see death and pain, inflicted by the means through
which capital punishment is carried out, as fair, considering the
brutality of certain crimes. Speaking on the nature of execution
as a form of punishment, Robert Blecker, a professor at New York
Law School and advocate of capital punishment stated:
I am a retributivist supporter of the death penalty. That is, I believe
that some people kill so viciously, with an attitude so callous or cruel,
that they deserve to dieand society has an obligation to execute
them.93
Professor Blecker also describes pain as a necessary element of
execution, clarifying, If it is not painful, it is not punishment.94
Blecker concurs with Kant on the important penal nature of the
death penalty, though Blecker has clarified that he supports the
death penalty specifically for the most horrific murders,95 whereas
Kant saw execution as the only rational response to murder,96
adhering to the principle established under Hammurabis legal

code calling for an eye for an eye.
A divide exists in the argument for justice for those who
are opposed to capital punishment. For some, capital punish-
ment represents too lax a punishment, as it involves ending the
life of convict prematurely, thus preventing the extended period
of incarceration provided by life imprisonment without the pos-
sibility of parole. The argument derives its basis from a desire for
retribution similar to that which death penalty proponents discuss
in supporting capital punishment, though they see death, even
a potentially painful death, as a lesser punishment compared to
confinement for the rest of the criminals natural life.97
More traditionally however, opponents of capital punish-
ment have viewed executions as a miscarriage of justice. Aside from
the previously mentioned potential for wrongful execution, there
are two elements of the death penalty that are cited as injustice:
the arbitrary nature of the death sentence and the hypocrisy of
punishing killing with killing.
Arbitrariness in capital punishment stems from the lack of
a clear standard for the application of the death penalty, as well as
personal biases in judgment by jurors. Since no uniform standard
exists for qualification for execution, it is difficult to determine at
face value what crimes warrant capital punishment and what crimes
do not. Therefore, it often falls to the discretion of the jury, the
judge, and the prosecutor to pursue and apply the death penalty.98
Disparities between public opinion and prosecutors result in an
uneven application of capital punishment, as well as a wide, often
contradictory disparity in the severity of death penalty cases.99
For opponents, the use of state-sponsored termination of
life on the grounds of punishing or deterring killing by others is
seen as hypocritical by nature. Retributionists have cited the use
of capital punishment as a punishment reflective of the crime
committed. In response, abolitionists have argued that capital
murder is the only crime that is punished by such a principle (and
even then only some of the time), as well as the fact that there is
282 Ben Chiacchia
no difference in the threat posed by a properly incarcerated killer

and an executed one.100
Connected almost directly to the argument over the justice
of the death penalty is the argument over its morality. The question
of morality, like that of justice, is subjective, as it is based on the
personal beliefs of each person. In the United States, historically
morality has been tied to religious belief, and as such different
religions, spiritual movements, and moral philosophies have af-
fected the use of capital punishment and the debate over its use
significantly.
The application of the death penalty in colonial times met
little resistance from religious orders in colonial America, and in
some instances was specifically sanctioned by them.101 Consider-
ing the more literal reading of the Bible during the time prior to
the First Great Awakening of the mid 18th century, especially the
laws of Exodus, Leviticus, and Deuteronomy found in the Old
Testament,102 coupled with the forms of Protestantism found in
colonial America, the near ubiquity of the death penalty for felony
offences in British North America is no suprise.103 In cases such as
the Salem Witch Trials, for example, religious doctrine served as a
reason for execution, sometimes in the absence of much credible
evidence of any actual crime.104
As Christianity has been, and continues to be, the dominant
religion in the United States, it has played an important role in the
death penalty debate since independence. With the shift towards
the New Testament from the laws of the Hebrew Scripture in some
denominations came the emergence of the Christian abolition
movement. Similar to the Christians involved in the slavery aboli-
tion movement, Christian death penalty abolitionists placed the
teachings of Jesus in the New Testament over Hebrew legal codes,
thus placing a higher value on forgiveness and shifting judgment
from mortal society to the realm of the divine.105 Reforms since
the Progressive Era regarding capital punishment have invariably
involved a religious element, as some denominations have declared
the use of the death penalty to be immoral.106
Currently, the major American Christian churches of the

United States are divided over whether capital punishment is
moral. The American Baptist Church,107 the Episcopal Church,108
the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America,109 the Orthodox
Church in America,110 the Presbyterian Church USA,111 the Roman
Catholic Church,112 the Universalist Unitarian Association,113 the
United Church of Christ,114 and the United Methodist Church115
have all taken positions of opposition to the use of capital punish-
ment. Churches including the Lutheran Church: Missouri Synod116
and the Southern Baptist Convention117 have maintained their
support of capital punishment as a legitimate function of the
state as ordained by God, while the Assemblies of God118 and the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints119 have either taken
no position on the issue or have made no distinction among dif-
fering opinions on the topic.
Secular humanism, while not a religion, has also played a
major role in recent anti-death penalty advocacy. As an increasingly
popular philosophy or movement among the irreligious (though
no single, codified philosophy or identity exists for atheists, ag-
nostics, anti-theists, and the non-religious), humanist groups have
become prominent in the debate over many issues. While typically
in confrontation with religious groups in debates over the First
Amendment and the separation of church and state, the majority
of prominent religious bodies and humanist organizations both
abroad and at home oppose the death penalty on the grounds that
it is immoral to take life where no immediate threat is posed, with
the American Humanist Association the largest such organization
in the United States.120
Other religious denominations have conflicting views on
the death penalty. Within Judaism, there is a divide, as The Union
of Orthodox Jewish Congregations holds mixed views,121 whereas
congregations within Reform Judaism are wholly opposed to
the practice.122 No official organization represents the Muslims,
Hindus, and Buddhists of the United States, and no official posi-
tion exists for American adherents to these faiths. It should also
be noted that while individual churches or religious institutions
284 Ben Chiacchia
may hold a position on capital punishment, the position is not

necessarily reflective of the opinions of all adherents to these
religious doctrines.
The final main point of debate over the death penalty
covers the 8th Amendments prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishment. Such debate has focused on each form of capital
punishment, and has extended into the present in renewed con-
troversy over execution.
All Supreme Court cases involving the constitutionality of
the death penalty on 8th Amendment grounds with the exception
of Furman v. Georgia (1972) have ruled in favor of capital punish-
ment. Currently, except in jurisdictions where the practice has
been explicitly outlawed, capital punishment is permitted, though
the restrictions placed on the exercise of the death penalty by the
Court hold. Despite the Supreme Courts decision to uphold the
death penalty, the debate over whether the practice constitutes
cruelty has endured.
Historically, in the face of public outcry, proponents of
capital punishment have sought to find a humane means of
execution. While the current methods of execution have been
discussed previously, many of these methods have changed over
time due to attempts to find a humane method of execution.
Hanging by strangulation, often times in public, was once the most
common form of capital punishment, though it often resulted
in a slow death, leaving the condemned choking for upwards of
several minutes, and often resulting in the protrusion of the eyes
and tongue, erratic shaking, and involuntary defecation.123 Long
drop hanging attempted to resolve this issue by causing neck
breaking instead of strangulation, though this process has also
resulted in occasional decapitations due to the force of the fall.124
Though often used in impromptu situations historically, the firing
squad is used rarely in modern times, as failure to hit the target
effectively results in a slow death from bleeding.125
To overcome these issues, and in an attempt to make execu-
tions more painless, the electric chair was devised. While initially
believed to be less painful, the process resulted in the burning of
the inmates flesh, the swelling of bodily tissues, skin blistering,

vomiting, bleeding, defecation, urination, and occasionally the
expulsion of the eyeballs from their sockets.126 Another attempt
at solving these issues came in the form of the gas chamber. The
inmate was subjected to breathing hydrogen cyanide gas in an
enclosed chamber while restrained. Theoretically, the gas should
render the inmate unconscious quickly though this requires a
high degree of prisoner compliance, namely in the form of them
willingly inhaling the gas. During the gassing process, hypoxemia
renders the skin purple and choking occurs. Oxygen deprivation
typically kills the inmate, though hydrogen cyanide is toxic and
can also cause death.127
In response to outcries over electrocution and the gas
chamber, lethal injection became the primary method of execution.
Initially, the three-drug cocktail method of execution seemed to
provide the necessary effect without pain or suffering. However, in
instances where the execution is preformed incorrectly, the vein
can clog, resulting in extreme pain.128 In other cases, such as that
of Clayton Lockett, an Oklahoma man executed in 2014 for the
murder of Stephanie Neiman,129 improper procedure followed by
EMTs (as the American Medical Association bars doctors licensed
by them from participating in the execution process since taking
a life would violate the Hippocratic oath) resulted in his veins
exploding. After Lockett clenched his teeth in pain, the execution
chamber was closed, and he eventually died of a heart attack.130
Similarly, the last words of Michael Wilson during his execution
after the sedative failed to render him unconscious quickly enough
were, I can feel my whole body burning.131
The evidence of physical pain incurred by death row
inmates during execution is well established, which leaves pro-
ponents taking one of two sides. The first, in a similar opinion to
that of the previously mentioned Professor Blecker, hold that pain
is a necessary component of the punishment. Judge Roy Moore
discussed pain and the death penalty as it pertained to the case
of Michael Taylor:
286 Ben Chiacchia
Taylor claims that Missouris triple-chemical process of lethal injec-

