Behavioral Science As The Art of The 21st Century

The Behavior Analyst Today Volume 4, Issue 2, 2003
Behavioral Science as the Art of the 21st Century

Philosophical Similarities Between B.F. Skinners
Radical Behaviorism and Postmodern Science.
Joseph Cautilli, M.Ed., M.Ed.
Beth Rosenwasser, M.Ed.
Don Hantula, Ph.D.
Abstract
Since B.F. Skinners death in 1990, psychologists taking a historical approach are beginning to clear misconceptions of his philosophy:
radical behaviorism. Contrary to the belief of many, radical behaviorism, continues to grow and branch into new areas. This paper attempts to explore
the history of Skinners assertions and place them within the context of contemporary western thought. Parallels are drawn between Skinners science
and diverse areas such as evolutionary biology and postmodern philosophy. The social construction of knowledge is one of the many lasting legacies
of Skinners work.
Introduction
Say what you like as long as it does not stop you from seeing how things are.... And when you have seen this
there is plenty that you will not say- (Wittengstein, 1953)
For many contemporary thinkers, the idea that Skinners Radical Behaviorism and postmodernist philosophy of
science are compatible would appear ridiculous, or at best superficial. After all both evolved from drastically different
historical roots (Andresen, 1992) and some scientists have accused postmodern philosophers of being antiscience (i.e.
Holton, 1993). For example, Lyotards (1979) book The Postmodern Condition enjoys a special distinction for weaving
together Postmodern art, with elements of the post structuralism philosophy, and a theory of postindustrial society. While
the work has some clear seems, it is considered a good starting point. Lyotard attempts to define the postmodern by
contrast to the modern:
"I will use the term modern to designate any science that legitimates itself with reference to a
metadiscoursemaking an explicit appeal to some grand narrative, such as the dialects of Spirit, the
hermeneutics of meaning, the emancipation of the rational or working subject, or creation of wealth.
Although Lyotards statement holds for some postmodernists, much of postmodernism is not antiscience but
rather the natural evolution of thinking following the discrediting of realism (Ross, 1996; Rorty, 1979, 1991). One can
contrast the statement above with that of another recognized postmodernist Griffin (1988)physics no longer disenchants
our stories; physics itself provides us with a new story which can become a common, unifying story underneath our more
particular stories. (p. 15ff).
As we will see central tenets of the postmodernism trend were factors that most contemporary sciences adopted in
the early part of this century (long before even the word postmodernism was considered) with the notable exception of
psychology and linguistics, which still seem to be dominated by realistic thinking and methodology.
On the other hand, within psychology, Skinner has been wrongly described to epitomize the logical positivist
movement. Some erroneously argued that Skinner was a realist, a copy theorist indistinguishable from other
behaviorists (Paiget and Ingelder, 1969). However, this characterization fails to recognize Skinners behaviorism as an
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attempt to "know what we come to know" (Baum, 1994; Lana, 1991, 1995). Far from being a copy theorist, Skinner
argued that all thinking is dynamic: even the experimenters thinking is shaped by organism/environment interaction
(Skinner, 1956). In postmodernist terms, Skinner was studying the building of Moscovicis (1987) virtual worlds. Brinker
and Jaynes (1988) point out this precisely differentiates Skinnerian behaviorism from other behavioral theories.
Few would disagree that B.F. Skinner has contributed much to psychological thinking of the 20th century.
Historical recognition of Skinners work is assured (Lana, 1991) with divergent fields such as anthropology (Glenn, 1988)
and behavioral biology (Robinson & Woodward, 1989) readily discuss his writings. However, whether or not Skinners
ideas are fossils (Sutherland, 1990, cf. Richelle, 1995), as some have contended, will be left to history to judge.
Our analysis of Skinners work occurs because currently, the field of psychology must place its work within
contemporary views of science, developing a greater contextual awareness of its historical roots (Richelle, 1995). This
will allow for greater understanding of the works instead of the usual misunderstandings that appear in introductory texts
(Todd & Morris, 1992).
This paper will deconstruct the evolution of postmodern thinking. It will focus on the movement of information,
ideas and technology, the points the common worker reflected on, keys to understanding the world, the view of self, the
role and station of humanity. Next the evolution of theories of science will be presented. We will discuss the movement
from essentialism to selectionism and the movement from certainty to uncertainty. With this background, Skinners
theory of verbal behavior will be shown to be fully compatible with the postmodernist view of language and offering a
inventive way for science to better serve the community. Finally, the methodology Skinners behaviorism will be shown
to offer new promise for a contextual view of data. Thus for us, Skinners behaviorism is to barrow Griffins (1988) words
a unifying story underneath our more particular stories.
It is important to note that postmodern approaches to psychology exist. A leading spokesman for postmodernism
in psychology, Gergen (1985) identifies feminism, various multicultural perspectives, and narrative psychology as core
areas of postmodern thought within psychology. To this list, Radical Behaviorism should be added (Ruiz, 1995; Freeman
& Locurto, 1994). Furthermore, of the three, Radical Behaviorism deserves special attention for three reasons: (1) it is
currently the only model with widespread and demonstrated effectiveness in developing technologies for both acceptance
(i.e., Hayes, 1993; Christiansen, Jacobson, & Babcock, 1995; Jacobson & Christensen, 1996) and change (i.e. Martin &
Pears, 1992; Kohlenberg & Tsai, 1994); (2) it has been largely misunderstood and misrepresented by its critics (see Todd
& Morris, 1992); (3) it is being explored by two other branches of postmodern psychology, feminism and multicultural
psychology for the production of theory (W. Hayes, 1991; Ruiz, 1995), cultural level analysis (Briggs & Pulson, 1996)
and effective culture change action (Biglan, 1995).
Postmodernism in Context
Alf Evers had said to me, Science is the art of the twentieth century, and I believed him. B.F. Skinner, 976 p. 291.
We resist giving a singular definition of the postmodern because with any cultural practice, postmodernism is
evolving. As an evolving community, we will not attempt to impose an essentialist definition on it. Instead, we will
attempt to place it in historical context, by exploring its historical antecedents: modernism and premodern thought and
demonstrating shifting views.
In the premodern world, medieval times society was mostly stagnant. Ideas, technology, and understanding of the
universe remained unchanged for generations. Science and technology were considered different activities (Russo &
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Cone, 1995). Workers weaved tales of pride, quality, and craftsmanship (Boje, 1994). In this stable environment, God was
the key to understanding man and nature. In premodern times man went directly to God to get answers to lifes
questions and self was bicameral (Jaynes, 1990). Ruling classes were considered blessed by God to rule as part of Gods
divine will. Mans station was below God but above beast.
Reading and consciousness were both invented at about the same time, the 12th century B.C. (Jaynes, 1990).
Jaynes's (1990) method was to look at old literature, like the Bible and Homer. He points out that, in the Old Testament,
God and angels talked directly to people. Then, in the 12th century, God stopped talking and people had to figure things
out for themselves. For an example, envision the scene where Agamemnon wanders on the beach before Troy, trying to
decide what to do. He doesn't really think about the problem the way a modern person would, he just wanders around until
the Goddess Athena appears and tells him what to do.
Jaynes suggests that, prior to this "discovery of consciousness", people thought the same way modern-day
schizophrenics do; by hearing voices that told them what to do. In the 12th century, they discovered that those voices were
their own and modern thought was born. Environmental conditions lead to the discovery of both consciousness and
literacy (Jaynes, 1990). Major earthquakes followed by a famine at about that time which so totally disrupted many
societies that people had to start knowing more then just how to do things, but had to know that they knew how to do
them.
In the Renaissance (14th century to the 17th century), new technology emerged (e.g. the printing press) allowing
ideas to become fluid. Books were no longer limited to the wealthy and could be mass-produced outside of the
monasteries. Libraries began to be utilized and brought the printed word back to the common man. A new art emerged in
which man became fascinated with the realistic - actually observed form of man. Flowing images of people covered
with robes were replaced by body details. A love of classical Greece dominated. Art modeled this period. Art was to
resemble life as closely as possible.
Experimentation of depth perception enhanced the appearance of reality in pictures. Man as the key to
understanding the world replaced God. Philosophers grappled with the concept of what could be known. Renee Descartes
in his exploration of what could be known took philosophers to the basis of existence with the argument that I know that I
think and even if the world does not exist something must be thinking. I think therefore I am became the theme. From this
basis Descartes began the slow and long process of reassembling the world.
Science emerged from philosophy assuming a realistic flavor (i.e. reality was considered out there to discover).
Science, at this point, still had not merged with technology (Russo & Cove, 1995). Science was the study of the world to
discover harmony and technology was the ability to construct things (Russo & Cove). Logical positivism, Cartesian
philosophy (M. Gerge n, 1995) and truth by agreement dominated science, politics, and philosophy. From the writings of
John Locke (1689), an argument against the divine right of kings, viewing man born with natural rights, freely
surrendered to government for protection. This idea paved the way for the American Revolution. Democracy reemerged
with the idea that, given consensus, society would reach a more perfect union. Still individual rights were to be
protected, thus a Republic, the United States of America was born. This new Republic saw itself as a melting pot.
Gradually, the machine with its push- pull metaphor and the study of forces replaced the notion of God and spirits. With
mans exaltation came the search for his essence. This essence became known as the self (Jaynes, 1990). This
representational view dominated phenomenology and psychodynamic theory. Deikman (1973) referred to the self as a
resting feeling of I. He considered the self as an organizing force that compels an individual to act. Winnicott
insisted the real and true self as the generator of creativity and ideas. Mastersons (1985) viewed the self as the
ultimate of real expression. Erikson (1968) holds self as the perception of self sameness and continuity of ones
existence in space and time. Therapeutic goals focused on making the self cohesive. To become oneself is mans true
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vocation (Kierkegaard as cited in OConnor, 1985, p.94). These cohesive views of self marked the modern era. In short
society became kinetic with a unified self as its focus.
Machines came and went. Interchangeable parts came about in 1800 (Beniger, 1986) and integration of
production in factories occurred about 1820 (Beniger, 1986). Even during the industrial revolution science and technology
remained distinctly different fields. By the middle of the nineteenth century with the development of electrical and
chemical technology science and technology began to merge (Russo & Cove, 1995). The stories of workers changed from
pride, quality, and craftsmanship to those of efficiency, increased quantity and estrangement (Boje, 1994; Skinner, 1986).
Many improvements in the quality of life occurred, as people fled farms to cities for jobs. In society, individuals and
companies began to seek out technology. The automobile followed the steam engine. The airplane followed the
automobile. The pony express was replaced by the telegraph, replaced by the telephone, replaced by email. Society again
is in the process of change. Information is moving from the kinetic to the hyperkinetic. With the automobile and new
roads, workers no longer needed to work close to home. Many families moved from the cities and commuted to work.
World War I and II placed women in the workforce. After the First World War, society recognized that women
had rights. In 1920, women gained the right to vote. Medical technology reduced the time women needed to nursemaid
and even contributed to decreased children/family. Libertarian thought highlighted the focus on individual rights.
Individualism became the marking point of modernism but also served as the strongest criticism against modernism.
Many began to understand that while it was an employers right to earn 80x the amount of his line workers, it came to be
seen as selfish. In art, Anderson (1988) argued Modernism as a notion is the emptiest of cultural categories. Unlike
Gothic, Renaissance, Baroque, Mannerism, Romantic, or Neoclassical, it designates no describable object in its own right
at all; it is completely lacking in positive content.
About 20 years after Descartess famous dicta, Giambattista Vico rose into opposition to the dualism inherent to
Descartes. Descartess philosophy formulated and systematized a new way to acquire knowledge through methods of