tion exposes him to a risk that if he is not sufficiently unconscious
he could feel pain but be unable to indicate so. (If this is where I am
supposed to feel sorry for Taylor, Im sorry, but I dont.) Taylor argued
to the federal courts, and will soon argue to the Supreme Court, that
this chance of pain constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. But Taylor
obviously knows what it means to inflict cruel and unusual punish-
ment, and a mere chance of pain is not enough for him to avoid an
immediate execution.132
For many, the claim that it is necessary to eliminate pain for the
condemned, most of whom have committed incredibly heinous
acts of murder, seems hypocritical considering the criminals
disregard for their victims at the time of their crimes.
Despite this, abolitionists cite the pain incurred at death for
the condemned as less an element of the penal system and more
a manifestation of revenge. This, together with what they assert to
be the hypocrisy of solving violent actions with additional violence
unnecessarily, and the physical and psychological torment that
they claim to be associated with death row, constitutes injustice
on the part of the American criminal justice system.
For many abolitionists, the very act of killing makes capital
punishment inhumane. However, the addition of pain and suffer-
ing on the part of the condemned party plays a significant role in
the perception of the death penalty as an inhumane punishment.
Writing about his experience in witnessing the execution of Den-
nis McGuire, a convicted murderer and rapist from Ohio whose
execution in 2014 proved to be highly controversial, Lawrence
Hummer, a Catholic priest stated:
They began to put lines into him. That was unsettling, as from what I
could observe they seemed to find it hard to insert the IV and there
seemed to be blood coming from his right arm.
At 10.27am, the syringe containing the untested concoction of
midazolam and hydromorphone was injected into him. At 10.30am,
three minutes into the execution, he lifted his head off the gurney,
and said to the family who he could see through the window: I love
you, I love you. Then he lay back down.
At about 10.31am, his stomach swelled up in an unusual way, as

though he had a hernia or something like that. Between 10.33am
and 10.44am I could see a clock on the wall of the death house he
struggled and gasped audibly for air.
I was aghast. Over those 11 minutes or more he was fighting for
breath, and I could see both of his fists were clenched the entire time.
His gasps could be heard through the glass wall that separated us.
Towards the end, the gasping faded into small puffs of his mouth. It
was much like a fish lying along the shore puffing for that one gasp
of air that would allow it to breathe. Time dragged on and I was help-
less to do anything, sitting helplessly by as he struggled for breath. I
desperately wanted out of that room.
For the next four minutes or so a medical tech listened for a heart
beat on both sides of his chest. That seemed to drag on too, like some
final cruel ritual, preventing us from leaving. Then, at 10.53am, the
warden called the time of death, they closed the curtains, and that
was it.133
While some have chalked up the length of this particular execu-
tion to the experimental drug cocktail used, of which one drug
became the focus of the 2015 Supreme Court case Glossip v. Gross,
testimony from witnesses in cases of executions described as suc-
cessful still mentions the suffering tied to the execution process.
Furthermore, abolitionists view that lengthy incarceration
under the looming threat of execution serves as a form of psycho-
logical torture. Proponents of the death penalty contend that the
time spent on death row prior to execution provides reflection
time and acts as a form of punishment in addition to the finality
of death. Some scholars have identified that the prolonged time
inmates spend on death row, specifically the lengthy periods of
time spent in solitary confinement, can lead to strong feelings
of anxiety and depression in inmates, in some cases culminat-
ing in the onset of severe mental illness (though the concept of
a death row syndrome has not been recognized formally as a
medical condition).134 Such accusations have brought increased
scrutiny to the psychological effects of capital punishment on the
condemned. Juan Mndez, the United Nations Special Rapporteur
on torture, has objected to the current use of capital punishment,
288 Ben Chiacchia
as his investigations have led him to label the practice as a form

of torture.135
It is difficult to translate the personal moral views of indi-
viduals into law effectively and fairly. However, morality has and
will continue to play a significant role in the debate over the death
penalty, as it represents a manifestation of the popular will and the
shifts in tendencies among the electorate in regard to the practice.
In addition to the electorate, politics in the American
democratic system play a central role in the continuation of, and
debate over, capital punishment. Both major parties mentioned
their respective positions in their 2012 party platforms (the most
recent platforms from a presidential election).
The Republican Party took a pro-death penalty stance in
its last platform. The platforms text states, Courts should have
the option of imposing the death penalty in capital murder cases,
holding with the current status of the death penalty in practical
application.136 At the same time that this platform was issued, 80%
of Republicans identified themselves as supporters of the death
penalty according to a Gallup Poll.137
The Democratic Party also took a vague pro-death penalty
stance in its 2012 party platform. The text of the platform states,
We believe the death penalty must not be arbitrary, though no
explicit call for abolition was made in the document.138 Democrats
tend to have a lower margin of support for the death penalty,
though a majority of 51% was still in favor of capital punishment
as of 2012.139 In the same poll, 65% of independents stated that
they supported the death penalty, within two percentage points
of overall public approval.140
Despite the fact that for nearly all of American history
capital punishment has enjoyed majority support among the elec-
torate, it has played an important role in politics as well. Most of
the political and legal discourse surrounding capital punishment
took place in the Supreme Court, mainly on the constitutionality
of the punishment. In certain cases however, raising questions
over the death penalty has meant success or failure of a candidate

on the campaign trail.
In 1992, following the crucial New Hampshire primary,
Bill Clintons signing of the death warrant of Ricky Ray Rector in
Arkansas was construed by some to be an effort to counter the drop
in polls in the face of the tough on crime policies of the 1990s.
Rectors case was controversial, as he had effectively lobotomized
himself with a self-inflicted gunshot wound after committing a
double homicide, and when called to the execution chamber,
a guard noticed he had left his dessert, pecan pie, untouched.
When asked about the pie, Rector reportedly responded that he
was saving it for later, highlighting what many saw as his mental
incompetence.141 The execution seemed to contribute to Clintons
success over the incumbent Republicans position on crime, as
well as other Democrats who were seen as comparatively weaker
on combating violent crime.142
Four years earlier, in a debate between George H.W. Bush
and Michael Dukakis, the debate moderator, Bernard Shaw of
CNN, asked Governor Dukakis if he would support the death
penalty if his wife, Kitty Dukakis, was raped and murdered. Du-
kakis responded, No, I dont, Bernard. And I think you know
that Ive opposed the death penalty all of my life.143 Many people
saw Dukakis answer as cold and robotic, which, coupled with the
case of Willie Horton, a Massachusetts man convicted of murder,
who was furloughed under the Dukakis administration and went
on to commit assault and rape, cemented Dukakis reputation of
being weak on crime.144 Dukakis ultimately lost the presidential
election to Bush.
Like any other contentious issue, the death penalty is a point
that politicians have exploited to create a reputation of strength
against killers, especially in cases of extreme public outcry. In a
federal republic, however, politics are not merely national, and
issues of decentralization affect the criminal justice system greatly.
Regional disparity in the use of the death penalty is very
evident. Areas of the country with more conservative populations,
namely the South and West (save for the Pacific coast, which tends
290 Ben Chiacchia
to be more liberal, though the death penalty is largely retained),

tend to use the death penalty more than the North and East,
where states tend to have more liberal populations (though Ohio,
Indiana, Delaware, Pennsylvania, and New Hampshire defy this
general rule).145 Three southern states, Texas, Oklahoma, and Vir-
ginia, account for more than half of post-moratorium executions.
Furthermore, certain counties within death penalty states, such as
Harris County in Texas (with 115 executed individuals), account
for disproportionate numbers of executions.146 These numbers
reflect the geographic arbitrariness of capital punishment, as the
location in which a crime is committed plays a significant role in
whether or not a killing would be pursued as a death penalty case.
The issue of socio-economic status has also been observed
in death penalty cases. The Sixth Amendment guarantees the
right of the accused to an attorney, but in many cases the qual-
ity of the lawyers, especially court-appointed defenders in death
penalty cases, has come into question. The majority of death pen-
alty inmates received a court-appointed attorney due to financial
difficulties. However, a number of death penalty cases have been
commuted in federal appeals courts on the grounds of inadequate
legal representation, and 12% or more of death row inmates were
represented by lawyers who went on to be disbarred or sanctioned
for incompetence or illegal conduct.147 Such inadequacy reflects
the lack of support for the public defense system in death penalty
states, often culminating in a disproportionate number of people
of lower socio-economic class being sentenced to die in recent
years, let alone in the years prior to the extensive monitoring of
capital punishment.
Race has proven to be a highly contentious element of the
death penalty. Historically, both judicial and extrajudicial execu-
tions of African Americans were performed in disproportionate
numbers, with lawful executions in the South performed four out
of five times on African Americans despite the fact that they were
never a majority or even a plurality of the population.148 Today,
while African Americans do not constitute the majority of death row
inmates, the percentage of African American death row inmates
executed since 1976 compared to the current proportion of blacks