logical and reason, replacing the traditions of religious dogma, superstition and prejudices. Vico argued that thought
preceded the individual and was traceable through history, so even your thoughts were not the persons originally (Vico,
(1984/1744, 1990/1709). Vico (1990/1709) opposed the argument that all knowledge could come from logic and reason.
He sought the return of such philosophical underpinnings dialectical thinking, metaphor and rhetoric but most important
was history. Indeed Vico claimed to create a new science of the socio-historical world and argued for the superiority of
the knowledge that could be obtained from the outside as opposed to the inside.
In tradition of Vico, the point at which the essence of postmodernism began cannot be determined. We can trace
the emergence of ideas that would influence the basis of postmodernism. Many of these ideas began at the turn of the
century but can be traced back to Vico, himself in his dialectic with Descartes. It was first noticed in the art community,
which struggled for many reasons (including the advent of the camera) to rid the world of the concept of the artist as a
genius, capturing essential (real) detail characteristic of the world. High art became the point of contention and was
replaced by individual meaning. Lyotard (1989) art does not imitate nature, it creates a world apartin which the
monstrous and formless have their rights (p. 202). In literature, meaning of texts changed from its essential nature (its
ability to capture truth) to work understood in its historical context (deconstructionist / reconstructionism). In philosophy
and politics many questioned if reality was the same for all. Workers stories changed from efficiency, mass production,
and alienation to fragmented special interests of societal subgroups such as multiculturalism, feminism, and ecology
issues (Boje, 1994; Rakos, 1992). In some ways the shift could be seen as The nineteenth-century vision of how to
make the world a better place in which to live was called progress. It was a coal-fueled ideology for a vast colonial
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expansion and it was crushingly discredited by World War I and the interwar era of stagnation and depression.
Development is the successor to the vision of progress that accompanied the petroleum-fueled spread of industrialism in
the post-World War II nationalizing. If the illusion of progress was dashed by the First World War, the development
illusion began to crack and fragment, on the other hand, with increased poverty, social movements and revolts, military
interventions and regional wars, and on the other hand, environmental pollution and degradation (Newbold-Adams,
1988). aphors of self changed from static to dynamic views, as a fundamental shift occurred: instead of viewing self
as a content or structure, the self became an active process (Gerge n, 1995).
The self is not something fixed inside my head. If it exists at all, my self is a process: the unending process by which
I turn new experiences into language. (Bronowsky, 1973 p.65)
A person produces a poem and a women produces a baby, and we call the person a poet and the woman a
mother. Both are essential loci in which vestiges of the past come together in certain combinations. The process is
creative in the sense that the products are new. (Skinner, 1972, p.354).
the author is never more than the instance of writing, just as I is nothing other than saying I: language knows a
subject, not a person, and this subject, empty outside of the very enunciation which defines it, suffice to make
language hold together suffices, that is to say, to exhaust it. (Barthes, 1977 p. 145)
Multiculturalism and feminism began unthinking cultural myths of the times (Bush, 1989). For example Bush
(1979) cites that feminists unthought rape as a crime of passion reframing it as a crime of power. Another example is
multiculturalists, Robert C. Johnson (1984) argued that the African American community suffers from neglect compared
to the abuse of slavery during the modern era. He argued that only by consciously taking a more active role in science and
innovation would African Americans reshape the course of technological development to address their needs and interest
(Johnson, 1984). All recent technological advances are firmly rooted in the sciences and the budget for these advances is
ever increasing due to the need for more complicated instruments and data collection methods (Russo & Cove, 1995).
Person in context replaced Man as the key figure. This contextual perspective is the core of postmodern analysis and
evaluation of truth in all arenas from the art and literary to the political to the scientific (i.e. Pepper, 1942).
In the early 1980s Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPAnet) was developed and the modern Internet, which to
that time had only been used by the defense department in the U.S. was beginning to attract University users and
companies. In 1996, President Clinton signed the Telecommunications Act and the integration of the telecommunication
industrys previously separate technologies began a new revolution in the amount of information available to the common
man. By the end of the century, libertarian thought began to receive its strongest challenge from those holding
communitarian beliefs. While the libertarians argued for the rights of the individual, communitarians focused on the
individual responsibility to the community. The question moved from my right to how can I be a good neighbor.
Thus, the communitarian approach emerged with its principles drawing on premodern thought of the importance of
communities. This philosophical position contrasted with libertarianism appears to offer an interesting parallel, which cuts
the old liberal-conservative debate. Even former First Lady, now Senator, Hillary Clinton, wrote on the subject in It
Takes a Village.
Trends in Science and the Philosophy of Science
One of the most remarkable features of modern thought is the extent to which ideas about science have
changed- Woolgar, 1988 p. 9
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Sciences were considered part of philosophy and no distinction was made. Most of the Greek scientists were not
interested in techniques (Russo & Cove, 1995). The sciences began to emerge during the modern era. It emerged with the
concept of experimentation. Galileo Galilei (1564-1642) introduced the concept of experimentation and used it in his
studies of acceleration. Chemistry began in France with Antoine Lavoisiers (1743-1794) discovery of the conservation
of matter. While the classification of organisms started with Aristotle, modern biology started with the discovery of the
existence of microbes by Anton van Leeuwenhoek (1632-1723). Auguste Comte articulated the modern concept of
positivism around the 1830's. It held that the only reliable source of knowledge is that which is obtained by the direct
observation of the material world. Through positivist scientific experiments, one can explain how gravity works but
never why gravity exists. This model held dominant through the turn of the century; however, even as far back as 1859,
science and philosophy by their own discoveries began shifting away from positivism and certainty.
The fledgling science of biology was the first to shift. The mechanistic metaphor of billiard balls and push pull
mechanics was seriously challenged by a new model- evolution. Wallace ( 1858) and Darwin (1859) co-discovered
evolution. The worldview formed by any thinking person in the Western World after 1859, when The Origin of the
Species was published was quite different than any prior point in history (Mayr, 1991). When we speak of cause in the
evolutionary sense, it is not the action reaction concept of early physics but selection by consequence over time (Dawkins,
1976; Donohoe, 1988; Mayr, 1991; Skinner, 1953, 1981). If a snap shot in time is taken it appears that effect precedes
cause, for this reason this mode of causality was hard to identify because as Skinner (1981) pointed out, selection only
occurs in living things and later by machines made by living things.
Initially this mode of causality troubled physicists (Mayr, 1991), who spent most of the early part of the twentieth
century debating biologists over the plausibility of selection as a causal mode. One of the most highly publicized debates
was over the age of the sun. Using combustion standards of the time, the sun was calculated to be only a few thousand
years old. This was far short of the millions of years that Darwin was calling for in his theory. Eventually this changed
with discoveries made in nuclear decay and combustion.
Difficulty with Darwins ideas was not limited to the physicists: other biologists staunchly rejected Darwin. At the
turn of the century evolution was considered dead. In fact, it was more then 75 years before Darwin was accepted in the
biological community until the evolutionary synthesis of the 1930's (Baum, 1995; Bowler, 1983; Catania, 1978; Mayr,
1991). Most of this problem centered on the incompleteness of functional/contextual theories. Darwin lacked and still
lacks an adequate conceptualization of the species. Second, no proximal causal mechanism was stated. In fact it was just
after population genetics demonstrated a plausible account of how selection can be retained that Darwin received wide
scale acceptance (Bowler, 1983; Catania, 1978, 1987; Donahoe, Burgos, & Palmer, 1994 p.18-27; Mayr, 1982).
Finally, Darwin had upset the modern view of man as being above beast. It had also completely wiped away the need
to postulate a divine creator. This elimination of stature was not well received by the religious element. In the Catholic
Church it was not until the Second Vatican Counsel (1975) that the idea of evolution was accepted and a contextual view
of the creation story adopted. Some forms of Christianity still have not adopted the concept of evolution. One reason is
that man is not considered the highest level of creature but one of many top branches. This has led some religions to
sponsor teleological (i.e. Gods as final cause. Evolution is purposeful leading to more advanced forms. Man as the top
creature) accounts into evolutionary patterns. This exists despite the fact that Darwinian evolution has been shown to
account for all data once thought of as teleological (Simpson, 1949; 1974; Monods, 1970). Finally, as Mayr (1991) points
out, teleological explanations fail to explain things such as:
(1) What is so wonderful about parasites that torture victims and leads to eventual death? (2) How
could a perfectly designed plan lead to such widespread extinction, as documented by the fossil record? (3) If,
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as the teleologists claim, the harmony of the world is reflected by mutual adaptation of organisms to one another
and to their environment, and if these adaptations must adjusted continuously to cope with the changes of the
earth, and with the restructuring of the faunas owing to extinction, what final causes could there be to govern all
these ad hoc changes?
Physics was the next field to adjust. Findings suggested that Newtonian physics could not be applied to all physical
phenomena. Initially this shocked the scientific community and adjustments were calculated for different contexts. These
simple problems eventually lead to the stunning discoveries in quantum mechanics and relativity theory. Initially
however, certain aspects of nature were no longer straight forward and calculable. Relativity emerged to argue that there
are many frames of reference from which absolute motion or rest may be determined and that no one point of reference is
inherently superior to any other.
In philosophy of science, Godel conceptualized mathematics (once thought of as the purest science) as a language.
Like any language, math is coherent only within the system it seeks to describe. No system can stand outside itself and
completely describe itself. Math can never exhaust the possibilities of its own language. Thus a system could either be
complete or consistent. Thus began the emergence of the concept of scales of analysis, which culminated in Chaos theory
(Gleick, 1988). Chaos theory, contrary to its name, demonstrates how deterministic systems (i.e. mathematical equations)
can account for great diversity. One famous example is a demonstration that a butterfly flapping it wings in New York can
produce a typhoon in Japan.
Aditionally, in the social study of science, critiques began to emerge undermining the notion of scientists proceeding
in a rational, logical, objective way (e.g. Skinner, 1956). Kuhn (1962, 1970) developed his concept of the paradigm and
with it swept away popular notions of absolute truth. Kuhn (1970) viewed science as a social activity with special rules of
conduct. Science was viewed as clashing camps, where one view dominated over another: victor and vanquished.
However, revolution is not the way science precedes. Laudan (1977) questioned Kuhns ideas focusing on the problem
solving nature of science. In Laudains (1977) view theories are constructed to solve both empirical and conceptual
problems. A theory is preferred over another when it solves more problems than the other. However, Laudan
acknowledged that conceptual problems, such as, social, ethical, and theological problems are often stated by scientists as
reasons switching from one orientation to another.
A more comprehensive view of how sciences progress was stated in the evolutionary model of Popper (1975). In
this view science serves as adaptive behavioral learning. It adapts through two processes instruction and selection
(Popper, 1975 p. 73). Scientific theories serve as structures that are transmitted by instruction through social tradition
and imitation. If mutation occurs, than these new instructions arise from within the organism. These new structures are
exposed to certain pressures, challenges, or problems. In response variation to traditional instructions are produced by
methods that are at least partly random (p.73). Survivable instructions will be ones, which produce new depths to