to the total American population is 34.7% of death row inmates149
to roughly 13.2% of the total population.150 White Americans on
the other hand, have been executed at a lower percentage com-
pared to the total population, with 55.5% of executed individuals151
versus 77.7% of the total population.152 Hispanic Americans also
saw a lower percentage of executed individuals versus the total
population at 8.0%153 and 17.0%154 respectively. The breakdown
of victims in murder cases has a much wider gap, with 75.8% of
victims being White Americans, 15.2% African Americans, and
6.8% Hispanic Americans.155 To many, the racial disparity among
convicts and victims alike represents jury bias and the continu-
ation of post-Reconstruction race politics in historically racially
volatile areas of the country.
The widest disparity in capital punishment cases is that of
gender. Historically and currently the murder rate has been higher
for males than for females, with 90.3% of convicted murderers
being men, and the other 9.7% women.156 However, 97.9% of
death row inmates since 1973 have been men, versus the 2.1% who
were women.157 While the higher percentage of men sentenced to
death may be largely reflective of the higher number of murders
committed by men, some have also claimed that jury bias plays a
role in handing down more executions for men than for women.
These disparities and their historical significance are reflec-
tive of the influence of the popular will on death penalty cases, as
the biases of citizen juries manifest in the conviction and sentencing
of criminals. The death penalty represents a unique punishment
in the legal arsenal of the American justice system, which, when
tied to public opinion in the face of particular heinous crimes
and personal biases, may lead to arbitrary application of the most
severe punishment possible under the law. As a democratic society,
Americas use of capital punishment is largely dependent on the
opinion of the electorate, though the current issues surrounding
the use of the punishment may lead to more court rulings limit-
ing or barring execution, adding to the vast array of historic cases
that have modified the use of capital punishment. The only way
292 Ben Chiacchia
to see the true legal implications of a change to the current use

of the death penalty is to observe the changes made, a difficult
task for an issue surrounded with as much strong feeling as hard
fact and legal opinion.
Whether or not the death penalty survives as a form of
punishment lies in the balance of the voters and the courts. Con-
troversies surrounding the current application of the millennia-
old practice will determine its future, and largely rest on its con-
stitutionality and the sentiment of those whose money finances
its exercise. Abolitionists hope to continue to swing the trend of
support for the punishment downwards, and may use evidence
surrounding its ineffectiveness in many areas and the questions
of its current use to try to bring an end to the death penalty. For
proponents, the odds remain in their favor, as they enjoy both
the historical precedent and the continued existence of majority
support among the voting public to retain capital punishment.
As it stands now, capital punishment has and continues
to reflect the publics belief in the efficacy and necessity of the
death penalty for killers. While the popular will alone cannot de-
termine the continued legality of the death penalty, the voice of
the people has played an important role in the use of the death
penalty, and will possibly determine how and if the punishment
will continue to play a role in the American criminal justice system
in the twenty-first century.
Endnotes
1
Hugo Adam Bedau, The Death Penalty in America: Current
Controversies (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997),
3-4, accessed June 30, 2015, https://books.google.com/
books?id=U7Nx-lwlaQAC&printsec=frontcover&dq=death+pen
alty+in+america&hl=en&sa=X&ei=ADCTVbrqFsGggwSUk4KgA
g#v=onepage&q=death%20penalty%20in%20america&f=false.
2
Ibid., 3.
3
Dale S. Recinella, The Biblical Truth About Americas Death
Penalty (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2004), 68-70,
accessed June 30, 2015, https://books.google.com/books?id
=vcFfWiOnD1MC&pg=PA66&dq=death+penalty+in+colonia
l+americA&hl=en&sa=X&ei=KGSTVY9ihJU2heuD8A4&ved=
0CDcQ6AEwBA#v=onepage&q=death%20penalty%20in%20
colonial%20americA&f=false
4
Howard W. Allen and Jerome M. Clubb, Race, Class,
and the Death Penalty: Capital Punishment in American History,
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 2008), 38,
accessed June 30, 2015, https://books.google.com/
books?id=XK7Bb-ars74C&pg=PA38&dq=death+penalty+in+
colonial+americA&hl=en&sa=X&ei=KGSTVY9ihJU2heuD8A
4&ved=0CCIQ6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q=death%20penalty%-
20in%20colonial%20americA&f=false
5
Ibid., 38-40.
6
Michael H. Reggio, History of the Death Penalty, in
Societys Final Solution a History and Discussion of the Death Penalty,
ed. Laura E. Randa (Lanham: American University Press,
1997), 1-12.
7
Ibid., 4-7.
8
Ibid., 8.
9
Ibid., 8-9.
10
Ibid., 9.
11
Part I: Introduction to the Death Penalty, Death
Penalty Information Center, accessed July 2, 2015, http://www.
deathpenaltyinfo.org/part-i-history-death-penalty
12
Robert M. Bohm, DeathQuest: An Introduction to the Theory
and Practice of Capital Punishment in the United States, (London:
Routledge, 2011), 13.
13
Reggio, 9-10.
14
Ibid., 9-11.
15
Ibid., 9-11.
294 Ben Chiacchia
16
Executions by Year Since 1976, Death Penalty
Information Center, last modified June 4, 2015, http://www.
deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions-year
17
United States Supreme Court Decisions: 2014-2015
Term, Death Penalty Information Center, last modified June
30, 2015, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/united-states-
supreme-court-decisions-2014-2015-term
18
Methods of Execution, Death Penalty Information Center,
accessed July 2, 2015, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
methods-execution
19
Descriptions of Execution Methods, Death Penalty
Information Center, accessed July 2, 2014, http://www.
deathpenaltyinfo.org/descriptions-execution-methods
20
Ibid.
21
Methods of Execution.
22
Ibid.
23
Descriptions of Methods of Execution.
24
25
Description of Methods of Execution.
26
27
Description of Methods of Execution.
28
Death Sentences and Executions 2014, Amnesty
International, last modified March 31, 2015, http://www.
amnestyusa.org/research/reports/death-sentences-and-
executions-2014
29
Number of Executions by State and Region Since 1976,
Death Penalty Information Center, last modified June 19, 2015,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/number-executions-state-
and-region-1976
30
National Statistics on the Death Penalty and Race, Death
Penalty Information Center, last modified June 17, 2015, http://
www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/race-death-row-inmates-executed-
1976?scid=5&did=184
31
Ibid.
32
NEW RESOURCES: Death Row, USA Spring 2014
Now Available, Death Penalty Information Center, last modified
September 19, 2014, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
node/5890
33
Immanuel Kant, The Science of Right, trans. W. Hastie
(Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1887), accessed July 3, 2015, http://
intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/eBooks/BOOKS/Kant/The%20
Science%20of%20Right%20Kant.pdf
34
Voltaire, The Philosophical Dictionary, trans. H.I. Woolf
(New York: Knopf, 1924), accessed July 3, 2015, https://
history.hanover.edu/texts/voltaire/volcivil.html
35
Cesare Beccaria, On Crimes and Punishments and
Other Writings, trans. Richard Davies, ed. Richard Bellamy,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), http://
ebooks.cambridge.org/ebook.jsf?bid=CBO9780511802485
36
John D. Bessler, Revisiting Beccarias Vision:
The Enlightenment, Americas Death Penalty, and the
Abolition Movement, Northwestern Journal of Law and Social
Policy 4, no. 2 (2009): 195, accessed July 3, 2015, http://
scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.
cgi?article=1039&context=njlsp
37
Death Penalty, Gallup, accessed July 3, 2014, http://
www.gallup.com/poll/1606/death-penalty.aspx
38
Julie Bosman, Nebraska Bans Death Penalty, Defying
Veto, The New York Times, May 27, 2015, accessed July 3, 2015,
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/28/us/nebraska-abolishes-
death-penalty.html?_r=0
39
David Garland, Modes of Capital Punishment: The
Death Penalty in Historical Perspective, in Americas Death
Penalty: Between Past and Present, eds. David Garland, Randall
McGowen, Michael Meranze (New York: New York University
Press, 2011), 34, accessed July 3, 2015, https://books.google.
com/books?id=u_BoTlIv9R8C&printsec=frontcover&dq=death
+penalty+in+america&hl=en&sa=X&ei=ADCTVbrqFsGggwSUk
4KgAg&ved=0CCQQ6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q&f=false
40
Ibid., 116.
41
ACLU History, American Civil Liberties Union, accessed
July 4, 2015, https://www.aclu.org/about/aclu-history
42
History, NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund,
accessed July 4, 2015, http://www.naacpldf.org/history
43
Furman v. Georgia, The Oyez Project at IIT Chicago-Kent
College of Law, accessed July 4, 2015, http://www.oyez.org/
cases/1970-1979/1971/1971_69_5003/
44
Gregg v. Georgia, The Oyez Project at IIT Chicago-Kent
cases/1970-1979/1975/1975_74_6257
45
Death Penalty, Amnesty International USA, accessed July
4, 2015, http://www.amnestyusa.org/our-work/issues/death-
penalty
46
About Us, National Coalition to Abolish the Death Penalty,
accessed July 4, 2015, http://www.ncadp.org/pages/about-us
296 Ben Chiacchia
47
Links to Abolitionist Organizations, The Campaign to Free
Jarvis Jay Masters, accessed July 4, 2015, http://www.freejarvis.
org/abolish/abolish_12.html
48
Death Penalty, Gallup.
49
Death Penalty Information, Justice For All, accessed July
4, 2015, http://www.jfa.net/deathpenalty.html
50
Category Archives: Death Penalty, Klaas Kids Foundation,
accessed July 4, 2015, http://www.klaaskids.org/blog/?cat=86
51
Death Penalty Deters Crime, National Center for Policy
Analysis, last modified June 12, 2007, http://www.ncpa.org/
sub/dpd/index.php?Article_ID=14648
52
Robert Blecker, New York Law School, accessed July 5,
2015, http://www.nyls.edu/faculty/faculty-profiles/faculty_
profiles/robert_blecker/
53
Understanding deterrence, Australian Institute of
Criminology, November 2004, accessed July 5, 2015, http://
www.aic.gov.au/publications/current%20series/crm/21-40/
crm027.html
54
Death Penalty, Gallup.
55
Robert Tanner, Studies Say Death Penalty Deters
Crime, The Washington Post, June 11, 2007, accessed July 5,
2015, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2007/06/11/AR2007061100406.html
56
Committee on Deterrence and the Death Penalty,
Deterrence and the Death Penalty, eds. Daniel S. Nagin and John
V. Pepper (Washington: The National Academies Press, 2012),
accessed July 5, 2015, https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/
files/1529-nagin-full-reportpdf
57
Michael L. Radelet and Traci L. Lacock, Do
Executions Lower Homicide Rates: The Views of Leading
Criminologists, Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology vol.
99, issue 2, article 4 (2009), accessed July 5, 2015, http://
cgi?article=7323&context=jclc
58
The Death Penalty and Deterrence, Amnesty
International USA, accessed July 5, 2015, http://www.
amnestyusa.org/our-work/issues/death-penalty/us-death-
penalty-facts/the-death-penalty-and-deterrence
59
Dudley Sharp, Death Penalty and Sentencing
Information, prodeathpenalty.com, last modified October 1,
1997, accessed July 5, 2015, http://www.prodeathpenalty.com/
dp.html#D.Cost
60
Jeffrey A. Fagan, Capital Punishment: Deterrent Effects
& Capital Costs, Columbia Law School, accessed July 5, 2015,
https://www.law.columbia.edu/law_school/communications/
reports/summer06/capitalpunish
61
Costs of the Death Penalty, Death Penalty Information
Center, accessed July 5, 2015, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.
org/costs-death-penalty
62
Fagan.
63
Costs of the Death Penalty.
64
Death Penalty Appeals Process, Capital
Punishment in Context, accessed July 6, 2015, http://www.
capitalpunishmentincontext.org/resources/dpappealsprocess
65
Ibid.
66
COSTS: Appeals for Last Two Inmates Executed in
California, Death Penalty Information Center, accessed July 6,
2015, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/costs-appeals-last-two-
inmates-executed-california-cost-176-million
67
Ibid.
68
Arthur L. Alarcon and Paula M. Mitchell, Executing the
Will of the Voters?: A Roadmap to Mend or End the California
Legislatures Multi-Billion-Dollar Death Penalty Debacle,
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review, vol. 44 (2011), accessed July
6, 2015, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/
LoyolaCalifCosts.pdf
69
Kent S. Scheidegger, The Death Penalty and Plea
Bargaining to Life Sentence, Criminal Justice Legal Foundation,
p.1-12, February 2009, accessed July 6, 2015, http://www.cjlf.
org/publications/papers/wpaper09-01.pdf
70
Death Penalty Not Needed to Secure Plea Bargains,
Death Penalty Focus, accessed July 6, 2015, http://deathpenalty.
org/article.php?id=556
71
The Plea Bargain Myth, Equal Justice USA, accessed July
6, 2015, http://ejusa.org/learn/plea%20bargains
72
Maurice Possley, Johnny Lee Wilson, The National
Registry of Exonerations, last modified August 22, 2014,
accessed July 6, 2015, https://www.law.umich.edu/special/
exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3454
73
DNA Exonerations Nationwide, Innocence Project, last
modified June 15, 2015, accessed July 6, 2015, http://www.
innocenceproject.org/free-innocent/improve-the-law/fact-
sheets/dna-exonerations-nationwide
74
David Von Drehle, More Innocent People on Death Row
Than Estimated: Study, Time, April 28, 2014, accessed July
298 Ben Chiacchia
6, 2014, http://time.com/79572/more-innocent-people-on-
death-row-than-estimated-study/
75
Executed But Possibly Innocent, Death Penalty
Information Center, accessed July 6, 2015, http://www.
deathpenaltyinfo.org/executed-possibly-innocent
76
Michael Griffin, Cop Killer is Innocent, Attorney
Tells Court, Sun Sentinel, February 25, 1998, accessed July
6, 2014, http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/1998-02-25/
news/9802250141_1_thomas-j-szafranski-electric-chair-leo-
jones
77
Alexandra Gross, Alan Gell, The National Registry of
Exonerations, last modified June 2012, accessed July 6, 2015,
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/
casedetail.aspx?caseid=3236
78
Witherspoon v. Illinois, The Oyez Project at IIT Chicago-
Kent College of Law, accessed July 6, 2015, http://www.oyez.
org/cases/1960-1969/1967/1967_1015
79
Coker v. Georgia, The Oyez Project at IIT Chicago-Kent
cases/1970-1979/1976/1976_75_5444
80
Enmund v. Florida, The Oyez Project at IIT Chicago-Kent
cases/1980-1989/1981/1981_81_5321
81
Kennedy v. Louisiana, The Oyez Project at IIT Chicago-
Kent College of Law, accessed July 6, 2015, http://www.oyez.
org/cases/2000-2009/2007/2007_07_343
82
Convention on the Rights of the Child, United Nations
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, November
20, 1989, accessed July 6, 2015, http://www.ohchr.org/en/
professionalinterest/pages/crc.aspx
83
Roper v. Simmons, The Oyez Project at IIT Chicago-Kent
cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_03_633
84
Lindsey Bever, It took 10 minutes to convict 14-year
old George Stinney Jr. It took 70 years after his execution
to exonerate him, The Washington Post, December 18, 2014,
accessed July 6, 2015, http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
morning-mix/wp/2014/12/18/the-rush-job-conviction-of-14-
year-old-george-stinney-exonerated-70-years-after-execution/
85
Ford v. Wainwright, The Oyez Project at IIT Chicago-Kent
cases/1980-1989/1985/1985_85_5542
86
Atkins v. Virginia, The Oyez Project at IIT Chicago-Kent
cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_00_8452
87
Penry v. Lynaugh, The Oyez Project at IIT Chicago-Kent
cases/1980-1989/1988/1988_87_6177
88
Marilyn Peterson Armour and Mark S. Umbreit, The
Ultimate Penal Sanction: Closure For Survivors of Homicide
Victims, Marquette Law Review, pp.383-384, accessed July 10,
2015, http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/cgi/viewcontent.
cgi?article=1140&context=mulr
89
John Futty, Death penalty brings relief to victims
family, The Columbus Dispatch, May 16, 2012, accessed
July 10, 2015, http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/
local/2012/05/16/measure-of-relief.html
90
Death Penalty Can Prolong Suffering for Victims
Families, Death Penalty Focus, accessed July 10, 2015, http://
deathpenalty.org/article.php?id=56
91
Ann ONeill, Aaron Cooper, and Ray Sanchez, Boston
Marathon bomber Dzhokhar Tsarnaev sentenced to death,
CNN, May 17, 2015, accessed July 10, 2015, http://www.cnn.
com/2015/05/15/us/boston-bombing-tsarnaev-sentence/
92
Bill Richard and Denise Richard, To end the anguish,
drop the death penalty, The Boston Globe, April 17, 2015,
accessed July 10, 2015, https://www.bostonglobe.com/
metro/2015/04/16/end-anguish-drop-death-penalty/
ocQLejp8H2vesDavItHIEN/story.html
93
Robert Blecker, Among Killers, Searching For the Worst
of the Worst, The Washington Post, December 3, 2000, accessed
July 12, 2015, http://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/
opinions/2000/12/03/among-killers-searching-for-the-worst-
of-the-worst/d48af4b8-dbb2-44d6-9b16-e2966eda7015/
94
Crime and PunishmentThe Story of Capital Punishment,
(London: BBC Four, 2012), Online Video, http://www.bbc.
co.uk/programmes/b0105r8x
95
Ibid.
96
Kant, The Science of Right.
97
Matthew Pearl, Dante and the Death Penalty: How
Capital Punishment Fails its Audience, Legal Affairs, January
2003, accessed July 12, 2015, http://www.legalaffairs.org/
issues/January-February-2003/review_pearl_janfeb2003.msp
300 Ben Chiacchia
98
Arbitrariness in the Application of the Death
Penalty, Death Penalty Focus, accessed July 12, 2015, http://
99
Arbitrariness, Death Penalty Information Center, accessed
July 12, 2015, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/arbitrariness
100
Daniel C. Stevenson, Use of the Death Penalty Solves
Nothing, The Tech, vol. 113, issue 52, October 26, 1993,
accessed July 12, 2015, http://tech.mit.edu/V113/N52/
stevenson.52o.html
101
Allen, 38-39.
102
What Does the Bible Say About Capital Punishment
and the Death Penalty?, Christian Bible Reference Site, accessed
July 15, 2015, http://www.christianbiblereference.org/faq_
CapitalPunishment.htm
103
Allen, 39-40.
104
Ibid.
105
Capital punishmentthe death penalty, Ontario
Consultants on Religious Tolerance, accessed July 15, 2015,
http://www.religioustolerance.org/executb.htm
106
Herbert H. Haines, Against Capital Punishment: The
Anti-Death Penalty Movement in America, 1972-1994, (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1996), pp.9-10, accessed July 15,
2015, https://books.google.com/books?id=s3nKg0eiWm0C&p
rintsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q=christianity&f=false
107
American Baptist Resolution on Capital Punishment,
American Baptist Church, accessed July 15, 2015, http://
www.abc-usa.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Capital-
Punishment.pdf
108
Urge Parishes and Dioceses to Study the Death Penalty
and Explore Reasons for Opposition, The Episcopal Church,
accessed July 15, 2015, http://www.episcopalarchives.org/cgi-
bin/acts/acts_resolution.pl?resolution=2000-A083
109
Death Penalty, The Evangelical Lutheran Church in
America, accessed July 15, 2015, http://www.elca.org/Faith/
Faith-and-Society/Social-Statements/Death-Penalty
110
Minutes of the Tenth Plenary Session, The Orthodox
Church in America, accessed July 15, 2015, http://www.
deathpenaltyinfo.org/ortho.pdf
111
Capital Punishment, The Presbyterian Church USA,
accessed July 15, 2015, http://www.presbyterianmission.org/
ministries/101/capital-punishment/
112
The Churchs Anti-Death Penalty Position, United States
Conference of Catholic Bishops, accessed July 15, 2015, http://
www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/human-life-and-dignity/
death-penalty-capital-punishment/catholic-campaign-to-end-
the-use-of-the-death-penalty.cfm
113
End the Death Penalty, Unitarian Universalist Association,
July 15, 2015, http://www.uua.org/statements/end-death-
penalty
114
Capital Punishment, United Church of Christ, accessed
July 15, 2015, http://www.ucc.org/justice_criminal-justice_
death-penalty
115
The Death Penalty, The United Methodist Church,
accessed July 15, 2015, http://archives.umc.org/interior.
asp?ptid=1&mid=6385
116
Frequently Asked Questions, Lutheran Church: Missouri
Synod, accessed July 17, 2015, http://www.lcms.org/faqs/
lcmsviews#contemporary
117
On Capital Punishment, Southern Baptist Convention,
accessed July 17, 2015, http://www.sbc.net/resolutions/299
118
Capital Punishment, Assemblies of God, accessed July
17, 2015, http://www.ag.org/top/Beliefs/contempissues_08_
capital_punish.cfm
119
Capital Punishment, The Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints, accessed July 17, 2015, http://www.
mormonnewsroom.org/official-statement/capital-punishment
120
Humanism and the Death Penalty, American Humanist
Association, accessed July 18, 2015, http://americanhumanist.
org/HNN/details/2012-06-humanism-and-the-death-penalty
121
Judaism and the Death Penalty; Of Two Minds but One
Heart, Orthodox Union Advocacy Center, accessed July 18, 2015,
http://advocacy.ou.org/2004/judaism-and-the-death-penalty-
of-two-minds-but-one-heart/
122
Position of the Reform Movement on the Death
Penalty, Religious Action Center of Reform Judaism, accessed July
18, 2015, http://www.rac.org/position-reform-movement-
death-penalty?id=1665&pge_prg_id=8089&pge_id=2396
123
Descriptions of Methods of Execution.
124
Ibid.
125
Ibid.
126
Ibid.
127
Ibid.
128
Ibid.
129
Ziva Branstetter, Death row inmate killed teen because
she wouldnt back down, Tulsa World, April 20, 2014, accessed
July 18, 2015, http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/courts/death-
302 Ben Chiacchia
row-inmate-killed-teen-because-she-wouldn-t-back/article_
e459564b-5c60-5145-a1ce-bbd17a14417b.html?mode=story
130
Ben Crair, Cruel But Not Unusual: How Oklahoma
botched Clayton Locketts execution, The New Republic, April
30, 2014, accessed July 18, 2015, http://www.newrepublic.
com/article/117585/clayton-lockett-execution-botched-
problem-lethal-injection
131
Zachary Fine, Executing Them Softly, The New York
Times, February 9, 2015, accessed July 19, 2015, http://
opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/02/09/death-penalty-
pain/?_r=0
132
Judge Roy Moore, No Right to a Painless Death Penalty,
WND, October 3, 2007, accessed July 19, 2015, http://www.
wnd.com/2007/10/43823/
133
Lawrence Hummer, I witnessed Ohios execution of
Dennis McGuire. What I saw was inhumane, The Guardian,
January 22, 2014, accessed July 21, 2015, http://www.
theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jan/22/ohio-
mcguire-execution-untested-lethal-injection-inhumane
134
Dr. Karen Harrison and Anouska Tamony, Death
Row Phenomenon, Death Row Syndrome, and Their
Affect On Capital Cases in the US, Internet Journal
of Criminology, accessed July 21, 2015, http://www.
internetjournalofcriminology.com/Harrison_Tamony_%20
Death_Row_Syndrome%20_IJC_Nov_2010.pdf
135
Death penalty increasingly viewed as torture, UN
special rapporteur finds, Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights, October 23, 2012, accessed July 21, 2015,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.
aspx?NewsID=12685&LangID=E
136
We Believe in America: Republican Platform, Republican
National Convention, 2012, accessed July 21, 2015, https://cdn.
gop.com/docs/2012GOPPlatform.pdf
137
Lydia Saad, U.S. Death Penalty Support Stable at 63%,
Gallup, December 2012, accessed July 21, 2015, http://www.
gallup.com/poll/159770/death-penalty-support-stable.aspx
138
Our Platform: The 2012 Democratic Platform, The
Democratic Party, 2012, accessed July 21, 2015, https://www.
democrats.org/party-platform#ensuring-safety
139
Saad.
140
Ibid.
141
Christopher Hitchens, Fool Me Thrice, Slate, January
28, 2008, accessed July 21, 2015, http://www.slate.com/
articles/news_and_politics/fighting_words/2008/01/fool_
me_thrice.html
142
Peter Applebome, THE 1992 CAMPAIGN: Death
Penalty; Arkansas Execution Raises Questions on Governors
Politics, The New York Times, January 25, 1992, accessed July
21, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/1992/01/25/us/1992-
campaign-death-penalty-arkansas-execution-raises-questions-
governor-s.html
143
Roger Simon, Questions that kill candidates careers,
Politico, April 20, 2007, accessed July 21, 2015, http://www.
politico.com/news/stories/0407/3617.html
144
Beth Schwartzapfel and Bill Keller, Willie Horton
Revisited, The Marshall Project, May 13, 2015, accessed July 21,
2015, https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/05/13/willie-
horton-revisited
145
Arbitrariness.
146
Frank R. Baumgartner, The Geography of the Death
Penalty, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill,
October 17, 2010, accessed July 21, 2015, http://www.unc.
edu/~fbaum/Innocence/NC/Baumgartner-geography-of-
capital-punishment-oct-17-2010.pdf
147
Inadequate Legal Representation, Death Penalty Focus,
accessed July 21, 2015, http://deathpenalty.org/article.
php?id=83
148
Allen, 69.
149
Race of Death Row Inmates Executed Since 1976, Death
Penalty Information Center, accessed July 21, 2015, http://www.
deathpenaltyinfo.org/race-death-row-inmates-executed-1976
150
Black or African American Populations, Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, accessed July 21, 2015, http://
www.cdc.gov/minorityhealth/populations/REMP/black.html
151
Race of Death Row Inmates Executed Since 1976.
152
State and County QuickFacts, United States Census
Bureau, accessed July 21, 2015, http://quickfacts.census.gov/
qfd/states/00000.html
153
154
Facts for Features: Hispanic Heritage Month 2014: Sept.
15Oct. 15, United States Census Bureau, September 8, 2014,
accessed July 21, 2015, http://www.census.gov/newsroom/
facts-for-features/2014/cb14-ff22.html
155
156
Expanded Homicide Data, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
accessed July 21, 2015, https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/
304 Ben Chiacchia
ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2010/crime-in-the-u.s.-2010/offenses-
known-to-law-enforcement/expanded/expandhomicidemain
157
Women and the Death Penalty, Death Penalty Information
Center, accessed July 21, 2015. http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.
org/women-and-death-penalty#facts
Bibliography
Alarcon, Arthur L., and Paula M. Mitchell. Executing the