problems or solve and open up new problems.
Skinner (1945, 1956) turned the science of behavior analysis on itself. The rationale was that science could serve
as the basis for its own epistemology. Skinners analysis produced an awareness of the interlocking patterns between
experimenter and experimental subjects. In describing his own investigations Skinner (1956) commented:
The organism whose behavior is most extensively modified and most completely controlled in research... is the
experimenter himself (sic)... The subjects we study reinforce us much more effectively than we reinforce
them.(p.232)
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This type of analysis at least on the surface appears compatible with Marxist and feminist philosophers. These
philosophers criticized science as having a political agenda and technology as serving to maintain the status quo (see
Harding, 1996; Kipnis, 1994; Woolgar, 1985; McCanny-Gergins, 1991) and under control of business and government
funding (Kipnis, 1994; Ross, 1996). Even more to the point, social sciences demonstrated that even in the process of
validating scientif ic knowledge there is a measure of arbitrary decision-making (Wittgenstein, 1953; Hanson, 1969; Rorty,
1979). The argument was clear- even what the scientist saw was shaped by the environment (Skinner, 1974 p. 256), or in
Rortys (1979) language dependent on what one knows about what they see. For Skinner (1945, 1953, 1974), science
was the behavior of scientists subject to the same laws as any other human activity. Knower and knowledge became
inseparable. The scientist does not observe the system perched on the epicycle of Mercury (Skinner, 1974 p. 256).
Thus, science should be a focus of study and ethnographers did in a manner that was objective and did not go native
(Latour & Woolgar, 1986) but offering insight and critique. Or in speaking of ethnographic study of scientists, Latour and
Woolgar (1986) described it as Not only do scientists statements create problems for historical elucidation; they also
systematically conceal the nature of the activity which typically gives rise to their research reports. In other words, the
facts that scientist often change the manner and content of their statements when talking to outsiders causes problems both
for outsiders reconstruction of scientific events and for an appreciation of how science is done. It is therefore necessary to
retrieve some of the craft character of scientific activity through in situ observations of scientific practice. (p. 28-29)
While such ethnography will indeed help to better understand how scientists chase down particular problems for now
the sciences remain divided into different worldviews. What emerged is the meta-philosophy of Pepper (1942). In 1942,
Pepper described four distinct clusters around which theoretical systems are base. These clusters highlight a root
metaphor and truth criteria. These are Formism (e.g. Plato), Organicism (e.g Hegel, Piaget ), Mechanism (e.g S-R
learning theory; information processing theory; Freudian psychology), and Contextualism (e.g. Dawkins, Darwin, Harris,
James, Skinner). Formistic theories highlight similarities and hold as a truth criteria correspondence. Organicismic
theories highlight the developing organism over time in stages. Organicimic theories use the developing organism as the
model for theory development. They view what occurs for the average organism in the average environment. The whole is
seen as more then the sum of its parts and often teleology is accepted a priori. They view truth being constructed by the
organism and changing with development. Mechanistic theories, holding to the logical positivist model, proceed by
looking at the world as a big machine. It searches to provide complete accounts and tries to fill temporal gaps with
proximal causes. Science is seen as successively approximating truth. Most of the questions in this type of theory are
structurally based answering how questions (e.g. How does the brain store information?). It often holds to a
hypodeductive model and postulates science as achieving successive approximations to truth. In contrast, contextual
theories try to answer questions of what occurs when (Hineline, 1995) not of how even when presented with
questions of how an attempt is made to answer the how question as a what and when question over time. In contrast
with the organismic theorists environmental links are sought not a focus on stages. Contextual theory holds to a view of a
whole organism in context over time. These models utilize a pragmatic truth criterion: a theorys worth is measured by its
ability to allow the scientist to successfully negotiate the world (Hayes & Hayes, 1992).
A contextual analysis of a scientific theory holds that no one type of theory is inherently better then another, but each
has a set of problems that it can optimally solve (Hayes & Hayes, 1992). For example genetics has been a field that has
been largely dominated by mechanistic models and has demonstrated remarkable success (Russo & Cove, 1995). Once
one theory is used other questions will forever be unanswered (Lana, 1991). For example, Darwins theory of evolution
will never develop a definition of what constitutes a species. It will never answer how selection is retained. Skinners
theory of language will never answer a formal question of what is a sentence or how conditioning is retained. For both
these theories a mechanistic account is needed to complete them (For Darwin that came in the form of genetics; for
Skinner, who always believed it would be neurology, it will probably be connectionism from computer science). Both of
the above ideas from a contextual perspective are unnecessary but from a mechanistic perspective are highly important
(e.g. Chomsky, 1959). However, to answer questions like why do these finches have long beaks and those have short, or
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why is the child antisocial or what should a counselor do to help this client build intimate relationship, contextual theories
will provide answers. (For the answers to these questions see Darwin, 1859; Snyder & Patterson, 1995; Kohlenberg &
Tsai, 1994 respectively). Since as Skinner (1981) states the most consistent part of the context is dealing with other
people, contextual analysis is where science and postmodern philosophy have merged.
Contextual theories use a pragmatic truth criterion. Skinners (1974) theory postulated that a statement was true in
as much as it helped the listener to effectively respond to the situation. Just because objective truth in the traditional
sense is unknowable, does not mean that we cannot distinguish between two conflicting claims (Rorty, 1991). Science
does this pragmatically by appeal to its goals. For Rorty (1991) these goals are prediction and control. For Skinner (1953,
1974) these goals were understanding, prediction and control. While understanding seemed to be less of a primary goal in
later writings (Hackenberg, 1995), Skinners initial concept of understanding goes beyond the engineering goals
suggested by Rorty (1991) to more broad discovery oriented goals. Also understanding, defined as the number of
problems a theory can address or reasonably interpret, may be a deciding factor in the flourishing or passing of a scientific
approach (e.g. Lakatos & Mustgrave, 1970).
Under the pragmatic view of science, science is useful if it achieves its stated goals. Also for the information to be
called scientific, exploration of the area must be conducted and formally critiqued. In this pragmatic view of science, no
one study is enough to make claims plausible. This parallels feminist scholars who have argued that science presents a
formal way of critiquing information and that through this critiquing process a more refined understanding of the subject
matter occurs (McCanny-Gergin, 1988). An example of this would be if one uses a pre-post control study, then questions
revolve around the comparability of the control, sample size and mortality. For this reason Gergen (1995) suggests that
scientists try to keep their data as close to the original context as possible and limit their claims to their subject matter of
study. For Skinner, the canons of science were ways of lessening incidental effects and reducing the probably that the
scientist will lie. Thus, the scientific method can reduce the probability of lying but in no way guarantees that
honesty will occur. For Skinner competing contingencies were always present for any form of verbal behavior (Skinner,
1957). Indeed, this analysis leaves the scientist to be a privileged knower, for his or her contact with the subject matter,
but it is not an unlimited privilege.
Shifting views of what science is and what we can know, occurring in the first through midpoint of the 20th century,
reached the masses in the 1970's about the same time as the supposed cognitive revolution in psychology. Literary
scholars ranging from noble scientists to journalists documented for the lay public the breath and scope of the changes in
science and the philosophies, which guided it. The shift in science can be seen as a move along the dialectic of
essentialism versus selectionism, certainty and uncertainty, and a move from realism and relativism. As Chiesa (1992,
1994) pointed out, "Scientists and thinkers kept the public informed along the way with popular books such as About
Behaviorism (Skinner, 1974); The Toa of Physics (Capra, 1975); The Selfish Gene (Dawkins, 1976); Mathematics: The
Loss of Certainty (Kline, 1980); The Death of Nature: Women, Ecology, and the Scientific Revolution (Merchant, 1982);
Turning Point: Science, Society, and the Rising of Culture (Capra, 1983); The Cosmic Blueprint (Davis, 1987); Darwins
Dangerous Idea (Dennett, 1995); A Brief History of Time (Hawkins, 1986); and Does God Play Dice (Stewart, 1989).
Each of the above philosophies naturalized their epistemology, developing a place for the scientist within the nature of
his or her system, not an objective observer outside the system. Science had become the attempt to build the life raft while
on the sea. Bound by the world in which the scientist functioned the scientist was infused with a learning history, which
clouded and shaped his/her perception and understanding, while still trying to find the stable pockets of regular
occurrence with the world that surrounded him or her. Thus, Moscovicis (1987) concept of virtual worlds, contrary to
Moscovicis own beliefs, has made it into most areas of science and had done so before it ever arrived as fashionable in
philosophy. Also, Derridas (1978) criticism that western science assumes that it can attain essential knowledge-
universal truth- that is not situated within a set of culturally bound language practices is unsubstantiated. Through it all,
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science not only succeeded in surviving, but also developed more accurate models to support its goals of prediction and
control (Rorty, 1991).
Skinners Radical Behaviorism vs. Mechanistic Theory
About the same time as Logical Positivism was formally being laid to rest by physics (This formally occurred at the
Copenhagen Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics in 1927), it was being hailed by psychologists and linguists trying to
establish credibility for their field. Many schools of science formed in the new discipline of psychology; one of them
was Behaviorism. Behaviorism, far from the monolithic model that academic folklore would believe had many divisions
(Todd & Morris, 1992; Ruiz, 1995). The first step in understanding the comparability between Skinner and the
postmodern is to disentangle the multiple meanings that obscure the boundaries of individual models subsumed under the
generic heading (Ruiz, 1995).
In psychology, the classic example of positivism is Hulls hypo-deductive model. In this model of science theories
are generated, then one logically reasons out hypotheses to test and tests the hypotheses. Thus theories would meet like
gladiators doing battle on a field with one as victor, the other vanquished. Except that logical reasoning can be flawed
and hypotheses considered not relevant to the theory. This remains the standard of scientific research in applied
psychology and has many problems (as discussed in the preceding section).
Hulls model, the drive reduction model, represented a mechanistic (Mechanistic models are based in machine
push/pull systems) account of reinforcement theory. In Hulls model, Habit Strength was considered the product of drive
multiplied by learning. Hull later added several other terms to correct for observations in the lab. Skinner was critical of
Hulls model (Skinner, 1944). It is here that Skinner began to move away from mechanistic accounts to relational
accounts (Chiesa,, 1992; Moxley, 1992). Earlier, while still an S-R psychologist, Skinner (1935) redefined the reflex from
a connection to a systematic relationship between classes of stimuli and classes of responses.
Skinner (1945) was very critical of the truth by agreement model adopted by other behaviorists of the time. This
model often insisted that scientific knowledge must somehow be essentially public in nature. Skinners (1988) view on
science was best stated in a reply to Dodwell So far as I am concerned, science does not establish truth or falsity; it seeks
the most effective way of dealing with the subject matter. (p. 241). It is this epistemological stance that most clearly
aligns radical behaviorism with the pragmatic philosophy of William James (Baum, 1994; Day, 1992; Morris, 1993). For
James, all knowledge is functional in nature, and our capacities for knowledge are driven by our practical needs to adapt
to our environments. For Skinner, knowledge is action, and knowing refers to behavioral relations in the context that
facilitate adaptation (Ruiz, 1995). This clearly outlines a role for knowing as behavior and for other private events.
Indeed, private behaviors became a central tenet that needed explanation in Skinners system; however, Skinner
stayed away from giving private events causal status (mentalist) instead suggesting that private events would need further