Will of the Voters?: A Roadmap to Mend or End the California
Legislatures Multi-Billion-Dollar Death Penalty Debacle.
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review volume 44 (2011). Accessed
July 6, 2015. http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/
LoyolaCalifCosts.pdf.
Allen, Howard W., and Jerome M. Clubb, Race, Class, and
the Death Penalty: Capital Punishment in American History. Albany:
State University of New York Press, 2008. Accessed June 30,
2015. https://books.google.com/books?id=XK7Bb-ars74C&pg=
PA38&dq=death+penalty+in+colonial+americA&hl=en&sa=X&e
i=KGSTVY9ihJU2heuD8A4&ved=0CCIQ6AEwAQ#v=onepage&
q=death%20penalty%20in%20colonial%20americA&f=false
American Baptist Church. American Baptist Resolution on
Capital Punishment. Accessed July 15, 2015. http://www.abc-
usa.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Capital-Punishment.
pdf
American Civil Liberties Union. History. Accessed July 4,
2015. https://www.aclu.org/about/aclu-history
American Humanist Association. Humanism and the Death
Penalty. Accessed July 18, 2015. http://americanhumanist.
org/HNN/details/2012-06-humanism-and-the-death-penalty
Amnesty International. Death Sentences and Executions
2014. Last Modified March 31, 2015. http://www.amnestyusa.
org/research/reports/death-sentences-and-executions-2014
Amnesty International USA. Death Penalty. Accessed July
4, 2015. http://www.amnestyusa.org/our-work/issues/death-
penalty
Amnesty International USA. The Death Penalty and
Deterrence. Accessed July 5, 2015. http://www.amnestyusa.
org/our-work/issues/death-penalty/us-death-penalty-facts/the-
death-penalty-and-deterrence
Applebome, Peter. THE 1992 CAMPAIGN: Death Penalty;
Arkansas Execution Raises Questions on Governors Politics.
The New York Times. January 25, 1992. Accessed July 21, 2015.
http://www.nytimes.com/1992/01/25/us/1992-campaign-
death-penalty-arkansas-execution-raises-questions-governor-s.
html
Armour, Marilyn Peterson and Mark S. Umbreit. The
Ultimate Penal Sanction: Closure For Survivors of Homicide
Victims. Marquette Law Review, 383-384. Accessed July 10,
2015. http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/cgi/viewcontent.
cgi?article=1140&context=mulr
Assemblies of God. Capital Punishment. Accessed July
17, 2015. http://www.ag.org/top/Beliefs/contempissues_08_
capital_punish.cfm
Baumgartner, Frank R. The Geography of the Death
Penalty. The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
October 17, 2010. Accessed July 21, 2015. http://www.unc.
edu/~fbaum/Innocence/NC/Baumgartner-geography-of-
capital-punishment-oct-17-2010.pdf
Beccaria, Cesare. On Crimes and Punishments and Other
Writings, translated by Richard Davies, edited by Richard
Bellamy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
Accessed July 3, 2015. http://ebooks.cambridge.org/ebook.
jsf?bid=CBO9780511802485
Bedau, Hugo Adam. The Death Penalty in America: Current
Controversies. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997. Accessed
June 30, 2015. https://books.google.com/books?id=U7Nx-lwla
QAC&printsec=frontcover&dq=death+penalty+in+america&hl=
en&sa=X&ei=ADCTVbrqFsGggwSUk4KgAg#v=onepage&q=dea
th%20penalty%20in%20america&f=false
Bessler, John D. Revisiting Beccarias Vision: The
Enlightenment, Americas Death Penalty, and the Abolition
Movement, Northwestern Journal of Law and Social Policy issue
4, number 2 (2009): 195. Accessed July 3, 2015. http://
cgi?article=1039 &context=njlsp
Bever, Lindsey. It took 10 minutes to convict 14-year
old George Stinney Jr. It took 70 years after his execution
to exonerate him. The Washington Post. December 18, 2014.
Accessed July 6, 2015. http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
morning-mix/wp/2014/12/18/the-rush-job-conviction-of-14-
year-old-george-stinney-exonerated-70-years-after-execution/
Blecker, Robert. Among Killers, Searching for the Worst of
the Worst. The Washington Post. December 3, 2000. Accessed
July 12, 2015. http://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/
306 Ben Chiacchia
opinions/2000/12/03/among-killers-searching-for-the-worst-of-
the-worst/d48af4b8-dbb2-44d6-9b16-e2966eda7015/
Bohm, Robert M. DeathQuest: An Introduction to the Theory
and Practice of Capital Punishment in the United States, London:
Routledge, 2011.
Bosman, Julie. Nebraska Bans Death Penalty, Defying
Veto. The New York Times, May 27, 2015. Accessed July 3, 2015.
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/28/us/nebraska-abolishes-
death-penalty.html?_r=0
Branstetter, Ziva. Death row inmate killed teen because
she wouldnt back down. Tulsa World. April 20, 2014. Accessed
July 18, 2015. http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/courts/death-
row-inmate-killed-teen-because-she-wouldn-t-back/article_
e459564b-5c60-5145-a1ce-bbd17a14417b.html?mode=story
Capital Punishment in Context. Death Penalty
Appeals Process. Accessed July 6, 2015. http://www.
capitalpunishmentincontext.org/resources/dpappealsprocess
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Black or
African American Populations. Accessed July 21, 2015. http://
www.cdc.gov/minorityhealth/populations/REMP/black.html
Christian Bible Reference Site. What Does the Bible Say
About Capital Punishment and the Death Penalty? Accessed
July 15, 2015. http://www.christianbiblereference.org/faq_
CapitalPunishment.htm
Committee on Deterrence and the Death Penalty. Deterrence
and the Death Penalty, edited by Daniel S. Nagin and John V.
Pepper. Washington: The National Academies Press, 2012.
Accessed July 5, 2015. https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/
files/1529-nagin-full-reportpdf
Crair, Ben. Cruel But Not Unusual: How Oklahoma
botched Clayton Locketts execution. The New Republic. April
30, 2014. Accessed July 18, 2015. http://www.newrepublic.
com/article/117585/clayton-lockett-execution-botched-
problem-lethal-injection
Crime and PunishmentThe Story of Capital Punishment.
Online Video. 2012. London: BBC Four, 2012. Film. http://
www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b0105r8x
Death Penalty Focus. Arbitrariness in the Application
of the Death Penalty. Accessed July 12, 2015. http://
Death Penalty Focus. Death Penalty Can Prolong Suffering
for Victims Families. Accessed July 10, 2015. http://
Death Penalty Focus. Death Penalty Not Needed to Secure