explanation as to why they occurred. In Skinner (1945) went on to clarify the difference between private (which needs to
be accounted for) and mental (which science had no use for).
There is of course, no question of whether responses to private stimuli are possible. They occur commonly
enough and must be accounted for. But why do they occur, and what, if any are their distinguishing characteristics?
(p.273)
Skinner (1974) would echo his earlier comments:
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A science of behavior must consider the place of private stimuli as physical things, and in doing so it provides
an alternative account of mental life. [The question he raises then is] What is inside the skin and how do we know
it? [He goes on to say] The answer I believe is at the heart of Radical Behaviorism. (Pp.211-212).
The careful clarification of what Skinner is getting at in such statements as these requires a more detailed analysis. It
removes the concept of correspondence as the basis of meaning (Moxley, 2003) and it dismisses the objective/subjective
distinction but leaves the question of privacy. The issues are quite complex (Day, 1969b). It often revolves around
thinking as a pattern of activity (which Skinner would agree with) or thought as a construct (cognitive psychology)
(Skinner, 1945). By 1953, Skinner was drawing parallels between his behaviorism and evolutionary theory. One of
Skinners first written statements in Science and Human Behavior is below:
We have seen that in certain respects operant reinforcement resembles the natural selection of evolutionary
theory. Just as genetic characteristics which arise as mutations are selected or discarded by their consequences,
so novel forms of behavior are selected or discarded through reinforcement (p.430)
Psychology had a very difficult time trying to interpret this different worldview as Skinner moved away from the rate
of behavior as important and to the rate of reinforcement (environmental payoff) linked to the rate of behavior as central.
However, mechanism versus selections would have its greatest clash, when Skinner tried to use his theory to explain
verbal behavior.
Mechanism and Language
If one was to select from the substantial corpus of postmodern writings a single line of argument that (a)
generates broad agreement within these ranks and (b) serves as a critical divide between what we roughly
distinguish between modern versus the postmodern, it would be the abandonment of the traditional commitment to
representationalism. By representationalism I mean here the assumption that their is (or can be) a determinant (
fixed or intrinsic) relationship between words and the world. (Gergen, 1994; p. 412).
In the field of linguistics most of the contemporary research is associated with Noam Chomsky. Chomsky continued
and expanded a line of research known as transformational grammar. Chomsky plays an interesting point in the movement
from modernism to postmodernism first for his review of Skinners (1957) Verbal Behavior (Chomsky, 1959) and second
for the range of his own research program. We will briefly explore the research program now and answer some of
Chomskys (1959) criticisms of Skinner later. What is Chomskys view of transformational grammar?
Chomsky attempts to isolate crucial variables essential to language (Chomsky, 1980). He holds language as an
abstract system, which cannot be learned through traditional learning principles. Chomsky posited three different models
over the years. The first appeared in Syntactic Structures, which contained three essential components: the rewriting rules,
the transformational rules, and the morphological rules. In 1965, he published a significantly different model in Aspects of
the Theory of Syntax. The base components of the model are (1) rewriting, rules, which as before, indicated the structure
of sequences of words; and the lexicon, to which are essential features of syntactic, semantic, and phonological properties
of the lexical items. The idea that emerges from this is the base grammar or deep structure. The transformational
component changes this initial structure into other (surface) structures. The final model is laid out in the Minimalist
Program. We will limit our comments to Aspects of the Theory of Syntax.
Chomsky argues the human nervous system contains a structure called a Language Acquisition Device (LAD), which
includes an innate concept of human language (Chomsky, 1968). Chomskys theory (GB- government binding Theory)
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is multi-layered. (1) It hypothesizes much of the structures of human language are inborn. In this model, babies only
have to learn the vocabulary and structural patterns of the native language- they do not learn language from scratch.
While Chomskys approach no longer dominates linguistics, it still has strong influence over other work and the last
principle dominates even over Pinkers (1984) work. Often linguists support this theory with two assertions (a) babies
appear to talk remarkably well from despite inadequate exposure to language 1(b) the structure of language on different
levels can be lost by injury. (2) The hypothesis that adequate description of grammar requires that each sentence has at
least two different structures, called deep structures and surface structures, together with rules called transformations. (3)
For deep structures to emerge a specific LAD would have evolved, but it did not evolve from any methods of known
Darwianian evolotion because it emerged as a whole without incremental addition.
Chomsky (1986) further postulates the independence of grammars from the rest of cognition. In arguing for a
Universal Grammar, Chomsky stated there is little hope in accounting for our knowledge in terms of such ideas as
analogy, induction, association, reliable procedures, good reasons, and justificationor in terms of generalized learning
mechanismsWe should, so it appears, think of knowledge of language as a certain state of the mind/brainas a state of
some distinguishable faculty of the mind- the language faulty- with specific properties, structures, and organization, one
module of mind (p. 12)
This universal mechanism of grammar is expressed by Chomsky (1986) as a set of distinguishable principles and
parameters (pp. 145-273). This universal mechanism utilizes a small number of general principles that must suffice to
derive the consequences of elaborate and language -specific rule systems (Chomsky, 1986, p. 145). The major elements
are a binding theory, a thata theory, a case theory (p. 145). These elements are genetically transmitted and constitute
a fixed initial state S0 of thelanguage faculty consisting of a system of principles associated with certain parameters of
variation and a markedness system with several components of its ownthe state SL [a particular language] is attained by
setting parameters of S0 in one of the permissible ways, yielding the core, and adding a periphery of marked exceptions
on the basis of specific experience, in accordance with the markedness principle of S0 (p. 221)
The first counter statements came from Piagets (1970)
Chomsky has reversed the position of the logical positivists on the question of the relationship between logic
and language. According to Chomsky, logic is not derived from language, but language is based on a kernel of
reason. Transformational grammars, in whose development Chomsky played a leading role, seem to me to be of
great interest and to show clear similarities to the operation of intelligence that have been discussed. Chomsky
goes so far as to say that the kernel of reason on which the grammar of language is constructed is innate. I think
that this hypothesis is unnecessary, to say the least. In point of fact, it is very striking that language does not
appear in children until the sensory-motor intelligence is more or less achieved. I agree that the structures that
are available to a child at age of fourteen or sixteen months are the intellectual basis upon which language can
develop, but I deny that these structures are innate. I think that we been able to see that they are the result of
development (p. 47)
With the gauntlet down, data derived from hundreds of studies of human intelligence demonstrated that scores
obtained on standard intelligence tests are closely correlated with the size of the individuals vocabulary (Sternberg,
1985). In addition it was argued that language was absent in many severely retarded people (Wills, 1973). Gopnick and
Meltzoff (1985) analyzing there data found that semantic and cognitive development are linked Finally, Bates (1976)
demonstrated that social interactions and cognitive development are clearly linked. Many argued that children acquired
1
This view is changing due to work of the linguist Moerk, 1977, 1978, 1983, 1990 and the enormous longitudinal database presented by
Wolfe & Ris ley, 1996.
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many aspects of culture in a rapid fashion, not just language. In these cases social interactions were seen as clearly related
to the development.
In another vain, the model of deep structures was soon challenged, because of the exclusive link it postulated between
semantic and deep structures. Chomsky described the linguistic problems in Language and Responsibility (1977)
Contrary to what the Standard Theory of Aspects proposed, it seemed highly probable that surface structure plays a
primary role in semantic interpretation. (p. 163). Others took a different path with the data, as Chomsky describes But
at the same time the Standard Theory was modified to accommodate the role of surface structures, others too a contrary
path, relying on a different intuition: they drew the connection between semantic representation and deep structure more
closely, to the point where the two became identical. That is of course generative semantics. So described, the basic
position is incorrect, because the hypothesis shared with the Standard Theory is false, as Ive just pointed out. (p. 152).
Lakoff (1987) described nine reasons for the programs demise including there is a clear division between the grammar
and the lexicon, with grammar providing meaningful words to plug into grammatical structuresa clear division is
problematic, and there is more likely a continuum between the grammar and the lexicon.(p. 465)
Enthusiastic investigation of psycholinguists from the sixties to present has failed to demonstrate the psychological
reality of deep structures and grammatical transformations (Richelle, 1995). By the 1970's many former Chomskians
were concluding that children do not operate with the formal apparatus of Transformational Grammar (Brown, 1973;
Bowerman, 1973; Braine 1976). Palmer (1986) sums it up:
Chomsky has been able to formulate precisely his theoretical ideas because they have remained abstract, but
useful theories cannot remain abstract forever. If there is no way to use them to predict, control, or describe actual
events, then they are empty. (p.56)
In short, transformational grammar has problems because the theory is abstracted away from its use in meaningful
communicative context. Detailed criticisms have argued against the notion that a childs syntactic and semantics resemble
adults as positied by Chomsky (1980, 1986) (see Braine, 1976; Bruner, 1979; Bowerman, 1973; Edwards, 1978; Howe,
1976; Salzinger, 1975, 1979). These authors argue that no evidence exists supporting the notion that children operate with
adult like categories or rules in formulating early sentences and thus these should not be posited. Bruner (1979) wrote a
necrology for the innate language acquisition device.
In Rules and Representation, Chomsky (1980) tries to determine parts of an innate endowment that defines the
human essence. To insolate againstwhat children actually do, he creates the distinction between competence and
performance (Chomsky, 1972). Also, Chomsky quickly retreats into the world of the idealized speaker and listener
(Lakoff, 1987). For Chomsky (1986) the relationship between words and the world is intrinsic, fixed, and determined
(This is the antithesis of the postmodern approach outlined by Gergen, 1994, 1995). Language as an individual process
emerges. It is seen as neither incremental nor adaptive. This view is a dramatic departure from current theories of
evolution (for excellent critique of this proposition see Dennett, 1995 or Donohoe & Palmer, 1992 or Palmer, 1986). Also
unlike fix action patterns, the relationship between environmental input that triggers grammatical output is arbitrary
(Palmer, 1986). Palmer (1986) further goes on to state:
Languages vary from culture to culture and within a language there is no relationship between the sound of the
utterance and its grammatical structure. Clearly there is no physical property of the stimulus that suffices to identify
its part of speech. Nothing about the word house enables us to conclude that it is a noun, or that it might be a
subject (pp.54-55)
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Finally, Chomskys (1995) book Minimalist Program represents a significant departure from GB and Chomsky
appears to be taking a position closer to current trends in cognitive psychology. An alternative to Chomskys fixed and
ideal account is Skinners selectionist account.
The Behavior Analytic Theory and Parallels to Other Theories
..the traditional concepts of reward and punishment are about as close to operant conditioning as traditional
concepts of heat, space, or matter are to contemporary scientific treatments. Skinner, 1968, p.709.
Skinner defines behavior as anything that an organism does such as thinking, feeling or acting (Skinner, 1945, 1953).
For Skinner(1984) all behavior is:
the joint product of (i) contingencies of survival for natural selection and (ii) contingencies of reinforcement
responsible for the repertoires of individuals, including (iii) the special contingencies maintained by an evolved
social environment.
Thus, in Skinner's view, behavior is the interaction of biology and the environment over time. At the second level,
operant conditioning was explained on the basis of variation and natural selection by consequences a process that Skinner
terms reinforcement (Skinner, 1953, 1963, 1966, 1975, 1981, 1984; Tyron, 1993; 1995). For Skinner (1953, 1974),
reinforcement is anything that completes the function from mastery to control, from tangibles to sensory enjoyment to
social praise. Reinforcement is considered the ultimate shaper and maintainer of behavior. Also for Skinner (1981),
operant conditioning supplemented natural selection not eliminated it. As Richelle (1995) pointed out, this is very close
to Piagets position (except Piaget was looking from the endogenous perspective):
The environment plays a fundamental role at all levels (that is in biological evolution of species as well as in
cognitive development), but as object of conquest, and not as shaping causation, which is to be looked for, again
at all levels, in endogenous activities of the organism and of the subject, both of which would remain conservative
and unable to innovate...in the absence of the many problems raised by the environment or the external world, but
which can react to them by trials and explorations of all sorts, from the elementary level of mutations to the
higher level of scientific theory.(Piaget, 1970 cf. Richelle, 1995).
At the level of the individual Skinners analysis of behavior in some respects parallels Marxs (1859/1970). For
Marxs:
The mode of production in material life determines the general character of the social, political, and spiritual
process of life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but on the contrary, their social
existence determines their consciousness (p.21)
In attempting to eliminate the circularity of explanation that plagued most theories, Skinners view also mirrors a
basic point adopted in Vygotskys theory:
...the distinction between the subject of study and the explanatory principle is probably the most important
epistemological contribution made by Vygotsky in his early psychological papers. The implicit conclusion is that
if consciousness is to become a subject of psychological study, some other layer of reality should be referred to in
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the course of the explanation...Socially meaningful activity, then, may serve as such a layer and an explanatory
schema (Kozulin, 1990, pp. 83 - 84)
According to Lana (1995), Skinners model is an axiomatic system, which is consistent in the Godelian sense and
uses a noncentral concept, the behavioral repertoire to account for genetic and previous behavior environment relations to
achieve completeness. This model takes place in a dynamic and fluid world (Lana, 1991). Skinners unit of behavioral
class is defined as the operant because it operates on the environment (Catania, 1978; Hayes, 1995; Skinner, 1953). As
Hineline (1992) highlights, an operant can be operative at many scales of analysis. For example, it could be as simple as a
muscle twitch or as complex as reciting a poem or the generation of truly random numbers (i.e. Neuringer, 1986) or
creativity and novelty (Winston & Baker, 1985). This parallels demonstrations in the physical sciences (Hineline,
1992), where multiple scales of time and space are easily demonstrated for tightly deterministic systems and lead to great
diversity (Gleick, 1987). For example, when computes analog calculations are given for simple mathematic fractal
equations complex images can be created, often called Mandelbrot sets. Mandelbrot sets have an infinite number of sides.
Drawing on this conceptualization of the operant, Skinner (1957) detailed his functional analysis of verbal behavior.
Defining Verbal Behaviors Units of Analysis
Meaning for Skinner, is not a property of words or propositions. It is not even a property of behavior but of the
conditions under which behavior occurs. Technically, Skinner writes, meanings are not to be found among the
independent variables in a functional account, rather than as properties of the dependent variables. (Andresen,
1992 p. 10)
Each operant consists of a verbal or nonverbal antecedent condition, the operant behavior, a verbal or nonverbal
consequence, and a motivational or setting factor (a term used to describe a history of reinforcement, deprivation, or
punishment). This is the basis for Skinners functional analysis of verbal behavior. One can immediately see parallels to
gestaltist Jerome Bruner (1993):
...childrens acquisition of language requires far more assistance from interaction with care givers than
Chomsky (and many others) had suspected. Language is acquired not in role of spectator but through use. Being
exposed to a flow of language is not nearly so important as using it in the midst of doing. Learning language,
to barrow from John Austins celebrated phrase, is learning how to do things with words. The child is not
learning simply what to say but how, where, to whom, and under what circumstances. It is certainly a legitimate
occupation for linguistics to examine only the phrase rules that characterize what a child says from week to week,
but in no sense can this provide an account of conditions upon which language acquisition depends. (p.70-71).
As is commonly the problem with contextual theories, classification of events is often arbitrary with fuzzy boundaries
separating classes. For example where verbal behavior begins from social behavior is a fuzzy boundary.
The Context of Verbal Behavior
Verbal behavior is relationally defined as behavior reinforced through the mediation of others. For the postmodern
movement the representational view of language is repla ced by a relational one. (Gerge n, 1994, p.414). This means that
verbal behavior is inherently a social process maintained by the verbal community for Skinner (1957) or in Moscovici
(1988) words the subgroup. This dynamic view also avoids the inherent dualism that definitions of codes seem to imply
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(Andresen, 1992). Skinners view of the verbal community is similar to modern sociolinguistic concepts like Gumperz
(1968) concept of the speech community. Both identified three key concepts of a speech community: (1) people who meet
regularly (2) who have a shared mode of communication (3) and a shared mode of interpretation. The earliest speech
community can be considered the family. Also, Skinners concept of audience is similar to Bell (1984, 1991) views (see
Guerin, 1997).
Here again we see parallels to Piagets constructivism, but again the focus is reversed. According to Singer and
Revenson (1979) for Piaget childrens speech begins as egocentric (done for the enjoyment of the new experience) and
later becomes socialized. In a Skinnerian sense this means that the primary reinforcement for early speech is sensory
automatic and comes primarily under the control of the contingencies provided in a social interaction. Skinners (1957)
analysis attempts to explain Verbal Behavior by analyzing the antecedents and consequences over time, which select for
particular classes of behavior. Skinners approach clearly parallels Wittgenstein (1969) who in discussing language games
stated that all children are trained into language games. He further went on to say:
I am using the word trained in a way strictly analogous to that in which we talk of an animal being trained to
do certain things(p.77)
If behavior is within the repertoire then in Skinners model, as with Darwins model, one assumes generativity to be
the norm and the environment (context) to place constraints on the selection and maintenance of behavior. In the simplest
case lets look at opening a door (a nonverbal example). Each time that the door is open subtle variation may occur in the
pressure applied, the place of each finger, and the positioning of the body. The only thing that identifies this class of
behaviors is the function of the door opening.
An example of verbal selection is as follows. You are out playing baseball with some friends. The ball is hit to you
and you say to yourself: If I keep my eye on the ball, Ill catch it. Notice how this phrase does not control your
behavior. You can for example say the phrase and not perform the action of looking at the ball. At some point if you say
the phrase and yet you continue to miss the ball, you will eventually stop saying the phrase. Finally, if you say the phrase,
commit the action (looking), and catch the ball (reinforcing looking), first the probability that you will say the phrase the
next time the ball is hit to you will increase and the action itself will also increase. Eventually, the rule will no longer need
to be stated, your eyes will focus on the ball once it is hit and the verbal behavior will extinguish. At this point the looking
will be directly under control of environmental contingencies. It is important to note that this is a simple example for
illustrative purposes. For Skinner verbal behavior was considered under multiple influences (Skinner, 1957).
One of Chomskys (1959) critiques of Skinner (1957) was the poverty of the stimulus argument. In other words,
children did not have enough opportunities to acquire language. While single trial learning is within Skinner system
(Skinner, 1938), evidence exists to suggest that the frequency of presentation and the number of interaction of parent and
children around new words is important to verbal acquisition (Meork, 1983, 1988; Hart & Ris ley, 1996). In addition,
feedback and correction seems to play a role. In a reanalyzation of Browns data, Moerk (1983) discovered that mothers
correct and expand infants grammatical statements approximately 50times/hour. Also Moerk (1983) discovered that
children might experience every major sentence type about 100,000 times/month. Moerk (1992) argued strongly to place
language learning within a skill-learning paradigm. Moerk (1992) Eves performance in production of past tense required
more than positive feedback. In sample 9, hour 1, utterance number 3590, the missing article was supplied. In sample 10,
hour 1, utterance numbers 144-145, the requirement for past-tense form was emphasized twice. In sample 12, hour 1,
utterance number 36, the truth value of Eves utterance was corrected, and in sample 12, hour 1 utterance number 91, the
need for past-tense form was again emphasized. (p. 83). In addition, he goes on to state Quantitative data may explain
why corrections have been overlooked and denied in past data. Adults provided only a total of 75 corrections on Eves
failed attempts at producing the past-tense morphemes during the 16 sample hours, or approximately 5 corrections per
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hour. The probability of corrective responses to filial mistakes was, however, very high ad approached 100% when adults
attended to the childs utterances. If the information value of confirming responses to correct trials is considered, the
feedback is high ly consistent to Eves attempts at using past tense. (p.83)
Currently, a debate exists among operant researchers as to if parents directly reinforce infant vocalization rates
and shape imitation of first sounds and words (Fry, 1966) or if parent directly reinforce only some vocalizations of the
infant and similarity between parents speech and infants speech becomes a conditioned reinforcer, automatically shaping
closer approximations to parental speech (Mower, 1960; Risley, 1977). Both of these have proven productive lines of
research.
Soon, single words combine, and by the age of three we see the emergence of the copula sentence. Chomsky (1959)
seemed to be interested in the hows (what in the brain causes it) of recombination but behaviorists were interested in how
to predict and control it (Warren, 1988). As Warren (1988) points out many training situations are useful in promoting
generalization of words into new sentences, especially since it often does not occur. Still he remains skeptical that all
possibilities have been exhausted. Predicting and controlling generalization has been a productive line of research for
behaviorists in language studies (Guess, 1969; Guess, & Baer, 1973; Frisch & Schumaker, 1974;Goldstein & Mousetis,
1989). More will be said on this later under the section of Development and Verbal Behavior.
Sentences in Skinners system begin with the recombining of words from autoclitic frames or in the case of phonetic
parts, partial frames (see Whetherby, 1978). This recombination leads to some grammatical errors, which parents correct
through feedback (Moerk, 1992).
Skinners major contribution to the study of Verbal Behavior was his recognition of the philosopher Ryles (1949)
distinction between knowing that and knowing how. In Skinnerian terms, the difference between contingency shaped
and rule- governed behavior. A rough distinction between the two would be learning by contact with the environment and
learning by what you have been told about the environment (Kohlenberg & Tsai, 1994). As Skinner (1957, 1966a, 1974)
noted many times, contingency shaped and rule-governed behavior may look alike but might have subtle differences. For
example Joe has taken a job. His supervisor tells him that she does not like the place because of all of the inaccurate
stories that circulate about people. She warns him not to talk to others at work too much. Joe agrees and does not talk to
the others at work. Their behavior of not talking to others may look similar but Joes supervisor may have a feeling of
correctness that Joes lacks. This would be because her behavior was contingency shaped by the environment itself,
while Joes is a product of the collateral contingencies (Cerutti, 1991) formed in his interaction with his supervisor.
Rule Governed Behavior and Fitness
In Skinners account language is both incremental and adaptive (Baum, 1995). Rule- governed behavior is adaptive
because it opens the speaker to short termed social contingencies which may lead to an insensitivity to immediate gains
from the environment and help the listener move on to long term contingencies (Baum, 1994). It allows one person to
greatly increase the aid that they render to another (Skinner, 1981). In Skinners account one must look at rule giving and
rule following. For Skinner (1957, 1966a, 1974) rule giving, like any other operant, is defined by its functions not
structure. So what would reinforce rule giving?
PRAGMATISM AND RULE GOVERNED BEHAVIOR