Plea Bargains. Accessed July 6, 2015. http://deathpenalty.org/
article.php?id=556
Death Penalty Focus. Inadequate Legal Representation.
Accessed July 21, 2015. http://deathpenalty.org/article.
php?id=83
Death Penalty Information Center. Arbitrariness. Accessed
July 12, 2015. http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/arbitrariness
Death Penalty Information Center. COSTS: Appeals for
Last Two Inmates Executed in California. Accessed July 6,
2015. http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/costs-appeals-last-two-
inmates-executed-california-cost-176-million
Death Penalty Information Center. Costs of the Death
Penalty. Accessed July 5, 2015. http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.
org/costs-death-penalty
Death Penalty Information Center. Descriptions of
Execution Methods. Accessed July 2, 2015. http://www.
deathpenaltyinfo.org/descriptions-execution-methods
Death Penalty Information Center. Executed But Possibly
Innocent. Accessed July 6, 2015. http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.
org/executed-possibly-innocent
Death Penalty Information Center. Executions Since 1976.
Last modified June 4, 2015. http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
executions-year
Death Penalty Information Center. Methods of Execution.
Accessed July 2, 2015. http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
methods-execution
Death Penalty Information Center. National Statistics on
the Death Penalty and Race. Last Modified June 17, 2015.
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/race-death-row-inmates-
executed-1976?scid=5&did=184
Death Penalty Information Center. NEW RESOURCES:
Death Row, USA Spring 2014 Now Available. Last Modified
September 19, 2014. http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
node/5890
Death Penalty Information Center. Number of Executions
by State and Region Since 1976. Last modified June 19, 2015.
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/number-executions-state-
and-region-1976
Death Penalty Information Center. Part I: Introduction
to the Death Penalty. Accessed July 2, 2015. http://www.
deathpenaltyinfo.org/part-i-history-death-penalty
308 Ben Chiacchia
Death Penalty Information Center. Race of Death Row

Inmates Executed Since 1976. Accessed July 21, 2015.
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/race-death-row-inmates-
executed-1976
Death Penalty Information Center. United States Supreme
Court Decisions: 2014-2015 Term. Last modified June 30,
2015. http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/united-states-supreme-
court-decisions-2014-2015-term
Death Penalty Information Center. Women and the Death
Penalty. Accessed July 21, 2015. http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.
org/women-and-death-penalty#facts
Equal Justice USA. The Plea Bargain Myth. Accessed July
6, 2015. http://ejusa.org/learn/plea%20bargains
Fagan, Jeffrey A. Capital Punishment: Deterrent Effects
& Capital Costs. Columbia Law School. Accessed July 5, 2015.
https://www.law.columbia.edu/law_school/communications/
reports/summer06/capitalpunish
Federal Bureau of Investigation. Expanded Homicide
Data. Accessed July 21, 2015. https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/
cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2010/crime-in-the-u.s.-2010/offenses-
known-to-law-enforcement/expanded/expandhomicidemain
Fine, Zachary. Executing Them Softly. The New York Times.
February 9, 2015. Accessed July 19, 2015. http://opinionator.
blogs.nytimes.com/2015/02/09/death-penalty-pain/?_r=0
Futty, John. Death penalty brings relief to victims family.
The Columbus Dispatch. May 16, 2012. Accessed July 10, 2015.
http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2012/05/16/
measure-of-relief.html
Gallup. Death Penalty. Accessed July 3, 2015. http://www.
gallup.com/poll/1606/death-penalty.aspx
Garland, David. Modes of Capital Punishment: The
Death Penalty in Historical Perspective, in Americas Death
Penalty: Between Past and Present, edited by David Garland,
Randall McGowen, and Michael Meranze. New York: New York
University Press, 2011. Accessed July 3, 2015. https://books.
google.com/books?id=u_BoTlIv9R8C&printsec=frontcover&dq
=death+penalty+in+america&hl=en&sa=X&ei=ADCTVbrqFsGg
gwSUk4KgAg&ved=0CCQQ6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q&f=false
Griffin, Michael. Cop Killer is Innocent, Attorney
Tells Court. Sun Sentinel. February 25, 1998. Accessed
July 6, 2015. http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/1998-02-25/
news/9802250141_1_thomas-j-szafranski-electric-chair-leo-jones
Haines, Herbert H. Against Capital Punishment: The Anti-