Quine (1953, 1960) posed two serious challenges to any approach to linguistic analysis of discourse. The first was that
some rules are true or false based entirely on what they mean and not on any additional contribution from the
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extralinguistic world. The second is that there is no such thing as meaning or that rules cannot appeal to meaning to
achieve their status. Skinners (1969) concept of rule governed behavior would meet both of these conditions. That is (1)
rules can come under direct control of the environment as in the case of a rule that is a tact- for example some self
generated rules talking ones self through an event and (2) no appeal needs to be made to meaning of the sentence because
rule governed behavior occurs because of a history of conditioning.
Development and Verbal Behavior
Developmental studies themselves have for the most part appeared to the social study of science, including its
feminist components, to lie far off in the conceptual and political distance. They appear as a completely separate
discourse, with few obvious points of contact to histories, sociologies, ethnographies, and philosophies of modern
science that have been centered in science studies.... the notion of science central to many developmental
accounts are largely the older, purportedly value-free, mirror of nature ones, not the social and cultural ones
developed by the social studies of science Harding, 1996 p.20-21.
Before we can answer the question posed at the end of last section and produce a developmental science that responds
to Hardings above well founded critique, three additional pieces of information are needed from Skinners (1957)
account of verbal behavior: These are tacts, mands, and intraverbals. A tact is defined as a primary form of verbal
behavior (a) whose form is controlled by an antecedent primarily nonverbal stimulus (b) whose reinforcement is
contingent on a conventional correspondence between that stimulus and the verbal response. An example of this would
be a child pointing to a dog and saying doggie and the mothers responding with a smile or get the doggie.
A mand is a verbal operant whose primary control is a setting factor (things like motivational operations such as
deprivation or aversive or pleasurable stimulation) and are reinforced by the behavior of the listener or specify both the
behavior of the listener and the reinforcement. An example would be Speak-up so I can hear you? with the person
speaking up and Roll mommy the ball with the listener complying.
Interverbal responses are occasioned by a verbal stimulus, where the relation between stimulus and response is an
arbitrary one established by the verbal community. For intraverbal behavior there is no point to point correspondence
between antecedent stimuli and response. Thus, interverbals are under antecedents that are other words. Some historical
misrepresentations have occurred here because Skinner often referred to this process as chaining. However, for Skinner
the constraints on skipping steps in the chaining process were always considered environmental constraints. Since the
antecedent stimuli can come from the speaker or others and may be either vocal or written four possible combinations
occur: (1) An antecedent vocal stimulus may produce an auditory response as in narrative conversation. For example, the
speaker says to his friend Awesome game and the listener responds Yeah, totally cool. (2) A vocal stimulus that
elicits a nonvocal response. For example a lost child asked: What is your name? and may point to a name tag (3) A
written antecedent stimulus may result in a vocal response. A flash card is displayed that reads 5 x 6 =, a child answers
30" (4) A written antecedent stimulus may produce a written response of a different form, as in making notes on the
essential topics in this paper. Intraverbals behavior was troublesome for traditional semantic theory (Skinner, 1957 p.128).
The only consequences that can reinforce intraverbals is verbal behavior on the part of other people (Geurin, 1992, 1994).
In some respects intraverbal behavior is similar to Foucults concept of discourse (Andresen, 1991). Thus, as amply stated
by feminists such as Condor (1988) social situations have influence over what is thought and felt. The consequences are
not likely to be obvious, however, as they will be intermit tent and mediated by several other people.
Skinners conceptualization was later linked to production through Ullmans concept of the promotive (Ulman, 1985).
The promotive is a tact that is under multiple control and/or a mand that commands for productive behavior (Ulman,
1985).
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When presented with novel environments, tacts, mands, intraverbals and promotives recombine in ways that show
higher levels of complexity. Behaviorists have posited training phenomena such as stimulus pairing (Stemmer, 1973,
1980, 1989), recombinative generalization (Esper, 1973, Whetherby, 1978), contingency co-adduction (Johnson &
Layng, 1992), stimulus equivance (Sidman, 1986) and relational frames (Hayes, 1991, 1994). As with current genetic
theories, which are trying to determine patterns of differential use of genes in development (Russo & Cove, 1988),
behavior analysts are trying to piece out what leads to differential use of language (Johnston & Layng, 1992; Hart &
Risley, 1996; Hayes, 1991, 1994). However, a growing amount of evidence is suggesting that the context in which verbal
behavior is acquired is crucial to the childs intellectual development (Hart & Ris ley, 1996) and the frequency with which
the child uses a word are critical to building fluency and flexibility (Johnson & Layng, 1992). Steven Hayes (1991b,
1994), drawing on the equivalence research of Murray Sidman1 (1986) proposed that what is selected in emerging
equivalence classes are relations between stimuli and not individual cases or simple generalization. Tonneau (2001) took
issue with the idea of emergent equivalent classes being the basis of language and presented a strong challenge. An
alternative view of generalization could be provided by the work of Esper (1973) work on analogy learning, which was
used by Whetherby (1978) to severe as the basis for the development of Skinners autoclitic frames. Esper (1973)
proposed through analogy children and adults learn responds to untrained shapes. As Whetherby (1978) pointed
out this research could lead to insights into Skinners (1957) autoclitic frames. This position has received some
research support. For example in the area of tense (goed for gone), it appears that three successive stages occur
before tense form of verbs is acquired (1) the acquisition of individual past tense form of verbs; (2) the
acquisition of a past tense rule with the wrong generalization and (3) the final adult version (King, 1969). Still
another method proposed by Quine (1974) attributes the generalization to the exposure of certain pairing events. This
work serves as the basis for research by Stemmer (1973, 1980, 1989) in both humans and nonhumans. Continued work in
these area should produce a developmental psychology well based in the the social and cultural (Harding, 1996 p.21)
Language and Feelings
Verbal behavior around private events such as feelings depends on the public practice of the verbal community
(Day, 1969b; Skinner, 1957). It is obvious that what is felt when we speak of feelings is the body; however, problems
can occur with tacting especially with private events like feelings where the verbal community does not have access to the
phenomena. (Day, 1969b; Kohlenberg & Tsai, 1994; Skinner, 1957) For example, a child may say I hate you! to its
mother and she may reply No you dont! If this occurs for many emotions, the child may have difficulty later on
discriminating how s/he feels. Bruner (1995) had similar cautions when he stated The acquisition of language is very
context sensitive, by which is meant that it progresses far better when the child already grasps in some prelinguistic way
the significance of what is being talked about in the situation in which the talking is occurring. (p.71)
1
An equivalence class is an ordering of stimulus relations that develops such that each stimuli may serve as a discriminative stimulus, thus
all can be substituted for each other and evoke the same functional response.
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Another problem in the analysis of private events is that they may be determined not by the event but by the situation
in which they occur (Bem, 1967). For example, if you notice yourself binge eating and say I must be hungry, this
discriminating of ones own behavior is not a report of a private state but rather what one would state if one observed
another in the same situation. This could evolve as a common process from repeated questioning when young of Why
did you do X? Generated accounts (self discriminations) may be plausible but not accurate. It can be concluded that just
as we judge others based on discriminations of their behavior, we also judge ourselves the same way.
Rule Giving
Rule making is operant behavior. It depends on a history of reinforcement for verbal behavior under the control of
regularities in behavior or environment (Baum, 1994, 1995). For example Dont wake Joe up to ask him questions; hes
a grouch, a rule in the present sense, occurred for the first time after several waking-up encounters with Joe, but the first
time it occurs, it depends on a history of reinforcement for such generalizations. According to Skinner (1957, 1969) this
history may go back to the childs early training in naming objects, then naming events, then talking about simple
relations, and so on.
Rule Following
Rule following depends on the listeners history (Skinner, 1957). Certain developmental histories make rule following
less probable (Snyder & Patterson, 1995). For example, the story of the boy who cried wolf illustrates from a selection
perspective of how rule following can be lost. If lack of rule following occurs regularly as an overall deficit in
development the results can be disastrous (Barkley, 1985). This is completely in line with Gerge n (1994) observation:
...whatever is the case makes no requirements on our descriptions or theories, and our modes of writing and
talking have no necessary consequences for action.(p412).
Skinners (1957) original account did not focus specifically on the behavior of the listener. In the radical behavioral
tradition this account was provided by Robert Zettle and Steven Hayes. They further elaborated the listeners behavior by
including the concepts of pliance and tracking. Pliance simply means reaction to a mand as a mand. Tracking means
reacting to a tact as a tact (Zettle & Hayes, 1982). Both control and counter control serve as pliance (For example, if I say
give me the bowl and you say No, this serves as an example of pliance). Problems occur in relationships when a
person reacts to a mand as if it were tact. For example, Beth states I am cold as a mand and Joe does not get up and turn
off the air conditioner but states So you are feeling cold. Beth may respond with anger. Eventually, rule governed
behavior comes under the control of long term contingencies (Baum, 1995).
In short, Verbal Behavior provides an avenue for temporal extension. Listeners can respond indirectly to events in the
future. For example, a speaker may suggest to a listener that its going to rain and the listener may take a raincoat. Some
may think that this functional view of Verbal Behavior parallels Vygotskys (1978) view of language as a tool. We would
expect to find great overlap between Skinner and Vygostsky because they were both initially trained as Pavlovians. Both
assumed that language was learned through interactions with more capable members of the childs environment. Both the
operant and the tool are externally oriented and leading to changes in the external world. Skinners (1938) concept of
shaping and Vygotskys (1978) zones of proximal development suggest learning is gradual with more complex steps of an
activity coming later. Both emphasized the importance of continued use, Skinners concept of over learning (Johnston&
Layng, 1992) and Vygotskys (1978) concept of mastery. Both the operant and the tool are very broadly defined to
encompass many phenomena. Both viewed the organism as changed by experience (for Vygotsky it was modifying the
stimulus situation as part of the process of responding to it). However, in Vygotskys model, the role of language as
medational was a given assumption. For Skinner, language may or may not mediate. Also, for there appears to be a
conscious level of adoption of tools implied in Vygotskys work. This would imply a knowing that component that
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Skinner would not assume. An example of a non-aware use of language would be in the case of what is commonly
referred to as a Freudian slip. A further point of agreement between Skinner and Vygosky (1978) is that for Vygotsky
thinking is fundamentally a social enterprise and for Skinner thinking is a bi-product of contact with a verbal community.
Finally, Vygotsky makes a distinction between internally and externally oriented tools; to Skinner these would be just
different levels of the same application.
Rules In Relationships
In rule - governed behavior, consequences are at least partially determined by the extent to which the behavior
matches the rule, not by natural consequences related to the rule. (Skinner, 1966a; Christensen, Jabcobson, & Babcock,
1995). For example, people learning to drive may talk themselves through driving step by step. In contrast, behavior under
long termed contingencies or contingency shaped is determined not by the match of the behavior to the rule, but by the
natural consequences that accrue from that behavior. Christensen and colleagues (1995) use the following example:
those who learn to play the piano by ear do not follow the rule of music notes but are shaped from the
sounds of the keys they press.
As discussed before rule governed behavior and contingency shaped behavior differ in subtle ways (Skinner, 1957,
1966a; Kohlenberge & Tsai, 1994; Christensen et al., 1995; Jacobson & Christensen, 1996). Privately, contingency
shaped behavior may feel right or more genuine.(Skinner, 1966a). Publicly, contingency shaped behavior may look
more authentic, than rule governed behavior. An example would be a wife having with husband sex out of desire or
having sex out of a sense of duty. The behavior topographically may look similar but the wife with desire may feel
more passion than the dutiful wife. Also, unless the woman is skillful in deception her overt behavior may betray any of
the following: her decision to have sex, her lack of desire, and/or feelings of being coerced. The sexual act may seem
routine, like doing a job rather than expressing desire.
Another example may occur when a woman tacts Im sad and her lover's history hears responds as a mand (such as
make me happy). The lover may, in an effort for pliance, begin offering suggestions of solutions. This could be
experienced as very punishing to the initial woman assertion of the tact. This distinction of rule governed behavior vs.
Contingency shaped has lead to a wave of acceptance technologies being produced in behavior therapy (Hayes &
Wilson, 1994; Jacobson & Christensen, 1996). Jacobson and Christensen (1996) have stated that this distinction has
revolutionized the way that behavioral couples therapy is done. They report that some have remarked that this new form
of therapy looks spiritual(p.258) and that this new focus has led them to reach more couples. Thus, for Skinner (1974):
There are no meanings which are the same in the speaker and the listener. Meanings are not independent
entities(p. 95)
Skinner and Social Construction
In contrast [to cognitivists], for the social constructionist, there is an acute sensitivity to perspectives of other
peoples and times. For, as the investigator demonstrates variations in perspectives, the effect is to break the hold
of the common sense realities of contemporary culture. It is to deconstruct local ontologies, and thereby free the
individual from the constraints of existing convention. Gergen, 1989, p.476.
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Social construction is the concern with identifying processes by which people come to describe, explain, or account
for the world (Gergen, 1985, 1989; Guerin, 1992, 1994). Like Skinner, social constructionists are concerned with how we
know what we come to know. In the Rylianian sense, Gergen (1985, 1995) is concerned with knowing that not
knowing how 1. In the Skinnerian sense, Gergen (1985, 1995) is concerned with the establishment of rule-governed
behavior as opposed to contingency shaped behavior. Also like Skinner, Gergen (1985, p.269) criticizes the endogenic
theorizing of cognitive psychology for taking focus away from the processes that create our understanding of the world.
As Bernard Guerin (1992, 1994) pointed out, social constructionist operate under several basic assumptions (1) our
relationship to the world lacks correspondence with what others see as the actual world; (2) terms used to describe and
explain the world are active cooperative enterprises based in social relationships (words do not refer to things but refer
people to things); (3) the prevalence of social construction is not related to objective or empirical knowledge; (4) social
construction is based in social activities completely indistinguishable from other social life; (5) social construction needs
to be studied in a new discipline. Gergen (1985) termed this new discipline the interpretive disciplines. As highlighted
each of these assumptions is compatible with Skinners system. Also it is evident from the sheer number of literary
interpretations in Skinners Verbal Behavior (so many that the publisher asked Skinner to remove many of them) that
Skinner would agree with the concept of studying social text. As Lana (1995) put is ...behavior analysis is about process
and social psychology is, or should be, about the social-historical content of the behavioral repertoire(p.403).
How does Skinners theory account for social construction? Skinners (1957) account was conceptualized, extended,
and researched by Benard Geurin (1992, 1994). Accordingly, social construction of knowledge occurs as intraverbals, as
tacts with loose discriminations, and social controls exist powerful enough to narrowly determine the social behavior in a
group (Guerin, 1992b). For example, a young republican who takes a position at the Environmental Protection Agency
may find his views on the environment slowly changing from his original beliefs. A second example would be the classic
Asch (1956) experiment where a subject is placed in a room with several confederates. The subject is shown several lines.
The confederate looks at each of the lines and states that one is the longest. In actuality this choice is not correct but the
other confederates all agree. The actual subject often would agree with the confederates as to which line was longest.
Understanding, prediction, and functional control for social constructions will come from experimentation on
intraverbals. What controls the production of words that appear to be discriminative stimuli for intraverbals? The tact.
The shift from tact to intraverbal is crucial to the maintenance of social representation, when stimulus control shifts
from the environment to other words (Geurin, 1992, 1994). Guerins (1992b) analysis rests heavily on the tact, this is
because tacts are controlled and maintained by general social consequences. These consequences are ones that in the past
have led to a variety of functional consequences that control behavior. If tacting is under control of a small group of
people, who reinforce particular verbal reports and ignore or even actively punish others, then the characteristics of this
smaller verbal community can begin to control knowledge reported even if the functional consequences are generalized.
1
This distinction may separate the postmodernist from the humanists/existentialists. The former are concerned with rule-governed and the latter are concerned with
contingency shaped behavior such as what some would term the unconscious. If this dividing line proves to be of interest than Radical Behaviorism might serve as a rejoinder
between the two. A good starting point would be Day, 1969a.
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This shaping process can even effect what the person sees (Skinner, 1974). Skinner (1957) called these distorted tacts.
An example from Skinners (1957) book would be:
The distortion due to differential generalized reinforcement may be traced in the behavior of the troubadour or
in the history of the art of fiction. The troubadour begins, let us say, by recounting actual heroic exploits. Certain
parts of his account receive special approval because they interest or flatter his listeners. A first effect is that
these parts survive in future telling. Under the same differential reinforcement he begins to stretch his report: he
exaggerates the size of the battle and the heroism of the participants (hyperbole). Finally, he breaks away from
stimulus control altogether, describing scenes he has never observed or reporting stories he has never heard.
As a creative artist, his behavior is now controlled entirely by the contingencies of reinforcement (some of which,
of course, he himself may supply as his own listener). p.150
This means that tacts are always prone to bias (even in science). Also, communities may train tacts differently. In the
scientific community it becomes extremely important to have tight control on the ways in which tacts (of experiments and
measures) are trained to allow the least about of social distortion to enter. This is especially difficult in the social sciences,
in which a fair amount of the research is justification of political agendas (see W. Hayes, 1991; Harding, 1996). In the
extreme case, a verbal unit will appear to be tact but be under the control of the communitys words, and therefore
properly be called an intraverbal (Guerin, 1992b). Guerin (1994) has elaborated on his original position and now is
studying the process by which pliance is turned to tracking as away of analyzing the breaking of societal control over
the individual (p.236) and turning intraverbals back to tacts.
What Can Be Gained from A Radical Behavioral Account?
The traditional view misrepresents our task. It suggests that by changing an environment we first change
feelings or states of mind, and that these, in turn, determine what a person does. The feeling or state of mind
seems to be a necessary link in a causal chain, but the fact is that we change behavior by changing the
environment, and in doing so, change what is felt. Feelings and states of mind are not causes they are by-
products. Skinner, 1972, p.423.
Under postodern conditions, persons exist in a state of continuous construction and reconstruction; it is a world
where anything goes that can be negotiated Gergen, 1991 p.7
There are several things that Skinners (1957) account adds to the study of social construction: (1) It provides
information about the limitations of socially constructed knowledge- knowledge formed from nonsocial stimulus control
and predictions of counter control from strong counter historical (personal) or factual statements (Guerin, 1992). For
example, it would be extremely difficult to convince a survivor of the holocaust that it never happened or a rape victim to
believe that they were not raped; (2) it can demonstrates ways that social construction can be increased or decreased
(prediction and control of social construction); (3) has the potential to unite the postmodern with existential/humanistic
theories by accounting for the emergence of a relatively stable - self that still had the potential for a fair amount of social
construction; 1 (4) as Guerin (1992, 1994) points out another more specific advantage of the behavior analytic account is
that Skinners definition of verbal behavior includes many behaviors other then speech and writing, which Moscovici
(1985) also argues should be part of social representation. These include gestures, art, music, self -talk, and imaging-
literally any behavior that can be mediated by others. Finally, as Guerin (1992b) points out with a behavior analytic
account of social construction new interpretive disciplines are not required. The principles used are well based in the
natural sciences, avoiding the need for the artificial distinction between nature and human society (very much argued for
1
This is important for even if as Capri (1975) put it the idea of a constant self undergoing successive experiences is an illusion that illusion must be accounted for.
This is especially true since this matter is of great concern to humanists (e.g. Brewster Smith, 1994).
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by Moscovici, 1976). The seemingly relativistic nature of the postmodern is confirmed, receiving strong theoretical
backing from the experimental analysis of behavior. Also, the experimental analysis of behavior may help move the
postmodern from cultural relativism to what Ross (1996) termed social rationality. Finally, Skinners natural science
analysis can help extended into considerations at the cultural level of selection with focus on increased stability and
satisfaction of cultural members (Glenn, 1988; Harris, 1979; Rakos, 1992).
In addition to the above, the current fractionation of psychology has become increasingly of concern (Fowler, 1990;
Slife, 2000; Richardson, 2000). This approach could serve as a unifying position in psychology.
Current Status of Skinners Verbal Behavior
Despite claims of Behaviorisms death, it now appears that the cognitive revolution had little effect on the
behavioral communitys publications, which continued to witness rapid growth during the 1970's & 1980's (Friman,
Allen. Kerwin, & Larzelere, 1993; Wyatt, Hawkins, & Davis, 1986). Also, recent trends have witnessed growing
dissatisfaction with the increasing fractionation of cognitive psychology by cognitivists (Loftus, 1985; Watkins, 1990) and
postmodernists (Gerge n, 1989). Finally some have begun to question the political implications of cognitive psychology,