Death Penalty Movement in America, 1972-1994. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1996. Accessed July 15, 2015. https://books.
google.com/books?id=s3nKg0eiWm0C&printsec=frontcover#v=
onepage&q=christianity&f=false
Harrison, Karen, and Anouska Tamony. Death Row
Phenomenon, Death Row Syndrome, and Their Affect On
Capital Cases in the US. Internet Journal of Criminology. Accessed
July 21, 2015. http://www.internetjournalofcriminology.com/
Harrison_Tamony_%20Death_Row_Syndrome%20_IJC_
Nov_2010.pdf
Hitchens, Christopher. Fool Me Thrice. Slate. January 28,
2008. Accessed July 21, 2015. http://www.slate.com/articles/
news_and_politics/fighting_words/2008/01/fool_me_thrice.
html
Hummer, Lawrence. I witnessed Ohios execution of
Dennis McGuire. What I saw was inhumane. The Guardian.
January 22, 2014. Accessed July 21, 2015. http://www.
theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jan/22/ohio-mcguire-
execution-untested-lethal-injection-inhumane
Innocence Project. DNA Exonerations Nationwide. Last
modified June 15, 2015. Accessed July 6, 2015. http://www.
innocenceproject.org/free-innocent/improve-the-law/fact-
sheets/dna-exonerations-nationwide
Justice For All. Death Penalty Information. Accessed July
4, 2015. http://www.jfa.net/deathpenalty.html
Kant, Immanuel. The Science of Right, translated by W. Hastie.
Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1887. Accessed July 3, 2015. http://
intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/eBooks/BOOKS/Kant/The%20
Science%20of%20Right%20Kant.pdf
Klaas Kids Foundation. Category Archives: Death Penalty.
Accessed July 4, 2015. http://www.klaaskids.org/blog/?cat=86
Lutheran Church: Missouri Synod. Frequently Asked
Questions. Accessed July 17, 2015. http://www.lcms.org/faqs/
lcmsviews#contemporary
Moore, Roy. No Right to a Painless Death Penalty. WND.
October 3, 2007. Accessed July 19, 2015. http://www.wnd.
com/2007/10/43823/
NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund. History.
Accessed July 4, 2015. http://www.naacpldf.org/history
National Center for Policy Analysis. Death Penalty Deters
Crime. Last modified June 12, 2007. http://www.ncpa.org/
sub/dpd/index.php?Article_ID=14648
310 Ben Chiacchia
National Coalition to Abolish the Death Penalty. About

Us. Accessed July 4, 2015. http://www.ncadp.org/pages/
about-us
New York Law School. Robert Blecker. Accessed July 5,
2015. http://www.nyls.edu/faculty/faculty-profiles/faculty_
profiles/robert_blecker/
ONeill, Ann, Aaron Cooper, and Ray Sanchez. Boston
Marathon bomber Dzhokhar Tsarnaev sentenced to death.
CNN. May 17, 2015. Accessed July 10, 2015. http://www.cnn.
com/2015/05/15/us/boston-bombing-tsarnaev-sentence/
Ontario Consultants on Religious Tolerance. Capital
Punishmentthe death penalty. Accessed July 15, 2015.
http://www.religioustolerance.org/executb.htm
Orthodox Union Advocacy Center. Judaism and the Death
Penalty; Of Two Minds but One Heart. Accessed July 18, 2015.
http://advocacy.ou.org/2004/judaism-and-the-death-penalty-
of-two-minds-but-one-heart/
Pearl, Matthew. Dante and the Death Penalty: How Capital
Punishment Fails its Audience. Legal Affairs. January 2003.
Accessed July 12, 2015. http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/
January-February-2003/review_pearl_janfeb2003.msp
Possley, Maurice. Johnny Lee Wilson. The National Registry
of Exonerations. Last modified August 22, 2014. Accessed July 6,
2015. https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/
casedetail.aspx?caseid=3454
Radelet, Michael L., and Traci L. Lacock. Do
Executions Lower Homicide Rates: The Views of Leading
Criminologists. Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology volume
99, issue 2, article 4 (2009). Accessed July 5, 2015.http://
cgi?article=7323 &context=jclc
Recinella, Dale S. The Biblical Truth About Americas Death
Penalty. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2004.
Accessed June 30, 2015. https://books.google.com/books?id
=vcFfWiOnD1MC&pg=PA66&dq=death+penalty+in+colonia
l+americA&hl=en&sa=X&ei=KGSTVY9ihJU2heuD8A4&ved=
0CDcQ6AEwBA#v=onepage&q=death%20penalty%20in%20
colonial%20americA&f=false
Reggio, Michael H. History of the Death Penalty, in
Societys Final Solution a History and Discussion of the Death Penalty,
edited by Laura E. Randa, 1-12. Lanham: American University
Press, 1997.
Religious Action Center of Reform Judaism. Position of

the Reform Movement on the Death Penalty. Accessed July 18,
2015. http://www.rac.org/position-reform-movement-death-
penalty?id=1665&pge_prg_id=8089&pge_id=2396
Republican National Convention. We Believe in America:
Republican Platform. 2012. Accessed July 21, 2015. https://
cdn.gop.com/docs/2012GOPPlatform.pdf
Richard, Bill, and Denise Richard. To end the anguish,
drop the death penalty. The Boston Globe. April 17, 2015.
Accessed July 10, 2015. https://www.bostonglobe.com/
metro/2015/04/16/end-anguish-drop-death-penalty/
ocQLejp8H2vesDavItHIEN/story.html
Saad, Lydia. U.S. Death Penalty Support Stable at 63%.
Gallup. December 2012. Accessed July 21, 2015. http://www.
gallup.com/poll/159770/death-penalty-support-stable.aspx
Sharp, Dudley. Death Penalty and Sentencing
Information. prodeathpenalty.com. Last modified October 1,
1997. Accessed July 5, 2015. http://www.prodeathpenalty.com/
dp.html#D.Cost
Schiedegger, Keith S. The Death Penalty and Plea
Bargaining to Life Sentence. Criminal Justice Legal Foundation,
1-12. February 2009. Accessed July 6, 2015. http://www.cjlf.org/
publications/papers/wpaper09-01.pdf
Schwartzapfel, Beth, and Bill Keller. Willie Horton
Revisited. The Marshall Project. May 13, 2015. Accessed July 21,
2015. https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/05/13/willie-
horton-revisited
Simon, Roger. Questions that kill candidates careers.
Politico. April 20, 2007. Accessed July 21, 2015. http://www.
politico.com/news/stories/0407/3617.html
Stevenson, Daniel C. Use of the Death Penalty Solves
Nothing. The Tech volume 113, issue 52. October 26, 1993.
Accessed July 12, 2015. http://tech.mit.edu/V113/N52/
stevenson.52o.html
Southern Baptist Convention. On Capital Punishment.
Accessed July 17, 2015. http://www.sbc.net/resolutions/299
Tanner, Robert. Studies Say Death Penalty Deters
Crime. The Washington Post. June 11, 2007. Accessed July 5,
2015. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2007/06/11/AR2007061100406.html
The Campaign to Free Jarvis Jay Masters. Links to
Abolitionist Organizations. Accessed July 4, 2015. http://www.
freejarvis.org/abolish/abolish_12.html
312 Ben Chiacchia
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints. Accessed

July 17, 2015. http://www.mormonnewsroom.org/official-
statement/capital-punishment
The Democratic Party. Our Platform: The 2012 Democratic
Platform. 2012. Accessed July 21, 2015. https://www.
democrats.org/party-platform#ensuring-safety
The Episcopal Church. Urge Parishes and Dioceses to
Study the Death Penalty and Reasons for Opposition. Accessed
July 15, 2015. http://www.episcopalarchives.org/cgi-bin/acts/
acts_resolution.pl?resolution=2000-A083
The Evangelical Lutheran Church in America. Death
Penalty. Accessed July 15, 2015. http://www.elca.org/Faith/
Faith-and-Society/Social-Statements/Death-Penalty
The Orthodox Church in America. Minutes on the
Tenth Plenary Session. Accessed July 15, 2015. http://www.
deathpenaltyinfo.org/ortho.pdf
The Oyez Project. Atkins v. Virginia. Accessed July 10, 2015.
http://www.oyez.org cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_00_8452
The Oyez Project. Coker v. Georgia. Accessed July 6, 2015.
http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1976/1976_75_5444
The Oyez Project. Enmund v. Florida. Accessed July 6, 2015.
The Oyez Project. Ford v. Wainwright. Accessed July 9, 2015.
The Oyez Project. Furman v. Georgia. Accessed July 4, 2015.
http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1971/1971_69_5003/
The Oyez Project. Gregg v. Georgia. Accessed July 4, 2015.
The Oyez Project. Kennedy v. Louisiana.
Accessed July 6, 2015. http://www.oyez.org/
cases/2000-2009/2007/2007_07_343
The Oyez Project. Penry v. Lynaugh. Accessed July 10, 2015.
The Oyez Project. Roper v. Simmons. Accessed July 6, 2015.
The Oyez Project. Witherspoon v. Illinois. Accessed July 6,
2015. http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1967/1967_1015
The Presbyterian Church USA. Capital Punishment.
Accessed July 15, 2015. http://www.presbyterianmission.org/
ministries/101/capital-punishment/
The United Methodist Church. The Death Penalty.
Accessed July 15, 2015. http://archives.umc.org/interior.
asp?ptid=1&mid=6385
Understanding deterrence. Australian Institute of