especially its focus problems being intrapsychic (Lee, 1995; Prilleltensky, 1989, 1990). However, the cognitive revolution
with its representational focus may have cut off activists from a powerful model of conceptualization and technology to
serve the community (e.g. Cone & Hayes, 1980; Geller, Winett, & Everett, 1982; Skinner, 1971, 1986, 1987). Indeed,
Skinner (1971) was concerned with many area of over consumption that are presently the hallmark of the ecology
movement (e.g. Skinner, 1948, 1971; Rakos, 1992). However, representationalists switched the focus onto issues of the
controller or the behavioral elite. With a renewed focus on the person/context interaction, the question switches to the
more productive question of which people placed in what contexts will place community service over the abuse of others.
Again we see the beginnings of change. Deborah Winters (1996) book Ecological Psychology: Healing the Split between
Planet and Self has an excellent review of the behavioral literature as it applies to environmental issues. Her constructivist
views are remarkably lucid and very insightful when it comes to discussing environmental issues; however, she appears
not to be aware of recent work in Behavior Analysis on the role of group contingencies (Glenn, 1988) and verbal
interventions (Biglan, 1995). Even with the last her book is truly integrative and an excellent read for activists.
Thus, while significant similarities exist between Skinners behaviorism and the postmodern position, Skinners
view is described as retrogressive contrasting to the postmodernism, which is seen as innovative (see comments by
Freeman & Locurto, 1994). This is largely due to the academic folklore that has been built around Behaviorism (Todd
& Morris, 1992). Much of this misrepresentation came from Chomskys (1959) polemic critique of Skinners Verbal
Behavior. Chomskys review had very little to do with Skinners Behaviorism (Richelle, 1976; MacCorquodale, 1970).
For example, Chomsky makes almost one reference per page that Skinner developed Verbal Behavior based on rats
pressing levers. Most behavior analyst will quickly point out that Verbal Behavior makes no references to rats pressing
lever rather in the dedication Skinner acknowledges Verbal Behavior to be based on observations that he made of his
two daughters learning language. MacCorquodale (1970) described Chomskys review as one-half Skinner, with the
rest a mixture of odds and ends of other behaviorism and some other fancies of vague origins. MacCorquodale (1970)
concludes:
...Chomskys review did not constitute a critical analysis of Skinners Verbal Behavior. The theory criticized in
the review was an amalgram of some rather outdated behavioristic lore including reinforcement by drive
reduction, the extinction criterion for response strength, a pseudo-incompatibility of genetic and reinforcement
processes, and other notions that have nothing to do with Skinners account.
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Unfortunately, Skinners book was very long and in comparison Chomskys review was very short. Given this context
most have not read Skinners Verbal Behavior and correspondingly little research was done on the book (McPherson,
Bonem, Green, & Osborne, 1984; Spradlin, 1985; Hall & Sunberg, 1987; Oah & Dickinson, 1989).
Recently, this trend has begun to change (Andersen, 1991, 1992). One of the reasons for this change was the rise in
parallel distributive process models for computers. With this type of computer system new Neural Network programs
have been designed. Rather then in old programs where all the information is placed into the system by the programming,
these programs work on a selectionist principle with reweighing after consequence occurs. Edelmans (1987)
connectionist theory is behaviorism in computer clothing according to Andresen (1991). Another reason for the change
has been the emergence of Functional Linguistics (see Bates & MacWhinney, 1979, 1982, 1987, 1989). While still
retaining a focus on meaning, functional linguistics suggests that the language learning process relies more heavily on
childrens social interaction then on inborn cognitive concepts.
Many operant laboratories, who were devoted to work on schedules of reinforcement in the 50 and 60's (the basics of
Skinners theory that had to be refined and demonstrated before work on verbal behavior was to begin), switched to
workin g on Verbal Behavior after MacCorquadales (1970) reply. In the applied field, Slaone, & MacAulay (1968)
published a work on operant procedures for language intervention. In 1982 an entire journal was devoted to Skinners
functional analysis of verbal behavior The Analysis of Verbal Behavior. In language intervention behavior analysis has
emerged as the dominant model (Goldstein & Hockenberger, 1991). Finally work on Verbal Behavior appears to be
providing more information then operant researchers can complete and recently Mark Sundberg published an article
giving away 301 research topics and dissertations that need to be done on Verbal Behavior (see Sundberg, 1991). It has
been projected to that VB research will dominate behavior analytic research to the point where most working in the field
will be unable to keep up with the information (Eshleman, 1991).
Still radical behaviorism has difficulty being adopted by mainstream psychologists. This might in part be because
radical behaviorism has a distinct dialect (Hineline, 1980). The directionality of talk for radical behaviorists contrasts
from the dominant verbal community. The dominant community tends to describe events from person to behavior or some
dispositional aspect of a person to behavior, while radical behaviorism discusses interactions from environment to
behavior (Hineline, 1992). This may come across as disrespectful or confusing to the dominant verbal community and
may lead to selection against radical behavioral interpretation. Hineline (1980) uses the following example:
The child learns to catch someones eye when needing assistance or attention
Is translated into the radical behavioral dialect as
Eye contact becomes both a reinforcer and a discriminative event setting the occasion on which the childs
behavior is likely to be reinforced by another person (Hineline, 1980).
This verbal difference may also represent a form of ontogenic teleology. As Darwin removed God from the center
stage, so Skinner has removed the rationally autonomous man. Here again we see parallels to Gergen. Gerge n (1987) also
has difficulty with the idea of the human as originating source of influence of his or her behavior ( p.21). Gergen (1982)
writes the individual may be programmed to process information in an infinity of ways. Such programming is clearly
susceptible to exogenous influences. (P.56). This position maybe selected against by current societal standards. Indeed,
there was quite a controversy over such topics in the seventies when Skinner published Beyond Freedom and Dignity.
Gergens (1982) position has some data to support it: the meta-ethic of a rationally autonomous person adopted by
much of psychotherapy (e.g. Englehardt, 1982). Recently, postmodernism has begun to champion movement away from
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the myth of rational autonomy. It is a movement toward the recognition of cultural influences in achieving
completeness (Cushman, 1990). As Cushman (1990) typifies:
Culture completes humans.... Culture is not indigenous clothing that covers the universal human; it infuses
individuals, fundamentally shaping and forming them and how they conceive of themselves and the world, how
they see others, how they conceive of themselves and the world, how they see other, how they engage in
structures of mutual obligation, and how they make choices in the everyday world (p.601).
The movement away from representationalism is simultaneously postmodern and Skinnerian. It holds much promise
for the science of human behavior and the study of social text. Further, feminists have been looking for away that
feminist studies can communicate with technological studies (Harding, 1996). In the area of behavioral technology,
behavior analysis can provide that bridge by not limiting cognitive diversity and by having a similar focus on
developmental issues and social interaction (Ruiz, 1995). Finally in the area of studying of human behavior, behavior
analytics designs challenge standard research protocols and offer an interesting alternative.
Quantative Contextualism
If one assumes that all behavior is truly random and no patterns of acting can be described then a science of
behavior would be impossible and one would be reduced to describing elements that make up the system. Indeed the latter
is what humanism has done. To take it a step further if one is to assume that neither regular patterns occur or no
characteristics are describable then no science is possible; however, if patterns of regularity do occur then a science can be
formulated but it would need to be individualized and process driven. Luckily in the field of mathematics proofs are
demonstrating that the universe is not probabilistic but that this is a product of discontinuous perception (Davis & Hersh,
1981). Like feminist scholars (Condor, 1986; McCanny-Gergen, 1988) radical behaviorists are critical of traditional group
designs used in psychology. Behavior analysis (the science of the radical behavioral philosophy) recognizes that some
variables by their very nature take long periods of time before effects on behavior can be observed (Sidman, 1960).
Behavior analysis has developed a powerful methodology for analyzing such phenomena (Sidman, 1960).
Behavior analytic research designs depend in part on the type of incoming data and the type of question to be
answered (Poling, Methot, & LaSage, 1995; Sidman, 1960). In application, behavior analysis is a movement away from
group designs toward within subject research. In this type of research the subject serves as his or her own control
(Sidman, 1960; Poling, Methot, & LeSage, 1995). In this research paradigm, one intensively studies a small number of
subjects for extended periods of time (Sidman, 1960). This allows for richer description and holds the datum closer to the
context from which it was derived. Even if it is essential to answering the research question for a between subject design
often a within subject design can be combined to increase information about process (Poling, Methot, & LaSage, 1995).
Instead of pre-post measure data is continuous. Serial replication is the norm, starting with similar and gradually moving
toward less similar subjects. This type of experimental design highlights the variance of a subject rather then trying to
lump all subjects together and searching for essential truths. By these accounts no one study alone is plausible. Finally,
Poling and colleagues (1995) conclude their book with:
As a rule, be cautious about drawing broad conclusions based on single studies, no matter how the studies are
conducted or analyzed. (p.179)
In Conclusion
Contrary to the idea that postmodernism would lead to an erosion of a scientific psychology, it may witness the
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growth of radical behaviorism as a philosophy and behavior analysis as a scientific pursuit. Skinner would be pleased to
find the movement away from structuralism/ representationalism. His life work was always opposed to building
hypothetical constructs at some other level of analysis that if measured at all were measured indirectly (Skinner, 1950). I
think that the greatest irony of the matter is that when Gergen (1994) called for an interpretive science, he never
dreamed of getting a Skinnerian science. Yet he did question As a critical phase runs its course, can we anticipate a
return to some form of behaviorism (Gergen, 1997 p. 28). We believe the answer is yes.
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Behavioral Science As The Art of The 21st Century - Philosophical Similarities Between B. F. Skinner's Radical Behaviorism and Postmodern Science

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Behavioral Science As The Art of The 21st Century - Philosophical Similarities Between B. F. Skinner's Radical Behaviorism and Postmodern Science

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The Behavior Analyst Today Volume 4, Issue 2, 2003

Trends in Science and the Philosophy of Science

Skinners Radical Behaviorism vs. Mechanistic Theory

Skinner (1974) would echo his earlier comments:

Mechanism and Language

The first counter statements came from Piagets (1970)

The Behavior Analytic Theory and Parallels to Other Theories

Defining Verbal Behaviors Units of Analysis

The Context of Verbal Behavior

Rule Governed Behavior and Fitness

PRAGMATISM AND RULE GOVERNED BEHAVIOR

Development and Verbal Behavior

Language and Feelings

Skinner and Social Construction

What Can Be Gained from A Radical Behavioral Account?

Current Status of Skinners Verbal Behavior

Is translated into the radical behavioral dialect as

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Wittenstein, L. (1953). Philosophical investigations. Oxford, England: Basil Blackwell.

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