Criminology: AICrime reduction matters number 27 (November
2004). Accessed July 5, 2015. http://www.aic.gov.au/
publications/current%20series/crm/21-40/crm027.html
Unitarian Universalist Association. End the Death Penalty.
Accessed July 15, 2015. http://www.uua.org/statements/end-
death-penalty
United Church of Christ. Capital Punishment. Accessed
July 15, 2015. http://www.ucc.org/justice_criminal-justice_
death-penalty
United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights. Convention on the Rights of the Child.
November 20, 1989. Accessed July 6, 2015. http://www.ohchr.
org/en/professionalinterest/pages/crc.aspx
United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights. Death penalty increasingly viewed as torture,
UN special rapporteur finds. October 23, 2012. Accessed
July 21, 2015. http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/
DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=12685&LangID=E
United States Census Bureau. Facts for Features: Hispanic
Heritage Month 2014: Sept. 15-Oct. 15. Last modified
September 8, 2014. Accessed July 21, 2015. http://www.census.
gov/newsroom/facts-for-features/2014/cb14-ff22.html
United States Census Bureau. State and County
QuickFacts. Accessed July 21, 2015. http://quickfacts.census.
gov/qfd/states/00000.html
United States Conference of Catholic Bishops. The
Churchs Anti-Death Penalty Position. Accessed July 15, 2015.
http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/human-life-and-
dignity/death-penalty-capital-punishment/catholic-campaign-
to-end-the-use-of-the-death-penalty.cfm
Voltaire. The Philosophical Dictionary, translated by H. I.
Woolf. New York: Knopf, 1924. Accessed July 3, 2015. https://
history.hanover.edu/texts/voltaire/volcivil.html
Von Drehle, David. More Innocent People on Death Row
Than Estimated: Study. Time. April 28, 2014. Accessed July
6, 2015. http://time.com/79572/more-innocent-people-on-
death-row-than-estimated-study/
Notes on Contributors
Jeremy Chung Hoon Rhee (Yick Wo v. Hopkins) is a Senior at

the Trinity School in Manhattan, where he has been a speaker and
presenter at the Shepherd Symposium on Social Justice. He is a
debater who has represented the school at a number of tournaments
and placed first at the Harvard Public Forum Invitational.
Elizabeth Anne Johns (Tobacco Advertising) is an 8th Grader

at the Whitney Young Magnet High School in Chicago, where she
has taken part in National History Day. She enjoys playing the flute
and doing mathematics, and she loves acting in Shakespeare plays.
Rock Pang (South China Sea) is a Senior at Beyond English

in China. He is presently applying to colleges in the United States.
Shrey Vardhan Agarwal (Serbian Autonomy) is a Senior at

Strawberry Crest High School in Dover, Florida, where he is a
candidate for the IB Diploma. He builds robots for competitions.
His team, the Neutrinos, won first place at the world championships.
He is an AP Scholar with Distinction and scored a 36 on the ACT.
Cathy Wu (Korean War) is a Junior at the Lawrenceville

School in Lawrenceville, New Jersey, where she is the president of
Math Club and the co-president of Speech and Debate. She also
founded and is currently leading the Business Startups Club. She has
qualified for the American Invitational Mathematics Exam twice.
Matthew Waltman (Dokdo Islands) is a Senior at the Dwight-

Englewood School in Englewood, New Jersey. His essay on the
John Peter Zenger Trial, for which he won an Emerson Prize, was
published in The Concord Review in the Summer 2015 issue.
Daniel H. Wang (Missouris Civil War) is a Senior at Taipei

American School. He was born in Cleveland, Ohio and is living in
Taiwan. He is interested in physics, biology, literature and history.
He is an Eagle Scout and a member of the varsity swim team. He
has worked as a docent at the National Palace Museum in Taipei.
Owen Tedford (Battle of Gettysburg) is a Senior at Greenwich

High School in Greenwich, Connecticut, where he won the Mike
Batcheller Award in History. He is a member of the National
Honor Society and an AP Scholar with Distinction. He won the
Scholar-Athlete Award for the varsity ski team and has played rugby
in Ireland and France.
Zhengdong Wang (Tiberius Gracchus) is a Junior at Hamilton

High School in Chandler, Arizona, where he is captain of the
Debate Team and competes in debates across the country. He
also participates in the Academic Decathlon and the International
Public Policy Forum. He also enjoys historical strategy games.
Daniel W. Jo (Korean Financial Crisis) is a Junior at Troy

High School in Fullerton, California, where he won an award at the
Organge County Science Fair. He is on the varsity marksmanship
team at the high school, competing in tournaments at the state
level. He also teaches the clarinet to children at a local non-profit.
Benjamin Patrick Chiacchia (Capital Punishment) is a Senior

at Lincoln High School in Lincoln, Rhode Island, where he has
participated in the Hugh OBrien Youth Leadership Program and
the United States Senate Youth Program. He is a National Merit
Scholarship Finalist, and co-founder of the schools Model UN
Club. He is vice-president of his class and captain of the varsity
swimming team.
k k k k k k
SUBMISSIONS
==============
We need the best history research papers we can find, and

we welcome a chance to consider your best work.
Essay Requirements
You may submit a history paper to The Concord Review if
you completed it before starting college.
You must be the sole author.
The paper must be in English and may not have been
previously published except in a publication of a secondary school
that you attended.
Essays should be in the 4,000-7,000 (or more) word range,
with Turabian (Chicago) endnotes and bibliography. The longest
paper we have published was 21,000 words (on the Mountain
Meadows Massacre. She went to Stanford...see it on www.tcr.org).
Essays may be on any historical topic, ancient or modern,
domestic or foreign.
Essays must be submitted online at tcr.org with a fee of
$70. The author will register there and receive the next four issues
of the journal online.
Essays should have first the notes and then the bibliography
placed at the end (Chicago/Turabian style).
For more information, and a submission form, go to:
www.tcr.org and click on Submit
Send questions to the Editor, Will Fitzhugh, at

fitzhugh@tcr.org

Concord Journal

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Concord Journal

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

THE

Yick Wo v. Hopkins Jeremy Rhee

A Quarterly Review of Essays by Students of History

Volume 26, Number Three $30.00 Spring 2016

25 Elizabeth Anne Johns

141 Matthew Waltman

157 Daniel H. Wang

181 Owen Tedford

221 Zhengdong Wang

265 Ben Chiacchia

314 Notes on Contributors

The Spring 2016 issue of The Concord Review

Partial funding was provided by: Carter Bacon, Earhart Foundation,

Editorial Offices: The Concord Review, 730 Boston Post Road,

The Concord Review (ISSN #0895-0539), founded in 1987, is published

Subscription orders must be paid in advance, and change-of-address

TCR Subscriptions: Subscribe at tcr.org, or by check mailed to 730 Boston

I n February 1874, Thistletons Jolly Giant, a weekly satirical

Jeremy Chung Hoon Rhee is a Senior at the Trinity School in Manhattan,

in wooden buildings. However, while most white businesses were

ning to move in a direction that supported greater federal power

this in turn increased racial tensions.9 Powerful businessmen and

anti-competitive rebates. The Act also established the first federal

meant the ability to make genuine economic choices.27 In Yick

tion reached even the highest echelons of American governance.

status in society.44 Over time, as the Chinese in Mississippi became

employed generalized language in its efforts to target incoming

of trade relations with China and specified the increasing impor-

China. To Justice Matthews, the Senates efforts to stop Chinese

rights. Yick Wo, therefore, represented a stricter approach to federal-

achieving equal protection under the laws. The Laundry Ordinance

Anti-Chinese Laundry. San Francisco Chronicle, July 3,

University of Illinois Law Review, September 2, 2008, 1427-440.

Porter, Glenn. Industrialization and the Rise of Big

A. Walker. Accessed May 15, 2015. http://www2.census.gov/

THEY GOT LIPS? WE WANT THEM THE MARKETING OF

Elizabeth Anne Johns

In 1991, the journal JAMA published a research paper

Elizabeth Anne Johns is an 8th Grader at the Whitney Young Magnet

This paper reconstructs the history of how smoking was

engage young smokers, will be of interest beyond its immedi-

Smoking Becomes Unhealthy

after the Surgeon Generals report. Tobacco companies were los-

Todays teenager is tomorrows potential regular customer13

smoking campaigns, led by both government entities and non-

and interests. All of this opened up a vast field of information to

were episodes in a developing story, with one character trying on

Meet them where they live

Camel merchandise, and these could be purchased with Camel

Buys n the Hood

that drivers published a newspaper, The Weekly Bull, and awarded

The anti-smoking campaigns

that seemed so clearly designed to target childrennone more

had worked too well: It quoted an industry executive as saying

way for the cascade of events of the mid 1990sthe congressio-

and 1990s. In 1999, she became the Executive Director of the

tobacco/docs/tnww0041 (Accessed 5 September 2015).

A note on archival materials: This paper uses archival

announcing a contest to increase awareness among children

A1, at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/

Gross, D. Santa Barbara. 1993 June 24. Philip Morris, at

Proctor, Robert,Golden Holocaust: Origins of the Cigarette

Tursi, Frank, Susan E. White, and Steve McQuilkin, Lost

THE TERRITORIAL HISTORY OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA